Part 4

At the close of the year 1813, Murat was already in the occupation of the Roman States, making an appeal to the patriots, for it was the custom of Europe at that time to march forward invoking the liberty of the people. To detach him from a bad cause, Metternich had particularly recourse to a gentle and tender influence, a pleasing reminiscence of his embassy in Paris, and he guaranteed to Murat the peaceable possession of the kingdom of Naples. After the re-establishment of the Bourbons in France gave rise to the strongest uneasiness in his astonished mind, King Joachim deputed the Duke of Serra Capriola to the Congress of Vienna, pleading his treaties with Austria and England; but his envoy was not admitted to the assembly, for a negotiation was on foot to replace the old dynasty of Sicily upon the throne, a negotiation conducted by Prince Talleyrand. Louis XVIII. had recommended the interests of his family to the Congress of Vienna, and M. de Talleyrand was to receive from the Neapolitan branch of the Bourbons a rich equivalent for his sadly compromised principality of Benevento. Austria was a little unmindful of her promises, and defended her engagements with Murat but very feebly; indeed, the general bent towards the restoration of the former order of things was so strong, that he who had usurped the crown of Naples was actually declared guilty of treason. In the English House of Commons, Lord Castlereagh read a private correspondence, carried on with Napoleon at the very moment when Murat was negotiating with the Alliance, which afforded evidence of a double policy having been pursued. Having become uneasy concerning the resolutions of the Congress of Vienna, he made vast military preparations, in concert with the patriots and the secret societies, with the intention of assuming the great crown of Italy. Metternich caused the Austrian armies to assemble _en masse_ in the Lombardo-Venetian kingdom, where they awaited under arms the coming events.

The storm soon burst.

Napoleon then landed in the Gulf of Juan to attempt his heroic exploit of the Hundred Days. Matters were in a strangely complicated state at the Congress of Vienna, and Napoleon, looking at the affairs of Europe under one point of view only, had formed a fair judgment of the condition of the allied powers with regard to each other, without, however, comprehending that his presence on the Continent would unite them all in a terrible coalition. The very name of Buonaparte filled the old European sovereignties with so much alarm, that they recovered themselves with the utmost haste, in order to take measures for the general safety.

They owed to the activity of Talleyrand and Metternich the official declaration of the Congress of Vienna, which placed Buonaparte at the ban of Europe, simultaneously roused against the common enemy. The mystic spirit of Alexander entered willingly into the idea of a Christian alliance and a European crusade, and Metternich, after the system he had adopted ever since the rupture in 1813, could not depart from the military agreement entered into at Chaumont. Napoleon was declared at the ban of the empire by a revived custom of the ancient assemblies of the German Diet.

The pretended agreement between Napoleon, Austria, and England, at the time of his landing in the Gulf of Juan, was a romance invented afterwards by the imperialist party. Napoleon, who was well informed concerning the diplomatic state of things, might imagine a separation of interests among the cabinets a probable thing, but beyond this there was nothing. One of his first steps was to endeavour to place himself in communication with Metternich, and we again find Fouché in correspondence with the chief of the Austrian cabinet: they had never lost sight of each other since their memorable conference in 1809, and their acquaintance was renewed in 1813, when Fouché was appointed Governor-General of Illyria. I have reason to believe, that they had even then spoken to each other in confidence concerning the decline of power of _that man_, as the disaffected called Napoleon, and of the possibility of a regency under Maria Louisa; in 1813 the subject they would select for their conversation would probably be the abdication of the Emperor, which was one of the favourite ideas of the senatorial party. At the same time Napoleon wrote to Maria Louisa, he despatched, by means of some secret agents, confidential letters from intimate friends of the minister, and even from a princess of the imperial blood, between whom and Prince Metternich a tender feeling had existed: and finally, in order to sow dissension throughout the whole of Europe, he transmitted to the Emperor Alexander a copy of the treaty of the triple alliance, concluded against Russia in the month of March 1815, and signed by Lord Castlereagh, Talleyrand, and Metternich: his primary object was to break the powerful union among the sovereigns.

At this period, the Austrian armies had marched into Italy against Murat and the Neapolitans, and General Bianchi had obtained the most brilliant victories over the wavering and ill-organised troops of Joachim. Metternich caused all the fortresses of the kingdom of Naples and the Roman States to be garrisoned by Austrian troops; for he had decided, in concert with the French legation, upon the re-establishment of the House of Bourbon at Naples as completing the scheme of the government of Europe.

