Part 18

Ghinzone, in the “Archivio Storico Lombardo,” Anno ix, Fasc. 2, 1882, quotes the original documents from the Milanese Archives, Reg. Miss. N. 12, foglio 40. The letters are all of the greatest interest.

The so-called Duke of Milan was irate, and despatched a curt letter to the suspicious and insubordinate lawyer, and by the same messenger he sent a line to the Castellan of Pavia, informing him that Oliari had not come, and bidding him despatch the notary at once, _cum dicto testamento et non cum la copia_. But neither the Duke nor the constable of the castle could induce Oliari to go back from his decision. “I really cannot come,” he replied to Sforza on February 24th, “for I have neither money nor horses.” Now Pavia is not so long a journey from Milan, but that, to serve a sovereign, a man might borrow his neighbour’s hackney. The same day, the 24th, the Duke replied in anger, both to Oliari and to the castellan, that he could not conceive why it should be so difficult to come at the said testament. “And forasmuch as you hold dear our favour, and under pain of rebellion, you must be here with us to-morrow with the said will, for if you dost not come we will make you repent it.” Oliari dared not hold out against so ominous a command. He made in secret five copies of the precious document, and then we may suppose that he took the original to Sforza, for no more letters require it from his custody. Thus the original will of Giangaleazzo Visconti was destroyed.

But while Sforza was stooping to a crime in order to protect himself against the rivalry of Orleans, as a fact that pretender was less dangerous than he had been before. However good his claim might be, his inefficiency was a terrible counterpoise. When,[85] at the new year of 1454, Alfonso the Magnanimous wrote to Venice requesting the government to continue their relations with Orleans, the Venetians replied that Orleans was too far off and too unready. They were as desirous as Arragon to get rid of the usurper. A month before they strove to enlist Arragon in favour of their novel candidate, they had written to Savoy,[84] asking Duke Louis to join with them in requesting the Dauphin of France to invade Italy and suppress Francesco Sforza. They proposed that the Dauphin should conquer the Ticinese and Piacenza for himself, and the Duchy of Milan for the Duke of Orleans. In case the Duke was not minded to go to this expense and danger for a cousin’s sake, the Venetians let it be understood that any French prince would be agreeable to them upon the throne of Milan.

Footnote 84:

Reg. 20, fol. 1. Secreta del Senato, MS. January 3, 1454.

Footnote 85:

Reg. 19, fol. 232. Secreta del Senato, MS. December 11, 1453.

V.

The House of Orleans had no more dangerous enemy than the royal house of France. Matters had greatly changed since, immediately after the liberation of Orleans, Charles VII. had seconded his claim to the Milanese. The reduction to insignificance of the great feudal houses in general, and particularly the reduction of Orleans, was now the policy of the French crown; and at that moment the policy of the already inscrutable Dauphin appears to have been the conquest of a kingdom which should comprise the Dauphiny, the Ticinese, Asti, the Piacentine angle of the Emilia, and the entire stretch of Liguria. To the restless contriver of a plan so bold the claims of Sforza and of Orleans came equally amiss; and, in secret, the chief enemy of either credulous pretender was the Dauphin.

Sforza, however, had little to fear from Orleans, and less from the French. In fact, in King Charles he found at this difficult period his ablest friend. The records of the Archives of Milan, from the year 1452 until the death of King Charles, abound in friendly letters, and are evidence of the cordial relations existing not only between the Duke of Milan and the King of France, but between the House of Sforza and the royal Governor of Asti. In 1459 the King besought Francesco to ask the hand of the little Princess Marie d’Orléans for his only son; but we may presume that Orleans would not consent to so much recognition of the usurper, for the negotiation came to nothing. Yet with the Court of France Francesco continued on terms of affectionate friendship and mutual respect.

