Part 13

In the secret conferences of the plenipotentiaries, the Russian minister pressed the necessity of not exercising too much severity in the conditions exacted from France and the new dynasty; because, when dishonour, weakness, or degradation, are imposed upon a king or a nation, a natural reaction takes place against a yoke too oppressive to be borne. The treaty of Paris, the result of these conferences, was no doubt a very hard measure; when the Duc de Richelieu signed it, the trembling of his hand shewed the pain and grief he endured, and he wrote a most noble letter, which is still extant, deploring this cruel necessity; still, compared with the conditions imposed by the Anglo-Prussians, a great step had been gained. France underwent no partition; though she lost some posts on the frontier, though she was obliged to submit to a military occupation, though a contribution of seven hundred millions[23] of francs was levied, at least she could look forward to a limit, however distant, to the evils of war, she neither lost Lorraine nor Alsace, she still was a great nation.

[23] About twenty-eight millions sterling.

When the Emperor Alexander quitted Paris, he invested Pozzo di Borgo with full power to uphold the government of Louis XVIII., to watch his first proceedings and prevent his first faults. A powerful royalist reaction had taken place; the greater part of the Chamber of 1815 had decided in favour of a system of unbounded energy, in which parties, when left to themselves, are always apt to indulge in the first joy of victory. This chamber was strongly opposed to the Richelieu ministry, and made political order of impossible attainment, though it was the only means of realising the loans, and, consequently, of fulfilling the terms imposed by the army of occupation. Under existing circumstances, moderation was not merely a natural impulse of elevated minds, it was an actual law of necessity; besides which, reactions do not create real resources, they only disturb people's minds, and destroy public prosperity. Pozzo di Borgo upheld the Duc de Richelieu in the plan common to both, of endeavouring to arrest the ultra-royalist movement, which threw obstacles in the way of the fulfilment of their engagements towards the allies; and the _ordonnance_ of the 5th of September altered the course of ideas, and political principles of the Restoration. The despatches of Pozzo di Borgo had prepared the Emperor Alexander for this change, being altogether in favour of the moderate royalist system, which the duke was desirous of following; "It was necessary," said he, "to put a stop to the reaction of 1815;" and the emperor perfectly agreed with him in opinion. The Russian minister considered this _ordonnance_ as an act evincing the royal will, likely to be favourably received in Europe, and thus to advance the deliverance of the country from foreign occupation; the event shewed he was not mistaken, for Louis soon received letters from the Czar, congratulating him upon the act of firmness which enabled his government to pursue the path of salutary moderation.

The Russian influence continued to increase. The military occupation was still in force, and France, which had to arrange pecuniary conventions resulting from various treaties, was exposed to very severe trials: war was succeeded by famine, famine by internal disorders, and simultaneous revolts. In his despatches to the emperor, Pozzo di Borgo endeavoured to convince him of the necessity of alleviating the burden of the military contributions, unless they wished to drive to despair a nation which they might find it difficult to bring into entire subjection. I never met with a collection of documents better reasoned, or more thoroughly imbued with the desire of putting an end to the military occupation of the country; perhaps his strong and patriotic anxiety on that head often made him form too severe a judgment of the royalist party.

The influence of the Russian ambassador was favourable to all the negotiations of the French government, and at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle it assumed the character of a most generous intervention. Before starting for the congress he had received full authority from his sovereign to endeavour to prevail upon the Duke of Wellington to declare himself arbiter and mediator in the delicate question regarding the debts claimed by foreigners from the French government. These liabilities exceeded all bounds; and Pozzo di Borgo, appealing to the generosity and military honour of the Duke of Wellington, persuaded him to give over the military occupation which injured and tormented France, and to make an end of these liquidations, which appeared to have neither limit nor probable termination. Though the Duke of Wellington had an interest in keeping up a command which invested him with such vast authority in France, he consented to become the arbiter of the different interests; and affairs were thus arranged beforehand, that no obstacle might arise to interfere with the resolutions already formed, and which were to be finally settled at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle.

The result of that congress was the liberation of France, the credit and trouble attending which are due to the Duc de Richelieu; but the exertions of Pozzo di Borgo also contributed greatly to calm the fears of Alexander, which had been excited by the liberal tendency at that time so vehement in Europe.

