CHAPTER L.

GRAHAM'S ADVANCE AND WITHDRAWAL FROM THE EASTERN SOUDAN.

On the 26th March, another convoy was attacked, this time about two miles only from Souakim. The enemy on this occasion charged the head of the square, and were repulsed with considerable loss, none of them getting within five yards of the square. The British casualties were three wounded. It was said that 100 of the enemy were killed in this affair. The heat of the weather was now beginning to make itself felt, and several cases of sunstroke occurred amongst the troops engaged.

The first part of the Australian Contingent arrived at Souakim on the 29th March. The troops consisted of twenty-eight officers, 500 men of the battalion of Infantry, thirty men of the Artillery, and thirty-three men of the Ambulance Corps. The Contingent, which was commanded by Colonel Richardson, met with an enthusiastic reception from the naval and military forces at Souakim.

The railway was now vigorously pushed forward in the direction of Handoub, and on the 2nd April General Graham determined to advance and attack Osman Digna in his position at Tamaai, although there was some doubt whether he would accept battle.

Accordingly at three a.m. the General paraded his troops in the moonlight, and at four marched them to McNeill's zeriba. This zeriba (No. 1) was reached at 9 a.m., and the force halted until 10.15 a.m. for rest and refreshment. During this time arrangements were made for the defence of the zeriba, at which the 28th Bombay Native Infantry were left with two Gardner guns manned by marine artillery. The balloon was filled and made ready for use for reconnoitring purposes.

The troops were joined at the zeriba by the Grenadier Guards, the Berkshire Regiment, the 24th Company of the Royal Engineers, two Gardner guns, manned by the Naval Brigade, the Mounted Infantry, and one troop of the 9th Bengal Cavalry.

A finer body of men than that which was now assembled was probably never got together. They were in the best of spirits, and looked forward with eagerness to meeting the enemy. The size and composition of the force were such as to render any possibility of it receiving a check from Osman Digna out of the question.

The place where it was hoped the engagement would come off was the spot where Graham had encountered such severe resistance just twelve months before. This time it was determined to be prepared to meet any number of the enemy.

The march was resumed at 10.15 a.m., the whole force marching in square. It was composed of 8,175 officers and men, 1,361 horses, 1,639 camels, 930 mules, and 1,773 camp-followers.

Soon after starting, an attempt was made to reconnoitre from the balloon, and parties of the enemy were reported to be discovered some miles in front. The wind, however, increased to such an extent as to render the balloon unserviceable, and at eleven it had to be packed up.

The following details of the operations are taken mainly from General Graham's despatch.

"The square advanced slowly with frequent halts, owing to the density of bush in the neighbourhood of the zeriba.

"At 12.15 p.m., about three miles from zeriba No. 1, the Cavalry and Mounted Infantry reported the presence of the enemy in the bush in scattered groups, a few being on camels and the main portion on foot. These appeared to be at first advancing through the bush, but gradually fell back before the advance of the Cavalry.

"At 12.45 p.m. the force halted for a short time, and at 1.30 p.m. the enemy were reported as retiring towards the Teselah Hills and Tamaai. At 2 p.m., about three miles from the Teselah Hills, the force halted for water and food, and the Mounted Infantry and a squadron of the 9th Bengal Cavalry were ordered to reconnoitre the position on these hills, reported to be lined with the enemy.

"At first the enemy seemed inclined to defend the position, but their flanks being threatened they fell back on Tamaai. Teselah, a group of bare rocky hills, about 100 feet high, but practicable for guns, was occupied by the Mounted Infantry and Bengal Cavalry at three o'clock. From these hills an excellent view was obtained of the scattered villages of New Tamaai, lying between the ridges of low hills beyond Teselah, and the deep ravine Khor Ghoub, beyond which the country becomes exceedingly mountainous and intersected by ravines with precipitous sides.

"The Mounted Infantry were ordered to push on to the village, find out if it was occupied, and then, if practicable, move on to the water and water the horses. One company advanced about a mile south through a village, when fire was opened on them from another village further south; while the company moving towards the water in the Khor Ghoub were fired upon by the enemy on the ridges near. The fire was returned, and the Mounted Infantry fell back to the Teselah Hill, where they were ordered to join the Cavalry, and return to No. 1 zeriba for the night."

The main body of the force reached the Teselah Hills at 5 p.m., when the usual zeriba (2) was formed.

