CHAPTER XXIV.

ENGLAND AND THE PORTE.

As already stated, on the 18th August Sir Garnet Wolseley started from Alexandria with the British force, and two days later Port Saïd, Ismailia, and Kantara were occupied.

Notwithstanding this, the negotiations with the Porte for the despatch of the Turkish troops were being, outwardly at least, pressed on by Lord Dufferin. The Turkish Ministers continued to make objections to the terms of the proposed Military Convention referred to in Chapter XV.

Meanwhile the export of mules, purchased in Asia Minor for the use of the British force, was stopped, and the drivers were imprisoned. The unfriendly conduct of the Turkish Government in delaying the removal of this prohibition led to remonstrances on the part of Lord Dufferin. It was not until the 23rd August that the Sultan ordered that the mules and drivers were to be allowed to be embarked.

He, at the same time, sent Lord Dufferin a personal message urging that Alexandria should be the port of disembarkation for the Turkish troops. After an interview with the Turkish Ministers, Lord Dufferin agreed to submit the Sultan's request to the British Government, and the Sultan's Ministers finally accepted all the other clauses of the Military Convention, with certain amendments. When, however, the issue of the Proclamation against Arabi was demanded, the Ministers changed round, and proposed to throw aside the Proclamation which had been agreed upon, by which Arabi was declared to be a rebel, and to issue a mere appeal to his loyalty. Lord Dufferin, assuming an air of surprise at this breach of faith, refused indignantly to listen to any such suggestion, and informed the Ministers that he would not sign the Convention until the Proclamation had been officially communicated.

On the 24th Lord Dufferin was instructed that Her Majesty's Government could not accept the amendments made in the Convention. Again the Turkish Ministers sought out Lord Dufferin with messages from the Sultan, pressing that the landing might be at Alexandria, and assuring the Ambassador that the Proclamation should be communicated the moment that the heads of the Convention were agreed to.

Things began to look as if they were in a way to be arranged, when it was discovered, on the 25th, that the instructions given for the despatch of the mules and the release of the drivers had been cancelled by an order from the Palace. Lord Dufferin was at once instructed that if this information was correct it was no longer possible for him to continue the negotiations.

On the 27th the Turkish Ministers accepted Aboukir as the place of disembarkation, and promised that before the Convention was signed they would communicate the Proclamation officially, and order its publication in Egypt. Lord Dufferin was instructed that he might sign the Convention on the preliminary condition that the mules and drivers should be released, and a promise given by the Porte to assist in sending them to Egypt, and that the Proclamation should be issued at once.

On the 29th Lord Dufferin reported that he had settled the text of the Convention with the Sultan's Ministers.

The 30th passed without any further communication from the Porte; but in the middle of the night Said Pasha called upon Lord Dufferin at Therapia, with a further message from the Sultan, urging that the troops should go to Aboukir _viâ_ Alexandria; and in the morning the Pasha came again with the Sultan's private secretary, and stated that His Majesty was ready to take any step to remove Lord Granville's misgivings if he were only allowed to land his troops at Alexandria. He was willing to reduce their number from that originally proposed to 2,000, or even 1,000. Baker Pasha might go second in command, and take with him as many English officers as he pleased, and the Turkish troops should be as much under English control as they were in the Crimea.

The extraordinary anxiety of the Sultan to show his troops in Egypt at this period is to be accounted for on the supposition that he foresaw the impending collapse of the Arabi revolt, and was desirous that it should not be accomplished without his appearing, at all events, to have taken part in its suppression. The presence of but a single Turkish battalion in Alexandria would have sufficed to enable him to claim the credit of overthrowing Arabi and his followers. It was, however, not to be. The Sultan's views were now diametrically at variance with those of the British Cabinet. Sir Garnet Wolseley was, at this time, well to the front, and there was little doubt that he would soon bring the war to a close. Under these circumstances, the presence of a Turkish force in Egypt would only be a source of embarrassment. Accordingly it was necessary to finesse and to play off upon the Porte its own tricks of delay and dissimulation. Lord Dufferin was therefore instructed to inform the Porte that Her Majesty's Government were willing to meet its proposals, and to receive 2,000, or even 3,000 troops; but that, in view of the strong objections to Alexandria, it would be preferable that the landing should take place in the Suez Canal.

On the 3rd September the Turkish Ministers were willing that the troops should go to Port Saïd, promising at the same time that the Proclamation should be issued immediately.

On the 24th August Lord Granville had authorized the Ambassador to conclude the Convention as soon as the Proclamation should be published, the words "such point or points on the Canal as may be previously arranged with the British Commander-in-Chief" being substituted for Aboukir.

