CHAPTER XXVI.

ON CONJUNCTIONS.

s. 606. A CONJUNCTION is a part of speech which connects _propositions_,--_the day is bright_, is one proposition. _The sun shines_, is another. _The day is bright_ because _the sun shines_ is a pair of propositions connected by the conjunction, _because_.

From this it follows, that whenever there is a conjunction, there are two subjects, two copulas, and two predicates: _i.e._, two propositions in all their parts.

But this may be expressed compendiously. _The sun shines_, _and the moon shines_, may be expressed by the _sun and moon shine_.

Nevertheless, however compendious may be the expression, there are always two propositions wherever there is one conjunction. A part of speech that merely combines two words is a preposition--_the sun along with the moon shines_.

It is highly important to remember that conjunctions connect propositions.

It is also highly important to remember that many double propositions may be expressed so compendiously as to look like one. When this takes place, and any question arises as to the construction, they must be exhibited in their fully expanded form; _i.e._, the second subject, the second predicate, and the second copula must be supplied. This can always be done from the first proposition,--_he likes you better than me_=_he likes you better than he likes me_. The compendious expression of the second proposition is the first point of note in the syntax of conjunctions.

s. 607. The second point in the syntax of conjunctions is the fact of their great convertibility. Most conjunctions have been developed out of some other part of speech. {483}

The conjunction of comparison, _than_, is derived from the adverb of time, _then_; which is derived from the accusative singular of the demonstrative pronoun.

The conjunction, _that_, is derived also from a demonstrative pronoun.

The conjunction, _therefore_, is a demonstrative pronoun + a preposition.

The conjunction, _because_, is a substantive governed by a preposition.

One and the same word, in one and the same sentence, may be a conjunction or preposition, as the case may be.

_All fled but John._--If this mean _all fled_ except _John_, the word _but_ is a preposition, the word _John_ is an accusative case, and the proposition is single. If, instead of _John_, we had a personal pronoun, we should say _all fled but_ him.

_All fled but John._--If this mean _all fled, but John did not fly_, the word _but_ is a conjunction, the word _John_ is a nominative case, and the propositions are two in number. If, instead of _John_, we had a personal pronoun, we should say, _all fled but_ he.

From the fact of the great convertibility of conjunctions it is often necessary to determine whether a word be a conjunction or not. _If it be a conjunction, it cannot govern a case. If it govern a case, it is no conjunction but a preposition._ A conjunction cannot govern a case, for the following reason,--the word that follows it _must_ be the subject of the second proposition, and, as such, a nominative case.

s. 608. The third point to determine in the syntax of conjunctions is the certainty or uncertainty in the mind of the speaker as to the facts expressed by the propositions which they serve to connect.

1. Each proposition may contain a certain, definite, absolute fact--_the day is clear_ because _the sun shines_. Here, there is neither doubt nor contingency of either the _day being clear_, or of the _sun shining_.

2. Of two propositions one may be the condition of the other--_the day will be clear_ if _the sun shine_. Here, although it is certain that _if the sun shine the day will be clear_, there is {484} no certainty of _the sun shining_. Of the two propositions one only embodies a certain fact, and that is certain only conditionally.

Now an action, wherein there enters any notion of uncertainty, or indefinitude, and is at the same time connected with another action, is expressed, not by the indicative mood, but by the subjunctive. _If the sun_ shine (not _shines_) _the day will be clear_.

Simple uncertainty will not constitute a subjunctive construction,--_I am_, perhaps, _in the wrong_.

Neither will simple connection,--_I am wrong_ because _you are right_.

But, the two combined constitute the construction in question,--_if I_ be _wrong_, _you are right_.

Now, a conjunction that connects two certain propositions may be said to govern an indicative mood.

And a conjunction that connects an uncertain proposition with a certain one, may be said to govern a subjunctive mood.

_The government of mood is the only form of government of which conjunctions are capable._

s. 609. Previous to the question of the government of conjunctions in the way of mood, it is necessary to notice certain points of agreement between them and the relative pronouns; inasmuch as, in many cases, the relative pronoun exerts the same government, in the way of determining the mood of the verb, as the conjunction.

