Part 2

Victory had then decided between France and Austria, proving the star of Napoleon to be utterly irresistible. The two parties which divided the court of Vienna now became more marked, the opinion in favour of peace, represented by Count Bubna, prevailed in the Emperor's council, and Count Stadion, who had hitherto had the direction of affairs under the influence of the English system, was obliged to retire from the cabinet. The ministry for foreign affairs having thus become vacant, Francis II. thought to conciliate France by the appointment of Metternich, who had displayed great abilities during his embassy to that country. The count, having been reconciled with Napoleon, had since then carefully maintained a middle course between peace and war, and he had also begun to adopt in politics the attitude of armed neutrality, which, ever since 1813, has been the characteristic of Austrian policy. This was a period of deep humiliation for the old imperial crown. The _Moniteur_ had announced that _the House of Lorraine had ceased to reign_; the Austrian monarchy had been vanquished in the struggle, its armies had experienced terrible reverses; but there still remained to the Emperor Francis the devoted affection of his people, and the indignation they felt at the prospect of French domination.

Count Metternich was sent as minister plenipotentiary to Napoleon, together with Count Bubna, and interviews took place for the purpose of treating of peace. The victor was excessively irritated at the vigorous conduct of Austria, and never were conferences attended with more violence or more fiery disputes; so that Metternich was obliged to apply all the powers of his mind towards inspiring the haughty conqueror with more moderate sentiments. If Napoleon bore in mind his silent and skilful conduct in 1809, he knew, that by favouring his elevation at the court of the Emperor of Austria, he should secure to himself an ally and a representative of his system. These motives, joined to dark hints of assassination, and to the uneasiness caused by the religious brotherhoods among the people, which were already beginning to stir for independence, all contributed to hasten the conclusion of the treaty of Vienna. Is it necessary to remind the reader that the French every where made use of their victories with the inflexible right of the conqueror?

On the occasion of this treaty, Count Metternich received the title of Chancellor of the State, with the direction of foreign affairs,--an office of immense responsibility under existing circumstances. The population was exhausted by the war; the treasury without resources, having been completely drained by the contributions levied by the French; and the monarchy was deprived of all influence in Germany, the treaty of Vienna having robbed it of the last remains of importance towards the south; so that, as I have elsewhere[3] remarked, beside her was the Confederation of the Rhine, that is to say, Napoleon; in front the Helvetic Confederation, again Napoleon; to the south the kingdom of Italy, still Napoleon. There remained but a choice of two plans to Austria, either again to try the chance of war, or to appease the Emperor of the French by the most profound submission to all his wishes. Such was the idea of Metternich, when he suggested the marriage of the archduchess, when, as it was said by the implacable Lady Castlereagh, it was necessary to deliver up a daughter of the house of Austria to satisfy the Minotaur.

[3] See "Europe during the Consulate and the Empire of Napoleon."

If the French emperor were to choose a wife among the grand-duchesses of the house of Romanoff, the plan proposed at Erfurt would be quickly accomplished, that is to say, the formation of two great empires, around which there would be a number of small intermediate kingdoms, in some degree dependent upon them; and, to avoid this peril, Metternich hastened the marriage between Napoleon and Maria Louisa: by this means the house of Austria would secure a real protector in the French emperor, and the suit of a brilliant adventurer, at the feet of the daughter of a royal line, might be advantageous to the future prospects of the German crown. It is allowable in politics to calculate to what extent human passions may affect the course of affairs, and therefore the new chancellor of the state, when negotiating the union of the archduchess with Napoleon, looked forward, by means of a family arrangement, to recovering the position of which Austria had been deprived by the fortune of war. The marriage of the archduchess was arranged and concluded entirely by Metternich.

Still, however, he carefully pursued the course towards which there appeared at that time to be a general bent in Europe. In the beginning of the year 1811, certain symptoms appeared to indicate to the court of Vienna that a rupture was about to take place between France and Russia, and these suspicions were changed ere long into certainty: M. Otto, the French ambassador at Vienna, opened his mind completely to Metternich, and, acting on the principle of the late alliance, he proposed they should form a kind of league of offence and defence in the war Napoleon was about to commence against Russia. The French emperor only required a detached corps of 40,000 Austrian auxiliaries as an active force, who were to attack the eastern extremity of Gallicia, at the same time that the French army should proceed to the Vistula. This treaty farther stipulated that the Austrian possessions in Poland should remain untouched, and certain territorial cessions in favour of Austria were agreed upon, in the event of the war against Russia proving successful; thus Metternich began to reap the advantages of the French alliance.