On Lord Dufferin proceeding to the Porte on the 6th September to sign the Convention, he found that the Proclamation had that morning appeared in the newspapers in a changed form. Lord Dufferin thereupon declined to sign. Said Pasha said that the publication, as it stood, was an act of heedlessness, and he undertook that a correction should be published in the official journal. A further discussion ensued as to the form of the stipulation respecting the landing of the Turkish troops in the Canal, Said Pasha objecting to the words proposed by Lord Granville, and pressing for the mention of Port Saïd.

Lord Dufferin accepted, _ad referendum_, an amended paragraph to the effect that the Turkish forces should proceed to Port Saïd, and from thence to whatever point or points might be agreed upon between the two Commanders-in-Chief. The British Government, however, insisted that the clause should state that the Turkish troops would "enter the Canal at Port Saïd and proceed from thence," whilst the Sultan wished to substitute the word "débarqueront" for "se rendront à Port Saïd."

On the 10th September the Ottoman Plenipotentiaries, who seemed unconscious that they were being played with all the time, came to the Embassy with copies of the Conventions and Memorandum for signature. They were authorized to accept the words "se rendront à Port Saïd." Lord Dufferin, however, having in the meantime been informed of the views of Her Majesty's Government, stated that he could not accept them. His Lordship would agree to the retention of the words on the understanding that a paragraph should be inserted in the Memorandum, explaining the meaning of the words to be that the troops should "direct their course to Port Saïd in order to enter the Canal."

It was now the eve of Tel-el-Kebir, and Lord Dufferin suddenly discovered that it was necessary to suspend negotiations on account of the arrest by the Turkish authorities of a number of porters who had been engaged at Sir Garnet Wolseley's request for service in Egypt. The men were released the same day with a promise that such proceedings should not be repeated. The signature of the Convention, as further amended, was authorized by telegram from Lord Granville, on the 13th, on the condition that the Proclamation should be issued with the amendment required by Her Majesty's Government.

On the 13th the battle of Tel-el-Kebir took place. On the 15th Lord Granville instructed Lord Dufferin, that, in view of the defeat and submission of the Egyptian insurgents, the British Government contemplated shortly commencing the withdrawal of the British troops from Egypt, and presumed that, the emergency having passed, the Sultan would not consider it necessary to send troops; and on the 18th his Lordship was authorized to convey to the Sultan, in the most courteous terms, the permission given to his Lordship to drop the negotiation of the Military Convention. He was at the same time to express to His Majesty that the British Government conceived this step to be most consistent with the dignity of the two countries, and that it was not intended or calculated to alter the good and friendly relations between them.

The Sultan now began to realize how completely befooled he had been. It was necessary, however, to put a good face on the matter. The Turkish Foreign Minister accordingly answered by expressing the deep satisfaction of the Sultan and his Government at the sentiments expressed on behalf of the British Government. He declared that the wish of Turkey was to maintain unaltered the old friendship between the two countries. Finally, the Minister asked, a little anxiously, what date had been fixed on for the evacuation by the British troops.

This last question was met by Lord Dufferin reminding the Sultan of the sacrifices made by England in order to restore order in Egypt; and stating that whilst those sacrifices had given England power, that power had thrown upon her great responsibility; that the Egyptian army being disbanded, until the Khedive had organized the means of securely maintaining his authority it was impossible for England to withdraw her troops, although she had already greatly diminished their number, and had no wish to keep any in Egypt longer than was justified by the circumstances. With regard to the overtures for a closer alliance, Lord Dufferin pointed out that the Sultan would remember that the like offer had been made by him on several occasions, without any practical results, owing to the apparent change of His Majesty's views. His Lordship concluded by giving the Porte a little lecture, pointing out that offers of friendship were unsatisfactory without some tangible proof of the willingness of the Ottoman Government to adopt that line of conduct which could alone render their friendship acceptable to English public opinion; and suggested that that proof might be given by inaugurating those internal reforms which were indispensable to the existence of the Empire and to the maintenance of a really good understanding with England.

No better way can be found of concluding the present chapter than by giving an extract from his Lordship's despatch of the 18th September, 1882, to Lord Granville, which runs as follows:--

"In fact, I can only reiterate that from first to last I have used every means at my disposal to induce the Turkish Government to move quickly and to settle the matter out of hand. I told them at the commencement that I had your Lordship's instructions to press forward the Convention with all despatch; that your private letters, as well as your public despatches, evinced your desire to see that instrument executed; that in asking me to telegraph to your Lordship these repeated references, they were playing into our hands, and that their conduct was so obviously contrary to their interests, that Europe had begun to misjudge the situation. While ruining my reputation as an honest man, they were enhancing it as a diplomatist, for it had begun to be believed that the delay in signing the Convention could not possibly result from their own incomprehensible shortsightedness, but must have been artificially created by the Machiavellian astuteness of the English Ambassador."