Between the relative pronouns and conjunctions in general there is this point of connection,--both join propositions. Wherever there is a relative, there is a second proposition. So there is wherever there is a conjunction.

Between certain relative pronouns and those particular conjunctions that govern a subjunctive mood there is also a point of connection. Both suggest an element of uncertainty or indefinitude. This the relative pronouns do, through the logical elements common to them and to the interrogatives: these latter essentially suggesting the idea of doubt. Wherever the person, or thing, connected with an action, and expressed by a relative be indefinite, there is room for the use {485} a subjunctive mood. Thus--he that troubled you shall bear his judgment, _whosoever_ he _be_.

s. 610. By considering the nature of such words as _when_, their origin as relatives on the one hand, and their conjunctional character on the other hand, we are prepared for finding a relative element in words like _till_, _until_, _before_, _as long as_, &c. These can all be expanded into expressions like _until the time when_, _during the time when_, &c. Hence, in an expression like _seek out his wickedness till thou_ find (not _findest_) _none_, the principle of the construction is nearly the same as in _he that troubled you_, &c., or _vice vers[^a]_.[63]

s. 611. In most conditional expressions the subjunctive mood should follow the conjunction. All the following expressions are conditional.

1. _Except_ I _be_ by Silvia in the night, There is no music in the nightingale.

SHAKSPEARE.

2. Let us go and sacrifice to the Lord our God, _lest_ he _fall_ upon us with pestilence.--_Old Testament._

3.---- Revenge back on itself recoils. Let it. I reck not, _so_ it _light_ well aimed.

J. MILTON.

4. _If_ this _be_ the case.

5. _Although_ my house _be_ not so with God.--_Old Testament._

6. He shall not eat of the holy thing _unless_ he _wash_ his flesh with water.--_Old Testament._

Expressions like _except_ and _unless_ are equally conditional with words like _if_ and _provided that_, since they are equivalent to _if--not_.

Expressions like _though_ and _although_ are peculiar. They join propositions, of which the one is a _prim[^a] facie_ reason against the existence of the other: and this is the conditional element. In the sentence,_ if the children be so badly brought up, they are not to be trusted_, the _bad bringing-up_ is the reason {486} for their _being unfit to be trusted_; and, as far as the expression is concerned, _is admitted to be so_. The only uncertainty lies in the question as to the degree of the badness of the education. The inference from it is unequivocal.

But if, instead of saying _if_, we say _although_, and omit the word _not_, so that the sentence run _although the children be so badly brought up they are to be trusted_, we do two things: we indicate the general relation of cause and effect that exists between _bad bringing-up_ and _unfitness for being trusted_, but we also, at the same time, take an exception to it in the particular instance before us. These remarks have been made for the sake of showing the extent to which words like _though_, &c., are conditional.

It must be remembered, however, that conjunctions, like the ones lately quoted, do not govern subjunctive moods because they are conditional, but because, in the particular condition which they accompany, there is an element of uncertainty.

s. 612. This introduces a fresh question. Conditional conjunctions are of two sorts:--

1. Those which express a condition as an actual fact, and one admitted as such by the speaker.

2. Those which express a condition as a possible fact, and one which the speaker either does not admit, or admits only in a qualified manner.

Since _the children_ are _so badly brought up_, &c.--This is an instance of the first construction. The speaker admits as an actual fact the _bad bringing-up of the children_.

If _the children_ be _so badly brought-up_, &c.--This is an instance of the second construction. The speaker admits as a possible (perhaps, as a probable) fact the _bad bringing-up of the children_: but he does not adopt it as an indubitable one.

s. 613. Now, if every conjunction had a fixed unvariable meaning, there would be no difficulty in determining whether a condition was absolute, and beyond doubt, or possible, and liable to doubt. But such is not the case.

_Although_ may precede a proposition which is admitted as well as one which is doubted. {487}

_a._ Although _the children_ are, &c.

_b._ Although _the children_ be, &c.

