CHAPTER XXXV.

GRAHAM'S VICTORY AT TAMAAI.

By the 9th of March the change of base from Trinkitat to Souakim had been completed.

On the same day the Black Watch marched out and occupied a zeriba constructed by Baker some weeks before, and distant about eight miles on the road from Souakim to Sinkat.

According to the account given by a correspondent, before they moved off the ground Graham addressed them on parade. To the amazement of every one who heard him, he said that, although he claimed to have the reputation of the Black Watch as much at heart as any of them, he could not say that he was altogether pleased with their performance the other day at El-Teb. He was understood to refer to the fact that the regiment had not broken into the double when amongst the enemy's rifle-pits, and to the rate at which they had fired away their ammunition. But to show that he had not lost confidence in them, he went on to say he was going to place the Black Watch in front throughout the coming operations.

With that unfortunate speech rankling in the minds of both officers and men, the General sent the regiment on its way. Not only was the speech ill-advised, but, as every one knew except Graham himself, it was unjust. Its effect was apparent later on.

Owing to the absence of a breeze and the intense heat, the men were unable to proceed except at the slowest rate and with frequent halts. Even then there were hundreds of stragglers from the ranks. The officers did all in their power to keep the men together, but it was nearly 1 p.m. before they were all got to the zeriba. Five men suffered attacks of sunstroke, and many others were temporarily disabled by heat and exhaustion.

Camels and mules conveying water and stores kept arriving from Souakim during the 9th and 10th, by the end of which time a large quantity of water, ammunition, and provisions had been collected at the zeriba. At 6 p.m. on the 11th the artillery and infantry advanced to the zeriba, which they reached at midnight. There was a bright moon, and the night air was soft and pleasant, so that the march did not distress the men, although it was hard work for the Naval Brigade.

The strength of the force was as follows:--

Royal Artillery, 176 men.

1st Infantry Brigade, under General Buller: Royal Engineers, 62 men; 3rd Battalion King's Own Rifles, 565 men; Gordon Highlanders (75th), 712 men; Royal Irish Fusiliers (89th), 343 men.

2nd Infantry Brigade, under General Davis: Royal Highlanders (42nd Black Watch), 623 men[99]; York and Lancaster (65th), 435 men; Royal Marine Artillery and Light Infantry, 478 men.

At daybreak on the 12th the cavalry, comprised of 251 men of the 10th Hussars, 362 men of the 19th Hussars, and 124 of the Mounted Infantry, arrived at the zeriba, where the total force now amounted to 4,069 men.

About 10 a.m. it was reported that the enemy was in force some six miles distant. Accordingly, the troops were ordered to advance towards Tamaai as soon as the men had had their dinners. About 1 p.m. the force began to move.

The following diagram explains the formation:--

The 1st Brigade, under Buller, marched on the right rear of the other, at a distance varying from 600 to 900 yards in an oblique line. In military language the two brigades moved in echelon, the 2nd Brigade leading, the object being to expose the enemy, in the event of his charging one brigade, to a raking or flank fire from the other. The rear battalions and the half-battalions on either flank of each brigade marched at wheeling distances, so that on the word to form outwards being given, two complete squares could be formed. The two brigades were thus placed so as to form two independent oblongs, the front face or line of each brigade being about 200 yards in length, the sides about 100 yards. The main body of the cavalry was echeloned on the left rear of the 2nd Brigade.

It will be seen that, although the force at Tamaai was about the same as that at El-Teb, a different formation was adopted. The unwieldiness of a single great square had been shown by experience. It had the further disadvantage that, in the event of an attack on one side, the fire of at least two of the other sides could not be utilized. There was, moreover, the old adage against "putting all one's eggs in one basket." The comparatively difficult ground which had to be got over at Tamaai was probably another reason for the change.

The line of march was about south-west. The Mounted Infantry having reported that the low hills, six miles in front, were clear of the enemy, it was deemed advisable to gain and occupy them before dark, and, if possible, attack the enemy and drive them from their position near the wells. The afternoon was hot, and frequent halts were necessary. The ground was covered with grass knee-deep, scrub and brushwood, and in some places the prickly mimosa and cactus were seven feet high.

