Chapter 18

"2. That notwithstanding from the confusion always attendant on a revolution, from our having had governments to frame, and every species of civil and military institution to create, from that inexperience in affairs necessarily incident to a nation in its commencement, some errors may have been committed in the administration of our finances, to which a part of our embarrassments are to be attributed; yet they are principally to be attributed to our essential want of means; to the want of a sufficient stock of wealth as mentioned in the first article, which, continuing to operate, will make it impossible, by any merely interior exertions, to extricate ourselves from these embarrassments, restore public credit, and furnish the funds requisite for the support of the war.

"3. That experience has demonstrated the impracticability of maintaining a paper credit, without funds for its redemption; the depreciation of our currency was in the main a necessary effect of the want of those funds, and its restoration is impossible for the same reasons, to which the general diffidence, that had taken place among the people, is an additional, and in the present state of things, an insuperable obstacle.

"4. That the mode, which for want of money has been substituted for supplying the army, by assessing a proportion of the productions of the earth, has hitherto been found ineffectual, has frequently exposed the army to the most calamitous distress, and from its novelty and incompatibility with ancient habits, is regarded by the people as burthensome and oppressive, has excited serious discontents, and, in some places, alarming symptoms of opposition. This mode has besides many particular inconveniences, which contribute to make it inadequate to our wants, and ineligible but as an auxiliary.

"5. That from the best estimates of the annual revenues, which these States are capable of affording, there is a balance to be supplied by credit. The resource of domestic loans is inconsiderable, because there are, properly speaking, few monied men, and the few there are can employ their money more profitably otherwise; added to which, the instability of the currency and the deficiency of funds have impaired the public credit.

"6. That the patience of the army, from an almost uninterrupted series of complicated distress, is now nearly exhausted, their wants carried to an extremity, which has recently had very disagreeable consequences, and demonstrate, the absolute necessity of speedy relief, a relief not within the compass of our means. You are too well acquainted with all their sufferings, for want of clothing, for want of provisions, for want of pay.

"7. That the people being dissatisfied with the mode of supporting the war, there is danger to apprehend, that evils actually felt in prosecuting it may weaken the cause which began it, evils founded not on immediate sufferings, but on a speculative apprehension of future sufferings from the loss of their liberties; there is danger that a commercial and free people, little accustomed to heavy burthens, pressed by impositions of a new and odious kind, may not make a proper allowance for the necessity of the conjuncture, and may imagine they have only exchanged one tyranny for another.

"8. That from all the foregoing considerations result, 1st, the absolute necessity of an immediate, ample, and efficacious succor of money, large enough to be a foundation for substantial arrangements of finance to revive public credit, and give vigor to future operations. 2dly, the vast importance of a decided effort of the allied arms on this continent the ensuing campaign, to effectuate once for all the great object of the alliance, the liberty and independence of these United States. Without the former, we may make a feeble and expiring effort the next campaign, in all probability the period to our opposition; with it we should be in a condition to continue the war as long as the obstinacy of the enemy might require. The first is essential; both combined, would bring the contest to a glorious issue, crown the obligations which America already feels to the magnanimity and generosity of her ally, and render the union perpetual by all the ties of gratitude and affection, as well as mutual interest, which alone render it solid and indissoluble.

"9. That next to a loan of money, a constant naval superiority is the most interesting; this would instantly reduce the enemy to a difficult, defensive war, and by removing all prospects of extending their acquisitions, would take away the motives for prosecuting it. Indeed, it is not to be conceived, how they could subsist a large force in this country if we had the command of the seas to interrupt the regular transmission of supplies from Europe. This superiority, with an aid of money, would enable us to convert the contest into a vigorous offensive war. I say nothing of the advantages to the trade of both nations, nor how much it would facilitate our supplies. With respect to us, it seems to be one of two deciding points, and it appears to be the interest of our allies, abstracted from the immediate benefits to this country, to transfer the naval war to America. The number of ports friendly to them and hostile to the British, the materials for repairing their disabled ships, the extensive supplies towards the subsistence of their fleet, are circumstances which would give them a palpable advantage in the contest of the sea. No nation will have it more in its power to repay what it borrows than this. Our debts are hitherto small. The vast and valuable tracts of unlocated lands, the variety and fertility of climates and soils, the advantages of every kind, which we possess for commerce, insure to this country a rapid advancement in population and prosperity, and a certainty (its independence being established) of redeeming in a short term of years the comparatively inconsiderable debts, it may have occasion to contract. Notwithstanding the difficulties under which we labor, and the inquietudes among the people, there is still a fund of inclination and resource in the country equal to great and continued exertions, provided we have it in our power to stop the progress of disgust, by changing the present system, and adopting another more consonant with the spirit of the nation, and more capable of activity and energy in measures of which a powerful succor of money must be the basis.