In 1453 the Dauphin still had designs on Italy, and offered to the Venetian Signory his aid in Italy to combat Count Francesco.[86] It was arranged that he should come with from eight to ten thousand men, dispossess Sforza, and conquer for himself a Duchy of Milan to extend from Adda to Ticino, from Padua beyond Piacenza. Or, if the King and the Dauphin would guarantee the army, Venice professed herself willing to aid the Duke of Orleans in the same undertaking. But while these princes were arranging their future conquests, a spirit stronger than they was making these conquests impossible—a spirit which, a score of years ago, had begun to draw together Scotland and England, those ancient enemies, to the alarm of France; a spirit which had estranged Burgundy and Brittany from their English companions in so many battles, and which was leading them to the feet of the long-despised and outraged King of France; a spirit which now should reconcile Venice with Sforza, Florence with Milan, and make, for a brief moment of millennium, those immemorial foes at peace together; a spirit which awoke in these middle years of the fifteenth century—aroused Heaven knows whence or how—and strangely changed the world it breathed across: I have named the spirit of Nationality.

Footnote 86:

“Secreta,” tome (_sic_ Reg?) xix. fol. 211, under date August 31, 1453, quoted M. Étienne Charavay in his “Rapport sur les Lettres de Louis XI. conservées dans les Archives d’Italie.” The following documents from the Venetian Archives—as yet, I believe, unpublished—form the natural sequel to this interesting letter:

“Senato” I., Reg. 19, fol. 232, under date December 11, 1453.—The Venetians send Venier to ask Savoy to join with them in requesting the Dauphin to invade Italy: “Venier must ascertain the views of the Duke of Savoy as to Sforza, since King René comes into Italy. Let him clearly understand that Sforza is a most ambitious man, and that if he continue to prosper as he does he will certainly turn his thoughts towards Savoy. Venice not only intends to secure her own estate, but for the sake of her friends and allies will as much and as resolutely as possible repress the said Count Francesco Sforza, who may become the Common Enemy. And to this end Venice has determined to request the aid of France, and among others the aid of the Dauphin, asking the said Dauphin for the common good to invade Italy with a force of from 8,000 to 10,000 men. And we of Venice entreat Savoy to send a suitable ambassador along with ours to persuade the said Dauphin to this undertaking. And our intention is to grant the said Dauphin a suitable subvention in money and whatsoever he may conquer from Adda to Ticino, and from Padua to Piacenza, except the domains of Savoy and Montferrat.... Let Venier then discover how many men and of what sort and when Savoy could supply to the field.... And if my Lord Dauphin stand out for the consent of his father, you shall offer on our part to implore it and procure it for him. And if he wish you to go to the King you shall go, and, as best you can, procure his consent.... And if the said King or Dauphin say to you this undertaking regards the Duke of Orleans, say it is true that on the death of Filippo Maria he sent to us notifying his claims (and fain would we see a prince of the house of France on the throne of Milan!), and saying he expected supplies from France, and we assured him of our delight and pleasure; and if indeed the King or the Dauphin, at your instance, will supply the said Lord Duke with an army of from viii. thousand to x. thousand men, we will aid and assist him upon the same terms and conditions as my Lord the Dauphin. And go then to the Duke of Orleans and persuade him to the enterprize.”

Reg. 20, fol. 26, July 23, 1454.—This document concerns a League meant to secure Italian peace by means of an offensive and defensive alliance, against all breakers of the peace, to be made between Venice, Milan, Florence, and Naples. Florence desires an exception in favour of the house of France. At this Milan, much alarmed, desires Venice by a secret and separate agreement to sign the First Clause at least with him. Venice sends ambassadors to Florence and to Milan, pointing out that the First Clause is absolutely necessary, since, without it, there is no reason why the King of Arragon should enter the League. Indeed if an exception be made in favour of France, it will only and justly irritate him, and thus the alliance would bring rather discord than peace into the Peninsula. No specific mention need be made of the house of France, to which Venice entertains the most friendly feelings. But if the First Clause were signed and Arragon induced to enter the League Italy might look forward to many years of peace and tranquillity.

Reg. 20, fol. 103, October 8, 1456.—The Marquis of Varese, ambassador to the Duke of Milan, informs the Venetians that the Doge of Genoa—notwithstanding his open alliance with France and apparent subjection to her—has made a second and secret alliance with Arragon and Milan, in which Venice is prayed to join, against the French. The Venetians reply that, owing to the mutability and diversity of Genoese affairs, it is impossible to give any solid advice.