By 3.30 the highest hill of the range was reached by the cavalry scouts, and the broad intervening valley of Tamaai could be seen from its summit through the haze. About four o'clock the infantry squares reached the base of the hill and halted for a few minutes, whilst the scouts were pushed forwards. At five o'clock they came in and reported that the enemy, estimated at 4,000 men, were advancing to the attack.

The force was at once formed up in a defensive position on a favourable piece of ground, having a clear space of 100 yards to the front, and, as there was now barely an hour of daylight left, the Engineers and pioneers were set to work to form a zeriba round the camp by cutting down the mimosa bushes which grew plentifully about. Before this the enemy had fired a few rifle shots and had shown in some numbers on a ridge about 1,200 yards distant. By way of checking this, and to show the power of the guns, two of the 9-pounders and a Gardner gun fired a few rounds, and the enemy disappeared.

The operations of the day thus closed, the cavalry were sent back to Baker's zeriba to water their horses, and, tired with their day's exertion, the infantry lay down within the irregularly-shaped square formed by the mimosa bushes. The men lay two deep and slept with their great-coats on and their arms beside them. Orders were given that all lights should be extinguished at nine.

About a quarter to one on the morning of the 13th there was an alarm, and the enemy opened a distant dropping fire, which continued throughout the night, causing few casualties, but disturbing the men's rest. One man of the York and Lancaster was killed, and five, including an officer, were wounded, as well as some camel drivers and horses.

At sunrise a 9-pounder and the Gardner gun were run out and made some excellent practice at a range of 1,300 yards, dispersing the enemy, who retired to their main position near the wells of Tamaai. About 7 a.m. Stewart arrived with his cavalry, and at 7.30 ordered out the Mounted Infantry to feel the enemy. At 8 o'clock the whole force moved out from their bivouac. A native who accompanied the troops, and who had lately been a prisoner in Osman Digna's camp, informed General Graham that the bulk of the enemy's force would be in a deep khor, or watercourse, the sides of which would serve as an intrenchment. Graham therefore directed the advance to be made to the left of this position, where the ground rose a little, intending (as he stated in his despatch) to sweep the ravine with artillery fire before attacking.

The advance was made by the two brigades in squares marching in echelon. Owing to some slight delay in getting the 1st Brigade forward, the 2nd (which General Graham and his staff now joined) was somewhat further in advance than was intended when they first came in contact with the enemy. The route lay towards the south-south-east, across a sloping plateau intersected by dry watercourses, towards a deep ravine, full of boulders and huge detached rocks.[100] The morning was bright and clear, with a brilliant sun, but there was no wind, as at El-Teb, to carry off the smoke. This, as will be seen, became important.

As the brigades advanced the black forms of the Soudanese were seen ranged along the hills on the front and right of the British force. Two squadrons of cavalry, together with some Abyssinian scouts, were sent forward to skirmish and endeavour to clear the bushes through which the infantry had to advance. The skirmishers had not gone far before they became hotly engaged. Captain Humphreys, in command, sent back word that the ravine was occupied in force. Although this was only a few hundred yards in front, it was so hidden by bushes as to be invisible to the infantry.

About twenty minutes after starting, the 2nd Brigade was halted to re-form itself from the somewhat loose order into which it had fallen in its advance over the rough ground. At half-past eight it was moving slowly towards the ravine, which extended itself irregularly all along the front, and was from 900 to 1,000 yards off. The 1st Brigade, 700 yards distant to the right and rear, was timing its movements and taking its ground step by step with the 2nd Brigade.

Some 5,000 or 6,000 Soudanese were now visible, the greater part being on the south, or more distant, side of the ravine, here about 50 to 100 yards wide. Some hundreds of them were also among the bushes to the right as well as in the immediate front. They opened fire on the 2nd Brigade, but the greater part of the bullets flew harmlessly overhead. The skirmishers were withdrawn, and as soon as they were out of the line of fire, the brigade replied, the men firing independently as they advanced. When the square got within 200 yards of the ravine, a series of broken and irregular rushes was made by the Soudanese on the front; but the fire of the Martinis prevented any of the enemy getting at this time within twenty yards of the British line. The front became soon comparatively clear of foes, and then (about 9 a.m.) Graham[101] gave the order, "Forty-second, charge!" and the Black Watch, forming the left half face of the square, remembering the General's speech of two days before, cheered, and, regardless of consequences, broke away at the double. The 65th half battalion, on the right face of the square, had no order given to them, but seeing the Highlanders dash ahead, they too rushed on. The front rank of the square charged up to within thirty yards from the edge of the ravine, then slackened speed, and, though still advancing, recommenced firing. The order was given to "Cease firing," but the men, seeing armed natives spring up in every direction right and left, were not to be controlled, and continued to blaze away.

