The End of the Middle Ages: Essays and Questions in History
Part 25
The great Visconti died in September, 1402; and in the same year Marshal Boucicaut was sent as Governor to Genoa. Boucicaut was an enemy of Milan,[118] a hater of the Turk, a man who saw in the Visconti the secret allies of the Sultan, a man who had been a captive at Nicopolis. A pure, devoted, honourable spirit, yet officious, yet impatient:—a restless hero working persistently in a nervous and unquiet fashion the thing that he believed to be the Will of God—Boucicaut is a figure as unusual among the factions and intrigues of fifteenth-century history as Gordon among the small surroundings of to-day. The Marshal was sent to Genoa because that jealous and unaccountable people (“qui n’aime pas qu’on aille leur desbauscher leurs femmes”) would no longer endure his predecessor. They found in him the man they had prayed to have, a sterner master. Boucicaut was as rigid as he was simple: a man soon deceived, but swift and inflexible in the punishment of treachery. His immaculate life, his proved authority, his skill in regulating and organizing commercial traffic, gave him a great position in Northern Italy, made him the man of men there, the central figure, even as before him had been Giangaleazzo Visconti. For one reason, these two men, so unlike in every detail, were alike in the great fact that they were thinkers, men with a mission, inspired by an idea that ruled their lives and to which they subordinated every consideration. The Duke of Milan dreamed of a great United Italian Confederation, of which he should be the head, and of which the Pope should be merely the ornament and crown: his dream was the dream of the Emperor Napoleon III. Boucicaut, a crusader by nature and tradition, above all things a religious spirit, dreamed of ending the Schism, of gaining state after state to the adherence of the true Pope at Avignon, and, _pari passu_, of extending the dominions of his lord the King of France. The ambition of Boucicaut was all spiritual loyalty and feudal devotion; the ambition of Visconti, stained with crimes, was directed only to self-aggrandizement: different stars were theirs, shining from different poles. But the men who see a star and follow where it leads them, though they go as far apart as Hell and Heaven, have more in common than the mere human bond which ties them to the obscure multitude of their fellows, swaying hither and thither, devoid of purpose, will, or way.
Footnote 118:
On October 30, 1403, he wrote to Florence and offered to take one of the finest cities of the Milanese between Milan and Piedmont if Florence would afford him (as indeed she offered to do) an aid of 200 lances (Florence Archives, Filza II. dei Dieci 3). Nothing appears to have come of this arrangement, which appears to have been quite uncountenanced by the King.
Almost the first act of Boucicaut at Genoa was to write to Florence inviting her to assist him in capturing from the young Visconti (the Serpent-brood) one of the finest cities between Milan and Piedmont. The Florentines shared to the full the distrust of Boucicaut for the children of him whom they had called “the self-dubbed Count of Virtues (Vertus), the veritable Count of Vice.” And they consented to the enterprise, but yet did not pursue it. For, at that moment, they had other work to hand. There was another Visconti than the Lords of Milan and Padua whom they must subdue. They were laying siege to Pisa “e chi la tiene”: her master Gabriel’ Maria Visconti.
At the same moment, as we know, Orleans beyond the Alps was mysteriously advancing southwards; his aim, no less than that of the Florentines, the reduction of Pisa. For through his wife, Valentine Visconti,[119] he had, as he considered, a prior claim on Pisa, and indeed on all possessions of the dead Duke not included in the heritage of the two legitimate sons. Gabriel’ Maria, the bastard, supported only by his mother, besieged by the Florentine allies of France, threatened by his brother-in-law the puissant brother of the King of France,—what hope had he? None indeed, save in the disquiet which the news of Orleans’ coming might inspire among his neighbours. For was it only on Pisa intent that so great a lord was advancing on Lombardy? At this moment the young Visconti of Milan were at open war with Boucicaut, and had declared their intention to drive him out of Genoa and to obtain for themselves the rich province of which the French had baulked their father. Did Orleans also remember with rancour that disappointment of ten years ago? Did he intend to join his brothers-in-law of Milan, take Genoa first and Pisa afterwards? It might be; and yet it were difficult to be at once the ally of the Milanese Visconti, and the usurper of their half-brother’s possessions. Was it possible that the King’s brother intended to unite his army to that of the King’s lieutenant, defeat the young Visconti before Genoa, drive them from Lombardy as well as out of Pisa, and make for himself a great territory (Milan, Asti, Pisa) alongside of the French protectorate of Genoa? Boucicaut was an ancient and intimate companion of the Duke of Orleans; it was rumoured that Orleans had frequent interviews with Pope Benedict at Beaucaire; it was possible that the three had come to an understanding.
