Chapter 6

I answered: So far I follow you, Ischomachus. You tell me that by labouring to his full strength, [11] by expending care, by practice and training, a man may hope more fully to secure life's blessings. So I take your meaning. But now I fain would learn of you some details. What particular toil do you impose on yourself in order to secure good health and strength? After what particular manner do you practise the arts of war? How do you take pains to create a surplus which will enable you to benefit your friends and to gratify the state?

[11] Or, "by working off ill-humours," as we should say.

Why then (Ischomachus replied), my habit is to rise from bed betimes, when I may still expect to find at home this, that, or the other friend, whom I may wish to see. Then, if anything has to be done in town, I set off to transact the business and make that my walk; [12] or, if there is no business to do in town, my serving-boy leads my horse to the farm; I follow, and so make the country-road my walk, which suits my purpose quite as well, or better, Socrates, perhaps, than pacing up and down the colonnade. [13] Then when I have reached the farm, where mayhap some of my men are planting trees, or breaking fallow, sowing or getting in the crops, I inspect their various labours with an eye to every detail, and, whenever I can improve upon the present system, I introduce reform. After this, as a rule, I mount my horse and take a canter. I put him through his paces, suiting these, as far as possible, to those inevitable in war [14]--in other words, I avoid neither steep slope [15] nor sheer incline, neither trench nor runnel, only giving my utmost heed the while so as not to lame my horse while exercising him. When that is over, the boy gives the horse a roll, [16] and leads him homewards, taking at the same time from the country to town whatever we may chance to need. Meanwhile I am off for home, partly walking, partly running, and having reached home I take a bath and give myself a rub; [17] and then I breakfast--a repast which leaves me neither empty nor replete, [18] and will suffice to last me through the day.

[12] See "Mem." III. xiii. 5.

[13] {xusto}--the xystus, "a covered corridor in the gymnasium where the athletes exercised in winter." Vitruv. v. 11. 4; vi. 7. 5. See Rich, "Companion," s.n.; Becker, op. cit. p. 309. Cf. Plat. "Phaedr." 227--Phaedrus loq.: "I have come from Lysias the son of Cephalus, and I am going to take a walk outside the wall, for I have been sitting with him the whole morning; and our common friend Acumenus advises me to walk in the country, which he says is more invigorating than to walk in the courts."--Jowett.

[14] See "Horsemanship," iii. 7 foll.; ib. viii.; "Hipparch," i. 18.

[15] "Slanting hillside."

[16] See "Horsemanship," v. 3; Aristoph. "Clouds," 32.

[17] Lit. "scrape myself clean" (with the {stleggis} or strigil). Cf. Aristoph. "Knights," 580. See Becker, op. cit. p. 150.

[18] See "Lac. Pol." ii. 5. Cf. Hor. "Sat." i. 6. 127:

pransus non avide, quantum interpellet inani ventre diem durare.

Then eat a temperate luncheon, just to stay A sinking stomach till the close of day (Conington).

By Hera (I replied), Ischomachus, I cannot say how much your doings take my fancy. How you have contrived, to pack up portably for use--together at the same time--appliances for health and recipes for strength, exercises for war, and pains to promote your wealth! My admiration is raised at every point. That you do study each of these pursuits in the right way, you are yourself a standing proof. Your look of heaven-sent health and general robustness we note with our eyes, while our ears have heard your reputation as a first-rate horseman and the wealthiest of men.

Isch. Yes, Socrates, such is my conduct, in return for which I am rewarded with--the calumnies of half the world. You thought, I daresay, I was going to end my sentence different, and say that a host of people have given me the enviable title "beautiful and good."

I was indeed myself about to ask, Ischomachus (I answered), whether you take pains also to acquire skill in argumentative debate, the cut and thrust and parry of discussion, [19] should occasion call?

[19] Lit. "to give a reason and to get a reason from others." Cf. "Cyrop." I. iv. 3.

Isch. Does it not strike you rather, Socrates, that I am engaged in one long practice of this very skill, [20] now pleading as defendant that, as far as I am able, I do good to many and hurt nobody? And then, again, you must admit, I play the part of prosecutor when accusing people whom I recognise to be offenders, as a rule in private life, or possibly against the state, the good-for-nothing fellows?

