Part 32

Pigot is arrived at New York, with twentysix sail of the line. The late changes in administration seem to have made such a change here, that I much doubt whether they will quit us this fall, at least, till they hear again from England, though they certainly were making every disposition for it before. I will keep this letter open till I hear the fate of the frigates, and know whether our despatches by them can be preserved.

M. Dumas's application is before Congress. They may possibly appoint him Secretary to the Legation, which I heartily wish they may, as he certainly has been an assiduous and faithful servant. But there is no probability of their going further, as they would not choose to appoint any but an American to so important an office, as that of _Chargé des Affaires_. Nor will their present system of economy permit them to make so great an addition to his salary as you mention, which is much greater than is usually allowed to secretaries, as their circumstances require it to be less.

_September 18th._ The Aigle, Captain La Fouche, has been driven on shore, and is lost within the Capes; her despatches, money, and passengers, have, however, happily been saved. The Gloire, the other frigate, has arrived at Chester. I find no despatches from you among the letters that have come to hand; nor anything from Holland, but duplicates of letters from M. Dumas. Congress yesterday passed the annexed resolution, which needs no comment.

I am, Sir, &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

* * * * *

TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

The Hague, September 17th, 1782.

Sir,

This morning, I was in conference with M. Fagel, in order to make the last corrections in the language of the treaty, which is to be executed in English and Dutch, as that with the Crown of France, was in English and French. We have now, I hope, agreed upon every word, if not every point, and nothing remains, but to make five fair copies of it for signature, which, however, is no little labor. The Secretary thinks he shall accomplish them in the course of this week, and part of the next, so that they may be signed by the latter end of next week, or perhaps the middle. The Secretary, who has always been complaisant, was more so than ever today. He congratulated me, upon the prospect of a speedy conclusion of this matter; hoped it would be highly beneficial to both nations; and that our posterity might have cause to rejoice in it even more than we. He says the usage is, for two Deputies to sign it, on the part of Holland, and one on the part of each other Province, so that there will be eight signers in behalf of the Republic.

It is now nearly five months since I was publicly received, and proposed a project of a treaty. All this time it has taken the several Provinces and cities to examine, make their remarks, and fresh propositions, and bring the matter to a conclusion. It would not have been so long, however, if the Court had been delighted with the business. But, in a case where unanimity was requisite, and the Court not pleased, it was necessary to proceed with all the softness, caution, and prudence, possible, that no ill humors might be stirred. Yet, in a case, where the nation's heart is so engaged, in which its commerce and love of money is so interested, what wretched policy is it in this Court, to show even a lukewarmness, much more an aversion. Yet, such is the policy, and such it will be. The Prince of Orange is, to all appearance, as incurable as George the Third, his cousin.

I was afterwards an hour with the French Ambassador, at his house. He tells me, his last letters from the Count de Vergennes say, that he has yet seen no appearance of sincerity on the part of the British Ministry, in the negotiations for peace. Of this, Congress will be easily convinced by the copies I have transmitted of the commissions of Mr Fitzherbert and Oswald.

The subject of our conversation was the means of getting out the Dutch fleet, which is now in the Texel, although the British fleet, under Milbank, is returned to Portsmouth, and probably sailed with Lord Howe for Gibraltar. I asked the Duke, where was the combined fleet? His last accounts were, that they were off Cape Ortegal, endeavoring to get round Cape Finisterre to Cadiz. He speaks of it, as doubtful, whether they will give battle to Lord Howe, because the Spanish ships, with an equal number of guns, are of a smaller caliber than the English; but hopes that the blow will be struck before Howe arrives. The means of getting the fleet out of the Texel to intercept a fleet of English ships from the Baltic, came next under consideration. But the wind is not fair. It might have gone out, but they had not intelligence.

I asked, who it was that governed naval matters? He answered, the Prince. But surely the Prince must have some assistance, some confidential minister, officer, clerk, secretary, or servant. If he were a Solomon, he could not manage the fleet, and the whole system of intelligence, and orders concerning it, without aid. He said, it is the College of the Admiralty, and sometimes M. Bisdom, who is a good man, and sometimes M. Van der Hope, who may be a good man, he has sense and art, but is suspected. Very well, said I, M. Bisdom and M. Van der Hope ought to be held responsible, and the eyes of the public ought to be turned towards them, and they ought to satisfy the public. The Duke said the Prince is afraid of the consequences. He knows that the sensations of the people are very lively at present, and nobody knows what may be the consequence of their getting an opinion, that there has been negligence, or anything worse, which may have prevented them from striking a blow. I asked, if they had any plan for obtaining intelligence, the soul of war, from England? And he said the Grand Pensionary told him, he paid very dear for intelligence.