Footnote 119:
See the preceding chapter on Valentine Visconti.
And Orleans marched south. And Florence assailed Pisa. So late as April 17, 1404,[120] the Florentines believed that by diplomacy, if not by force, they might secure their prey. But in the end of February or the beginning of March the Duke of Orleans turned north in high dudgeon, indignantly marching on Paris. And in April it was commonly known that, on the 4th of that month, Messer Gabriel’ Maria Visconti had been acknowledged a vassal of the Crown of France; he was “homme du Roy” and the King’s men henceforth would support him in Pisa.
Footnote 120:
See a manuscript letter, I believe imprinted, in the Florence Archives, Dieci di Balia, Classe x. dist. iii. No. 2, f^o. 56: _Istruzione data a Pierotto Fidini_: “Andrai a Pisa e sarai con Madonna Agnese e dicele che tu ciai (ci hai) referito quello chella ta detta (ch’ella ti ha detta) e, uditolo, noi siamo contenti seguitare il ragionemento, cioè di contrarre con lei buona pace e sicura si che tra lei e noi non abbia da essere guerra. Ma che, per fare contento il nostro popolo, e mostrargli come cosa sia sicura che guerra non gli sia fatta a noi, è bisogno chella metta nelle mani del Comune nostro quatro Castella colle loro forteze, di quelle del Terreno di Pisa che per noi si nomineranno et vogliendo ella fare questo noi verremo alla pace e alla concordia realmente.
“Se ella dinegasse questo volere fare, avendo tu prima provato e riprovato chella il consento, et ella dicesse di volere mettere le dette castelle colle forteze loro in mano di terza persona fidata a lei ed a noi, dirai in ultimo che noi siamo contenti. E se questo ella non movesse a te ma stessesi pure in su la negativa—di non ci volere dare le dette castella—allora moverai tu a lei dicendo che, poi che non le dia piacere mettere le dette castella nelle mani nostre, chella le metta nelle mani di terza persona di lei e di noi fidata. E che a questo ella consente e volere che tu nommassi le castella, dirai Livorno, Librafacta, Casena e Ponteacra. E se d’alcuni di questi ella dicesse non potere fare, saprai quali. E in scambio loro dirai Palaia e Marti se fossino più d’uno. Se ella ti venisse a domandare chi noi porremo per terza persona, dirai che tu non ne sei informato ma che tu ci lo riferirai, e se ella te ne nominasse alcuno, tiengli a mente. E poi ne vieni subito alla presentia nostra, bene informato d’ogni cosa. Et eziandio d’ogni novettà e cosa che sentire puoi” (April 17, 1404).
Great was the wrath of Orleans, loud the remonstrance of Florence. Orleans had scarcely arrived in Paris before the King transferred to him all the Royal rights to Pisa (as I have already shown the reader in the chapter on Valentine Visconti), and formally disowned the conduct of Boucicaut, forbidding him in future to put any obstacle in the path of his brother. Censured at home, Boucicaut was not less fervently condemned by his allies in Italy. The Signory of Florence addressed a most indignant letter to him,[121] accusing him of a dishonest action in seizing from the King’s faithful allies the prey they had hunted so long, now, in their very grasp, to be wrested from them by a friend. “Questa non era honesta cosa.” The Florentines could easily have reduced Pisa, but against the fief of France, their ally, they could do nothing. They withdrew from the siege, protesting and with many murmurs.
Footnote 121:
Dieci di Balia, Classe x. distinzione iii. No. 2, f^o. 58. I translate the whole of this interesting letter, hitherto, I believe, unpublished:
“_Istruzione data a Bonaccorso di Neri Pitti ... di quello che abbia fare a Genova._ April 28, 1404: Andrai a Genova. E sarai al Governatore Messer Giovanni Bouciquaut, Luogo tenente del Re. E lui saluterai affetuosamente per parte del Comune nostro.