[20] "The arts of the defendant, the apologist; and of the plaintiff, the prosecutor."

But please explain one other thing, Ischomachus (I answered). Do you put defence and accusation into formal language? [21]

[21] "Does your practice include the art of translating into words your sentiments?" Cf. "Mem." I. ii. 52.

Isch. "Formal language," say you, Socrates? The fact is, I never cease to practise speaking; and on this wise: Some member of my household has some charge to bring, or some defence to make, [22] against some other. I have to listen and examine. I must try to sift the truth. Or there is some one whom I have to blame or praise before my friends, or I must arbitrate between some close connections and endeavour to enforce the lesson that it is to their own interests to be friends not foes. [23]... We are present to assist a general in court; [24] we are called upon to censure some one; or defend some other charged unjustly; or to prosecute a third who has received an honour which he ill deserves. It frequently occurs in our debates [25] that there is some course which we strongly favour: naturally we sound its praises; or some other, which we disapprove of: no less naturally we point out its defects.

[22] Or, "One member of my household appears as plaintiff, another as defendant. I must listen and cross-question."

[23] The "asyndeton" would seem to mark a pause, unless some words have dropped out. See the commentators ad loc.

[24] The scene is perhaps that of a court-martial (cf. "Anab." V. viii.; Dem. "c. Timocr." 749. 16). (Al. cf. Sturz, "Lex." s.v. "we are present (as advocates) and censure some general"), or more probably, I think, that of a civil judicial inquiry of some sort, conducted at a later date by the Minister of Finance ({to stratego to epi tas summorias eremeno}).

[25] Or, "Or again, a frequent case, we sit in council" (as members of the Boule). See Aristot. "Pol." iv. 15.

He paused, then added: Things have indeed now got so far, Socrates, that several times I have had to stand my trial and have judgment passed upon me in set terms, what I must pay or what requital I must make. [26]

[26] See "Symp." v. 8. Al. {dielemmenos} = "to be taken apart and have ..."

And at whose bar (I asked) is the sentence given? That point I failed to catch. [27]

[27] Or, "so dull was I, I failed to catch the point."

Whose but my own wife's? (he answered).

And, pray, how do you conduct your own case? (I asked). [28]

[28] See "Mem." III. vii. 4; Plat. "Euth." 3 E.

Not so ill (he answered), when truth and interest correspond, but when they are opposed, Socrates, I have no skill to make the worse appear the better argument. [29]

[29] See Plat. "Apol." 19-23 D; Aristoph. "Clouds," 114 foll.

Perhaps you have no skill, Ischomachus, to make black white or falsehood truth (said I). [30]

[30] Or, "It may well be, Ischomachus, you cannot manufacture falsehood into truth." Lit. "Like enough you cannot make an untruth true."

XII

But (I continued presently), perhaps I am preventing you from going, as you long have wished to do, Ischomachus?

To which he: By no means, Socrates. I should not think of going away until the gathering in the market is dispersed. [1]

[1] Lit. "until the market is quite broken up," i.e. after mid-day. See "Anab." I. viii. 1; II. i. 7; "Mem." I. i. 10. Cf. Herod. ii. 173; iii. 104; vii. 223.

Of course, of course (I answered), you are naturally most careful not to forfeit the title they have given you of "honest gentleman"; [2] and yet, I daresay, fifty things at home are asking your attention at this moment; only you undertook to meet your foreign friends, and rather than play them false you go on waiting.

[2] Lit. "beautiful and good."

Isch. Let me so far correct you, Socrates; in no case will the things you speak of be neglected, since I have stewards and bailiffs [3] on the farms.

[3] Cf. Becker, op. cit. p. 363.

Soc. And, pray, what is your system when you need a bailiff? Do you search about, until you light on some one with a natural turn for stewardship; and then try to purchase him?--as, I feel certain, happens when you want a carpenter: first, you discover some one with a turn for carpentry, and then do all you can to get possession of him. [4] Or do you educate your bailiffs yourself?

[4] The steward, like the carpenter, and the labourers in general, would, as a rule, be a slave. See below, xxi. 9.