The enemy were now swarming on the ridges on the opposite side of the ravine, and the Gatling and Gardner guns, which had been run out a few yards in front of the right corner of the square, were turned upon them. Many were observed running down the slopes, and disappearing among the rocks in the little valley intervening. In the absence of any wind, the smoke from the guns hung around the column in thick folds, totally obscuring the view. Under cover of this smoke, hundreds of the Soudanese crept up the near side of the ravine, and threw themselves upon the right front and right flank of the square, which fell back in disorder. The 65th, unable to resist the onslaught, were thrown back in confusion upon the Marines in the rear, numbers being knocked off their legs in the rush. Their colonel (Byam) and four of his officers were thrown down. Soldiers and savages alike went trampling over them. As the colonel lay, he was assailed by four spearmen, but with his revolver he shot one at each touch of the trigger. The colonel rose up, and whilst the main body of his regiment was breaking up, rallied some thirty of his men, who, standing back to back, repelled with bayonet-thrusts the assaults of the Soudanese who encircled them. Fifteen of the men of the 65th fell where they stood.

As the 65th on the right face and corner were borne back from the edge of the ravine, the right wing of the 42nd became exposed, and the enemy, rushing in at the gap, were among the Highlanders on their flank and rear, cutting and spearing in every direction. The 42nd then recoiled several paces, the movement, according to one correspondent, "resembling the slow swing of a door on its hinges."

The condition of the column was something like this:--

An officer appropriately compared the appearance of his part of the yielding line to the scramble in a game of football. The men were so huddled together that many of them were unable either to fire their rifles or use their bayonets. Captain Scott Stevenson, of the 42nd, was suddenly seized by the legs by some Soudanese, who were crawling on the ground. One of them dragged at the frogs of his kilt, and then at his "sporran." The Captain, who was one of the best boxers in the army, literally kicked himself clear, and his claymore being too long a weapon to use at such close quarters, he laid about him with its hilt and with his fists.

The Marines in rear of the Brigade were wheeled up to support the 65th and close the gaps left in the formation, but it was too late, and they too were thrown into confusion, and borne away on the line of retreat. Graham and his staff tried their best to check the movement and rally the men. As the Marines were being swept away, Major Colwell shouted in stentorian tones, "Men of the Portsmouth Division, rally," which they did, 150 of them closing together in a compact body, forming a little square. The Highlanders also formed one or two such groups, and materially assisted in bringing about the general rally which soon followed. In spite of every effort, however, the whole force fell back about 800 yards, in a direction to the eastward of that taken in the advance.

The Naval Brigade, which had been sent to the front with the machine-guns, during the rush lost three of their officers, Lieutenants Montresor, Almack, and Houston Stewart, and many of their men. The guns had to be abandoned, partly owing to the hurried retreat, and partly because of the nature of the ground. Before retiring, the Naval Brigade found time to lock the guns, so as to prevent the enemy, who immediately captured them, from making any use of the weapons in the short interval which elapsed before they were retaken.

Instances of individual heroism were not wanting at this trying moment. One Highlander, seeing three or four mounted sheikhs, who were hounding on their men, rushed out at the leader of them and bayoneted him on his horse. Whilst the Black Watch were retiring, hard pressed, a private rushed at one of the enemy who was slashing right and left, and ran him through with his bayonet, so violently that he had to drag the wounded man with him for some distance before the soldier could extract the weapon. Every soldier who stumbled or fell during the retreat was at once done for, the enemy darting forward in squads and thrusting their spears into him as long as a sign of life remained. The nature of the struggle may be gathered from the fact that of twenty men who formed a section of a company of the Black Watch when charging up to the ravine, only three escaped alive, and they were badly wounded.