“Di poi gli dirai come di questo mese egli manda al nostro comune suo Ambasciatore Maestro Piero di Nantrone, suo secretario. Il quale, per sua parte, ci notifica come egli aveva ricevuto per vasallo e feudatorio del serenissimo Re di Francia Messer Gabriello Maria di Visconti colla città di Pisa e col suo terreno che possedea. Et aveva presa la sua difesa. E che darà per censo al detto Re ogni anno uno cavallo e uno falcone pellegrino. Secondaria, ci prega che ci piacesse per lo avvenire non offendere la città nil (ne il) terreno di Pisa predetto, per rispetto del Serenissimo Re predetto. Et agli aveva preveduto che di quelli di Pisa non sarebbe fatta alcuna offesa nel nostro terreno.
“Tertio disse che noi possiamo colle nostre mercatantie usare et trafficare a Pisa sicuramente come a Genova e in qualunque altra terra del Re di Francia.
“Al quale Ambasciatore fu risposto in effecto che noi ci maravigliamo et dolevamo, come essendo noi in guerra colla dicta città di Pisa e con chi la teneva—et essendo noi al disopra per liberare la detta città di tirannia et avendo rispetto quanto noi siamo sempre frati, e siamo servidori della detta Corona di Francia; et egli aveva presa la difesa loro contro a noi; e che questa non era honesta cosa.
“Alla seconda parte—di non offender—egli fu detto, che in ciò noi terremo tali modi come vedessimo convenirsi e che non gli darebbero dispiacere.
“E alla terza parte, diciamo che l’usare in luogo dove avesse a fare alcuno dei Visconti di Milano non ci fu mai sicuro, non potrebbe essere, considerati le inimicitii e odii antichi stati da detti Visconti al comune nostro; Conchiudendo che sopra le dette cose noi faremo risposta più pienamente al detto Signor Boucequaut per nostri Ambassadori.
“E poi gli direte che—se mai noi avevamo maraviglia di alcuna cosa—noi abbiamo dello avere gli, in nome del Serenissimo Re di Francia, presa la difesa di Pisa e di quello che gli possiede, contro a noi, figludi devotissimi della corona di Francia stati sempre, in favore dei Pisani che sempre sono stati inimici della detta Corona. Et maximamente essendo noi in guerra con Pisa e con chi la tiene, non di nascosa ma pubblicamente e non di guerra hora cominciata ma durata lungamente. Et essendo noi con nostro esercito in punto et in ordine per esser intorno alla città di Pisa, sperando in brevissimo tempo liberarla della Tirannia dei Visconti. E per poter meglio e con maggiore forza cosa fare, abbiamo fatta grandissima spesa nello apparecchio di questo, il quale possiamo dire per cagione sua avere tutta perduta. E con lui di questo vi direste amichevolmente, subiungnendo che noi ci rendiamo certi che quando il Serenissimo Re di Francia e suo Consiglio sapranno questo, essi n’avranno dispiacere come di cosa non honesta et iniusta. Il che non fu mia usanza della Corona di Francia fare, et come di cosa fatta contro a i suoi figluoli e divoti in favore di un Tiranetto e d’una città stata sempre nemica della Corona di Francia. A presso gli direte, che, per riverentia della Maestà Reale la quale egli rappresenta (come che duro e malagevole ci paresse per le ragioni di sopra assegante) già sono più di passati, noi facciamo commandamento a tutta nostra gente d’arme e subditi: Che nel terreno di Pisa non dovesseno fare alcuna offesa o cavalcata, e così è stata observata: la qual cosa fare grava molto il nostro popolo per gli rispetti scripti di sopra. E mai non si sarebbe creduto per nessuno Fiorentino che Messer Bouciquaut il quale abbiamo reputato a noi e reputiamo amico singolarissimo avesse mai fatta tale cosa contra a noi ma pensiamo che questo sia proceduto da altri con velati colori che gli le hanno dato a dividere; ma veramente questo che fatta ha non è cosa punto honesta ne iusta ne utile ne honorevole per la Maestà Reale. E per tutto il pregherate che gli piaccia, veduta la verità del fatto, renonciare questo che ha ordinato in questa materia, ed essere contento che noi possiamo seguitare contro a Pisa, e chi la tiene, la nostra impresa. E questo sarà a lui honore et a noi, figluoli della Corona, singolarissimo piacere.