Reg. 21, fol. 21, October 10, 1465.—The descendants of Valentine Visconti—_i.e._, the Dukes of Orleans and Brittany and the Count of Angoulême—sent secret ambassadors to Venice to treat concerning the recovery of the Duchy of Milan from the hands of Count Francesco Sforza. Venice replies with compliments, but expresses herself desirous to keep the peace.

Reg. 22, fol. 176, July 28, 1466.—French ambassadors have been received at Venice from Louis XI., King of France. Venice assures him of her excellent disposition towards the new Duke of Milan as well as of her “antiqua benivolentia” towards his father. Venice believes a resumption of the Italian League is not at that moment necessary, extols King Louis for his intention to proceed against the Turk, and congratulates him on the quiet of his realm.

The Latin originals of these documents will be included in the volume of “Pièces Justificatives,” for my History of the French in Italy, 1378-1530.

At Christmas-time in 1453 the Venetians spared neither pains nor prayers nor promise to induce the Dauphin to come and suppress Count Francesco Sforza. In April of the next year[89] they sent to tell him, as delicately as possible, that they had no further need of his services (a refined way of informing him that they would oppose him), since they had made peace with the man whom four months ago they had called the Common Enemy of his countrymen, and whom they had so many times endeavoured to assassinate. And probably the Dauphin was not sorry. For the spirit that animated these Italians inspired him also. Already it had touched his intelligent and sensitive spirit. Already, in 1447,[88] he had laughed for joy when the French lost Genoa, and had declared “le Roy se gouvernoit si mal qu’on ne pouvoit pis.” In the five years between 1445 and 1450 the Dauphin had passed from the friendship of Orleans to the friendship of Burgundy, and his ideal had changed. He raged to see the King prefer Italy to the north, and amuse himself with taking Genoa and securing Asti when he should have set to conquering Normandy. He said aloud that the true place for such a King as that was in such a Hermitage as the Duke of Savoy’s. He plotted to seize the government of affairs himself, and leave the King, in prosperous desuetude, to amuse himself with his Belle Agnès and his pleasures. As we know, the plot fell through, and the impatient Dauphin, a discomfited fugitive, was himself the one to seek a hermitage at the Court of Burgundy. There he spent five years of chafing exile and mortification while his father ruled France, not unsuccessfully, after his own fashion, pursuing shadows indeed in Italy, yet at home administering affairs and inventing a regular army with no less zeal and skill for this extraneous ambition. Louis was still at the Court of Philip of Burgundy when, in 1461, he heard the news of his father’s death. And the prince who, of all others, should do most for the reintegration of his country ascended the throne of France.[87]

Footnote 87:

Reg. 20, fol. 17, April 26, 1454.—“Ordre à Francesco Veniero de prévenir le dauphin, avec tous les ménagements possible, qu’ils ont faiz la paix avec Francesco Sforza et qu’ils n’ont plus besoin de ses services” (Charavay, _loc. cit._).

Footnote 88:

Quoted by the Marquis de Beaucourt, iv. p. 244, from the “Procès de Mariette.”

Footnote 89:

“Procès de Mariette” in the Preuves de Matthieu d’Escouchy, p. 290. See Marquis de Beaucourt, “Histoire de Charles VII.,” pp. 207 _et seq._

As we know, the law of historic necessity required that the Dauphin should renounce his ambition of a North Italian state—he had, in fact, already renounced it; that he should abandon his early visions and his early friends, and adopt for his counsellors the very men who once had ruined him. Henceforth he must bend the whole strength of his spirit to the furthering of that policy which he had so long, and at so great a sacrifice, resisted and attempted to destroy. The interests of the time required that France should forego all ambitions foreign to herself in order to consolidate herself; that she should sacrifice the south in order to insure the north; that she should also sacrifice the aristocracy to the people; and Louis XI., who, as a prince, had paid so dear for his adherence to the rights of the nobles, became the monarch who more than any other was governed by men of low and base condition—who more than any other oppressed and resisted the pride of feudalism. Those who had been his friends became his enemies; those likewise who had been his enemies became his friends. Francesco Sforza, from whom he had been so eager to take his duchy, became the one man alive whom he admired and respected. Yes, this successful captain of adventure, who for years had prevented him in Milan, in Naples, and in Genoa, who once had been the chief stumbling-block in the path of the Dauphin, became the corner-stone of the policy of the King. Like Catherine de’ Medici, like Rodrigo Borgia, like most unscrupulous rulers, there was something oddly magnanimous in the moral indifference of Louis IX. Sforza never suffered for his enmity of yore. The new King of France was a being as destitute of rancour as devoid of gratitude.