The campaign of 1812 began. The Austrian corps of 30,000 auxiliaries was posted on the Vistula, and, if not required to take an active part in the operations, it still was a check upon the Russian army, which already threatened the flanks of Napoleon's troops. Metternich watched with extreme anxiety the movements of the invading army in Russia; its disastrous retreat was an appalling and unlooked-for catastrophe, and Prince Schwartzenberg went to oppose the Russian troops.

A new train of ideas, a new series of negotiations were now to be entertained. The retreat from Moscow had been so calamitous, that it had not spared to the French enough troops to protect the line of the Oder, far less to retain possession of that of the Vistula. If Prussia and Austria had been faithful to their alliance with Napoleon, they ought immediately to have combined their forces, and opposed all their strength to the Russians, who were already making incursions on every side. The situation of the two courts was very difficult, for the whole German nation was so unanimous in their dislike to the French, that it would have been impossible for the cabinets of Berlin and Vienna to take any steps in their favour, without placing themselves in direct opposition to the people they governed; and, besides, after the deep humiliation they had both endured at the hands of Napoleon, was it not natural they should seek some motive, or, if the expression be preferred, some pretext, for delivering themselves from a state of subjection so fatal to them? Prussia, who was foremost, had no hesitation in abandoning an alliance that was so dishonourable to her. Metternich did not immediately follow her contagious example, but, a cessation of hostilities having taken place between the Russian and Austrian armies, the eyes of France fell upon the cabinet of Vienna, as the mediatorial power which was to prepare a peace, on a foundation in better keeping with the general equilibrium of Europe. In his conferences with M. Otto, the imperial chancellor gave him clearly to understand, that the Austrian government would not depart from the principles of the French alliance, but that the nature of their situation had been altered by the late military events, and, as the frontier of Austria might become the theatre of war, the cabinet of Vienna would naturally assume a more decided attitude, in order to bring to a conclusion a struggle which would for the future so closely affect the empire.

The mission of Prince Schwartzenberg and Count Bubna, at Paris, was conducted in the same spirit. Without giving up the alliance, the Austrian government signified that it could no longer rest upon the same basis, in fact, that they must take a more decided part in the approaching military crisis. Metternich's object in this new negotiation was to lay the foundation for a general peace. Such a resolution was by no means disinterested on his part, for, in the new settlement of the boundaries of the different states of Europe which must ensue, Austria would obtain an accession of territory, as a consequence of the position in which the course of events had placed her. The English party was gaining ground at Vienna, and Lord Walpole had arrived with offers of subsidies and augmentation of territory; in proportion, also, as the French army met with fresh reverses, the popular feeling of Germany assumed a more decided character; still Metternich persisted in his mediatorial system, from the conviction that it would be for the real advantage of his country.

These negotiations continued all through the winter of 1812-13. In the meanwhile, M. Otto had been replaced by Count Louis de Narbonne, the representative of the family alliance. He had been appointed by Napoleon, in the hope that his presence would remind Austria that an archduchess sat upon the throne of France; and, by the decree of the senate and the emperor, this same archduchess had just been officially proclaimed regent during the absence of Napoleon: the government being placed in her hands was a fresh guarantee to Austria of the personal feelings of the emperor's son-in-law. In politics alliances are formed upon positive interests, and Napoleon had too greatly abused his victories; the decree had gone forth, the empire, which extended from Hamburg to Venice--the protectorate, which pressed heavily upon Germany, Prussia, Italy, Switzerland, and Holland--the diplomatic oppression which burdened Sweden and Denmark--all must have an end: after action, a reaction must be expected.

During this time considerable levies took place in every part of the Austrian territory, for it was determined the army should be made up to its full complement of 300,000 men. Metternich justified these warlike preparations by the natural position in which Austria was placed: when the belligerents came so closely in contact with the territory of a neuter party, it appeared quite natural that the neuter should take precautions to preserve its own independence. The position which Metternich had given to Austria had made her a predominant power, with the right of insisting upon real advantages, by way of indemnity; this was an admirable change of circumstances, which left Austria at liberty to come to a definitive decision.

Baron Weissemberg then started for London, under the official pretext of bringing about a general peace, but in reality for the purpose of sounding the English cabinet upon the advantages likely to be offered to Austria, in the way of subsidies and accession of territory, in case she should declare openly in favour of the coalition, and should be willing to furnish so considerable a force as 450,000 men. Now all this occurred in the month of March 1813, and the armaments of Austria received a fresh augmentation, when the thunders of the artillery were heard at Lutzen and Bautzen; 200,000 men were already located in Bohemia: against whom could these immense bodies of troops be intended to act? At this juncture, Metternich again appeared in his mediatorial capacity, to prepare the armistice of Plesswitz, afterwards definitively settled at Nieumarch: Austria constantly declared that, as the conflicting armies occupied four hundred leagues of her frontiers, it was impossible she should any longer refrain from taking an active part in the struggle, if the belligerent powers would not agree to terms of reconciliation. A step was thus taken, from a state of alliance with Napoleon, towards a condition of armed neutrality, and how could so powerful a country as Austria long continue in this situation? In the heated state of the public mind in Germany, how was it possible to calculate the exact point where the mediation would stop for the _casus belli_?

