Part 14

I am very apprehensive that our new commission will be as useless as my old one. Congress might very safely, I believe, permit us all to go home, if we had no other business, and stay there some years; at least, until every British soldier in the United States is killed or captivated. Till then, Britain will never think of peace, but for the purposes of chicanery.

I see in the papers, that the British Ambassador at Petersburg has received an answer from his Court to the articles. What this answer is, we may conjecture from the King's speech. Yet the Empress of Russia has made an insinuation to their High Mightinesses, which deserves attention. Perhaps you may have seen it; but, lest you should not, I will add a translation of it, which I sent to Congress in the time of it, not having the original at hand.[2]

I must beg the favor of your Excellency to communicate to me whatever you may learn, which has any connexion with this negotiation; particularly the French, Spanish, and British answers to the articles, as soon as you can obtain them. In my situation, it is not likely that I shall obtain any information of consequence, but from the French Court. Whatever may come to my knowledge, I will communicate to you without delay.

If Britain persists in her two preliminaries, as I presume she does, what will be the consequence? Will the two Imperial Courts permit this great plan of a Congress at Vienna, which is public and made the common talk of Europe, to become another sublime bubble, like the armed neutrality? In what a light will these mediating Courts appear, after having listened to a proposition of England, so far as to make propositions themselves, and to refer to them in many public acts, if Britain refuses to agree to them? and insists upon such preliminaries as are at least an insult to France and America, and a kind of contempt to the common sense of all Europe? I am weary of such round-about and needless negotiations, as that of the armed neutrality, and this of the Congress at Vienna. I think the Dutch have at last discovered the only effectual method of negotiation, that is, by fighting the British fleets until every ship is obliged to answer the signal for renewing the battle by the signal of distress. There is no room for British chicanery in this. If I ever did any good, it was in stirring up the pure minds of the Dutchmen, and setting the old Batavian spirit in motion, after having slept so long.

Our dear country will go fast asleep, in full assurance of having news of peace by winter, if not by the first vessel. Alas! what a disappointment they will meet. I believe I had better go home, and wake up our countrymen out of their reveries about peace. Congress have done very well to join others in the commission for peace, who have some faculties for it. My talent, if I have one, lies in making war. The Grand Seignior will finish the _procès des trois rois_, sooner than the Congress of Vienna will make peace, unless the two Imperial Courts act with dignity and consistency upon the occasion, and acknowledge American independency at once, upon Britain's insisting on her two insolent preliminaries.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

FOOTNOTE:

[2] See pp. 147 and 148.

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JAMES LOVELL TO JOHN ADAMS.

Philadelphia, September 1st, 1781.

Sir,

Enclosed you have some important instructions, passed in Congress upon the 16th of last month.[3] They will probably reach you first through our Minister at Versailles, an opportunity to France having earliest presented itself. Should that not be the case, you will be careful to furnish copies to Dr Franklin and Mr Jay.

I remain, &c.

JAMES LOVELL, _For the Committee of Foreign Affairs._

FOOTNOTE:

[3] See the _Secret Journals of Congress_, Vol. II. p. 470, 472.

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TO B. FRANKLIN.

Amsterdam, October 4th, 1781.

Sir,

Since the 25th of August, when I had the honor to write to you, this is the first time I have taken a pen in hand to write to anybody, having been confined and reduced too low, to do any kind of business, by a nervous fever.

The new commission for peace has been a great consolation to me, because it removed from the public all danger of suffering any inconvenience, at a time, when, for many days together, there were many chances to one, that I should have nothing more to do with commissions of any sort. It is still a great satisfaction, because I think it a measure essentially right, both as it is a greater demonstration of respect to the powers, whose Ministers may assemble to make peace, and as it is better calculated to give satisfaction to the people of America in all parts, as the Commissioners are chosen from the most considerable places in that country.

It is probable, that the French Court is already informed of the alteration. Nevertheless, I should think it proper, that it should be officially notified to the Count de Vergennes, and, if you are of the same opinion, as you are near, I should be obliged to you if you would communicate to his Excellency an authentic copy of the new commission.

I should think, too, that it would be proper to give some intimation of it to the public, in the Gazette, or _Mercure de France_, the two papers, which are published with the consent of the Court, and, if you are of the same opinion, upon consulting the Count de Vergennes, I should be glad to see it done.

Have you any information concerning Mr Jefferson, whether he has accepted the trust? Whether he has embarked? Or proposes soon to embark? I saw a paragraph in a Maryland paper, which expressed an apprehension, that he was taken prisoner, by a party of horse, in Virginia.