With Savoy, Orleans, Dunois, and Anjou the new king was ill-disposed to treat. He had learned the secret of their intrigues and their ambitions. On May 10, 1463, he wrote to Sforza that he was content to come to an understanding with Milan, if Milan would utterly disavow Savoy. This conspirator, versed since boyhood in all the dismal ins and outs of treachery, was too well aware of the tricks of his confederates.[90] It still might be possible that his enemies were honest. They at least were the only people he could trust; and more than any other he confided in Francesco Sforza. In December, 1463, he made to the _de facto_ Duke of Milan the significant cession of the French claim to Genoa.[91] He also arranged for the cession of Savona. Negotiations were even begun for yielding Asti to Francesco Sforza; but the inhabitants declared that they would stand by the house of Orleans.

Footnote 90:

March 14, 1451, Amédée of Savoy had promised to assist the Dauphin against all, “even against the King of France” (Charavay, _l. c._ p. 34). This had a different aspect after Louis’ coronation.

Footnote 91:

Dumont, iii. ccxxviii.

At first the cousins of the King could not believe that he had actually abandoned them—he who had begun his career as the pupil of Dunois, and had suffered so long as the champion of the nobles. So late as October 10, 1465, the descendants of Valentine Visconti sent a very secret embassy to Venice[92] to propose to the Ten a league between their government and the Duke of Orleans, the Count of Angoulême, and the Duke of Brittany, for the purpose of ousting the usurper, Count Francesco, and delivering the Duchy of Milan to Charles of Orleans. This league, which could not be confirmed by the Pope, a political adversary, might, it was suggested, be headed by the King of France. Probably the Venetians were better informed as to the real intentions of Louis XI. Certainly they knew that it was too late or too early to dream of dislodging the Sforzas from Milan. They replied that they loved the house of France, but that peace also was dear to them: they begged to be excused from attacking Count Francesco.

Footnote 92:

Secreta del Senato, MS. Reg. 21, folio 21.

After this for many years the house of Orleans ceased to struggle. Before the year was out Charles of Orleans was dead, and the French pretender to the crown of Milan was only an infant, three years old. Before the child was six Dunois was also dead. Dunois—who had not suffered the children of his adoptive mother to be cheated of their inheritance in Asti—would, had he lived, have instructed his nephew in the details of his claim to Milan. But Louis II. of Orleans, born in his father’s seventy-second year, was naturally doomed to lose in infancy his father’s contemporaries. As the child grew up every link was severed that might have bound him to the past, and he knew little or nothing of the pretensions of his house. His mother, who had a romantic worship for the memory of Valentine Visconti, related to her son many a legend of the quasi-royal power which during the last century his ancestors possessed. But that supremacy seemed at an end for ever. In France, in Italy, the star of Orleans suffered a long eclipse. By his own experience in rebellion Louis XI. was aware how dangerous to the Crown and how disastrous to the kingdom was the power of the great feudal houses. Alençon and Armagnac and many another he diminished by confiscation and captivity; Dunois, Bourbon, Saint-Vallier, Sancerre, he attached to the Crown by royal marriages. Kinship in subjection, independence in imprisonment: these were the two alternatives presented by the King to the nobles of France. Among the most unfortunate of those who accepted the former gift was the young Louis d’Orléans. Louis XI. had decided that with this young man the house of Orleans should end; and when its representative was eleven years of age, the King married him to Jeanne of France, a gentle girl, deformed, incapable of offspring, and so ugly that when she was brought to court for her wedding the king himself exclaimed: _Je ne la croyais pas si laide_. To this bride the young duke was married in 1473. “They will have no expense with a nursery,” wrote the malicious King to Dammartin: _ils n’auraient guères à besoigner et nourrir les enfans qui viendraient du dit mariage: mais toutefois se feroit-il_.