While Fouché was negotiating with Metternich a plan for substituting the regency under Maria Louisa to the empire, organised as it had been during the hundred days, French agents were contriving means of carrying off the child who had been saluted in his cradle with the title of King of Rome. A great deal of mystification went on in all this; there was even one of these gentlemen, otherwise, too, a man in good society, who received a large sum of money, but who had in reality no other object than that of joining M. de Talleyrand at Vienna. Napoleon had promised that his wife and son would be present at the Champ de Mai, but Metternich's police baffled the intentions of the French agents, and, with the politeness which characterises all his actions, the minister conducted the daughter of the emperor and the Duke de Reichstadt to the palace of Schönbrunn, under an escort of the most trustworthy servants of the house of Austria. It was one of the most delicate circumstances that occurred during the life of Metternich, a man, too, always remarkable for his attention to propriety; for Maria Louisa did not at that time feel the cold indifference for Napoleon which she afterwards exhibited, and she was a party to the project formed for carrying her off, by some attendants who had remained with her, but who now all received an order to quit Schönbrunn.

The Austrian armies proceeded from Italy across the Alps, and took a part in the melancholy invasion of the south of France; they afterwards occupied Provence and Languedoc as far as Auvergne, their head-quarters being at Lyons and Dijon. On the dissolution of the Congress of Vienna, after the second fall of Napoleon, Metternich repaired to Paris, to be present at the conferences which were to precede the treaty of November 1815. Prussia and England had been victorious at Waterloo, and their interest had proportionally increased. In the negotiations of Paris, the two cabinets of Berlin and Vienna acted in concert to represent the interests of Germany, which were very hostile to the French nation. The German population had been greatly irritated during the gigantic efforts that Europe had made against Napoleon; the secondary princes on the banks of the Rhine demanded Alsace and a portion of Lorraine, marked upon a map drawn in 1815 (which now lies before me), under the name of Germania, as the representation of Germany. There was a terrible reaction in that country against France, one of those refluxes of the people and the national feeling by which various periods of our history have been distinguished.

Nevertheless, what organisation, exterior or interior, did they intend to establish, to form a general constitution in Germany? How could they restore to the Emperor Francis the influence in that country which he formerly possessed, but of which he had been deprived by Napoleon? Germany had arisen with the double cry of liberty and unity on her lips. Unity! how was it to be established among principalities of which the power and the population varied so greatly, and who still maintained the feudal principle in the midst of civilised Europe? And liberty! it was an indefinite expression; how could it be applied to so many different systems of government, and to so many various localities whose interests were so distinct from each other? The scheme of the Confederation of the Rhine had been formed by Napoleon solely with a view of increasing the importance of all the petty states, and of inducing them to enter into a coalition hostile to Austria and Prussia. Now circumstances were altered; Austria and Prussia were the great predominant powers, whose business it was to establish their own influence, and govern the whole confederation by means of a protectorate, more or less clearly defined; Prussia assuming the power in the northern provinces, Austria to the south. It was necessary, when the fatherland should be threatened, that its mixed population should be capable of being called forth to serve indifferently in the armies of Prussia and Austria. The unity of the German states was thus opposed as a barrier against Russia and France, and served equally as a protection against both those nations.

Metternich, when he gave up the old imperial mantle in the name of the emperor, obtained for him a more real advantage as president of the diet; a number of votes were awarded to Austria and Prussia, in proportion to the importance of their position; and either by means of their command of the army of the confederation, or by their influence in the diet, these two countries held undisputed sway over the deliberations and the employment of the troops. No doubt, many little acts of injustice were committed, and some caprice was exhibited in the repartition of the states and of the contingents. Sovereignties were sometimes aggrandised because they were protected by the Emperor Alexander, and, sometimes, even by Metternich; but where are the human operations over which perfect justice presides? Since they were desirous of unity, this sacrifice of some to the cause of all was the natural consequence of it; and should it now be asked, what is to be the result of this confederation, I reply, that Austria has reason to fear lest Prussia should assume a constantly increasing importance in Germany. The destiny of Austria henceforth is elsewhere, her future lies in the south; Prussia is too singularly situated not to strive to agglomerate her dominions; she will undoubtedly do so, either in point of fact, by means of conquest, or morally, by the influence she will exercise. It is towards the shores of the Adriatic that Austria will find herself indemnified for the diminution of her influence in central Germany.

The cry of liberty had been raised in Germany when it roused itself against Napoleon; and the secret societies of Schill and Stein still had representatives in old Blucher and General Gniesenau. What did the government propose doing for the liberty they demanded? Constitutions had been promised, and representative states were granted to some principalities, but, the victory being once obtained, there was hesitation about proceeding any farther.