_If_, too, may precede propositions wherein there is no doubt whatever implied: in other words it may be used instead of _since_.

In some languages this interchange goes farther than in others; in the Greek, for instance, such is the case with [Greek: ei], to a very great extent indeed.

Hence we must look to the meaning of the sentence in general, rather than to the particular conjunction used.

It is a philological fact (probably referable to the _usus ethicus_) that _if_ may stand instead of _since_.

It is also a philological fact that when it does so it should be followed by the indicative mood.

This is written in the way of illustration. What applies to _if_ applies to other conjunctions as well.

s. 614. As a point of practice, the following method of determining the amount of doubt expressed in a conditional proposition is useful:--

Insert, immediately after the conjunction, one of the two following phrases,--(1.) _as is the case_; (2.) _as may or may not be the case_. By ascertaining which of these two supplements expresses the meaning of the speaker, we ascertain the mood of the verb which follows.

When the first formula is one required, there is no element of doubt, and the verb should be in the indicative mood. _If_ (_as is the case_), _he _is_ gone, I must follow him_.

When the second formula is the one required, there _is_ an element of doubt, and the verb should be in the subjunctive mood. _If_ (_as may or may not be the case_) _he _be_ gone, I must follow him_.

s. 615. The use of the word _that_ in expressions like _I eat that I may live_, &c., is a modification of the subjunctive construction, that is conveniently called _potential_. It denotes that one act is done for the sake of supplying the _power_ or opportunity for the performance of another.

In English the word _that_, so used, cannot be said to govern a mood, although generally followed by either _may_ or _might_. {488} It should rather be said to require a certain combination to follow it. The most important point connected with the powers of _that_ is the so-called _succession of tenses_.

s. 616. _The succession of tenses._--Whenever the conjunction _that_ expresses intention, and consequently connects two verbs, the second of which takes place _after_ the first, the verbs in question must be in the same tense.

I _do_ this _that_ I _may_ gain by it.

I _did_ this _that_ I _might_ gain by it.

In the Greek language this is expressed by a difference of mood; the subjunctive being the construction equivalent to _may_, the optative to _might_. The Latin idiom coincides with the English.

A little consideration will show that this rule is absolute. For a man _to be doing_ one action (in present time) in order that some other action may _follow_ it (in past time) is to reverse the order of cause and effect. To do anything in A.D. 1851, that something may result from it in 1850 is a contradiction; and so it is to say _I _do_ this _that_ I _might_ gain by it_.

The reasons against the converse construction are nearly, if not equally cogent. To have done anything at any _previous_ time in order that a _present_ effect may follow, is, _ipso facto_, to convert a past act into a present one, or, to speak in the language of the grammarian, to convert an aorist into a perfect. To say _I _did_ this_ that _I may gain by it_, is to make, by the very effect of the expression, either _may_ equivalent to _might_, or _did_ equivalent to _have done_.

_I _did_ this_ that _I _might_ gain_.

_I _have done_ this_ that _I _may_ gain_.

A clear perception of the logical necessity of the law of the succession of tenses, is necessary for understanding the nature of several anomalous passages in the classical writers. In the following, an aorist is followed not by an optative, but by a subjunctive.

[Greek: Ouk agathon polukoiranie; heis koiranos esto,] [Greek: Heis basileus, hoi edoke Kronou pais ankulometeo] [Greek: Skeptron t' ede themistas, hina sphisin embasileuei.]

{489}

Here it is necessary to construe [Greek: edoke], _has given and continues to allow_, which is to construe it like a _perfect_[64] tense. Upon similar passages Mathiae writes, "but frequently the conjunctive is used, although the preceding word be in the time past, viz., when the verb which depends upon the conjunction shows an action continued to the present time." That means when the verb is really a perfect.

In Latin, where the same form is both aorist and perfect, the succession of tenses is a means of determining which of the two meanings it conveys. _Veni ut videam_=_I have come that I may see._ _Veni ut viderem_=_I came that I might see_.