The disposition of the Czar always evinced a greater degree of warmth and generosity than of deep reflection; a bias had been given by education, and he was also surrounded by timid people, constantly ready to be alarmed at the posture of affairs, and more especially uneasy at the excited state of the German universities. During his brief stay in Paris, after the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, Alexander had entered into an explanation on this subject with the French king. According to his ideas, the principal danger in Europe at that time arose from Jacobinism, and this was an evil above all others to be avoided; it was a disorder of a new species, against which the Holy Alliance would have some difficulty in acting so as to preserve the world from its contagion. The instructions left with Pozzo di Borgo bore the stamp of the same opinions; and what must have been the disappointment of the emperor, when, upon his arrival at Warsaw, he received intelligence that the Richelieu ministry was dissolved, and that a political system more decidedly liberal had been adopted by France! The Russian ambassador felt no repugnance for General Dessole, and Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr, who formed part of this administration, for they both belonged to the military opposition which had formed the basis of the restoration; but, when the choice fell upon M. Grégoire, and when the Duc de Berri was assassinated, terror and amazement took possession of the _corps diplomatique_, and Pozzo di Borgo was not unacquainted with the resolutions which again placed the Duc de Richelieu at the head of affairs. The influence of the ambassador was then neither very strong nor important, for a very simple reason; from the year 1815 to 1818 it was impossible the French government should act independent of foreigners; they occupied the country; it was necessary to consult their diplomatic agents, and be in a great measure decided by their opinion; but, when France was delivered from them, the influence changed its nature, there was then no material action, only a moral, and consequently limited, influence exercised by the _corps diplomatique_.

The revolutionary spirit began to be manifest in Europe: Spain, Naples, Piémont, had all proclaimed the constitution with arms in their hands; the assassination of Kotzebue, the excited state of the universities, the mysterious societies in the Russian army, the riots at Manchester, the commotions of the active population of Paris in the month of June 1820, all were presages of a popular movement against crowned heads. The thrones of Europe were never more shaken than in those two years of 1820 and 21; it was necessary they should defend themselves. Pozzo di Borgo, therefore, received orders to uphold the royalist system of the Duc de Richelieu's second ministry, and he entered into it with a loyal ardour which proceeded not only from the personal friendship he entertained for that minister, but also from his profound conviction that certain limits would not be overstepped. Nevertheless, from the hands of M. de Richelieu the government fell into those of MM. de Montmorency and De Villèle, the representatives of the ultra-monarchical and religious opinions, and who had a bias towards the English system. Count Pozzo felt some annoyance in viewing the triumph of men with whom he was well acquainted, and whom he had even been called upon to oppose in the _ordonnance_ of the 5th of September; but the orders of his sovereign were imperative, and he became their organ at Paris. He approved of the occupation of Piémont by the Austrians; and his advice principally decided the question of the war with Spain, which had been suggested at the congresses of Troppan and Laybach, and finally resolved upon at Verona.

The royalist party returned in triumph from Cadiz, having replaced Ferdinand VII. on his throne. In that country, where moderation either in politics or religion is unknown, the power had fallen into the hands of Don Saez, the king's confessor; and the object of Russia being always to exercise a powerful influence in the south of Europe, in order to counterbalance that of England, Count Pozzo received orders to repair to Madrid and use all his endeavours to push M. Hirujo into the ministry, who was a man of moderate views, and consequently inclined to favour the Russian interests. A perfect understanding on this head existed between the Russian minister and M. de Villèle. M. de Hirujo, forerunner of M. Zéa, gained the ascendant at Madrid, and people could reckon upon the government of Ferdinand being conducted with some degree of order and regularity. Pozzo di Borgo then returned to Paris; he was on intimate terms with MM. Pasquier and Molé, friends of the Duc de Richelieu, and disapproved highly of the folly of the royalist party, who tormented France every year with fresh laws, still more remarkable for their silliness and want of importance than for their unpopular tendency; but the ambassador had now hardly any influence upon the government; it was almost entirely confined to the opposition formed in the diplomatic circles and in good society, which before long extended to the conduct of the sovereign. Although he approved of the law regarding the conversion of the _rentes_,[24] he had no hesitation in giving utterance to his opinion concerning the extreme unpopularity the measure would naturally be attended with. "The King of France," said he, "wishes to become the richest sovereign in Europe; but I greatly fear this measure will lead to some unfortunate catastrophe. People do not play with impunity with the _pot-au-feu_ of the citizens." And the event shewed his opinion to have been well founded.