About 1 a.m., on the 3rd, shots were fired into the camp from about 800 to 1,000 yards. The moon was shining brightly, and the men at once stood to their arms, and the Grenadier Guards answered by a volley. This and a shrapnel shell silenced the enemy, not, however, before one of Graham's men had been killed and two wounded.

At 4.30, on the 3rd, the troops were aroused, and the zeriba being left in charge of McNeill with the East Surrey and Shropshire Regiments, the advance was resumed at eight.

Graham's object was to gain possession of a cluster of villages at New Tamaai which had long been Osman Digna's head-quarters, and to secure the water supply, either by attacking the enemy's position, or by drawing them into an engagement on the open ground near the villages. The ground over which the men advanced was rough and broken. It was free from bush, but was intersected with deep gullies, and studded with jutting rocks and boulders.

At 8.45 fire was opened at long range by about 200 Arabs on the Mounted Infantry and Bengal Cavalry in front. This was replied to. It soon became evident that the enemy were unable to oppose any serious resistance to the advance of the column.

The force proceeded through the villages, which were found to have been recently deserted, and at 9.30 the crest of the north side of the Khor Ghoub was gained.

The Mounted Infantry and Bengal Cavalry were all this time engaging the enemy on the right flank, but were unable to draw them from their positions.

The 2nd Brigade, under General Hudson, now moved to the right, advanced across the Khor Ghoub, and ascended the hill on the opposite bank. The Berkshire Regiment, with the Marines on their right, opened fire from the highest point in the centre of the hill, and the Scots Guards threw out a company to fire up the khor. The Guards' Brigade and Australian Regiment moved forward in support of the 2nd Brigade, crowning the ridges on the north side of the khor. G Battery of the Royal Horse Artillery came into action on the left flank of the 1st Brigade, and opened fire on some parties of the enemy.

During those operations the enemy were keeping up a distant fire, which resulted in one man being killed, and one officer and fifteen men wounded. The enemy's numbers and loss it was impossible to estimate with any accuracy, but a steady, well-aimed fire was kept up on such bodies as showed themselves, and the effect of the fire was to overcome any opposition they may have intended to make.

On descending to the bed of the khor it was found that at the spot where the previous year was running water, there were no signs of water beyond a little moisture, and well-holes partly filled in. By digging about four feet down only a small supply of brackish water could be obtained, and at a short distance there was a shallow pool on a bed of black mud.

It is probable that this failure of the water supply had had much to do with the disappearance of Osman Digna's forces.

Graham's force had brought with it only three days' supply of water, and this failure of the wells at Tamaai rendered it dangerous to advance against Tamanieb, for should the wells there be found to be also waterless, the position of the army would become very serious.

Under these circumstances, and in view of the retirement of the enemy, and their evident inability or indisposition to meet the force, the General considered it best to withdraw, as it would have been fruitless to attempt to follow Osman Digna into the mountainous country with no water for the transport animals.

At 10.20 a.m. Graham ordered the withdrawal of the force, by alternate brigades, from the position which had been taken up. By 10.40 a.m. the troops had recrossed the khor, the movement being covered by two Horse Artillery guns on the ridge to the north, which fired a few rounds of shrapnel at detached parties of the enemy.

New Tamaai was ordered to be destroyed, and it was fired as the troops retired through it. Considerable quantities of ammunition were destroyed. Osman Digna's residence is believed to have been among the huts burnt.

At noon the force reached No. 2 zeriba at the Teselah Hill. As the troops fell back a handful of Arabs made their way, parallel to the line of march, along the distant hills to the right, keeping up a running fire on the British column. From zeriba No. 2 the force moved gradually back to the other zeriba, and thence to Souakim.

The total casualties were one man killed and six wounded. Only seven men fell out during the march.

It was a severe disappointment to the troops that, after all their exertions, the marches in the blazing sun to and from the zeribas, and the loss of life in previous engagements, the enemy should refuse to await the attack, and that the want of water should prevent the column following him up. The temporary occupation, followed by the destruction, of a wretched village, was a very inadequate result to show after such extensive preparation, and so much labour and effort.

From the 11th to the 20th April, Graham was occupied in making reconnaissances to Hasheen, Otao, Deberet, and Tambouk, taking a few prisoners, and capturing sheep and cattle.

The construction of the railway was at the same time pushed forward, till it was close to Otao, making altogether a total distance of eighteen miles.

Meanwhile, Osman Digna's followers amused themselves cutting the telegraph wires and damaging the railway works as opportunities offered.