Arnold states, from Krueger and Zumpt, that even where the praeterite was clearly a perfect (_i. e._, =_to have_ with the participle), the Roman ear was so accustomed to the _imperfect_ subjunctive, that it preferred such an expression _as diu dubitavi num melius esset to diu dubitavi num melius sit_. The latter part of the statement is sure enough; but it is by no means so sure that _dubitavi_, and similar forms in similar constructions are perfects. There is no reason for considering this to be the case in the present instance. It seems to be so, because it is connected with _diu_; but an action may last a long time, and yet not last up to the time of speaking. _Diu dubitavi_ probably expresses, _I doubted a long time_, and leaves it to be inferred that _now I do not doubt_.

s. 617. It has been stated above that whilst the Latin and English have a succession of _tenses_, the Greek language {490} exhibits what may be called a succession of _moods_. This suggests inquiry. Is the difference real? If so, how is it explained? If not, which of the two grammatical systems is right?--the English and Latin on the one side, or the Greek on the other? Should [Greek: tuptoimi] be reduced to a past tense, or _verberarem_ be considered an optative mood.

The present writer has no hesitation in stating his belief, that all the phaenomena explicable by the assumption of an optative mood are equally explicable by an expansion of the subjunctive, and a different distribution of its tenses.

1. Let [Greek: tupso] be considered a subjunctive _future_ instead of a subjunctive aorist.

2. Let [Greek: tuotoimi] be considered an _imperfect subjunctive_.

3. Let [Greek: tetuphoimi] be considered a _pluperfect subjunctive_.

4. Let [Greek: tupsaimi] be considered an aorist _subjunctive_.

Against this view there are two reasons:

1. The double forms [Greek: tupsaimi] and [Greek: tupsoimi], one of which would remain unplaced.

2. The use of the optative and conjunctive in simple propositions, as--

[Greek: o pai, genoio patros eutuchesteros.]

The first reason I am not prepared to impugn. _Valeat quantum_, &c. The second indicates a class of expressions which tense will _not_ explain, and which mood _will_. Yet this is not conclusive. _Would that thou wert_ is thoroughly optative: yet it is expressed by a tense.

The _form_ of the so-called optatives proves nothing. Neither the subjunctive nor the optative has any signs of _mood_ at all, except the negative one of the absence of the augment. Their signs are the signs of _tense_.

In favour of the view are the following reasons:--

1. The analogy of other languages. The imperfect has a subjunctive in Latin. So has the future.

2. The undoubtedly future character of the so-called aorist imperative. To give an order to do a thing in _past_ time is a philological contradiction. Forms like [Greek: blepson] _must_ be future. Though [Greek: thes] and [Greek: tithei] differ in power, they both mean an {491} action subsequent to, or, at any rate, simultaneous with the order given; certainly not one anterior to it.

s. 618. _Be_ may stand for _may be_. In this case the preterite is not _were_ but _might be_. The sentence, _what_ care _I how fair the lady_ be, _if she be not fair to her admirer_? is accurate. Here _be_ = _may be_. But, _what_ cared _I how fair the lady_ were, _if she were not fair to her admirer_? is inaccurate. It ought to run thus,--_what_ cared _I how fair the lady_ might be, _if she were not fair to her admirer_?[65]

s. 619. _Disjunctives_.--Disjunctives (_or_, _nor_) are of two sorts, real, and nominal.

_A king or queen always rules in England._ Here the disjunction is real; _king_ or _queen_ being different names for different objects. In all _real_ disjunctions the inference is, that if one out of two (or more) individuals (or classes) do not perform a certain action, the other does.

_A sovereign or supreme ruler always rules in England._ Here the disjunction is nominal; _sovereign_ and _supreme governor_ being different names for the same object. In all nominal disjunctives the inference is, that if an agent (or agents) do not perform a certain action under one name, he does (or they do) it under another.

Nominal disjunctives are called by Harris, _sub_disjunctives.

In the English language there is no separate word to distinguish the nominal from the real disjunctive. In Latin, {492} _vel_ is considered by Harris to be disjunctive, _sive_ subdisjunctive. As a periphrasis the combination _in other words_ is subdisjunctive.