Now that experience has made us perfectly acquainted with the spirit of revolutions, it is easy to understand how, in the rapid alteration of political situations, the promises of to-day are violated to-morrow. It is in vain to imagine that these periods of transition, when the people struggle for crochets of sovereignty, can bear a comparison with seasons when the proceedings of the government are calm and regular; after victory the popular excitement shews itself unreasonable, and wants to insist upon promises the government is no longer able to perform.

In 1813, during the period of battles and revolutions, many things had been promised to Germany; but was it possible to perform them in 1815 and 1816? Suppose that in Germany, that country of excitement and mystical spirit, the utopias of the secret societies had been realised,--a political existence given to the universities, and a turbulent representation to all the states,--that they had granted them the liberty of the press and an organised democracy,--would Germany ever have reached the high degree of prosperity and public tranquillity she now enjoys? We must take customs as they exist, and minds with the habits they have formed; we must not give a people institutions which would be a torment to their existence without increasing their well-being. I do not say that the governments of Austria and Prussia acted rightly in not fulfilling their promises--I merely say, that time alone can shew whether this conduct proceeded from prudence, or from a calculating spirit of selfishness. The events of 1814 and 1815 had considerably increased the possessions of Austria in Italy, and, as this was really a country obtained by conquests, it was natural and necessary that an armed surveillance should be established in the Lombardo-Venetian territory, as well as a police capable of controlling the provinces united to the Austrian empire. The utmost ability will be required to slacken successively the springs of this police, in proportion as the victors may be more firmly established in their foreign possessions. To have granted free constitutions to the people would have been an imprudent generosity, for this conquest, like those of Napoleon, could only be maintained by military occupation, which it was desirable to render as little oppressive as circumstances would permit. The Italians, a hot and enthusiastic people, had driven out the French in the day of their calamity; the Austrians should endeavour to avoid a similar misfortune, and keep carefully upon their guard.

Here begins the melodrama which has been cast around the person of Prince Metternich, with the picture of the cruel prisons and Piombi of Venice. I appeal to the Christian sincerity and good faith of Silvio Pellico, whether there be one word of real truth in his book, _Le mie Prigioni_. Does he call to mind the terrible Piombi of Venice, which, in his case, consisted of a room on the fourth floor in the ducal palace, commanding a most extensive view over the Great Canal, and for which Lord Byron would have paid some hundreds of sequins? He was deprived of his liberty, it is true; and this is, no doubt, a deplorable misfortune: but had he engaged in a conspiracy?--had he attempted to overturn the established government? He avows that he had done so, and in attempts of this kind a man sets his liberty and

"Life upon a cast, And he must stand the hazard of the die."

The Austrian cabinet, no doubt, takes ample precautionary measures, but there is no cruelty or oppression in its system; and whoever has had an opportunity of conversing with Prince Metternich ought to ask himself, whether it is possible a man of so calm and reasonable an intellect should be guilty of an act of barbarity without even a motive for his conduct?

The strict repressive measures upon which the system of Prince Metternich in Germany and Italy is founded occasioned a movement of reaction; for liberty, that master passion of the mind, does not allow itself to be crushed without making some despairing efforts. Far from the secret societies having been dissolved in Germany, they were regularly organised in the universities among the students, and the heated state of their minds was encouraged by the influence of poetry and the political writings, which called upon the courage and patriotism of all those who possessed noble hearts to lend their assistance to the German unity. This unity, so loudly appealed to by the young generation, was in reality only a sort of federative republic, in which all the states, while enjoying their individual freedom, were to be united by the practice of virtue, and would thus tend to the general happiness of mankind. The old German sovereignties were obliged to curb these associations, which burst forth in the assassination of Kotzebue.

Metternich had just been travelling in Italy when the universities distinguished themselves by this sanguinary crime. He was loaded with the benefits of his sovereign; he now bore the title of prince, and stars of almost all the orders of knighthood in Europe glittered on his breast. The state of fermentation which existed in Germany had not escaped his statesmanlike penetration, and it was solely at his suggestion that a congress took place at Carlsbad, where severe and distrustful measures were adopted against the organisation of the public schools in Germany. The conduct of the universities, the repression of seditious writings, the establishment of a political police,--nothing was neglected in this regular crusade, undertaken by the government against the revolutionary feelings by which the heated imaginations were then inflamed. After great disturbances have taken place in a state, the sole anxiety of the government is to check any disposition to disorder, and they are excited to do so by public opinion, and by the middle classes, who entertain a dread of fresh revolutions, and with good reason.