Isch. Most certainly the latter, Socrates; I try to educate them, as you say, myself; and with good reason. He who is properly to fill my place and manage my affairs when I am absent, my "alter ego," [5] needs but to have my knowledge; and if I am fit myself to stand at the head of my own business, I presume I should be able to put another in possession of my knowledge. [6]

[5] Or, "my other self."

[6] Lit. "to teach another what I know myself."

Soc. Well then, the first thing he who is properly to take your place when absent must possess is goodwill towards you and yours; for without goodwill, what advantage will there be in any knowledge whatsoever which your bailiff may possess?

Isch. None, Socrates; and I may tell you that a kindly disposition towards me and mine is precisely what I first endeavour to instil.

Soc. And how, in the name of all that is holy, do you pick out whom you will and teach him to have kindly feeling towards yourself and yours?

Isch. By kindly treatment of him, to be sure, whenever the gods bestow abundance of good things upon us.

Soc. If I take your meaning rightly, you would say that those who enjoy your good things grow well disposed to you and seek to render you some good?

Isch. Yes, for of all instruments to promote good feeling this I see to be the best.

Soc. Well, granted the man is well disposed to you does it therefore follow, Ischomachus, that he is fit to be your bailiff? It cannot have escaped your observation that albeit human beings, as a rule, are kindly disposed towards themselves, yet a large number of them will not apply the attention requisite to secure for themselves those good things which they fain would have.

Isch. Yes, but believe me, Socrates, when I seek to appoint such men as bailiffs, I teach them also carefulness and application. [7]

[7] {epimeleia} is a cardinal virtue with the Greeks, or at any rate with Xenophon, but it has no single name in English.

Soc. Nay, now in Heaven's name, once more, how can that be? I always thought it was beyond the power of any teacher to teach these virtues. [8]

[8] For the Socratic problem {ei arete didakte} see Grote, "H. G." viii. 599.

Isch. Nor is it possible, you are right so far, to teach such excellences to every single soul in order as simply as a man might number off his fingers.

Soc. Pray, then, what sort of people have the privilege? [9] Should you mind pointing them out to me with some distinctness?

[9] Lit. "what kind of people can be taught them? By all means signify the sort to me distinctly."

Ishc. Well, in the first place, you would have some difficulty in making intemperate people diligent--I speak of intemperance with regard to wine, for drunkenness creates forgetfulness of everything which needs to be done.

Soc. And are persons devoid of self-control in this respect the only people incapable of diligence and carefulness? or are there others in like case?

Isch. Certainly, people who are intemperate with regard to sleep, seeing that the sluggard with his eyes shut cannot do himself or see that others do what is right.

Soc. What then? [10] Are we to regard these as the only people incapable of being taught this virtue of carefulness? or are there others in a like condition?

[10] Or, "What then--is the list exhausted? Are we to suppose that these are the sole people..."

Isch. Surely we must include the slave to amorous affection. [11] Your woeful lover [12] is incapable of being taught attention to anything beyond one single object. [13] No light task, I take it, to discover any hope or occupation sweeter to him than that which now employs him, his care for his beloved, nor, when the call for action comes, [14] will it be easy to invent worse punishment than that he now endures in separation from the object of his passion. [15] Accordingly, I am in no great hurry to appoint a person of this sort to manage [16] my affairs; the very attempt to do so I regard as futile.

[11] See "Mem." I. iii. 8 foll.; II. vi. 22.

[12] {duserotes}. Cf. Thuc. vi. 13, "a desperate craving" (Jowett).

[13] Cf. "Symp." iv. 21 foll.; "Cyrop." V. i. 7-18.

[14] Or, "where demands of business present themselves, and something must be done."

[15] Cf. Shakesp. "Sonnets," passim.

[16] Or, "I never dream of appointing as superintendent." See above, iv. 7.

Soc. Well, and what of those addicted to another passion, that of gain? Are they, too, incapable of being trained to give attention to field and farming operations?

Isch. On the contrary, there are no people easier to train, none so susceptible of carefulness in these same matters. One needs only to point out to them that the pursuit is gainful, and their interest is aroused.

Soc. But for ordinary people? Given they are self-controlled to suit your bidding, [17] given they possess a wholesome appetite for gain, how will you lesson them in carefulness? how teach them growth in diligence to meet your wishes?

[17] Or, "in matters such as you insist on."