As has been related above, the formation of isolated groups among the retreating soldiers assisted to bring about the rally which took place in about twenty minutes. But a more powerful aid, and one without which Davis's square might have shared the fate of Baker's force at El-Teb, was at hand. The 1st Brigade, under Buller, had been attacked at the same time as the 2nd Brigade, and from its position at some 400 to 500 yards distance from the ravine, it had the advantage of a wider fire radius. The men were formed in square, the 75th on the right, and the 89th on the left being the leading regiments with the 60th in the rear and the 9 and 7-pounder guns in the centre. Whilst the narrowness of the space between the slope and the 2nd Brigade enabled the enemy to "rush" the square before the infantry had time to fire more than a round or two, the distance between the slope and Buller's troops rendered it impossible for the enemy to reach them in face of a well-directed fire. Not one of the Soudanese who ran nearer than eighty yards to Buller's square lived to tell the tale. There was no hurry, no flurry in the handling of this brigade. The men formed up, shoulder to shoulder, in leisurely order when they saw the enemy coming on. Their deliberate volleys sounded like the harsh grating sound of the sea on a shingly beach, and when the smoke drifted slowly away the plain reappeared black with the bodies of the dead and dying.

Not content with attacking Buller's square in the front and on the flanks, the enemy even passed round to the rear, so that, at one time, all four sides were engaged. So well, however, was the brigade handled, and so steady were the men, that this made no difference. Buller was able, not only to hold his own ground, but also to assist the 2nd Brigade. As this fell back, it got to the left of Buller's square, and the General, seeing that something was wrong, moved up a short distance, and began pouring in a heavy cross fire upon the Soudanese who were assailing the other brigade. At the same time Stewart, moving his cavalry round to the left flank of Buller's square, dismounted his men, and fired a volley into the enemy's right flank. The Soudanese were thus between two fires.

Now, covered by the fire of the 1st Brigade and by the cavalry, Davis's square rallied. The retreating troops were halted and re-formed, this time in line with the Marines on the right, the 65th in the centre, and the 42nd, with 160 of the Naval Brigade in their rear, on the left. After a quarter of an hour's halt, a fresh supply of ammunition having been served out to each man, the 2nd Brigade went once more to the attack.

The soldiers were forbidden to fire until the enemy should come well within range, and on this occasion they obeyed orders more faithfully, marching slowly and clearing the ground of the enemy as they advanced. Thanks to the position taken by the 1st Brigade, which had now moved up 200 yards closer to the ravine and halted, Buller was able to pour a raking fire into the enemy, and so prevent any attempt to again "rush" Davis's flank.

The position was thus:--

In ten minutes the lost ground was regained and the guns recaptured. They were immediately hauled into position, and fired a few rounds at the enemy, who began to move off to the opposite slopes of the ravine, within twenty paces of which Davis's force halted at 11 a.m.

It was now the turn of the 1st Brigade, which, still in square formation, was sent off to take a second intervening ridge some 800 yards off. Forward down and across the ravine went the brigade. With a cheer the men took the first ridge, firing as they went along occasional shots at the enemy's main body, who could be seen gathered on the second ridge beyond. The Soudanese, disheartened, kept up a feeble fire, retreating as the brigade advanced. The defence of the second ridge was insignificant, and it was carried without difficulty.

From the top Tamaai could be seen in the valley 180 feet below, with the tents and huts of Osman Digna's camp. By 11.40 a.m. these were in the possession of the British forces.

Osman Digna was not present at the battle, preferring to watch the action from the top of a neighbouring hill. His cousin, Mohammed Mousa, commanded the enemy's forces, and was shot at the commencement of the engagement.

Squads of men were told off to search for the wounded, a task of some danger, on account of the number of partially disabled Soudanese lying in the bush. Here, as at El-Teb, wounded Arabs refused to accept quarter, but waited an opportunity to spring out and attack any of the soldiers who came sufficiently close. An eye-witness wrote as follows:--

"One wounded savage lay half reclining on a sloping bank near the spot where the Gatling gun had been rolled into the ravine. He was badly wounded in the leg, a bullet having shattered his knee. Grasping his heavy broad-bladed spear, he looked defiance and mischief at the soldiers as they approached. A bluejacket was the first to venture near him, and although Jack had his rifle and cutlass attached, he liked not the far-reaching spear. The troops were forbidden to fire, and there was nothing for it but to tackle the man with steel. The deft handling of the spear, wounded as the foe was, made Jack cautious. I looked and watched. A soldier now stole up on the opposite side of the Hadendowa, but even then the savage, like a wounded stag at bay, was not to be trifled with. A mean subterfuge, cunning stratagem, or what you will you may call it, prevailed. A stone thrown at the Arab's head stunned him for the moment, and before he recovered the bluejacket had plunged his cutlass into him, bending the weapon into such a hoop shape that he could barely withdraw it."