"The people are discontented, but it is with the feeble, oppressive mode of conducting the war, not with the war itself; they are not unwilling to contribute to its support, but they are unwilling to do it in a way that renders private property precarious, a necessary consequence of the fluctuation of the national currency, and of the inability of government to perform its engagements oftentimes coercively made. A large majority are still firmly attached to the independence of these States, abhor a re-union with Great Britain, and are affectionate to the alliance with France. But this disposition can ill supply the means customary and essential in war, nor can we rely on its duration amidst the perplexities, oppressions, and misfortunes, that attend the want of them."

From those extracts it will appear to your Excellency, that the fate of America depends upon the immediate and decisive succor of her august ally, in the two points of a specific loan and a naval superiority. The most accurate calculation of the expense requisite for a vigorous campaign, and the interior means which Congress have of defraying that expense, prove that there is a deficiency of the full sum solicited by Congress. The grant of six millions, which his Majesty is pleased to make under the title of a donation to the United States, will be acknowledged with the liveliest emotions of gratitude by affectionate allies, at the same time it would be frustrating the gracious intentions of his Majesty towards his allies, and betraying the common cause of France and America, to encourage a belief, that the above mentioned aid will enable the United States to surmount the present perilous juncture of our affairs. The reasoning in the foregoing extracts will evince how inadequate the sum is to the present exigency.

I must likewise remark to your Excellency, that the credit in bills of exchange is subject to difficulties and disadvantages, which render such a resource very unfit for the conduct of the war. Bills are obnoxious to the vicissitudes and speculations of commerce, and it is easy to foresee, that his Majesty's allies would be great sufferers by their drafts, and at the same time be incapable of giving that vigor and energy to their operations, which would be derived from specie. The same enlightened policy and generous regard for the rights of mankind, which prompted France to espouse the cause of America, still dictate the conduct which she is to pursue; they demand every effort on her part to prevent America from being reduced to the British domination, her commerce, and those sources of wealth being restored to the tyrant of the European seas, the ancient rival of France; but on the contrary, the abasement of this rival, and the establishment of a faithful ally, united by all the ties of gratitude, affection, and the most permanent mutual interests. To those invaluable purposes give me leave to repeat to your Excellency, that the decisive measures in the foregoing extracts are necessary.

I submit to your Excellency, whether the objection to his Majesty's favoring a loan in the name of Congress, may not be obviated by an additional loan in the name of his Majesty, on account of the United States, for which Congress will be accountable. The excellent state of the finances of this kingdom, the exalted state of public credit, must unquestionably give the greatest facility for this purpose, and it may be clearly proved, that giving decisive succor in this article at the present juncture will be infinitely more advantageous, than suffering the war to languish, by affording partial and inadequate assistance. Supposing that fortunate casualties, at this time very improbable, should enable us to continue the war upon its present footing, I beg leave to repeat to your Excellency, that the greatest promptness in this business is essential. The British, by being in possession of two States, fertile in grain, timber, and naval stores, have acquired new animation, and fresh resources for the war, and every day, according to present appearances, brings America nearer to the period of her efforts.

JOHN LAURENS.

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_Questions proposed to Colonel Laurens; with his Answers to them._

Paris, March 29th, 1781.

"1st. To what number can the United States increase their continental troops?

"2dly. What will be the expense of the number fixed?

"3dly. This expense is to be distinguished into pay and appointments, clothing, arms, ammunition, and provision.

"4thly. What does the artillery of the United States consist of, and what is the number of carriages?

"5thly. What is the number of provision wagons?

"6thly. What are the plans of General Washington, in case his army should amount to fifteen, twelve, or ten thousand men, independently of the French troops?"

After answering the foregoing questions generally, both with respect to the northern and southern army, I added the following remarks.

The plans of General Washington are absolutely subordinate to the succors, which his Most Christian Majesty will be pleased to grant to his allies. If Congress obtain the succor in money and military effects, and the naval superiority which they solicit, they will be enabled to revive public credit, to make solid arrangements of finance, to give activity to the resources of the country, to augment their troops, to appease their discontents, and to reinforce General Washington with a select corps of ten thousand militia.