Isch. By a simple method, Socrates. When I see a man intent on carefulness, I praise and do my best to honour him. When, on the other hand, I see a man neglectful of his duties, I do not spare him: I try in every way, by word and deed, to wound him.

Soc. Come now, Ischomachus, kindly permit a turn in the discussion, which has hitherto concerned the persons being trained to carefulness themselves, and explain a point in reference to the training process. Is it possible for a man devoid of carefulness himself to render others more careful?

No more possible (he answered) than for a man who knows no music to make others musical. [18] If the teacher sets but an ill example, the pupil can hardly learn to do the thing aright. [19] And if the master's conduct is suggestive of laxity, how hardly shall his followers attain to carefulness! Or to put the matter concisely, "like master like man." I do not think I ever knew or heard tell of a bad master blessed with good servants. The converse I certainly have seen ere now, a good master and bad servants; but they were the sufferers, not he. [20] No, he who would create a spirit of carefulness in others [21] must have the skill himself to supervise the field of labour; to test, examine, scrutinise. [22] He must be ready to requite where due the favour of a service well performed, nor hesitate to visit the penalty of their deserts upon those neglectful of their duty. [23] Indeed (he added), the answer of the barbarian to the king seems aposite. You know the story, [24] how the king had met with a good horse, but wished to give the creature flesh and that without delay, and so asked some one reputed to be clever about horses: "What will give him flesh most quickly?" To which the other: "The master's eye." So, too, it strikes me, Socrates, there is nothing like "the master's eye" to call forth latent qualities, and turn the same to beautiful and good effect. [25]

[18] Or, "to give others skill in 'music.'" See Plat. "Rep." 455 E; "Laws," 802 B. Al. "a man devoid of letters to make others scholarly." See Plat. "Phaedr." 248 D.

[19] Lit. "when the teacher traces the outline of the thing to copy badly." For {upodeiknuontos} see "Mem." IV. iii. 13; "Horsem." ii. 2. Cf. Aristot. "Oecon." i. 6; "Ath. Pol." 41. 17; and Dr. Sandys' note ad loc.

[20] Or, "but they did not go scot-free"; "punishments then were rife."

[21] Cf. Plat. "Polit." 275 E: "If we say either tending the herds, or managing the herds, or having the care of them, that will include all, and then we may wrap up the statesman with the rest, as the argument seems to require."--Jowett.

[22] Or, "he must have skill to over-eye the field of labour, and be scrutinous."

[23] "For every boon of service well performed he must be eager to make requital to the author of it, nor hesitate to visit on the heads of those neglectful of their duty a just recompense." (The language is poetical.)

[24] See Aristot. "Oecon." i. 6; Aesch. "Pers." 165; Cato ap. Plin. "H. N." xviii. 5. Cic. ap. Colum. iv. 18; ib. vi. 21; La Fontaine, "L'Oeil du Maitre."

[25] Or, "so, too, in general it seems to me 'the master's eye' is aptest to elicit energy to issue beautiful and good."

XIII

But now (I ventured), suppose you have presented strongly to the mind of some one [1] the need of carefulness to execute your wishes, is a person so qualified to be regarded as fit at once to be your bailiff? or is there aught else which he must learn in order to play the part of an efficient bailiff?

[1] Breit. cf. "Pol. Lac." xv. 8. Holden cf. Plat. "Rep." 600 C.

Most certainly there is (he answered): it still remains for him to learn particulars--to know, that is, what things he has to do, and when and how to do them; or else, if ignorant of these details, the profit of this bailiff in the abstract may prove no greater than the doctor's who pays a most precise attention to a sick man, visiting him late and early, but what will serve to ease his patient's pains [2] he knows not.

[2] Lit. "what it is to the advantage of his patient to do, is beyond his ken."

Soc. But suppose him to have learnt the whole routine of business, will he need aught else, or have we found at last your bailiff absolute? [3]

[3] Cf. Plat. "Rep." 566 D. Or, "the perfect and consummate type of bailiff."

Isch. He must learn at any rate, I think, to rule his fellow-workmen.

What! (I exclaimed): you mean to say you educate your bailiffs to that extent? Actually you make them capable of rule?

At any rate I try to do so (he replied).