The British losses were as follows:--Killed: Lieut. Montresor, _Euryalus_; Lieut. Almack, _Briton_; Lieut. Houston Stewart, _Dryad_; Capt. H. G. W. Ford, York and Lancaster; Major Aitken, Royal Highlanders; and 86 non-commissioned officers and privates. Wounded: Seven officers and 103 non-commissioned officers and privates. Missing: Nineteen men. Of the above, three officers and eleven men were killed at the taking of the guns, and the loss of the 2nd Brigade at the time of the square being broken was 70 in killed alone. The number of the enemy was originally reported by Graham as being from 10,000 to 12,000, and the loss as over 2,000 in killed. According to one account, over 1,500 lay dead in an area of 200 yards; 600 of these were counted on the spot where the square was broken. Another account puts the total number of the enemy's forces engaged at 9,000, and the loss in killed and wounded 2,400. No prisoners were taken.

Of the nature of the surprise intended for him at the ravine, Graham had ample warning beforehand. Nevertheless he moved his men almost up to the brink of the spot where the enemy lay in ambush, and very nearly brought about a disaster.

As to the order given to a part of the front rank to charge, it is unnecessary to say anything in its condemnation. The charge was made at nothing. The front rank of the square doubled, whilst the sides and rear only followed at quick time. It was, as a critic remarked, taking the lid off the box.

Of the conduct of the soldiers of the 2nd Brigade it is impossible to speak too highly. It was in consequence of a sheer military blunder that the front of the square got separated from the rest, and that the men were driven back by the surging mass of Soudanese; but it was proof of the highest discipline and coolness that under these circumstances the men, compelled to retire, kept their faces steadily toward the enemy, and were able to re-form without panic or confusion.

The feeling of the troops, or at all events of the 2nd Brigade, after the battle, was that they had been victorious, in spite of the mismanagement of their superiors. The men of the Black Watch were especially sore at what had occurred. Their idea was that they had been needlessly exposed. They had a grievance ever since the beginning of the campaign. At El-Teb they had been expected to charge rifle-pits in which hundreds of the enemy were concealed. As this movement would have caused great loss, the advance was made deliberately. For this the regiment had, as has already been mentioned, been severely taken to task. To enable them to retrieve their supposed loss of reputation, the Black Watch were placed in the position of honour and danger at Tamaai, and when the order to double against the enemy, thus, as it turned out, breaking the square, was given, they obeyed promptly, though, as they said, "We knew the order was foolish, but we were put on our mettle." "It was of no use," they argued, "to form a square if it was to rush at the enemy in fragments."

Before returning to Souakim on the 15th of March, parties of Engineers were told off to complete the destruction of Osman Digna's camp at Tamaai. This extended over a level plain two miles in length, surrounded by naked rocks. The camp, as well as the huts and stores, were soon in a blaze in scores of different places, the flames shooting up to a great height, and volumes of smoke obscuring the view between the camp and the distant hills. One feature of the scene was the explosion of the magazines, containing about 600,000 rifle cartridges, captured from Baker at El-Teb, besides a large quantity of Krupp and machine-gun ammunition.

The British forces being once more concentrated at Souakim, Admiral Hewett issued a proclamation offering 5,000 dollars for the head of Osman Digna. Whether this step was in accordance with the rules of civilized warfare or not may well be doubted. At all events, it created a strong feeling of indignation in England, and in three days the Admiral, acting under instructions from home, withdrew the objectionable document.

On the 18th the 19th Hussars, the Mounted Infantry, and the Gordon Highlanders made a march to the wells of Handouk, a few miles from Souakim. They found them all deserted, and no signs of the enemy. A zeriba was formed at the base of a detached hill held by a company of the Highlanders. News was brought to the camp that Osman Digna's force was increasing, and that he had announced his intention of renewing the fighting. He was reported to have 2,000 men with him.

On the 19th General Stewart, with two squadrons of Hussars, went to Otao, eight miles further west, in search of the enemy, but in vain. A squadron was also sent to Tamanieb, where Osman was reported to be, but found no traces of him.

On the 21st two batteries of artillery and also the 10th Hussars were moved out to Handouk.