With the addition of this force and the French troops, the General will be in condition to undertake the siege of New York. It is unnecessary to say how glorious and decisive the success of this operation would be for the common cause; it is equally unnecessary to add, how much the promptness of succor from France would contribute to it.

The expense of artillery required for this operation will be found in the estimate delivered; that of clothing, &c. for the army in its present state, will be found in deducting a quantity proportioned to the number of men; but it is impossible to represent too strongly, that this excess far from being superfluous, is absolutely necessary to recruit the army in general; a precaution which is indispensable, unless we should choose to hazard all upon the event of a single operation. That the Congress besides, owes great arrearages of clothing to the soldiers, and that as the estimate of Indian presents has not been included in the present demand, we may be obliged perhaps to sacrifice a part of the clothing now solicited, to maintain the friendship of some of the tribes attached to France and America, and that it is of the greatest importance to prevent them from joining the hostile tribes, who in conjunction with the English tories ravage the country, destroy our harvests, put to flight and massacre all the inhabitants on the western frontier, from New York to Virginia. We may more especially expect, that this diversion will be employed during the siege of New York. It is to be added, that a number of men will be found who have already served, who would eagerly rejoin their ancient standards, provided they had the assurance of proper treatment, instead of the misery and sufferings which they have hitherto experienced. That the army would be augmented, notwithstanding the daily loss in the trenches, by levies perfectly accustomed to fire.

The extreme weakness of the southern army is attributable to the following causes.

1st. That two of the States that furnish quotas to this army are invaded by the British.

2dly. That they have all a great many prisoners in the hands of the enemy, and that their troops in general have been wasted, as well by the excessive marches, which they have undergone in carrying succors to the southward, as by the different misfortunes which have happened there.

The naval superiority of the British, and the rapidity of their movements by sea, secured to them the capture of Charleston, and all their southern successes; enjoying the advantages they have had in their power, to transport a body of troops, with all requisites in ammunition and provision, from one end of the continent to the other in fourteen days, to attack a feeble point; while the American succors, wasted by a march of two months, commenced in the rigors of winter, and without intermission from the fatigues of a campaign, could only arrive to increase the public calamity, by being beat in detail.

JOHN LAURENS.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Versailles, April 9th, 1781.

Sir,

Since I had the honor of writing to your Excellency, on the 23d ultimo, I have employed the most unremitting efforts to obtain a prompt and favorable decision relative to the objects of my mission. After many difficulties and delays, with the details of which it is needless to trouble Congress, the Count de Vergennes communicated to me yesterday his Most Christian Majesty's determination to guaranty a loan of ten millions, to be opened in Holland, in addition to the six millions granted as a gratuitous gift, and the four millions appropriated for the payment of bills of exchange drawn by Congress on their Minister Plenipotentiary. The purchase money of the clothing, which must be an affair of private contract, and the value of the military effects which may be furnished from the royal arsenals, are to be deducted from the six millions.

I shall use my utmost endeavors to procure an immediate advance of the ten millions from the treasury of France, to be replaced by the proposed loan, and shall renew my solicitations for the supplies of ordinance and military stores on credit, that the present of six millions may not be absorbed by those objects, and the purchase of necessary clothing. The providing this article I fear will be attended with great difficulties and delays, as all the woollen manufactories of France are remote from the sea, and there are no public magazines of cloth suitable to our purposes. The cargo of the Marquis de Lafayette will I hope arrive safe under the convoy of the Alliance; and by satisfying our immediate necessities prevent the delays above mentioned from having any disagreeable consequences.

The Marquis de Castries has engaged to make immediate arrangements for the safe transportation of the pecuniary and other succors destined for the United States, and has repeatedly assured me, that the naval superiority will be established on the American coast the ensuing campaign. The French fleet, he informs me, was on the 27th ultimo sixty leagues west of Cape Finisterre, proceeding to its destination, in good order and with a favorable wind.

I do myself the honor to transmit to your Excellency extracts of the most conspicuous letters of an intercepted mail, taken in a packet bound from Falmouth to New York. Your Excellency will have been informed, that the Court of London have referred the offered mediation of Russia, between England and the United Provinces, to a general pacification. I have been some days stationary at Versailles for the facility of seeing the different Ministers, and accelerating their deliberations. Being just apprized of an opportunity from Nantes to America, I take the liberty of sending this short provisional letter, lest upon my return to Passy I should not have time to write more fully.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN LAURENS.