“Alla parte del trafficare et usare a Pisa i nostri cittadini e mercatanti colle loro mercatantie, direte che niuno cittadino se ne fiderebbe mai ne vorebbero trafficare, essendo Pisa nella mani d’alcuno dei Visconti, come ella è. E non che ivi—ma in alcuna terra dove alcuno dei Visconti avesse a fare, per che essi sono antichi nostri nemici e molte volte lanno (l’hanno) dimostrato—e romperci la fede e pace e tregua; e bene lo vedevamo dove, essendo colligati colla Serenissima Corona di Francia, il Conte di Vertus ci ruppe la Pace e manifestò tradimento contra Dio a vergogna della detta Corona, si che in modo alcuno non ci potremo mai fidare in luogo done alcuno di loro avesse a fare.”
Here the document leaves politics to defend the quarrel of private Florentine merchants in Genoa, to complain of the conduct of the Pisans who have made a raid on to the lands of Messer Gherardo d’Appiano, feudatory of Florence, and to complain of the sequestration of the goods of certain Florentine merchants of Genoa. The Ten also state that they are sending Messer Rinaldo Gianfigliazzi and Messer Filippo Cosimi on an embassy to France to state their case to the King. F^o. 60 instructs us that Boucicaut liberated the sequestered goods and that a truce was signed between Florence and Pisa for so long as Pisa should continue subject to the King of France.
What indeed was the motive of Boucicaut? The Florentines with some reason suspected an unseen hand pulling the strings that worked this sudden action; “pensiamo che questo sia proceduto da altri, con velati colori.” But what man save the King, who disowned the business, was strong enough to dare to oppose the will of Orleans? Was Burgundy jealous of those Italian prospects of his rival which freed him from his neighbourhood at home? Or was it possible that the Antipope Benedict, ill-contented with Orleans after their interview at Beaucaire, had privately summoned Boucicaut “ce bon Chrestien” to hold Pisa in the King’s name and not in the name of his too powerful guardian? Mysteries! It is as likely, perhaps more likely, that Boucicaut, ever hot-headed, wilful, and officious, asked no permission save his own to accept this new vassal for the King of France. His brain was fired by the thought of converting Pisa to the true obedience; and he feared that she would fall to heretic Florence ere Orleans could pass the Alps.
Gabriel’ Maria Visconti and his mother were ill at their ease in Pisa. He, an elegant, faithless, persuasive _Tiranetto_ (as the Tuscans called him), was often at the Court of Boucicaut, making various negotiations, among others handing over the Tower and Fort of Leghorn to France.[122] Boucicaut was in high spirits notwithstanding his half disgrace; he had persuaded the Genoese to accept the authority of Benedict XII., “the greatest deed,” writes his biographer, “that has been done in Italy these 200 years.” He hoped soon to convert Leghorn and Pisa; and, in time, to induce Italy to renounce the heinous Italian Antipope.
Footnote 122:
Brit. Museum MSS. 30, 669, f. 238; a treaty between the King of France and G.M. Visconti, Lord of Pisa. The Tower and Fort of Leghorn are to be given to the French, the King promising that no one shall be allowed to enter Leghorn against the will of Gabriele Maria Visconti. Also _quod absit_ should the Castle of Leghorn be taken by the enemies of the said Gabriele Maria, or should it in any way rebel against him, the King and his Lieutenant bind themselves to allow free passage to any army the said Gabriele Maria may send for its subjection. The King explicitly promises that if any of Gabriele Maria’s possessions be lost by the treachery of guards or other means, he will make war upon the fraudulent possessors and attempt their recovery. The King invests Gabriele Maria, with a gold ring, in all his possessions save the Tower and Fort of Leghorn.
Suddenly his hold over Pisa ominously slackened.
The Pisans cared little for Pope or Antipope; they were fanatic for liberty. They detested Agnese Mantegazza and her bastard with a Tuscan hatred for the Visconti, treacherous alike to God and man. One day in 1405, while Messer Gabriel’ Maria was absent in Genoa, some Florentine soldiers made a raid on Pisa. The citizens, not without reason, suspected their tyrant of selling them to the Florentines,—old neighbours and rivals yet more odious than the Milanese. They rose as one man fighting for death or liberty in the streets. No sooner had they driven back the Florentines than they rushed on the Fortress, surging through the narrow corridors, till, in the heart of the palace, they came on Madonna Agnese. A man raised his harquebuss and shot her through the heart. Her son was absent in Genoa. For the moment the Pisans were quit of the Visconti.