And how, in Heaven's name (I asked), do you contrive to educate another in the skill to govern human beings?

Isch. I have a very simple system, Socrates; so simple, I daresay, you will simply laugh at me.

Soc. The matter, I protest, is hardly one for laughter. The man who can make another capable of rule, clearly can teach him how to play the master; and if can make him play the master, he can make him what is grander still, a kingly being. [4] Once more, therefore, I protest: A man possessed of such creative power is worthy, not of ridicule, far from it, but of the highest praise.

[4] i.e. {arkhikos} includes (1) {despotikos}, i.e. an arbitrary head of any sort, from the master of one's own family to the {turannos kai despotes} (Plat. "Laws," 859 A), despotic lord or owner; (2) {basilikos}, the king or monarch gifted with regal qualities.

Thus, then, I reason, [5] Socrates (he answered): The lower animals are taught obedience by two methods chiefly, partly through being punished when they make attempts to disobey, partly by experiencing some kindness when they cheerfully submit. This is the principle at any rate adopted in the breaking of young horses. The animal obeys its trainer, and something sweet is sure to follow; or it disobeys, and in place of something sweet it finds a peck of trouble; and so on, until it comes at last to yield obedience to the trainer's every wish. Or to take another instance: Young dogs, [6] however far inferior to man in thought and language, [7] can still be taught to run on errands and turn somersaults, [8] and do a host of other clever things, precisely on this same principle of training. Every time the animal obeys it gets something or other which it wanted, and every time it misbehaves it gets a whipping. But when it comes to human beings: in man you have a creature still more open to persuasion through appeals to reason; [9] only make it plain to him "it is his interest to obey." Or if they happen to be slaves, [10] the more ignoble training of wild animals tamed to the lure will serve to teach obedience. Only gratify their bellies in the matter of appetite, and you will succeed in winning much from them. [11] But ambitious, emulous natures feel the spur of praise, [12] since some natures hunger after praise no less than others crave for meats and drinks. My practice then is to instruct those whom I desire to appoint as my bailiffs in the various methods which I have found myself to be successful in gaining the obedience of my fellows. To take an instance: There are clothes and shows and so forth, with which I must provide my workfolk. [13] Well, then, I see to it that these are not all alike in make; [14] but some will be of better, some of less good quality: my object being that these articles for use shall vary with the service of the wearer; the worse man will receive the worse things as a gift, the better man the better as a mark of honour. For I ask you, Socrates, how can the good avoid despondency seeing that the work is wrought by their own hands alone, in spite of which these villains who will neither labour nor face danger when occasion calls are to receive an equal guerdon with themselves? And just as I cannot bring myself in any sort of way to look upon the better sort as worthy to receive no greater honour than the baser, so, too, I praise my bailiffs when I know they have apportioned the best things among the most deserving. And if I see that some one is receiving preference by dint of flatteries or like unworthy means, I do not let the matter pass; I reprimand my bailiff roundly, and so teach him that such conduct is not even to his interest.

[5] {oukoun}. "This, then, is my major premiss: the dumb animal..." (lit. "the rest of animals").

[6] {ta kunidia} possibly implies "performing poodles."

[7] {te gnome... te glotte}, i.e. mental impression and expression, "mind and tongue."

[8] Or, "to run round and round and turn heels over head." Al. "dive for objects."

[9] "Logic, argument." Or, "a creature more compliant; merely by a word demonstrate to him..."

[10] Cf. Plat. "Rep." 591 C.

[11] See Pater, "Plato and Platonism," "Lacedaemon," p. 196 foll.

[12] See "Cyrop." passim.

[13] {ergastersi}, Xenophontic for the common Attic {ergatais}. See Hold. ad loc. for similar forms, and cf. Rutherford, "New Phrynichus," 59.

[14] Cf. Aristot. "Oecon." i. 5 (where the thesis is developed further).

XIV

Soc. Well, then, Ischomachus, supposing the man is now so fit to rule that he can compel obedience, [1] is he, I ask once more, your bailiff absolute? or even though possessed of all the qualifications you have named, does he still lack something? [2]

[1] Or, "that discipline flows from him;" al. "he presents you with obedient servants."

[2] Lit. "will he still need something further to complete him?"