However, I cannot learn, and do not believe that they have any rational plan for obtaining intelligence necessary from every quarter, as they ought. They should have intelligence from every seaport in France, England, Scotland, Germany, and all round the Baltic, and they should have light frigates and small vessels out. But when war is unwillingly made, everything is not done. The next subject was the proposition from Amsterdam, for renewing the concert of operations for the next campaign.

Congress may hear of some further plans for a separate peace between Holland and England, but they will not succeed. The Republic will stand firm, though it will not be so active as we could wish, and the concert of operations will be renewed.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

_Extract from the Records of the Resolutions of their High Mightinesses the States-General of the United Netherlands._

_Tuesday, September 17th, 1782._ "The Lord Van Randwyk and others, Deputies of their High Mightinesses for the Department of Foreign Affairs, in obedience to, and in compliance with their resolution of the 23d of April of the present year, having conferred with Mr Adams, Minister Plenipotentiary from the United States of America, respecting the entering into a treaty of amity and commerce with the said States, reported to this Assembly, that the said Mr Adams, on the 26th of April thereafter, did deliver to them a plan of such a treaty, requesting the same might be examined, and that such articles might be added, as might be deemed most serviceable. That the said gentlemen, Deputies, after having consulted and advised with the committees of the respective colleges of the Admiralty upon the said plan or sketch of a treaty, made sundry observations thereon, and also sundry separate propositions, all which on the 26th of August last they communicated to the said Mr Adams, who, on the 27th following, returned his answer thereto; which having compared with the said propositions, and finding the same in substance conformable thereto, and all difficulties that had occurred entirely removed, they drew up a new treaty, and also a new convention on the subject of retaken prizes, in conformity to the determination that has been previously adopted and resolved on, and the treaties so prepared, they handed to Mr Adams, on the 6th of this current month, who, since, has declared himself perfectly satisfied therewith.

"Wherefore, the said gentlemen, Deputies for Foreign Affairs, submit it to the consideration of their High Mightinesses to determine, whether it would not be proper and necessary to authorise them to conclude and sign with Mr Adams, the treaty and convention aforesaid.

"Whereupon having deliberated, it is found and judged right, that the said treaty and convention be drawn out afresh, and fair copies thereof made, in order that the finishing hand may be put thereto; and the said Lord Van Randwyk, and others, their High Mightinesses' Deputies for Foreign Affairs, are hereby requested and authorised to conclude and sign the said treaty and convention with the aforesaid Mr Adams.

W. Z. VAN BORSSELE.

Compared with the record.

H. FAGEL."

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TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

The Hague, September 17th, 1782.

Sir,

You will naturally inquire, whether the neutral powers will continue their neutrality, or whether the neutral confederacy will be broken?

No certain answer can be given to these questions. We must content ourselves with probabilities, which are strong for the continuance of the neutrality. Who indeed should break it? The Emperor was thought to be the most unlikely potentate to accede to it; but he has acceded and has taken several steps, which prove that he will not break it, at least by leaning towards England. Sweden is the steady friend to France. The King of Prussia, whose affections and inclinations are certainly towards France and Holland, and alienated from England, would certainly at this age of life be too cautious a politician to wage war for England, against the Houses of Bourbon and Austria, Holland and America.

There remains only Russia and Denmark. What can Russia do? This is a maritime war. She cannot assist the English with land forces; a hundred thousand men would do no good to England, on land. Her boasted fleet, added to that of England, would only weaken it for several reasons. Among the rest, because England must maintain it with money, if not with officers and men, for cash is wanting in Russia. Denmark remains, but what can she do? Her Islands in the West Indies, and her trade are at our mercy, and she would not have force enough to defend her own, much less to assist England, if she should declare war.

A doctrine prevails that the acknowledgment of the independence of America, is a hostility against England, and consequently a breach of the neutrality. Our friends have sometimes favored this idea. The Duc de la Vauguyon has often expressed this sentiment to me; and if I am not mistaken, the Marquis de Verac has said the same to Mr Dana. If this opinion is not clear, it is very impolitic to favor it. The Court of France, in their public memorials, have denied it, and it would be difficult to prove it, either by the law or practice of nations. Sending or receiving Ambassadors, entering into peaceful commercial treaties, or at least negotiating at Philadelphia, the rights of neutral nations, is not taking arms against Great Britain.

But if an acknowledgment of our independence is a hostility, a denial of it is so too, and if the maritime confederation forbids the one, it forbids both. None of the neutral nations can take the part of Great Britain, therefore, without breaking to pieces that great system, which has cost so much negotiation, and embraces so great a part of mankind.

The neutral powers set so high a value upon it, and indeed make so great profit by it, that I think none of them will take the part of Great Britain. The connexions of the Duke Louis of Brunswick in Denmark and Russia, have set some little machines in motion, partly to favor him, and partly to hold out an appearance of something fermenting for the benefit of Great Britain. But these will never succeed so far as to draw any nation into the war, or to incline this Republic to make a separate peace.

It is to this source that I attribute certain observations that are circulated in pamphlets and in conversation, "that there is at present an incoherence in the general system of Europe. That the Emperor has deranged the whole system of the equilibrium of Europe, so that if ever the Northern Powers should think of stopping by a confederation the preponderance of the Southern Powers, Holland will be unable, on account of the demolition of the barriers, to accede to that confederation."

M. Magis, who has been eight and twenty years Envoy at the Hague from the Bishop of Liege, and who converses more with all the foreign Ministers here, than any other, has said to me, not long since, "Sir, the wheel rolls on too long and too rapidly one way; it must roll back again, somewhat, to come to its proper centre. The power of the House of Bourbon rises, and that of Great Britain sinks too fast, and I believe, the Emperor, although he seems perfectly still at present, will come out at length, and take the greatest part of any power in the final adjustment of affairs."

The Count de Mirabel, the Sardinian Minister, said to me, upon another occasion, "your country, Sir, will be obliged in the vicisitudes of things, to wheel round, and take part with England, and such allies, as she may obtain, in order to form a proper balance in the world." My answer to both was, "these sentiments betray a jealousy of a too sudden growth of the power of the House of Bourbon; but whose fault is it, if it is a fact, (which it does not appear to be as yet) and whose fault will it be, if it should hereafter become a fact? Why do the neutral powers stand still and see it, or imagine they see it, when it is so easy to put a stop to it? They have only to acknowledge American independence, and then, neither the House of Bourbon nor England will have a colorable pretence for continuing the war, from which alone the jealousy can arise."

The Prince de Gallitzin said, not long since, that the conduct of this Republic, in refusing a separate peace, &c. he feared would throw all Europe into a war, there were so many pretensions against England. I quote these sayings of foreign Ministers, because you express a desire to hear them, and because they show all the color of argument in favor of England that anybody has advanced. All these Ministers allow that American independence is decided, even the Ministers from Portugal, within a few days said it to me expressly. It is therefore very unreasonable in them to grumble at what happens, merely in consequence of their neutrality.

It is the miserable policy of the Prince of Orange's counsellors, as I suppose, which has set a few springs in motion here. M. Markow, one of the Ministers of Russia, and M. St Saphorin, the Minister from Denmark, are the most openly and busily in favor of England. But if, instead of endeavoring to excite jealousies and foment prejudices against the House of Bourbon, or compassion towards England, they would endeavor to convince her of the necessity of acknowledging American independence, or to persuade the neutral powers to decide the point, by setting the example, they would really serve England, and the general cause of mankind. As it goes at present, their negotiations serve no cause whatever, that I can conceive of, unless it be that of the Duke of Brunswick, and, in the end, it will appear that even he is not served by it.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

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TO ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

The Hague, September 23d, 1782.

Sir,

As this is a moment of great expectation, news of the greatest importance from the East Indies, from the West Indies and North America, from Gibraltar, from Lord Howe's fleet, and the combined fleet, being hourly looked for, I took this opportunity to return to the Spanish Minister a visit, which I owed him.

He told me, that he trembled for the news we should have from Gibraltar. I asked him if he thought there would be a battle at sea. He answered, yes. He believed the combined fleet would meet Lord Howe, and give him battle. I said, in this case it will probably be but a running fight. His Lordship's object was to protect his convoy and get into the port, and he would not stop to fight more than should be unavoidable. D. Llano, however, said, that he believed the fate of Gibraltar would be decided before Howe could arrive, either the place taken, or the assault given over. By his advices, the attack was to begin the 4th or 5th of September. Howe sailed the 12th, and would be probably twenty days at least on his way, which would leave a space of twentyseven or twentyeight days for the attack, which would decide it one way or the other.