The news of the revolt of Pisa flew swiftly to Genoa. The bereaved Tiranetto dispossessed and orphaned, repaired to Boucicaut as to the Lieutenant of his liege-lord, the King of France, asking aid because, as the Chronicle reminds us, “seigneur doibt au besoing secourir son vassal qui le requiert à son aide.”
Boucicaut was dismayed at this first result of his new acquisition. To reduce Pisa by arms would be a ruinous affair. The Marshal comforted as best he could the vassal of his master, and promised to go and reason with the rebels. Forth, therefore, he went from Genoa to a very beautiful place called Porto Venere, in the neighbourhood of Pisa. There a deputation of the insurgents awaited him, and for a long while he harangued them as to the virtues of the dead Madonna Agnese and the merits of the kind and amiable young man whom they had banished.
The Pisans listened respectfully while “moult leur dict de belles paroles,” but when the sermon was over they replied that never should Messer Gabriel’ be their lord again, rather would every man of them be hewn in pieces; but, they went on to say, the Marshal Boucicaut himself should be welcomed and honoured by all the citizens of Pisa, if he would accept her as his fief. “Never,” cried the Marshal, “could I draw such a profit from a friend’s misfortune” (“car ce n’est mie l’usaige des François d’user de tels tours”). And he fell again to praising Messer Gabriel’, but all in vain, for the last word of the Pisans was that, if the Marshal himself would not accept the city for his own, then they prayed him to meet them at Leghorn another day, and there they would give themselves directly to the King of France, accepting a French governor for their waiter, even as the Genoese had done ten years before.
Boucicaut went home, sore perplexed between his duty to his liege and his duty to his vassal. He had gone to Porto Venere to plead the cause of Gabriel’ Maria: and he had supplanted the young man, as it seemed. On the other hand, since it was clear that the Pisans would never re-admit their Tiranetto, and since the city was the fief of France, how could he honourably forbid them to give themselves entirely to their lawful suzerain? And the vision grew in him of a great Mediterranean State, French, supporting French interests in the East—a terror to the Saracens and the men of Barbary, a lamp of Christendom, faithful to the True Obedience, reclaimed for ever from the heresy of the Elect of Rome.
Arrived in Genoa he sent for Messer Gabriel’, and told him the case; “de quoy feult moult dolent Messire Gabriel,” who doubtless wished that he had sent to Porto Venere, a spokesman less eloquent and less engaging. But Boucicaut persuaded him that since he could not hope to leave the city for himself, ’twas better to entrust it to the King of France—who would recompense so generous a vassal with lands as good elsewhere—than to let it fall into the power of an enemy or a neighbour. Gabriel’ Maria agreed—as he must perforce agree—and Boucicaut set out again to meet the rebels at Leghorn.
But the Pisans had never meant to give themselves another master. To gain time, they had played with Boucicaut and had flattered his weak side. They said that on second thoughts they preferred that, before they gave themselves to the King of France, the men of Messer Gabriel’, who were still in the strong places of Pisa, should be expelled the city, and a garrison of French and Genoese sent thither in their stead. The request appeared the less unreasonable as Gabriel’ Maria was himself the King’s vassal, and the Pisans might suspect that their mutual suzerain would only confirm the power of the rejected _Tiranetto_. Boucicaut agreed, returned to Genoa, and arranged for the exchange of garrisons.
This done the Pisans sent to say the Fortress needed revictualling. Boucicaut, eager to ingratiate his new subjects, despatched his nephew, some gentlemen of his household, with many gentlemen and citizens of Genoa; and a great galley heaped with provisions. The ship sailed down the coast and up the Arno into Pisa; at the quay the embassy descended. They were immediately overpowered by an ambush of Pisans, who seized upon the welcome cargo of the ship, and carried off the crew and the passengers into a dark and villainous prison, using their sufferings as a means to extract higher ransom from the King’s Lieutenant.
Thus amply provisioned at Boucicaut’s expense, the Pisans began to feel secure of liberty. They sent to Florence, offering her four of their castles if she would help them to regain Leghorn, where at the moment Boucicaut and Gabriel’ Maria were esconced, and to revenge themselves on both these men. But the Florentines returned a dilatory answer, for they were, in truth, pursuing a more fruitful negotiation.