Meanwhile the six sons of Sforza had grown to manhood; and the eldest ruled in Milan, accepted, by the mere fact of his unchallenged succession, as the lawful inheritor of his father’s duchy.

VI.

When Louis II. of Orleans had reached the age of twenty he was the best archer, the most dexterous horseman, the most adroit and brilliant man-at-arms about the Court of France. He was handsome, fond of the arts, and well instructed. He had an engaging manner, gentle, gracious, and benign. A brave and eager cavalier, he was ready for adventures; but a strong hand kept him down, a hand whose cruel restraint was never lifted from that audacious brow. Suddenly the pressure ceased: the hand was gone; on August 30, 1483, King Louis died.

He was succeeded by a child of fourteen, an ugly, ignorant youth, who had grown up neglected in the castle of Amboise, far from the Court, alone with his gentle forsaken mother, Charlotte of Savoy, who had taught him the only thing she knew, the plots of innumerable romances of chivalry. For Louis XI., partly afraid of injuring the delicate constitution of his only heir, and partly remembering his own dangerous and rebellious childhood, denied any solid education to his son. He never saw the boy, leaving him for years at a time to grow up as best he might alone with his mother at Amboise. “Let the body grow strong first,” said the King; “the mind will look to itself.” And, according to tradition, the sole food that he provided for the eager mind of his son was one single Latin maxim: _Qui nescit dissimulare nescit regnare_. This was all the Latin that was taught to Charles VIII., and on this solitary morsel of classic attainment he was never known to act. Louis XI., for all his subtlety, had forgotten that by simply withholding one sort of education you cannot insured vacuity. The child at Amboise knew nothing of history, nothing of geography, nothing of the classics. But his mind was stuffed with the deeds of Roland and Ogier, and the beauty of _La belle dame sans merci_. Suddenly one summer day, unwonted messengers knocked at the gates of Amboise; they fetched the child away to see an old, misshapen, suspicious man, whom he did not know—who was his father. The next day Charles VIII. was king of France under the regency of his married sister, Anne de Bourbon. Madame Anne inherited her father’s dislike and distrust of Orleans; but her sister was his wife and adored him, and her brother, the king, admired him. She did her best to repress Orleans in France; but her hand, though firm, had not the solidity of her father’s. Orleans grew and expanded.

Just at this moment Venice was in sore distress. Almost every power in Italy was against her, and she turned for help to France. On January 16, 1484, she sent Antonio Loredan to Charles VIII., complaining of the aggressions of Naples, Milan, and Ferrara, and desiring a resumption of the Franco-Venetian league of Louis XI. That league had been a very tame and passive piece of policy; the Venetians hoped a bolder favour from a younger king. Loredan was bidden to insist upon the suggestion that the kingdom of Naples occupied by Ferdinand of Arragon, belonged in fact to France.[95] “Nor content with that,” run the instructions of the Senate, “this king it was who instigated Lodovico Sforza to the usurpation of Milan.” Lodovico il Moro,[94] the fourth son of Count Francesco Sforza, had, as a matter of fact, usurped the position of his nephew in 1481, and, though nominally regent, conducted himself as Duke of Milan. But this intrusion was not the seizure which now the Venetians meant to blame. They wished to suggest, as the lawful claimant, not the young son of Galeazzo Sforza, but the Duke of Orleans.

“Express to the Duke of Orleans in secret our desire for his exaltation [run the instructions given to Loredan], and explain to him how good is the opportunity for him to recover the Duchy of Milan, which belongs to him by right; and how his claim would be favoured by the differences and dissidences at present existing between ourselves and Milan, as also by the discontent of the Milanese with their tyrants. Inform the Duke that Lodovico Sforza aspires to seize the sovereignty for himself, amid the murmurs of his people, and that he will certainly massacre all who uphold the claim of the Duchess Bona. Inflame and excite as best you can the Duke of Orleans to pursue this enterprise, ... and if the French should choose to make good their claim to Naples as against the tyrant Ferdinand, they could not find a better time than now.”[93]

Footnote 93: