Chapter 1

it. The Minister's caution in making his becoming engaged for the advances in question to depend on M. Cabarrus' persisting in the same dispositions he had lately declared, relative to the time he would be content to wait for a reimbursement, is somewhat singular, considering that his offers on that head had been repeatedly and explicitly communicated to the Minister, and to the Ambassador of France, both by him and by me. Immediately on receiving the Ambassador's letter, I gave it to Mr Carmichael with instructions to show it to M. Cabarrus, and bring me back his answer without delay, for I was then expecting the notary and others with bills.

Mr Carmichael returned and informed me, that he had communicated the letter to M. Cabarrus, and that instead of abiding by his former offer, to be content with the Minister's engaging to see him repaid in ten or twelve months, he insisted on being repaid in four months, in four equal monthly payments, and those payments secured by orders on the rents of the general post-office; and that M. Cabarrus promised either to write or speak to the Minister about it.

A new application to the Minister became necessary, and consequently further time and indulgence from the holders of the bills was to be solicited.

I told the notary, that I was in treaty with M. Cabarrus for the supplies I wanted, and that one or two articles remained to be adjusted, which could not be done till the next day.

I therefore requested him to suspend the protest for twentyfour hours more, and to apply to the holders of the bills for permission, adding that near twenty of them belonged to M. Cabarrus, and that from the friendly conduct of several of the others I had reason to flatter myself, that they would readily consent. He seemed surprised at what I said respecting my expectations from M. Cabarrus, and with a degree of indignation told me, that M. Cabarrus was more pressing than any of the others, and had already sent him two messages to conclude the matter with me without delay, that he had received one of the messages the day before, and the other that morning. He nevertheless cheerfully undertook to obtain permission from the holders of the bills to wait till the next afternoon, and succeeded in it.

The next morning, viz. the 16th of March, I waited upon the Ambassador. I mentioned to him these several facts, and told him, that my hopes from M. Cabarrus were at an end, for that exclusive of other circumstances it was not probable that, considering his lucrative connexions with government, he would risk treating the promise of the Minister, made in consequence of his own offer, with so little respect, as to demand such formal and unusual securities for the performance of it, unless there had been some previous concert, or indirect management in the case. The Ambassador declined assenting to this opinion. He promised to see the Minister, with whom he was that day to dine, and to send me his positive and final answer by four o'clock in the afternoon.

Having prepared the draft of a protest, I thought it would not be amiss to show it to the Ambassador. He returned it to me without making any other remark, than that it was rather pointed.

From the Ambassador's I went to M. Cabarrus'; he had not been at the Pardo, and was then at a meeting of merchants, to whose consideration his plan of a bank had been referred.

The Ambassador went to the Pardo and mentioned the matter to the Minister, who replied briefly, "that affair is already arranged with M. Cabarrus," but the Chevalier de Bourgoing, having been desired to bring back a decided answer, applied to M. Del Campo on the subject, who told him, "that they could not possibly comply with M. Cabarrus' terms; that he had written so that morning to M. Cabarrus by a private courier, and that in the evening the Minister would repeat it to him officially." On the Chevalier's mentioning this to the Ambassador, he was clearly of opinion that I had not any resource left, and, therefore, that the bills must be protested, and that the Chevalier should tell me so. I showed the protest, as translated into Spanish by M. Gardoqui, to the Chevalier. The original in English is as follows.

"Mr Jay says, that when he accepted the bills hereunto annexed, he had good reason to expect to be supplied with the funds necessary to pay them. That he has been disappointed in the expectations he was encouraged to entertain on this subject, and that his endeavors to obtain moneys for the purpose both here and elsewhere have been unsuccessful, although the bills which remain to be paid by him, together with all his other engagements, do not exceed twentyfive thousand pounds sterling. That these disappointments being unexpected, he cannot, for want of time, have recourse to Congress, and, therefore, finds himself reduced to the mortifying necessity of permitting them to be protested."

The Chevalier approved of the protest, but the notary on reading it observed, that the sum was really so trifling, that he thought it would do better to strike it out. The Chevalier was struck with this remark, and advised me with some earnestness to make no mention of the sum, for, said he, "it will appear very extraordinary, that you should be obliged to protest the bills of Congress for the want of such a sum, and people will naturally turn their eyes towards France, and ask how it happened that your good allies did not assist you; it will look as if we had deserted you."

I replied, that since the bills must be protested, I was content that my true situation should be known. I admitted his inferences to be just, and naturally flowing from the facts, adding, that as France knew my situation and had withheld relief, she had so far deserted us; but that I was, nevertheless, mindful of the many proofs we had received of her friendship, and should not cease to be grateful for the ninetynine acts of friendship she had done us, merely because she had refused to do the hundredth.

In short, I directed the notary to recite this protest _verbatim_.

This protest was drawn at my leisure, and with much consideration. It operated as I expected, and I am persuaded you will see the reason of each sentence in it without the aid of my comments. I will only remark, that I was at first induced to insert, and afterwards to refuse striking out the sum, lest from leaving it uncertain, the public might have had room to conjecture, or individuals to insinuate, that I had imprudently run into such rash and expensive engagements, as to render it improper for Spain or France to afford me the necessary supplies.

Nor did it appear to me that both of them should have reason to be ashamed of permitting our credit to be impeached and injured for such an unimportant sum. Both Courts were blamed, and we not only acquitted, but pitied by the public.

I ought to inform you, that the sum which I really wanted did not amount to twentyfive thousand pounds, but as some straggling bills frequently made their appearance, and it could not be foreseen how much those which might still be behind would amount to, I thought it advisable to make a considerable allowance on that score; for in case I should have asked for less than might afterwards have proved indispensable, I should, doubtless, have been put to great difficulties in obtaining a supply for the deficiency.

In justice to the bankers who held the protested bills, I must say that they in general appeared disposed to show me every reasonable indulgence. The house of Joyes and Sons, though considered as anti-American, were particularly civil. They offered to take such of the bills as had been remitted to them on themselves, provided I would only pass my word for the payment of them within a few weeks; but as I had no assurance of funds, I could not risk it. Besides, unless all the bills due could have been suspended on the like terms, it could have answered no purpose, because the difference of protesting a few bills more or less was unimportant. The conduct of Don Ignacias Salaia, the notary, was so particularly and singularly generous, that I cannot forbear mentioning it. Though without expectations, and uninfluenced by promises from me, he behaved as if the case had been his own, and proved the sincerity of his professions by doing everything in his power to serve me. On perceiving how much he was engaged in my favor, I did not choose to lessen the appearance of its being disinterested by promises of rewards. But after the bills were protested, and he could be of no further use, I sent him a gold piece of sixteen dollars, as an acknowledgment for the trouble I had given him. He returned it with an assurance, that he wished to serve me from other motives, and the next day waited upon me to thank me for that mark of attention, and again to assure me that his best services were always at my command.

When the bills were protested, and M. Cabarrus' conduct mentioned in his presence, the poor fellow literally shed tears. I was much affected by the warmth and generosity of this man's heart, and should not have readily pardoned myself, had I neglected to bear this testimony to the goodness of it.

During the whole time that this matter was in agitation, that is from the 11th to the 16th of March, and for sometime afterwards, M. Cabarrus did not come near me.

On the 18th I wrote a letter to Dr Franklin informing him of the protest, and reciting the reasons assigned for it. I also hinted the propriety of taking up the bills at Paris, if possible.

The national pride of the Ambassador of France was hurt by this event; I am sure he regretted it as disreputable and impolitic. I remarked to him, that most of our cross accidents had proved useful to us, and that this might save us the Mississippi. For I thought it more prudent to appear a little incensed than dispirited on the occasion. I suspect that there has been an interesting conversation between the two Courts about us. He told me this winter, that he believed Spain wished to modify our independence, and to keep herself in a situation to mediate between us and England at the general peace. He did not explain himself further. As great successes on our part must operate against such designs, the Spanish Minister can neither rejoice in, nor be disposed to promote them; and this may help both to account for the little impression made by the capitulation of York, and for their conduct as to our bills and propositions, &c. I am sure that they fear us too, and the more, perhaps, as they have misbehaved towards us.

Not many days elapsed before a special courier from Paris brought advices to this Court, that the British Parliament had resolved to advise the King to cease all offensive operations against us, &c. This, and the subsequent debates and resolutions of Parliament relative to the American war, made a deeper impression here in our favor than any event which has happened since my arrival. New ideas seemed to pervade the whole Court and people, and much consultation as well as surprise was occasioned by it.

On the 26th of March I received the following letter from Dr Franklin, from the hands of M. Cabarrus, to whom I behaved, on that occasion, with reserved and cold politeness.

"Passy, March 16th, 1782.

"Dear Sir,

"I have received your several favors of January 30th, February 11th and March 1st, and propose to write fully to you by the next post. In the meantime this line may serve to acquaint you, that I paid duly all your former bills drawn in favor of M. Cabarrus, and that having obtained a promise of six millions for this year, to be paid me quarterly, I now see that I shall be able to pay your drafts for discharging the sums you may be obliged to borrow for paying those upon you, in which however I wish you to give me as much time as you can, dividing them so that they may not come upon me at once. Interest should be allowed your friends who advance for you. Please to send me a complete list of all the bills you have accepted, their numbers and dates, marking which are paid, and what are still to pay.

"I congratulate you upon the change of sentiments in the British nation. It has been intimated to me from thence, that they are willing to make a separate peace with us exclusive of France, Spain, and Holland, which so far as relates to France is impossible; and I believe they will be content that we leave them the other two; but Holland is stepping towards us, and I am not without hopes of a second loan there. And since Spain does not think our friendship worth cultivating, I wish you would inform me of the whole sum we owe her, that we may think of some means of paying it off speedily.

"With sincerest regard, I am, &c. &c.

B. FRANKLIN.

"_P. S._ The Marquis de Lafayette has your letter."

I answered this letter as follows, by a French courier.

"Madrid, March 19th, 1782.

"Dear Sir,

"On the 18th instant I informed you of my having been reduced, by M. Cabarrus' want of good faith, to the mortifying necessity of protesting a number of bills, which were then payable.

"Your favor of the 16th instant reached me three days ago. It made me very happy, and enabled me to retrieve the credit we had lost here by those protests. I consider your letter as giving me sufficient authority to take the necessary arrangements with the Marquis d'Yranda for paying the residue of my debts here, as well as such of the protested bills as may be returned for that purpose.

"The account you request of all the bills I have accepted is making out, and when finished shall be transmitted by the first good opportunity that may offer. You may rely on my best endeavors to render my drafts as little inconvenient to you as possible.

"The British Parliament, it seems, begin to entertain less erroneous ideas of us, and their resolutions afford a useful hint to the other powers in Europe. If the Dutch are wise, they will profit by it. As to this Court, their system (if their conduct deserves that appellation) with respect to us has been so opposite to the obvious dictates of sound policy, that it is hard to divine whether anything but experience can undeceive them. For my part, I really think that a treaty with them daily becomes less important to us.

"That Britain should be desirous of a separate peace with us is very natural, but as such a proposal implies an impeachment of our integrity, I think it ought to be rejected in such a manner as to show that we are not ignorant of the respect due to our feelings on that head. As long as France continues faithful to us, I am clear that we ought to continue hand in hand to prosecute the war until all their, as well as all our, reasonable objects can be obtained by a peace, for I would rather see America ruined than dishonored. As to Spain and Holland, we have as yet no engagements with them, and therefore are not obliged to consult either their interest or their inclinations, further than may be convenient to ourselves, or than the respect due to our good allies may render proper.

"France, in granting you six millions, has acted with dignity as well as generosity. Such gifts, so given, command both gratitude and esteem, and I think our country possesses sufficient magnanimity to receive and remember such marks of friendship with a proper degree of sensibility. I am pleased with your idea of paying whatever we owe to Spain. Their pride, perhaps, might forbid them to receive the money. But our pride has been so hurt by the littleness of their conduct, that I would in that case be for leaving it at the gate of the palace, and quit the country. At present such a step would not be expedient, though the time will come when prudence, instead of restraining, will urge us to hold no other language or conduct to this Court than that of a just, a free, and a brave people, who have nothing to fear from, nor to request of them.

"I am, &c. &c.

JOHN JAY."

On receiving Dr Franklin's letter I sent for my good friend the notary, and desired him to make it known among the bankers, that I had received supplies equal to all my occasions, and was ready to pay to every one his due. He received the commission with as much pleasure as I had the letter. He executed it immediately, and our credit here was re-established.

M. Cabarrus became displeased with himself, and took pains to bring about a reconciliation by the means of third persons, to whom I answered, that as a Christian I forgave him, but as a prudent man, could not again employ him. As this gentleman has suddenly risen into wealth and importance, and is still advancing to greater degrees of both, I shall insert a letter, which I wrote in reply to one from him on the subject.

TO M. CABARRUS.

"Madrid, April 2d, 1782.

"Sir,

"I have received the letter you did me the honor to write on the 29th of March last.

"As soon as the examination of your accounts shall be completed, I shall be ready to pay the balance that may be due to you, either here or by bills on Paris.

"I should also be no less ready to subscribe a general approbation of your conduct, if the latter part of it had been equally fair and friendly with the first.

"Although it always affords me pleasure to recollect and acknowledge acts of friendship, yet, Sir, I can consider only one of the five instances you enumerate as entitled to that appellation. I shall review them in their order. You remind me,

"1st. _That you risked the making me considerable advances, at a time when I could only give you hopes, and not formal assurances of repayment._

"I acknowledge freely and with gratitude, that (exclusive of the commissions due to you for paying out the various sums I had placed in your hands) you did advance me between twenty and thirty thousand dollars; but as the United States of America were bound to repay it, and I had reason to expect supplies to a far greater amount, I conceived, and the event has shown, that you did not run any great risk, although the uncertainty of the time when these supplies would be afforded, prevented my giving you positive and formal assurances of the time and manner of repayment.

"2dly. _That you augmented these advances to quiet the demands of the Marquis d'Yranda._

"Permit me to remind you, that this circumstance might have been more accurately stated. The fact was as follows. I had received about fifty thousand dollars, which, by a prior contract, I had agreed to pay the Marquis on account of a greater sum borrowed from him in paper. The sum in question was in specie. You and others offered to exchange it for paper at the then current difference. The preference was given to you. Under that confidence, and for that express purpose, the specie was sent to your house, and you did exchange it accordingly. With what propriety, Sir, can you consider this transaction in the light of making advances, or lending me money to quiet the Marquis d'Yranda? It is true that by sending the money to your house I put it in your power, by detaining part of it, to repay yourself what you had before advanced. But, Sir, such a proceeding would have been a flagrant breach of trust; and I cannot think any gentleman ought to give himself, or expect to receive, credit for merely forbearing to do a dishonorable action.

"3dly. _That you gave me, on my signature, the money for which I applied to you for my personal use, without detaining any part of it on account of the balance then due to you._

"The transaction you allude to was as follows. I had authority to draw from his Excellency, Dr Franklin, on account of my salary. It happened to be convenient to me to draw for a quarter. You agreed to purchase my bill on him, and to pay me in specie at the current exchange. As it was post day, I signed and sent you the bill before I had received the money. These are the facts, and it seems two favors are to be argued from them. First, that you did not scruple my signature, or in other words, that you took my bill. To this I answer, that you had no reason to doubt its being honored. All my former ones had been duly paid. Nor could you or others produce a single instance, in which my signature had not justified the confidence reposed in it. Secondly, that by sending you the bill before you had sent me the money for it, I gave you an opportunity of keeping the money, and giving my public account credit for it, and that in not taking this advantage you did me a favor.

"After having agreed to purchase this bill, and pay me the money for it, you could have no right to detain it. And surely, Sir, you need not be informed, that there is a wide distinction between acts of common justice and acts of friendship. I remember that there was then but little demand for bills on Paris, and so far as you may have been induced to take this one, from regard to my convenience, I am obliged to you.

"4thly. _That by your agency you accelerated the payment of the twentysix thousand dollars._

"I really believe, Sir, that you did accelerate it, and you would have received my thanks for it, if the unusual and very particular manner, in which the order for that payment was expressed, had not been less consistent with delicacy, than with those improper fears and apprehensions, which the confidence due to my private as well as public character, ought to have excluded from your imagination. All the preceding orders, which had been given on similar occasions, directed the money to be paid to me. But in this instance, as I owed you a considerable balance, care was taken that the twentysix thousand dollars should not, as formerly, be paid to me, but to you on my account.

"5thly. _That you offered to make me further advances, if either the Ambassador of France or the Minister of State would give you a positive order for the purpose, which you say they constantly refused._

"It is true, Sir, that you offered to supply me with money to pay my acceptances for the month of March, provided the Minister of State or the Ambassador of France would engage to see you repaid with interest, within a certain number of months, sometimes saying that you would be content to be repaid within seven months, and at others within ten or twelve months, and you repeated this offer to me in these precise terms on the 11th of March last.

"This offer was friendly. I accepted it with gratitude, and in full confidence that you would punctually perform what you had thus freely promised. I accordingly made this offer known to the Minister, and solicited his consent. On the 15th day of March he authorised the Ambassador of France to inform me, that you might advance me from forty to fifty thousand current dollars on those terms. The Ambassador signified this to me by letter, and that letter was immediately laid before you. Then, Sir, for the first time, did you insist on being repaid in four months, and that in four equal monthly payments, secured by orders on the rents of the post-office, or on the general treasury, &c. &c. These terms and conditions were all new, and never hinted to me in the most distant manner until after the Minister had agreed to your first offer, and until the very moment when the holders of the bills were demanding their money, and insisting that the bills should either be paid or protested.

"The Minister rejected these new conditions, and you refused to abide by the former ones. The bills were then due. I had no time even to look out for other resources, and thereby was reduced to the necessity of protesting them.

"Such conduct, Sir, can have no pretensions to gratitude, and affords a much more proper subject for apology than for approbation. I confess that I was no less surprised than disappointed, and still remain incapable of reconciling these deviations from the rules of fair dealing, with that open and manly temper which you appear to possess, and which I thought would insure good faith to all who relied on your word.

"How far your means might have failed, how far you might have been ill-advised, or ill-informed, or unduly influenced, are questions, which, though not uninteresting to you, are now of little importance to me.

"I acknowledge with pleasure, that until these late singular transactions I had reason to believe you were well attached to the interests of my country, and I present you my thanks for having on several former occasions endeavored to promote it.

"I am, &c. &c.

JOHN JAY."

As M. Cabarrus was concerned in contracts with government for money, and was the projector of several of their ways and means for supplying the Royal Treasury, it appeared to me expedient that he should wish us well, and be our banker. Some advantages have arisen from it, and they would probably have been greater, if not opposed by the great and unfriendly influence of M. Del Campo. At the same time that I blame M. Cabarrus, I cannot but pity him, for there is much reason to consider him in the light of the _scape goat_.

I have now employed Messrs Drouilhet to do our business; that house is one of the most considerable here in the banking way.

I showed Dr Franklin's letter to the Ambassador of France, and made him my acknowledgments for the generous supply afforded by his Court to ours. He seemed very happy on the occasion, and regretted it had not been done a little sooner.

His secretary remarked to me, that Spain would suspect that this subsidy had been granted in consequence of the protest of our bills, and that this Court would make it the cause of complaint against France.

The Court left the Pardo, and passed the Easter holidays at Madrid. I denied myself the honor of waiting on the Minister on that occasion, nor have I seen him since the protest of our bills. My judgment, as well as my feelings, approved of this omission. The Court are now at Aranjues, where I have taken a house, and purpose to go soon after these despatches shall be completed.

On the 30th of March I was surprised by the following note, being the first of the kind which I have received from the Minister since my arrival.

Translation.

"The Count de Florida Blanca has been to take the orders of V. S.[2] for Aranjues, where he hopes to have the honor of the company of V. S. at his table, every Saturday after the 11th of May next ensuing."

This invitation is imputable to the late news from England, and the grant of six millions by France was probably accelerated by it. Both Courts are watching and jealous of us. We are at peace with Spain, and she neither will nor indeed can grant us a present subsidy. Why then should we be anxious for a treaty with her, or make sacrifices to purchase it? We cannot now treat with her on terms of equality, why therefore not postpone it? It would not perhaps be wise to break with her; but delay is in our power, and resentment ought to have no influence.

Time would secure advantages to us, which we should now be obliged to yield. Time is more friendly to young than to old nations, and the day will come when our strength will insure our rights. Justice may hold the balance and decide, but if unarmed will for the most part be treated like a blind woman. There is no doubt that Spain requires more cessions than England, unless extremely humbled, can consent to. France knows and fears this. France is ready for a peace, but not Spain. The King's eyes are fixed on Gibraltar. The Spanish finances indeed are extremely mismanaged, and I may say pillaged. If England should offer us peace on the terms of our treaty with France, the French Court would be very much embarrassed by their alliance with Spain, and as yet we are under no obligations to persist in the war to gratify this Court. It is not certain what England will do, nor ought we to rely on the present promising appearances there; but can it be wise to instruct your Commissioners to speak only as the French Ministers shall give them utterance? Let whatever I write about the French and their Ambassador here be by all means kept secret. Marbois gleans and details every scrap of news. His letters are very minute, and detail names and characters.

Sweden is leaning towards us, and it will not be long before the Dutch become our allies. Under such circumstances, Spain ought not to expect such a price as the Mississippi for acknowledging our independence.

As it is uncertain when I shall again have so good an opportunity of conveying a letter to you as the present, I have been very particular in this. The facts might perhaps have been more methodically arranged, but I thought it best to state them as they arose; and though some of them separately considered do not appear very important, yet when viewed in connexion with others, they will not be found wholly uninteresting.

You will readily perceive on reading this letter, that parts of it relate to Mr Morris's department. I hope he will excuse my not repeating them in a particular letter to him, especially as he will readily believe, that the length of this, and the cyphers used in it, have fatigued me a good deal.

All the cyphers in this letter are those in which I correspond with Mr Morris, and the only ones I have received from him. They were brought by Major Franks and marked No. 1. Several of my former letters to Mr Thompson and you mentioned, that his cypher was not to be depended upon. The copy of it, brought by Mr Barclay, which is the only copy I have received of the original by Major Franks, having passed through the post office, came to my hands with marks of inspection on the cover.

I received, the 12th of April, a packet of newspapers, which I believe was from your office. It was brought to Bilboa by Mr Stockholm; but not a single line or letter from America accompanied it.

On the back of the packet there was this endorsement, "Bilboa, April 3d, 1782, brought and forwarded by your Excellency's very humble servant Andrew Stockholm." Notwithstanding this, it was marked _Paris_ by the post office, and charged with postage accordingly, viz. one hundred and six reals of vellon. I sent the cover to the director of the post office, but he declined correcting the mistake. Thus are all things managed here.

The _Courier de l'Europe_ informs us, that the English Ministry are totally changed, and gives us a list of those who form the new one. I think it difficult to predict how this change may eventually operate with respect to us. I hope we shall persevere vigorously in our military operations, and thereby not only quiet the fears and suspicions of those who apprehend some secret understanding between us and this Ministry, but also regain the possession of those places, which might otherwise counterbalance other demands at a peace.

Great preparations are making here for a serious attack on Gibraltar. The Duc de Crillon will doubtless command it. His good fortune has been very great.

It is natural as well as just, that Congress should be dissatisfied with the conduct of this Court; they certainly have much reason; and yet a distinction may be made between the Ministry and the nation, the latter being more to be pitied than blamed.

I must now resume a subject, which I did not expect to have had occasion to renew in this letter.

You may observe from the copy of the Count de Florida Blanca's note, containing an invitation to his table at Aranjues, and left at my house by his servant, that it was not expressly directed to me. This omission raised some doubt in my mind of its being intended for me, but on inquiry I found that the other Ministers had in the same manner received similar ones, and not directed to them by name. I mentioned my having received it to the Ambassador of France. He told me the Count had not mentioned a syllable of it to him. I desired him to take an opportunity of discovering from the Count, whether or no there was any mistake in the case, and to inform me of the result, which he promised to do.

On the 23d of April instant, the Ambassador being then in town, I paid him a visit. He told me, that on mentioning the matter to the Count, he said it must have happened by mistake, for that he intended only to ask my orders for Aranjues, but that he was nevertheless glad the mistake had happened, as it would give him an opportunity, by mentioning it to the King, to obtain his permission for the purpose, and to that end desired the Ambassador to write him a note stating the fact. The Ambassador did so, and the Count afterwards informed him, that he had communicated it to the King, who, with many expressions of regard for our country, had permitted him to invite me as a private gentleman of distinction belonging to it. He authorised the Ambassador to communicate this invitation to me, and also to inform me, that I might bring Mr Carmichael with me.

Much conversation ensued between the Ambassador and myself, consisting of my objections to accepting this invitation, and his answers to them. But as we continued to differ in sentiment, and he was going out, I agreed to think further of the matter before I gave my final answer.

For my part I doubt there having been any mistake. I think it more probable, that the Minister, afterwards reflecting on the use that might be made of this note, wished to render it harmless by imputing it to mistake, and substituting a more cautious invitation. For it can hardly be supposed, either that his servant would, for the first time in two years, leave such a note at my house unless ordered; or that he himself would for the first time in his life, and that in writing, inform me of his having called to take my orders for Aranjues, without taking care that his amanuensis wrote as he dictated. He was probably warmed by the news from England and Holland, and, in the perturbation of spirits occasioned by it, was more civil than on cool reflection he thought was expedient, especially on further considering, that the Ambassador might not be well pleased at not having been privy to it.

A few days afterwards I wrote the Ambassador the following letter on the subject.

"Madrid, April 27th, 1782.

"Sir,

"Be pleased to accept my thanks for the very friendly part you have acted relative to the Minister's written invitation left at my house, and the verbal one since conveyed from him to me by your Excellency. I have deliberately re-examined my former sentiments respecting the propriety of accepting it; and as they remain unaltered, my respect for your judgment leads me to refer them, fully explained, to your further consideration.

"As the Minister informed your Excellency, that the written invitation was left at my house by _mistake_, I think nothing remains to be said relative to it. On the discovery of that mistake, the Minister it seems was so obliging as to apply for, and obtain the consent of the King to renew the invitation, not in _general terms_, but in terms expressly declaring, that it was given to me as a private gentleman, and was so to be accepted; with the additional favor, nevertheless, of being permitted to bring Mr Carmichael with me.

"The only objection, which opposes my accepting it, arises from this question, viz. whether a Minister or representative of an independent sovereign can with propriety accept any invitation, which in the terms of it impeaches his title to that character? So far as this question respects the Ministers of independent states and kingdoms in general, your Excellency will agree with me in opinion that it must be answered in the negative. The next inquiry which presents itself is, whether the United States of America come so far under that description as to render this reasoning applicable to their Ministers? Every American thinks they do. Whatever doubts this, or other Courts may entertain relative to their independence, the United States entertain none, and therefore their servants ought not, by words or actions, to admit any. For instance, ought General Washington to accept an invitation, which expressly imposed upon him the condition of laying aside his uniform, and appearing at table in the dress of a private gentleman? I think not. If this reasoning be just, the impropriety of my accepting this invitation becomes manifest, and all arguments from the expediency of it must cease to operate. For my part I consider it as a general rule, that although particular circumstances may sometimes render it expedient for a nation to make great sacrifices to the attainment of national objects, yet it can in no case be expedient for them to impair their honor, their dignity, or their independence.

"As to the temporary advantages, which might result from accepting this invitation, I find them balanced by at least equal disadvantages. There can be no doubt on the one hand, but that my frequenting the Count de Florida Blanca's table on the days appointed for entertaining the foreign Ministers would impress a general opinion, that Spain was about to become our allies, and I readily admit, that such an opinion might operate to our advantage in other countries. But on the other hand, when the Count de Florida Blanca, in order (though perhaps in vain) to save appearances, shall inform those foreign Ministers, that I was expressly invited as a private gentleman, and had consented to come in that character, they would naturally entertain ideas, which would tend to diminish rather than increase their respect for America and American legations.

"It would give me pain if the Count de Florida Blanca should suppose me to be in the least influenced by the promising aspect of our affairs. I flatter myself he will not incline to that opinion, when he reflects on the particular circumstances under which the United States declared themselves independent, and under which they afterwards refused to treat with their then victorious enemies, on any terms inconsistent with it.

"Although offence and disrespect are very far from my thoughts, I fear the Count will be a little hurt at my declining the invitation in question. I am persuaded that he meant to do me a favor, and I feel myself indebted for his friendly intentions. But as the considerations mentioned in this letter forbid me to accept it, I wish to communicate that circumstance to him in the most soft and delicate manner, and, therefore, request the favor of your Excellency to undertake it.

"I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN JAY."

Reasons similar to those assigned for this refusal have induced me ever since my arrival to decline going to Court, where I might also have been presented as a stranger of distinction, but as Mr Carmichael had been presented in that character previous to my coming to Madrid, I never objected to his making subsequent visits.

I am, Dear Sir, with great regard and esteem, your most obedient and very humble servant,

JOHN JAY.

FOOTNOTES:

[2] Vuestra Senoria. _Your Lordship_, or _Your Excellency_. We have no title, which exactly corresponds with the Spanish.

* * * * *

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO JOHN JAY.

Philadelphia, May 9th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

Your letter of the 6th of February, with a duplicate of that of August last, directed to the President, has been received and read in Congress. I am extremely surprised to find from that and yours to me, that so few of my letters have reached you, since no vessel has sailed from this, or, indeed, from any of the neighboring ports, without carrying letters or duplicates of letters from me. The whole number directed to you, including the duplicates from October to this time, amounts to twentyfour; so that they must certainly be suppressed in many instances. But what astonishes me more, is to find that you cannot read my letter, No. 3, and the duplicate of No. 2; when, upon examining my letter book, I find it is written in the very cypher, which you acknowledge to have received, and in which your letter of the 20th of September is written; so that if it is not intelligible, it must have undergone some alteration since it left my hands, which I am the more inclined to think, because you speak of a cypher said to be enclosed, of which my letters make no mention, and only notes a slight alteration in Mr Thompson's cypher. My first letter was in our private cypher; this you had not received. My second, by the Marquis de Lafayette, in cypher, delivered to me by mistake by Mr Thompson, and lost with Mr Palfrey. My third, in the cypher sent by Major Franks, a duplicate of which was sent by Mr Barclay; and that enclosed a copy of my letter, No. 2. I had then discovered the mistake, so that I can in no way account for your being unable to decypher it.

Since my last, of the 28th of April, we have been informed of the change in the British administration. We have seen the act for enabling the King to make peace, and the new plan has begun to open itself here under the direction of Sir Guy Carleton. You, who know your countrymen, will feel little anxiety on this subject. It is proper, however, that you should be enabled to calm the apprehensions, which those who know us less and are interested in our measures may entertain. I have the pleasure of assuring you, that it has not produced the slightest alteration in our sentiments; that we view a change of men and measures with the utmost philosophic indifference. We believe that God has hardened the heart of Pharaoh, so that he cannot let the people go, till the first born of his land are destroyed; till the hosts are overthrown in the midst of the sea; and till poverty and distress, like the vermin of Egypt, shall have covered the land. The general sentiment here seems to be, that new endeavors will be so used to detach us from our ally, that the best answer to such attempts to disgrace us will be a speedy and spirited preparation for the ensuing campaign.

When Sir Guy Carleton arrived at New York, he found them in violent convulsions about the demand that General Washington had made of the persons who perpetrated the murder upon an officer of the Jersey levies, one Captain Huddy, whom they made prisoner, carried to New York, and afterwards taking him out of jail hung him in the county of Monmouth. I enclose the General's letter, and the other letters that have passed on that occasion. The affair has not yet ended; the British officers insist upon his [i. e. Lippincott, who hung Huddy] being given up. The refugees support him. A court martial is now sitting for his trial. In the extracts sent out by General Robertson are contained the cases of all the persons, that have been tried and convicted of robbery, horse stealing, &c. in the Jerseys since the war, as they have protected every species of villany. They wish us to consider every felon we hang, as a part of their regular corps.

Your last despatches by Colonel Livingston did not come to hand. The vessel in which he sailed was taken and carried into New York. He destroyed his letters. He was immediately committed to the Provost, where he met with your brother, who had been sometime confined there. On the arrival of General Carleton, which was a few days after, both were liberated on their _paroles_, so that Mr Livingston can give us no intelligence of any kind. Carleton spoke to him in the most frank and unreserved manner, wished to see the war carried on, if it must be carried on, upon more generous principles than it has hitherto been; I told him he meant to send his secretary to Congress with despatches, and asked whether the Colonel would take a seat in his carriage. Mr Livingston told him, that his secretary would certainly be stopped at the first post; upon which he expressed surprise, and inquired whether Mr Livingston would himself be the bearer of them, which he declined, unless they contained an explicit acknowledgment of our independence, and a resolution to withdraw the British troops. He replied, he was not empowered to make any such proposition, and that his letter was merely complimentary. The next day he wrote to the General the letter, a copy of which, No. 1, is enclosed. The General sent the answer, No. 2; these letters being laid before Congress, they came to the resolution No. 3. You will judge from these circumstances, whether it is probable, that Britain will easily seduce us into a violation of the faith we have pledged to our allies.

I am particular in giving you every information on this head, because I am persuaded, that means will be used by our enemies to induce a belief that this country pines after peace and its ancient connexion with England. It is strictly true, that they are very desirous of peace. But it is also true, that the calamities of war press lighter upon them every day, from the use they are in to bear them, and from the declining strength of the enemy. They consider themselves as bound, both in honor and interest, to support the alliance, which they formed in the hour of distress; and I am satisfied, that no man would be found in any public assembly in America sufficiently hardy, to hint at a peace upon any terms, which should destroy our connexion with France.

I yesterday took the sense of Congress upon the propriety of giving you leave of absence. They have declined giving any answer to that part of your letter, from which you are to conclude that they do not conceive it advisable at present. I enclose the resolution I proposed, which they thought it proper to postpone.

In all our transactions in Spain we are to consider the delicate situation in which they stand with France, the propensity of the former to peace, and the need that the latter has of their assistance. I should conceive it necessary, therefore, rather to submit with patience to their repeated delays than give a handle to the British party at Court. For this reason I conceive that no advantage could result from demanding a categorical answer, and that it might involve us in disagreeable circumstances. The resolution enclosed in my last will either serve as a stimulus to the politics of Spain, or leave us a latitude on the negotiation for a peace, which will be of equal advantage to us with any of those slight aids, which Spain seems willing or able to give us. Congress have found so little advantage from sending embassies to Courts, who have shown no disposition to aid them, that they have passed the enclosed resolution, No. 4. Every saving is an object of importance with them, and they feel very heavily the expense of their foreign embassies, which are in some particulars unnecessarily expensive.

The complaints, which have justly been made of the mode in which our Ministers are paid, have induced Congress to direct the financier to fall upon some other mode. The one adopted will be very advantageous to our Ministers. He proposes to make his payments here quarterly. I shall, as your agent, receive the amount, make out the account, and vest it in bills at the current rate, and remit them to Dr Franklin, and send you advice when I do it; or, when opportunity offers, send them directly to you. I shall follow your directions if you have any other to give, with respect to the money due to you, and consider myself liable in my private capacity for all the money I receive on your account, till you appoint another agent. This will simplify Mr Morris's account, he only opening one with the department of Foreign Affairs.

Your present account will commence the 1st of January. I wish you to transmit a state of your account prior to that date, and I will procure and remit you the balance.

We have nothing new but what you may collect from the papers enclosed. The Count de Montmorin will see with pleasure, that the birth of a Dauphin has been received here at this critical time in such a manner as to evidence our attachment to the King his father, and the French nation.

I am embarrassed beyond expression at the misfortune that happened to Mr Thompson's cypher. I shall enclose another with this, and send them both to Mr Harrison, with special directions to send them safely to you.

It must have been long since you heard from me. Our ports have been totally shut up for some time, and no less than three vessels with despatches from me to you have been taken and carried into New York within two months.

As you seem to suppose my appointment has not been sufficiently notified to you, to authorise your directing your letters to me, I enclose the resolution for my appointment, together with that for the organization of the office.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Madrid, May 14th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

A letter from Dr Franklin calls me to Paris. I set off in about five days. He has doubtless written to you on this subject. Major Franks is on the way to you with despatches from me. Be pleased to send your future letters for me under cover to Dr Franklin. No inconveniences will be caused by my absence. The instructions intended for M. Del Campo are to be sent to the Count d'Aranda. I congratulate you on the recognition of our independence by the Dutch. The French have lost a ship of the line, and they say thirteen transports bound to the Indies.

I hope my future letters will be less unfortunate than many of my former ones. Rely upon it, that I shall continue to write particularly and frequently to you.

With great regard and esteem, &c.

JOHN JAY.

* * * * *

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO JOHN JAY.

Philadelphia, June 23d, 1782.

Dear Sir,

The only letter I have received from you, since that of the 6th of February last, was a few lines, which covered an account of the surrender of Fort St Philip. This success is important, as it not only weakens an enemy, and operates against their future resources, but as it gives reputation to the arms of a nation, that have our sincerest wishes for their prosperity, notwithstanding the little attention we have received from them. This letter goes by too hazardous a conveyance to admit of my entering into many of those causes of complaint, which daily administer food to distrusts and jealousies between Spain and the people of this country. The Havana trade, notwithstanding the important advantages it affords to Spain, meets with the most unjustifiable interruptions. Vessels have been detained for months together, in order to carry on the expeditions which Spain has formed, no adequate satisfaction being allowed for them; and then sent away without convoy; by which means many of them have fallen into the hands of the enemy, and where they did not, the expense and disappointment occasioned by their detention have thrown the greatest discouragements on the trade. The Bahama Islands having surrendered to the arms of Spain, if the copy of the capitulation, published by Rivington, may be depended upon, it is a counterpart to that of Pensacola, and the troops will probably be sent to strengthen the garrisons of New York and Charleston. These transactions, together with the delays and slights you meet with, cannot but have a mischievous effect upon that harmony and confidence, which it is the mutual interests of Spain and America to cultivate with each other. It seems a little singular to this country, that the United Provinces, which never gave us the least reason to suppose that they were well inclined towards us, should precede Spain in acknowledging our rights. But we are a plain people; Courts value themselves upon refinements, which are unknown to us. When a sovereign calls us friends, we are simple enough to expect unequivocal proofs of his friendship.

Military operations have not yet commenced, so that the field affords us no intelligence, and the Cabinet seems to be closed, by the determination of Congress not to permit Mr Morgan to wait upon them with General Carleton's compliments.

General Leslie, in consequence of the late alteration in the British system (together with the scarcity of provisions in Charleston) proposed to General Greene a cessation of hostilities. I need hardly tell you, that the proposal met with the contempt it deserved. Those, who are unacquainted with our dispositions, would be surprised to hear that our attachment to an alliance with France has gathered strength from their misfortune in the West Indies, and from the attempts of the enemy to detach us from it. Every legislative body, which has met since, has unanimously declared its resolution to listen to no terms of accommodation, which controvenes its principles.

Congress have it in contemplation to make some alteration in their foreign arrangements, in order to lessen their expenses, but as nothing is yet determined on, I do not think it worth while to trouble you with a plan, which may not be carried into effect.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, June 25th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

My letters from Madrid, and afterwards a few lines from Bordeaux, informed you of my being called to this place by a pressing letter from Dr Franklin.

The slow manner of travelling in a carriage through Spain, Mrs Jay's being taken with a fever and ague the day we left Bordeaux, and the post horses at the different stages having been engaged for the Count du Nord, who had left Paris with a great retinue, prevented my arriving here until the day before yesterday.

After placing my family in a hotel, I immediately went out to Passy, and spent the remainder of the afternoon in conversing with Dr Franklin on the subjects, which had induced him to write for me. I found that he had then more reason to think my presence necessary than it seems to be at present.

Yesterday we paid a visit to Count de Vergennes. He gave me a very friendly reception, and entered pretty fully with us into the state of the negotiation. His answer to the British Minister appeared to me ably drawn. It breathes great moderation, and yet is so general as to leave room for such demands as circumstances, at the time of the treaty, may render convenient.

There is reason to believe, that Mr Fox and Lord Shelburne are not perfectly united, and that Rodney's success will repress the ardor of our enemies for an immediate peace. On leaving the Count, he informed us, that he was preparing despatches for America, and that our letters, if sent to him tomorrow morning, might go by the same opportunity. This short notice, together with the interruptions I meet with every moment, obliges me to be less particular than I could wish; but as Dr Franklin also writes by this conveyance, you will doubtless receive from him full intelligence on these subjects.

My last letters also informed you, that the Court of Spain had commissioned the Count d'Aranda, their Ambassador here, to continue with me the negotiation for a treaty with our country. I have not yet seen him, and Dr Franklin concurs with me in opinion, that it is more expedient to open this business by a letter than by a visit.

Mr Adams cannot leave Amsterdam at present, and I hear that Mr Laurens thinks of returning soon to America, so that I apprehend Dr Franklin and myself will be left to manage at least the skirmishing business, if I may so call it, of our commission, without the benefit of their counsel and assistance. You know what I think and feel on this subject, and I wish things were so circumstanced as to admit of my being indulged.

You may rely on my writing often, very often. My letters will now have fairer play, and you will find that I have not ceased to consider amusement and rest as secondary objects to those of business.

I shall endeavor to get lodgings as near to Dr Franklin as I can. He is in perfect good health, and his mind appears more vigorous than that of any man of his age I have known. He certainly is a valuable Minister, and an agreeable companion.

The Count d'Artois and Duc de Bourbon are soon to set out for Gibraltar. The siege of that place will be honored with the presence of several princes, and therefore the issue of it (according to the prevailing modes of thinking) becomes in a more particular manner interesting. The Duc de Crillon is sanguine; he told me, that in his opinion, Gibraltar was far more pregnable than Mahon. It is possible that fortune may again smile upon him.

I am, Dear Sir, &c.

JOHN JAY.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, June 28th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

I had the pleasure of writing to you on the 25th instant. As the express, which is to carry that letter, will not depart till tomorrow morning, I have a good opportunity of making this addition to my despatches.

Agreeably to the desire of Congress, as well as my own wishes, I have had the satisfaction of conferring with the Marquis de Lafayette, on several interesting subjects. He is as active in serving us in the cabinet as he has been in the field, and (there being great reason to believe that his talents could be more advantageously employed here, than an inactive campaign in America would admit of there,) Dr Franklin and myself think it advisable, that he should postpone his return for the present. The Marquis inclines to the same opinion, and, though anxious to join the army, will remain here a little longer.

The intentions of the British Ministry with respect to us are by no means clear. They are divided upon the subject. It is said that Mr Fox and his friends incline to meet us on the terms of independence, but that Lord Shelburne and his adherents entertain an idea of making a compact with us, similar to that between Britain and Ireland, and there is room to apprehend that efforts will be made to open a negotiation on these subjects at Philadelphia. When it is considered that the articles of a general peace cannot be discussed in America, and that propositions for a separate one ought not to be listened to, it is evident to me, that their sending out commissions can be calculated for no other purpose than that of intrigue.

I should enlarge on this topic, were I not persuaded, that you will see this matter in the same point of view, and that any proposition, which they may offer, will be referred to the American Commissioners in Europe. How far it may be prudent to permit any British agents to come into our country, on such an ostensible errand, is an easy question, for where an unnecessary measure may be dangerous it should be avoided. They may write from New York whatever they may have to propose, and may receive answers in the same manner.

If one may judge from appearances, the Ministry are very desirous of getting some of their emissaries into our country, either in an avowed or in a private character, and all things considered, I should think it most safe not to admit any Englishman in either character within our lines at this very critical juncture. A mild and yet firm resolution, on the impropriety and inexpediency of any negotiation for peace in America, would give great satisfaction to our friends and confirm their confidence in us. We indeed, who know our country, would apprehend no danger from anything that British agents might say or do to deceive or divide us; but the opinions of strangers, who must judge by appearances, merit attention; and it is doubtless best not only to be steadfast to our engagements, but also to avoid giving occasion to the slightest suspicions of a contrary disposition. An opinion does prevail here, that in the mass of our people there is a considerable number who, though resolved on independence, would nevertheless prefer an alliance with England to one with France, and this opinion will continue to have a certain degree of influence during the war. This circumstance renders much circumspection necessary.

I am, with great regard and esteem, Dear Sir, &c.

JOHN JAY.

* * * * *

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO JOHN JAY.

Philadelphia, July 6th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

Since my letter of the 23d ultimo, Congress have passed the enclosed resolution. My letter had already anticipated it, so that it will only serve to show, that I was warranted in the observations I had made, and am sorry to add, that my prediction, that the troops taken by Spain would be sent to serve against us, seems to be confirmed by an account received from Charleston of a number of soldiers, taken in Pensacola, having been sent there. Could I suppose the Court of Spain entirely regardless of our interests, I should presume, that an attention to their own would keep them from affording such reinforcements to the British here, as will enable them to detach to Jamaica, of any other of their islands, which Spain may have it in contemplation to reduce.

I am, therefore, fully persuaded, that every measure of this kind must originate merely in the inattention of the officer, and, that if mentioned to his Majesty's Ministers, it will be prevented in future. You will therefore take the earliest opportunity to state it to them, and to show them the pernicious influence it will have, not only upon our measures, but upon those sentiments of friendship and affection, which Congress wish the people of these States to entertain for a nation, that is engaged in the same cause with them, and with whom a variety of considerations will lead them to maintain in future the most intimate connexion.

I have remitted to Dr Franklin the amount of one quarter's salary due to you, which I have vested in bills at six and three pence this money for five livres, which yields a profit to you of about five and a half per cent, and will be more than sufficient to pay the expense of commissions, that this new mode of paying your salaries will subject you to. I have directed an account to be opened with you, and will receive your directions, unless you shall think it proper to appoint some other agent. My Secretary, Mr Morris, will enclose a particular state of your account, exclusive of contingencies, an account of which I wish you to remit me, that I may get it discharged for you. The second quarter being now due, I shall get the accounts passed and the bills remitted by the next opportunity. You will be pleased to pay particular attention to the enclosed paper in cyphers, as it relates to a private transaction of some importance to both of us.

Let me hear from you on this subject as soon as possible.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO JOHN JAY.

Philadelphia, September 12th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

We yesterday received letters from Mr Adams by Captain Smedley, who brought out the goods left by Commodore Gillon. These were the first advices, that had reached us from Europe since your short note of the 14th of May. You will easily believe, that this neglect is borne here with some degree of impatience, particularly at this interesting period, when we learn that a negotiation for a peace has commenced, and that Mr Grenville is in France upon that business. Mr Adams's letters take no more notice of this important transaction, than if we were not interested in it; presuming, probably, that we are fully informed from France. I may think improperly upon this subject, but I cannot be satisfied that a quarterly letter from our Ministers is sufficient to give Congress the information, that is necessary for the direction of their affairs; and yet this is much more than we receive. Some pay half yearly, and others offer only an annual tribute. Your last letter, properly so called, is dated in April; Dr Franklin's in March. This is the more mortifying, as want of time can hardly be offered as an excuse by our Ministers, who must certainly have more leisure upon their hands than they know how to dispose of.

I congratulate you upon your arrival in France, where if your negotiations are not more successful than they have been in Spain, you will at least have some enjoyments, that will console you under your disappointments. Carleton has informed us, that Great Britain had agreed to yield us unconditional independence. I find that he has been too hasty in his opinion, and that the death of the Marquis of Rockingham has made a very material alteration in the system. That this inconsistency may be fully displayed, I would advise you to have the enclosed letter from Carleton and Digby published in Europe. Before the arrival of the packet, every disposition was made for the evacuation of Charleston, which was publicly announced. The tories have, in consequence of it, come out in crowds with the consent of General Leslie to solicit pardon. The works at Quarter House were burned. Whether the late intelligence will alter their determination I cannot say. High expectations have also been entertained of the evacuation of New York, where the royalists were in despair. Their hopes are again revived.

If the negotiations go on, let me beg you to use every means for procuring a direct trade with the West Indies. It is an object of the utmost importance to us. The exports of Philadelphia alone to the islands amounted before the war to three hundred thousand pounds; they could not have been much less from New York; they were considerable also from the Eastern States. We shall be very long in recovering the distress of the war, if we are deprived of this important commerce. It is certain, too, that the European powers who hold islands would find themselves interested in this intercourse, provided they exclude the introduction of manufactures, which might interfere with their own.

In proportion to the expense at which articles of the first necessity are furnished, must be the improvement, population, produce, and wealth of the islands, while the inhabitants of these States are compelled by law as well as allured by fashion and habit to receive their manufactures and luxuries from the mother country. She must reap the full benefit of such improvement, population, produce, and wealth. It may be said, that this check upon the exportation of provisions from the parent State would, by reducing the price of grain, discourage agriculture; to this I would observe, that it is extremely doubtful whether it would occasion such reduction; secondly, that if it did, it would be beneficial to the community. My doubt upon the first head arises from this consideration; if, as I maintain, the increased wealth and population of the islands occasioned an increased consumption of the manufactures of the mother country, the provisions that formerly fed the planters abroad are now consumed at home by the manufacturer, and the price of provisions stands where it did, with this clear advantage to the mother country, that by the cheapness of living on the islands, she has increased the number of subjects, who till the earth for her abroad, and by the same means has added to the people, who make her strength and riches at home.

My second position is grounded upon the competition, that prevails at this moment among the maritime manufacturing nations of Europe, France and England particularly. The nation that undersells its rival in foreign markets will sap the foundation of her wealth and power. The nation that can maintain its manufactures, and navigate its vessels at the cheapest rate, will undoubtedly enjoy this advantage, all things else being equal. It is obvious, that the price of labor is regulated by that of provisions, that manufacturers never earn more than a bare subsistence. If so, where provisions are cheap, manufactures can be carried on to most advantage. Of this, the East Indies are a striking proof. In proportion, too, to the price of provisions and the price of labor, which depends upon it, must be the expense of building and navigating ships. Both these advantages, where there is a concurrence, are therefore clearly in favor of the nation, that can reduce the price of provisions within her own kingdom.

But it may be said, that this reduction of the price of provisions, which seems so desirable in one view, may be found injurious in another; and that it is at least as expedient to encourage agriculture as manufactures. I agree in the principle, though not in the application. Going back to my first position, that the man who labors gets a bare subsistence, for the moment he does more, the number of laborers in that kind (provided his employment does not require uncommon skill) increases, and his labor is not more profitable, than that of the other laborers of the country. It will follow then, that so far as he consumes what he raises, the price will be entirely out of the question. If a bushel of grain a day is necessary for the support of his family, he will equally raise and equally consume that grain, whether it sells for a penny or a pound. But as there are other articles necessary for the use of his family, that he must purchase, this purchase can only be made by the excess of what he raises beyond his own consumption. If he purchases the manufactures of the country, and they rise in proportion to the value of provisions, it must be a matter of indifference to the husbandman, whether the price of the latter is high or low, since the same quantity will be necessary to purchase what his necessities demand in either case; unless indeed his provisions are carried to foreign markets, and the manufactures he wants imported, in which case the price of his grain will become an object of moment, and operate as an encouragement to agriculture. But it would also in the same proportion operate as a check on the manufactures, population, and navigation of the country. On the first, for reasons which have been already explained; on the second, because manufactures require more hands than agriculture; and on the third, because the expense of labor, which increases with the diminution of population, and the price of victualling the vessels employed in the transportation of their produce, will enable nations, who can maintain their subjects cheaper, to navigate their vessels at a lower rate, and of course to engross this branch of business, unless the laws of the State, such as acts of navigation, shall forbid, in which case those acts will operate so far as a discouragement upon agriculture; the advanced freightage being so much deducted from the husbandman's profit.

There are many collateral arguments to show the policy of this measure, even with reference to agriculture, arising out of the general positions I have stated, such as the advantage husbandmen find in a manufacturing country, in placing their weak or supernumerary children to trades, and procuring a number of hands on a short notice, at any of those critical periods, which so frequently occur in the culture of land, without being compelled to maintain them all the year, which increase their profit though they reduce the price of grain. But these are too extensive to take notice of here. I will conclude with some observations, which arise from the circumstances of the country with relation to Europe, which I trust will be found so important as to merit attention.

The commercial nations of Europe begin already to see, that the attention, which is almost universally afforded to the improvement of manufactures, must set bounds to their commerce, unless they can open new markets. Where are these new markets to be found but in America? Here the wishes and habits of the people will concur with the policy of the government, in encouraging the cultivation of their lands at the expense of manufactures. Both will continue to operate while we have a great wilderness to settle, and while a market shall be afforded for our produce. But if that market is shut against us; if we cannot vend what we raise, we shall want the means of purchasing foreign manufactures, and of course must from necessity manufacture for ourselves. The progress of manufactures is always rapid, when once introduced in a country where provisions are cheap, and the means of transportation so extremely easy as it is in America. I am fully persuaded, therefore, that it is the interest of a nation with whom present appearances promise us such extensive commerce as France, to give every encouragement to our agriculture, as the only means of keeping open this market for the consumption of their manufactures.

I meant to write a few lines on this subject, and I have written a treatise; it will however cost you no great trouble to read it, and may possibly afford you some useful hints.

Pigot is at New York, with twentysix sail of the line. The Marquis de Vaudreuil is at Boston with twelve, having lost the Magnifique in the harbor; Congress have presented his Most Christian Majesty with the America, a seventyfour built at Portsmouth. She was to have been commanded by Paul Jones. I wish heartily it were possible to give some employment to that brave officer.

The allied army is at present at Verplanck's Point, in good health and spirits. Where is the Marquis de Lafayette? We have impatiently expected him these four months. Present my compliments to him, General Du Portail, and Viscount de Noailles. Tell the last I congratulate him on his preferment, though it is with difficulty I rejoice at it, since it is to deprive us of the pleasure of seeing him again.

I have written you four private letters since the last I had from you.

I have the honor to be, Dear Sir,

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, September 18th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

I send you herewith enclosed a copy of a translation of an important letter. The original in French I have not seen, and at present is not accessible to me, though I shall endeavor to get a copy of it, in order the better to decide on the correctness of the translation. I am not at liberty to mention the manner in which this paper came to my hands. To me it appears of importance, that it should for the present be kept a profound secret, though I do not see how that is to be done, if communicated to the Congress at large, among whom there always have been and always will be, some unguarded members. I think, however, as I thought before, that your Commissioners here should be left at liberty to pursue the sentiments of their country, and such of their own as may correspond with those of their country.

I am persuaded (and you shall know my reasons for it) that this Court chooses to postpone an acknowledgment of our independence by Britain, to the conclusion of a general peace, in order to keep us under their direction, until not only their and our objects are attained, but also until Spain shall be gratified in her demands, to exclude everybody from the Gulf, &c. We ought not let France know, that we have such ideas. While they think us free from suspicion they will be more open, and we should make no other use of this discovery than to put us on our guard. Count de Vergennes would have us treat with Mr Oswald, though his commission calls us colonies, and authorises him to treat with any description of men, &c. In my opinion we can only treat as an independent nation, and on an equal footing. I am at present engaged in preparing a statement of objections in a letter to him, so that I have not time to write very particularly to you. The Spanish Ambassador presses me to proceed, but keeps back his powers. I tell him that an exchange of copies of our commissions is a necessary and usual previous step. This Court, as well as Spain, will dispute our extension to the Mississippi. You see how necessary prudence and entire circumspection will be on your side, and if possible secrecy. I ought to add, that Dr Franklin does not see the conduct of this Court in the light I do, and that he believes they mean nothing in their proceedings, but what is friendly, fair, and honorable. Facts and future events must determine which of us is mistaken. As soon as I can possibly have time and health to give you details, you shall have them. Let us be honest and grateful to France, but let us think for ourselves.

With great regard and esteem, I am, &c.

JOHN JAY.

* * * * *

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO JOHN JAY.

Philadelphia, September 18th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

Since closing the despatches you will receive with this, I was honored with yours of June. Nothing material having since occurred, I only write to enclose the annexed resolutions of Congress, on the subject of your powers for negotiating. I see by yours, that you entertain no hope of a speedy termination of that business, even though you were then unacquainted with the change, that has since taken place in the administration, and which renders peace a more remote object. It has certainly wrought a great change here. The state of negotiations we are yet to learn, as neither you nor the Doctor have entered into that subject.

I hope my despatches by Mr Laurens, with the cyphers under his care, have reached you in safety, as very few either of your or Dr Franklin's letters, passed through the channel through which I usually receive them, come to me uninspected. Be pleased to acknowledge the receipt of my letters, that I may know which have reached you.

I am, Dear Sir,

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, September 28th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

I have only time to inform you, that our objections to Mr Oswald's first commission have produced a second, which arrived yesterday. It empowers him to treat with the commissioners of the _Thirteen United States of America_. I am preparing a longer letter on this subject, but as this intelligence is interesting, I take the earliest opportunity of communicating it.

With great regard and esteem, I am, &c.

JOHN JAY.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, October 13th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

I hope my letter to you of the 18th of September, of which I also sent a duplicate, has come safe to hand, for it contained important matter, viz. a copy of a letter from M. Marbois to the Count de Vergennes, against our sharing in the fishery.

This Court advised and persuaded us to treat with Mr Oswald under his first commission. I positively refused.

Count d'Aranda will not or cannot exchange powers with me, and yet wants me to treat with him; this Court would have me do it, but I decline it.

I would give you details, but must not until I have an American to carry my letters from hence.

Mr Oswald is well disposed. You shall never see my name to a bad peace, nor to one that does not secure the fishery.

I have received many long letters from you, which I am as busy in decyphering as my health will permit.

M. de Lafayette is very desirous to give us his aid; but as we have a competent number of Commissioners, it would not be necessary to give him that trouble.

I am, Dear Sir, with great esteem and regard, your most obedient servant,

JOHN JAY.

_P. S._ General du Portail is to be the bearer of this. I believe he goes by order of the Court.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, November 17th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

Although it is uncertain when I shall have an opportunity either of finishing or transmitting the long particular letter, which I am now undertaking to write, I think the matter it will contain is too interesting to rest only in my memory, or in short notes, which nobody but myself can well unfold the meaning of. I shall, therefore, write on as my health will permit, and when finished, shall convey this letter by the first prudent _American_ that may go from hence to Nantes or L'Orient.

My reception here was as friendly as an American Minister might expect from this polite and politic Court; for I think they deceive themselves, who suppose that these kinds of attentions are equally paid to their private, as to their public characters.

Soon after the enabling act was passed, I was shown a copy of it, and I confess it abated the expectations I had formed of the intention of the British Ministry to treat in a manly manner with the United States, on the footing of an unconditional acknowledgment of their independence. The act appeared to me to be cautiously framed to elude such an acknowledgment, and, therefore, it would depend on future contingencies, and on the terms and nature of the bargain they might be able to make with us.

Mr Grenville, indeed, told the Count de Vergennes, that his Majesty would acknowledge our independence unconditionally, but, on being desired to commit that information to writing, he wrote that his Majesty was _disposed_ to acknowledge it. This had the appearance of finesse.

About this time, that is, in June last, there came to Paris a Mr Jones[3] and a Mr Paradise, both of them Englishmen, the former a learned and active constitutionalist. They were introduced to me by Dr Franklin, from whom they solicited recommendations for America. The story they told him was, that Mr Paradise had an estate in the right of his wife in Virginia, and that his presence there had been rendered necessary to save it from the penalty of a law of that State, respecting the property of absentees. Mr Jones said he despaired of seeing constitutional liberty re-established in England, that he had determined to visit America, and in that happy and glorious country to seek and enjoy that freedom, which was not to be found in Britain. He spoke in raptures of our patriotism, wisdom, &c. &c. On speaking to me some days afterwards of his intended voyage, he assigned an additional reason for undertaking it, viz. that his long and great friendship for Mr Paradise had induced him to accompany that gentleman on an occasion, which, both as a witness and a friend, he could render him most essential services in Virginia.

I exchanged three or four visits with these gentlemen, and, in the meantime, was informed that Mr Jones was a rising character in England, that he had refused a very lucrative appointment in the Indies, and had by his talents excited the notice of men in power.

In conversing one morning with this gentleman on English affairs, he took occasion to mention the part he had taken in them, and, at parting, gave me two pamphlets he had published.

The first was a second edition of "An Inquiry into the Legal Mode of Suppressing Riots, &c." first published in 1780, to which was added, "A Speech on the Nomination of Candidates to Represent the County of Middlesex, on the 9th of September, 1780." And this second edition contained also a letter, dated the 25th of April, 1782, from Mr Jones to Mr Yeates, the Secretary to the Society for Constitutional Information, of which Mr Jones is a member. The other was a Speech to the assembled Inhabitants of Middlesex and Surry, &c. on the 28th of May, 1782.

As it appeared to me a little extraordinary that a gentleman of Mr Jones's rising reputation and expectations should be so smitten with the charms of American liberty, as "to leave all, and follow her," I began, on returning to my lodgings, to read these pamphlets with a more than common degree of curiosity, and I was not a little surprised to find the following paragraphs in them.

In his letter to Mr Yeates of last April, he says, "my future life shall certainly be devoted to the support of that excellent constitution, which it is the object of your society to unfold and elucidate, and from this resolution long and deliberately made, no prospects, no connexions, no station here or abroad, no fear of danger, or hope of advantage to myself, shall ever deter or allure me."

He begins his essay on suppressing riots, by saying, "It has long been my opinion, that in times of national adversity, those citizens are entitled to the highest praise, who, by personal exertions and active valor, promote, at their private hazard, the general welfare."

In his speech of last April, are these paragraphs; in the first, speaking of his being sick, he says, "It would prevent my attendance, for in health or in sickness I am devoted to your service. I shall never forget the words of an old Roman, Ligarius, who, when the liberties of his country were in imminent danger, and when a real friend to those liberties was condoling with him on his illness at so critical a time, raised himself from his couch, seized the hand of his friend, and said, if you have _any business worthy of yourselves, I am well_."

"Since I have risen to explain a sudden thought, I will avail myself of your favorable attention, and hazard a few words on the general question itself. Numbers have patience to hear, who have not time to read. And as to _myself, a very particular and urgent occasion, which calls me some months from England_, will deprive me of another opportunity to communicate my sentiments, until the momentous object before us shall be made certainly attainable through the concord, or forever lost and irrecoverable, through the disagreement of the nation."

To make comments on these extracts would be to waste time and paper. On reading them, I became persuaded that Mr Paradise and American liberty were mere pretences to cover a more important errand to America, and I was surprised that Mr Jones's vanity should so far get the better of his prudence, as to put such pamphlets into my hands at such a time.

I pointed out these extracts to Dr Franklin; but they did not strike him so forcibly as they had done me. I mentioned my apprehensions also to the Marquis de Lafayette, and I declined giving any letters either to Mr Paradise or to Mr Jones.

I am the more particular on this subject, in order that you may the better understand the meaning of a paragraph in my letter to you, of the 28th of June last, where I inform you, "that, if one may judge from appearances, the Ministry are very desirous of getting some of their emissaries into our country, either in an avowed or in a private character; and, all things considered, I should think it more safe not to admit any Englishman in either character within our lines at this very critical juncture."

Mr Jones and Mr Paradise went from hence to Nantes in order to embark there for America. Some weeks afterwards I met Mr Paradise at Passy. He told me Mr Jones and himself had parted at Nantes, and that the latter had returned directly to England. How this happened I never could learn. It was a subject on which Mr Paradise was very reserved. Perhaps the sentiments of America, on General Carleton's overtures, had rendered Mr Jones's voyage unnecessary; but in this I may be mistaken, for it is mere conjecture.

On the 25th of July, 1782, the King of Great Britain issued a warrant,[4] or order, directed to his Attorney or Solicitor-General.

A copy of this warrant was sent by express to Mr Oswald, with an assurance that the commission should be completed and sent him in a few days. He communicated this paper to Dr Franklin, who, after showing it to me, sent it to the Count de Vergennes. The Count wrote to the Doctor the following letter on the subject.

Translation.

"I have received, Sir, the letter of today, with which you have honored me, and the copy of the powers, which Mr Oswald communicated to you. The form in which it is conceived, not being that which is usual, I cannot form my opinion on the first view of it. I am going to examine it with the greatest attention, and, if you will be pleased to come here on Saturday morning, I shall be able to confer about it with you and Mr Jay, if it should be convenient for him to accompany you.

"I have the honor to be, &c.

DE VERGENNES.

"_Versailles, August 8th, 1782._"

On the 10th of August, we waited upon the Count de Vergennes, and a conference between him and us, on the subject of Mr Oswald's commission, ensued.

The Count declared his opinion, that we might proceed to treat with Mr Oswald under it, as soon as the original should arrive. He said it was such a one as we might have expected it would be, but that we must take care to insert proper articles in the treaty, to secure our independence and our limits against all future claims.

I observed to the Count, that it would be descending from the ground of independence to treat under the description of Colonies. He replied, that names signified little; that the King of Great Britain's styling himself the King of France was no obstacle to the King of France's treating with him; that an acknowledgment of our independence, instead of preceding, must in the natural course of things be the effect of the treaty, and that it would not be reasonable to expect the effect before the cause. He added, that we must be mindful to exchange powers with Mr Oswald, for that his acceptance of our powers, in which we were styled Commissioners from the United States of America, would be a tacit admittance of our independence. I made but little reply to all this singular reasoning. The Count turned to Dr Franklin and asked him what he thought of the matter. The Doctor said, he believed the commission would do. He next asked my opinion. I told him that I did not like it, and that it was best to proceed cautiously.

On returning, I could not forbear observing to Dr Franklin, that it was evident the Count did not wish to see our independence acknowledged by Britain, until they had made all their uses of us. It was easy for them to foresee difficulties in bringing Spain into a peace on moderate terms, and that if we once found ourselves standing on our own legs, our independence acknowledged, and all our other terms ready to be granted, we might not think it our duty to continue in the war for the attainment of Spanish objects. But, on the contrary, as we were bound by treaty to continue the war till our independence should be attained, it was the interest of France to postpone that event, until their own views and those of Spain could be gratified by a peace, and that I could not otherwise account for the Minister's advising us to act in a manner inconsistent with our dignity, and for reasons, which he himself had too much understanding not to see the fallacy of.

The Doctor imputed this conduct to the moderation of the Minister, and to his desire of removing every obstacle to speedy negotiations for peace. He observed, that this Court had hitherto treated us very fairly, and that suspicions to their disadvantage should not be readily entertained. He also mentioned our instructions, as further reasons for our acquiescence in the advice and opinion of the Minister. A day or two afterwards I paid a visit to Mr Oswald, and had a long conversation with him respecting his commission. On the resignation of Mr Fox, many reports to the prejudice of Lord Shelburne's sincerity, on the subject of American independence, had spread through France as well as through Great Britain. His Lordship, fearful of their effect on the confidence with which he wished to inspire the American commissioners, conveyed by Mr Benjamin Vaughan to Dr Franklin an extract of certain instructions to Sir Guy Carleton, of which the following is a copy, viz.

"_June 25th, 1782._ It has been said, that 'great effects might be obtained by something being done _spontaneously_ from England.' Upon this and other considerations, his Majesty has been induced to give a striking proof of his royal magnanimity and disinterested wish for the restoration of peace, by commanding his Majesty's Ministers to direct Mr Grenville, _that the independence of America should be proposed by him in the first instance, instead of making it the condition of a general peace_.

"I have given a confidential information to you of these particulars, that you may take such measures as shall appear to you most advisable for making a direct communication of the substance of the same, either immediately to Congress, or through the medium of General Washington, or in any other manner, which you may think most likely to impress the well disposed parts of America with the fairness and liberality of his Majesty's proceedings in such great and spontaneous concessions.

"The advantages, which we may expect from such concessions are, that America, once apprised of the King's disposition to acknowledge the independence of the thirteen States, and of the disinclination in the French Court to terminate the war, must see that it is from this moment to be carried on with a view of negotiating points, in which she can have no concern, whether they regard France, or Spain and Holland at the desire of France; but some of which, on the contrary, may be in future manifestly injurious to the interests of America herself.

"That if the negotiation is broken off, it will undoubtedly be for the sake of those powers, and not America, whose object is accomplished the instant she accepts of an independence, which is not merely held out to her in the way of negotiation by the executive power, but a distinct unconditional offer, arising out of the resolutions of Parliament, and therefore warranted by the sense of the nation at large.

"These facts being made notorious, it is scarce conceivable that America, composed as she is, will continue efforts under French direction, and protract the distresses and calamities, which it is well known that war has subjected her to. It is to be presumed, that from that moment she will look with jealousy on the French troops in that country, who may from allies become dangerous enemies.

"If, however, any particular States, men, or description of men, should continue against the general inclination of the Continent devoted to France, this communication will surely detect their views, expose their motives, and deprive them of their influence in all matters of general concern and exertion. You will, however, take particular care in your manner of conducting yourselves, not only that there should not be the smallest room for suspicions of our good faith and sincerity, but that we have no view in it of causing dissensions among the colonies, or even of separating America from France upon terms inconsistent with her own honor. You must therefore convince them, that the great object of this country is, not merely peace, but reconciliation with America on the noblest terms and by the noblest means."

In the course of the beforementioned conversation with Mr Oswald, I reminded him, that the judgment and opinion of America respecting the disposition and views of Britain towards her, must be determined by facts and not by professions. That the Enabling Act, and the Commission granted to him in pursuance of it, by no means harmonised with the language of these instructions to Sir Guy Carleton. That unless the offers and promises contained in the latter were realised, by an immediate declaration of our independence, America would naturally consider them as specious appearances of magnanimity, calculated to deceive and disunite them, and, instead of conciliating, would tend to irritate the States. I also urged, in the strongest terms, the great impropriety, and consequently the utter impossibility of our ever treating with Great Britain on any other than an equal footing, and told him plainly, that I would have no concern in any negotiation, in which we were not considered as an independent people.

Mr Oswald upon this, as upon every other occasion, behaved in a candid and proper manner. He saw and confessed the propriety of these remarks; he wished his commission had been otherwise, but was at a loss how to reconcile it to the King's dignity, to make _such_ a declaration, immediately after having issued _such_ a commission. I pointed out the manner in which I conceived it might be done; he liked the thought, and desired me to reduce it to writing. I did so, and communicated it to Dr Franklin, and, as we corrected it, is as follows, viz.

"George III, &c. to Richard Oswald, greeting. Whereas by a certain act, &c. (here follows the Enabling Act.)

"And whereas, in pursuance of the true intent and meaning of the said act, and to remove all doubts and jealousies, which might otherwise retard the execution of the same, we did, on the ---- day of ---- instruct Sir Guy Carleton, &c. our General, &c. to make known to the people of the said Colonies, in Congress assembled, our royal disposition and intention to recognise the said Colonies as independent States, and as such, to enter with them into such a treaty of peace as might be honorable and convenient to both countries.

"And whereas further, in pursuance of the said act, we did on the ---- day of ---- authorise and commission you, the said Richard Oswald, (here follows the commission.) Now, therefore, to the end that a period may be put to the calamities of war, and peace, commerce, and mutual intercourse the more speedily restored, we do hereby, in pursuance of our royal word, for ourselves and our successors, recognise the said thirteen Colonies as free and independent States. And it is our will and pleasure, that you do forthwith proceed to treat with the Commissioner or Commissioners already appointed, or to be appointed for that purpose by the Congress of the said States, and, with him or them only, of and concerning the objects of your said commission, which we do hereby confirm, and that this declaration be considered by you as a preliminary article to the proposed treaty, and be in substance or in the whole inserted therein, or incorporated therewith. And it is our further will and pleasure, that, on receiving these presents, which we have caused to be made patent, and our great seal to be hereunto affixed, you do deliver the same to the said Commissioner or Commissioners, to be by him or them transmitted to the Congress of the United States of America, as an earnest of the friendship and good will, which we are disposed to extend to them. Witness, &c. 15th of August, 1782."

Mr Oswald approved of the draft, and said he would recommend the measure to the Minister. The next day, however, he told me that he had an instruction, which he thought enabled him to make the declaration; but that it would be necessary to obtain the previous consent of the Minister for that purpose. He then read to me the fourth article of his instructions, of which the following is a copy, viz.

"In case you find the American Commissioners are not at liberty to treat on any terms short of independence, you are to declare to them that you have our authority to make that cession; our ardent wish for peace disposing us to purchase it at the price of acceding to the complete independence of the thirteen colonies."

He said he would immediately despatch a courier to London, and would press the Ministry for permission to acknowledge our independence without further delay, which he accordingly did.

At this time the commission under the great seal had arrived, and Dr Franklin and myself went to Versailles to communicate that circumstance to the Count de Vergennes, and (agreeably to our instructions) to inform him of what had passed between Mr Oswald and us.

The Count and myself again discussed the propriety of insisting, that our independence should be acknowledged previous to a treaty. He repeated, that it was expecting the effect before the cause, and many other similar remarks, which did not appear to me to be well founded. I told the Count, that a declaration of our independence was in my opinion, a matter of very little consequence; that I did not consider our independence as requiring any aid or validity from British acts; and provided, that nation treated us as she treated other nations, viz. on a footing of equality, it was all that I desired. He differed with me also in this opinion. He thought an explicit acknowledgment of our independence in treaty very necessary, in order to prevent our being exposed to further claims. I told him we should always have arms in our hands to answer those claims, that I considered mere paper fortifications as of but little consequence; and that we should take care to insert an article in the treaty, whereby the King of Great Britain should renounce all claims of every kind to the countries within our limits.

The Count informed us, he had delayed doing business with Mr Fitzherbert, until we should be ready to proceed with Mr Oswald, and that he expected to see him the next day or the day after.

Mr Fitzherbert went the next day to Versailles, and immediately despatched a courier to London.

The answer of the British Ministry to Mr Oswald is contained in the following extract of a letter to him from Mr Townshend, dated Whitehall, September 1st, 1782.

"Sir,

"I have received and laid before the King your letters of the 17th, 18th, and 21st ultimo, and I am commanded to signify to you, his Majesty's approbation of your conduct, in communicating to the American Commissioners the fourth article of your instructions; which could not but convince them, that the negotiation for peace, and the cession of independence to the Thirteen United Colonies, were intended to be carried on and concluded with the Commissioners in Europe.

"Those gentlemen, having expressed their satisfaction concerning that article, it is hoped they will not entertain a doubt of his Majesty's determination to exercise in the fullest extent the powers with which the act of Parliament has invested him, by granting to America, full, complete, and unconditional independence, in the most explicit manner, as an article of treaty."

When Mr Oswald communicated this letter to me, I did not hesitate to tell him, that his Court was misled by this, for that the language of Mr Townshend corresponded so exactly with that of the Count de Vergennes, and was at the same time so contrary to that of the instructions to Sir Guy Carleton, as to be inexplicable on any other principle. I also told him I suspected, that the courier despatched by Mr Fitzherbert on his return from Versailles had been the means of infusing these ideas. He smiled, and after a little pause said; why, Count de Vergennes told Mr Fitzherbert, that my commission was come and that he thought it would do, and therefore they might now go on, and accordingly they did go on to discuss certain points, and particularly that of Newfoundland.

Mr Oswald did not deny or contradict the inference I drew from this, viz. that Mr Fitzherbert, struck by this conduct of Count de Vergennes, and finding that the commission given to Mr Oswald was deemed sufficient by him, thought it his duty directly to inform his Court of it, and thereby prevent their being embarrassed by our scruples and demands on a point, on which there was so much reason to think, that our allies were very moderate.

For my own part I was not only persuaded that this was the case, but also that the ill success of Mr Oswald's application was owing to it.

These considerations induced me to explain to him, what I supposed to be the natural policy of this Court on the subject, and to show him that it was the interest of Britain to render us as independent on France, as we were resolved to be on her. He soon adopted the same opinion, but was at a loss to see in what manner Great Britain, considering what had just past, could consistently take further steps at present. I told him, that nothing was more easy, for that the issuing of another commission would do it. He asked me if he might write that to the Ministry; I told him he might; he then desired, in order to avoid mistakes, that I would give it to him in writing, which I did as follows, viz.

"A commission (in the usual form) to Richard Oswald to treat of peace or truce with Commissioners, vested with equal powers by and on the part of the United States of America, would remove the objections to which his present one is liable, and render it proper for the American Commissioners to proceed to treat with him on the subject of preliminaries."

I then reminded him of the several resolutions of Congress, passed at different periods, not to treat with British Commissioners on any other footing than that of absolute independence, and also intimated, that I thought it would be best to give him our final and decided determination not to treat otherwise in writing, in the form of a letter. He preferred this to a verbal answer, and the next day I prepared the following draft of such a letter.

"Sir,

"It is with regret, that we find ourselves obliged by our duty to our country, to object to entering with you into negotiations for peace on the plan proposed. One nation can treat with another nation only on terms of equality; and it cannot be expected, that we should be the first and only servants of Congress, who would admit doubts of their independence.

"The tenor of your commission affords matter for a variety of objections, which your good sense will save us the pain of enumerating. The journals of Congress present to you unequivocal and uniform evidence of the sentiments and resolutions of Congress on the subject, and their positive instructions to us to speak the same language.

"The manner of removing these obstacles is obvious, and in our opinion no less consistent with the dignity than the interest of Great Britain. If the Parliament meant to enable the King to conclude a peace with us on terms of independence, they necessarily meant to enable him to do it in a manner compatible with his dignity; and consequently that he should previously regard us in a point of view, that would render it proper for him to negotiate with us. What this point of view is you need not be informed.

"We also take the liberty of submitting to your consideration, how far his Majesty's now declining to take this step would comport with the assurances lately given on that subject, and whether hesitation and delay would not tend to lessen the confidence, which those assurances were calculated to inspire.

"As to referring an acknowledgment of our independence to the first article of a treaty, permit us to remark, that this implies, that we are not to be considered in that light until after the conclusion of the treaty, and our acquiescing would be to admit the propriety of our being considered in another light during that interval. Had this circumstance been attended to, we presume that the Court of Great Britain would not have pressed a measure, which certainly is not delicate, and which cannot be reconciled with the received ideas of national honor.

"You may rest assured, Sir, of our disposition to peace on reasonable terms, and of our readiness to enter seriously into negotiations for it, as soon as we shall have an opportunity of doing it in the only manner in which it is possible for one nation to treat with another, viz. on an equal footing.

"Had you been commissioned in the usual manner, we might have proceeded; and as we can perceive no legal or other objection to this, or some other such like expedient, it is to be wished that his Majesty will not permit an obstacle so very unimportant to Great Britain, but so essential and insuperable with respect to us, to delay the re-establishment of peace especially, and in case the business could be but once begun, the confidence we have in your candor and integrity would probably render the settling all our articles only the work of a few hours.

"We are, &c."

I submitted this draft to Dr Franklin's consideration. He thought it rather too positive, and therefore rather imprudent, for that in case Britain should remain firm, and future circumstances should compel us to submit to their mode of treating, we should do it with an ill grace after such a decided and peremptory refusal. Besides, the Doctor seemed to be much perplexed and fettered by our instructions to be guided by the advice of this Court. Neither of these considerations had weight with me; for as to the first, I could not conceive of any event, which would render it proper and therefore possible for America to treat in any other character than as an independent nation; and, as to the second, I could not believe, that Congress intended we should follow any advice, which might be repugnant to their dignity and interest.

On returning to town, Mr Oswald spoke to me about this letter. I told him that I had prepared a draft of one, but that on further consideration, and consulting with Dr Franklin, we thought it best not to take the liberty of troubling his Court with any arguments or reasonings, which without our aid must be very evident to them.

He appeared disappointed, and desired me to let him see the draft. I did. He liked it. He requested a copy of it; but as I doubted the propriety of such a step, I told him I would consider of it, and give him an answer the next day.

It appeared to me on further reflection, that no bad consequences would arise from giving him a copy of this paper; that, though unsigned, it would nevertheless convey to the Ministry the sentiments and opinions I wished to impress, and that if finally they should not be content to treat with us as independent, they were not yet ripe for peace or treaty with us; besides, I could not be persuaded, that Great Britain, after what the House of Commons had declared, after what Mr Grenville had said, and Sir Guy Carleton been instructed to do, would persist in refusing to admit our independence, provided they really believed, that we had firmly resolved not to treat on more humble terms.

I gave him a copy, and also copies of the various resolutions of Congress, which evince their adherence to their independence. These papers he sent by express to London, and warmly recommended the issuing a new commission to remove all further delay. This matter was not communicated to the Count de Vergennes, at least to my knowledge or belief, by either of us.

I might now enumerate the various expedients proposed by the Count de Vergennes and the Marquis de Lafayette to reconcile our difficulties. Such as Mr Oswald's writing a letter to us, signifying that he treated with us as independent, &c. &c. But as our independence was indivisible, there could not easily be contrived a half way mode of acknowledging it, and therefore any method of doing it short of the true and proper one could not bear examination.

Being convinced, that the objections to our following the advice of the Count de Vergennes were unanswerable, I proposed to Dr Franklin, that we should state them in a letter to him, and request his answer in writing, because, as we were instructed to ask and to follow his advice on these occasions, we ought always to be able to show what his advice was.

The Doctor approved of the measure, and I undertook to prepare a draft of such a letter.

I must now remind you of what some of my former letters informed you, viz. the propositions made to me by the Count d'Aranda on the part of Spain. It is necessary that I should in this place go into that detail, because they will be found in the sequel to be strongly connected with the subject more immediately under consideration.

On my arrival at Paris in June last, it being doubtful whether if I made a visit to Count d'Aranda he would return it, I thought it most advisable to avoid that risk, and to write him the following letter.

TO COUNT D'ARANDA.

"Paris, June 25th, 1782.

"Sir,

"On leaving Madrid his Excellency, the Count de Florida Blanca, informed me, that the papers relative to the objects of my mission there had been transmitted to your Excellency, with authority and instructions to treat with me on the subject of them.

"I arrived here the day before yesterday, and have the honor to acquaint your Excellency of my being ready to commence the necessary conferences at such time and place as your Excellency may think proper to name.

"Your Excellency's character gives me reason to hope, that the negotiation in question will be conducted in a manner agreeable to both our countries; and permit me to assure you, that nothing on my part shall be wanting to manifest the respect and consideration, with which I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN JAY."

The following is a copy of the Count's answer.

Translation.

"Paris, June 27th, 1782.

"Sir,

"I have the honor to reply to your note of the 25th, informing me of your happy arrival at this Court. I shall also have the honor to receive you, when you shall intimate that it is proper, and whenever you will inform me of your intention, so that I may expect you at whatever hour shall be most convenient to you.

"I shall be pleased to make your acquaintance, and to assure you of the respect with which I have the honor, &c.

THE COUNT D'ARANDA."

It having been intimated to Dr Franklin, that if we paid a visit to Count d'Aranda, it would be returned, we waited on him on the 29th of June. He received us in a friendly manner, and expressed his wishes, that closer connexion might be formed between our countries on terms agreeable to both.

He returned our visit the next day, and gave us an invitation to dine with him a few days afterwards. On that day I was taken sick, and continued so for many weeks, nor, indeed, am I yet perfectly recovered from the effects of that illness, having a constant pain in my breast, and frequently a little fever.

Hence it happened, that I did not meet Count d'Aranda on business till a month afterwards, when agreeably to a previous appointment I waited upon him.

He began the conference by various remarks on the general principles on which contracting nations should form treaties, on the magnanimity of his sovereign, and on his own disposition to disregard trifling considerations in great matters. Then opening Michell's large Map of North America, he asked me what were our boundaries; I told him that the boundary between us and the Spanish dominions was a line drawn from the head of Mississippi, down the middle thereof to the thirtyfirst degree of north latitude, and from thence by the line between Florida and Georgia.

He entered into a long discussion of our right to such an extent, and insisted principally on two objections to it. 1st. That the western country had never belonged to, or been claimed as belonging to the ancient Colonies. That previous to the last war it had belonged to France, and after its cession to Britain remained a distinct part of her dominions, until by the conquest of West Florida and certain posts on the Mississippi and Illinois, it became vested in Spain. 2dly. That supposing the Spanish right of conquest did not extend over _all_ that country, still that it was possessed by free and independent nations of Indians, whose lands we could not with any propriety consider as belonging to us. He therefore proposed to run a longitudinal line on the east side of the river, for our western boundary; and said, that he did not mean to dispute about a few acres or miles, but wished to run it in a manner that would be convenient to us; for though he could never admit the extent we claimed, yet he did not desire to crowd us up to our exact limits.

As it did not appear to me expedient to enter fully into the discussion of these objections, until after he had marked the line he proposed, I told him I would forbear troubling him with any remarks on the subject until the points in controversy should be reduced to a certainty; and, therefore, I desired him to mark on the map the line he proposed, and to place it as far to the west as his instructions would possibly admit of. He promised to do it, and to send me the map with his proposed line marked on it in a day or two.

I then gave him a copy of my commission, and showed him the original. He returned it to me with expressions of satisfaction, and then changed the subject, by desiring me, if after receiving his map and examining his lines, I should find it in any respect inconvenient, that I would mark such other line on it as would, in my opinion, be more agreeable to America; assuring me, that he had nothing more at heart, than to fix such a boundary between us as might be satisfactory to both parties. I told him, that on receiving his map, I would take all that he had said into consideration, and take the earliest opportunity of acquainting him with my sentiments respecting it. I then observed, that I hoped his powers to treat were equal with mine. He replied, that he had ample powers to confer, but not to sign anything without previously communicating it to his Court, and receiving their orders for the purpose; but to my surprise, he did not offer to show me any powers of any kind.[5]

A few days afterwards he sent me the same map, with his proposed line marked on it in red ink. He ran it from a lake near the confines of Georgia, but east of the Flint River, to the confluence of the Kanawa with the Ohio, thence round the western shores of lakes Erie and Huron, and thence round lake Michigan to lake Superior.

On the 10th of August I carried this map to the Count de Vergennes and left it with him. Dr Franklin joined with me in pointing out the extravagance of this line; and I must do him the justice to say, that in all his letters to me, and in all his conversations with me respecting our western extent, he has invariably declared it to be his opinion, that we should insist upon the Mississippi as our western boundary, and that we ought not, by any means, to part with our right to the free navigation of it.

The Count de Vergennes was very cautious and reserved; but M. Rayneval, his principal Secretary, who was present, thought we claimed more than we had a right to.

Having thus clearly discovered the views of Spain, and that they were utterly inadmissible, I had little hope of our ever agreeing; especially as the Mississippi was, and ought to be, our _ultimatum_.

It was not long before I had another interview with M. Rayneval. He asked me whether I had made any progress in my negotiations with the Count d'Aranda. I told him, that the Count had not yet shown me any powers from his Court to treat. He expressed surprise that I should have any difficulties on that head; especially considering the public as well as private character of that nobleman. I replied, that I was very sensible of the respectability, both of his public and private character; but, that neither the one nor the other authorised him to negotiate treaties with the United States of America; and consequently, that his Court would be at liberty to disavow all his proceedings in such business. That it was my duty to adhere to the forms usual in such cases, and that those forms rendered it proper for Ministers to exchange copies of their commissions, before they proceeded on the business, which was the object of them.

The Count d'Aranda was very urgent, that I should mark on his map some line or other to the eastward of the Mississippi, to which we could agree; and on the 26th of August we had another conference on these subjects. I told him frankly, that we were bound by the Mississippi, and that I had no authority to cede any territories east of it to his Catholic Majesty, and that all I could do relative to it, was to transmit his proposition to Congress for their consideration.

He affected to be much surprised, that I should have no discretionary authority on that subject, and observed, that he had supposed I was a Minister Plenipotentiary. I told him, that few Ministers Plenipotentiary had discretionary power to transfer and cede to others the countries of their sovereigns. He denied, that the countries in question were our countries, and asked what right we had to territories, which manifestly belong to free and independent nations of Indians. I answered that those were points to be discussed and settled between us and them; that we claimed the right of preemption with respect to them, and the sovereignty with respect to all other nations. I reminded him, that Mexico and Peru had been in the same predicament, and yet that his Catholic Majesty had had no doubts of his right to the sovereignty of those countries.

He then desired me to write him a letter on the subject, in order that he might with the greater accuracy convey my sentiments to his Court.

On the 4th of September, I received the following letter from M. de Rayneval.

Translation.

"Versailles, September 4th, 1782.

"Sir,

"I should be glad to have a conversation with you on the subject of the boundaries in regard to Spain, but it is impossible for me to go to Paris for this purpose. You would oblige me, if you would have the goodness to come to Versailles tomorrow morning. It will give me great pleasure to see you at dinner. Meanwhile I have the honor, &c.

RAYNEVAL."

I accordingly waited upon M. de Rayneval. He entered into a long disquisition of our claims to the western country. It is unnecessary to repeat in this place what he said on those subjects, because I shall insert in this letter a copy of a paper, which at my request he wrote to me on them. That paper will speak for itself. You will be at no loss to form a judgment of the mode in which he proposed to reconcile us, by what he called a conciliatory line. We discussed very freely the propriety of my objecting to proceed with the Count d'Aranda; and among other reasons, which induced him to think I ought to go on, was my having already conferred with him on those subjects. My answer to this was obvious, viz. that though I had heard Count d'Aranda's propositions, yet that I had offered none of any kind whatever.

On the 6th of September, M. de Rayneval wrote me the following letter.

M. DE RAYNEVAL TO JOHN JAY.

Translation.

"Versailles, September 6th, 1782.

"I have the honor, Sir, to send you as you desired me, my personal ideas on the manner of terminating your discussions about limits with Spain. I hope they will appear to you worthy to be taken into consideration.

"I have reflected, Sir, on what you said to me yesterday of the Spanish Ambassador's want of powers. You cannot in my opinion urge that reason to dispense treating with that Ambassador, without offending him, and without contradicting the first step you have taken towards him. This reflection leads me to advise you again to see the Count d'Aranda, and to make him a proposition of some sort or other on the object in question. That which results from my memoir appears to me the most proper to effect a reasonable conciliation; but it is for you to judge whether I am mistaken, because you alone have a knowledge of the title, which the United States can have to extend their possessions at the expense of nations, whom England herself has acknowledged to be independent.

"As to the rest, Sir, whatever use you may think proper to make of my memoir, I pray you to regard it at least as a proof of my zeal, and of my desire to be useful to the cause of your country.

"I have the honor to be, with perfect consideration, yours, &c. &c.

RAYNEVAL.

"_P. S._ As I shall be absent for some days, I pray you to address your answer to M. Stenin, Secretary to the Council of State, at Versailles.

"I must desire you not to let the perusal of the following memoir make you forget the postscript of the above letter, for in the sequel you will find it of some importance."

_M. de Rayneval's Memoir respecting the Right of the United States to the Navigation of the Mississippi._

Translation.

"The question between Spain and the United States of North America is, how to regulate their respective limits towards the Ohio and the Mississippi. The Americans pretend, that their dominion extends as far as the Mississippi, and Spain maintains the contrary.

"It is evident, that the Americans can only borrow from England the right they pretend to have to extend as far as the Mississippi; therefore, to determine this right, it is proper to examine what the Court of London has thought and done on this head.

"It is known, that before the treaty of Paris, France possessed Louisiana and Canada, and that she considered the savage people, situated to the east of the Mississippi, either as independent, or as under her protection.

"This pretension caused no dispute; England never thought of making any, except as to the lands situated towards the source of the Ohio, in that part where she had given the name of Alleghany to that river.

"A discussion about limits at that time took place between the Courts of Versailles and London, but it would be superfluous to follow the particulars; it will suffice to observe, that England proposed in 1755 the following boundary. It set out from the point where the River de Boeuf falls into the Ohio, at the place called Venango; it went up this river towards lake Erie as far as twenty leagues, and setting off again from the same place, Venango, a right line was drawn as far as the last mountains of Virginia, which descend towards the ocean. As to the savage tribes situated between the aforesaid line and the Mississippi, the English Minister considers them as independent; from whence it follows, that according to the very propositions of the Court of London, almost the whole course of the Ohio belonged to France, and that the countries situated to the westward of the mountains were considered as having nothing in common with the Colonies.

"When peace was negotiated in 1761, France offered to make a cession of Canada to England. The regulation of the limits of this Colony and Louisiana was in question. France pretended that almost the whole course of the Ohio made a part of Louisiana, and the Court of London, to prove that this river belonged to Canada, produced several authentic papers; among others, the chart which M. Vaudreuil delivered to the English commandant when he abandoned Canada. The Minister of London maintained at the same time, that a part of the savages situated to the eastward of the Mississippi were independent, another part under its protection, and that England had purchased a part from the five Irequois nations. The misfortunes of France cut these discussions short; the treaty of Paris assigned the Mississippi for the boundary between the possessions of France and Great Britain.

"Let us see the dispositions, which the Court of London has made in consequence of the treaty of Paris.

"If they had considered the vast territories situated to the eastward of the Mississippi as forming part of their ancient Colonies, they would have declared so, and have made their dispositions accordingly. So far from any such thing, the King of England, in a proclamation of the month of October, 1763, declares in a precise and positive manner that the lands in question are situated between the Mississippi and the ancient _English establishments_. It is, therefore, clearly evident, that the Court of London itself, when it was as yet sovereign of the Thirteen Colonies, did not consider the aforementioned lands as forming part of these same Colonies; and it results from this in the most demonstrative manner, that they have not at this time any right over these lands. To maintain the contrary, every principle of the laws of nature and nations must be subverted.

"The principles now established are as applicable to Spain as to the United States. This power cannot extend its claims beyond the bounds of its conquests. She cannot, therefore, pass beyond the Natchez, situated towards the thirtyfirst degree of latitude; her rights are, therefore, confined to this degree; what is beyond, is either independent or belonging to England; neither Spain nor the Americans can have any pretensions thereto. The future treaty of peace can alone regulate the respective rights.

"The consequence of all that has been said is, that neither Spain nor the United States has the least right of sovereignty over the savages in question, and that the transactions they may carry on as to this country would be to no purpose.

"But the future may bring forth new circumstances, and this reflection leads one to suppose, that it would be of use that the Court of Madrid and the United States should make an eventual arrangement.

"This arrangement may be made in the following manner. A right line should be drawn from the eastern angle of the Gulf of Mexico, which makes the section between the two Floridas, to Fort Toulouse, situated in the country of the Alabamas; from thence the river Loneshatchi should be ascended, from the mouth of which a right line should be drawn to the Fort or Factory Quenassee; from this last place, the course of the river Euphasee is to be followed till it joins the Cherokee; the course of this last river is to be pursued to the place where it receives the Pelisippi; this last to be followed to its source, from whence a right line is to be drawn to Cumberland river, whose course is to be followed until it falls into the Ohio. The savages to the westward of the line described should be free under the protection of Spain; those to the eastward should be free, and under the protection of the United States; or rather, the Americans may make such arrangements with them, as is most convenient to themselves. The trade should be free to both parties.

"By looking over the chart we shall find, that Spain would lose almost the whole course of the Ohio, and that the establishments, which the Americans may have on this river, would remain untouched, and that even a very extensive space remains to form new ones.

"As to the course and navigation of the Mississippi, they follow with the property, and they will belong, therefore, to the nation to which the two banks belong. If then, by the future treaty of peace, Spain preserves West Florida, she alone will be the proprietor of the course of the Mississippi from the thirtyfirst degree of latitude to the mouth of this river. Whatever may be the case with that part, which is beyond this point to the north, the United States of America can have no pretensions to it, not being masters of either border of this river.

"As to what respects the lands situated to the northward of the Ohio, there is reason to presume that Spain can form no pretensions thereto. Their fate must be regulated with the Court of London."

I did not return M. Rayneval any answer to his letter, nor any remarks on his memoir, but the first time I saw him afterwards I told him, I had received his letter and memoir he had done me the honor to write, and that I should send a copy of it to our Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

As both the letter and memoir were _ostensibly_ written by him in a private character, it did not appear to me expedient or necessary to enter into any formal discussions with him on those subjects.

The perusal of this memoir convinced me,

1st. That this Court would, at a peace, oppose our extension to the Mississippi.

2dly. That they would oppose our claim to the free navigation of that river.

3dly. That they would _probably_ support the _British_ claims to all the country above the 31st degree of latitude, and _certainly_ to all the country north of the Ohio.

4thly. That in case we should not agree to divide with Spain in the manner proposed, that then this Court would aid Spain in negotiating with Britain for the territory she wanted, and would agree that the residue should remain to Britain.

In my opinion, it was not to be believed that the first and confidential Secretary of the Count de Vergennes would, without his knowledge and consent, declare such sentiments, and offer such propositions, and that, too, in writing. I therefore considered M. Rayneval as speaking the sentiments of the Minister, and I confess they alarmed me, especially as they seemed naturally to make a part of that system of policy, which I believed induced him rather to postpone the acknowledgment of our independence by Britain to the conclusion of a general peace, than aid us in procuring it at present.

You will now be pleased to recollect the postscript to M. Rayneval's letter.

On the 9th of September I received certain information that on the 7th M. Rayneval had left Versailles, and was gone to England; that it was pretended he was gone into the country, and that several precautions had been taken to keep his real destination a secret.

A former page in this letter informs you, that a little before this, Mr Oswald had despatched a courier with letters, recommending it to his Court to issue a new commission, styling us _United States_, and that I had agreed to prepare a letter to the Count de Vergennes, stating our objections to treat with Mr Oswald under his present one.

This, therefore, was a period of uncertainty and suspense, and whatever part Britain might take, must necessarily be followed by very important consequences. No time was, therefore, to be lost in counteracting what I supposed to be the object of M. Rayneval's journey. But before I enter into that detail, I must here insert a copy of the letter, which I wrote to the Count d'Aranda, agreeably to his request herein beforementioned.

TO THE COUNT D'ARANDA.

"Paris, September 10th, 1782.

"Sir,

"Agreeably to your Excellency's request, I have now the honor of repeating in writing, that I am not authorised by Congress to make any cession of any counties belonging to the United States, and that I can do nothing more respecting the line mentioned by your Excellency, than to wait for and to follow such instructions as Congress, on receiving that information, may think proper to give me on that subject.

"Permit me, nevertheless, to remind your Excellency that I have full power to confer, treat, agree, and conclude with the Ambassador or Plenipotentiary of his Catholic Majesty, _vested with equal powers_, of and concerning a treaty of amity and commerce and of alliance, on principles of equality, reciprocity, and mutual advantage.

"I can only regret, that my overtures to his Excellency, the Count de Florida Blanca, who was _ex officio_ authorised to confer with me on such subjects, have been fruitless.

"It would give me pleasure to see this business begun, and I cannot omit this opportunity of assuring your Excellency of my wish and desire to enter upon it as soon as your Excellency shall be pleased to inform me, that you are authorised and find it convenient to proceed.

"I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN JAY."

To this letter, the Count returned the following answer.

COUNT D'ARANDA TO JOHN JAY.

Translation.

"Sir,

"I have the honor to reply to your note of yesterday, that I am furnished with ample instructions from my Court, and am authorised by it to confer and treat with you on all points on which you may be instructed and authorised to treat by your constituents.

"As soon as you communicate your propositions, they will be examined, and I will submit to you my observations on them, in order that we may be able to agree on both sides.

"I have the honor to be, &c.

THE COUNT D'ARANDA."

On the same day, viz. the 10th of September, a copy of a translation of a letter from M. Marbois to the Count de Vergennes, against our sharing in the fishery, was put into my hands. Copies of it were transmitted to you, enclosed with my letter of the 18th of September, of which a duplicate was also forwarded.

I also learned from good authority, that on the morning of M. Rayneval's departure the Count d'Aranda had, contrary to his usual practice, gone with _post horses_ to Versailles, and was two or three hours in conference with the Count de Vergennes and M. Rayneval before the latter set out.

All these facts taken together led me to conjecture, that M. Rayneval was sent to England for the following purposes.

1st. To let Lord Shelburne know that the demands of America, to be treated by Britain as independent previous to a treaty, were not approved or countenanced by this Court, and that the offer of Britain to make that acknowledgment in an article of the proposed treaty was in the Count's opinion sufficient.

2dly. To sound Lord Shelburne on the subject of the fishery, and to discover whether Britain would agree to divide it with France to the exclusion of all others.

3dly. To impress Lord Shelburne with the determination of Spain to possess the exclusive navigation of the Gulf of Mexico, and of their desire to keep us from the Mississippi; and also, to hint the propriety of such a line as on the one hand would satisfy Spain, and on the other, leave to Britain all the country north of the Ohio.

4thly. To make such other verbal overtures to Lord Shelburne, as it might not be advisable to reduce to writing, and to judge from the general tenor of his lordship's answers and conversation, whether it was probable that a general peace, on terms agreeable to France, could be effected, in order that if that was not the case an immediate stop might be put to the negotiation.

Having after much consideration become persuaded, that these were M. Rayneval's objects, I mentioned his journey to Mr Oswald, and after stating to him the first three of these objects, I said everything respecting them, that appeared to me necessary; but at the same time with a greater degree of caution than I could have wished, because I well knew it would become the subject of a long letter to the Ministry. On reflecting, however, how necessary it was, that Lord Shelburne should know our sentiments and resolutions respecting these matters, and how much better they could be conveyed in conversation than by letter; and knowing also, that Mr Vaughan was in confidential correspondence with him, and he was and always had been strongly attached to the American cause, I concluded it would be prudent to prevail upon him to go immediately to England.

I accordingly had an interview with Mr Vaughan, and he immediately despatched a few lines to Lord Shelburne, desiring that he would delay taking any measures with M. Rayneval until he should either see or hear further from him.

Mr Vaughan agreed to go to England, and we had much previous conversation, on the points in question; the substance of which was;

That Britain, by a peace with us, certainly expected other advantages than a mere suspension of hostilities, and that she doubtless looked forward to cordiality, confidence, and commerce.

That the manner as well as the matter of the proposed treaty was therefore of importance, and that if the late assurances respecting our independence were not realized by an unconditional acknowledgment, neither confidence nor peace could reasonably be expected; that this measure was considered by America as the touchstone of British sincerity, and that nothing could abate the suspicions and doubts of her good faith, which prevailed there.

That the interest of Great Britain, as well as that of the Minister, would be advanced by it; for as every idea of conquest had become absurd, nothing remained for Britain to do, but to make friends of those whom she could not subdue; that the way to do this was by leaving us nothing to complain of, either in the negotiation or in the treaty of peace, and by liberally yielding every point essential to the interest and happiness of America; the first of which points was, that of treating with us on an equal footing.

That if the Minister really meant to make peace with us, it was his interest to make us believe so, and thereby inspire us with a certain degree of confidence, which could no otherwise be obtained; that his enemies charged him with insincerity on this very point, and that it must be useful to him to convince all the world that such a charge was groundless.

That it would be vain to amuse themselves with expectations from the affected moderation of France on this head; for that America never would treat on any but an equal footing, and, therefore, although such expectations might cause delay, they would ultimately be fruitless.

That a little reflection must convince him, that it was the interest and consequently the policy of France to postpone if possible the acknowledgment of our independence, to the very conclusion of a general peace, and by keeping it suspended until after the war, _oblige us by the terms of our treaty, and by regard to our safety, to continue in it to the end_.

That it hence appeared to be the obvious interest of Britain immediately to cut the cords, which tied us to France, for that, though we were determined faithfully to fulfil our treaty and engagements with this Court, _yet it was a different thing to be guided by their or our construction of it_.

That among other things we were bound not to make a separate peace or truce, and that the assurance of our independence was avowed to be the object of our treaty. While therefore Great Britain refused to yield this object, we were bound, as well as resolved, to go on with the war, although perhaps the greatest obstacles to a peace arose neither from the demands of France nor America. Whereas, that object being conceded, we should be at liberty to make peace the moment that Great Britain should be ready to accede to the terms of France and America, without our being restrained by the demands of Spain, with whose views we had no concerns.

That it would not be wise in Great Britain to think of dividing the fishery with France and excluding us; because we could not make peace at such an expense, and because such an attempt would irritate America still more; would perpetuate her resentments, and induce her to use every possible means of retaliation by withholding supplies in future to the fishery, and by imposing the most rigid restraints on a commerce with Britain.

That it would not be less impolitic to oppose us on the point of boundary and the navigation of the Mississippi;

1st. Because our right to extend to the Mississippi was proved by our charters and other acts of government, and our right to its navigation was deducible from the laws of nature, and the consequences of revolution, which vested in us every British territorial right. It was easy therefore to foresee what opinions and sensations the mere attempt to dispossess us of these rights would diffuse throughout America.

2dly. Because the profits of an extensive and lucrative commerce, and not the possession of vast tracts of wilderness, were the true objects of a commercial European nation.

That by our extending to the Mississippi to the west, and to the proclamation bounds of Canada to the north, and by consenting to the mutual free navigation of our several lakes and rivers, there would be an inland navigation from the Gulf of St Lawrence to that of Mexico, by means of which the inhabitants west and north of the mountains might with more ease be supplied with foreign commodities, than from ports on the Atlantic, and that this immense and growing trade would be in a manner monopolized by Great Britain, as we should not insist, that she should admit other nations to navigate the waters that belonged to her. That therefore the navigation of the Mississippi would in future be no less important to her than to us, it being the only convenient outlet, through which they could transport the productions of the western country, which they would receive in payment for merchandise vended there.

That as to retaining any part of that country, or insisting to extend Canada, so as to comprehend the lands in question, it would be impolitic for these further reasons. Because it would not be in their power either to settle or govern that country; that we should refuse to yield them any aid, and that the utmost exertions of Congress could not prevent our people from taking gradual possession of it, by making establishments in different parts of it. That it certainly could not be wise in Britain, whatever it might be in other nations, thus to sow the seeds of future war in the very treaty of peace, or to lay in it the foundation of such distrusts and jealousies as on the one hand would forever prevent confidence and real friendship, and on the other, naturally lead us to strengthen our security by intimate and permanent alliances with other nations.

I desired Mr Vaughan to communicate these remarks to Lord Shelburne, and to impress him with the necessity and policy of taking a decided and manly part respecting America.

Mr Vaughan set off the evening of the 11th of September. It would have relieved me from much anxiety and uneasiness to have concerted all these steps with Dr Franklin, but on conversing with him about M. Rayneval's journey, he did not concur with me in sentiment respecting the objects of it; but appeared to me to have a great degree of confidence in this Court, and to be much embarrassed and constrained by our instructions.

Nothing now remained to be done but to complete the letter we had agreed to write to the Count de Vergennes, stating our objections to treat with Mr Oswald under his present commission. I accordingly prepared the following draft of such a letter, and it was under Dr Franklin's consideration, when the news of our success in England rendered it unnecessary.

_Proposed Draft of a Letter to Count de Vergennes._

"Sir,

"The question, whether we ought to exchange copies of our respective commissions with Mr Oswald, and proceed to business with him under his, is not only important and consequential in itself, but derives an additional degree of weight from the variance subsisting between your Excellency's sentiments and our own on that subject.

"The respect due to your Excellency's judgment, our confidence in the friendship of our good and great ally, and the tenor of our instructions from Congress, all conspire to urge us to lay before your Excellency a full state of the facts and circumstances, which create our objections to treating with Mr Oswald under the commission in question.

"We flatter ourselves, that in the course of this discussion, some light will be cast upon the subject, and it gives us pleasure to reflect, that our objections will be reviewed by a Minister, possessed of candor to acknowledge their force on the one hand, and talents to detect and discover to us their fallacy on the other.

"It appears to us unnecessary to premise, that on the 4th day of July, 1776, the representatives of the then late Thirteen United Colonies, in Congress assembled, did in the name and by the authority of the good people of those Colonies, and for the reasons in that act specified, 'solemnly publish and declare, that the said United Colonies were and of right ought to be _free and independent States_, that they were absolved from all allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connexion between them and the State of Great Britain was and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as _free and independent States_, they had _full power_ to levy war, _conclude peace_, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things, which independent nations might of right do. And for the support of that declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, they did mutually pledge to each other their lives, their fortunes, and their _sacred honor_.'

"This declaration was immediately ratified by legislative acts of the different States, all of whom have ever since so uniformly abided by it, that the authority of the King of Great Britain has never from that day to this extended over more ground in that country, than was from time to time under the feet of his armies.

"The United States also bound themselves to each other by a solemn act of confederation and perpetual union, wherein they declare, 'that the style of the Confederacy should be, _the United States of America_,' and by it they vested _in Congress_ the sole and _exclusive_ right and power of determining on _peace_ and war, of sending and receiving Ambassadors, and entering into _treaties_ and alliances.

"Thus becoming of right, and being in fact free, sovereign and independent States, their representatives in Congress did on the 15th day of June, 1781, grant a commission to certain gentlemen (of whom we are two) _in their name_ to confer, treat, and conclude, with the Ambassadors, Commissioners, &c. _vested with equal powers_ relating to the re-establishment of peace, &c.

"On the 25th of July 1782, his Britannic Majesty issued a commission under the great seal of his kingdom to Richard Oswald, reciting in the words following, 'that whereas by an act passed in the last session of Parliament, entitled, "An Act to enable his Majesty to conclude a peace or truce with certain Colonies in North America," therein mentioned, it recited, that it is essential to the _interest, welfare, and prosperity_ of Great Britain, and the _Colonies or Plantations_ of New Hampshire, Massachusetts Bay, &c. (naming the thirteen) that peace, intercourse, trade, and commerce, should be restored between them, therefore, and for a full manifestation of our earnest wish and desire; and of that of _our Parliament_, to put an end to the calamities of war, it is enacted, that it should and might be lawful for us to treat, consult of, agree and conclude with any Commissioner or Commissioners, named or to be named, _by the said Colonies or Plantations_, or with any body or bodies, corporate or politic, or any assembly or assemblies, _or description of men or any person whatsoever_, a peace or truce with the said Colonies or Plantations, _or any of them_, or any _part or parts thereof_, any law, act or acts of Parliament, matter or thing to the contrary in anywise notwithstanding.' The commission then proceeds to appoint and authorise Mr Oswald to treat &c. in _the very words of the act_.

"We do not find ourselves described in this commission as the persons with whom Mr Oswald is authorised to treat.

"Nations, particularly corporations, mercantile companies, and indeed every private citizen, in every country, have their titles, their styles, their firms, and their additions, which are necessary to their being known in the law; that is to say, the law of nations requires, that national acts shall give to every sovereign and nation its proper political name or style, in the same manner as the municipal law of the land will only take notice of corporations, companies, and even private citizens by their proper names and legal descriptions.

"When the United States became one of the nations of the earth, they published the style or name, by which they were to be known and called, and as on the one hand they became subject to the law of nations, so on the other they have a right to claim and enjoy its protection, and all the privileges it affords.

"Mr Oswald's commission is a formal, national act, and no nation not mentioned or properly described in it can consider him properly authorised to treat with them. Neither the United States of America, nor Commissioners appointed by _them_, are mentioned in it, and, therefore, we _as their servants_ can have no right to treat with him.

"We are apprised the word _Colonies_ or Plantations of New Hampshire, &c. in _North America_, convey to the reader a geographical idea of the country intended by the commission, and of the manner of its first settlement, but it conveys no political idea of it, except perhaps a very false one, viz. as dependent on the British Crown; for it is to be observed, that the words _Colonies or Plantations_ have constantly been used in British acts of Parliament, to describe those countries while they remained subject to that Crown, and the act holds up that idea in a strong point of light when it declares, _that it is essential to the interest, welfare, and prosperity of the Colonies or Plantations_ of New Hampshire, &c. that peace, &c. should be restored, &c. For as independent States our interests, welfare, and prosperity, were _improper objects for the Parliamentary discussion and provision of Great Britain_.

"The United States cannot be known, at least to their Commissioners, by any other than _their present, proper, political name_, for in determining whether Mr Oswald's commission be such as that we ought to treat with him under it, we must read it with the eyes, and decide upon it with the judgment of _American Ministers_, and not of private individuals.

"But admitting that the studied ambiguity of this commission leaves every reader at liberty to suppose, that we are or are not comprehended in it, nay supposing it to be the better construction, that we are, still in our opinion it would ill become the dignity of Congress to treat with Mr Oswald under it.

"It is evident, that the design of the commission was, if possible, to describe the United States, the Congress, and their Commissioners, by such circumlocutory, equivocal, and undeterminate words and appellations, as should with equal propriety apply to the Thirteen States considered as British Colonies and territories, or as independent States, to the end, that Great Britain might remain in a capacity to say, that they either had the one or the other meaning, as circumstances and convenience might in future dictate.

"As Congress have no doubts of their own independence, they cannot with propriety sanctify the doubts of others, and, therefore, cannot admit the sufficiency or decency of any commission that contains them.

"It being well known, that the United States have vested in Congress the exclusive right to make peace, this commission, by authorising Mr Oswald to treat with them _separately_, and even with parts of them, and with any person or persons whatsoever, offers such open and direct violence to the honor and prerogatives of Congress, as to be better calculated to excite their resentment than their acquiescence. Nor can we conceive it very decent in Great Britain to expect that Congress, after having so long firmly and uniformly maintained the rights of independence, should now consent to deviate from that character by negotiating with her for peace, in any other capacity than the one in which they have carried on the war with her.

"It seems agreed on all hands, that the commission does not acknowledge us to be independent, and though the King of Great Britain consents to make it the _first article_ of the proposed treaty, yet, as neither the first nor the last article of the treaty can be of validity till the conclusion of it, can it be reasonably expected, that we should consent to be viewed during all that interval as British subjects, there being no middle capacity or character between subjection and independence? Neither Congress nor their servants, if so inclined, have a right to suspend the independence of the United States for a single moment, nor can the States themselves adopt such a measure, while they remember the solemn manner in which they pledged to each other their lives, their fortunes, and their _sacred honor_, to support their independence.

"It gives us pleasure to find that these inferences and conclusions from the general nature and rights of independence, stand confirmed by the express acts and declarations of Congress on the subject, and in whatever view these acts may be regarded by others, they must be considered as authoritative by their servants.

"So early as the 17th of July, 1776, Congress resolved, 'that General Washington, in refusing to receive a letter said to be sent by Lord Howe, addressed to "George Washington, Esq." acted with a dignity becoming his station, and, therefore, that this Congress do highly approve the same, and _do direct_ that no letter or message be received on any occasion whatever from the enemy by the Commander in Chief, or others, the commanders of the American army, but such as shall be directed to them in the characters they respectively sustain.'

"We conceive that the reason of this resolution extends with at least equal force to _civil_ officers, and particularly to Commissioners appointed to treat of peace with Great Britain.

"On the 5th of September, 1776, Congress resolved, 'that General Sullivan be requested to inform Lord Howe, that this Congress, _being the representatives of the free and independent States of America_, cannot with propriety send any of its members to confer with his Lordship in their _private_ characters, but that ever desirous of establishing peace on reasonable terms, they will send a committee of their body to know whether he has any authority to treat with persons _authorised by them_ for that purpose in behalf of _America_, and what that authority is; and to hear such propositions as he shall think fit to make respecting the same; that the President write to General Washington and acquaint him, that it is the opinion of Congress, no proposals for making peace between Great Britain and the United States of America _ought to be received or attended to_, unless the same be made in writing, and addressed to the representatives of the said States in Congress, or _persons authorised by them_, and if application be made to him by any of the commanders of the British forces on that subject, that he inform them, that these United States, who entered into the war only for the defence of their lives and liberties, will cheerfully agree to peace on reasonable terms, _whenever such_ shall be proposed to them in MANNER AFORESAID.'

"These resolutions were passed at a time when the United States had formed no alliances, and when a formidable and hostile army had just arrived to invade their country. If such, therefore, were their sentiments, and such their resolutions at so early, so dangerous, and doubtful a period, there certainly is reason to presume, that the fortitude which influenced them has not been abated by the present aspect of their affairs.

"On the 22d of November, 1777, Congress resolved, 'that all proposals of a treaty between the King of Great Britain or any of his Commissioners and the United States, _inconsistent with the independence_ of the said States, or with such treaties or alliances as may be formed under their authority, _will be rejected by Congress_.'

"We cannot consider the present proposals to treat with us in a character _below independence to be consistent with it_.

"Among other objections _unanimously_ made by Congress, on the 22d of April, 1778, to certain bills of the British Parliament, then about to be passed into laws to enable the King of Great Britain to appoint Commissioners to treat, &c. is the following, viz.

'Because the said bill purports, that the Commissioners therein mentioned may treat with _private individuals_, a measure highly derogatory to _national honor_.'

"Mr Oswald's commission contains a similar clause, and, consequently, is liable to the same objection.

"The Congress did also, on the same day, _unanimously_ declare, 'that these United States cannot with propriety hold any conference or treaty _with any Commissioners_ on the part of Great Britain, unless they shall _as a preliminary thereto_, either withdraw their fleets and armies, or else _in positive and express terms acknowledge the independence of the said States_.' Neither of these alternatives have as yet been complied with.

"On the 6th of June, 1778, the Congress ordered their President to give an answer in the following words to the Commissioners appointed under the British acts of Parliament beforementioned, viz.

'My Lord,

'I have had the honor to lay your Lordship's letter of May the 27th, with the acts of the British Parliament enclosed, before Congress, and I am instructed to acquaint your Lordship, that they have already expressed their sentiments upon bills not essentially different from those acts, in a publication of the 22d of April last.

'Your Lordship may be assured, that when the King of Great Britain shall be seriously disposed to put an end to the unprovoked and cruel war waged against these United States, Congress will readily attend to such terms of peace as may consist with the _honor of independent nations_, the interest of their constituents, and the sacred regard they mean to pay to treaties.'

"The honor of an _independent nation_ forbids their treating in a _subordinate_ capacity.

"On the 17th of June, 1778, Congress in another letter to the same Commissioners, _unanimously_ join in saying;

'Nothing but an earnest desire to spare the further effusion of human blood could have induced them to read a paper containing expressions so disrespectful to his Most Christian Majesty, the good and great ally of these States, or to _consider_ propositions so derogatory to the honor of an independent nation.

'The acts of the British Parliament, the commission from your sovereign, and your letter, suppose the people of these States to be subjects of the Crown of Great Britain, and are founded on an _idea of dependence_, which is utterly _inadmissible_.

'I am further directed to inform your Excellencies, that Congress are inclined to peace, notwithstanding the unjust claims from which this war originated, and the savage manner in which it has been conducted. They will therefore be ready to enter _upon the consideration_ of a treaty of peace and commerce, not inconsistent with treaties already subsisting, _when_ the King of Great Britain shall demonstrate a sincere disposition for that purpose. The only solid proof of this disposition will be an explicit acknowledgment of the independence of these States, or the withdrawing his fleets and armies.'

"On the 11th of July, 1778, the British Commissioners again endeavored to prevail upon Congress to treat with them on the humiliating idea of dependence. And on the 18th day of the same month, Congress came to the following resolution, viz.

'Whereas Congress, in a letter to the British Commissioners of the 17th of June last, did declare that they would be ready to _enter into the consideration_ of a treaty of peace and commerce not inconsistent with treaties already subsisting, _when_ the King of Great Britain should demonstrate a sincere disposition for that purpose, and that the only solid proof of this disposition would be an _explicit acknowledgment of the independence_ of these States, or the withdrawing his fleets and armies; and whereas neither of these alternatives have been complied with, therefore resolved, that no answer be given to the letter of the 11th instant from the British Commissioners.'

"We find Congress still adhering to the same resolutions and principles, and in pursuance of them lately directing General Washington to refuse Sir Guy Carleton's request of a passport for one of his family to carry despatches from him to Congress. The late resolutions of the different States on that occasion show how exactly the sense of the people at large corresponds with that of their representatives in Congress on these important points.

"To our knowledge, there is not a single instance in which Congress have derogated from the practice and conduct of an independent nation. All their commissions, as well _civil_ as _military_, are and always have been in that style. They have treated with France and the States-General of the United Provinces, and those powers have treated with them on an equal footing. What right, therefore, can Britain have to demand, that we should treat in a different manner with her? Or with what propriety can we pay marks of respect and reverence to our enemies, which we never have paid to our friends; friends too, who are at least equal to her in power and consideration; nor can we forbear observing, that the second article of our treaty of alliance with his Most Christian Majesty declares, 'That the essential and direct end of the present defensive alliance is, to maintain effectually the _liberty, sovereignty, and independence, absolute and unlimited_, of the said United States, as well in matters of _government_ as of commerce.'

"Hence it appears, that not only the regard due to our own dignity, but also to the dignity of our great ally, and the faith of treaties, forbid our receding in the least from the rights of _that sovereignty and independence_, the support of which forms the _direct end_ of our alliance.

"But although the United States as an independent nation can regard Great Britain in no other light, than they would any other Kingdom or State with whom they may be at war, yet we can easily perceive that Great Britain has stronger objections than other nations can have to treating with us as _independent_. But these objections, however strong, are more proper subjects for their deliberations whom they affect, than for ours, whom they do not respect. Britain may amuse herself with, and therefore be embarrassed by doubts of our title to independence, but we have no such doubts, and therefore cannot be perplexed or influenced by them.

"Other nations owe their origin to causes similar to those which gave birth to ours, and it may not be useless to inquire how they conducted themselves under similar circumstances.

"The tyranny of Philip II of Spain made his subjects in the Low Countries declare themselves independent; a long and cruel war ensued, which was suspended by a truce for twelve years, and afterwards concluded by a definitive treaty of peace.

"History bears honorable testimony to the wisdom and fortitude of that nation during that interval, and we think the following detail is so interesting, and so applicable to the case of our country in general, and particularly to the point in question, that we cannot forbear requesting your Excellency to peruse it.

"On the 26th of July, 1581, the United Provinces, by a formal act, declared that Philip II had forfeited his right to the sovereignty of those Provinces, and that consequently they were independent.

"On the last of June, 1584, the King of France sent an Ambassador (le Sieur Pruneaul) to Holland, and he in writing represented to the States assembled at Delft, that his Majesty had understood that they desired to treat with him, and that he had thought proper to inform them, that they should let him know on what terms they proposed to do it, with many reasons to induce the Provinces to come into such treaty.

"Queen Elizabeth did nearly the same thing by her letter of the last of October, 1584, which she sent to her Ambassador _Davidson_.

"The Deputies of the States soon after, by their order, returned thanks to the Queen and informed her, that they had resolved to accept the King of France for Prince of the country in the same manner as Charles V had been, but on condition to retain their rights and privileges.

"On the 3d of January, 1585, the States despatched Deputies to make this offer to the King of France. Spain remonstrated against their being _admitted to an audience_, calling them rebels, &c.

"To this remonstrance the King of France gave an answer, which does the highest honor to his magnanimity.

"On the 13th of February, 1585, the deputies had an audience of the King, and afterwards of the Queen Mother.

"On the 8th of March, 1585, the King gave for answer to the Deputies, that he could not at present accept their offer nor assist them; complained greatly of the violence done him by the Spaniards and Guises, and desired them, to provide for their own defence, until such time as he should be in quiet with his own subjects, and promised to recommend them to the Queen of England.

"On the 6th of June, 1585, the States-General resolved to transfer the sovereignty to the Queen of England, on lawful and reasonable conditions, or to treat with her to take them under her protection, or to obtain more aid and assistance from her.

"On the 9th of July, 1585, they had an audience of the Queen at Greenwich, and offered to her the sovereignty, &c.

"The Queen declined to accept the sovereignty or undertake the perpetual protection of the United Provinces, but on the 10th of August, 1585, she entered into a formal treaty with them to afford aid, &c.

"On the 16th of October, 1587, the States made a declaration to their Governor Leicester on the subject of some differences between them, in which they say, 'And as by divers acts, and particularly by a certain letter, which he wrote on the 10th of July to his secretary Junius, (as is said) the authority of these States is drawn into doubt; they think it proper to make a more ample declaration, containing a deduction of the rights of the States, which they are bound by oath to maintain. _For in case they had not been well founded in the sovereignty of the Provinces, they could not have deposed the King of Spain, nor have defended themselves against his power. Nor would they have been able to treat with their Majesties of France and England_, nor to have transferred the government to your Excellency,' &c. &c.

"On the 3d of September, 1587, the Earl of Leicester by order of the Queen intimated to them the propriety of negotiating for peace, for it seems the King of Denmark had privately sounded the King of Spain on that subject.

"The States answered, 'That they had never given any such commission to the King of Denmark, nor ever thought of it; but on the contrary, they had observed to the Earl of Leicester, in the year 1586, on his leaving Holland, and on his speaking to them about making peace, that there was _nothing so dangerous and injurious in their condition as to speak or treat of peace_, and that it was one of the _old finesses of Spain_; that neither a long war, the damages suffered, nor force, nor the unexpected deaths of their chiefs had been able to hinder their doing their duty, nor make them recede one step from that foundation of constancy on which they were fixed; but that seeing the honorable weapons which were left them, viz. firmness and resolution, they were sufficiently powerful to surmount their difficulties, in the same manner as the virtue of the Romans had made them triumph over Carthage.' They also reminded the Earl, that by pretext of treating of peace on a former occasion, they had lost Artois, Hainault, and other countries. That the treaties at Ghent and Bruges, which were prior to their independence, had cost the lives of more than a hundred thousand persons; that negligence and false security were always the consequences of such negotiations.

"On the 30th of October, 1588, the Queen again proposed their entering into negotiations for peace, and they again refused.

"In 1590 and 1591, the Emperor endeavored to persuade the United Provinces to enter into negotiations by the mediation of his good offices for a _reconciliation_ with the King of Spain. And on the 7th of April, 1592, they gave a formal answer to the Emperor, containing their reasons for declining his proposal; on this occasion they struck a medal representing a Spaniard offering peace to a Zealander, who points to a snake in the grass, with these words, '_latet anguis in herba_.'

"On the 6th of May, 1594, the Archduke of Austria sent a letter to the States on the same subject, and received the like answer, accompanied with a full state of their reasons for it.

"In the same year the United Provinces sent Ambassadors to Denmark, and received others from King James of Scotland, who desired them to send some persons on their behalf to assist at the baptism of his son, and to renew ancient treaties, &c.

"On the 31st of October, 1596, the King of France entered into a treaty of alliance with the United Provinces against Spain.

"On the 9th of August, 1597, the Emperor by his Ambassador, then at the Hague, proposed to the States to treat of peace. They refused, _alleging that they had been lawfully separated from the dominion of the King of Spain, and had formed alliances with England, France, &c._

"On the 15th of October, 1597, Ambassadors from the King of Denmark arrived at the Hague, among other things to dispose the States to peace. On the 24th of October, the States gave them a long answer, recapitulating their reasons for refusing to negotiate.

"On the 2d of November, 1597, the King of France, having been offered advantageous terms of peace by Spain, hinted his pacific inclinations to the States. They earnestly dissuaded him from making either _peace_ or _truce_. The King nevertheless began to treat under the mediation of the Pope, &c.

"The States sent Ambassadors to France with instructions dated 13th of January, 1598, to dissuade the King from peace, and to take measures with France against Spain for the ensuing campaign.

"On the 2d of May, 1598, peace was concluded between France and Spain, at Vervins.

"In treating of the articles of this peace, the Deputies of France declared, that they could not proceed to conclude it unless the Queen of England and the United Provinces, who were allied with his Christian Majesty, were received and admitted to the treaty. To which the Deputies of the King of Spain answered, that from the commencement of the conferences, they had declared that _they were ready and content_ to receive and treat with the Deputies of the said Queen and Provinces, and that they had resided long enough in that place to give them time to come there if they had been so pleased; and it was concluded and agreed, that if in six months the Deputies of the said Queen and United Provinces should come with sufficient powers, and declare themselves willing to treat of peace, they should there be received, and for that purpose the Deputies of the King of Spain should be at Vervins, or such other place as by common consent of parties should be agreed upon; and at the instance of the Deputies of his Christian Majesty, it was further agreed, that there should be a cessation of arms and hostilities between his Catholic Majesty, the Queen of England, and the United Provinces for two months, to be computed from the day on which the said Queen and Provinces should inform the Archduke of Austria, that they accepted the said cessation, &c.

"On the 6th of May, 1598, the King of Spain conveyed the Low Countries and Burgundy to his daughter Isabella Clara Eugenia on certain conditions, the first of which was to marry Albert, the Archduke of Austria.

"On the 29th of June, 1598, the Queen of England, by her Ambassador Sir Francis Veer, addressed the States on the subject of the late peace between France and Spain, and left it to _their choice_ to accede or continue the war. They resolved not to treat of peace.

"The Archduke expressed his astonishment, that the Queen should assist his _rebellious subjects_, on which she desired the King of France to tell him, that alliances with the States of the Low Countries was not a new thing; that they had not _recognised him_ for their sovereign, and that though she respected him as the brother of the Emperor and Archduke of Austria, yet as the Lieutenant of the King of Spain she held him as an enemy.

"On the 16th of August, 1598, the Queen of England entered into a new convention with the United Provinces, confirming the treaty of 1585, with certain other stipulations.

"On the 28th of August, 1598, the Archduke wrote a letter to the States-General, to persuade them to accept him for their sovereign. To this letter they resolved _not to give any answer_.

"On the 13th of September, 1598, Philip II, King of Spain, died. In the year 1599, the Emperor again commissioned Ambassadors to persuade the United Provinces to treat of peace, &c. The States, in their answer of the 2d of December, 1599, refuse to treat, because among other reasons, 'the insolence of the Archduke and Infanta was such that although they knew very well that they could claim no right to the said United Provinces under the beforementioned donation, or by any other title, yet so it was, that by placards, by public and notorious libels, and by indecent and unjust acts, which they could never excuse, they held them for rebels.'

"On the 7th of June, 1600, the States, in their answer to another application to the Emperor, say among other things that the Archduke had 'treated the inhabitants barbarously, proclaiming those to _be rebels who had nothing to do with him_, and that well considering all these things, they had good reason to judge, that it would neither be consistent with their honor nor their interest to acknowledge the Archduke, or treat either with him or with Spain.'

"On the 3d of April, 1602, the Queen of England died.

"On the accession of James, the Archduke immediately sent Nicholas Schossy to sound the King on the subject of peace, and the next year sent Count Arembergh there for the same purpose. King James sent Rudolph Winwood to inform the States, that the Archduke had proposed to him to treat of peace, but that he would do nothing till he had informed them of it, and should be advised of their inclinations.

"On the 30th of July, 1603, the Kings of France and England concluded a treaty of confederation, principally for the defence of the United Provinces against the King of Spain. This treaty was secret.

"In May, 1604, conferences for a peace were opened at London between the Deputies of Spain and the Archduke on the one part, and those of England on the other.

"The Spaniards requested the King to mediate a peace between the Archduke and the United Provinces _on reasonable and equal terms_. The English answered, that it was not their business, and that they could treat together, without saying anything of the United Provinces.

"On the 28th of August, 1604, peace was concluded between Spain and the Archduke on the one part, and England on the other.

"On the last of May, 1605, the States, in answer to the propositions for peace made by the Emperor, Electors, Princes, and States of the empire say, 'that they had been legally discharged from their oaths to the late King of Spain; insomuch that all impartial Kings, Princes, and States did at present acknowledge and hold the Low Countries for a _free State_, qualified of right to govern itself in form of a republic, or to choose another Prince.

'That as to what they had been advised, viz. to enter into any treaty, contrary to the free government right, which they had obtained, and which they still enjoyed, they considered it as _contrary to God, their honor, and their safety_.'

"About the end of February, 1607, there came from Brussels to Holland, as Deputy from the Archduke, the Commissary-General of the minor brothers, whose father had formerly been well acquainted with the Prince of Orange.

"He came to learn the reasons, which had prevented the propositions of the Sieur Horst from being successful. After speaking often in private with Prince Maurice, he came to the Hague, where he also had an audience of Prince Maurice, to whom he said, that it was not the intention of his Highness _either to better or to lessen his right by any treaty of truce, but to treat with the States in the state in which they were_. And on being given to understand, that the Archduke _must acknowledge the State for a free State before they would enter into any treaty_, he undertook to bring the Archduke to consent to it, in order to avoid the effusion of blood. On the 9th, he went in Prince Maurice's boat to Antwerp, and returned on the 17th of March to the Hague, and did so much, that both parties finally agreed to come to some mutual treaty, agreeable to the conditions of the following Declaration, viz.

'The Archdukes have found it proper to make the following declaration, offer, and presentation _to the States-General of the United Provinces of the Low Countries_.

'That the Archdukes having nothing more at heart than to see the Low Countries and the inhabitants thereof delivered from the miseries of war, declare, by these presents, and with mature deliberation, that they are content to treat with the States-General of the United Provinces, in quality, and as holding them _for free Countries, Provinces, and States, to which their Highnesses pretend nothing_, either by way perpetual peace, or truce, or cessation of arms for twelve, fifteen, or twenty years, at the election of the said States, and on reasonable conditions;' then follow certain propositions for a truce, &c. and afterwards a condition, 'That the States agree to the aforesaid provisional truce in eight days after the delivery of these presents, and shall make a declaration to their Highnesses in writing, before the 1st of September next ensuing, touching the principal treaty aforesaid of truce or cessation of arms, with the time and place which they may have chosen. Done at Brussels, under the signatures and the seal of their Highnesses, the 13th of March, 1607.'

"To this declaration and offer, the States answered, 'That the States-General in quality of, and as free States, Countries, and Provinces, over which their Highnesses have nothing to pretend, and being equally desirous of nothing more than to consent to a Christian, honorable, and sure issue to, and deliverance from the miseries of this war, after mature deliberation, and with the advice of his Excellency, and of the Council of State, _have accepted_ the said declaration of the Archdukes _to regard their United Provinces as free Countries, to which their Highnesses have nothing to pretend_, and also a truce for eight months, &c. &c. Their Highnesses further promising to obtain and deliver to the said States-General within three months next ensuing, the agreement of the King of Spain touching the treaty, under all the necessary renunciations and obligations, as well general as special.'

"On the last of June, 1607, the King of Spain ratified the truce, but _omitted an acknowledgment of their independence_.

"The States-General, on the 9th and 11th of August, 'declared these ratifications to be imperfect both in substance and in form.' The Archduke promised to procure a more complete one.

"On the 18th of September, 1607, the King of Spain made a new ratification _containing the acknowledgment in question_, but declaring that the said ratification should be void, unless the peace or truce in contemplation should take place.

"To this condition the States made strong objections.

"On the 2d of November, 1607, the States made various remarks on the ratification. They _absolutely refused to accept, and protested against the condition_ contained in it, but offered to proceed on the footing of the declaration, _provided_ the States should be firmly assured that nothing would be proposed either on the part of the Archduke or of the King _contrary to the same_, or prejudicial to the State or government of the United Provinces, and provided also, that the Archduke did send his Deputies to the Hague fully authorised, &c. within ten days after the receipt of that answer.

"On the 10th of November, the States-General adjourned to take the sense of their constituents on the subject of the ratification, and agreed to meet again on the 10th of December.

"On the 24th of December, 1607, they wrote to the Archduke, that under the _protest and declaration_ contained in the answer of the 2d of November, they were content to enter into conferences with his Deputies at the Hague, and proposed to prolong the truce a month or six weeks.

"On the 7th of January, the answer of the Archduke arrived, in which he calls the States, '_tres chers et bons amis_.' He observed, that he had learnt from their letter of the 24th of December, the resolution they had taken to enter into conferences with his Deputies about peace, and, in the meantime, to prolong the truce for a month or six weeks.

"That as to the first point, he had appointed for the said conferences the same persons whom he had before employed, and that they should set out the 15th of January, and that as to the truce, he was content to prolong it for six weeks.

"On the 6th of February, 1608, the Deputies of the States, and those of the Archduke, had their first meeting to exhibit their respective credentials. The Deputies of the Archduke produced two, one from him, and the other from the King of Spain.

"On the 8th of February, 1608, the Deputies of both parties had their second meeting. Those of the States asked the others if they were fully instructed (_encharges_) _to acknowledge the United Provinces to be free Provinces and countries, and to treat with them in that capacity_, to which they explicitly (_rondement_) answered, _yes_. The Dutch Deputies thereupon asked, why then the Archduke retained the arms and name of the said Provinces? They then replied, that it ought not to seem strange, for that the King of Spain retained the title of King of Jerusalem; the King of France that of King of Navarre, and the King of England retained the arms and title of France.

"On the 11th of February, 1608, they met again; the Deputies of the States presented to the others an article, which they had drawn up, by which the 'Provinces were declared to be free, and that the King of Spain and the Archdukes relinquished all their pretensions to the sovereignty of the said Provinces, &c. as well for themselves as for their successors and heirs, _with the name and arms_.'

"The others received the article and took time to consider of it, on which the meeting was adjourned. They immediately despatched a courier with a copy of it to Brussels, and received an answer on the 13th. They complained, however, to the Ambassadors of France and Great Britain, &c. of the States being _so precise_ in that article.

"On the 13th of February, 1608, in the afternoon, the Deputies again assembled, and those of the Archduke _consented to the article as it was drawn up_, with reserve, nevertheless, that in case all the other points should be agreed upon, _they hoped_ the States would do something for the King of Spain and the Archduke respecting the Indies, &c.

"On the 15th of February they again met; they agreed on the points of amnesty and oblivion; but on treating of reciprocal free trade and navigation to each other's ports and countries, the Deputies of the Archduke declared, that they did not mean to comprehend in that free trade, _the navigation to the Indies_ and all the fortresses there, but, on the contrary, that all the subjects of these countries should _forthwith desist therefrom_. The Dutch Deputies opposed _this strongly and firmly_, saying, that it would prejudice the liberty of the Provinces and _the free use of the sea_, and, therefore, that they were not authorised to relinquish it. The others continued firm in their demand, and after long debates the Deputies separated.

"On the 19th, 23d, and 27th of February, and 4th of March, 1608, the Deputies met, but, except debating, did nothing, both parties continuing firm and resolved not to cede anything.

"The Deputies of Spain, finding they could not carry the point as to the Indies, declared, at length, that they would consult together on a proposition to make a truce for some years respecting the navigation, and that they were ready to go on to the other points, and try to agree upon some of them.

"On the 7th of March, they exchanged heads of articles for consideration. On the 11th and 12th of March they again met, and had fruitless debates about a _free navigation to the Indies, &c._ The Marquis Spinola proposed that the subject should be divided, and that two sets of propositions should be prepared, one for the navigation in Europe and the other for the Indies.

"On the 17th of March they again met, and the Dutch Deputies offered to the others two sets of propositions as had been proposed; they received them for consideration; but, after debate, they declared that they could not agree to them, and that they must make a journey to Spain for further instructions; for this reason the truce was prolonged to the end of May.

"The truce was continued from time to time, and sundry fruitless meetings held; but, on the 20th of August, 1608, the Deputies assembled; 'the Spanish ones declared, that they had lately received full instructions on the several points in question, viz. _that the King and Archduke were content to quit the sovereignty of the United Provinces_; but that he required two points to be yielded by the States by way of compensation, viz. the re-establishment of the Roman Catholic religion in every place in the Provinces, and that they should immediately _desist from all navigation both to the East and West Indies_.'

"The Dutch Deputies reported this to the States-General. On the 25th of August, the States-General made a long and spirited declaration on the subject of this report, resolving against negotiating any longer, and they ordered a copy of it to be delivered to the Spanish Deputies.

"On the 27th of August 1608, the Ambassadors of France and England, &c. came to the States-General and endeavored to prevail upon them to agree to a long truce.

"On the 30th of August, the States expressed their readiness to agree to a long truce, provided, the adverse party 'would _so absolutely acknowledge them for free countries, as that it should not be questioned after the expiration of the truce_, that otherwise they could not listen to a truce.'

"On the 3d of September, the Spanish Deputies said they had no instructions to treat of truce, in acknowledging the United Provinces to be absolutely free, and _permitting the navigation to the Indies_, but that they had sent the proposition to Brussels, in order to have further instructions.

"On the 7th of September, they received an answer from Brussels, and they declared, that they had no instruction to agree to a long truce with the States, on condition to acknowledge them to be States absolutely free, and without comprehending the re-establishment of the Roman religion, and the relinquishment of _all navigation to the Indies_, but that the Archduke would send the proposition to Spain, from whence he might expect an answer by the end of September.

"They then proposed either to wait for the answer of Spain, or continue the present truce for seven years, observing, that it had been made with an express declaration to hold the United Provinces for free countries, and that as to the trade to the Indies, the Archduke would promise to _get it ratified by the King of Spain for that space of time_.

"The States unanimously rejected this new proposition, but gave them the time they had demanded for the answer of Spain. On the 28th of September, the Spanish Deputies applied to the Ambassadors of France, &c. to ask ten days more from the States. The Ambassadors agreed to do it _in the name of the Deputies_, but they declined it.

"On the last of September they took their leave.

"The States-General became possessed by accident of the instructions given to Spinola, and the other Deputies; they were signed by the Archdukes, and dated at Brussels, the 6th of January, 1608. They were thereby instructed to insist on the free exercise of the Roman Catholic religion.

"As to independence the instructions say;

'As to the subject of liberty, since you know what we have granted, make no difficulty of arranging it as they wish; doing or saying nothing in opposition, which may make them suspect that we desire to revoke our declaration on that point, as we are determined to abide by it in all respects.'

"These instructions also directed them to insist, that the States should renounce, and entirely and absolutely desist from the trade of the East and West Indies, and should agree to punish those who might undertake such voyages, &c. &c.

"On the departure of the Spanish Deputies, the Ambassadors of France and Great Britain endeavored to prevail upon the States-General to listen to a truce, and proposed to their consideration certain articles, which they had prepared. The States after much deliberation, agreed to enter into further negotiations on that subject.

"On the 25th of March, 1609, the Deputies of both parties met at Antwerp, and on the 9th of April following, a truce for twelve years was concluded upon. It was forthwith ratified by the States and the Archdukes, and published on the 14th of April.

"On the 7th of July, 1609, at Segovia, the King of Spain explicitly and without reserve ratified this truce, viz.

'His Majesty having seen the contents of the articles of truce and capitulation, which his dear and well beloved brothers, the Archdukes Albert and Isabella Clara Eugene have sent him, concerning the truce granted in the name of his Majesty, by his representative, and in that of their Highnesses by themselves, to the States-General of the United Provinces of the low countries, and having maturely considered it, declares that he applauds, approves, confirms, and ratifies the said truce, in so much as concerns him, &c.'

"The first article of this truce was in the words following.

'First, the abovementioned Archdukes declare, in their own name and in that of the King, that they are content to treat with the said States-General of the United Provinces, in the character of, and holding them for a free country, estates, and provinces, over which they have no claims, and to make a truce with them in the name and under the character above described; and this they do on the conditions hereinafter described and declared by these presents.'

"On the 30th of January, 1648, a treaty of peace was concluded between Spain and the United Provinces.

"The full powers or commission given by the King of Spain to his plenipotentiaries for making this peace, were dated near two years before, viz. 7th of June, 1646, and they show clearly, that he negotiated with those Provinces as with independent States, on that occasion.

"The tenor of this commission is very different from that of Mr Oswald. The following is an extract from it.

'All the powers, which are concerned in this war, having by common consent chosen the city of Munster as a place for holding the Congress and negotiations for the peace aforesaid; we have thought proper to name plenipotentiaries there to treat with the States of the free Provinces of the low countries, or with their Ambassadors and plenipotentiaries, authorised and deputed for this purpose, &c.'

"From this detail it appears, that the Dutch ever after their declaration of independence, in July, 1581, uniformly treated with the neighboring nations on an _equal footing_, and also that they constantly and firmly refused to negotiate either for truce or peace with Spain, until she consented to treat with them in _like manner_.

"We forbear engaging your Excellency's time and attention by the application of these facts and conclusions, to the case of our country. We are persuaded, that the similarity between the two will not escape your discernment, and that we shall not be thought singular in our opinion, that the example of the United Provinces merits at least in these respects the imitation as well as the approbation of the United States of America.

"But, Sir, we not only think it inconsistent with the dignity of the United States to treat with Britain in the humiliating manner proposed, but also that it would be repugnant to their interest.

"The respect of other nations is undoubtedly of importance to America; but, Sir, if she ceases to respect herself, how can she expect to respected by others?

"America has taken and published noble and manly resolutions to support her independence, at every hazard. She has hitherto done it, and would it be for her interest to quit the ground for which she has lost so much of her blood, merely to accommodate herself to the high-blown pride of an enemy? Sir, the very proposition carries with it insult, and therefore bears strong marks of _insincerity_.

"But suppose that the United States should descend from their present ground of equality, in order to treat with Mr Oswald, and that our negotiations should be _fruitless_. In what an awkward situation should we then be? We should find ourselves betrayed by our too great pliancy, and our too great desire of peace, to the ridicule of our enemies, the contempt of other nations, and the censure of our own minds. What a page would this make in history.

"As to Mr Oswald's offer to make an acknowledgment of our independence the first article of our treaty, and your Excellency's remark, that it is sufficient, and that _we are not to expect the effect before the cause_, permit us to observe, that by the _cause_, we suppose, is intended the _treaty_, and by the _effect_, an acknowledgment of our independence. We are sorry to differ from your Excellency, but, really, Sir, we cannot consider an acknowledgment of our independence as a subject to be treated about; for while we feel ourselves to be independent in fact, and know ourselves to be so of right, we can see but one cause from whence an acknowledgment of it can flow as an effect, viz. _the existence and truth of the fact_. This cause has long existed and still exists, and, therefore, we have a right to expect that Great Britain will treat with us being what we are, and not as what we are not. To treat about this matter, would be to suppose that our independence was incomplete until they pronounced it to be complete. But we hold it to be complete already, and that as it never did, so it never will, or must depend in the least degree, on their will and pleasure. To us there appears to be a wide distinction between their acknowledging the United States to be independent, and their renouncing their pretended, though troublesome claims; the former being a pre-existing fact, cannot depend upon, and, therefore, is not a proper subject for a treaty; but to renounce or not to renounce a claim, whether good or bad, depends on the will of him who makes and prosecutes it; and, therefore, like other matters of interest and convenience, is a proper subject for bargains and agreements between those who trouble their neighbors with such claims, and their neighbors who are troubled by them; and who, for peace sake, may choose to continue the law-suit, unless their future quiet is secured by a quit claim."

I think it was on the 24th of September, that I was informed of the intention of the British Court to give Mr Oswald such a new commission as had been recommended.

On the 26th of September, I went to pay a visit to the Count de Vergennes, at Versailles. I found the Marquis de Lafayette in the ante-chamber, and the Ambassador of Spain shortly after entered. After some common conversation, the Ambassador asked me when we should proceed to do business. I told him as soon as he should do me the honor of communicating his powers to treat. He asked me whether the Count de Florida Blanca had not informed me of his being authorised. I admitted that he had, but observed, that the usual mode of doing business, rendered it proper that we should exchange certified copies of our respective commissions. He said that could not be expected in our case; for that Spain had not yet acknowledged our independence. I replied, that we had declined it, and that France, Holland, and Britain, had acknowledged it. Here the Marquis de Lafayette took up the subject, and it continued between him and the Ambassador, till the Count de Vergennes came in. The Marquis told the Ambassador among other things, that it would not be consistent with the dignity of France, for her ally to treat otherwise than as independent. This remark appeared to me to pique the Count d'Aranda not a little.

The Count de Vergennes, on coming in, finding the conversation earnest, inquired whether we could not agree. The Ambassador stated my objections. The Count said I certainly ought to treat with the _Ambassador_, and that it was proper we should make a treaty with Spain in the same manner that we had done with France. I told him, I desired nothing more; and that the commission to M. Gerard, and the reason assigned by this Court to the King of Great Britain for entering into alliance with us, pointed out both the manner and the principles, which were observed and admitted on that occasion. The Count did not seem pleased with my allusion to the communication made of our alliance to England. He observed, that Spain did not deny our independence, and he could perceive no good reason for my declining to confer with the Ambassador about a treaty, without saying anything about our independence, an acknowledgment of which would naturally be the effect of the treaty proposed to be formed. I told the Count, that being independent, we should always insist on being treated as such, and, therefore, it was not sufficient for Spain to forbear denying our independence while she declined to admit it, and that notwithstanding my respect for the Ambassador, and my desire of a treaty with Spain, both the terms of my commission and the dignity of America forbid my treating on any other than an _equal footing_.

The Count carried the Ambassador into his cabinet, and when he retired, I was admitted.

The Count commenced the conversation, by explaining the reason of sending M. Rayneval to England, which he said was, that by conversing with Lord Shelburne about peace and matters connected with it, he might be able to judge whether a pacific disposition really prevailed in the British Court, and, therefore, whether any dependence might be placed in his Lordship's professions on that head; that he was satisfied with M. Rayneval's report, and that he believed that Lord Shelburne was sincerely desirous of peace.

A few words then passed about Mr Oswald's new commission; the Count observing in general terms, that as it removed our former objections, we might now go on to prepare our preliminaries.

The conversation next turned to our negotiation with Spain, and to her claims east of the Mississippi. Nothing new passed on the first topic; as to the latter, the Count made only some very general remarks, such as that he hoped we should, on conferring further about the matter, approach nearer to each other; that those limits ought to be settled, and while they remained in contest, a treaty with Spain could not reasonably be expected; that as soon as we should agree upon those points, Count d'Aranda would have a further or more formal commission to conclude the treaty, &c.

I remarked, that these claims of Spain were of recent date, for that on my first arriving in Spain, the Count de Florida Blanca told me, that the success of my mission would probably turn upon one single point, viz. the cession of our rights to the navigation of the river Mississippi; from which, as well as from their subsequent and uniform demands on that head, it was evident, that they then considered that river as our boundary; for it would have been very strange indeed, that they should insist on our forbearing to navigate a river, whose waters washed no part of our country, and to which we could not, of consequence, have any pretence of claim.

The Count smiled, but avoided making any direct reply; he hoped we should, nevertheless, agree, and that we must endeavor to approach and meet each other. I told him I could not flatter myself with such expectations, while Spain continued her claims to those countries, for that we should be content with no boundary short of the Mississippi.

I went from the Count's to M. Rayneval's chamber, for I had not seen him since his return from England. He gave me the same reason for his journey, which I had just received from the Count. We then talked of his memoir and the Spanish negotiation. He said much in favor of the conciliatory line he had proposed, and of the advantages of placing the Indian nations on the _west_ side of it, under the _protection_ of Spain, and those on the _east_, under that of the United States; that the rights of those nations would be thereby secured, and future disputes between us and Spain avoided. I replied, that so far as our claims might affect those Indian nations, it was a matter solely between us and them; and that admitting them to be independent, they certainly had a right to choose their own protectors; and, therefore, that we could have no right, without their knowledge or consent, to choose for them. I also made the same remark to him respecting the recency of these Spanish claims, which I had just before done to Count de Vergennes. He said it was a subject which Count de Florida Blanca had not understood, and imputed their former ideas of our extending to the Mississippi, to their ignorance respecting those matters; hence it became evident, from whom they had borrowed their present ideas.

On the 27th of September, Mr Vaughan returned here from England with the courier that brought Mr Oswald's new commission, and very happy were we to see it. Copies of it have already been sent to you, so that I will not lengthen this letter by inserting it here; nor will I add anything further on this head at present, than to assure you, that Mr Vaughan greatly merits our acknowledgments.

The next thing to be done, was to prepare and draw up the proposed articles. They were soon completed and settled between us and Mr Oswald, by whom they were sent to his Court, with letters declaring his opinion, that they ought to be accepted and agreed to; but they differed with him in opinion.[6]

These articles, for very obvious reasons, were not communicated to the Count de Vergennes.

Mr Oswald did not receive any opinion from his Court relating to our articles until the 23d of October, when letters from the Minister informed him, that the extent of our boundaries, and the situation of the tories, &c. caused some objections, and the Minister's Secretary was on the way here to confer with us on those subjects.

On the 24th of October, I dined at Passy with Dr Franklin, where I found M. Rayneval. After dinner, we were in private with him a considerable time. He desired to know the state of our negotiation with Mr Oswald. We told him, that difficulties had arisen about our boundaries, and that one of the Minister's Secretaries was coming here with papers and documents on that subject. He asked us what boundaries we claimed. We told him, the river St John to the east, and ancient Canada, as described in the proclamation, to the north. He contested our right to such an extent to the north, and entered into several arguments to show our claim to be ill founded. These arguments were chiefly drawn from the ancient French claims, and from a clause in the proclamation restraining governors from making grants in the Indian country, &c.

He inquired what we demanded as to the fisheries. We answered, that we insisted on enjoying a right in common to them with Great Britain. He intimated that our views should not extend further than a coast fishery, and insinuated that pains had lately been taken in the eastern States to excite their apprehensions, and increase their demands on that head. We told him that such a right was essential to us, and that our people would not be content to make peace without it; and Dr Franklin explained very fully, their great importance to the eastern States in particular. He then softened his manner and observed, that it was natural for France to wish better to us than to England; but as the fisheries were a great nursery for seamen, we might suppose that England would be disinclined to admit others to share in it, and that for his part he wished there might be as few obstacles to a peace as possible. He reminded us, also, that Mr Oswald's new commission had been issued posterior to his arrival at London.

On the 26th of October, Mr Adams arrived here, and in him I have found a very able and agreeable coadjutor.

When I began this letter, I did not flatter myself with being able to write this much before Captain Barney would leave us; and I now find myself too much exhausted to proceed with further details, and must therefore refer you to the letters you will receive from Mr Adams and Dr Franklin.

The same reason also prevents my writing to you and Mr Morris on other subjects by Captain Barney, and I hope the length of this letter, and the disagreeable state of my health will apologise for my not writing even to my own family by this opportunity.

I am sensible of the impression which this letter will make upon you and upon Congress, and how it will affect the confidence they have in this Court. These are critical times, and great necessity there is for prudence and secrecy.

So far, and in such matters as this Court may think it their interest to support us, they certainly will, but no further, in my opinion.

They are interested in separating us from Great Britain, and, on that point we may, I believe, depend upon them; but it is not their interest that we should become a great and formidable people, and therefore they will not help us to become so.

It is not their interest that such a treaty should be formed between us and Britain, as would produce cordiality and mutual confidence. They will, therefore, endeavor to plant such seeds of jealousy, discontent, and discord in it as may naturally and perpetually keep our eyes fixed on France for security. This consideration must induce them to wish to render Britain formidable in our neighborhood, and to leave us as few resources of wealth and power as possible.

It is their interest to keep some point or other in contest between us and Britain to the end of the war, to prevent the possibility of our sooner agreeing, and thereby keep us employed in the war, and dependent on them for supplies. Hence they have favored, and will continue to favor, the British demands as to matters of boundary and the tories.

The same views will render them desirous to continue the war in our country as long as possible, nor do I believe they will take any measures for our repossession of New York, unless the certainty of its evacuation should render such an attempt advisable. The Count de Vergennes lately said, that there could be no great use in expeditions to take places, which must be given up to us at a peace.

Such being our situation, it appears to me advisable to keep up our army to the end of the war, even if the enemy should evacuate our country; nor does it appear to me prudent to listen to any overtures for carrying a part of it to the West Indies, in case of such an event.

I think we have no rational dependence except on God and ourselves, nor can I yet be persuaded that Great Britain has either wisdom, virtue, or magnanimity enough to adopt a perfect and liberal system of conciliation. If they again thought they could conquer us, they would again attempt it.

We are, nevertheless, thank God, in a better situation than we have been. As our independence is acknowledged by Britain, every obstacle to our forming treaties with neutral powers, and receiving their merchant ships, is at an end, so that we may carry on the war with greater advantage than before, in case our negotiations for peace should be fruitless.

It is not my meaning, and therefore I hope I shall not be understood to mean, that we should deviate in the least from our treaty with France; our honor, and our interest are concerned in inviolably adhering to it. I mean only to say, that if we lean on her love of liberty, her affection for America, or her disinterested magnanimity, we shall lean on a broken reed, that will sooner or later pierce our hands, and Geneva as well as Corsica justifies this observation.

I have written many disagreeable things in this letter, but I thought it my duty. I have also deviated from my instructions, which though not to be justified, will, I hope, be excused on account of the singular and unforeseen circumstances which occasioned it.

Let me again recommend secrecy, and believe me to be, Dear Sir, &c.

JOHN JAY.

_P. S._ I have neither seen nor heard anything of Mr Laurens, nor of the cypher you mention to have sent by him.

FOOTNOTES:

[3] Afterwards Sir William Jones.

[4] See this warrant in the Correspondence of the Commissioners for making Peace, under the date here mentioned.

[5] When the Treaty was made with France, M. Gerard, who negotiated it on the part of the French Court, did not show his commission to treat till the Commissioners met him for the last time, and just before the signing of the Treaty. Mr Jay was more particular, however, on this point, and seemed disinclined to commence the negotiation in any form, till the powers had been exchanged.

[6] See these articles in the Correspondence of the Commissioners for Peace.

* * * * *

_Observations on the above Letter by the Editor._

Although in the present work I have carefully refrained from expressing any opinions on the contents of the letters, or views of the writers, not feeling authorised by the resolution of Congress, under which these papers are published, to assume the task of a commentator or critic, yet in regard to the preceding letter I cannot hesitate to make an exception to this rule, and for reasons which I trust will appear obvious and satisfactory.

On the main topics of the above letter, I have read in the office of Foreign Affairs in London the confidential correspondence of the British Ministers with their Commissioners for negotiating peace in Paris. I have also read in the French office of Foreign Affairs the entire correspondence of the Count de Vergennes, during the whole war, with the French Ministers in this country, developing the policy and designs of the French Court in regard to the war, and the objects to be attained by the peace. I have moreover read the instructions of the Count de Vergennes to M. de Rayneval, when he went to London, and the correspondence which passed between them while he remained there, containing notes of conversations with Lord Shelburne on one part, and Count de Vergennes' opinions on the other. After examining the subject with all the care and accuracy, which these means of information have enabled me to give to it, I am prepared to express my belief most fully, that Mr Jay was mistaken both in regard to the aims of the French Court, and the plans pursued by them to gain their supposed ends.

1. Mr Jay conceived, that one motive of M. de Rayneval's journey was to cause the acknowledgment of independence by Great Britain to be deferred, till France and England should have arranged their treaty. But in reality, M. de Rayneval was instructed to insist on the independence of the United States as a _preliminary measure_. In a letter to the Count de Vergennes, dated September 28th, 1782, he writes, that Lord Shelburne said, "he had always been opposed to independence, but that he perceived the necessity of ceding it, and that this object should be granted _without condition_." And in reporting the result of his conversations with the British Minister, M. de Rayneval states the points discussed in their order, the first of which is as follows.--"_Independence, this article is agreed upon; it shall be without restriction_;" (il sera sans restriction.) So far from recommending, therefore, to defer the recognition of American independence, M. de Rayneval insisted on an agreement to it as _a preliminary step_ to further discussions.

2. Mr Jay supposed again, that another purpose of M. de Rayneval's visit to London was to interfere with the claims of the United States respecting the fisheries and boundaries. But this supposition is contradicted by the following extract from his instructions, viz. "As it is possible, that the English Ministers may speak to M. de Rayneval concerning the affairs of America and of the United Provinces, he will declare, _that he has no authority to treat on these topics_." Accordingly we find him writing to the Count de Vergennes in the letter quoted above, that after discussing the subject of the fisheries with reference to the interests of England and France, Lord Shelburne said to him, "without doubt the Americans will also form pretensions to the fisheries, but he trusted the king (of France) would not sustain them." To which M. de Rayneval replied,--"that he was ignorant of the views of Congress concerning the object in question, but thought he might venture to say, that the king would never support unjust demands; that he was not able to judge whether those of the Americans were such or not; and that, besides, _he was without authority in this respect_." Again, in the same letter, M. de Rayneval adds; "Lord Shelburne said he had foreseen that there would be a great deal of difficulty with the Americans, as well in regard to boundaries, as to the fishery of Newfoundland; but he hoped that the king would not sustain them in their demands. I answered, that I did not doubt the earnest desire of the king to do all in his power to restrain them within the bounds of justice and reason. As to the extent of the boundaries, I supposed the Americans would regulate it by their charts; but the discussion was not continued far, _because it did not pertain to me either to uphold or weaken the pretension of America_, with which I was unacquainted. I added only, that the English Ministry ought to find in the negotiations of 1754, relative to the Ohio, the limits which England, then the sovereign of America, believed it proper to assign."

The above extracts, it must be kept in mind, are from the confidential letters written at the time between M. de Rayneval and Count de Vergennes. The purport of them is corroborated by testimony that might be drawn from other sources. They show most clearly, that Mr Jay's suspicions were in reality erroneous, on whatever grounds he might at the time suppose them to rest. M. de Rayneval's visit to London had nothing to do with American affairs, except to insist on unconditional independence.

Nor is it improbable, that the change in Mr Oswald's commission was effected in consequence of M. de Rayneval's representations; for the agreement on the part of the British Minister to cede independence "_without restriction_" was made before Mr Vaughan's arrival in London, as a messenger from Mr Jay.

These facts go far to rescue the French Ministry from the censure, which it has been usual to cast on them, respecting their supposed policy in the negotiations for peace. Whoever will examine all the testimony that exists on the subject will be convinced, that some grave particulars have crept into our history, which have a slender foundation in fact, and which bestow but scanty justice on the motives, conduct, and policy of the first ally of the United States.[7]

JARED SPARKS.

FOOTNOTES:

[7] For a further elucidation of this subject see the North American Review for January, 1830, No. LXVI, p. 15. Also Mr Livingston's letter to Mr Jay, dated January 4th, 1783, in the present volume.

* * * * *

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO JOHN JAY.

Philadelphia, November 23d, 1782.

Dear Sir,

I have before me your letters of the 25th and 28th of June. I congratulate you on your safe arrival at Paris, where I venture to hope your residence will on many accounts be more agreeable than it was at Madrid. Nothing can be more pleasing to us than your determination to write very frequently, since I am sorry to say, that we have not yet been favored with such minute information on many points of importance, as we have reason to expect. Both Dr Franklin and yourself dwell so much in generals in your last letters, that had it not been for a private letter of the Marquis to me, Congress would have remained ignorant of points, which they have thought sufficiently important to make them the foundation of those resolutions, which are herewith transmitted to you.

You need be under no apprehensions, that Commissioners from the Court of Great Britain will be allowed to negotiate with Congress; their sentiments on this subject are sufficiently manifested in the resolutions, that are sent to you and Dr Franklin with this. And the case of Mr Burgess, which you will find in one of the papers of last week, and in my letter to Dr Franklin,[8] will afford you some evidence of the extreme caution of particular States on this head.

That in the mass of our people, there is a great number, who though resolved on independence, prefer an alliance with England to one with France, must be a mere speculative opinion, which can be reduced to no kind of certainty. If we form our judgment from acts of government, we would suppose that no such sentiment prevailed; they all speak a different language. If from the declarations of individuals, we must entertain the same opinion, since independence and the alliance with France, connect themselves so closely together, that we never speak of them separately. The mass of the people here are not so ignorant of the common principles of policy as to prefer an alliance with a nation whose recent pretensions, and whose vicinity renders them mutual enemies, to that of a Prince who has no claims upon them, and no territory in their neighborhood, at least till the principles of his government shall be changed, and he gives evident proofs of the want of justice and moderation.

I think it unnecessary to repeat to you what I have already written to Dr Franklin, presuming that you communicate with freedom to each other. Mr Jefferson will afford, I dare say, a very acceptable aid to your commission; I have not yet learned from him whether he will take the duties upon him.[9]

Mr Barlow, a poet of New England, has requested me to transmit you his proposals for printing, by subscription, a poem of which he is the author. I can give no character of the work, but what you will get from the specimen enclosed, which is all I have seen of it. The enclosed resolution informs you of Mr Boudinot's advancement to the Presidentship. For other intelligence I refer you to my letter to Dr Franklin, and the papers that accompany this.

I am, Dear Sir, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

FOOTNOTES:

[8] See Franklin's Correspondence. Vol. IV. p. 34.

[9] Mr Jefferson did not join the Commissioners for Peace.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, December 12th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

I have already written a long letter to you by this vessel, and should have continued the details of our subsequent proceedings, had my health admitted of the necessary application.

You will receive from us a joint letter with a copy of the preliminaries. I shall therefore omit making any remarks on them.

Before I left Spain, and by letters since my arrival here, I desired Mr Carmichael to make out and transmit the public accounts. Our negotiations with that Court are at a stand. The Count d'Aranda either has not, or does not choose to show me a commission to treat. He is exceedingly civil, and frequent visits pass between us.

It gives me pleasure to inform you, that perfect unanimity has hitherto prevailed among your Commissioners here; and I do not recollect, that since we began to negotiate with Mr Oswald, there has been the least division or opposition between us. Mr Adams was particularly useful respecting the eastern boundary, and Dr Franklin's firmness and exertions on the subject of the tories did us much service. I enclose herewith a copy of a letter he wrote about that matter to Mr Oswald.[10] It had much weight, and is written with a degree of acuteness and spirit seldom to be met with in persons of his age.

I have the honor to be, with great regard and esteem, Dear Sir, &c.

JOHN JAY.

FOOTNOTES:

[10] See Franklin's Correspondence. Vol. IV. p. 36.

* * * * *

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO JOHN JAY.

Philadelphia, January 4th, 1783.

Dear Sir,

I have before me your despatches of the 4th and 18th of September last, and the 13th of October. It gives me much uneasiness to find by them, that your health is not yet confirmed, particularly as the extreme shortness of your letters, compared with the importance of the matter, gives me reason to fear, that it has suffered more than you would have us believe.

I am under some anxiety relative to the fate of your letter of the 18th of September, as only the duplicate copy has arrived, and I find by that you have risked it without a cypher. Should it get into improper hands, it might be attended with disagreeable consequences.

It is of so much importance, that both you and we should judge rightly of the designs of the Court, to whom we have intrusted such extensive powers, that I most earnestly wish you had enlarged on the reasons which have induced you to form the opinion you intimate; an opinion, which, if well founded, must render your negotiations extremely painful, and the issue of them very uncertain. If on the other hand, it should have been taken up too hastily, it is to be feared, that in defiance of all that prudence and self-possession, for which you are happily distinguished, it will discover itself in a reserve and want of confidence, which may afford hopes to our artful antagonists of exciting jealousies between us and our friends. I so sincerely wish that your conjectures on this head may not be well founded, that I am led to hope you carry your suspicions too far, and the more so as Dr Franklin, to whom I dare say you have communicated them freely, does not (as you say) agree in sentiment with you. But I pretend not to judge, since I have not the advantage of seeing from the same ground. Perhaps some light may be thrown upon the subject by such facts as I have been able to collect here, and with which it is impossible you should be acquainted.

The policy you suppose to influence the measures of France, can only be founded in a distrust, which I persuade myself she can hardly entertain of those who have put their dearest interest into her hands. She is too well informed of the state of this country, to believe there is the least reason to suppose, that we could have the most distant idea of a separate peace. If such distrust really exists, it would, in my opinion, dictate to them, to let Great Britain acknowledge our independence at once, rather than make it the subject of subsequent negotiation. When satisfied on that point, we can with more advantage contend for those our allies have at heart. Whereas by withholding it, and making it the price of concessions on the part of France, which she may not choose to make, an opportunity would be afforded, to embroil and incline us to listen to separate proposals. Upon this principle, France seems to have acted in all the answers, which she has hitherto given, as well to the direct proposals of Great Britain as to those made by the imperial Courts. When Mr Grenville proposed to treat of the independence of the United States with his Most Christian Majesty, an opportunity was afforded to take the lead in the negotiation, and to suspend that part of it; yet we find the reply of the Court of Versailles led to a direct negotiation between Great Britain and us, and ended in the offer of unconditional independence. The reply of the Court of France to that of London, communicated to Mr Grenville on the 21st of June, speaks the same language.

From these and the following facts you will, when you have compared them with those within your own knowledge, draw your inferences with more judgment than I can pretend to do without those you possess.

Before your letters were received, the Chevalier de la Luzerne showed me a letter from the Count de Vergennes of the 14th of August, in which he speaks of Mr Grenville's commission, and the ground it gave him to hope, that negotiations would open with an express and unconditional acknowledgment of independence. He mentions the change in the British administration; their assurances, that it should occasion no alteration in the plan of their negotiation, and concludes, by expressing his surprise at the alteration, which afterwards took place in this essential article in the propositions offered by Mr Fitzherbert, and infers from thence, that Lord Shelburne had no other design than to divide and deceive. In a letter of the 7th of September, he mentions Mr Oswald's commission, your objections to it, and his doubts of the manner in which these objections will be received. "If," says he, "Mr Oswald is right in his conjecture, that they will be favorably received and removed, then everything _is said_. If they reject them, because they will not begin where they propose to end, I conceive the negotiations should still go on. We may judge of the intentions of the Court of London by their first propositions. If they have independence for their basis, we may proceed; _if not, we must break off_." In his letter of the 14th of October, he mentions with great apparent satisfaction, the alterations in Mr Oswald's commission. From the general tenor of these letters, I can discover nothing but an anxious desire for peace, which might very naturally lead him to wish that objections, which he did not conceive essential in the first instance, after having declared to Great Britain that no peace could be made till our independence was acknowledged, should not break off a negotiation, which must end in the attainment of an object, which they have as much at heart as we.

Whatever the sentiments of the Count de Vergennes may be, as to the claim of Spain, in a letter which I have seen, he treats them as well as ours, as chimerical and extravagant, and declares, that he does not mean to interfere in them. You can best judge of the sincerity of this declaration. If insincere, I cannot conceive for what purpose it was made, or the subject treated so lightly, or why this should be confided to me. For my own part, I believe their situation with respect to Spain is very delicate, and that they are embarrassed by her demands. I mention these things, that you may, by comparing them with facts within your reach, draw useful inferences from them, and I wish to give you everything that may _possibly_ be of use to you.

As to the letter of Marbois, I am by no means surprised at it, since he always endeavored to persuade us that our claim to the fisheries was not well founded. Yet one thing is very remarkable, and I hope evinces the determination of France to serve us on this point. The advice given to discourage the hope is certainly judicious, and yet we find no steps taken in consequence of it. On the contrary, we have been repeatedly told in formal communications since that period, "that the King would do everything for us that circumstances will admit, and that nothing but dire necessity shall induce him to relinquish any of the objects we have at heart, and that he does not imagine that such necessity will exist." This communication was made on the 21st of last November, from letters of the 7th of September, _previous to our_ success at Yorktown, and has been renewed at different periods since. You will undoubtedly avail yourself of this engagement if necessary. Congress relying upon it, have made no alteration in their instructions since the change in their affairs, by the blow the enemy received at Yorktown.

This letter of Marbois, and the conduct of the Court of France, evince the difference between a great politician and a little one. France can, by prohibiting the importation of fish, supply herself; she cannot do more. Our exclusion from the fishery, would only be beneficial to England. The enmity it would excite, the disputes it would give rise to, would, in the course of a few years, obliterate the memory of the favors we have received. England, by sacrificing a part of her fisheries, and protecting us in the enjoyment of them, would render herself necessary to us, our friendship would be transferred to her, and France would in the end be considered as a natural enemy. I am persuaded, she has wisdom enough to see this in its true light.

I know not how far the Marquis may deserve your confidence; you are the best judge of his conduct. I ought, however, in justice to him to mention, that he has steadily, in all his letters, recommended an adherence to our claims, and assured us that both might be obtained if insisted upon.

You see, Sir, I have purposely leaned to the opposite side from that which you appear in some measure to have taken; not because I think you _are_ wrong in the opinion you have adopted, but because you _may possibly_ be so. Such essential injuries may flow from the slightest jealousies, that I wish you to examine yours with all the coolness you are master of. I am persuaded, the last hope of Britain is founded on the distrusts they may sow among their enemies. I wish you had in a private letter in cypher informed me how you got at the letter of Marbois, and why it was copied in English. I more particularly wish to know whether it passed through the hands of either of the British Commissioners. If it has, it will be of some consequence to see the original, not that I doubt its authenticity, but it may possibly have undergone some alterations. That which follows what is said of the great bank, is nonsense, or if it conveys any meaning, I think it is not such as a man of common sense would speak.[11]

Count de Vergennes, in his letters dated a day later than yours, gives no account of your propositions. I should conclude from this circumstance, that they had not been communicated. If I were not convinced, that acting under the instructions you do, you would not withhold them, except for the most weighty reasons, and that if such reasons existed you would have assigned them in your letters, and presuming, therefore, that you had communicated them, I have made no secret of them to the Count de la Luzerne, who appeared much pleased with them, though a little surprised at the article, which relates to commerce, which I cannot suppose perfectly agreeable to them in all its extent; since it will render a revolution necessary in the commercial system of France, if they wish to have an extensive trade with us. I am extremely pleased, that in freeing ourselves, we have a prospect of unfettering the consciences and the commerce of the world.

We are far from regretting that the Marquis d'Aranda has no powers to treat. We think, with you, that it is time to adopt the Spanish system. We may treat at any time with more advantage than at present. You had received your instructions on this subject before you wrote your last letters. By your saying nothing of them, I suppose you had not decyphered them. Mr Jefferson being the bearer of this, it is unnecessary to enlarge.[12] News and general politics will be contained in my letter to Dr Franklin, to whom I also send an instruction on the subject of your commercial proposition. I enclose you a new cypher, which I pray you to make use of. You will find it very easy on a little practice. I must again entreat you to write more fully to us. I have received _from the Count de Vergennes' letters_, the whole progress of the negotiation. Information of this kind it would give me more pleasure to receive through another channel.

I have the honor to be, Dear Sir, with great respect and esteem, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

FOOTNOTES:

[11] M. de Marbois' letter here alluded to, was very long, and written in cypher. It was intercepted by the English, taken to London, there decyphered, translated into English, and sent to the British Commissioners in Paris, (while the negotiations for peace were in progress.) The sense of the writer would be very likely to suffer by this process of decyphering and translating. But M. de Marbois never complained that the letter was not in the main correctly translated. As soon as the British Commissioners received it in Paris, they put a copy of it into the hands of the American Commissioners. M. de Marbois was at that time only a Secretary of Legation, and wrote the letter while the Minister, M. de la Luzerne, was absent from Philadelphia, and without his knowledge. The sentiments of the letter were never avowed by the French Ministry.

[12] Mr Jefferson did not go till some time afterwards.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, April 7th, 1783.

Dear Sir,

After the preliminaries had been settled and ratified, the Spanish Ambassador informed me that his Court was ready to receive me, not only in form, but "_tres honnetement_." He _then_ expected full instructions relative to the proposed treaty.

The Marquis de Lafayette, in his journey through Madrid, manifested great zeal to serve us there. A copy of a letter from him to the Minister, will be sent you by another opportunity, though I imagine he has already forwarded it.

On the 29th ult. the Spanish Ambassador communicated to me the desire of his Court that I would return to Madrid, and there complete the treaty, for that in their opinion, it ought to be concluded either at _Madrid_ or at Philadelphia.

You will have this communication at large in another letter.

No Ministry yet in England, nor any news of Barney, nor from you, since the 3d of January.

The definitive treaties must be concluded, and the heats of summer abated, before either my business here, or the very delicate state of my health will admit of a journey to Spain. Be assured of my esteem and regard.

I am, Dear Sir, &c.

JOHN JAY.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, April 11th, 1783.

Dear Sir,

I wrote you a short letter on the seventh instant. Certain intelligence has since arrived from England, that the Duke of Portland is first Lord of the Treasury, Mr Fox and Lord North Secretaries of State, and Lord John Cavendish Chancellor of the Exchequer. It is also said, that Lord Stormont is President of the Council, and the Duke of Manchester Ambassador to Versailles. I hear that Mr David Hartley is appointed to conclude a definitive treaty with us.

The Emperor and Russia have been requested in their mediatorial capacity, to send Plenipotentiaries to assist at the definitive treaties. The due motives to this measure can as yet be only conjectured. The ostensible one is, a mark of respect to their offered, but not accepted mediation. The proposition originated here. Their answer is expected daily. It is whispered that Russia consents. Safe opportunities of sending important letters from hence to Madrid are so very rare, that I think yours for that place had better be always conveyed directly to Cadiz or other ports in Spain, where some American of confidence may be settled.

Numberless applications for consulships continue to be made, and some will probably reach you. In my opinion Americans only should be employed to serve America. I early entertained this opinion, and it has been almost daily gathering strength since my arrival in Europe.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN JAY.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, April 22d, 1783.

Dear Sir,

I wrote to you so lately by Mr Mason, and there is such a dearth of news, that I now write less to give you information than as a mark of attention.

There are several of your letters, which on account of their length, the importance of their subjects, and the manner in which those subjects were treated, demanded of me more minute answers than my situation admitted of. Mr Hartley is not yet arrived, but is daily expected. I am told by Mr Laurens, that he will propose that the people of the two countries shall have all the rights of citizens in each. The instruction of Congress on this important point is much to be desired. For my part I think a temporary stipulation of that sort might be expedient. They mean to court us and in my opinion we should avoid being either too forward or too coy. I have no faith in any Court in Europe, but it would be improper to discover that sentiment. There are circumstances which induce me to believe, that Spain is turning her eyes to England for a more intimate connexion. They are the only two European powers, which have continental possessions on our side of the water, and Spain I think wishes for a league between them for mutual security against us. Perhaps this consideration should lead us to regard the present fervor of the British advances with the less indifference.

On looking over one of my former letters, containing my propositions to Spain, I find that I had omitted to explain the reason of the one for a guarantee of our possessions in North America. That we should _so_ guaranty the Spanish possessions as to _fight_ for them, was as distant from my design, as it could be from that of Congress. A common guarantee means nothing more than a _quit claim_, to which we certainly could have had no objection. When more is intended, provisional and express stipulations become necessary. To any such I never would have consented. A confidant of the Minister (and I believe by his directions) had assured me, that unless a guarantee was offered any other propositions would not induce the minister to negotiate for a treaty. To meet that objection I made the offer in the general terms you have seen. I had no doubt but that the Minister was acquainted with my instructions; and I considered this objection as a pretext for delay. My opinion as to a certain proposed cession was known, and uses not advantageous to us or to me had been made of it. It appeared to me advisable, that the intention of Spain with respect to us should have a full trial, and such a one as would convince Congress that I was entirely guided by their views and wishes.

I therefore endeavored so to frame those propositions as that they should not afford the Minister any pretence for refusing to commence the negotiation. The issue you are acquainted with.

I hope nothing will be done by the States for the tories until the British forces shall be withdrawn, and then I confess it would be for our honor to forgive all except the perfidious and the cruel.

After the definitive treaties are finished, I hope I shall be excused in trying the waters of Spa and Bath (which are recommended to me) before I proceed to Spain. Whatever may be their effect, I shall not loiter at either place. After my business at Madrid shall be finished, I wish to devote my care to the recovery of my health, and the concerns of my family, which must greatly interfere with the duties of my commission. Besides, as my country has obtained her object, my motives for entering into public life are at an end.

The same principles which drew me from the private station I formerly occupied, bid me to return to it. Actions are the only proofs of professions, and if I live mine shall not want that evidence.

I am, Dear Sir, &c.

JOHN JAY.

_P. S._ I am told, that a vessel, which went last year from our country, on the Ohio, down that river, and through the Mississippi to the Havana, took passports from the Count de la Luzerne. This, if a fact, appears to me a singular one. I mention it merely as a matter of information.

J. J.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, May 30th, 1783.

Dear Sir,

It cannot in my opinion be long before Congress will think it expedient to name a Minister to the Court of London. Perhaps my friends may wish to add me to the number of candidates for that office. If that should be the case, I request the favor of you to declare in the most explicit terms, that I view the expectations of Mr Adams on that head as founded in equity and reason, and that I will not by any means stand in his way. Were I in Congress I should vote for him. He deserves well of his country, and is very able to serve her. It appears to me to be but fair that the disagreeable conclusions, which may be drawn from the abrupt repeal of his former commission should be obviated by its being restored to him. I do therefore in the most unequivocal manner decline and refuse to be a competitor with that faithful servant of the public, for the place in question.

As Mr Barclay has power to settle our accounts in Europe, I wish that orders may be sent to Mr Carmichael to come here with the books and documents necessary to enable Mr Barclay to examine and settle the public accounts in my department. I cannot learn that my repeated requests to him to send a state of those accounts to Philadelphia have as yet been complied with.

I am, Dear Sir, &c.

JOHN JAY.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Paris, June 1st, 1783.

Dear Sir,

I have had the honor of receiving your favor of the 4th of January last. The cypher you mention to have enclosed is missing. My letter by Captain Barney affords an answer to the greater part of your inquiries. Business here goes on heavily. The Dutch and English are not yet agreed, and some points remain still to be adjusted between the latter and the French and Spaniards. Mr Hartley has an ample and proper commission to conclude with us. We are discussing the terms of a temporary commercial regulation, but as he is waiting for more full instructions, it may be a week or a fortnight before we shall be able to inform you of the real intentions of Britain on that subject.

Before I left Spain, and often since by letters, I desired Mr Carmichael to make out and transmit to Philadelphia a clear and full state of the public accounts; and also agreeably to Dr Franklin's request, to send him an account of the bills remaining to be paid. The Doctor has not received his account; and I have no reason to suppose that you or Mr Morris have received the other. I am not easy about this matter, for in case of the death or recall of Mr Carmichael, (by whom all these accounts were kept, and through whom I managed those transactions,) I might experience difficulties respecting those accounts, which may now be avoided.

I understood from Mr Barclay, that he is authorised to examine and settle these accounts, and as Mr Carmichael has not much to do at Madrid, I am very desirous that he should be ordered to bring here all the books and papers relative to these accounts, and with me to attend their settlement by Mr Barclay. Be so good as to lay this matter before Congress without delay.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN JAY.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

Passy, July 20th, 1783.

Dear Sir,

The delays which have postponed the completion of the definitive treaty, have hitherto prevented my trying the effect of the waters of Bath for a pain in my breast, which has continued in different degrees for a year past. Were I much longer to neglect that only probable chance of restoring my health, my little family might have much reason to complain.

I fear that the fluctuating counsels of the British cabinet will protract that business, until so late in the season, as not to leave me sufficient time both to give the waters a fair trial, and afterwards go to Spain, before the weather will become too inclement for an invalid to travel such a distance in a country so destitute of accommodations. Should that be the case, I shall hope to be excused for not undertaking it, especially as nothing of importance remains there to be done, except preparing the draft of a treaty of commerce, which I hoped to have been able to bring with me to America in the spring, when it was my fixed resolution to resign.

But as I should then pass the winter without being useful to the public, Congress may not perhaps think it reasonable, that their allowance to me should be continued. I think it my duty therefore to apprize them of these circumstances, and to refer it to their discretion to assign such earlier date to my resignation, as they may think best. I must beg the favor of you to request and to inform me of their decision on this subject, without delay, for as I shall not probably have an opportunity of sailing before June next, it is important to me to know by what rule I am to regulate the expenses of my family in the meantime.

As you know upon what principles I have devoted myself to the public for the last nine years, and as those motives would be questionable if after the war I did not return to a private station, I hope the propriety of my resolution to resign will appear manifest, especially when to these considerations are added the circumstances of certain individuals of my family, whose afflictions and whose relation to me give them the strongest claims to my care and attention.

Be pleased, Sir, to present to Congress my warmest acknowledgments for the marks of confidence with which they have honored me, and assure them that by becoming a private citizen, I mean not to retreat from any duties, which an American owes his country.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN JAY.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

New York, July 25th, 1784.

Sir,

Having waited until the settlement of the public accounts was completed, I left Paris the 16th of May last, and on the 1st of June embarked with my family at Dover, on board the ship Edward, Captain Coupar, in which we arrived here yesterday. Mr Barclay has transmitted, or will soon transmit to Mr Morris, a state of the above mentioned accounts; and as it will thence appear, that some of the bills drawn upon me have been twice paid, it becomes necessary for me to inform your Excellency of the particular and cautious manner in which that business was transacted on my part. Soon after the arrival of the first bills, I directed Mr Carmichael to prepare and keep a book, with the pages divided into a number of columns, and to enter therein the dates, numbers, and other descriptive particulars of every bill, that might be presented to me for acceptance, and to which on examination he should find no objection. I made it an invariable rule to send every bill to him to be examined and entered previous to accepting it; and from that time to the day I left Spain, I never accepted a single bill until after it had been inspected and sent to me by him to be accepted. Further, to avoid mistakes and frauds, I also made it a constant rule, that every bill presented for payment, should undergo a second examination by Mr Carmichael, that if he found it right, he should sign his name on it, and that the bankers should not pay any bill unless so signed.

The bills twice paid, or rather the different numbers of the same set, stand entered in different places in the book abovementioned; and I can only regret, that the entries of the numbers first presented and accepted, were not observed by him, either at the time when the subsequent ones were offered for acceptance, or at the time when they were afterwards brought for payment.

It gives me pleasure to inform your Excellency, that the British and American ratifications of the treaty of peace were exchanged a few days before I left Paris. The day of my departure, I received under cover from Dr Franklin, a copy of the British ratifications, which I have the honor to transmit herewith enclosed.

With great respect and esteem, I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN JAY.

_P. S._ I shall send with this letter to the post office, several others, which were committed to my care for your Excellency.

THE

CORRESPONDENCE

OF

FRANCIS DANA;

MINISTER FROM THE UNITED STATES TO RUSSIA

Francis Dana was a native of Massachusetts, and educated at Harvard University, where he was graduated in the year 1762. He studied the profession of the law, and was among the first to espouse the cause of the Colonies in resisting the aggressions of the mother country. In a letter to General Washington, dated Philadelphia, April 1st, 1776, Mr John Adams speaks of him in the following terms.

"The bearer of this letter, Mr Francis Dana, is a gentleman of family, fortune, and education, returned in the last packet from London, where he has been about a year. He has ever maintained an excellent character in his country, and a warm friendship for the American cause. He returns to share with his friends in their dangers and their triumphs. I have done myself the honor to give him this letter, for the sake of introducing him to your acquaintance, as he has frequently expressed to me a desire to embrace the first opportunity of paying his respects to a character so highly esteemed, and so justly admired throughout all Europe, as well as America. Mr Dana will satisfy you, that we have no reason to expect peace with Great Britain."

Mr Dana returned to Massachusetts and was chosen a delegate to Congress in December of the same year, though he did not take his seat in that body till the November following. This station he filled till September, 1779, when he was appointed Secretary to Mr John Adams, the Minister Plenipotentiary for negotiating a treaty of peace and a treaty of commerce with Great Britain. He went to Europe with Mr Adams, and resided with him in Paris, and a short time in Holland. On the 20th of June, 1780, he was commissioned to negotiate a loan in Holland, provided Mr Adams should be prevented by other business from attending to it. As Mr Adams undertook the negotiation, Mr Dana did not enter upon this commission.

On the 19th of December, he was elected by Congress to be Minister resident in Russia, with authority to accede to the convention of the neutral and belligerent powers for protecting the freedom of commerce and rights of nations, and also to negotiate a treaty for this purpose. He received his commission and instructions in Paris, and after spending a short time in Amsterdam and Berlin, he arrived at St Petersburg towards the end of August, 1781. Here he applied himself with zeal and activity to the objects of his mission, but the policy of the Russian Court was at that time such, as to prevent its recognizing the independence of the United States, or receiving publicly a Minister from that government. In his private capacity, Mr Dana was treated with due consideration, and was promised that, after the signature of the definitive treaty at Paris, he should be admitted to an audience of the Empress, and received in his public character, as Minister from the United States. Meantime his continued ill health had induced him to solicit from Congress permission to return home, which was granted. He sailed from St Petersburg in a ship bound for Boston, where he arrived in December, 1783.

Mr Dana was a member of the Convention at Annapolis, and of the Convention of Massachusetts for ratifying the Constitution of the United States. In this latter body he took an able and decided stand in favor of the Constitution. He was afterwards for many years Chief Justice of the State of Massachusetts, and died in 1811, at the age of sixtyseven years.

THE

CORRESPONDENCE

OF

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, August 10th, 1780.

Sir,

Mr Adams having left Paris the 27th of last month, to visit the Low Countries, I do myself the honor of forwarding to your Excellency two packets, the one containing his letters to you from No. 89 to 99 inclusive, and two private letters from a gentleman in London to him, the other containing letters numbered in their order from No. 1 to 10, inclusive. I shall also forward to your Excellency, if the bearer can take them, all the newspapers we have on hand. The whole will be committed to the care of Captain Jones, who will sail in the Ariel.

Had I been apprized less suddenly of the time of Captain Jones' departure, I should also have sent translations of the declarations of the Courts of Copenhagen and Stockholm to the belligerent powers, conforming to that of the Empress of Russia, relative to the commerce of the neutral powers, and the armed neutrality. These declarations are in the "_Suite des Nouvelles d'Amsterdam_," of the 8th of August, No. 63. The fleet, which left Virginia the 14th of last June, under the convoy of the _Frere Roderique_, bound for France, are all except one, which foundered at sea, the crew being saved, safely arrived. A vessel, which left New London the 27th of June, was cast away on the rocks entering Rochelle. We have no letters by any of these vessels, but learn from them, that no intelligence had been received from M. de Ternay, when they left America. We cannot but lament our total want of intelligence respecting the state of our country.

I am, Sir, with the greatest respect, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, August 24th, 1780.

Sir,

I did myself the honor on the 10th instant to write to your Excellency, by Captain John Paul Jones, who then expected to sail soon, in the Ariel, for Philadelphia, assigning as the reason the absence of Mr Adams, who was gone to visit the Low Countries. I then forwarded to your Excellency two packets, one containing his letters to you, and two private letters from a gentleman in London to him; the other containing letters to and from the Minister, and I also sent all the newspapers we then had on hand, directing the whole to the care of Captain Jones.

Mr Adams has not returned. I had a letter from him of the 17th instant, in which he makes no mention of his being about to return, so that it is probable he will stay there sometime longer. If anything occurs here worthy the notice of Congress, during his absence, I shall not fail to do myself the honor of communicating it to your Excellency. The packets sent with this contain Mr Adams's letters to your Excellency from No. 91 to 100, and letters to and from the Minister, from No. 1 to 7 exclusive, and also the newspapers, which have come to hand since making the first packet. We have not received any advice of the arrival of M. de Ternay, or any intelligence of the operations of the Spaniards on the Continent, since the reduction of Mobile, or of the combined armaments in the West Indies.

I am, with the greatest respect, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Amsterdam, September 20th, 1780.

Sir,

Having been disappointed in my expectations of forwarding to your Excellency the packets mentioned in the above letter from France, I have brought them on to this place, and shall commit them to the care of Captain Joseph Cook, of Providence, who is now ready to sail, and waits only for a wind.

I beg leave to acquaint your Excellency, that Mr Searle, a member of Congress, arrived at Paris on the evening of the 10th instant, and immediately sent me the despatches of Congress committed to his care. I perused them, and waited on him in the morning, and had a conversation of several hours with him, as well upon the subject matter of those despatches, as upon the concerns of our country.[13] I thought it my duty immediately to prepare to set off for Amsterdam with the despatches, and did so the next day at noon, and without quitting my carriage arrived at Brussels the day after, and at Amsterdam on the 16th, where I had the happiness of finding Mr Adams in good health.

From that moment to this, he has been industriously engaged to endeavor to effectuate the purposes of Congress. What success we may meet with here is uncertain; but I hope I may give it as my clear opinion to Congress, that their views would be very much facilitated if Mr Laurens, or any other person whom they may think proper to employ in this business, should be at the same time furnished with the powers of a Minister Plenipotentiary to the States-General. Some persons here, notwithstanding all that can be said, seem to be apprehensive that the United States have granted exclusive privileges in commerce to France. This idea is industriously propagated throughout Europe, by the emissaries of our enemies, and especially in this country. A disposition in Congress, therefore, to form an alliance with the States-General upon principles of perfect reciprocity of interest, although they should not at this instant be prepared to enter into it, would unquestionably have a powerful influence in effectuating the main intention of Congress, and further, would give a consideration and independence to our councils throughout Europe, which they will never acquire while they remain in their present circumscribed state. We might, perhaps, look still further with the hopes of much benefit to our country. There can be no occasion of being more particular on this subject. Indeed, I should not have troubled Congress at all from this place, with any letter of mine, had not Mr Adams requested me to give my sentiments to Congress upon the principal object of this letter. I have done so freely, and I presume the candor of Congress will excuse me in it.

I am, with the greatest respect, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

FOOTNOTES:

[13] Among these despatches, Mr Dana received a commission, empowering him to obtain a loan in Holland, in case Mr Adams should for any reason be prevented from attending to this object. As Mr Adams was then in Holland, Mr Dana did not act under this commission. See John Adams's Correspondence, Vol. V. p. 327.

* * * * *

_Commission to Francis Dana, referred to in the preceding Letter._

Whereas by our commission to the honorable Henry Laurens, bearing date the 30th day of October, 1779, we have constituted and appointed him the said Henry Laurens, during our pleasure, our agent for and on behalf of the United States, to negotiate a loan with any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate; and whereas the said Henry Laurens having, by unavoidable accidents, been hitherto prevented from proceeding on his said agency, we have, by our commission bearing equal date herewith, constituted and appointed the honorable John Adams, until the said Henry Laurens, or some other person appointed in his stead, shall arrive in Europe, and undertake the execution of his aforesaid commission, our agent to negotiate a loan as aforesaid;[14]

And whereas it may so happen, that the said John Adams, by reason of some disability arising from the state of the business of his present appointment, or otherwise, may be prevented from undertaking the execution of the said commission, or having undertaken it, from proceeding therein; we, therefore, reposing especial trust and confidence in your patriotism, ability, conduct, and fidelity, do by these presents constitute and appoint you, the said Francis Dana, in the event of the disability of the said John Adams, as aforesaid, until the said Henry Laurens, or some other person appointed in his stead, shall arrive in Europe, and undertake the execution of the aforesaid commission, our agent for and on behalf of the said United States, to negotiate a loan with any person or persons, bodies politic or corporate, promising in good faith to ratify and confirm whatsoever shall by you be done in the premises, or relating thereto.

Witness his Excellency, Samuel Huntington, President of the Congress of the United States of America, at Philadelphia, the 20th day of June, in the year of our Lord, 1780, and in the fourth year of our independence.

SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, _President_.

FOOTNOTES:

[14] See Mr Adams's commission in John Adams's Correspondence, Vol. V. p. 329.

* * * * *

TO JONATHAN JACKSON.

Amsterdam, November 11th, 1780.

Sir,

You must before this time have heard of the capture of the late President Laurens, on his voyage hither; that the enemy affect to consider him a state prisoner, and have, accordingly, confined him to the Tower, _in arcta et salva custodia_. Their treatment of him has marked the barbarity of the nation from the throne to the footstool. Does this look like peace? They recovered a part of his papers, such as the plan of a treaty adjusted by Mr William Lee, with the Regency of this city in 1778, a letter from M. de Neufville upon the subject, one from our friend, the Commodore, one from Mr Stockton, and one from an amiable character of this country, whom I personally know, Baron Van der Cappellen. These were hurried over to Sir Joseph Yorke, and by him delivered to the Prince, who, it is said, in much wrath, laid them before the States of Holland, who transmitted copies of them to the Regency, accompanied with certain resolutions.

The Regency have openly avowed the act. This has brought on the most extraordinary memorial of Sir Joseph Yorke to the States-General, which, perhaps, any foreign Minister ever made to an independent State; calling for their open disavowal of the conduct of the Regency; censuring them as a mad cabal, ever ready to sacrifice the public interests to private views, aiding the natural enemy (France) of both countries in destroying their mutual happiness; and it demands of the States-General also, an exemplary punishment of the Pensionary, Van Berckel, by name, and of all his _accomplices_, as disturbers of the public peace, and violaters of the laws of nations, that is, of the other members of the city Regency, for he acted officially in what he did, and by their order.

In default of this, the memorial says, the King will take such measures, as the maintenance of his dignity and the interests of his people require. The Regency have hereupon published the whole matter in the nature of an appeal to the people, which you will, doubtless, soon have among you. What further measures they have taken to vindicate themselves, and their country's rights and interests, are not yet made public. The States-General will meet the 22d instant. It is not probable they will, or can comply, with the several requisitions of this memorial. You may ask me, as in another case, what can Great Britain promise herself from all this? Whether or not she expected to be able to effect a compliance with her demands, which does not seem probable, by the weight of her influence in this Republic; or whether this memorial was to serve as a balance to that of the States-General, respecting the outrageous violation of her territorial rights by Admiral Rodney, at St Martin's; or whether she foresaw that the States-General will accede to the armed neutrality, and is, therefore, determined to go to war with them upon other pretences, so as to avoid for a time, at least, warring against the whole confederacy; whether any of these things were the motive of this singular conduct, is to me uncertain. If she seriously intends to put her threat against this country into execution, I should conjecture the last is the prevailing motive. For already Holland and three other of the States have declared for an unconditional accession to the neutral confederacy; two more have declared for an accession, but allege that their territories in both the Indies should be guarantied. This, however, I understand, is not absolutely made a condition, and that their Deputies are at liberty to accede without such guarantee, if they think fit. The seventh is the Province of Zealand, where the influence of the Prince is without control, from thence, therefore, nothing short of an open opposition to the neutral system is expected. Whether the other six States are prepared and determined to accede without Zealand, a short time will show.

The navy of these States is too feeble at present for an immediate war with England, which they seem to apprehend must take place upon their joining the neutral confederation. They have, I believe, but about twentysix vessels, instead of the fiftytwo voted, ready for sea. It has been apprehended, their naval preparations have been designedly kept back, in order to keep up the fears of the States about a war with Britain. There is no question but the Prince is fixed against it, and whatever ideas some of our countrymen may have entertained of the liberties of this people, they are as effectually enslaved by their magistracy, as are any people in the old world by the mighty kings, who hold almost all the rest of it in bondage. Nay, the influence of the Prince seems to pervade almost every department of their government, and the whole machine is much obstructed, when set in motion in a direction repugnant to his inclinations and views.

May heaven preserve us from kings, princes, and stadtholders. The people are the best guardians of their own liberties and interests.

I am, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

INSTRUCTIONS TO FRANCIS DANA, AS MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY TO THE COURT OF ST PETERSBURG.[15]

In Congress, December 19th, 1780.

Sir,

The great object of your negotiation is to engage her Imperial Majesty to favor and support the sovereignty and independence of these United States, and to lay a foundation for a good understanding and friendly intercourse between the subjects of her Imperial Majesty and the citizens of these United States, to the mutual advantage of both nations.

You will readily perceive, that it must be a leading and capital point, if these United States shall be formally admitted as a party to the convention of the neutral maritime powers for maintaining the freedom of commerce. This regulation, in which the Empress is deeply interested, and from which she has derived so much glory, will open the way for your favorable reception, which we have the greater reason to expect, as she has publicly invited the belligerent powers to accede thereto.

And you will give it an attention suitable to its importance. Your success will, however, depend on a variety of sources and contingencies; on a more perfect knowledge of the state of Europe than can be obtained at this distance; on the ultimate views of her Imperial Majesty, the temper of her cabinet, the avenues to their confidence, the dispositions of the neutral powers with whom she is connected, and the events of war. Under such circumstances, precise instructions for your conduct cannot be expected; on the contrary, the greatest room must be left for the exercise of your own penetration and assiduity in gaining proper information, and for your prudence and address in improving it to the best advantage. Your zeal for the public interest will lead you to embrace every favorable incident and expedient, which may recommend these States to the friendship of her Imperial Majesty and her Ministers. Your attachment to the honor and independence of your country will restrain you from every concession unbecoming the dignity of a free people. The diplomatic order in which you are placed by your commission, will prevent embarrassments, which, in so delicate a case, might arise from the punctilio of ceremony; while it entitles you to all the confidence and protection essential to the office of a public Minister.

For the further execution of your trust, you will conform, as far as possible, to the following instructions.

1. You shall communicate your powers and instructions to our Ministers Plenipotentiary, at the Court of Versailles, and for negotiating peace, and avail yourself of their advice and information; and it may be prudent through them to obtain the sense of the Court of France thereon.

2. You shall communicate the general object of your mission to the Minister of his Most Christian Majesty at the Court of Petersburg, and endeavor through his mediation to sound the disposition of her Imperial Majesty, or her Ministers, towards these United States.

3. If the result of your inquiries should point out a fair prospect of an honorable reception, you are to announce your public character, and deliver your letters of credence in the usual form.

4. You are to manifest on all proper occasions the high respect, which Congress entertain for her Imperial Majesty; for the lustre of her character, and the liberality of her sentiments and her views; and particularly you are, in the strongest terms, to testify our approbation of the measures, which her Imperial Majesty has suggested and matured for the protection of commerce against the arbitrary violations of the British Court. You will present the act of Congress herewith transmitted, declaring our assent to her Imperial Majesty's regulations on this subject, and use every means, which can be devised to obtain the consent and influence of that Court that these United States shall be formally invited, or admitted, to accede as principals and as an independent nation to the said convention. In that event, you are authorised to subscribe the treaty or convention for the protection of commerce in behalf of these United States, either with her Imperial Majesty conjunctly with the other neutral powers, or if that shall be inadmissible, separately with her Imperial Majesty, or any one of those powers.

5. You are to impress her Imperial Majesty and her Ministers with a sense of the justice of our cause, the nature and stability of our union, and the solemn engagements by which not only the States but his Most Christian Majesty, are reciprocally bound to maintain the sovereignty, rights and jurisdiction of each of the thirteen States inviolably; and the utter impracticability of our acceding to any treaty of peace with Great Britain, on the principles of a _uti possidetis_, or on any other terms than such as shall imply an express or tacit acknowledgment of the sovereignty of each and every part, and which shall be consistent with the letter and spirit of our treaty of alliance and friendship and commerce with his Most Christian Majesty. You shall represent, in pointed terms, the barbarous manner in which, contrary to the laws of all civilized nations, the war has been conducted by the enemy, the difficulties, which we have surmounted, and the certain prospect, under the divine blessing, of expelling our enemies, and establishing our independence on such basis as will render us useful to the whole commercial world, and happy in ourselves. You shall assure her Imperial Majesty of our ambition to number so wise and magnanimous a Princess among our friends, and to assign her a distinguished place among those illustrious personages of ancient and modern times, who have delighted in promoting the happiness of mankind, and in disarming tyranny of the power of doing mischief.

6. You shall assure her Imperial Majesty and her Ministers of the sincere disposition of these United States to enter into a treaty of friendship and commerce with her on terms of the most perfect equality, reciprocity and mutual advantage, and similar to those expressed in our treaty with his Most Christian Majesty; and you are authorised to communicate with her Imperial Majesty's Ministers on the form and terms of such treaty, and transmit the same to Congress for their ratification.

7. You shall communicate punctually with our respective Ministers in Europe, and avail yourself of their advice and information, and of the success of their respective negotiations to raise our importance and support our interest at the Court of Petersburg.

8. You shall endeavor to acquire a perfect knowledge of the manners and etiquette of the Court at which you reside, and particularly in the diplomatic line; and of the manufactures and commerce of that empire; and point out in your correspondence how far and on what conditions the two nations can be mutually beneficial to or improve each other in commerce or policy, arts or agriculture.

Lastly. And, in general, you shall pursue all such measures as shall appear to you conducive to the interests of the United States, to the faithful discharge of your important trust, and which circumstances may point out to be salutary and beneficial.

I am, &c.

SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, _President_.

FOOTNOTES:

[15] _In Congress, December 15th, 1780._--"Whereas a good understanding and friendly intercourse between the subjects of her imperial Majesty, the Empress of all the Russias, and these United States, may be for the mutual advantage of both nations;

"Resolved, That a Minister be appointed to reside at the Court of the Empress of Russia.

"Ordered, that Monday next be assigned for electing such Minister.

"Ordered, that a committee of three be appointed to prepare a commission and draft of instructions for the said Minister.

"_December 19th, 1780._--Congress proceeded to the election of a Minister to reside at the Court of the Empress of Russia; and the ballots being taken, the honorable Francis Dana was elected."

* * * * *

TO THE COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Paris, February 16th, 1781.

Gentlemen,

I do myself the honor to acquaint you, that I returned to this city the 28th of December, where it is probable I shall continue till the public business may require me to join Mr Adams, who still remains at Amsterdam. It was judged by both of us, that no possible detriment could happen to our public concerns by this separation. On the other hand, Mr Adams was pleased to say it might be attended with some benefit.

Shortly after I came to town, your despatches by Captain Bell were forwarded to me. Though they were addressed to Mr Adams, agreeably to his standing directions, I broke them open, and sent on to him such of them only as I knew he had not received before, and were necessary for the regulation of his present business. The additional instructions of the 18th of October, founded on his letters of the 23d and 24th of March last, and all the duplicates, I have still by me, not thinking it advisable to hazard them by the post. I have made Mr Adams fully acquainted with this.

You will permit me to say, that it is by no means prudent to commit to the care of the posts, papers of the nature of some of your last despatches.

Mr Adams has not been able to obtain the amount of the bills actually drawn on Mr Laurens. The resolution of Congress of the 23d of November, 1779, expresses a certain sum; so does that of the 6th of October last. But Mr Searle says, it is not the design of Congress to draw to the amount of both resolutions; that they had stayed their hands upon the first, after having drawn for about a quarter part of the sum named in it, for particular reasons, which he mentions. It would have been a relief under present circumstances, to have had this made certain. I am persuaded it would be acceptable to every one concerned in such business, to be acquainted as early as possible with the amount of bills drawn upon him from time to time, so that they might not fall in unexpectedly.

Congress, it appears from their printed journals, have taken into consideration the Declaration of the Empress of all the Russias, relative to the commercial rights of neutral nations, and have thereupon passed several resolutions, and ordered that copies of them should be transmitted to their Ministers, yet no such copies have yet been received. Although there does not appear at present any pressing occasion for them, nevertheless it is possible, though I cannot say I think probable, that one may offer, in which case there would be a total deficiency of the necessary powers. Mr Adams, in his last letter of the 8th instant, has desired me to consult with Dr Franklin upon this business, which I shall soon do. Lest Mr Adams should not have an opportunity to write from Holland, I would just say, that the principal matter then remained _in statu quo_.

I am this moment acquainted by Mr Temple Franklin, that a vessel has arrived at Nantes, which left the Capes of Delaware on the 7th of January, and that the Doctor has received copies of the resolutions of Congress relative to the above Declaration of the Empress of Russia.

I am, Gentlemen, with much respect, your most obedient and most humble servant,

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, March 24th, 1781.

Sir,

I have the honor to acquaint your Excellency, that Mr Laurens arrived at Passy the 15th instant, and in the evening of the same day, sent me your despatches intrusted to his care, as well as those which came by the Duke of Leinster, both for Mr Adams and myself. In a day or two after, I forwarded Mr Adams's to him by a private opportunity, it being very unsafe to send anything by the post, which it is of importance to keep secret. As I did not open them, I am wholly ignorant whether they contain anything relative to our first commissions, or in what light to consider myself respecting them, provided I should not proceed to the Court of St Petersburg. My actually going there is a condition precedent, and in virtue of which alone, I am entitled to anything under the resolution of Congress of the 20th of December last.[16]

I have communicated my instructions and commission, and everything respecting it, to Dr Franklin, and have asked his opinion whether it was expedient to make a communication of the general object of my commission to the administration here. He said he thought it was, and that it might be advisable likewise to take the opinion of the Count de Vergennes, whether it would not be proper to make this communication also to the Court of St Petersburg, and obtain their approbation of the measure, before I should set off for that country; that a similar course was taken in the case of Mr Arthur Lee for Madrid, and of Mr William Lee for Vienna. My own opinion exactly coincides with the first part of his advice, but not with the latter part. I think that would rather create than clear away obstacles; it would lay the Court of St Petersburg under a necessity of considering the general object of my commission, and if after this they should approve of the journey, it might involve them in consequences they are not prepared to meet; for Britain would consider such an act as absolutely decisive of the part the Court of St Petersburg meant finally to take, and this consideration, however well they might stand affected towards us, in my opinion would prevent their approving of the proposition, if it did not draw after it an absolute prohibition. There is no difficulty in going in the character of a private citizen of the United States, and when one has once entered, the ground is changed. Admission and rejection are essentially different. Besides, one would be at hand to open the way gradually, as favorable occurrences might arise.

I have been at Passy this day to consult the Doctor again on this point, and to lay my objections before him, but he was not at home. I shall do it the first opportunity. If we should finally differ on any point after having consulted Mr Adams, agreeably to my instructions, if they concur in opinion, I shall make no difficulty in conforming exactly to their better judgments, otherwise I must exercise my own upon the choice of opinions. But if the result should be, that I am not to proceed, how, and in what character am I to consider myself? Is my former commission superseded, and what am I to depend upon? The resolution of Congress of the 20th of December last, mentions a certain sum for which I have a letter of credit, conditionally, upon their Minister at this Court, as a salary for one year. Is it the intention of Congress, that that sum is to be my whole support, in the character of their Minister, empowered to do the same things at the Court of St Petersburg, that their Ministers at other Courts, which have not yet acknowledged the independence of the United States, are empowered to do? Or is it their intention, that my former commission should continue in force, and that I should receive the salary of both, which would make my whole support but nominally equal to that, which Congress allows to their other Ministers.

Further, there is no mention made of a secretary or clerk, appointed to assist me, or any provision for either. Is it the intention of Congress to confine me to the sum mentioned in their resolution of the 20th of December last, and even leave me to provide out of it for a clerk or private secretary, (for one will be indispensable,) and for all other expenses? Congress will not surely take it amiss if I ask for information on these points. The absolute necessity I am under of knowing on what I have to depend, I trust will be my sufficient apology. I cannot but lament, that the expediency of advising on these points, did not occur to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. I have as yet received no information upon this subject, but what comes to me in the acts of Congress, and in your Excellency's letter accompanying them.

Convinced as I am of the propriety of such an appointment, it is my present determination, throwing aside all pecuniary considerations, to accept of this honorable trust. I wish my abilities were equal to the importance of it. I can engage for nothing more, than sincere and uniform endeavors to promote the great end of it. Through you, Sir, I beg leave to communicate my most respectful acknowledgments to Congress for this distinguished instance of their confidence in me.

I am, with the greatest respect, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

_P. S._ I will under my present uncertainties, keep a regular account of all my expenses under this commission, and shall cheerfully submit to the justice of Congress, the propriety of the charges I shall make, and how much ought to be allowed under the denomination of salary, expenses, &c. I shall hope, however, that Congress will reduce these things to a certainty as soon as is convenient. If I find it impracticable to conform to their views, the step I ought to take is very clear and plain.[17]

F. D.

FOOTNOTES:

[16] _In Congress, December 20th, 1780._ "Resolved, That the President furnish the Minister appointed to the Court of Petersburg with letters of credit on the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at the Court of Versailles, for fifteen hundred pounds sterling, as his salary for one year; provided the said Minister shall proceed to the Court of Petersburg."

[17] See resolutions of Congress, on the subject of Mr Dana's salary and expenses, in the Secret Journal. Vol. II. p. 457.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, March 28th, 1781.

Sir,

I did myself the honor to write to your Excellency, on the 24th instant, and to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches by Colonel Laurens, and by the Duke of Leinster, both for Mr Adams and myself. I also acquainted your Excellency, that I had communicated my instructions, my commissions, and everything respecting it, to Dr Franklin. I mentioned also the question I proposed to him, and his advice upon it, that I differed from him in the latter part of his advice, and assigned my reasons for doing so. I added I would the first opportunity lay before him my objections, for his further consideration of that part of his advice. I have done so this day, and have the satisfaction to find that he now perfectly concurs in opinion with me, so that a simple communication of the general object only will be made here.

I have left the papers with him to consider whether he or I should make it. I think the last paragraph of the first article of my instructions, seems to point it out to be the sense of Congress, that he should do it. Through whatever channel it should be made, it seems to be agreed between us, that the voyage is already settled, and not now a question for consideration, I hope none will be made about it. If there should not arise any obstructions out of this communication, I shall leave Paris on Sunday next, and proceed for Holland, where I shall consult with Mr Adams upon the whole business of my mission, and it shall be my constant endeavor, to give Congress the earliest information of every material circumstance respecting it. My situation may however render my communications less frequent than I could wish, or they expect, especially when it is considered, that there is no safety in corresponding through the posts of these countries.

I hope no occasion will be lost to keep me properly informed of the state of our affairs, particularly of all military operations; so that I may be able to prevent our enemies making impressions to our disadvantage, in which business they constantly labor with much industry, and I wish I could not add with too much success; owing principally to our wanting the necessary information to counteract them.

The accession of Maryland to the Confederation is an event, which may have some good influence upon our affairs, as it may serve to convince a great part of Europe that a strong principle of union exists among us. Yet of this we have not any other account than what comes in private letters, at least I have not seen or heard of any other. Nothing but an anxious concern which I feel to be furnished with authentic evidences of events, which may be improved to the benefit of our country, has led me to speak of this, which I deem important in the manner I have done, and I presume Congress will not attribute it to a querulous disposition.

I am, with the greatest respect and esteem, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Paris, March 31st, 1781.

Sir,

I have the honor to acquaint your Excellency, that Congress have been pleased to charge me with a commission as their Minister at the Court of St Petersburg, and that reposing the highest confidence in his Most Christian Majesty, their first and illustrious ally, and in his Ministers, they have particularly instructed me to communicate the general object of my mission to his Majesty's Minister at the Court of St Petersburg, to the end without doubt, that their negotiations at that Court might be carried on in perfect harmony with those of his Majesty, upon whose gracious and powerful assistance, through his Minister there, Congress place much reliance.

Had Congress apprehended their despatches would have met me here, they probably would not have failed to direct this communication to be made to his Majesty in the first instance, through your Excellency. Under this persuasion, I beg leave to acquaint your Excellency, that the general view of Congress in this mission is, to engage her Imperial Majesty to favor and support the sovereignty and independence of the United States, and to lay a foundation for a good understanding, and friendly intercourse between the subjects of her Imperial Majesty, and the citizens of the United States, to the mutual advantage of both nations, and consistent with the treaties subsisting between his Most Christian Majesty and the United States.

In the firm confidence, that this measure will meet with the cordial approbation of his Majesty, I do not doubt but I shall experience his benevolence, in a proper encouragement and support, in the execution of my mission. It may be proper to acquaint your Excellency, that I propose to set off for Holland next Wednesday morning, if there should be no occasion for further delay, and from thence to proceed to St Petersburg. It is not my intention to assume any public character on my arrival there, but to appear only as a private citizen of the United States, until the result of my inquiries shall point out a ready and honorable reception. I shall most cheerfully obey my instructions to communicate the general object of my mission to his Majesty's Minister at St Petersburg, whose able advice and assistance, I hope your Excellency will be pleased to assure to me.

I am, with the greatest respect, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, March 31st, 1781.

Sir,

My letter of the 28th instant will inform your Excellency, that on that day I had a further consultation with Dr Franklin upon the subject of my mission, particularly upon the mode of communicating the general object of it here, that having agreed upon that, I left the papers with him, to the end that if he thought it proper to make the communication, he might have them before him, and do it without loss of time.

Partly to save time in case the Doctor should be of the opinion, that it was most proper for me to make it, and partly to lay before him my idea about it in writing, I drew up a letter to the Count de Vergennes, which I left with the other papers, a copy of which you will have enclosed. The Doctor called upon me late last evening with the whole, and told me he had attentively considered them, and that he thought it best I should make the communication; and was pleased to add, that he had carefully examined my draft of a letter in particular, and approved of it entirely; that he did not know of any alteration, which could be made in it for the better. Confiding in his judgment more than in my own, I this morning sent a fair copy of it to the Count de Vergennes, (adding only the few words underscored,) which was received at his office at five o'clock this afternoon. This mode obliges me to postpone the time of my departure from Sunday to Wednesday next, when, as I have said in my last, if there should not arise any obstructions out of this communication, I shall set off for Holland.

I am not without my apprehensions on this head, yet I do not see that the measure could have been decently avoided, most certainly not, consistent with the letter and spirit of my instructions. I have endeavored to adapt the mode to the main end I have in view, that is, to stave off any question touching the expediency of the voyage at this time, or prior to my obtaining permission to make it; for the reasons mentioned in my letter of the 24th instant, as well as for others, which it may not be prudent to mention just now. Perhaps they are not well founded. I shall not fail to do myself the honor to transmit to your Excellency the answer I may receive to the enclosed, and a particular account of every material circumstance, which may take place here before my departure. It is probable I shall have a safe opportunity to send duplicates of the whole from Holland.

I am, with the greatest respect, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

COUNT DE VERGENNES TO FRANCIS DANA.

Translation.

Versailles, April 1st, 1781.

Sir,

I have received the letter, which you did me the honor to write to me on the 31st ultimo. I was already informed of the part taken by Congress in the mission, with which you are charged for the Court of St Petersburg. As it would seem, that present circumstances ought to have some influence in fixing the time of your departure, I should be glad on this account to have an interview with you. The reflections, which I shall communicate, have for their principle the sincere interest which I take in the cause of your country, as well as in the dignity of Congress.

I have the honor to be, &c.

DE VERGENNES.

* * * * *

TO THE COUNT DE VERGENNES.

Paris, April 2d, 1781.

Sir,

I have received the letter, which your Excellency did me the honor to write to me yesterday, in answer to mine of the day before, and I shall do myself the honor to wait on your Excellency, for the purpose mentioned in it before my departure.

It is not to be doubted, that the reflections, which your Excellency desires to communicate to me, are founded in the sincere interest, which you take in the cause of our country, and in the dignity of Congress.

I am, with the highest respect, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, April 2d, 1781.

Sir,

I do myself the honor to enclose to your Excellency the letter of the Count de Vergennes to me of yesterday, in answer to mine of the day before, and my answer to him. Congress need not wait to be informed of the substance of the proposed conference, in order to form a judgment of the sentiments of his Majesty's Ministers, upon the mission with which they have charged me. These are sufficiently pointed out by the Count's letter, which proves the apprehensions, hinted in my last, were not wholly unfounded.

From the beginning, I have foreseen the difficulty of my situation, and I have felt it likewise. Had my instructions been positive to proceed, I should have been considerably advanced on my route at this time. But what can I now do; if I should be told, as I certainly expect to be told, that it is not expedient to proceed at this time, nor until I have taken the sense of the Court of St Petersburg upon the measure? I do not ask this question, expecting any seasonable answer to it. Our distance is unhappily too great for timely explanation. I shall go to Versailles tomorrow, to confer with the Count, after which, whatever may be the result there, I shall think it my duty to set off for Holland, for the purpose of consulting Mr Adams on the whole matter. Having done this, I shall have taken every step, which Congress will expect of me, prior to my making up my final determination respecting my voyage to St Petersburg. I will give your Excellency no further trouble at present, but as any new matter may arise, I will continue to give Congress, through you, the earliest information of it.

I am, with the greatest respect, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Paris, April 4th, 1781.

Sir,

If the packet, which I sent off for L'Orient early this morning comes safe to hand, your Excellency will receive a copy of my letter of the 31st ultimo, to his Excellency the Count de Vergennes, communicating to him the general object of my mission, my letter to yourself of the same date, a copy of the Count's answer to me of the 1st instant, proposing a conference with me before my departure, and my answer to _that_ of the 2d, together with my letter of the same date to you.

I hurried these away, because I conceived the Count's letter clearly manifested the sentiments of his Majesty's Minister on the subject of my mission, and was afraid the opportunity of sending them would otherwise be lost. Whether I was too hasty in this opinion formed upon his letter, Congress will judge. However that may be, I am happy to say, that in the conference I had with his Excellency this morning, (being, at my particular desire, introduced to him by Dr Franklin) I did not perceive that he had formed any fixed judgment upon it. Though he opened the conference with ideas perfectly consonant with those I had supposed him to entertain on the subject, yet, when I had explained to him my proposed line of conduct, he did not persist in them. He seemed rather to have desired an opportunity of communicating to me his reflections, by way of caution and advice, than as serious objections to the mission itself.

He asked if I had any particular object of negotiation in view, to which I answered, that I had communicated the general object of my mission in my first letter to him, that I had it not in contemplation to precipitate any negotiation whatever, that I did not think it agreeable to the design of Congress, and that I certainly would never expose them to any indignities; that it was thought by Congress expedient to have some person at St Petersburg, with an eventual character, who might improve the favorable moment for assuming it. He inquired whether I had received any assurances from that country, that my residence in it would be acceptable. I told him, a gentleman, not a native of the country, had written from thence, that some persons of rank, whether they were connected with the Court at all I could not say, had expressed their wishes that some person should be sent there from America, capable of giving information of the state of our affairs.

He observed, that Russia had not acknowledged the independence of America, that British influence was not done away at St Petersburg; that if I went, it would be supposed that I had some object in view, and there being no visible one, I being an American, would be supposed to have some political views, some eventual character, which might expose me, if I had not permission to reside there, as he expressed himself, to some _desagrements_. I answered to this effect. That I should appear as a mere private gentleman, travelling with a view of obtaining some knowledge of that country; that whatever suppositions of the sort might be made, the Court would always have it in their power to deny they knew anything about me; and while I held such a line of conduct, I did not imagine they would consider themselves at all concerned in the matter. On the other hand, if I asked permission and obtained it, the British Court would consider that as a proof of the part which Russia meant finally to take, and would immediately act in consequence of it; that it would, perhaps, embarrass the Court of St Petersburg unnecessarily. I added, I wished only to lay before his Excellency my ideas upon the subject, and begged him not to think it was my intention to press this point; that I had a perfect confidence in him (and did not fail to assure him of that of Congress) and wished for his advice; that I should always pay the highest respect to it, and should follow it in matters left to my discretion.

I put one general question to him, whether he thought my going would be injurious to our common interest? To which I did not receive a direct answer, but he advised me to mention my design of going to Petersburg to the Minister at the Hague. I asked him if he would permit me to make use of his name; but this did not comport with his idea of the matter, which was, to keep my eventual character out of sight, and to propose the journey only as a private gentleman of America, desirous of seeing that country, and of inquiring into the nature and state of its commerce, &c. I am not yet wholly reconciled to this step, for if, unhappily, my first apprehensions are well founded, it would be exceedingly easy here, to lay an insurmountable obstacle in my way. While I am making this observation, I feel a concern, lest it might be ungenerous. Besides, it has a strange appearance to me, for a private gentleman of one country to ask the public Minister of another, both being in amity together, whether it is safe or proper for him to travel into the other. The Minister would be apt to wonder what could give rise to such an inquiry, when the Americans are travelling into all other countries without molestation. But I will consult Dr Franklin and Mr Adams on this point.

In the course of our conversation, the Count told me that the resolutions of Congress with which I am particularly charged, (these are my words and not his) had been well received on the part of Russia. This, doubtless, will give Congress satisfaction, as it seems to show a friendly disposition in that Court towards us. If no accident intervenes to prevent it, I shall set off for Holland next Sunday, from whence I hope to be in season to send your Excellency duplicates of the whole. I shall be happy if my conduct thus far meets the approbation of Congress.

I am, with the greatest respect, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

TO B. FRANKLIN.

Paris, April 6th, 1781.

Sir,

Having, agreeably to my instructions as well as my own inclinations, laid before your Excellency all the papers, which I have received from Congress relative to my mission to the Court of St Petersburg, and my correspondence with his Excellency, the Count de Vergennes, in consequence of the same, for the benefit of your good counsel, and as you were so kind, at my particular request, as to introduce me to the Count, at the conference we had last Wednesday, upon the subject of my mission, and heard the whole, I hope you will not think I give you any unnecessary trouble when I request you to favor me, in writing, with your opinion upon the following matters. Whether, on the whole, you conceived the Count to have any objection to the mission itself? Or whether you considered his reflections upon the subject, rather intended as cautions and advice to me, respecting the conduct he would wish me to hold in the business? Whether you supposed him, finally, to make any real objections to my going to St Petersburg, in the character of only a private American gentleman, and there waiting for the favorable moment for opening my eventual character? And whether, all circumstances considered, your Excellency thinks it expedient for me to proceed to St Petersburg in a private character only, and there to wait as abovementioned?

You will not, I presume, think I mean anything particular in my request, when I assure you I shall likewise ask of Mr Adams his opinion, in writing, upon the same subject. Being directed by Congress to consult you and him, I am desirous only to have it in my power, in case of the death of either of you, to show them I have done so, as well as the result itself; and that I have paid, as I shall do, a proper respect and attention to your opinions and advice in the whole of the business.

I am, with the greatest respect, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

_P. S._ I shall set off for Holland on Sunday morning, and shall cheerfully take your commands.

* * * * *

B. FRANKLIN TO FRANCIS DANA.

Passy, April 7th, 1781.

Sir,

I received the letter you yesterday did me the honor of writing to me, requesting my opinion, in writing, relative to the conference you had with his Excellency, the Count de Vergennes last Wednesday, I being present; and also as to the expediency of your proceeding to St Petersburg; which request I willingly comply with as follows.

_Question 1._ "Whether, on the whole, I conceived the Count to have any objections to the mission itself?"

_Answer._ He did not make any such objections, nor did he drop any expression, by which it might be supposed he had any such in his mind.

_Question 2._ "Whether I considered his reflections upon the subject to be rather intended as cautions and advice to you, respecting the conduct he wished you to hold in the business?"

_Answer._ His Excellency expressed his apprehensions, that if you went thither under a public character before the disposition of the Court was known, and its consent obtained, it might be thought improper, and be attended with inconvenience; and, if I remember right, he intimated the propriety of your consulting the Ambassador at the Hague.

_Question 3._ "Whether I supposed him finally to make any real objections to your going to St Petersburg, in the character only of a private American gentleman, and there waiting the favorable moment of opening your eventual character?"

_Answer._ His objections were, that though you should not avow your public character, yet if known to be an American, who had been in public employ, it would be suspected, that you had such a character, and the British Minister there might exert himself to procure you "_quelques desagrements_," i. e. chagrins or mortifications. And that unless you appeared to have some other object in visiting St Petersburg, your being an American, would alone give strong grounds for such suspicions. But when you mentioned, that you might appear to have views of commerce, as a merchant, or of curiosity as a traveller, &c. that there was a gentleman at St Petersburg with whom some in America had a correspondence, and who had given hints of the utility there might be in having an American in Russia, who could give true intelligence of the state of our affairs, and prevent or refute misrepresentations, &c. and that you could, perhaps, by means of that gentleman, make acquaintance, and thence procure useful information of the state of commerce, the country, the Court, &c. he seemed less to disapprove of your going directly.

As to my own opinion, which you require, though I have long imagined that we let ourselves down, in offering our alliance before it is desired, and that it would have been better if we had never issued commissions for Ministers to the Courts of Spain, Vienna, Prussia, Tuscany, or Holland, till we had first privately learnt, whether they would be received, since a refusal from one is an actual slight, that lessens our reputation, and makes others less willing to form a connexion with us; yet since your commission is given, and the Congress seem to expect, though I think they do not absolutely require that you should proceed to St Petersburg immediately, I conceive (that assuming only a private character for the present, as you propose) it will be right for you to go, unless on consulting Mr Adams, you should find reason to judge, that under the present circumstances of the proposed mediation, &c. a delay for some time would be more advisable.

With great esteem, and best wishes for your success, &c.

B. FRANKLIN.

* * * * *

TO JOHN ADAMS.

Leyden, April 18th, 1781.

Sir,

I feel myself happy, that Congress have made it my duty to consult your Excellency upon the mission, with which they have charged me, for the Court of St Petersburg. To this end I have already laid before you all the papers, which I have received from Congress, any way relating to it, and also my correspondence with his Excellency, the Count de Vergennes, and Dr Franklin, upon the same subject, as well as my letters to the President of Congress from the time I received this commission. From all these your Excellency will be fully instructed in the several matters, on which I wish to have the benefit of your advice; but to bring some of them more immediately under your view, I beg leave to state the following questions.

Whether all circumstances considered, your Excellency thinks it expedient for me to proceed to St Petersburg, in the character of a private citizen of the United States only, and to wait there for a favorable moment to announce my public character?

Or whether, previous to my going in such a character, you judge it expedient for me to communicate my design to Prince Gallitzin, Ambassador at the Hague (secreting from him at the same time my public character) and to take his opinion thereon, according to the intimation given to me by the Count de Vergennes at our conference?

Whether it is advisable to communicate my real character to the Court of St Petersburg, and to ask their permission before I undertake the journey?

Whether in case you think it advisable for me to proceed to St Petersburg, in a private character only, without further communications to any one, you conceive it to be the intention of Congress, that I should present their resolutions, relative to the rights of neutral vessels, to the Court of St Petersburg on my arrival there, or whether this is left to my discretion, to be regulated by the then state of affairs at that Court?

Your Excellency will readily perceive the propriety of my writing to you on this business, although we have already had a conference upon it, and my requesting your sentiments in writing also. I shall be happy to make a more particular communication of my own sentiments and views, in further conversation, if you think it needful, before you give me yours.

I am, with the greatest respect, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

JOHN ADAMS TO FRANCIS DANA.

Leyden, April 18th, 1781.

Dear Sir,

I am at no loss what advice to give you in answer to the questions in your letter of this day, because they relate to a subject on which I have long reflected, and have formed an opinion as fully as my understanding is capable of. I think then it is necessary for you to prepare for a journey to St Petersburg without loss of time, that you travel in the character of a gentleman, without any distinction of public or private, as far as the publication of your appointment already made in France will permit.

I should think it altogether improper to communicate your design to the Ambassador of travelling to St Petersburg as a private gentleman, secreting from him at the same time your public character. It would expose you to something very disagreeable. The Ambassador would ask you, why you asked his advice when it is well known that private gentlemen travel in every country in Europe without molestation. Besides, the Ambassador I have reason to believe, would not give you any advice without instructions from his Court, and this would require so much time, that the most favorable opportunity which now presents itself would be lost. And after applying to the Ambassador, and being advised against the journey, or to postpone it for instructions from his Court, it would be less respectful to go, than to go now, when the circumstances of the times are very favorable.

The same reason applies equally against writing to the Court beforehand. The best opportunity would be lost, and the Court would never encourage you to come, until they had determined to receive you, and you would have no opportunity to assist the deliberations upon the subject, by throwing in any light, by answering objections, or explaining the views of Congress.

After your arrival at St Petersburg, I should advise you, unless upon the spot you discover reasons against it, unknown to us at present, to communicate your character and mission to ---- or the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in confidence, asking his advice, but at the same time presenting him a memorial ready prepared for the ----. If he informs you, if it is best for you to reside there as a private gentleman, or to travel for a time into Sweden or Denmark, or to return here to Holland, where I shall be happy to have your company and counsels, take his advice.

The United States of America have nothing dishonorable to propose to any Court or country. If the wishes of America, which are for the good of all nations, as they apprehend, are not deemed by such Courts or nations consistent with their views and interest, of which they are the supreme judges, they will candidly say so, and there is no harm done. On the contrary, Congress will be applauded for their candor and good intentions. You will make your communication to the French Ambassador of course, according to your instructions. This method was taken by this Republic in her struggle with Spain, nay it was taken by the Republican Parliament in England, and by Oliver Cromwell. It was taken by Switzerland and Portugal, in similar cases, with great success. Why it should be improper now I know not.

I conceive it to be the intention of Congress, that you should communicate their resolutions relative to the rights of neutral vessels, and I am the more entirely of this opinion, because I have already communicated those resolutions to their High Mightinesses, the States-General, and to their Excellencies the Ministers of Russia, Denmark, and Sweden, at the Hague, in pursuance of the letters I had received from the President, and I should now think it improper in me to sign a treaty according to those resolutions, if invited thereto, because it would be interfering with your department.

America, my Dear Sir, has been too long silent in Europe. Her cause is that of all nations, and all men; and it needs nothing but to be explained to be approved. At least these are my sentiments. I have reasons in my mind, which were unknown to their Excellencies, the Count de Vergennes, and Dr Franklin, when you consulted them; reasons which it is improper for me to explain at present. But the reasons I have given appear to me conclusive. No measure of Congress was ever taken in a more proper time, or with more wisdom in my opinion, than the appointment of a Minister at the Hague, and at St Petersburg. The effects of it may not appear in sudden and brilliant success, but the time was exactly chosen, and the happy fruits of it will appear in their course.

Although I shall be personally a sufferer by your appointment, yet I sincerely rejoice in it for the public good. When our enemies have formed alliances with so many Princes in Germany, and so many savage nations against us, when they are borrowing so much of the wealth of Germany, Italy, Holland, and Switzerland, to be employed against us, no wise Court or reasonable man, can blame us for proposing to form relations with countries, whose interests it is to befriend us. An excess of modesty and reserve is an excess still. It was no dishonor to us to propose a treaty to France, nor for our Ministers to reside there more than a year, without being acknowledged. On the contrary, all wise men applauded the measure, and I am confident the world in general will now approve of an application to the maritime powers, although we should remain without a public reception, as long as our Ministers did in France and Spain, nay, although we should be rejected. In this case, Congress and their constituents will all be satisfied. They will have neglected no duty in their power; and the world will then see the power and resources of three or four millions of virtuous men, inhabiting a fine country, when contending for everything which renders life worth supporting. The United States will then fix a medium, establish taxes for the payment of interest, acquire the confidence of her own capitalists, and borrow money at home, and when this is done, they will find capitalists abroad willing enough to venture in their funds.

With ardent wishes for your health and success, I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

TO EDMUND JENNINGS.

Amsterdam, April 26th, 1781.

Dear Sir,

Have you an inclination to favor me with your company to a certain place, where you seemed to think the presence of an American might be very useful to our country? I have it not in my power to make you any advantageous proffers, but perhaps it may be nearly equal to you to reside at Petersburg or Brussels. It may eventually be turned much to your benefit and honor.

I need not be more particular on this subject, or to request you to keep it to yourself. If my loose proposition meets your approbation, you will please to hasten on here, _without loss of time_, as I must go forward soon. If you wish to confer with me before you decide, come on immediately, but prepared, however, to proceed with me, in case you think proper to agree to my proposals. Your expenses here and back again shall be paid, if you choose to return. I should be very happy to have your good company, and the assistance of your abilities.

I am, Dear Sir, your sincere friend, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

EDMUND JENNINGS TO FRANCIS DANA.

Brussels, May 3d, 1781.

Dear Sir,

I had the honor of receiving your letters of the 26th and 29th ultimo, by the last post, containing a most obliging invitation to accompany you on some intended tour. It came upon me quite unexpected, and when I had arranged matters to go a very different course, and therefore embarrassed me much. However your very kind manner of holding up to me the most flattering object that I have or ought to have, the service of my country, determined me immediately to accept of your invitation, and I am now laboring hard to settle my little matters, here and elsewhere, that I may present myself to you at Amsterdam, without loss of time. I am afraid, however, that I shall not be able to accomplish it before the middle of next week. Should you think you ought not to stay so long, I beg, that no consideration for me should prevent you from making that despatch, which the public service may require.

I am, with the greatest respect, &c.

EDMUND JENNINGS.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Amsterdam, May 13th, 1781.

Sir,

I do myself the honor to transmit to your Excellency the duplicates of the papers, which have been already sent from France. To these are added others, which will give to Congress precise information of everything, which has hitherto taken place relative to my late appointment, that can be of any importance to them to know.

I shall not trouble you with observations upon any of them, except the letter of Dr Franklin, and merely to correct one or two mistakes in his account of my conference with the Count de Vergennes. The Doctor says, "when I mentioned that I might appear to have _views of commerce, as a merchant_, or of curiosity as a traveller," &c.--"that there was a gentleman in Petersburg with whom some _in America_ had a correspondence, who had given hints of the utility," &c.--"and that I could _perhaps by means of that gentleman_ make acquaintance," &c. Persuaded as I was from the beginning, that it could not be for the interest of our country, that I should be stopped short of my destination, and determined to endeavor to obviate every objection, which might be made to my going on, I told the Count, when he seemed to be stating a difficulty arising from my public character, that I could appear as a private gentleman, travelling with a view of obtaining some knowledge of that country. I added, indeed, of its laws, customs, manners, _commerce_, manufactures, &c. The character of a merchant in those countries is not so respectable as to recommend itself to my choice, when I wished to form connexions with a different order of men. As I did not know of any gentleman at Petersburg, with whom some _in America_ had a correspondence, I could never inform his Excellency of such a circumstance. The fact was quite otherwise, and that part of our conversation was introduced in the manner, and was exactly of the tenor mentioned in my account of the conference. I have a personal knowledge of the gentleman I alluded to; he named the persons of rank, but I did not think it prudent to give their names to the Count. Perhaps I may have the honor to form an acquaintance with persons of some consideration in the country to which I am going, without laying myself under obligations to that gentleman.

I shall set out from hence in a few days on my journey, probably without consulting the Russian Ambassador at the Hague, as I am not yet more reconciled to this step than I was when it was first proposed to me. Mr Adams, your Excellency will perceive, is decidedly against it. We have given our reasons. To these may be added, that to communicate my design of going into his country, and secreting from him at the same time, my public character, if by such means I might obtain his advice and passport to proceed, whenever my real character should be made known, he would perhaps consider it as a mean artifice and an imposition upon him, which he could not overlook, especially when the act of giving his advice or passport (though I have no expectation he would do either) might expose him, or his Court, or both, to all the consequences of having done so, with the full knowledge of my character; for declarations of ignorance in that respect would gain little credit. On the whole, I see no one good purpose that such a consultation as has been recommended to me, would produce, but, on the contrary, I think I see many mischiefs, which might come out of it.

Not thinking it prudent to go on farther unaccompanied by any person in whose hands, in case of my death or accident, your papers and affairs may be safely lodged, for the future advantage of Congress, I have invited Mr Edmund Jennings, a native American, and a gentleman whose character, I believe, may be known to some of the members of Congress, not only to accompany me on my journey but to remain with me there. I promise myself he will be able to afford me much essential assistance in the execution of my duty. I did not, however, take this step till I had communicated my design to Mr Adams, who well knew Mr Jennings, and found that it met his full approbation. I enclose (over and above the other papers) my letter to Mr Jennings on this occasion, and his answer to me. I hope Congress will not disapprove of this measure. I have no other end in it than to promote the interests of our country, in obtaining the assistance of his abilities, and to guard against an event, which may take place, and I think common prudence forbids should be left wholly unprovided for.

I am, Sir, with sentiments of the highest respect, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Amsterdam, May 20th, 1781.

Sir,

I do myself the honor to transmit to your Excellency certain papers, which are duplicates of such as have not been sent off from France. Your Excellency will receive the whole from hence in the South Carolina, commanded by Commodore Gillon, if she arrives safe. If not, the arrival of those from France, together with these by Captain Newman, for Newburyport, will supply them.

I shall not trouble your Excellency with any political matters from hence, because you will, doubtless, be fully informed about them by Mr Adams. I shall hope for early information from our country of every important event, civil or military. I perceive, with much pleasure, that Congress are about adopting a solid system of finance, which will, doubtless, meet with the cordial support of all the States in the Union. When this system shall be established, I hope the Committee of Foreign Affairs, or some others to whom it may belong, will not fail to transmit some account of it, with any observations which may be necessary to explain it. In my separate department, where there is yet little or no good information touching the state of our country, it may be more necessary to pay a particular attention to this business.

I am, with the highest sentiments of respect and esteem, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Berlin, July 28th, 1781.

Sir,

I beg leave to acquaint your Excellency, that after having been detained at Amsterdam more than a month from the time I myself was ready to enter upon my journey, in hopes of being accompanied by Mr Jennings, I have been exceedingly disappointed, that that gentleman has thought himself under the necessity to decline going with me, on account of certain circumstances, which have since turned up in his own affairs.

I left Amsterdam on the 7th instant, (Mr Adams having gone from thence for Paris on the 2d, upon a special call of which he will, doubtless, give your Excellency the earliest notice) and arrived in this city on the 25th, very much indisposed. I thought it expedient to take my route to this city, through Cologne, Frankfort, and Leipsic, though not the common or shortest one, to avoid passing through Hanover, lest my motions should have been watched in Holland, and notice given of my passing through Hanover, which might have brought on the seizure of my person and papers.

I have been unfortunate in having my carriage overthrown and broken in pieces, between Leipsic and Berlin; happily, however, no other injury was sustained. I mention this circumstance, because it not only lays me under the necessity of purchasing another here, (for there is no travelling in these countries tolerably without a private carriage) but it will detain me several days extraordinary. Though I am not quite well, I shall set off as soon as the carriage I have bought can be properly fitted for so long a journey, for no less than fifteen hundred of our miles are still before me; and the route far from being the most pleasant in Europe, yet I should go through it with much alacrity, if I had well grounded hopes that at the end, I should find matters in the state we wish them to be.

As I have no faith on the one hand, that the present mediation of the Emperor and Empress will issue in a pacification, general or partial, so, on the other, I as little expect that it will suddenly light up other wars. It is probable, nothing of the latter kind can take place, without this kingdom having a portion in it, and I have not yet been able to learn, that there is the least expectation of the sort here, which most commonly goes before the act. I suppose, therefore, that the belligerent powers will still continue belligerent, and that the mediators will hope for a more favorable opportunity to renew their mediation, and to make their particular advantage of the conflict. It seems to me it has been accepted by them, (America only excepted, to whom it has not been tendered) rather out of respect, or to avoid giving offence to the mediators, or to seek an advantage by discovering a ready disposition to hearken to every proposition having the least possible tendency to bring about a pacification.

Not one of the belligerent powers, I believe, has an expectation, or a sincere wish that a pacification will, or should be brought about at present. Spain wishes to possess herself of Gibraltar and of the Floridas; can she now hope that these will be ceded to her? Does she not flatter herself, that by the continuance of the war, Britain will become so enfeebled, that they may be wrested from her? That having once obtained them by conquest, she will easily retain them at a peace? France wishes to establish herself, in the place of Britain, the dominant power of Europe; to this end, she sees that it is necessary to snatch the trident from the hand of Britain, and to wield it herself. To effect this, _she knows well, that America must be supported in her independence_. But is the time yet come, when she can reasonably hope, that both the mediators are prepared to make this last measure a proposition in their mediation, or Britain to acknowledge it?

Great Britain, in my opinion, wishes not to make a separate peace with America, that she may be able to exert her whole force against the House of Bourbon, as many of her popular leaders have frequently expressed themselves. This would be humbling herself in a point on which she is most obstinately fixed. Much sooner would she humble herself before her ancient enemies, provided she could flatter herself, that by doing this, she might make a separate peace with them, and be thereby at liberty to direct her whole force against the United States. In this case she would cherish the hope, that America seeing herself forsaken by her new allies, and exposed singly to the whole power of Britain, might either be induced once more to submit to her domination, or would become an easy conquest, in part at least. So little wisdom, it is probable, experience has taught them. But is there the least hope for Britain, that her ancient enemies are prepared to give up their new friends? Does not their own safety and importance in the political system, absolutely depend upon supporting the independence of our country?

Of Holland or the United Provinces, I know not what to say. They can scarce be ranked among the belligerent powers. The objects of Holland are peace, with that freedom to her commerce, which she had a right to demand in virtue of treaties, which Britain has annulled; as also restitution of her conquered territories, and reparation of the destruction committed upon her navigation. Britain will not gratify Holland in any of these respects, unless she grants the aids claimed, and thereby plunges herself into the war against the House of Bourbon and America, which she can never do. Thus a partial pacification between them is not likely to take place.

America will not consent that the independence of her empire shall be brought into question, or that her rights and claims shall be litigated and adjusted in a Congress, in which she is not properly represented by her Minister. Nevertheless, these things will, I am persuaded, be attempted, and I fear they will not meet with a very vigorous opposition from a quarter, which we have a right to expect should stoutly oppose them.[18] Should a Congress be assembled in this half matured state of things, is there any reasonable ground to hope that the professed design of it, a general pacification, can be accomplished? The determination of such bodies, are, however, so frequently influenced by improper motives, that he who concludes that such a matter cannot be the result merely because it ought not to be, may find himself egregiously deceived in the end.

Thus I have attempted to give a sketch of my sentiments relative to the business of a mediation; but Congress will probably receive a much more particular and satisfactory account of it from a much more able hand, who has besides better information, and is now more immediately connected with it. I have said I should go through the fatigues of my journey with much alacrity, if I had well grounded hopes, that at the end I should find matters in the state we wish them to be. I do not form any strong conclusion from the answer of the Empress to the United Provinces. What could they expect from her when they had so shamefully neglected any preparations necessary even for their own defence, and seemed not to be half decided about making any. But the following memorial of the French Ambassador at her Court, taken in conjunction with the present retirement of Count Panin, her Prime Minister, seems to denote an essential change in the system of the Court of St Petersburg.

"_St Petersburg, 12th of June._ Friday last the Minister of the Court of Versailles had a conference with Count Osterman, Vice Chancellor of the Empire, and delivered him a memorial of the following import.

'Representations upon the continual proceedings of the English against the commerce and navigation of the neutral nations, upon the little activity of these last to prevent these arbitrary proceedings, and to support the principles of their declarations made to the belligerent powers, and the convention of neutrality, which has been concluded between them; upon the prejudice which will naturally result therefrom to all nations; and upon the desire which the King his master has, that it should be remedied by the vigorous co-operation of her Imperial Majesty; seeing that otherwise the said association of neutrality would be turned but to the benefit of the enemies of France, and that the King who has himself to the present time, exactly conformed to the principles of the above mentioned declaration and convention of neutrality, will find himself, though with regret, under the indispensable necessity of changing in like manner the system which he has hitherto pursued respecting the commerce and navigation of neutrals, and to order and regulate that according to the conduct which the English themselves pursue, and which has been so patiently borne by the neutral nations; objects upon the subject matter of which, his Majesty has nevertheless thought, that he ought to suspend his final resolution, until he should have concerted measures with her Imperial Majesty upon this business.'"

As Mr Adams had left Amsterdam before this memorial appeared, I could not have the benefit of his judgment upon it, but I am so thoroughly acquainted with his political sentiments, that I believe I may say, it would have made no alteration in his opinion touching the expediency of my going forward. It certainly has made none in mine on that point, though it has indeed given me some reason to apprehend, that at present the prospect of success is not so good as before. The experiment ought to be made, what are the real dispositions of that Court towards us, or what they would be if they were better and properly informed about us. Britain most certainly has been industrious in concealing the real state of things from them, and there has not been any one there to counteract her. By this step we shall at least have the satisfaction of knowing whether the Empress wishes to take any friendly concern in our affairs; a point of knowledge perhaps not altogether unprofitable, though it should turn out contrary to our wishes, as it may prevent our amusing ourselves vainly with expectations of important assistance from Europe, and teach us one wholesome lesson, that America, under the blessing of God, must depend more upon her own exertions, for the happy establishment of her great political interests.

I think it my duty to apprize Congress, that I have no expectation of any essential support in my commission there, though I shall be careful to appear to be persuaded of the contrary, so long as I may do so without injuring our cause. I doubt whether it is natural for us to expect this support in any part of Europe, for when a nation thinks it will insure to itself a powerful influence over another by being its only friend and ally, why should it seek to procure it other allies, who, by their friendly offices and support, will have a share of that influence, and nearly in the same proportion as the new friends gain it, the old ones must lose it? Some may act upon such a principle. I may, in some future letter, give you more particular reasons, why I am persuaded we ought not to expect any real support, in our attempts to form new alliances, and why the Ministers of Congress in Europe should be encouraged in pursuing a more independent line of conduct. I am sensible this is a matter of much delicacy, and that appearances of the most perfect confidence should be kept up as long as possible. I am sensible, also, that the man who thinks thus, and who wishes to act in conformity to his own sentiments, exposes himself to secret and malicious attacks, which may frequently wound, if not destroy his moral and political reputation, if he has any; but it becomes our duty to think freely, and to communicate freely on some matters, and I hope we may do so _safely_; otherwise, there is an end of all beneficial correspondence, and expectations of rendering any essential services to our country.

I crave your Excellency's pardon for the length of this letter, and beg leave to subscribe myself, with the highest respect, and most perfect esteem, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

FOOTNOTES:

[18] This doubtless refers to France, but the suspicion was not well founded, for when a pacification was proposed through the mediation of Russia and Austria, the Court of France insisted on an express _preliminary condition_, that the United States should be represented by their Ministers as _an independent power_ in the negotiations for peace. It was on this account alone, that England refused to come into the plan of the mediation.

* * * * *

TO THE MARQUIS DE VERAC, FRENCH MINISTER AT ST PETERSBURG.

St Petersburg, August 30th, 1781.

Mr Dana begs leave to acquaint his Excellency, the Marquis de Verac, that he has arrived in town, and proposes to do himself the honor of paying his respectful compliments to his Excellency, as the Minister of the sovereign in alliance with his country, at any hour, which shall be most agreeable to him.

Mr Dana is silent at present with regard to himself, presuming that his Excellency has been already informed by his Excellency, the Count de Vergennes, of his intended journey to this place, and of some circumstances, which have opened the nature of his business.

* * * * *

THE MARQUIS DE VERAC TO FRANCIS DANA.

Translation.

Thursday, August 30th, 1781.

The Marquis de Verac has the honor to present his compliments to Mr Dana, and is very happy to hear of his arrival, which he had been prepared to expect by the Count de Vergennes; he will be flattered to make his acquaintance, and to assure him of his eagerness to render him any service in his power in this country.

* * * * *

TO THE MARQUIS DE VERAC, AMBASSADOR FROM FRANCE.

St Petersburg, September 1st, 1781.[19]

Sir,

I have the honor to acquaint your Excellency, that the Congress of the United States of America have been pleased to charge me with a commission as their Minister at the Court of St Petersburg, and that they have also particularly instructed me to make a communication of the general object of my mission to his Most Christian Majesty's Minister at the same Court. This last measure was doubtless the effect of that full confidence they have, not only in his Majesty and his Ministers in general, but in your Excellency in an especial manner, and is strongly expressive of their earnest wish and persuasion, that their negotiations at this Court may, and will be conducted in perfect harmony with those of his Majesty, and that they rest assured, that his benevolence and friendship towards the United States and the general cause of humanity, are sufficient inducements to draw forth the most powerful aid and support of his Majesty in the business of this mission; the general object of which is, to engage her Imperial Majesty to favor and support the sovereignty and independence of the United States of America, and to lay a foundation for a good understanding and friendly intercourse between the subjects of her Imperial Majesty and the citizens of the United States, to the mutual advantage of both nations, and consistent with the treaties subsisting between his Most Christian Majesty and the United States.

Thus a foundation is laid in this quarter, the more strongly to cement the interests and affections of our two countries. And I feel myself inexpressibly happy, that it has fallen to my lot to be connected in this business with a person so distinguished as well for his benevolence of heart as for the eminence of his abilities; and I flatter myself your Excellency will at all times be ready to afford me every assistance in your power, which I may need in the execution of my mission.

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

FOOTNOTES:

[19] Almost all Mr Dana's letters from Russia were dated in the _Old Style_. In preparing them for the press, the dates have been altered to _New Style_.

* * * * *

THE MARQUIS DE VERAC TO FRANCIS DANA.

Translation.

St Petersburg, September 2d, 1781.

Sir,

I have received the letter, which you did me the honor to write to me yesterday, and I cannot too strongly express to you how sensible I am of the mark of confidence, which you have shown me, in communicating the views proposed by the Congress of the United States of America, when they decided to send you to the Court of Russia as their Minister Plenipotentiary to the Empress. You know, Sir, the deep interest, which the King takes in the cause of the United States, and you need not doubt, that I shall be anxious to render you here all the services in my power, and which the circumstances of place and persons will permit.

At this moment I cannot better reciprocate your confidence than by making you acquainted with the general dispositions of her Imperial Majesty in regard to the powers at war. From the commencement of hostilities, this sovereign has made it a point of honor to hold the balance perfectly equal between the different parties, taking particular care not to manifest any kind of preference, by carefully avoiding every advance, which could indicate the slightest partiality in favor of either of the belligerent powers to the prejudice of the others. It is this equitable and perfectly impartial conduct, which has determined the Courts of the House of Bourbon, as well as that of London and the States-General, to accept the offers of this Princess, when she proposed to terminate their differences by a mediation conjointly with that of the Emperor; and you are certainly not ignorant, Sir, that her first plan of pacification has been sent to all the Courts, that are interested. I confide to you, also, that the United States of America are to take a part in it, and that these august mediators desire that your Deputies may be admitted to the Congress, which shall regulate the pretensions of the belligerent powers, that they may there be able to debate and discuss their own interests. Thus you have in few words the state of things at the Court of Russia, and you will readily comprehend, that her Imperial Majesty, not wishing to dissatisfy the Court of London more than those of Versailles and Madrid, abstains with the greatest possible care from showing any particular inclination for the American cause.

Under these circumstances, Sir, it is very doubtful whether the Cabinet of her Imperial Majesty will consent to recognise the Minister of a power, which has not as yet, in their eyes, a political existence, and expose themselves to the complaints, which the Court of London will not fail to make against an indication of favor so public. I ought, therefore, to desire you to reflect much before you display the character with which you are clothed, or make advances which will be more injurious than beneficial to the success of your views. It is not now as the Minister of the King, that I have the honor to speak, but as a man whom the residence of a year in this place has furnished with local knowledge, which you cannot have acquired. If, however, you overcome this difficulty, if you commence a negotiation with the Russian Minister, and will do me the honor to make me acquainted with it, you need not doubt that I shall strive most cheerfully to second you in everything, which shall concern the common interest. Be persuaded, moreover, that on the occasions when I shall deem it my duty to remain inactive, it will be because I am well satisfied, that any advance on my part would be injurious to one, without any advantage to the other.

I can add nothing to the sincerity of my wishes for the success of your mission, or to the distinguished sentiments with which I have the honor to be, &c.

THE MARQUIS DE VERAC.

_P. S._ I ought to inform you, that the Count Panin and the Count d'Ostermann do not understand English; this will render your communications with these Ministers difficult.

* * * * *

TO THE MARQUIS DE VERAC.

St Petersburg, September 4th, 1781.

Sir,

I have received the letter, which your Excellency did me the honor to write to me yesterday, in answer to mine of the day before, communicating to you the general object of my mission.

It is impossible for me to express the obligations I feel myself under to your Excellency, for letting yourself so readily, and with so much frankness, into the state of affairs at this Court, so far as I could have any concern in them, and for your confidential communication respecting the proposition for the admission of the American Minister into the proposed Congress; a proposition founded in eternal justice, and which cannot fail to reflect immortal glory upon the august mediators. Although I had before been acquainted with this, and also that the Court of London had rejected the mediation on that very account, yet I deemed it so very productive an event, and of so much importance to the interests of my country, that I had proposed, after being honored with your answer to my first, to write to your Excellency upon that subject, and also to request your sentiments and opinions upon the actual state of things at this Court, but your goodness has anticipated my design.

You will not impute it to a proper want of respect for your sentiments and opinions, if I presume to raise some doubts, and to make some reflections upon them. For whether they come from the Marquis de Verac, or from the Minister of France, they make an equal impression upon my mind, and it is at present a matter of indifference to me. The wisdom of her Imperial Majesty, in making it, as you express yourself, "from the moment the first hostilities commenced, a point of honor to hold the balance perfectly equal between the different parties, taking particular care not to manifest any kind of preference, by carefully avoiding every advance, which could indicate the slightest partiality in favor of either of the belligerent powers to the prejudice of the others," cannot be too much admired. But it would be paying an ill compliment to that penetration, for which her Majesty is so justly celebrated, to suppose, that she did not also from that very moment clearly discover the importance of the American revolution, at least to all the maritime powers of Europe, and that it was the only basis, upon which could be erected her favorite and just system, of equal freedom and commerce and navigation to all nations.

She might hope to obtain this great end, and to acquire the glory of mediating between the belligerent powers at one and the same time. Upon this supposition, that exact neutrality she has hitherto held, was both wise and necessary. It was necessary above all, that she should abstain, with the greatest care, from manifesting a particular inclination for the cause of America. It seems her system of politics must have undergone an essential change, and that it has now become absolutely impossible for her Imperial Majesty any longer to conceal her particular inclination for the cause of America, since she, in conjunction with the Emperor has proposed, that the Minister of the United States, should be admitted into the Congress for settling the pretensions of the belligerent powers, and there to debate himself, and discuss their proper interests. This is to rank America (as in fact she stands) among the belligerent powers, and, in a manner, to acknowledge her independence. It is making a much larger stride towards it, I confess, than I expected would have been made in the first plan of pacification. That they must come to it at last, I have been long firmly persuaded.

I must take the liberty to differ in opinion from your Excellency, when you say, in the present circumstances, it is very doubtful whether the Ministry of her Imperial Majesty will acknowledge a Minister from the United States of America, more especially when I reflect upon the principal reasons you assign for this opinion. I can no longer consider myself as "the Minister of a power, which has not as yet, in her eyes, a political existence." It is difficult to conceive upon what ground her Imperial Majesty could propose that a Minister appointed for the express purpose, by the United States of America, in Congress assembled, should be admitted into a Congress to be held for settling the pretensions of the belligerent powers, if she did not admit the political existence of that body, and consider it as a complete sovereign. The fact is undeniably true, and no fallacy of our enemies can invalidate it, that the United States of America have been, ever since the 4th of July, 1776, a free, sovereign, and independent body politic. Your illustrious Sovereign made this declaration in the face of the whole world, more than three years since; and I flatter myself the time is now come, when other sovereigns are prepared to make the same, if properly invited to do it. Neither can I imagine, that her Imperial Majesty will now give herself much concern about any groundless complaints, which the Court of London may make against such a public mark of respect for my sovereign, as my open reception in the character of its Minister would be. I cannot but consider her Imperial Majesty's line of conduct, in this respect, decided by the above proposition, which she made as mediator between the belligerent powers. No one could more deeply wound the Court of London. She must have contemplated as probable, at least, what I think might have been almost certainly predicted, namely, the rejection of her mediation by the Court of London, on account of that very proposition, and have resolved upon her measures in consequence of it. She could never have committed the honor and dignity of her Imperial Crown to so improbable a contingency, as the Court of London accepting her mediation upon the terms upon which it was tendered.

Having seen Britain in vain attempting for more than six years, the reduction of the United States, without being able in all that time to conquer one of them; finding them to continue inflexibly firm through all their variety of fortune in the war, and still in full possession of their independence; seeing several of the principal powers of Europe long involved in the contest; having observed between them the strictest neutrality to this moment; and having at last freely tendered her good offices to bring about a general pacification upon the most reasonable and just grounds and principles, which the Court of London has thought proper to reject, still keeping up their absurd claims over the United States; it would seem after all this, that there now remained but one step for her Imperial Majesty to take, consistent with her dignity, (for I presume the mediators cannot withdraw their proposition,) which is, to acknowledge the independence of America, as the most probable means, if not the only one, now left to restore peace to both Europe and America, and effectually to establish freedom of commerce and navigation to all nations.

If the sovereigns of Europe do not see this to be the proper moment for putting the finishing stroke to so glorious a work, when is it to be expected the critical moment will arrive? How long are they likely to wait before they presume to form political connexions with, and enjoy the profitable commerce of the new world? Will they stay till the pride and arrogance of Britain shall be so far humbled, as voluntarily to give up her chimerical claims over the United States, and to invite them into this political connexion?

These are the sentiments and opinions of a man, who feels the want of experience in the business of Courts, and of that local information, both of which your Excellency possesses, in so eminent a degree. It is therefore with much diffidence I venture to differ from yours. I have endeavored to follow that example of frankness you have set me in your communication; and I hope I have treated your sentiments and opinions with all that decency and respect, which everything which may come from you, demands of me. If I am wrong, I trust you will have the goodness to set me right. I have already reflected upon this subject, but I shall most certainly attend to your friendly caution, and reflect again upon it, before I open the character with which I am clothed, and be careful to avoid engaging myself in any measure, which may become more prejudicial than advantageous to the success of my views. On the other hand, when I see no difficulty in adopting the measure I shall presently mention, it becomes my indispensable duty to adopt it, because it appears to me to be betraying the honor and dignity of the United States to seclude myself in a hotel, without making one effort to step forth into political life; besides, I think I owe this also to her Imperial Majesty, who it is possible, may have matured her political plan to the utmost gratification of my wishes. If otherwise, I presume I shall nevertheless be treated in such a manner, as will reflect no dishonor upon the sovereign authority of the United States, or upon myself individually considered. If the experiment is not made, the United States can never be satisfied, that in a juncture apparently so favorable, it would not have succeeded, and their Minister would find it extremely difficult to justify before them a state of absolute inaction.

At present, I should be puzzled for reasons to vindicate such a conduct, while they seem to crowd in upon me in support of a contrary one. The United States trust to the justice of their cause, and the rectitude of their intentions, to open the way for them into the affections of the sovereigns of Europe. They have no sinister, no dishonorable propositions to make to any of them, but such only as they are persuaded will essentially promote the great interests and well being of all. The measure I propose to take, is to make a confidential communication of my public character to the proper Minister of her Majesty, and of the general object of my mission; and perhaps to accompany those with a short memorial to her Majesty. I shall ask and conform to his advice, if he is pleased to give it to me, as to the proper time of presenting the memorial, or taking any other step in the business of my mission; and ask him in the meantime to assure me of the protection of her Majesty. I shall acquaint him, that I have not yet assumed any public character, or made it known to any person but to your Excellency, (in obedience to my instructions,) that I am invested with one, and that I shall not do either without his approbation.

As I have done in this instance, so your Excellency may be persuaded I shall in future make you fully acquainted with any negotiation I may enter upon with the Russian Ministry, because I rely upon the support you have been pleased to assure to me, in everything I may undertake, which may concern the common interests of our two countries, and which you should not think injurious to the one without being beneficial to the other. I must crave your Excellency's pardon for the length of this letter, and hope you will impute that to the desire I have to impart to you fully my sentiments and intentions touching the subject of it.

I have the honor to be, with sentiments of the highest respect, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

THE MARQUIS DE VERAC TO FRANCIS DANA.

Translation.

St Petersburg, September 12th, 1781.

Sir,

In the letter, which I had the honor to write to you on the 2d instant, I made only a passing mention of the article of the plan of pacification proposed by the Courts of Vienna and Petersburg, which stipulates for the admission of deputies from the United States at the Congress. Persuaded, as you appear to have been, that the American Minister would be admitted in the same manner as if their public character were recognised at the moment of their arrival, not only by the belligerent powers, but also by the mediating powers, your reasoning is perfectly just when you say, that one cannot admit and recognise the Minister of a power without recognising the independence and political existence of that power; and hence you conclude it is very possible, that the Court of Petersburg may be in a disposition to recognise voluntarily the character with which you are clothed. This reasoning is equally an evidence of the justice of your views and of your knowledge in the matter of public right. I alone have been wrong not to enter more into detail concerning the article, which you have erected into a principle. But in truth, I refrained from this, because I supposed you were already perfectly acquainted with it. I cannot better repair my omission, than to transcribe the article, as it has been sent to the Courts of Versailles, Madrid, and London. "There shall be a treaty at Vienna, under the mutual direction of the two Imperial Courts, concerning all the objects of the re-establishment of peace, &c." "And there shall at the same time be a treaty between Great Britain and the _American Colonies_ for the re-establishment of peace in America, _but without the intervention of any other belligerent parties, not even that of the two Imperial Courts, unless their mediation shall be formally asked and granted for this object_."[20]

By this the mediating Courts intend, that your deputies shall treat simply with the English Ministers, as they have already treated with them in America in the year 1778; that the result of their negotiations shall make known to the other powers upon what footing they ought to be regarded; and that their public character will be acknowledged without difficulty, from the moment the English themselves interpose no opposition. This plan has been conceived for the purpose of conciliating the strongly opposing pretensions. Have the goodness, Sir, to observe, that I do not say that I approve this scheme. I merely say, that the august mediators have adopted it, in rendering to you an account of the reasons by which they are guided. It is, therefore, clear that their design is to avoid compromiting themselves by acknowledging the independence of the United States, till England herself shall have taken the lead.

You perceive, Sir, that nothing is more conformable to my wishes, than to see Russia acknowledge the independence of the United States. If it depended on me to draw from her this acknowledgment, you would immediately have grounds to be perfectly contented with my efforts. In a word, you cannot doubt, that the Minister of his Most Christian Majesty in Russia takes a warm interest in your cause. But the more I desire your success, the more I feel myself obliged to forewarn you of the difficulties which you have to surmount, and I should betray my duty, if I were voluntarily to leave you in ignorance on so important a point. Invested, as you are, with a public character on the part of a power, whose rights and perfect independence it is my duty to recognise, it does not pertain to me to guide your advances, but the alliance of this same power with the King my master, invites me to acquaint you with all the knowledge, which I have acquired respecting this country, that can be useful to you. It is with the greatest pleasure, Sir, that I fulfil this duty in repeating to you, what I had the honor to say to you in my first letter, that when you shall have succeeded in surmounting the difficulties, which you may meet in causing your public character to be recognised at this Court, you will find me entirely disposed to second you in everything, which shall regard the common interest of our countries, when it shall be probable that my intervention will be agreeable to the Ministers of her Imperial Majesty.

You are too enlightened, Sir, to need my counsels, and much less my approbation. I shall confine myself, therefore, to communicating such facts as shall come to my knowledge, and which may interest you, leaving to your intelligence and discernment the task of combining them and drawing from them the plan of conduct, which you shall think most suitable, being well persuaded, that whatever course you may pursue will be for the best, and most conformable to your interests. I ought to confide to you, therefore, that we are daily expecting the answers of France and of Spain concerning the plan of pacification. When these arrive, we shall know what is intended as to the article relating to the deputies of Congress, and shall see how these observations will be received at St Petersburg. It is for you to judge, Sir, whether you think this circumstance ought to withhold you or not from making known here your political character.

I have the honor to be, &c.

THE MARQUIS DE VERAC.

_P. S._ I ask pardon for the delay of this answer. It has been owing to the embarrassment of translating your letter; the Marquis de la Coste, my son-in-law, being the only person in my family who can read a little English.

FOOTNOTES:

[20] See the articles of pacification at large, as far as they relate to America, in _John Adams's Correspondence_, Vol. VI. p. 100.

* * * * *

TO THE MARQUIS DE VERAC.

St Petersburg, September 13th, 1781.

Sir,

On my return home last evening, I found myself honored with your Excellency's letter of yesterday. No apology could be necessary for the delay of it. It is not to be expected, that M. le Marquis de la Coste, should make a task of translating my letters, or suffer them to interfere with his engagements or avocations. It is with extreme repugnance I write to your Excellency, because of the trouble I know that it must give him; and nothing but an opinion of the necessity of doing it, has given your Excellency, or the Marquis, any trouble of that sort.

It may not be amiss to acquaint your Excellency, that just before my departure from Holland, by an unforeseen accident, I was unexpectedly deprived of the assistance of a gentleman, who both speaks and writes the French language well, and was to have accompanied me hither. Your Excellency may be assured, I shall very readily wait some time before I enter upon the measure mentioned in my last, in hopes of being favored with the answers of the Courts of Versailles and Madrid to the plan of pacification, as soon after you may receive them, as shall be convenient to you. It is my earnest wish to form my conduct upon the fullest informations I can possibly obtain, and to avoid any step, which may have the least tendency rather to injure than to promote the interests of either country.

Your Excellency will be pleased to accept my warmest thanks for your attention to the business of my mission, your wishes for the success of it, as well as for the assurances of your personal zeal, to promote the general interests of the United States.

I have the honor to be, with sentiments of the highest respect, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

St Petersburg, September 15th, 1781.

Sir,

In my letter from Berlin I did myself the honor to give your Excellency an account of my route, as far as that city. A duplicate of that letter will accompany this. I was detained there nine days, the first part of which time was lost by my illness, and the rest in waiting for my carriage. I set off from thence the 2d of August, and arrived here, travelling day and night, on the 27th, _New Style_, having stopped in this route (sometimes to recruit a little, and sometimes to make the reparations to my carriage, necessary in so long a journey) at the following places, viz. Dantzic, Konigsberg, Memel, Riga and Narva, all of which are ports of consideration, and lay in my way.

I made during my short stay in them as full inquiry into the nature of their commerce as circumstances would admit of. I do not find that the exports from any of them, Riga excepted, are calculated for our markets, or that we can derive any advantage from them, till we engage in circuitous voyages and become their carriers. The great article of Riga is cordage of all sorts, which I am told is the best in all these countries. They export considerable quantities of hemp likewise, to say nothing of articles similar to our own, but this article can perhaps be better purchased at St Petersburg, than anywhere else. I expect to receive shortly a minute account of all the exports and imports of Riga, with their prices current, &c. Being no merchant, my account of these things it is to be expected will be defective, but this being made a part of my duty, I shall endeavor to execute it in the best manner I am able.

It is to be observed, that the Dantzickers, the Prussians and the Russians are improving the present opportunity, which the Dutch war affords them of increasing their own navigation, with the utmost industry; and the great rise of freights enables them to do it with much advantage. What effect this may have upon the sovereigns of the two last countries, to slacken their pace towards the acknowledgement of the independence of ours, which would lead to a speedy peace, I cannot say. The subjects of the Emperor are reaping the same advantages from the war.

An opportunity by water from hence to Amsterdam now presents itself, and this being the safest way, I shall send my despatches under cover to the care of Mr Adams, and shall desire him to break them up, and read them before he forwards them for America, as the best means of making him fully acquainted with all that has yet taken place here, especially with the sentiments of the French Minister, which appear to me to deserve our particular attention. Though I am no better satisfied with the reasons given in support of his opinion, in his second letter, than I was with those in his first, yet I thought it not prudent to press him any further, with my opposition to them, and that it was quite sufficient to give him to understand that I still intended to adopt the measure mentioned in my second letter. He possibly may have other reasons for his opinions, which he chooses to keep to himself, but surely such cannot serve as rules by which to regulate my conduct while I remain ignorant of them, nor can I imagine it to be my duty, or the expectation of Congress, that I should blindly fall into the sentiments of any man, especially when I think this backwardness to give proper support to our cause at the Courts of Europe, may be accounted for on other principles. That it does actually exist, I can now no longer doubt. However, Congress will make up their own judgment upon this point from the letters of the Minister himself, and from other facts, with which they are much better acquainted than I can be.

I confess, that had the proposition of the mediators been laid before me to form my opinion upon, unaccompanied with the strictures of the French Minister, I should have laid my finger upon three words only in it, viz. _en meme tems_, and considered the others, to which he meant to draw my particular attention, by underscoring them, as merely colorable terms, and a specimen of that finesse, from which the politics of Europe can never be free. I should therefore have drawn from it a conclusion very different from that of the French Minister, viz.--"_It is therefore clear, that their design is to avoid compromiting themselves by recognising the independence of the United States, till England herself shall have done it_;" for if, as he would have me to understand, the mediators do in fact still consider the United States as British Colonies, and that neither the belligerent powers, or themselves, ought to interfere in settling the war between them and Great Britain, without being invited by both parties, how comes it to pass, that as mediators between the belligerent powers, meaning not to comprehend America under that predicament, they should go on to annex, in the nature of condition of their mediation, that "there shall be _at the same time_ a treaty between Great Britain and the American Colonies, respecting the re-establishment of peace in America;" thereby prescribing to a sovereign State _the time_ when it shall enter upon the settlement of a dispute, existing between the Sovereign of that State and a part of his subjects, in which they mean not to intermeddle; and, according to the French Ministers, even the manner of doing it. For, says he, "the mediating Courts intend thereby, that your deputies shall treat simply with the English Ministers, in the same manner as they have already treated in America with the Commissioners from Great Britain in the year 1778." I could have set him right in matter of fact here, but it would have answered no good purpose.

This measure, I am told, has been proposed "to conciliate opposing pretensions," and "that the result of their negotiations will make known to the other powers on what footing they ought to be regarded, and that their public character will be acknowledged without difficulty _from the moment that the English interpose no opposition_." If such were the designs of the mediators, why not leave Great Britain to compose her internal troubles in her own time, and in her own way, and proceed to the great business of composing those of the nations of Europe? How are we to account for the Court of London rejecting the mediation if they conceived the proposition in that very inoffensive light, which he supposes it to be meant, and if it was so clear from it, that the mediators would not interfere in our particular negotiation unless invited to do it, and were determined never to acknowledge the independence of the United States until Great Britain herself had done it, or at least till the moment in which she shall cease to oppose it? Could a more favorable occasion be presented to Great Britain for negotiation? My present opinion upon this matter is, that the mediators do in fact consider the United States, as an independent sovereign power; that upon that principle they wish to extinguish the flames of war in both countries at the same time; that they do not flatter themselves they can restore peace to Europe during the continuance of the war in America, or that the United States will treat with Britain upon any other ground than that of an independent power; that to bring about a general pacification, in a manner the least offensive to any of the belligerent powers of Europe, particularly Britain, they have framed their propositions in the terms in which it is conceived; and although they declare in it, that the other belligerent powers, or even themselves ought not to interfere in our particular negotiations, yet it seems to be their intention, that the negotiation between the European powers, should proceed but with equal pace with our particular one.

I cannot but think the mediators expected the Court of London would reject this first plan of mediation, on account of the proposition respecting America (as I am told by a public Minister here, who ought to be well informed upon the point, they certainly have done) although it is worded in a manner as little offensive to their feelings as the nature of things would admit of; and that having tried this measure, the mediators will next proceed to another, in which their sentiments in favor of the United States will be less ambiguous.

After all, the French Minister may be perfectly right, touching the dispositions and resolutions of the mediating powers towards the United States, but I think his conviction must arise from other facts and principles, than those he has chosen to expose to me. I feel myself however on that supposition, at no great loss to determine what ought to be my own line of conduct. I think it ought to be exactly the same in both cases, so far as respects the proposed communication of my public character to this Court. If her Imperial Majesty has really resolved upon such a strange system of politics, the sooner Congress obtain the best evidence of it the better, on many accounts, and this is to be had only by making this experiment. They will among other things then consider, whether it is worth while for the United States to be at the expense of supporting a Minister at a Court, which is resolved to defer the acknowledgment of their independence, till Great Britain shall have done it herself, or at least to the moment she shall cease to oppose it. At this period, if it should ever arrive, the United States, I suppose, would feel themselves as much indebted to the sovereign, who should offer to acknowledge their independence, as I should to the French Minister here, who has told me, "that when you shall have succeeded in surmounting the difficulties, which you may meet in causing your public character to be recognised at this Court, you will find me entirely disposed to second you in everything, which shall regard the common interest of our countries," for any assistance he may then give me.

It is evident from hence, that I am not likely to receive from him the least assistance in the business of my mission. I must proceed in it therefore by myself, or be totally inactive. I thought it advisable to assure the French Minister, that I would wait some time for the answers of the Courts of Versailles and Madrid, lest he might think I treated his opinions with disrespect. In doing this I think no injury will happen to our interests, for besides the possibility that some important information may be obtained from them, and the effect they may have at this Court, I am told Count Panin will shortly return to Court, and that he has the most favorable sentiments of the United States, of any of her Imperial Majesty's Ministers. Should this information be just, an advantage is to be expected by the delay. Congress will doubtless consider the difficulty of my situation, standing alone upon new ground, and will make every allowance for it I ought in reason to expect.[21]

I am, with the highest respect, and most perfect esteem, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

FOOTNOTES:

[21] The French government seem to have considered the proposition of the mediating powers, by which England and the United States were to treat separately, as impracticable and inadmissible. In their answer they say,

"His Majesty thinks it his duty to say, that he has allies, with whom he has inviolable engagements; that he should betray them in abandoning the American cause; and that it would be abandoning this cause for him to negotiate a separate peace. The high mediators have seen the impossibility of such an attempt, since they have themselves perceived the impossibility of proceeding at an equal pace with the negotiation of the King and that of the United States. But even admitting, that the King could separate his affairs from those of America, that he could consent to pursue only his personal interests, and leave to the Americans the task of coming to an accommodation with their ancient metropolis; what would be the result of this conduct? It would evidently be an illusory peace, a mere creation of the brain. Indeed, if (as there is the strongest evidence) the Americans persist in refusing to return to obedience to the British Crown, the war will continue between England and her ancient Colonies, and the King will then be obliged, as he is now, to assist them." _Flassan_, Vol. VII. p. 319.

Again, the French government say in their answer;

"The two Imperial Courts cannot flatter themselves with the hopes of bringing their mediation to a happy issue, if they do not prevent the subterfuges and false interpretations, which either of the belligerent powers may avail themselves of to explain according to their views the preliminary propositions, which will certainly happen if they do not previously ascertain the sense of the expressions, which relate to America.

"The Court of London will elude as much, and as long as she possibly can, the direct or indirect acknowledgment of the independence of the United States, and will avail herself of the terms that are used in speaking of them, to maintain that she is not obliged to treat with her ancient Colonies as with a free and independent nation. From whence it will follow, that when the mediation is in force, and they shall be about to enter upon the negotiation, they will dispute the character in which the American Plenipotentiary shall be received. The King of England will consider him as his subject, while Congress will demand that he should be received as the representative of a free people, by means whereof the mediation will be stopped at the first outset.

"To prevent this inconvenience it should seem, that previous to any other measure, the character of the American agent ought to be determined in the most precise and positive manner, and Congress should be invited to confide its interests to the mediation. This invitation is so much the more interesting as the negotiation relative to America should go hand in hand with that of the Courts of Madrid and Versailles, and by consequence the negotiations, although separate, should commence at the same time. But who will invite the Congress to treat with England? The King (of France) cannot, since the first article excludes him from the negotiation. This task then can only be executed by the mediators themselves. All that the King can do, and that he will do with zeal and fidelity, is to invite the Americans to the peace, and to facilitate it by every means, which they believe compatible with their essential interests. But that the King may take this step with safety and the hopes of success, and with the certainty of not rendering himself suspected by the Americans, it is necessary that he should first know the determination of the mediators upon the observations now made to them, and that this determination should be such as to secure to the United States their political existence."

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

St Petersburg, October 1st, 1781.

Sir,

In the project of a treaty, which France proposes to Russia, there is an article to this effect;

"When the subjects of France shall carry in their own vessels French goods into Russia, and shall exchange them for Russian goods, in such cases there shall be a drawback of the duties, both of importation and exportation, paid by the subjects of France."

France, to induce Russia to grant this, says, "France will want great quantities of Russian goods, which, after the war, France will not be obliged to take of Russia, for France can have the like from America, and though perhaps not so cheap, yet it will be the interest of France, if Russia should not grant this, to pay America fifteen or twenty per cent more for the same articles; for this would enable America to take off more French goods, and to pay France for them." Hemp is particularly mentioned.

I pray you to keep this to yourself, and I have the honor to be, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

St Petersburg, October 15th, 1781.

Sir,

Since my letter to your Excellency of September 15th, enclosing a duplicate of mine from Berlin, and copies of all the enclosed papers, the French Minister has sent me a copy of all the propositions of the mediators, and of the answer of the Court of Versailles. I have the satisfaction to think the inferences I then drew from the first propositions only, are well supported by the tenor of the second, in which they expressly say, that our particular peace shall not be signed, but conjointly, and at the same time with that of the powers, whose interests shall have been treated of by the mediating powers; that the pacifications, notwithstanding they may be treated separately, shall not be concluded the one without the other; that care shall be taken constantly to inform the mediators of the progress, and of the state of our particular treaty, to the end the mediation may be able to govern itself in the progress of that, which is intrusted to them, according to the state of our particular negotiation, and that both of the pacifications, although they shall have been separately concluded, shall be solemnly guarantied by the mediators, and all other neutral powers, whose guarantee the belligerent powers shall judge proper to ask.

What force are we now to allow to the terms in the first proposition "the American Colonies," and "without the intervention of any of the other belligerent powers, or even that of the two Imperial Courts, unless their mediation has been formally demanded, and granted upon this object?" Is it clear from hence, that the design of the mediators is to avoid exposing themselves by acknowledging the independence of the United States before Great Britain has done this herself? Do not the propositions speak this language to Britain? You may make such a peace with America, not only as she chooses to make with you, but as the other belligerent powers, and we shall choose you should make with her; and remember you are to have no peace in Europe, unless you give peace to America, and when this peace is once made, we will take care you shall not break it. We shall soon see by the replies, which the mediators will give to the belligerent powers, particularly to the Court of Versailles, whether they will recede in favor of Britain from their first plan of pacification, or go on in their next a step further in the spirit of their former system. It seems, that consistent with their own dignity, they can neither retreat or remain on the same ground. The independence of the United States was certainly the basis of the first plan of pacification, and I have no great fears, that it will be departed from.

I have lately been told by a person, who certainly knew the truth of the matter, in so confident a manner that I have no room to doubt it, that it was a secret part of the original plan of the armed neutrality, as soon as it should be completed, that the neutral confederated powers should propose a general pacification between the belligerent powers, which it was supposed could not be brought about otherwise than by leaving America free and independent, and to enforce this proposition by their joint armaments; and that so long ago as in May, 1780, if Holland had done her part, affairs were then in all other quarters in a proper train to have carried the whole plan into execution; but unfortunately for her British influence was too great there, and instead of doing the business at once, they entered upon the parade of sending a brace of Ambassadors to this Court, not with a view to finish, but at least to delay it. Holland, in fact, did not accede to the Marine Convention, which was first entered into by Russia and Denmark on the 9th of July, 1780, and next by Sweden on the 21st of the same month, until the 20th of November following, and it was not signed on their part till the 5th of last January. All this time her navy was neglected, and the mischiefs she has suffered are not the only ones consequent upon her tardiness and inactivity. For Britain has been thereby enabled for a while to detach Denmark from the confederation, or at least to make that Court indifferent in the business of it. It was but a short time after it had adopted the plan before it made a breach upon it by including in a treaty with Britain, hemp, &c. among contraband articles. From that time the spirit of the confederation seems to have languished. The Danish Minister most interested in it has been superseded. Count Panin, who in this Court, it is said, was its principal support, retired. It is true, he has lately returned to Court, but has not assumed his former office of Chief Minister in the Department of Foreign Affairs, though he is still of the Privy Council. My information about the share he has in those affairs is very different; by some I am told, he has little or no influence in them, by others, that he possesses a considerable portion of his former influence, and my informants on both parts ought to, and perhaps do, know the truth of the matter. On one side everything is veiled in profound mystery, and nothing is let out but what presents a discouraging prospect.

It has not such an effect upon my mind at present, and I am strongly encouraged to hope, that the confederation will become properly invigorated by the accession of the King of Prussia. The first open part he took in it, was the issuing his ordinance of the 30th of last April. Soon after this, (the 8th of May) he entered into a similar convention with the Empress. About this time, (the 23d of May,) the propositions for a general pacification were made, and on the 20th of August, both the Prussian and Russian Ministers at the Hague notified to the States-General the accession of his Prussian Majesty to the confederation. Laying these things together, and presuming as I do, that the confederated powers can have no well-grounded hope of reaping any lasting benefit from their confederation, for the maintenance of the liberty of their commerce, and of their navigation, but in the establishment of the independence of the United States, one might conclude with confidence, that all would soon go well between us, if it was confidently to be concluded, that all Courts are governed by the real interests of their countries, even where that is clearly understood, or act upon a permanent system. All now depends upon the stability of the Empress. If she should persevere in the noble line she has marked out, of Sweden and of Russia there is no danger, and it is probable Denmark will not stand out. The Emperor has ceased his opposition to the confederation. The step is now short for him to favor and support it. I believe it may be depended upon, that he has already agreed to accede to it.

If I were to hazard an opinion touching the manner in which our particular business will issue here, it is that the success of it will depend upon the neutral powers consolidating themselves in their confederation; that even after this should take place, our independence will not be acknowledged by this Court before all the neutral confederated powers shall have agreed upon this measure, and are fully prepared to adopt it, and that even Holland waits for this event, although her ease is now different from theirs, by being actually at war with our enemy.

The ground on which the secret part of the original plan of the armed neutrality abovementioned was formed, was an apprehension of the powers engaged in it, that by the loss of America, and by the continuance of the war, the maritime force of Britain might be too much reduced to preserve the balance of power upon the ocean; but as she has not abated of her haughtiness, her injustice, and outrageous violations of the rights of the neutral maritime powers, and still opposes herself to the establishment of a system calculated to secure those rights, and to vindicate the general law of nations, thereby manifesting, that the measure of her power is to prescribe her rule of right, they have become tolerably well reconciled to the idea of seeing her more effectually weakened and humbled.

On the whole, I am not anxious about the manner of _thinking_ of the neutral powers, touching the great objects which concern our fundamental interests. We have nothing to apprehend, I believe, but the baneful influence of British gold, which can serve but to defer for awhile, however, the event they most dread, the open acknowledgment of our independence by this, and the other neutral powers. I expect to be informed of the answer of this Court to that of Versailles respecting the pacification, as soon as it shall be communicated to the French Minister. It has already been delayed longer than I was given to understand it would be, which is owing, probably, to the necessity of consultations with the Court of Vienna. I shall wait but a few days for it, before I make the communication of my mission to this Court, unless some matter which I do not foresee, should render it expedient to delay doing it still longer.

I am, with the highest respect, and most perfect esteem, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO FRANCIS DANA.

Philadelphia, October 22d, 1781.

Sir,

Congress having lately thought it advisable that their correspondence with foreign Courts and their Ministers abroad should pass through the hands of their Secretary for Foreign Affairs, I enclose the act by which they did me the honor to appoint me to that office. In this character, Sir, I have the pleasure of communicating to you the important account of two signal victories, which have lately been obtained over the enemy in this quarter, the one by General Greene, which has been followed by the re-establishment of the governments of South Carolina and Georgia, in which States, though the enemy hold one or two posts, yet they have no command of the country. The other still more signal, by the allied arms of France and America over Lord Cornwallis, in Virginia. By the latter, near seven thousand men, including seamen, fell into our hands; and about one hundred vessels, above fifty of them square rigged.

You will not fail to make the best use of this intelligence, which must fix our independence, not only beyond all doubt, but even beyond all controversy. I should have mentioned to you, that besides the troops and seamen abovementioned, the enemy lost during the siege of Yorktown, including those that were taken, upwards of two thousand negroes. The naval force of France in these seas under the command of the Count de Grasse, amounts to thirtyfour sail of the line, that of the British to twentyfour. Both fleets have lately sailed, the one from New York, the other from the Chesapeake. We daily expect to hear of their meeting, and promise ourselves a second victory, since every advantage is on the side of the French. Should they think it more advisable to go to the West Indies, the Islands must fall an easy prey to them, as the whole British fleet is at present on this coast, nor will it be in their power to follow immediately, as Sir Henry Clinton with the best part of the troops from New York are on board the fleet, which, on the very day that Cornwallis surrendered, left New York for his relief. These must be brought back and re-landed, which will be a work of some time.

It is of importance to you to know that the spirit of opposition to the independence of this country, which was languishing when you left it, has been growing weaker ever since, and may now be said to be quite extinct. To this, the settled form that our governments have assumed, the success of our arms, and above all, the shocking barbarity of the British, have greatly contributed.

As this letter goes by an uncertain conveyance, and as, indeed, I have hardly yet entered upon my office, having only been qualified a few days since, I do not think it prudent to proceed to any minute discussions. I can only tell you, that the people here entertain the highest respect for the Court you are at. They consider the plan of the armed neutrality as the best proof of an enlarged and generous policy, and look upon its execution as a charter of enfranchisement from the ambition of Princes; granted by the wisdom of the Empress to the trade of the world. The sense of Congress on this subject, I enclose you in an abstract from their minutes of October 5th, 1780;[22]

What a pity it would be, if a more confined policy should lessen the glory, or defeat the purposes she has so liberally formed. You will do me the favor to direct in future your public letters to me. I wish them to be as numerous and as minute as possible, particularly on the subject of such negotiations as may be in agitation for a general peace, and for a partial one between Britain and the United Provinces.

I forgot, under the head of intelligence, to inform you that the British had, in September last, made one effort to relieve Cornwallis with their fleet, consisting of nineteen sail of the line, before the Count de Barras, from Rhode Island, had made his junction with the Count de Grasse. They were defeated with the loss of the Terrible, a seventyfour, burnt, and two frigates taken, and compelled to return to New York, whence, as I before mentioned, having been reinforced, they have again sailed.

I am, with the greatest esteem, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

_P. S._ I will be obliged to you for sending me, for the use of this office, by the first safe opportunity, a Russian Grammar and Dictionary, in English, if possible, if not, in French. If the latter, the Grammar of Charpenteer, and the Dictionary of Woltchhoff, would be preferable. Both parts of the Dictionary are to be procured, if possible, but particularly the one which begins with the Russian. If anything like a Court Calendar is published at St Petersburg, in Russian, German, or French, you will oblige me by transmitting to me two copies of it, if you choose, with notes of your own upon it.

FOOTNOTES:

[22] "_In Congress, October 5th, 1780._--On the report of a committee, to whom was referred a motion of Mr Adams, relative to certain propositions of the Empress of Russia respecting the rights of neutral nations, Congress passed the following act;

"Her Imperial Majesty of all the Russias, attentive to the freedom of commerce, and the rights of nations, in her declaration to the belligerent and neutral powers, having proposed regulations founded upon principles of justice, equity, and moderation, of which their Most Christian and Catholic Majesties, and most of the neutral maritime powers of Europe, have declared their approbation;

"Congress, willing to testify their regard to the rights of commerce, and their respect for the sovereign who has proposed, and the powers who have approved the said regulation;

"Resolved, That the Board of Admiralty prepare and report instructions for the commanders of armed vessels commissioned by the United States, conformable to the principles contained in the declaration of the Empress of all the Russias, on the rights of neutral vessels.

"That the Ministers Plenipotentiary from the United States, if invited thereto, be, and hereby are respectively empowered to accede to such regulations, conformable to the spirit of the said declaration, as may be agreed upon by the Congress expected to assemble in pursuance of the invitation of her Imperial Majesty.

"Ordered, That copies of the above resolution be transmitted to the respective Ministers of the United States at foreign Courts, and to the honorable, the Minister Plenipotentiary of France."

* * * * *

TO WILLIAM ELLERY.

St Petersburg, January 17th, 1782.

Sir,

The Empress you know formerly proposed to mediate between Britain and Holland, which was declined by the former, as she could not enter upon a partial mediation, for the reasons she then assigned; since which time, the joint mediation has been tendered by the two Imperial Courts, between all the belligerent powers, which has issued unsuccessfully. Finally, her Imperial Majesty, and the Kings of Sweden and Denmark, jointly tendered their mediation between Britain and Holland. Britain has declined to accept that of the Kings in conjunction with the Empress, but has agreed to accept her sole mediation. This is at present on foot. A Russian Minister has very lately gone, or will soon set off for Holland, to join Prince Gallitzin in this business, which I prognosticate will issue as fruitlessly as the general mediation has done. There is no peace to be had in Europe separate from that of our country, which already too sensibly affects the European systems to be overlooked or disregarded by those who have the adjustment of them.

Notwithstanding the material change, which our revolution has wrought in their old systems, which is felt somehow by all the politicians of Europe, yet they seem some of them not to be sufficiently acquainted with the real nature of it. Hence that strange fluctuation or indecision in some cabinets; at least this is the best apology I can make for it. Sweden it appears to me acts as consistent a part as any power. She maintains her rights as a neutral nation, by constantly convoying her trade, and is besides wisely reaping the benefits of the American commerce, by silently and gradually admitting our vessels into her ports, and permitting our countrymen to purchase there everything they want, and to depart when and where they please. If this country would adopt the same system in every respect, they would soon see the happiest effects from it. At present, Sweden is making considerable profits, by being the depot of Russian manufactures for our use.

I wish this country had a more commercial turn. We should then soon see a direct communication between the two countries opened and established, to the great benefit of both. But a free trade between them will meet with other obstacles. I am apprehensive not one of the maritime powers of Europe will aid us in our attempts to effect this, but that on the contrary, Britain, Holland, Denmark, and Sweden, will all at least secretly be opposing us. They well know this country has no navigation of its own, comparatively speaking; if, therefore, by various suggestions, they can excite a jealousy respecting the commerce of our country rivalling this in all the markets of Europe, a sentiment however groundless, which I am persuaded has made a considerable impression here, they will flatter themselves they shall each share a proportion of the benefits of an intervening commerce. Nothing, you will readily perceive, is to be expected here, while the business of mediation is kept up.

I am, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO FRANCIS DANA.

Philadelphia, March 2d, 1782.

Dear Sir,

I find myself extremely embarrassed in writing to you, on account of my ignorance of the place of your present residence; and the want of a cypher. You forgot when you left Holland, if you have yet left it, for this is a matter of which we have not been informed, to send me your direction; so that there are an infinite number of chances against a letter's reaching you. This must account for my not entering into a minute consideration of your letters, or of our own affairs. The subject of your conference with the[23] ---- is too delicate to be discussed here. The event has, ere this, shown you whether his sentiments were well founded; though we can form no judgment from this circumstance, as we have not been favored with a single line from you since May, 1781.

We presume, that you must frequently have written, as the ports of Holland, Sweden, and France, afforded you many opportunities, of which you have undoubtedly availed yourself, but we have unfortunately not received the advantage we could wish from your attention. I must therefore beg the favor of you to increase the number of your letters, and to send at least four copies of each to the different ports. There are indeed many things, which it would be imprudent to trust to the common post. There are also many other matters, which may safely be sent by it. If you have letters always ready, safe opportunities will occasionally offer for the first, and those which relate to general politics should be written weekly, and sent to France and Holland.

You will continue, I presume, to appear only in a private character, as it would give Congress great pain to see you assume any other without an absolute certainty, that you would be received and acknowledged. The United States, fired with the prospect of their future glory, would blush to think, that the history of any nation might represent them as humble suppliants for their favor. The least slight from a sovereign, whose life will be read with applause by posterity, whose situation places her above those little shifting politics by which inferior Princes govern, who has magnanimity enough to feel and declare herself independent of every other tie, but that which wisdom and justice impose, might be urged with weight against us, and give force to the calumnies of our enemies. All, therefore, Sir, that your situation will admit of, is to endeavor to give just ideas of this country, of its resources, of its future commerce, its justice and moderation, its sincere desire for peace, but at the same time of its firm determination to forego any present advantage, and to brave any danger, rather than purchase it upon terms unworthy of the struggles they have made, or which shall render their liberties insecure. This, which is an important truth, you will be able to prove by showing the circumstances under which we entered into the war, and the difficulties we struggled with, when without arms, without military stores, without discipline, without government, without commerce, we bid defiance to one of the most powerful nations in the world, and resisted alone, for three years, forty thousand disciplined troops, attended by a considerable navy, and amply supplied with every necessary to enable them to use their force with advantage. Contrast this with our present situation. Allied to a powerful nation, in possession of governments with which the people are pleased; having an army disciplined, well appointed, and flushed with victory; an extensive and active commerce; provisions cheaper than in time of peace; credit reviving again, and specie introduced into circulation.

It is also important to show the unanimity of this country, in opposition to what the Court of Great Britain has desired to inculcate. I have touched upon this in my last letter, and have endeavored to show it from the conduct, which she herself holds towards this country. It will never be doubted by those who reflect on these circumstances, and the ease with which every order of government is carried into effect, and the few partisans the British have found, when they marched out into the country. But though we wish these matters to be understood, yet I am far from recommending it to you to make a pompous display of them. Your own judgment will direct you on this subject. Your having been long in a public character, will naturally lead those who wish to be informed to inquire the state of our affairs from you. You may avail yourself of the opportunities this will afford you to speak of them with that temper and moderation, that cannot fail to make an impression, particularly when these facts appear rather to be drawn from you by your desire to answer the inquiry, than urged by a wish to make converts. In the first case, the hearer is disposed to believe, because you lay him under obligations; in the second, he is cautious lest he should be led away by your prejudices. Should these inquiries be made by people who are able to serve you, be particularly attentive to render your information agreeable by enlivening it with some little interesting incidents, which this war has furnished in abundance, and which cannot but give pleasure to a people, who are too remote to have heard them.

These may possibly be the means, when repeated, of exciting the curiosity of the sovereign, and procure for you the honor of conversing with her in the character of a private gentleman. This incident will be best improved by preparing yourself to answer all her inquiries with respect to this country, without touching on the politics of Europe, with which she is infinitely better acquainted than we can be. The first settlement of the Colonies; their population, agriculture, commerce, and revenues; their past and present governments; the progress of the arts and sciences; the steps which led to this revolution, and the present state of the war, will probably be the objects of her inquiry. These you will answer with candor, even though you should thereby expose some of our defects or imperfections. For you will never cease to bear in mind, that the celebrated sovereign of the country you are in is too well informed to be deceived, could our politics ever stoop so low as to make the attempt.

Since my last, conveying an account of Cornwallis's capture, nothing very important has happened here, unless it be the evacuation of Wilmington and Beaufort, by which means all the enemy's posts in the southern States are reduced to Charleston and Savannah, and the trade of that extensive country is again opened. The few friends to slavery in the States the British marched over, are abandoned to our mercy. For the rest the enemy keep close within their lines, and our troops are cantoned about the country. In the meanwhile the British islands and commerce are sacrificed to the possession of three posts, which cost them millions to retain on this continent. I give you no account of what is doing in the West Indies, presuming that you will have the earliest and best intelligence on this subject from Paris. It may be of some importance to you to learn, that our plan for calling in the old paper and emitting new, was not attended with all the success that was expected. The old paper was indeed redeemed, but the new beginning to depreciate, most of the States thought it prudent to take it in by taxation.

The only money now in general circulation is specie and notes from the American banks, which have the same credit as silver. Our taxes are collected in these, and by removing the restrictions on our commerce, together with the small loans we have made in Europe, we find not the least want of a circulating medium; and though there will probably be some failure in the amount of the taxes from some of the States, which are most impoverished, yet a considerable proportion of the eight millions of dollars in specie, which have been imposed this year, will be paid, exclusive of the duty of five per cent premium on our imports, which is designed as a perpetual fund for the payment of the money we borrow. Every exertion is making here for the most vigorous and active campaign, and we have the greatest reason to believe it will be decisive.

I enclose an ordinance relative to captures, which will show the respect paid by these States to the armed neutrality. It will be evident to you, that this is not a mere empty compliment, since nothing can be more injurious to us than conforming to principles, which our enemy despises, and is permitted to despise with impunity, particularly on this coast, where Britain is left at liberty to consider us not as independent States, but as revolted Colonies; and to make prize of any vessel whatsoever bound to our ports, though both ship and cargo should be in the strictest sense neutral. But interested considerations have less weight with us, than those immutable laws of justice, which make the basis of these regulations; and these States cannot but hope, that the neutral powers will sooner or later dare to execute what they have so wisely projected.

Now, Sir, let me again repeat to you my request to write regularly to me, at least once in every week, since the high opinion we have formed of the Empress, makes all her actions important to us. When no other political object presents itself, give us the best account you can collect of the history, manners, revolutions, manufactures, arts, revenues, civil and military establishments of Russia, with the names and characters of those who hold the great offices, or share the favor of the sovereign. If a change has taken place (as we are informed) in the Russian administration, be pleased to acquaint yourself and me, when you can safely do it, with the causes of it; and with the characters of the present administration. Send me by the first safe hand a cypher, if an opportunity should offer before I send one to you.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

FOOTNOTES:

[23] A blank in the original, but probably the Count de Vergennes is alluded to.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON, SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

St Petersburg, March 5th, 1782.

Sir,

I had the honor of the triplicate of your letter of the 22d of last October, on the 20th instant. It was forwarded to me by that amiable nobleman, the Marquis de Lafayette. The original or duplicate has not yet come to hand.

I am much pleased that Congress have thought fit to create the office of Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and to direct their foreign Ministers to correspond through that department. This will, doubtless, be the means of keeping them properly informed about the affairs of our country. I am happy to learn also, that the choice of Congress has fallen upon a gentleman not less distinguished for his abilities and integrity, than for the early and decided part he took, and has steadily pursued, from the commencement of our revolution.

We received the important news of the surrender of Lord Cornwallis and his army, on the 13th of December. Soon after, came the account of General Greene's action, which you mention also. The first seemed to have settled every one's mind upon the real state of desperation of the British affairs within the United States; the other, though very important to us in its consequences, made apparently but little impression, owing, perhaps, to two causes, that it followed so nearly after so capital and brilliant an event, and that it was scarce possible to add to the conviction, which the former carried along with it. From this state of things it may be imagined, that the way is open to us to make our advances. The conclusion, I believe, would be too hasty. For the time does not so much depend upon the real sentiments, which her Imperial Majesty and her Ministers may entertain of the stability of our independence, as upon other circumstances. To explain myself. Her Majesty has, doubtless, a wish to add to her other glories that of mediating a peace between the great powers who are now at war. For although her first attempt to mediate between Britain and Holland was rejected by the former, and her second, in conjunction with the Emperor, between Britain and the other belligerent powers, may be said to be at a full stand, yet, as you are informed long before this time, she set on foot a third, in conjunction with the Kings of Sweden and Denmark, between Britain and Holland, which Britain rejected so far as respects that of the two Kings accepting of the _sole_ mediation of her Imperial Majesty. This is still in agitation. A Minister before this time has arrived from this country in Holland, to assist Prince Gallitzin in it. But, from everything I can learn, there is not the least probability of its succeeding. I am told it is not even expected by any of her Majesty's Ministers.

However this in fact may be, so long as her Majesty continues to tender her mediation, partial or general, so long it appears to me prudent for us to refrain from making any open advances. For however strongly convinced her Majesty may be, that our independence is now laid on a foundation, which Britain can never destroy or shake, however clearly she may see that the freedom of the commerce and of the navigation of Europe absolutely depend upon the severance of America from the British Empire, and however beneficial she may suppose a direct and free commerce with America would be to her Empire, yet she could not consistently with the character of a mediator, form any political connexions with the United States, or manifest an attachment to their interests. She would, therefore, feel herself under a necessity to reject any propositions we have to make to her, if made under such circumstances. And though we could be assured that this rejection would be made with as much delicacy, or as much respect to the United States as the case would admit of, yet is it not advisable to delay making any open advances till this business of mediation should be entirely done away, and not unnecessarily expose ourselves to a repulse; which, it is probable, would in the end rather retard than advance our business?

By these and similar sentiments, I have been hitherto induced not to make the communication spoken of in my former despatches from hence. I hope my conduct in this respect will be approved by Congress. Notwithstanding what I have said above, if I really thought with my correspondent, that her Imperial Majesty had adopted the system mentioned in his letter to me of the 12th of September, viz. "Not to acknowledge the independence of the United States till Britain herself had done it," I should soon bring the business to a conclusion, and take my leave of this Court; not thinking it conformable to the views of Congress to support a Minister at a Court, which should adopt and be likely to persevere in such a system.

You seem desirous of my sentiments upon the state of affairs, particularly relative to the mediation, whether general or partial. I have given them to you on that head very briefly above, and I can only add, that from the best intelligence I can obtain, we shall not hear much more of the mediation till another campaign is closed; that things will remain nearly in their present state in Europe through this year, unless Holland, by the prevalence of the patriotic party, should be able to make some exertion, and come to a decision about the much talked of alliances with the enemies of Britain. Whether this will probably take place, you will be better informed from that quarter than from me.

The acts of accession and acceptation on the part of the Emperor and Empress, relative to the neutral confederation, were exchanged here a few days after the date of my last letter to the President. A want of connexion is observable among the powers who have adopted this system; they are divided into three parties, the Empress standing at the head of each. First, Russia, Denmark, Sweden, and Holland; next, Russia and Prussia; and lastly, Russia with the Emperor. These parties are without connexion one with the other, unless it should be supposed, that the Empress being a party in each of them, connects the whole; but this must necessarily be a feeble connexion, as it imposes no duties, and confers no rights, which are in common to all the powers, which have adopted the system. The principles of it, however, have acquired some support by these last accessions, particularly by that of Russia, and it seems highly probable, that they will not fail of being established as the clear rights of neutral nations at the close of the present war. During the continuance of it, unless Britain should be so imprudent as to commit further infractions upon this system, we may not see anything more arise out of these associations. For if the subjects of the confederated powers, at present in a state of neutrality, meet with no further obstruction in their commerce or navigation, their end is answered. Neither Russia, Sweden, nor Denmark will give themselves much concern to vindicate the right of Holland to participate in the benefits of the system, according to their demands, especially the two last, who derive very great advantages from the present situation of the Dutch. Holland has let her opportunity slip by unimproved, and she must patiently wait the return of a _general_ peace for the restoration of her rights, whether founded in her treaties with Britain or in this new system.

You will excuse my referring you to my former despatches, because it would be imprudent to send copies of them with this by the post. Duplicates have already been forwarded. If I had a private conveyance, I should be more particular under the head of mediation and neutral confederation, as well as enter into an explanation of some parts of my former despatches from hence. I have not yet received any account of my letters sent from France; you will doubtless pay an attention to such parts of them as may require it. If you will direct your letters for me to the care of Mr Adams, whenever they may come on in that course, he will be careful to forward them to me in a way, which we have settled for our correspondence. As it will be more convenient, I shall request Mr Adams to send you along with this the reply, which the Imperial Courts made to the answers of the belligerent powers, to their propositions for a general pacification, and also the final answer of the Court of Versailles. Although you may probably receive these through another channel, yet perhaps that is not a good reason why we should fail to furnish you with them.

I am, Sir, with much esteem, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

_P. S._ I hope to have an opportunity to forward next week, to the care of Mr Adams, two or three Court Almanacs for you in French. The other books I will procure for you as soon as possible, but as they will be cumbersome, it is not probable I shall find any other conveyance from hence than by water for them. I shall at all times be very happy to have an opportunity to execute any of your commands.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

St Petersburg, March 30th, 1782.

Sir,

I did myself the honor on the 5th instant to acknowledge the receipt of the triplicate of your letter to me of the 22d of October last, the original has since come to hand. I will forward a duplicate of the above by this opportunity.

Everything seems to confirm the opinion I have expressed, relative to the partial mediation between Britain and Holland, but more especially the resolution of Friesland respecting the United States. The failure of that mediation is now universally considered here as beyond a doubt. And nothing I believe but the very critical condition of Britain, will revive the idea of a general mediation sooner than I have estimated in my last. She has now lost Minorca, and in a manner too that astonishes every one here, and with it the remains of her commerce in the Mediterranean Sea. St Christopher, as it is said, is in imminent danger, and the formidable force gone against Jamaica, may make her reflect seriously upon her forlorn state, and perhaps drive her to the humiliating necessity of reviving a mediation she has rejected with so much haughtiness. If so, it seems evident, from the decided nature of the final answer of the Court of Versailles, as well as from that of Madrid to the Imperial Courts, that to do this with any effect, the mediators must advance to the line marked out, they must invite the Ministers of the United States to the General Congress.

The Minister of Spain, who went to Vienna to assist at the Congress, has received orders to repair to this Court, (where they have now only a _Charge d'Affaires_) as a resident Minister. He is expected here the next month.

There has lately been a lively sensation in this quarter, occasioned by a publication in the "_Courier du Bas Rhin_," where it was positively asserted, that a secret treaty had been concluded between her Imperial Majesty and the Emperor, relative to a partition of the Turkish territories in Europe. The affair, it is said, has been denied. However the fact may be, there seems to be some suspicions remaining, that a scheme is forming, if not of the nature mentioned, yet at least relative to a full enjoyment of a commerce upon the Black Sea and into the Mediterranean. This is an object, which has more or less engrossed the attention of this Court from the days of Peter the Great, and is one of no small consequence to the interests of this Empire. The state of things brought on by the peace of Kainardgi, (1774,) between Russia and Turkey, has opened the way for the completion of this design. By this treaty Russia obtained a right to a free commerce in the Turkish seas, and for that end, three ports there, viz. Kinbourn, Kersch, and Yenikale. Further, the Khan of the Crimea (who is no longer liable to be deposed by the Grand Sultan) is very friendly disposed towards her Imperial Majesty, and would be capable of affording essential services towards the execution of such a plan. He has lately sent an Ambassador to this Court, who has been most graciously received. The Porte has been constantly opposed to this commercial plan. Hence the difficulties, which have taken place respecting the admission of a Russian Consul, which the firmness of her Majesty has at last overcome. The whole seems yet to be on too precarious a foundation. Perhaps solidly to establish this system of commerce, another war may be deemed necessary, particularly for the purposes of gaining better ports, and to give greater security to the navigation, which may be carried on from them, by removing the Turks to a more convenient distance, and establishing a marine in those seas, capable of affording it a complete protection; without this, all that vast commercial project lies at the mercy of the Turks.

I have touched upon this subject, that from the great interest this empire has in such a plan from the extensive views of its sovereign, and from the present apparently favorable state of circumstances, you may be enabled to form a better opinion of the probability or improbability of the supposed connexion. But upon the supposition of its truth, will our enemies draw any essential benefits from it? Or will it in any way injure our interests? are questions which may arise out of it, and bring it home to us. It will happen, I think, if it happens at all, too late for the former, but as to the latter, it may procrastinate our views, as it will form the principal object of her Majesty's attention, and the affairs on this side of Europe will become but secondary concerns. I shall add nothing further at present on this subject, but shall from time to time endeavor to give you some account of the prevailing system, and the leading principles of politics in this Court.

In pursuance of one branch of my duty, I have during my residence here made a particular inquiry into the nature of the commerce of this country. By the list of exports for the last year, which will accompany this, may be seen the commodities of all kinds which it furnishes, as well as the share which the several nations of Europe have taken in this commerce, for the same time; and by the list of vessels passing and repassing the Sound, the proportion of their navigation which has been concerned in it. When it is considered that the Dutch used to send about six hundred vessels into the Baltic annually, there can remain no doubt but that the neutral maritime powers are very well contented with the Dutch war; and that they are deeply interested in the principles of the neutral confederation, though a crooked and corrupt system of politics may prevent some of them from defending their rights with proper vigor.

The great demands we have for the principal articles of this commerce, such as hemp, cordage, sailcloth, their linen manufactures of all sorts, especially for household use, is well known, as we have been heretofore supplied with these through Great Britain. But perhaps the commodities suitable for this market may not be so well understood among us. The principal ones of our country are rice and indigo; tobacco is a prohibited article. Grain is not wanted, except rice. From this state is it not evident if we would carry on this commerce to any considerable extent, as we shall certainly find it proper to do, we must do it by circuitous voyages in a great measure? For this purpose the productions of the West Indies and of the continent of America south of us, such as sugar, coffee, (rum would not answer,) all sorts of dyeing woods, cochineal, &c. are proper. This may point out the importance of obtaining a right to cut those woods on the Spanish shores in the Bay.

The wines, brandies, fruits, and manufactures of France form a great branch of the trade to this country. This has heretofore been chiefly carried on by the Dutch; but may we not come in for a share of it? Many of our commodities are adapted to the markets of France. Might not our vessels intended for this circuitous voyage, arrive in France towards the end of the winter, charged with our produce, and take in a cargo there, so as to be ready to enter the Baltic early in May. The ports of France, frequented by the Dutch in this carrying trade, are Havre, Nantes, Bordeaux, Cette, and Marseilles. Havre has an advantage over all the others, from its proximity to the Baltic, as well as its situation below the Seine, by means of which all the manufactures of Paris, Rouen, &c. are easily conveyed thither. The cargoes from Havre for Russia consist in fine cloths, linens of Rouen, sugar, coffee, indigo, preserved fruits of all kinds, and of all the manufactures of Paris. Wines are from Bordeaux. The exports from Nantes are nearly the same as those from Havre; Cette and Marseilles may be too distant for us. The greatest navigation between France and this country is from Havre. I have been so particular upon Havre, because I suppose Congress would choose to have _one_ free port, (in virtue of our treaty with France,) in or near the Channel, and I have heard Dunkirk talked of; but is it not worth consideration, whether a port at the very extremity of the empire, can be of equal advantage to that of Havre, which may answer as well for a direct commerce as for this circuitous one, if it should be thought proper to adopt it. By our treaty, I am sensible we have a right to demand but _one_ free port in France, and that for the purpose of carrying there our own commodities _only_. If we should be held rigidly to this, the appointment of a free port will be of great importance to our interests. If we could obtain more, perhaps Havre, Bordeaux, and Marseilles, might be the most advantageous of any three, to furnish us at the best rate, with the productions and manufactures of the several parts of the kingdom.

I express myself with much diffidence on this subject, because I know that a thousand matters ought to be taken into consideration, many of which are known only to those who have made commerce the business of their lives, in order to form a solid judgment upon it. But if anything I have said may serve as hints, which may be improved by others to the general benefit of our country, my purpose will be completely answered.

I have the honor to be, with much esteem and respect, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

TO JOHN ADAMS.

St Petersburg, April 23d, 1782.

Dear Sir,

I see with infinite satisfaction the progress our affairs have made in Holland within a short time, and that you will soon be able to put the finishing hand to your business. No one will more sincerely rejoice in the honor you will merit and acquire by it, than I shall. That nation, after much internal struggling, seems at last to have adopted an almost universal sentiment upon the propriety, or rather, necessity of forming an intimate commercial connexion with us, and this without loss of time. They have been doubtless justly alarmed by the late important change in the councils and system of Great Britain, and have wisely resolved not to suffer her to get the start of them, by adjusting her commercial connexions with America before they have concluded their treaty with us. They well know how much is risked by a further delay. Hence their present zeal to acknowledge our independence.

I wish others saw their interest to do the same thing in as clear a light, and did not longer think of the glory of mediating a peace, which in the end they may miss of; for it is evident to every one who will attentively consider the late measures of Britain, that she means to settle her peace with America, without the participation of any mediators; well knowing the great danger which her most important commercial interests will be exposed to, if they pass through such a medium. Her aim will be to exclude the other maritime powers, as far as possible, from the benefits of our commerce. To effect this, she will make great sacrifices in some respects. You know what I allude to. The critical moment for the maritime powers of Europe has already arrived. They may never, or at least for a long time to come, again see so fair an occasion to promote their essential interests, if they suffer this moment to slip by without fixing their connexions with America. It must be apparent to them all, (the neutral powers I mean,) that no just objections can now be made to a measure of this sort, since the British themselves have felt the necessity of publicly proclaiming to the world their utter inability to obtain the great object of their war, the subjugation of the United States, or of any one of them; and have even made the attempt to do this criminal. With what face can they now pretend to claim any dominion over that country, or to require the neutral powers to forbear the acknowledgment of our independence, till they themselves shall have acknowledged it? Or in other words, to rest idle spectators, as I have before said, till Britain has adjusted all her commercial interests with America, as far as possible to their exclusion.

Do you ask whether this will probably be the case here? I cannot say that it will not. For besides, that I have some reason to suppose this government not yet properly informed, I may say of the immense interest it has at stake relative to the commerce of our country, I know the British will not fail constantly to hold up to her Imperial Majesty the glory of mediating a peace between the great belligerent powers, while they are secretly carrying on a negotiation as above with the United States. Should you ask me if it is not practicable to give those in government just ideas upon the nature of the commerce of the two countries, I must say I have taken such measures to this end, as the peculiar state of things will admit of. I dare not expose the dignity of the United States by making any official advances. They may be rejected. I am not satisfied that they would not be. The cry of mediation I know would open upon me. It is necessary therefore first, to do away all errors upon this subject of commerce, to establish the great mutual interests the two nations have in a close and intimate connexion with each other, and to point out the danger this interest is exposed to, in the present critical state of affairs by delay. When this is done (and I flatter myself the task is very easy if the door is open to me) I shall have nothing to apprehend from mere sounds or words. Her Majesty would most certainly pursue the great interests of her empire, and not suffer herself to be diverted from that pursuit by any dazzling prospects of glory, which the British or any others might hold out. She has too much wisdom not to change her system when affairs have changed their face, and not to improve every favorable occasion, which the course of events may present to her for the benefit of her empire.

I agree with you, that glory and interest are both united in our case; that her Majesty could not by any line of conduct more effectually promote both, than by stepping forth at this moment, and acknowledging the independence of the United States, and forming a commercial treaty with them, that there is nothing to fear from any quarter, that the example of so illustrious a sovereign would probably be followed by the other neutral maritime powers, and would infallibly restore peace and tranquillity to both worlds; and that all Europe would partake equally in the benefits of our commerce, or at least enjoy an equal freedom in it. But if instead of this, America cannot obtain a hearing, which is all she wants to insure her success, wherever national counsels are influenced by national interests, and her Majesty should persevere in her system of mediation, notwithstanding the change in affairs, is not the consequence plain? America will make the best bargain in her power with Britain, and she can now clearly make an advantageous one. When this is done, her Majesty and the other neutral powers will certainly see, though too late, the importance of the present moment to the interests of their respective empires. I will only add, may they be wise in season, may they follow the example, which Holland is setting them, and which she would have set them at this moment, had she been in profound peace with Britain, even at the hazard of a war, little as she delights in it, rather than suffer herself to be foreclosed in her great commercial schemes.

I have the honor to be, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO FRANCIS DANA.

Philadelphia, May 10th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

In my letter of the 2d of March last, I explained fully to you the intentions of Congress in sending you to Petersburg; and the reasons that influenced them to wish, that you would by no means display your public character, till you were fully convinced, that it was the wish of the Court to acknowledge it. And I saw with pleasure, in your letter of the 31st of March, 1781, to the Count de Vergennes, that you had determined agreeably to the spirit and meaning of your instructions, to appear only as a private citizen of the United States, until the result of your inquiries should point out a ready and honorable reception. The opinion of the Minister of his Most Christian Majesty, as well as of Dr Franklin, whom you were directed to consult, was so decided upon that point, that though you might not have thought it sufficient to justify delaying your journey, yet it certainly rendered it proper to take the best precautions to conceal your public character, under some other, that would have been unsuspected; and this for reasons that carried the greatest weight with them.

The Empress having projected the armed neutrality, she naturally wished it to have the appearance of a general regulation, and not of an attempt to serve one of the belligerent powers at the expense of the other. The strictest impartiality could alone give a dignity to her measures, or crown them with success. She further wished to be the means of re-establishing peace, and was perhaps influenced by the laudable ambition of being at the same time the great legislator and arbiter of Europe. At this critical moment it could hardly be expected, that she would publicly entertain a Minister from the United States. For though the powers at war have many collateral objects, yet it is well known, that American independence is the great question in controversy; and though a decision in favor of it might be worthy of the magnanimity of the Empress, yet it would certainly militate against her objects, and afford Great Britain an apology for considering the armed neutrality as a partial regulation; and for rejecting the mediation of a power, whom they would charge with having decided the very point in controversy. A secret agent, if his character was declared to the Russian Minister, would in a less degree have the same effects, and reduce them to the necessity of embarrassing themselves by dissimulation, or permitting us to entertain unfavorable sentiments of their impartiality by directing you to withdraw.

Your eager desire to render essential services to your country had in some measure biassed your judgment, and led you to see this matter in a different light from that in which it would have appeared to you, if your patriotism had permitted you coolly to weigh and consider circumstances. It appears by your letters of the 28th of July, the 15th of September, and 15th of October last, which have been received and read in Congress, that you entertain serious thoughts of making an immediate display of your powers to the Russian Ministry, notwithstanding the cautions given you by the Count de Vergennes, the opinion of Dr Franklin, and the advice of the Marquis de Verac, whom you are expressly directed to consult; whose lights you are interested to avail yourself of, and to sound the dispositions of the Court of Petersburg.

Congress, when they appointed you to the important and delicate mission in which you are engaged, discovered their respect for your abilities, while they meant by their instructions to guard against any inconvenience into which you might hastily run, by directing you before you declared your character, to take the advice of a Minister, whose residence at the Court of Petersburg (independent of other circumstances) gave him advantages, which an absolute stranger could not enjoy. The letters that have passed between you, confirm the propriety of this restriction. The conclusions of the Marquis de Verac on the plan of the proposed mediation are sound and just; and if you have disregarded them, there is no doubt but the event has before this time justified them to you. He has, probably, shown you the answer of France to the proposals of the mediators. You will have remarked therein, the same reasoning extended in such a manner, as fully to have convinced you that the distinction he has drawn between our treating _at the same time_, and our treating as an independent nation, are very well founded. It will serve too, Sir, to show that your suspicions on another point are groundless. To suppose that France would go to war for our independence, and yet not wish to see that independence recognised, is a solecism in politics. Surely every acknowledgment of this kind raises our hopes and depresses those of the enemy, and places the justice of the war, both on the part of France and of us, in a fairer point of view. But, Sir, I do not enlarge on this subject; your instructions ought to be your guide, and they evidently show, that at the time they were given, Congress meant that you should treat the Minister of France at the Court of Petersburg, with the most unreserved confidence, and that you should not declare your mission till he thought the moment favorable. They still retain the same sentiments, every day having convinced them that France makes but one interest with them in establishing their independence. That she should be delicate about advising us to solicit the notice of other Courts, is not to be wondered at, since she must partake, in some degree, of the humiliations that our ill-timed solicitations subject us to. The whole of your communications with the Count de Vergennes, marks a delicacy on the other side, about advising upon a measure, which the instructions of your sovereign should direct. It is easy to see his opinion and his apprehensions of appearing to have disapproved what Congress had thought might be advantageous to them. I conclude this, Sir, by requesting you, if you have not yet made a communication of your powers, to delay doing it till the Marquis de Verac shall agree in sentiment with you that it will be expedient, or until you shall receive farther instructions from Congress.

In the meanwhile you will employ yourself in the manner, which your instructions and my last letter advise. I can see no other line in which you can be useful in your present station. As you will have much leisure on hand, I must beg you to write weekly to this office in cypher, and to write with freedom whatever it may be useful for us to know, particularly all changes that may take place in the administration and the measures of Russia. I will not repeat what I have said on this subject in my last, a quadruplicate of which is enclosed, as is also a cypher. This letter will be consigned to Mr Adams, who will take means to forward it to you by a safe hand.

I am in great pain on account of your letter of the 28th of July, a duplicate of which is arrived. The original has miscarried; should it have fallen into improper hands it may do us very essential injury. I need not tell you how impatient I shall be to hear that this has reached you, since I cannot use my cypher till I receive a line from you written in it, nor can I write with freedom to you till I have a cypher.

Since the reduction of York, nothing important has passed in the military line. The enemy keep possession of New York, Charleston, and Savannah, though they have not strengthened either of the garrisons. They are consequently much weakened; if, as we expect, we shall have a naval support, we have no doubt of being able to expel them this campaign from the continent. Our effective force, exclusive of militia, which we can call in as we want them, including four thousand five hundred French troops, amounts to about twenty thousand men.

They are hardy veterans, well disciplined, well armed, well clad, and well fed. Our finances have assumed a new form, and are every day becoming more respectable by the total abolition of paper, except that of the bank, payable in specie at sight. You have doubtless heard of the late change in the British administration. Sir Guy Carleton has come out in the place of Sir Henry Clinton, and we have reason to believe, that the present system is to endeavor by lenient measures, to seduce us from our alliance with France, and to cajole us out of that freedom, which they find they cannot force us to relinquish. It is astonishing to see the contempt with which these attempts are received. The only effect they have, is to convince us of the declining strength of the enemy, and to excite a general determination to push them with vigor before they recover their late blow. I enclose the last resolution of Congress, organizing this office, that you may, by seeing my powers, know what attention you are to pay to my letters, which will consist of two sorts; the one written by me without consulting Congress, in which, however, I shall always govern myself by what I suppose to be their sentiments; the other, written and submitted to their inspection, so that you may have the highest evidence of its corresponding with their views. When this is the case, I shall always inform you of it. This letter has been read in Congress, and of course contains no instructions, which they disapprove. I shall send you a packet of newspapers with this.

I should have told you, that your salary will in future be paid here. I shall receive it as your agent, and vest it in bills on Dr Franklin, and remit them to him, so that you may draw upon him quarterly. I shall send him one quarter's salary by this conveyance, commencing the 1st of January last, and ending the 1st of April last, and considering myself as the agent of all our foreign Ministers, I shall follow your directions relative to the disposition of your appointment, until you shall think it expedient to name another.

Your most obedient humble servant,

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO FRANCIS DANA.

Philadelphia, May 22d, 1782.

Sir,

Your letters, from the 28th of July to October 15th, have been read in Congress. I have reported an answer,[24] but they have not yet agreed on it, and I do not care to let this vessel go without a line, however hastily written, to you. You will receive with this the newspapers, which contain some information upon a delicate point. The administration of Britain having been changed, they will endeavor to represent themselves as popular in America, to induce a belief that we will, under their auspices, be desirous of returning to our connexion with them. Be assured, that the change in their administration has produced none in the sentiments of America; they are immovably fixed in their determination to support their independence, and not to violate their alliance with France. The Assembly of Maryland and the Council of this State have passed resolutions to that effect; it will be the language of all, as soon as they meet. Congress have refused a passport to Sir Guy Carleton's Secretary, which was asked in order that he might be the bearer of a letter to Congress. Neither army has taken the field, of course I have no military operations to communicate.

Your salary will in future be paid here, where your agent will vest it in bills on Dr Franklin, quarterly, upon whom you will draw accordingly. I shall consider myself as agent for all our foreign Ministers, and transact the business accordingly for you, unless you should choose to appoint some other.

I enclose a cypher, which you will use if it arrives safe, till I have leisure to send you a better.

I am, Sir, your most humble servant,

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

FOOTNOTES:

[24] This refers to the preceding letter of May 10th.

* * * * *

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO FRANCIS DANA.

Philadelphia, May 29th, 1782.

Sir,

You will receive herewith a letter of the 10th instant, which having been submitted to Congress, was returned yesterday to this office, together with the resolution, which I have the honor to enclose expressive of their sense of the sentiments contained in the letter, and of the line of conduct you ought to pursue. Having written to you lately, I have little to add.

We have not been able to settle a cartel with the British for the exchange of prisoners, of whom we have a balance in our hands to the amount of ten thousand. They refuse to pay the great sums, that we have advanced for their maintenance, which we make a preliminary to an exchange. It is not improbable, that the Germans will be made free of the country, sold for three years, to defray this expense, which they most of them wish, as they express a great inclination to settle here.

I have the honor to be, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

St Petersburg, June 28th, 1782.

Sir,

Immediately after we had received intelligence here of the important change in the councils, and in the system of Great Britain, I consulted my correspondent (the Marquis de Verac) upon the expediency of disclosing my public character, without further delay to her Majesty's principal Minister. He gave me his opinion freely and candidly. For your information, I need only say, that it is the same in every respect with his former one, which you will find in his letter to me, of the 12th of September last, and in mine of September 15th to the President of Congress.

I cannot take upon me to say, that his opinion is not well founded. My private sentiment then was, that that event could not fail to occasion a correspondent change in her Majesty's system also; but I knew my means of information were not as good as those of my correspondent, and that though every one seems to think the mediation of her Majesty, between Great Britain and Holland, was in effect at an end, yet in form it was still kept up, so that the reasons against disclosing my character, mentioned to you in my letter of March 5th, might still be supposed to have some influence. This determined me to conform to his advice.

However, I could not think of resting totally inactive in this state of things; though I thought it not prudent to make any official communications, yet it could not be amiss to endeavor at this time to turn, if possible, the thoughts of those in government upon our affairs, and to refute certain assertions of our enemies, which had remained without contradiction here, and by this means to prepare the way for the former. It might at least serve to sound the sentiments of the Ministers. With these views I have thrown the few following reflections upon paper, three translations of which into French, have, I am assured, been placed in the very hands I wished to place them, and that they have not been unacceptable.

_Reflections._

"When Great Britain engaged in a war with her late Colonies, either to obtain allies, or to prevent new enemies rising up against her, she was desirous to have it believed that she was contending in the common cause of all the maritime powers of Europe. Spain she endeavored to alarm by suggesting, that the revolt in America would be a fatal example to all her Colonies in the new world, and if it had not such an effect upon them, they would at least be liable to be conquered one after another, by their new neighboring empire, so that in one way or the other Spain would lose her American Colonies, if the independence of the United States should be established. To Holland she held up the danger her peculiar commerce, and her navigation would be exposed to, from the enterprising spirit of the Americans, who would not fail to become soon her rivals throughout all Europe. To the nations about the Baltic she alleged, that the free commerce of America would be highly prejudicial to their commerce, _because many of the commodities of America, being of the same nature with theirs, they would everywhere in the markets of Europe come into concurrence with them_. She has been more particular with regard to Russia, and asserted, that this empire can derive no possible benefit from a free and direct commerce with America, and that with or without this commerce, Russia will be in the same circumstances, _because Great Britain who now takes off, will continue to take off, all the superfluous productions, and manufactures of Russia_.

"The conduct of Spain, and of Holland, is the best comment upon the declarations of the British, which respect those nations. I shall confine myself, therefore, to those which respect the nations about the Baltic, and particularly Russia. A few short reflections upon these reasonings, or rather assertions, may perhaps show the mere fallacy of them.

"Let it be admitted, that Great Britain will in fact continue to take off all the superfluous productions and manufactures of Russia. Does it follow from hence, that Russia can have no interest in a free and direct commerce with America? Will it make no difference to the interests of Russia whether she disposes of her commodities to Great Britain alone, or to Great Britain and America at the same time? Will not the concurrence of America in her ports give an additional advantage to Russia? Will it not enhance the price of her commodities? Will it not increase the demand for them? And will not this increased demand be the means also of increasing the quantity of her productions and manufactures? If these things do not follow, all the reasonings of the best writers upon the principles of commerce, showing the great benefits every nation derives from the concurrence of purchasers of her commodities, are false and delusive. Besides, how is Russia paid for her productions and manufactures? Is it not by exchange in a very great proportion for foreign commodities? Are not many of these foreign commodities of the peculiar production or manufacture of America, such as rice, indigo, sugar, coffee, cocoa, pimento, cochineal, and all sorts of dyeing woods? Does it make no difference to the interest of Russia, whether she receives those articles directly from the countries, which produce them, or in circuitous voyages through Great Britain, and consequently from a third hand? Does not this course draw along with it double freight, double insurance, double commissions, and are not all the other charges attending a voyage (to say nothing of additional duties,) ordinarily doubled by means of this circuitous course? Will not the price of such American commodities be increased by these means when they arrive in Russia, at the most moderate computation, at the rate of twentyfive per cent? Will not Russia, therefore, necessarily lose at that same rate, upon all her commodities sold to Great Britain in exchange for such American commodities? And will not this contribute in a great measure to keep the course of exchange against her? And will she not lose also the advantages she would infallibly derive from the concurrence of the Americans in her ports? Is it not worthy of consideration, whether this extra price of materials, necessary for the manufactures of Russia, will not render them so much dearer to foreign nations, and whether this circumstance will not expose her to the danger of being rivalled in those very commodities in other countries? In one word, is it not of the last importance to a nation to draw all such foreign commodities as she wants from the first hand, or from their proper source? What credit, then, is to be given to the assertion of the British, viz. that this empire can derive no benefit from a free and direct commerce with America and that, without this commerce, Russia will be in the same circumstances.

"Further, if it is true, that many of the productions of America are of the same nature with those of Russia, and that a concurrence of those articles on the part of America, in the markets of Europe, would be prejudicial to the commerce of Russia, does it follow from hence, that it would not be the interest of Russia to have a free and direct commerce with America? Let us take one article by way of example; hemp, which is the foundation of the principal commerce of Russia. That within some parts of the extensive territories of the United States, both the soil and climate may be adapted to the cultivation of hemp of the best quality, cannot reasonably be doubted. Is it not then of the highest importance to Russia, to turn the thoughts of the Americans from the cultivation of this plant, or in other words, to make it their interests not to cultivate it? That Russia can do this; by means which may be pointed out, and in the use of which both nations may promote their general interests, is certain. But will the exclusion of the Americans from a free and direct commerce have this effect? Will the sending them to Great Britain, or to any other country in Europe than Russia, for the commodities of Russia, but especially for her hemp, have a tendency to that effect? Will not the Russian hemp, in consequence of such measures, be burthened with all the charges abovementioned when it comes to the hands of the Americans, that is to say, with the extraordinary charge of twentyfive per cent? And will not this twentyfive per cent in fact operate in the nature of a bounty to that amount, to encourage the cultivation of American hemp?

"Besides if America should find a combination to exclude her from the benefit of a free and direct commerce with Russia, is it not natural to suppose she would endeavor to relieve herself from the effects of such an inequitable system, by vigorously adopting proper measures for that purpose? And could she not do it? Might she not begin by profiting of the errors of such an exclusive system, to the encouragement that system would give to the cultivation of her hemp, could she not superadd a duly upon all Russian hemp, which should be imported into America? The effects of such a policy on the one part and on the other, cannot possibly escape the penetration of those whose business it is maturely to consider these things. But may it not be asked, if the mischiefs pointed out above should in fact take place, are there any benefits which Russia could derive from such a system, which would more than counterbalance them? And what are these benefits? What, for instance, could compensate Russia for the damage she would sustain by losing the supply of hemp for the great American market, a market which will be rapidly increasing, while that of Great Britain, to say the least, has come to a full stand? Would not two other important supplies be in danger of sharing the same fate, viz, sailcloth and cordage? All these three articles have hitherto been imported in great quantities into America; sailcloth for the use of all their navigation, and there is scarce any kind of Russian manufactures, which they have not imported, and which they do not want. Finally, it is certain, that if America had continued under the dominion of Great Britain, that very concurrence in the markets of Europe, which the British pretend will be a consequence of the independence of America, would have taken place, especially in the articles of pitch, tar, turpentine, iron, ship timber, masts, spars, bowsprits, and in general of all naval stores.

"Every one knows that Great Britain drew great quantities of all these commodities from the northern nations. It is not less certain, that she drew some of all of them from her late Colonies. But these commodities are so bulky, and of so little intrinsic value, that it was utterly impossible for the Americans to transport them across the Atlantic so cheap as the nations of Europe, which wanted them, and Great Britain in particular, could import them from the northern nations. This kind of commerce, therefore, would long since have utterly failed, and been left free for those nations, if, to prevent this, Great Britain had not adopted the policy of granting large bounties upon all those commodities, iron alone excepted, when imported into Great Britain from America. It was her interest to do this, because at the same time, that she was thereby encouraging the commerce of her Colonies, she was rendering a great benefit to her own manufactures, in which she paid the Americans for those commodities, so that her bounties turned to the account of both parts of the Empire at once. Besides, they made her less dependent upon any foreign nations for those commodities, and she was too well acquainted with her commercial and political interests ever to lose sight of that object. She could not grant a bounty upon iron without injuring her own mines; she therefore adopted the method of exempting the iron of America from duties, which she imposed upon all the iron imported from any foreign country, and these duties being considerable, they had a like effect upon American iron, as the bounties had upon the other commodities. This system was calculated gradually to destroy the commerce of the northern nations with Great Britain.

"Now is it not certain, take away the dependence of America upon the empire of Great Britain, and you take away at the same time the interest of Great Britain, to give the preference to those American commodities? She will then procure them where she can procure them cheapest, that is from the northern nations. When the British bounties therefore cease, the commerce of America with Europe in those articles will cease with them. And thus those nations will nowhere be troubled with the dangerous concurrence in the markets of Europe on the part of America, which has been so much talked of by the British, and may have influenced the political systems of those powers. During the time America was dependent upon the British empire, she has always imported great quantities of iron and steel from Sweden through Great Britain. She will certainly continue to import those articles when she can obtain them so much cheaper by a direct commerce with Sweden or Russia. Is it not then clear, that the independence of the United States, in whatever view it is properly considered, will turn to the benefit of all Europe, Great Britain alone excepted; that the nations about the Baltic, Russia above all, if they adopt in season a wise policy towards America, have everything to hope and nothing to fear from the commerce of that country?"

As these reflections were not in my hand writing, or signed, or delivered by me, so there was no danger of exposing Congress or myself in this business. Though no great doubt could be entertained from what hand they came, yet they might have been disavowed by me if it should be thought advisable. I pretend not to have suggested any new matter upon the subject, or to have urged the whole that might have been said upon it. Brevity was a thing indispensably necessary. They are perhaps more adapted to the local state of affairs, than anything the Ministers here may have seen. On the whole, I have no reason to repent of the measure. Although it should not be attended with any immediate good effects, yet I flatter myself it may not be wholly fruitless.

I have prepared a second part, which enforces the first, enters more into political matter, and is chiefly designed as an answer to certain ostensible objections, which I understand have been made against her Imperial Majesty's forming at present any political connexion with the United States, but have made no use of it yet, because since the delivery of the first, accounts of the advantages gained by the British fleet over the French in the West Indies, have arrived here, and seem a little to have changed the face of affairs in this quarter; though it seems to me whoever reflects upon that unfortunate action, cannot really suppose the relative force of the two nations essentially altered by it. The British it is true may have thereby saved the most valuable of their possessions in those parts, for this year at least, the loss of which would have reduced them nearly to despair, and compelled them to solicit a universal peace upon such terms as they know it is to be obtained. In this view it has its serious consequences.

I would very willingly comply with your request, and make my letters more numerous and more minute, but the want of a safe conveyance from hence, (having no other than the post, and not having any cypher from your office) obliges me to remain totally silent upon some matters, and to use so much caution in others, that I fear none of them will afford you much satisfaction, or can be of any real service. I have not been honored with any letter from you since that of the 22d of October last, the duplicate of which has never come to hand. When you write me, please to send your letters to the care of Mr Adams. I pray you to acquaint Congress, that I shall not fail to exert my small abilities to the utmost, and to improve every favorable opportunity to promote the end of my mission. I should be happy if I could give them any reasonable assurances, that my success was at hand.

I am, with much respect and esteem, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

St Petersburg, August 30th, 1782.

Sir,

I cannot suffer the post of this day to depart without acknowledging the receipt of the quadruplicate of the 2d of last March, and another of the 22d of May. They were received last evening. Neither the original of the first, nor either of the other copies has reached me, so that I have been a long time without any intelligence about affairs in our country from you. The reason you assigned for this surprised me. I thought it had been next to impossible, that my letters written from hence, in August, September and October last, should not have reached you long before that time. The only channel through which you can write me with the least security, is Holland. If your letters are sent to the care of Mr Adams, they will come on under every possible caution; but no letter should be sent addressed immediately to me. In such a case, there is no doubt but they would all be opened at the office here. I send all my own letters under cover to friends in Holland, which, though it doubles the postage, is a caution which ought not to be dispensed with.

Your letter has eased me of much anxiety, particularly that paragraph of it, which begins with the word "_you_" and ends with "_acknowledged_," as it has cleared up the point of most importance, and upon which I wanted more explicit directions than are contained in my instructions. Though this letter has been so long on its way, yet it has arrived in good season to answer every purpose of it. I have hitherto been governed by sentiments exactly conformable to those you have expressed in the clause which begins with "_all_" and ends with "_insecure_." But my anxiety arose from an apprehension, that the expectations of Congress might possibly have been different, for want of some local information, which I have never ventured to communicate.

I have reason to believe, that at this time, the illustrious Sovereign of this empire, and her principal Ministers are fully convinced, that the affairs of the United States have acquired a consistency, which renders their independence perfectly secure, particularly that they are not distracted by internal divisions, that Congress are everywhere highly respected, freely obeyed, and firmly supported; that the governments of the several States harmonise with them and with each other, in all great political points, and in their turn are equally respected, obeyed, and supported by their respective citizens. On these points there is no danger of our suffering from the misrepresentations of our enemies. If I have been able to collect any part of the sentiments of this Court, it is that the independence of the United States is established beyond all question, and that its political measures, so far as they may take our country into view, will be formed upon that supposition. Indeed, they have long since been formed on that ground.

Sir, as I propose to forward two copies of this letter by the post of the day, I should miss of the opportunity if I enlarged here. I will take up the subject in my next by the next post. I am sorry to find the ordinance you mention does not accompany your letter, though you say you enclosed it. I wrote to Mr Adams for it as soon as I heard of it, but have not received it from him.

I have the honor to be, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

St Petersburg, September 5th, 1782.

Sir,

Though there is now no danger of our suffering from the misrepresentations of the British, and our independence may be considered as established beyond all question, yet her Imperial Majesty, still entertaining the expectation of mediating at the general peace, every measure which may possibly be deemed an obstacle to that end will be studiously avoided. It is not, therefore, to be expected, that any application of ours would meet with the desired success, while her Imperial Majesty continues to tender her mediation. This has all along been my idea of the matter, and if I had not received the further instructions of Congress, contained in your letter, I should not have attempted to assume my public character under such circumstances.

But I must confess at the same time I should have risked the measure the first moment I saw the mediation given up by her Majesty; because I did not view the United States as humble supplicants at this Court; as they were not seeking aids from her Majesty, and had nothing to ask but what they intended to give an ample equivalent for. And I did not consider, that the real honor and dignity of the United States would be more exposed, even by her Majesty's declining to accept our propositions, and by my immediate retirement from her Court in that case, than they would be exposed to, by my long residence here (no such cause as is mentioned existing) in the character of a private citizen of the United States, when the event would show, that I had all the while a commission in my pocket as their public Minister. You will not conceive, Sir, that I mean to question the propriety of the orders of Congress which you have communicated to me. I am sensible it is my duty to obey, and not to dispute their commands, and I am very happy to have received them in such clear and explicit terms.

I beg leave to observe, that when Congress ordered my commission and instructions to be made out, they seem to have misapprehended the nature of the confederation proposed by her Imperial Majesty, to maintain the freedom of commerce, and of navigation. My commission and instructions are in part founded upon the supposition, that her Imperial Majesty, in her declaration of February 28th, 1780, had invited both the belligerent and neutral powers to enter into a general convention for that purpose, and authorise and direct me to accede to the same (if invited thereto) on the part of the United States. Whereas that declaration is in the nature of a notification to the belligerent powers only, and contains a complaint of the interruption the commerce and navigation of the neutral nations, and of her own subjects in particular, had suffered from the subjects of the belligerent powers, in violation of the rights of neutral nations, sets forth and claims those rights and declares, that to maintain them, to protect the honor of her flag, &c. she had fitted out the greatest part of her marine forces. These violations, it is said in it, ought to excite the attention of all neutral powers. In pursuance of this sentiment, a copy of the declaration was communicated to the Courts of Stockholm, Copenhagen, Lisbon, and to the States-General; in which communication they are invited to make a common cause of this business with her Imperial Majesty, who adds, that if to establish this system on a solid foundation, the neutral powers abovementioned would open a negotiation, and enter into a particular convention, she would be ready to come into it.

This is the only passage I have been able to find in all the acts relative to this subject, which gives the least idea of a Congress or general negotiation. No general negotiation has ever been opened in consequence of this intimation, and if there had been, the belligerent powers, I conceive, could have taken no part regularly in it, or in the particular conventions which might have been the result. They had only to make their several answers to the declaration which her Imperial Majesty made to them, as they have done. The marine convention which was afterwards first entered into by her Imperial Majesty, and the King of Denmark, and which has served as a basis for all the others, being nothing more than an association to maintain their rights as neutral powers, no formal accession can be made to such a confederation on the part of the United States, till they cease to be a belligerent power.

Viewing the matter in this light, and knowing that the resolutions of Congress have long since been communicated to her Majesty by Mr Adams, through her Minister at the Hague, I have not communicated them, though he thought it was the intention of Congress I should do it, on my arrival here. I hope, Sir, you will favor me with the sentiments of Congress upon this subject by the earliest opportunity, that I may know not only whether I am mistaken in my opinion about it, but whether my conduct meets with their approbation.

It is proper to advise Congress, that there is a fixed custom at this Court, that every power entering into any treaty with her Imperial Majesty, must pay six thousand roubles to each of her principal Ministers, that is, to four of them, making twentyfour thousand in all, reckoning them upon an average of exchange upon London, at fortyfive pence sterling, makes L4,500, if I mistake not. This sum has been paid by all the neutral powers, who have acceded to her marine convention. If therefore the time should ever arrive for me to make any treaty here, it will be indispensably necessary Congress should enable me to advance that sum upon the execution of each treaty. I make no other comment upon this practice, than that I hope it may never find its way into our country.

I was too much pressed for time when I wrote you last to acquaint you, that Portugal had acceded to the neutral confederation. This should not be considered as a mere voluntary act on the part of Portugal. For Portugal sent on hither, in the course of last winter, a consul, in expectation of forming a commercial treaty, which her Majesty declined, unless Portugal would accede to the neutral confederation. The commercial treaty is not yet finished. It seems to be the present determination of her Majesty, not to grant any special commercial favors to any nation, but to make treaties with all upon equal principles. The treaty with Britain, which will expire on the 20th of June, 1786, I am assured is not likely to be renewed, so that that nation will presently lose the benefits derived from a kind of monopoly, which they have long enjoyed here.

You acquaint me that Congress have ordered the salaries of all their foreign Ministers to be paid in America, and that you shall transmit bills to Dr Franklin, upon whom they are to draw quarterly. I shall attend to this new arrangement in future. I wish you would be pleased to inform me in your next, whether Congress have taken into consideration the questions I stated in my letter of the 24th of March, 1781, relative to my salary; and what has been done upon it. I am inclined to think, from the concluding paragraph of the preamble to my instructions, that Congress supposed, "the diplomatic order, in which I am placed by my commission;" was inferior to that in which their other Ministers in Europe are placed by their commissions. That paragraph seems to have been taken from Vattel's Law of Nations, where he treats of the several orders of public Ministers. He supposes a great difference in point of ceremony or etiquette, and says, that Ministers Plenipotentiary are of much greater distinction than simple Ministers. In both these suppositions he is certainly mistaken, at least as to this Court, where they are treated in the same manner in every respect. Indeed Envoys Extraordinary, and Extraordinary Ministers Plenipotentiary, and Ministers simply so named, being all in the second class of public Ministers, and of equal rank, are treated in the same manner. No distinction is made between them on account of their different titles.

Precedency among Ministers of the same class, is not settled here throughout. The general rule of adjusting here and elsewhere, is the relative rank of their respective masters or sovereigns. No Minister, for instance, of the second class, would dispute precedency with a Minister of the Emperor of the same class; but we have seen a Minister of the present Empress claim precedency of a Minister of France of the same class, though generally the Ministers of France have been in possession of the place next to the Ministers of the Emperor. This dispute has left the matter of precedency among Ministers of the same class, much at loose here, where indeed they are not much troubled about etiquette of any sort. Each Court has its particular usage in such cases, and no good information is to be drawn from any general treatises upon the subject.

I have the honor to be, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO FRANCIS DANA.

Philadelphia, September 18th, 1782.

Sir,

I have just now received your favor of the 30th of March, it being the only letter we have had from you in eleven months. The previous one of March 5th never reached me: I am compelled from the variety of things that press upon me at this time, to answer in fewer words than I would wish to do. Your observations on the trade of Russia are very pertinent, and afford us some useful hints, and as none of the actions of the Empress, who has at present, by the force of her own abilities, such influence upon the affairs of Europe can be indifferent to us, we feel an interest in the statement you give us of her connexion with the Porte. You have, however, been totally silent upon a subject that interests us more immediately. You say nothing of your own situation, whether you are known or concealed; whether you have conversed with the Minister, or thought it prudent to keep at a distance till a more favorable moment offers; whether our cause gains or loses ground at Petersburg; and what means you use to support it; whether you have had any conversation with the French Ambassador since that you detailed to us, and what the result of your conferences with him have been. These are points upon which we should not be left in the dark.

As to ourselves, nothing important has been done in the military line this summer. The enemy has remained inactive, and our disappointment in the expected naval aid from the misfortune of Count de Grasse, has compelled us hitherto to be so too; though we never at any period of the war had so respectable an army, if we take into view either their numbers, their discipline, or their supplies of every kind. The French troops from Virginia have just joined ours on the banks of the Hudson. The feeble attempt of the British to dissolve the alliance formed against them, by detaching us from France, or France from us, was received here with contempt and almost every legislature on the continent immediately passed unanimous resolutions expressive of their determination to make no peace in which the interest of their allies was not included. Congress refused to receive Mr Morgan, Secretary to General Carleton.

The change which afterwards took place in the British administration, has made a very important alteration in their system here. Savannah was evacuated, and the proposed evacuation of Charleston has been announced in general orders. Everything seemed to speak the evacuation of New York, when we learnt that a second change has taken place, and that the death of the Marquis of Rockingham has put Lord Shelburne at the head of the administration.

The enclosed letter from General Carleton and Admiral Digby, Commissioners for making peace, is such a glaring evidence against them, if they change their conduct towards us, that I wish you to have it published.

I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

St Petersburg, September 23d, 1782.

Sir,

Your answer to my letters, from the 28th of July to October, mentioned in yours of the 22d of May, has not reached me, nor have any of your letters except those the receipt of which is acknowledged in my last. That of the 22d of May, I received on the 29th of last month, but the newspapers which you say accompany it, were brought me by yesterday's post, at an expense of near four pounds sterling. How they came to be separated from your letter, or who forwarded them to me, I know not.

It may be advisable to furnish me, when the time will admit of it, with authentic copies of such proceedings of Congress, as I ought to be particularly informed about, or when these matters, or any other of that nature are published in the newspapers, to cut them out and enclose them in your letters. For I cannot receive our newspapers through any other channel than the post, and at what expense, you have a specimen above. I cannot tell to what accident it has been owing, that I never received the resolutions of Congress of the 26th of June, 1781, till the last week. Had I been possessed of them when I wrote my last, I should not have troubled you with an inquiry about the questions stated in my letter of the 24th of March, 1781, to which they seem to be intended as an answer. If Congress have made any alterations touching the subject of them as far as it can now concern me, I should be glad to know them.

As it seems to be the fixed determination of Congress that nothing shall be put to hazard here, I shall not think myself at liberty to take any official step to bring on the business of my mission, though the general state of affairs should seem to promise success, unless I have assurances, that I shall be received and acknowledged in my public character. Congress must not expect any such assurances will begin on the part of this Court, so long as the Court of London shall oppose any act by which we may be considered as an independent nation. For her Imperial Majesty would not choose unnecessarily to give the least umbrage to the Court of London, and, of course, if not called upon to do it, she will not make any advances to meet our views, till all opposition shall cease. Her Majesty and her Ministers well know our policy is founded upon great and liberal principles, and they do not apprehend they shall lose any advantages, by postponing a political connexion with us, till the way is perfectly clear to form it.

There has no change taken place in the administration here, as you have been informed, since my arrival. Count Panin had retired from Court before, and though he still bears the title of Chief of the College of Foreign Affairs, yet he takes not the least part in them. The Vice Chancellor, Count d'Ostermann, continues to conduct the etiquette of that department, as the First Minister. Things appear to be governed still by the same influence and the same principles, which took place upon the retirement of the former. I have attempted to write to you in your cypher, but find the scheme intolerably tedious, and so liable to errors, that I have been obliged to give it up. Besides, it has come to me through the post office, and I am not sure they are not in possession of a copy of it. I will endeavor to prepare another scheme, which I think will be attended with much less trouble, and be equally good on other accounts. I will forward it to Holland by Mr Adams's son, who will soon leave me, when I shall be totally destitute of any assistance, and deprived of any person into whose hands your papers might be committed in case of my death; nor is it possible here to procure any one in whom I could safely confide. I am the more easy about this, as I propose to return to America as soon after I shall be received in my public character, as the principal business of my mission shall be finished. I will, myself, bring any treaty I may conclude here for ratification, when I doubt not I shall be able to assign such reasons for my departure, without express permission, as will be satisfactory to Congress.

I have the honor to be, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

St Petersburg, September 29th, 1782.

Sir,

I have this day been honored with the duplicate of yours of the 10th of May, and of the 22d and 29th of the same month, together with the resolutions of Congress of the 22d of February, and of the 1st of March last, relative to your department, but no copy of your letter, or of the resolutions of Congress expressive of their sense of the sentiments contained in the letter of the 10th of May, or of the cypher, all of which you say are enclosed in that letter, has come to hand with it.

If my first letter to you, dated March 5th, which was written by the next post after the receipt of your first, has been received, and I think it must have been soon after the date of your last, all anxiety which might have been occasioned by my earlier letters from hence, I hope will be removed, and that I shall be thought not to be totally destitute of political prudence. When that letter was written, I was rather apprehensive I might be censured by some as suffering prudence to degenerate into pusillanimity, for not taking advantage of the impression made by so important an event as the surrender of Lord Cornwallis and his army, and thought it expedient to assign any reasons for not doing it, knowing that we are apt to think events, which so immediately change the face of affairs among ourselves, operate almost as sudden changes in the systems of Europe.

My letter of June 28th, I hope also will have the same favorable tendency. The measure mentioned in it, I presume will not be censured. To say the least, it has not been productive of any unhappy effects. I have never delivered the second part, because I have not yet been satisfied of the expediency of touching upon some matters which it contained. I have always consulted the French Minister freely, whenever I have thought any circumstances favorable to our views have turned up, (an instance will be found in the above letter) and I have never acted against his opinion given me upon any point.

The line I have hitherto pursued, is precisely that pointed out in your letter of March 2d. In truth, Sir, no person has higher ideas of the real honor and dignity of the United States than myself, and no person, perhaps, would be less liable rashly to expose them to any indignities. I will not now trouble you with observations upon any parts of your letter of May 10th, though I may think myself obliged to do so hereafter, when I shall have a more convenient opportunity to enter fully into the subject of it, and into the necessary explanations.

At present, we have no interesting intelligence here. What may be the consequences of the measures taken by her Imperial Majesty to restore the deposed Khan of the Crimea, of whom I have made some particular mention in my letter of the 30th of March, is not easily foreseen. Whenever we shall receive any certain accounts from that quarter, I shall not fail to communicate them. In that same letter I gave you some account of the commerce of this country, and pointed out in what way I imagined we might take a part in it to our advantage. I enclosed you a printed list of the exports from hence for 1781. You will receive one with this also, which will serve to show the nature of them with more exactness than the quantity; for this is always considerably greater than those lists import it to be, because they are formed from the articles alleged by the merchants to be shipped, and for which they pay the duties, and they scarce ever report the whole to the custom house.

To give you a more particular knowledge of the commerce of this country, I have sent you (with the dictionaries you wrote for) a small treatise upon the subject, which enters into mercantile details, and may be very serviceable to some of our merchants. It is in general well written, and is the only one I can learn which has been published upon it. Her Majesty, who seems to give great attention to the commerce of her empire, has since freed it in many instances from the restrictions imposed upon it. In particular, all kinds of military stores are now permitted to be exported by any one paying the duties, salt petre, rhubarb, &c. And the exploring and working of mines, have also been lately encouraged. Though there are vast mines in this empire, yet they were never worked upon till the time of Peter the Great. Before that period Russia imported all her iron, copper, lead, &c. principally from Sweden. At this day Russia exports as much iron (the exportation of copper is prohibited) as Sweden, that is, one year with another, about three millions of poods, a pood being forty pounds Russian, a little more than thirtysix pounds English. Some of the iron of Russia is at least as good as the best Swedish, particularly what is called old sable iron. We used to import considerable quantities of the Swedish, if I am not mistaken.

Upon my arrival here, I found a strong apprehension prevailing, that we should rival this country in the other parts of Europe, especially in the important articles of iron and hemp. Besides what I have said upon this subject in the reflections contained in my letter of June 28th, I endeavored to show the high improbability of our going into the business of mining, even to a degree to answer our own demands, for an age at least, much less for foreign markets. From the dearness of labor, when our mines if worked at all must be worked by freemen, and not as in Europe in general, by slaves, as we had no white slaves, and had prohibited the importation of blacks; that by this means, aided by the enemy, who in their progress through the southern States had stolen them from many plantations, and shipped not a few to their Islands, we should shortly see an end of slaves in our country; that the policy of our governments was opposed to the commerce of slaves; that upon the supposition we could work our mines by freemen nearly as cheap as Russia, yet we should import her iron in great quantities, because the nature of the other commodities we should take from hence is such as would require our vessels to be ballasted, and that they would wish to take in iron in preference to other unprofitable ballast and without freight, so that it would always arrive among us at an advantageous rate. From the prodigious extent of our uncultivated territory, joined to the ease with which every inhabitant might make himself an independent proprietor of a sufficient portion of it, for the comfortable support of himself and a family, who in their turns might find in the same way the same facility of subsisting in an independent state of life; that it was not in the nature of things for men thus circumstanced to bury themselves in the bowels of the earth, and spend their lives and their labor for the profit of others.

As to the article of hemp, I observed, notwithstanding the encouragement by bounties given by the Parliament of Britain, aided by the influence of the King's Governors in the Colonies, we had never adopted the cultivation of it in any degree worth consideration; that we had continued to import it through Great Britain in very great quantities; that scarce any vessel ever came from thence without bringing more or less of it; that it had never become an article of exportation, unless possibly in some instances for the purpose of recovering bounties; that the people were averse to its cultivation, as it not only required a good soil, which could be more profitably imployed in raising grain, but impoverished it very fast; that grain was one of our capital articles; that by means of it we kept up a profitable commerce with all the West Indies, as well as with some of the more southern parts of our continent; that further, it would be the policy of America, whenever circumstances should turn her attention to manufactures, to begin upon the coarse woollens in preference to linens of any kind, and to that end to promote the increase of wool, rather than of flax or hemp; that a system of this sort coincided perfectly with the cultivation of grain, as it contributed to fill the country with provisions, to render labor cheaper, and to afford further supplies for the above foreign markets; and that our lands instead of being injured, would be much meliorated by such means.

By arguments of this kind, pursued into their details, and such as are contained in those reflections, I have endeavored, I hope with some good effect, to dissipate any apprehensions of the abovementioned rivalry. This had become an object of consequence to us, as this rivalry was maintained by both friends and foes, though with very different views. I will explain myself hereafter upon this point.

Our latest intelligence from America, comes by the way of Iceland, and in substance is, that the ship of war the Princess Caroline, had arrived there last from Charleston; that she was at Savannah on the 30th of June; that the garrison had received orders to evacuate that post; that on the 1st of July transports had arrived there from Charleston to take them off; that she carried Governor Wright to Charleston, where she arrived the 3d of July; that all was then quiet there, but that General Carleton had determined to evacuate that place also, and to keep possession of St Augustine. Thus it is generally supposed here, that those two posts have been evacuated by the British to reinforce New York and their Islands, and that New York is besieged, as we learn further by the way of London, that Vaudreuille had sailed with twenty ships of the line for our continent, supposed with the design of covering the siege of that place. As to military operations in Europe, Gibraltar now commands universal attention, and it is believed that celebrated rock must soon change its masters, and if so, that this will smooth the way to peace.

I have the honor to be, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

_P. S._ I do not write to you in your cyphers, because, since your last copy is missing, I think the reasons against doing it are stronger than when I wrote my last.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

St Petersburg, October 14th, 1782.

Sir,

I should have done myself the honor of writing to you before this day, but I have been so much indisposed ever since the date of my last, that I have been unable to do it. Notwithstanding the difficulties I have had upon my mind, and have expressed in my letters of September 29th, and October 1st, I have hazarded writing to you in your cypher, to communicate the matter contained in my last. It may be proper to acquaint you, that the reasons urged in support of that project, were in writing and annexed to it, that I read the whole carefully, and immediately upon my return home reduced it to writing from my memory, more at large than I have given it to you, having in my communication expressed myself in as few words as possible, preserving the substance only, to save unnecessary trouble in cyphering and decyphering. This is what is alluded to where it is said "this rivalry was maintained by both friends and foes, though with very different views."

As you have the matter now before you, if I did not feel myself under any restraint, it would be needless for me to trouble you with any particular observations of my own upon it, because you will at once discern its effects upon our present interests here, as well as upon our commerce and navigation in future, should the scheme be carried into execution, of which I believe there is now no probability, the plan mentioned in my letter of March 30th, particularly that part of it contained in the clause beginning "perhaps solidly" and ending with "protection" seems to be opening upon us. I have never entertained an idea, that her Imperial Majesty, or any other of the neutral powers, would take a part in the present war. The probability of her doing so is, if possible, much weaker than before.

Her attention will be turned to another quarter, and we may see a war break out against the Turks, in which the Emperor may be concerned likewise. Many movements tend to this end. An army of a hundred and sixty thousand Russians are ordered to assemble at Kersant, a new fortified village in New Russia, situated on the western side of the Dnieper or Borysthenes, at about fourteen leagues from Oczakow, a well fortified town of the Turks, famous in the war of 1736, situated at the mouth of the same river, and opposite to Kinburn, a port which Russia obtained at the last peace, but which is exposed to the sudden attacks of the Turks from Oczakow. Eighteen regiments, amounting to about twentyfive thousand men, have already arrived at Kersant, and the residue, or as great a part as can be collected, will be at that rendezvous in March next. The restoration of the deposed Khan of the Crimea is the declared object of this great force; but I am told that revolution has been effected by the intrigues of the Court of St Petersburg, to raise a pretext for this movement, and to cover the real object in view, and that the campaign next year will open with the siege of Oczakow. I pretend not to be certain about this particular information, but I give it to you as what appears to me not to be improbable.

The Russian Ministers are in general Ante-Gallicans, and have, since the exit of Count Panin, sought to divide or lessen the enemies of Great Britain. Hence the most extraordinary proceedings to bring or rather to drive the United Provinces into a separate peace with Great Britain, (which have not yet ceased,) and hence all the patient acquiescence in her attempt to make a particular peace with the United States, though repugnant to the propositions of the mediating Courts. I believe they would have been well pleased, not only that their partial mediation between Holland and Great Britain had succeeded, but that the United States as an independent nation had made their own peace with Great Britain, and left her to contend with the house of Bourbon alone. From this general sketch of their system, you may be enabled to account for many appearances.

I have the honor to be, &c.

FRANCIS DANA.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

St Petersburg, November 1st, 1782.

Sir,

Conceiving that the most, if not the only profitable connexion, we can form with this Empire, is of a commercial nature, I have, during my residence here, turned much of my attention to learn in what manner we can carry on a commerce with it, to our greatest benefit. In a former