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_Memorial from Colonel John Laurens to Count de Vergennes._

The underwritten, special Minister of the United States of America, has the honor to represent to his Most Christian Majesty in behalf of Congress and by their orders, that the crisis is extreme, and that it demands prompt and decisive succors.

The United States claim with confidence the power and good will of their august ally. They had requested,

1st. A loan of twentyfive millions.

2dly. A naval superiority on the American coast.

3dly. Arms and ammunition, materials for clothing, equipments and tents, estimates of which have been laid before the Ministry.

The underwritten, being informed by the Count de Vergennes of the King's intentions with regard to pecuniary succors, earnestly offers in the name of the Congress the homage of the most lively gratitude, but at the same time it is his duty to represent, that although this succor tends to the object which his Majesty has in view, it is nevertheless demonstrated in the present state of affairs, that it is insufficient, considering the urgent necessities of the army and the administration, its engagements and debts, the exhausted condition of America, the absolute deficiency of resources and specie, and the enormous expense essential to the vigorous support of the war. It is on this account, that the underwritten earnestly entreats his Majesty to grant, on credit to the United States of America, the artillery, arms, ammunition, &c. which shall be drawn from his Majesty's arsenals and magazines, as a very considerable sum must be absorbed for the payment of clothing and other articles to be collected in France.

The underwritten further entreats his Majesty to consider, that the operation of a loan in Holland cannot be terminated in less than three months, that the delay of this result may commit the safety of America, and the common cause, lose the fruit of all the expense and sacrifices hitherto made; a single instant is precious, the least delay becomes of the most dangerous consequence, while the successes of the British multiply their resources and give them new energy.

The loan which will be opened in Holland under the auspices of his Majesty, favored by the guarantee which he is pleased to grant, cannot fail of success.

The underwritten flatters himself, therefore, that his Majesty will find no inconvenience in ordering the immediate advance of ten millions to be delivered at the disposal of the United States, which will be returned to his royal treasury by means of the loan in question.

Events of the greatest importance depend upon this disposition equally good and indispensable. The underwritten would think himself deficient in his duty, if he did not persevere in entreating his Majesty to adopt and order it.

The arrival of this sum is necessary to give a vigorous impulse to the organisation of administration in the present state of things, renew the tone of parts which have lost their energy, and revive public credit by making the resources of the country concur in the expenses of the war, which resources cannot be turned to account without coin to determine them.

If it is impossible to make it a part of the general arrangement to grant safe means of conveyance for the whole of this sum, the underwritten entreats his Majesty to cause as considerable a portion as possible to be remitted immediately, and to fix a very early date for the departure of the remainder.

The underwritten further earnestly solicits, that a naval superiority be permanently maintained on the American coast. The practicability and success of all military operations and the event of the war, depend directly and even exclusively on the state of the maritime force in America.

The British, by preserving this advantage, will be able to accomplish all their plans by the rapidity of their movements. The facility of transporting themselves everywhere secures them a series of successes, which are rendered still more decisive by the certainty of finding no opposition in defenceless points.

It is by these means that they have been able lately to possess themselves of a very important maritime point in North Carolina, and, by effecting a sudden junction between two divisions of their army, have been able to penetrate to the granary of that State. This position is the more favorable to the enemy, as he encloses between his army and the port of Wilmington, of which he is master, a considerable number of Scotch colonists attached to the interests of England, and who will be determined, perhaps, by his successes to declare themselves openly. Such consequences are to be expected from great successes in all civil wars. If his Majesty thinks proper to oppose a naval superiority to the British, they will be obliged to recall their troops from the interior country to reunite for the defence of the most important maritime points, the communication between which will be cut off, and the choice of attacks left to the allies.

The abasement of Great Britain, the dismemberment of its empire, the inestimable commercial advantages arising to France, present great interests, and merit powerful efforts. If this opportunity be neglected, if too much be left to chance, if time be lost, and the means employed be insufficient, the British pride will know neither bounds nor restraint; our object will be missed perhaps forever; it is easy to foresee how fatal the consequences would be to the French islands.

The underwritten renews the assurances of the most inviolable attachment on the part of the United States. Whatever may be the decision of his Majesty on these representations, his goodness towards his allies will never be effaced from their hearts; they will support the common cause with the same devotion to the last extremity, but their success must necessarily depend upon their means.

JOHN LAURENS.

_Paris, April 18th, 1781._

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, April 24th, 1781.

Sir,