I did not think proper to tell him my own apprehensions, and I wish I may be mistaken, but I have no expectation at all, in my own mind, that the combined fleet will meet Howe; that there will be any naval engagement; or that Gibraltar will surrender. They will make a horrid noise with their artillery against the place; but this noise will not terrify Elliot, and Gibraltar will remain to the English another year, and Lord Howe return to England, and all Europe will laugh. England, however, if she were wise, would say, what is sport to you, is death to us, who are ruined by these expenses. The earnest zeal of Spain to obtain that impenetrable rock, what has it not cost the House of Bourbon this war? And what is the importance of it? A mere point of honor! a trophy of insolence to England, and of humiliation to Spain! It is of no utility, unless as an asylum for privateers in time of war; for it is not to be supposed, that the powers of Europe, now that the freedom of commerce is so much esteemed, will permit either England or Spain to make use of this fortress and asylum as an instrument to exclude any nation from the navigation of the Mediterranean.

From the _Hôtel d'Espagne_, I went to that of France, and the Duc de la Vauguyon informed me that he had a letter from the Count de Vergennes, informing him that he had received, in an indirect manner, a set of preliminary propositions, as from the British Ministry, which they were said to be ready to sign, that he had sent M. de Rayneval to London, to know with certainty whether those preliminaries came from proper authority or not.

Thus we see, that two Ministers from England, and another from Holland, are at Paris to make peace. The Count d'Aranda is said to have powers to treat on the part of Spain. Mr Franklin and Mr Jay are present on the part of the United States, and M. Gerard de Rayneval is at London. Yet, with all this, the British Ministry have never yet given any proof of their sincerity, nor any authority to any one to treat with the United States. I believe the British Ministry, even my Lord Shelburne would give such powers if he dared. But they dare not. They are afraid of the King, of the old Ministry, and a great party in the nation, irritated every moment by the refugees, who spare no pains, and hesitate at no impostures, to revive offensive hostilities in America. If Gibraltar should be relieved, and their fleets should arrive from the West Indies and the Baltic, and they should not have any very bad news from the East Indies, the nation will recover from its fright, occasioned by the loss of Cornwallis, Minorca, and St Kitts, and the Ministry will not yet dare to acknowledge American independence. In this case, Mr Fox and Mr Burke will lay their foundation of opposition, and the state of the finances will give them great weight. But the Ministry will find means to provide for another campaign.

But to return to the Duc de la Vauguyon, who informed me further, that he had received instructions to propose to the Prince of Orange a new plan of concert of operations, viz; that the Dutch fleet, or at least a detachment of it, should now, in the absence of Lord Howe, sail from the Texel to Brest, and join the French ships there, in a cruise to intercept the British West India fleet. The Prince does not appear pleased with the plan. He has not yet accepted it. The Grand Pensionary appears to approve it, and support it with warmth. There is now a fine opportunity for the Dutch fleet to strike a blow, either alone, upon the Baltic fleet, or in conjunction with the French, or even alone upon the West India fleet. But the main spring of the machine is broken or unbent. There is neither capacity nor good will among those that direct the navy.

At dinner, in the course of the day, with M. Gyzelaar, M. Visscher, and a number of the co-patriots, at the _Hôtel_ _de Dort_, they lamented this incurable misfortune. Some of them told me, that the sums of money, granted and expended upon their marine, ought to have produced them a hundred and twenty vessels of war of all sizes; whereas they have not one quarter of the number. They have no more than twelve of the line in the Texel, reckoning in the number two fifties; and they have not more than six or seven in all the docks of Amsterdam, Zealand, the Meuse and Friesland, which can be ready next year.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

* * * * *

A MEMORIAL CONCERNING THE BANK OF AMSTERDAM.[10]

The Bank of Amsterdam is much more simple than the denomination implies, in general, in the ideas of foreigners.

It differs widely from those of Venice, London, and others, which have a capital, formed by proprietors (actionaries) to whose profit these banks operate. That of Amsterdam makes neither commerce nor loan, but upon real specie, upon their intrinsic value, and upon matters in bars (ingots) of gold and silver.

This bank was erected in 1609. The magistrates of the city opened the project of the bank for the convenience of the merchants; but it is probable it was invented by the merchants themselves, as a remedy for the difficulty of payments, which became more and more considerable and embarrassing.

1. Because there was a great deal of foreign money in the city, with which they made payments reciprocally, amidst eternal disputes, concerning the value to be given or received.

2. Because, in the great number of coins struck by the States, diversely altered, and singularly divided, they had not all a constant circulation, notwithstanding the orders of the sovereign. Some were declined, even below the fixed value, and others were worth more.

3. The external cashiers, which the merchants employed in those times, as they do at present to receive the money, which is due to them in the city, and to pay in their turn what they owe, profited, of the two inconveniences beforementioned to make to themselves gain, which augmented the disorder and the vexation of payments, as well as in writings.