On the 23rd the Gordon Highlanders were sent to a point near the entrance of the Tamanieb valley to form a new zeriba in conjunction with a company of the 89th, which marched from Souakim to join them, with water and stores.

On the 25th General Graham marched with two brigades, under Buller and Davis respectively, to a zeriba eleven miles from Souakim.

The march-out was a most exhausting one on account of the heat, and between 300 and 400 men fell out of the ranks. There were numerous cases of sunstroke. According to one account, the number of men who fell out was equal to one-fourth of the whole force, the rear of which, it is said, resembled a routed army. Many of the sick found room in the ambulances, and others trudged along as best they could on foot. The men were now becoming tired and disgusted with the campaign, and there was a good deal of grumbling and dissatisfaction in the ranks.

The whole force bivouacked when nine miles from Souakim, and the night's rest restored the men who had fallen out during the march, and all but four returned to duty on the morning of the 26th.

Stewart's brigade of cavalry left the camp shortly after 9 a.m. for Tamanieb. Graham's orders were that operations should be confined to reconnoitring, the troops to fall back on learning the enemy's position. For the first five miles the route lay across a plain through patches of mimosa. After this, the hills were reached. Small parties of the enemy were seen mounted on dromedaries, watching the force. On a hill 600 feet high Stewart established a heliograph station for signalling to the zeriba in the rear. After another five miles' march, a second signal station was placed among the hills. From this point the enemy's position could be seen two miles distant. Behind them were the wells of Tamanieb. The number of the enemy appeared, at first, to be about 3,000, though it subsequently turned out much less. It was now half-past one, and the Mounted Infantry advanced to within 700 yards, keeping up a fire meanwhile. This skirmishing was continued till 3 o'clock, when, the object of the reconnaissance having been attained, General Stewart withdrew to the first signal station. Here he was met by General Buller, who had advanced with the 75th and 89th Regiments, having left camp at ten. In the afternoon the remainder of the force, with the exception of the 65th Regiment and the sick, also advanced, and joined Buller at the first signal station, where a new zeriba was formed. A quiet night was passed at the advanced zeriba.

Shortly after 5 a.m. on the following day, the entire force, numbering 3,000 men, marched out. The Mounted Infantry scouted along the ridges to the right and left flanks, but there was for some time no sign of the enemy.

It was cool at first, owing to the early hour at which the march commenced, and there were no sick. The men were in the best of spirits, not only at the prospect of offering the enemy battle, but because they believed that the impending engagement would end the campaign. The troops went forward very slowly on account of the rocky nature of the ground. About fifty men fell out owing to the heat. As the hostile position was approached, the Mounted Infantry and a squadron of Hussars were sent forward to occupy the ground held during the skirmish of the previous day. When they advanced the enemy opened a fire, to which the troopers replied.

At nine Graham brought up the reserve of the Mounted Infantry, leaving the two Infantry Brigades in the rear. Shortly after this, the enemy's fire slackened. Half-an-hour afterwards the 1st Brigade had advanced far enough for the 9-pounders to open fire on the enemy, of whom only small bodies could be seen.

At ten the cavalry skirmishers were within 100 yards of the Tamanieb Khor, and the Soudanese were seen retreating _en masse_ to the right and left. Close at hand were the wells, and the troops, instead of pursuing, were halted for a quarter of an hour to water the horses, which were suffering greatly from thirst. The soldiers, too, drank copiously after their march. When the cavalry formed up and moved along the wells to the village the enemy had disappeared. There was no resistance, and Graham ordered the burning of the village. This was immediately carried out, and the huts, some 300 in number, were soon in a blaze.

There were no casualties on the side of the British, nor do any of the accounts refer to any loss on the part of the enemy, who, according to one report, did not number over 100 altogether.

After this achievement the troops started on the return march to Souakim.

The whole of the force reached Souakim on the 28th, and with the exception of a battalion left to garrison that place was at once broken up, the troops from Egypt returning to Cairo, and the remainder proceeding to England. No trustworthy information was obtained as to the position or force of Osman Digna, though the village of Tamanieb showed signs of a recent occupation by his army. Under these circumstances, to attempt to pursue Osman further into the interior was considered to be impracticable. The troops, too, were again suffering from the heat, and it was deemed best to close the campaign for the season.