They also made nightly attacks on Graham's camp. In order to check this, a series of automatic mines, to explode when trodden on, was placed outside the British lines. It does not appear that this measure answered the purpose intended, although an accidental explosion of one of the mines resulted in the loss of a promising young officer, Lieutenant Askwith, of the Royal Engineers.

Osman Digna's exact position at this period seems to have been somewhat of a puzzle to Graham, but on the 22nd he was able to telegraph that Osman was for the time without any large following, and that his people were greatly discouraged by their losses in the various engagements, and also in want of food.

The question of withdrawing the expedition now arose. Graham was most unwilling to retire without having achieved something decisive, and on the 26th he telegraphed that he strongly recommended crushing Osman before the expedition should be withdrawn. He added, that with Osman crushed, the country would be at peace, and the native allies safe; whereas if the British force were withdrawn he would soon become as strong as ever, would threaten Souakim, and punish the friendly tribes.

In the beginning of May Lord Wolseley arrived at Souakim and from that moment the question of what was to be done was taken out of Graham's hands.

The Government had made up its mind, so far as such an operation was possible, not to go on with the railway to Berber at all events for the present, and the inutility of keeping the expedition in Souakim in face of the policy of abandoning the Soudan, referred to in the following chapter, generally, naturally struck Lord Wolseley.

On the 4th May he telegraphed to Lord Hartington that if it was positively decided not to push forward the railway as part of the campaign against the Mahdi at Khartoum, he advised the immediate embarkation of the Guards, the navvies, and Australians, leaving only the Indian Contingent and one British battalion for a garrison at Souakim. He added, on the 5th, that the heat was increasing, and the men of the expedition would soon become sickly; that he did not think the further operations wished for by Graham were, in face of the hot weather, desirable. Among other suggestions he proposed to the Government to send back to England the ships laden with railway material, and to take up the railway before the troops fell back.

This despatch suggests the idea that Wolseley was beginning to get a little tired of giving advice to a Government which was always asking his opinion and never acting upon it.

On the 8th he was instructed that the Government adhered to the decision to adopt the proposal for defence of the frontier in his despatch of 14th April, but that the Government did not approve of his suggestion to take up the railway and ship off the plant; but that he should arrange to hold the line, pending consideration whether it would be carried onwards.

This last despatch was too much for Wolseley, who appears to have thought it hard enough to have to carry out a policy of which he disapproved, without having the initiation of it attributed to himself; and in his despatch of the 11th he replied, "What you term my proposals, were the military dispositions recommended in order to give effect to your policy at Souakim, to stop the railway, and send away as many troops as could be spared for service elsewhere. If the garrison here is to be seriously reduced, the railway must be either taken up or abandoned." He added, "Unless you have some clearly defined Soudan policy to initiate, any military operations, such as the extension of the railway would entail, would be to throw away uselessly valuable lives."

On the 13th Wolseley was instructed that the Government adopted the dispositions recommended in his telegram of the 5th. This was followed by preparations for the immediate embarkation of the expedition.

Before this, Graham had on the 5th made a raid on Takool, a village ten miles south of Otao, and twenty west of Souakim, and driven out the enemy, reported to be 700 strong. Graham's force burnt Takool, and captured between 1,500 and 2,000 sheep and goats in this the last exploit of the campaign.

The railway works were now discontinued, the troops called in from Otao, and the navvies withdrawn. As the last truckload came in from the front, it was followed and fired on by jeering Soudanese.

The store-ships, which had for weeks been lying in the roads with rails, plant, and machinery not yet unloaded, were ordered back to England with their cargoes.

On the 17th May Graham and his staff left Souakim with the Coldstream Guards. The Grenadiers, as well as the Australians and Scots Guards, sailed the following day.

The remainder of the troops followed shortly after, and before the end of the month the whole of the expedition, with the exception of the Shropshire Regiment and a portion of the Indian Contingent, had left Souakim.

Of the results obtained by the expedition, there is but little to say. Its departure left Osman Digna still uncrushed, and the Souakim-Berber route still unopened; and Osman was enabled in 1885 to boast, as he had done in 1884, that he had driven the British out of the country.[136]

This expedition was of far greater strength than its predecessor, and it is no disparagement to the officers and men engaged in it to say that their exploits did not equal those of the expedition of 1884. Tamaai, Handoub, and other positions had been taken and occupied temporarily, and a small portion of the railway had been made. This represented about the sum total of results.[137]