Both nominal and real disjunctives agree in this,--whatever may be the number of nouns which they connect, the construction of the verb is the same as if there were but one--Henry _or_ John, _or_ Thomas, _walks_ (not _walk_); the sun, _or_ solar luminary, _shines_ (not _shine_). The disjunctive _isolates_ the subject however much it may be placed in juxtaposition with other nouns.

s. 620. _Either, neither._--Many disjunctives imply an alternative. If it be not this person (or thing) that performs a certain action (or exists in a certain state) it is some other. If a person (or thing) do not perform a certain action (or exist in a certain state), under one name, he (or it) does so under another. This alternative is expressed by the word _either_.

When the word _either_ is connected immediately with the copula of a proposition, it is, if not a true conjunction, at least _a part of a conjunctional periphrasis_.--_This either is or is not so._

When it belongs more to one of the terms of a proposition than to the copula, it is a pronoun,--_Either I or you is in the wrong_. _It is either you or I._

I use the words, _part of a conjunctional periphrasis_, because the full conjunction is _either_ + _or_ (or _neither_ + _nor_); the essential conjunctions being the latter words. To these, _either_ (or _neither_) is superadded, indicating the _manner_ in which the disjunction expressed by _or_ (or _nor_) takes place; _i. e._, they show that it takes place in the manner of an alternative. Now, this superadded power is rather adverbial than conjunctional.

s. 621. From the pronominal character of the word _either_, when it forms part of a term, and from the power of the disjunctive, _or_, in _isolating_ the subject of the verb, combined with an assumption which will be explained hereafter, we get at the principle of certain rules for doubtful constructions.

In expressions like _either you or I is in the wrong_, we must {493} consider _either_ not only as _a_ pronoun, but as _the leading_ pronoun of the proposition; a pronoun of which _or I_ is an explanation; and, finally, as the pronoun which determines the person of the verb. _Either you or I is wrong_=_one of us_ (_you or I_) _is wrong_.

Then, as to expressions like _I, or you, am in the wrong_. Here, _I_ is the leading pronoun, which determines the person of the verbs; the words, _or you_, being parenthetic, and subordinate. These statements bear upon the rules of p. 457.

s. 622. Will this principle justify such expressions as _either they or we is in the wrong_?

Or will it justify such expressions as _either he or they is in the wrong_?

Or will it justify such expressions as _I or they am in the wrong_? In all which sentences one pronoun is plural.

Perhaps not. The assumption that has been just alluded to, as helping to explain certain doubtful constructions, is the following, _viz._, that in cases of apposition, disjunction, and complex terms, the _first_ word is the one which determines the character of the sentence wherein it occurs. This is a practice of the English language, which, in the opinion of the present writer, nothing but a very decided preponderance of a difference in person, gender, or number, can overrule. Such may fairly be considered to be the case in the three examples just adduced; especially as there is also the secondary influence of the conjunctional character of the word _either_. Thus, although we say,--

_One of two parties, they or we, is in the wrong._

We also say,--

_Either they or we are in the wrong_.

As for the other two expressions, they are in the same predicament, with an additional reason for the use of the plural. It _contains_ the singular. The chief object of the present remarks has been less to explain details than to give due prominence to the following leading principles.

1. That _either_ (or _neither_) is[66] essentially singular in number.

{494}

2. That it is, like any common noun, of the third person.

3. That it is pronominal where it is in apposition with another noun.

4. That when it is the first word of the proposition it determines the concord of the verb, unless its character of a noun of the singular number and third person be disguised by the prominence of some plural form, or some pronoun of the first or second person in the latter part of the term.

5. That in a simple disjunctive proposition (_i.e._, one where _either_ does not occur) all nouns are subordinate to the first.

s. 623. I believe that the use of _either_ is limited to _real_ disjunctives; in other words, that we can say _either a king or a queen always reigns in England_, but that we cannot say _either a sovereign or a supreme ruler always reigns in England_.

* * * * *

{495}