The rapidity of Graham's campaign was one of its most striking features. The orders for the expedition were received in Cairo on the 12th February. By the 1st of March a force of over 4,000 men had been assembled at Trinkitat, had fought the battle of El-Teb, and had brought away the fugitives from Tokar. Starting from Souakim on the 11th March, the expedition had by the 28th fought the battle of Tamaai, occupied the enemy's position at Tamanieb, and terminated the campaign.

Besides serving to develop the admirable qualities of the British soldier under trying conditions, the campaign cannot be said to have achieved any permanent result, it having only shattered and not annihilated, Osman Digna.

The ill effects of the withdrawal of Graham's force upon the rebellious tribes cannot well be exaggerated. Notwithstanding their repeated defeats they easily persuaded themselves that they had driven the English out of the country, and the policy of "Rescue and retire" pursued by the British Government was the means of laying up a store of future trouble for Souakim and the neighbourhood.

Although there was no further opportunity of fighting Osman Digna at this period, the question naturally arises, whether at all events part of Graham's force might not have been usefully employed in assisting Gordon in withdrawing the Egyptian garrisons.

One pretext for the battles of El-Teb and Tamaai was the necessity for opening the road to Berber. On March 25th Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice said:--"One thing was perfectly certain, that it was of the very greatest importance, with a view to keeping open communications with Khartoum, that the road between Souakim and Berber should itself be open." As the road between Souakim and Berber was the short cut out of the Soudan, the importance of keeping it open could hardly have been ignored by a Government concerned in the task of extricating from the Soudan an army of 29,000 men with all the civil employés and their wives and families. Gordon could hold Khartoum, but by no possible miracle could he keep open the road hundreds of miles in his rear by which he had to send the troops and refugees down to Egypt. Hence, he suggested to the Government that if they wished to intervene, they should open up the Souakim-Berber route by Indian Moslem troops.

After the victory at Tamaai Graham could have sent a few squadrons of cavalry through to Berber with ease, and he was anxious to do so. Two squadrons would, in the opinion of all the authorities in the Soudan, have sufficed to open the road and to save Berber, which was the key of the Soudan, and without the retention of which evacuation was hopeless. General Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood both agreed that the move was possible, although Stephenson disliked it, owing to the scarcity of water on the road.

On February 29th Gordon had telegraphed:--

"There is not much chance of the situation improving, and every chance of it getting worse; for we have nothing to rely on to make it better. You must, therefore, decide whether you will or will not make an attempt to save the two-thirds of the population who are well affected before these two-thirds retreat. Should you wish to intervene, send 200 British troops to Wady Halfa, and adjutants to inspect Dongola, and then open up Souakim-Berber road by Indian Moslem troops. This will cause an immediate collapse of the revolt."

On March 2nd he telegraphed:--

"I have no option about staying at Khartoum; it has passed out of my hands, and as to sending a larger force than 200, I do not think it necessary to Wady Halfa. It is not the number, but the prestige which I need. I am sure the revolt will collapse if I can say that I have British troops at my back."

On the 5th Sir Evelyn Baring wrote to Lord Granville:--

"General Gordon has on several occasions pressed for 200 British troops to be sent to Wady Halfa. I agree with the military authorities in thinking that it would not be desirable to comply with this request."

On March 11th Lord Granville replied to Gordon's urgent entreaties that "Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to send troops to Berber."

Sir Evelyn Baring, who had opposed the despatch of troops to Wady Halfa and to Berber, on March 16th recognized the necessity for action. On that day he telegraphed home:--

"It has now become of the utmost importance not only to open the road between Souakim and Berber, but to come to terms with the tribes between Berber and Khartoum."

But Lord Granville still felt unable to authorize an advance of British troops.

On March 24th Sir E. Baring telegraphed:--

"Under present circumstances, I think that an effort should be made to help General Gordon from Souakim, if it is at all a possible military operation. General Stephenson and Sir Evelyn Wood, whilst admitting the very great risk to the health of the troops, besides the extraordinary military risks, are of opinion that the undertaking is possible."

"We are daily expecting British troops. We cannot bring ourselves to believe that we are to be abandoned by the Government. Our existence depends on England," is what Mr. Power, British Consular Agent, telegraphed from Khartoum on March 23rd.

It was in vain; notwithstanding every appeal the British Government determined to refuse, until too late, the assistance asked for.