It was the interest of Russia and Prussia to keep on good terms with a court capable of drawing up a body of excellent troops 200,000 strong. After some bitter and ill-advised observations, Napoleon also accepted the mediation; it was a sort of break in the military operations, an expression of the weariness felt by an army now worn out with battles. We may see how great a part Metternich had created for Austria in these negotiations, for, on former occasions, the plenipotentiaries could treat the Austrian interests as a separate concern, while in her new position Vienna became the indispensable intermediate agent in any treaty that might be contemplated. The question was, Did Austria offer her mediation in good faith, with a sincere wish for peace? or was it merely as a lure, to enable her to render her military establishment more complete? This becomes an important question for history.

It must be remembered that, after the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen, the desire for peace was universal, even in France, and in the tent of Napoleon, in the military night-watch, as well as on the morning of battle; the troops still fought, but it was no longer with the willingness, the enthusiasm of the victories of Austerlitz and Jena. Napoleon submitted to the powerful voice of public opinion, but could his iron disposition bend to circumstances? Until that time as general and consul, and afterwards as emperor, he had been accustomed to say to the vanquished states, "These are my conditions, you have no choice but to accept them; and, if there are any alleviating circumstances, it is to my clemency alone that you will owe them." In 1813, the tables were turned: cabinets now appeared with powers quite equal to that of France, animated, too, with the ardour of battle, and burning with the desire of repairing their former humiliation, and reconquering their independence. The allied powers had signed the armistice of Nieumarch, one great inducement being the opportunity gained for carrying on a secret negotiation with the crown prince of Sweden, and also for the sake of persuading Austria to join the league. I think their anxiety for peace was less than their wish to gain the time necessary to complete their vast military arrangements, by detaching Austria from her part of mediator, and inducing her to join them in the war against the common enemy; pious Germany, having gained her feet, now wanted to make an end of her oppressor. Now, would Metternich continue to preserve this neutral position? would not the Austrian government be inclined for a change of system?

Let us not forget how Austria was at that time situated. Had she not a right to obtain, by diplomatic means, all the advantages offered by her present position? We know the heavy losses she had sustained in Italy; the Milanese, the Tyrol, and the Illyrian provinces, had been successively torn from her: and was it not natural she should take advantage of her armed mediation, a favourable position in which Metternich had contrived to place her? Had she derived the expected advantages from the general peace, she would not have joined the coalition against Napoleon; failing in that, she must endeavour to recover by force of arms all she had been deprived of during the war. It was for the purpose of justifying this delicate situation that Metternich first introduced the elegant system of high and noble diplomatic language, a style of which Baron Gentz has since been the most distinguished organ--Gentz, whose life has been so busy, and so full of disappointments, who, in his old age, came to utter soft love speeches at the feet of Miss Fanny Elssler.

Metternich unfolds in his papers his ideas upon the balance of power in Europe, which tended to diminish the prodigious influence of Napoleon, to the benefit of the allied states. I am not aware of any thing written in a more remarkable style than these despatches; they are, perhaps, rather loose in their details, but all the expressions are so carefully guarded, that they never compromised either the cabinet or the writer.

After signing the armistice of Nieumarch, Napoleon had fixed his head-quarters at Dresden. Successive despatches, from the French cabinet, requested the Emperor Francis II. to affix his signature to the preliminaries of a treaty of peace; at last, Metternich, bearing an autograph letter from his sovereign, in answer to the overtures that had been made to him, repaired to Dresden, commissioned to find out what might be the definitive intentions of Napoleon with regard to peace. The conference lasted nearly half a day; the emperor, in his military dress, strode hastily up and down the room, with flashing eyes, and sharp, hurried gestures: he took up his hat, then laid it down again, and threw himself into a large easy chair, while the perspiration started on his brow; he was evidently disturbed in mind, for he burst forth, in no measured terms, to Metternich: "Your government," said he, "wants to take advantage of my perplexed situation; and the question with you is, whether you can exact so much from me without fighting, or whether you must decide in ranging yourselves among my enemies? Well, let us see! Let us negotiate--I am perfectly willing. What do you want?"