[24] On the 5th of April, 1824, the minister of finance brought forward a plan to substitute _rentes_ at three per cent for those already existing at five per cent, reserving to the holders of the five per cent _rentes_ the option between the repayment of their nominal capital and its conversion into three per cents at the rate of seventy-five. Some modifications were suggested, but the plan failed at the time. In the following year it was renewed, and then it was decreed that the proprietors of five per cent _rentes_ should be allowed till the 22d of June (afterwards extended to the 5th of August) the faculty of demanding from the minister of finance their conversion into three per cents at the price of seventy-five, and till the 22d of September the faculty of requiring their conversion into four and a half per cent stock at par, with a guarantee in both cases against being paid off till September 1835. The _rentes_ so converted were to continue to bear interest at five per cent until the 22d December, 1825.--_Editor._

At this period the Russian ambassador lost his protector, I may almost say his friend. Alexander died on his journey into the Crimea, a pilgrimage enveloped in mystery,[25] and which was immediately followed by the revolutionary movement in St. Petersburg. Some officers were desirous of throwing the government into the hands of the old Russian nobility, always ready to enter into any measure calculated to restore the predominance of the Muscovite aristocracy, which was a sort of republic formed of the great vassals of the crown. Would the Emperor Nicholas repose the same confidence in Pozzo di Borgo that his predecessor had done? He had not like Alexander a sort of brotherhood in arms and affairs with his ambassador, but as Count Nesselrode remained at the head of affairs, he retained his situation and presented his renewed credentials to Charles X. at the time when the storms of the opposition assumed every where a menacing aspect. Two years afterwards the ministry of M. de Villèle was at an end, and the king formed a fresh administration, at the head of which he intended placing M. de Martignac and M. de la Ferronays. The latter was at that time ambassador at St. Petersburg, and enjoyed the confidence of the Emperor Nicholas, who was therefore likely to be satisfied with his appointment to the ministry, and Pozzo di Borgo considered it necessary to support him with all his power; for the interests of Russia had at that time assumed so complicated a form, that the concurrence of France was a matter of the greatest importance to her.

[25] Alexander had gone on a tour of inspection to the southern parts of his empire, and on arriving at a village in the Crimea, he insisted upon attending the service in a church which had long been shut up, in spite of the remonstrances of his attendants, who represented the danger arising from malaria. He was shortly afterwards seized with the fever common in the Crimea, and refused to submit to the strong measures recommended by his medical attendants, resolving to trust to abstinence and the mild remedies he had usually found successful when attacked by illness, but which were insufficient in this instance; and when he at last resigned himself into the hands of his physicians, it was too late. Reports were raised of his having been poisoned, but they were totally devoid of foundation.--_Editor._

Russia had deeply offended the Porte by signing the treaty of the month of June 1827, which established the independence of Greece; and the Mussulmans, proud of their ancient glory, had been still further irritated by the battle of Navarino. The occupation of Moldavia and Wallachia had given rise to fresh dissensions, which ended by the Russian ambassador's quitting Constantinople. Every thing was thus progressing towards a war likely to involve Russia in considerable danger, especially if England were to take part with the Sultan: the Emperor Nicholas was determined to pass the Balkan, for he found it necessary to employ the superstitious and turbulent disposition of the old Russian nobility in active military operations, to prevent its bursting out in revolutionary attempts.

Under these circumstances Count Nesselrode commissioned Pozzo di Borgo to sound the French cabinet as to the conditions they would require,--not for an armed alliance, but simply to observe a friendly neutrality during the oriental war. Count Pozzo proposed that France should keep up a force of 100, or 150,000, to act as a check upon Austria, and augment her armaments, so as to restrain England; he also hinted that should any important advantages result to Russia from the events of the campaign, the frontiers of France might possibly be reconsidered and the natural boundary of the Rhine granted to her without expense, by arranging an indemnity for Prussia and Holland; and that indeed it was not impossible the Morea might be given her as a compensatory measure, with the same rights as those enjoyed by England over the republic of the seven islands. What a magnificent portion this would have been for France!

The first operations of the campaign were not attended with success: there were sanguinary sieges and doubtful battles. During this time Count Pozzo exhibited the utmost activity in Paris, where the checks sustained by the Russians were the general subject of conversation, and General Lamarque had even published a series of articles to prove that the destruction of the army was inevitable. General Pozzo entered much into society, and at every fresh disaster or difficulty he strove to remove the fears they excited as to the consequences of the war: "Wait, have patience," repeated he incessantly, "and then you will see." The best understanding existed between him and M. de la Ferronays, who exerted himself to calm the minds which England took equal pains to disturb.