In the year of the Congress of Carlsbad, the Propaganda menaced the kingdoms of Europe with a fresh revolution. Let us observe accurately their situation in 1820. Towards the south there was the insurrection of Spain and the Cortes, and the proclamation of a government more liberal than even that of England; at Naples, almost by a magical echo, the constitution was also proclaimed; from Naples the cry of liberty was heard in Piémont, and the king was deprived of his throne. In Paris the disturbances were so great that the government was exposed every evening to a change in its political system. This year of 1820 might be considered as the first edition of the stupendous event of July, which took place ten years later with all the fracas of an insurrection.

Austria was particularly endangered by these revolutions, for the extremities of the kingdom of Naples and Piémont came in close contact with her Italian possessions. The people had declared themselves; the sovereigns then became aware of the danger, and roused themselves for their defence; congresses were held at Troppau and at Laybach, and Metternich, without hesitation, urged the adoption of powerful measures to quell the revolutionary spirit now manifested; he was so deeply convinced of their indispensable necessity, that he opposed every kind of delay, and only required the moral support of Prussia and Russia, declaring at once that an Austrian army was about to march into Italy and occupy Naples and Piémont. The Emperor Alexander, whose mind was full of the dread of secret societies and plots in Europe, lent his support to Metternich. There was but one single instance of opposition with regard to Piémont, and it is known from whence proceeded these objections. To such a degree has history been disfigured! It proceeded from the dignity of Louis XVIII., and the despatches of the Duc de Richelieu and M. Pasquier. The revolutionary spirit was breaking out in the streets of Paris in 1820, and the restored sovereign declared to Metternich, that if the Austrian army entered Piémont their occupation could not be of long continuance, as France could not allow of the Austrians upon the Alps.

In this _wrestling_, to use the old expression of M. Bignon, the cabinets had the advantage over the people. Naples was overcome in a few marches, and Piémont was occupied by the Austrian troops. The repressive impulse being once given, a combined system was every where manifested with the design of suspending political liberty. War was declared by the cabinets against all forms of government which owed their birth to military excitement or to an exclusively revolutionary spirit. Metternich was present at the Congress of Verona, a meeting which appears to me to have been the final expression of the will of Europe regarding the spirit of insurrection. France was charged with the suppression of the Spanish Cortes, as Metternich had executed by force of arms the will of the allied powers against Naples and Piémont. Here the cabinets were again successful, the revolution was completely suppressed, as far as regarded its power of action, and only kept a place in the disordered imagination.

All these acts of government, and all the proclamations which followed the assembly of the Congress, were the especial work of Prince Metternich. The Chancellor of Austria possesses a remarkable flow of language, a pure taste, and a noble manner of expressing his ideas, even in a diplomatic despatch, where the sense is almost always hidden under technical, and, it may be added, heavy modes of speech. To him is owing the style distinguished by the elevation of ideas, which always appeals to posterity and to the justice of future times, from the opinion formed by contemporary passions. He even allows himself to be carried on too far by his anxiety to express his meaning, and by the literary ornament he is desirous of conferring upon the most trifling despatch that leaves his cabinet; he takes the principal part in their composition, he writes in French with extreme elegance and precision, and he reads all the newspapers regularly, even to the part which contains merely literary and theatrical critiques. Those who saw him in 1825, when the unfortunate illness of his wife obliged him to visit Paris, were surprised to find him possessed of the most exquisite literary taste. He was acquainted with all our good authors, and shewed remarkable sagacity in the judgment he formed of the writers of our own times. One could hardly imagine how a politician, whose life had been spent in affairs of so much importance, could have found time to study the most trifling productions of literature.

Affairs were now settled in Europe. The governments began to emerge a little from the undecided political condition proclaimed by the Holy Alliance. From the beginning of the year 1827, Metternich had felt some uneasiness concerning the proceedings of Russia with regard to the Ottoman Porte, which was likely to be productive of extreme danger to the Austrian influence. If the Russian projects were realised, Austria would see herself deprived of her ascendancy over the Porte, which was nearly as old as that of France. At this time Metternich caused the French ministry to be sounded, but he was hardly listened to, for the most decided negotiations were in progress between the three cabinets of Russia, London, and Paris, on the Greek question; and here it is well to explain the refusal of Metternich to interfere with the transactions which led to the treaty of July 1827.