To this abrupt sally, to this demand so little in accordance with the usual diplomatic forms, Metternich merely replied, "That Austria was desirous of establishing an order of things, which, by the wise distribution of power, should place the preservation of peace under the protection of an association of independent states; that the object of the cabinet of Vienna must be to destroy the sole predominancy of the Emperor Napoleon, by substituting to his colossal influence a balance of power, which should establish Austria, Russia, and Prussia, on a footing completely independent of the French empire." As a summary of these conditions, Austria claimed Illyria, and a more extended frontier towards Italy; the Pope was to be reinstated in his dominions; Poland to be subjected to another partition; Spain and Holland were to be evacuated by the French army; and the Confederation of the Rhine and the mediation of Switzerland were to be given up by the Emperor, who was already overwhelmed with ill-fortune.

Thus was to be accomplished the dismemberment of the gigantic work erected by the toils and victories of Napoleon. Shall I venture to describe this scene as it has been depicted to me by the sole eye-witness, Prince Metternich himself? As the Austrian plenipotentiary unfolded the views of his cabinet, the sallow complexion of Napoleon gradually assumed a crimson hue; at last he exclaimed, "Metternich, do you attempt to impose such conditions upon me without drawing a sword? These demands are most insulting! And it is my father-in-law who agrees to such a plan! What kind of position does he wish to place me in with regard to the French people? Ah, Metternich! how much has England given you to play this part against me?"

To this offensive language, Metternich, retaining his calm and dignified demeanour, replied not a word; and Napoleon, in the violence of his gestures, having let fall his hat, the Austrian minister did not stoop to pick it up, as politeness would have induced him to do under any other circumstances. There was a silence of half an hour.[4] Afterwards the conversation was resumed in a cooler and calmer tone; and, in dismissing Metternich, the Emperor, taking his hand, said to him, "After all, Illyria is not my last word, and we may be able to arrange better conditions."

[4] Prince Metternich told me the Emperor had locked the door.

This dialogue is of importance to history, for it decided the fate of Napoleon.

The Emperor's habits of command made his language hasty and his summons for an answer abrupt; and, when he addressed himself thus to a person in an elevated position, it naturally gave great offence. Metternich retained the strongest resentment for his behaviour--he had been deeply insulted; and, besides, so experienced a minister could not fail to discover the secret thoughts of the Emperor, and must have been well convinced that, with such a character as his, there was but little reason to hope for the re-establishment of the balance of power in Europe.

Nevertheless, Austria consented to the conferences at Prague, and, by a fresh agreement, the suspension of hostilities was prolonged till the 10th of August. Metternich, as the representative of the mediatorial power, was by right president of the congress, in the same manner as it had fallen to the Swedish minister at the congresses of Nimeguen and Ryswick. M. Maret first raised difficulties on the score of etiquette, because Baron Humboldt and Baron d'Anstett, the representatives of Russia and Prussia, were only ministers of the second rank, while M. de Caulaincourt and M. Maret belonged to the first. They next discussed the order of precedence and little questions of detail; they considered whether the negotiation should be carried on in writing or _viva voce_, and the forms of the congresses of Nimeguen and Ryswick were called for. The object of each party was to gain time, in order that hostilities might recommence. At last, Metternich, seeing the indefinite turn affairs were taking, resolved to join the military Congress of Trachenberg, where the Crown Prince of Sweden, Bernadotte, was employed in tracing out the vast plan of the campaign of the allied armies against Napoleon. They decided upon marching straight upon Paris, without a moment's hesitation, and making an appeal to the people, dissatisfied with the Emperor. At Trachenberg, Russia and Prussia received all the propositions of the Austrian minister without the slightest difficulty; they agreed, whatever might be the personal pretensions of the Emperor Alexander, that the general command of the allied troops should be conferred upon Prince Schwartzenberg. The importance of securing the co-operation of the Austrian army was fully appreciated, and no sacrifice was spared to attach an additional force of 200,000 men to the coalition.

With a view to avoid this immense co-operation, Napoleon had addressed himself at once to the Emperor Francis II., recalling to his mind the alliance of their families. Maria Louisa had gone to Mayence, and her husband, taking advantage of one or two days which the armistice still left at his disposal, went to meet her there, to give his last instructions to the daughter of the Cæsars, and to confirm to her all the powers of the regency. France then would be governed by an archduchess, and, according to all dynastic ideas, could Austria fight against a country ruled by the daughter of her emperor? They were mistaken; the cabinets no longer stood in awe of Napoleon, and this was a circumstance which the French plenipotentiaries at Prague had not understood. M. Maret, in particular, had shewn his insufficiency, or, at all events, an inferior capacity, unable to bear a comparison with a statesman of the school and character of Prince Metternich. One of the greatest misfortunes of the Emperor Napoleon was, that he was surrounded by a crowd of people constantly at his feet, and dazzled with his glory: these were clerks, not statesmen.