The following year the Russian armies were more fortunate, having advanced upon Constantinople, and the position of the ambassador became less difficult; but to counterbalance this advantage, the ministerial revolution took place in the month of August, which placed Prince Polignac, and consequently the English system of precedents and opinions, at the head of affairs. Pozzo de Borgo was much annoyed at this change; the cabinet of St. Petersburg entered into an explanation on the subject with M. de Mortemart, and in proportion as the French ministry advanced in the adventurous path of _coups d'état_, Count Pozzo multiplied his despatches to his government to warn them of an impending catastrophe. The information he gave on this subject was so positive, that the Emperor spoke to M. de Mortemart, telling him he was well aware some foolish steps were about to be taken in Paris. "The king of France," added he, "is at liberty to act as he pleases in his kingdom, but if evil comes of it, so much the worse for him. Give him warning that he will not be supported, and that Europe will not engage in a quarrel on his account."

The Russian ambassador only became acquainted with the _ordonnances_ of July the evening before they were promulgated; he had neither been informed confidentially, nor had he received any official intimation; only a few days before the event he said in a conference with Polignac, "Prince, I do not wish to inquire into your secrets, I do not ask you what you are about, only take precautions not to compromise Europe;" and then Prince Polignac replied with his habitual smile, so expressive of perfect security, "All we ask is, that Europe will not compromise us." At these words the ambassador turned his back upon him. When the fatal _ordonnances_ appeared the next day in the Moniteur, Pozzo di Borgo expressed great dissatisfaction and alarm at seeing the utter carelessness of the government in the midst of so much difficulty and danger, and the total absence of any military force or precaution. "How," said he, "are there no troops? The bridges are not occupied! Have no military precautions been taken?" "Every thing is quiet," replied they, "nobody stirs." "Every thing quiet!" repeated the ambassador warmly, "yes, every thing will probably be quiet to-day, but to-morrow we shall have firing in the streets, and the next day who knows what may happen? I shall be obliged to ask for my passports."

Here was the commencement of another series of events. It is necessary to judge the conduct of the ambassador during the latter days of the government which was about to expire, and the commencement of that which succeeded to it.

The events of July were characterised by so much agitation and importance, that the _corps diplomatique_ must have found itself placed in an embarrassing position: Charles X. had quitted St. Cloud and sought refuge at Rambouillet, and a municipal commission had restored order in the midst of the insurrection. If Prince Polignac had possessed the slightest political forethought, he would have notified to the _corps diplomatique_ that the king proposed removing his menaced government to such and such a part of the kingdom; this resolution would have served as an official order to all the ambassadors, to accompany the sovereign who had received their credentials, and by whom they were officially accredited, and their presence at St. Cloud would have been a sort of protest against the events then taking place at Paris; it might also have facilitated the negotiation between the royal party and the Hôtel de Ville, for the provisional government would have been afraid of committing itself with Europe, and being exposed to a general war. But with the utter carelessness he displayed in the whole business, Prince Polignac, minister for foreign affairs, made no official communication to the _corps diplomatique_, but treated every thing with a degree of levity quite in keeping with his predestinarian character.

The ambassadors naturally hesitated what course they should pursue in the midst of so many difficulties. Should they proceed to St. Cloud? But it was necessary the translation of the government should be officially notified to them by the minister for foreign affairs; ought they to make observations, to mix themselves up with the withdrawal of the _ordonnances_, or the negotiations of the Hôtel de Ville and the provisional government? That was not their duty, nor had they any right to interfere. The only plan, then, they could adopt was to await the end of the struggle, and not concern themselves with the plan of the government, until it placed itself in communication with their respective courts by requiring to be recognised.

In a meeting at the residence of the Nuncio, they decided upon remaining at Paris until further orders, and taking no part in events until they should receive an official communication from Charles X. Couriers extraordinary were despatched to the different courts to keep them constantly informed of the progress of this important affair, and request further instructions; generally speaking, all the despatches blamed Prince Polignac's carelessness, and described the events that had taken place in Paris in moderate language; mentioning the order that prevailed in the midst of disorder, the appointment of a lieutenant-general of the kingdom, and the abdication of the King and of the Duke of Angoulême: they then awaited patiently the termination of the insurrection, without compromising themselves, and without either giving or receiving an impulsion.