I feel a strong curiosity to know the answer of the British Court, to the articles to serve as a basis, &c. and should be much obliged to your Excellency for a copy of it, if to be procured, and for your opinion, whether there will be a Congress or not.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Amsterdam, October 15th, 1781.

Sir,

I am very sorry to learn, that Congress have received no letters from me from October to June. It is not that I wrote less than usual in that period, but that I was more unfortunate. Two vessels, which sailed from hence for Boston, each of which had despatches from me for Congress, destroyed them, one upon being taken, and the other upon being chased. But the most of my despatches were lost at St Eustatia, I fear.

While that island was in the possession of the Dutch, I sent a great number of letters, packets of papers, &c. by several vessels, to the care of Curson and Gouverneur, to be forwarded to Congress. It is very certain, the enemy have got possession of some, one very short and insignificant one they have published, and the London papers give intimations of more; but I fancy they will not choose to publish them.

I hope Commodore Gillon has arrived before this day, who had letters from me, and all the public papers for some time. I sent despatches also by several other vessels, which have sailed from hence. It is extremely difficult for me to send letters by the way of Nantes, L'Orient, &c. or by the way of Spain. There is so much bad faith in the public posts, that it would not be possible for me to write without having my letters opened, perhaps copied, and there is scarcely ever an opportunity by a private hand to any sea-port in France.

But I have a further apology to make to Congress for the few letters I have lately written. On the 2d of July I left Amsterdam at the invitation of the Count de Vergennes for Paris, for a conference upon the subject of peace, at the mediation of the two Imperial Courts, and the Congress at Vienna. After despatching all that was necessary relative to these sublime bubbles, I returned to Amsterdam. Not long after I got home, I found myself attacked by a fever, of which at first I made light, but which increased very gradually and slowly, until it was found to be a nervous fever of a very malignant kind, and so violent as to deprive me of almost all sensibility for four or five days, and all those who cared anything about me, of the hopes of my life.

By the help, however, of great skill, and all powerful bark, I am still alive; but this the first time I have felt the courage to attempt to write to Congress. Absence and sickness are my apologies to Congress for the few letters they will receive from me since June. Whether it was the uncommon heat of the summer, or whether it was the mass of pestilential exhalations from the stagnant waters of this country, that brought this disorder upon me, I know not; but I have every reason to apprehend, that I shall not be able to re-establish my health in this country. A constitution ever infirm, and almost half a hundred years old, cannot expect to fare very well amidst such cold damps and putrid steams as arise from the immense quantities of dead water, that surround it.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Amsterdam, October 15th, 1781.

Sir,

I wish it were possible to communicate to Congress the present state of every affair, which they have been pleased to confide in any measure to me. I have received the new commission for peace, and the revocation of my commission and instructions of the 29th of September, 1779.[4] To both of these measures of Congress, as to the commands of my sovereign, I shall pay the most exact attention. The present commission for peace, is a demonstration of greater respect to the powers of Europe, and must be more satisfactory to the people of America, than any former one; besides that it guards against accidents, which in my late sickness I had reason to think may well happen. I am, however, apprehensive that this commission will lie a long time neglected, and as useless as the former one.

I am myself seriously of opinion, that the English will not treat with the United States for many years. They will see all their dominions in the East and West Indies conquered by the French and Spaniards; they will see their government reduced to the limits of their own island before they will do it. The present Ministers must die off, and the King too, before there will be any treaty between Britain and America. The nation will stand by the King and Ministry through every loss, while they persevere; whereas both would sink into total contempt and ridicule, if they were to make peace. While they persevere, they are masters of the purses and commerce too of the whole nation. Make peace and they lose a great part of this influence. National pride, when it has become a habitual passion by long indulgence, is the most obstinate thing in the world; and this war has been made so completely, though so artfully the national act, as well as that of King and Ministers, that the pride of the nation was never committed more entirely to the support of anything. It is not to be supposed that the present Ministry will treat with America, and if there should be a change, and the leaders of opposition should come in, they will not treat with America in any character, that she can with honor or safety assume. They might propose a peace separate from France, or they might withdraw their troops from the United States, but they would not make a general peace. The Congress at Vienna will prove but a magnificent chimera, as the British Ministry ever intended it should be.

It has already answered their insidious ends, and now they are giving it a dismission, by insisting upon their two preliminaries; so that upon the whole, according to the best judgment I can form, it will not be worth while for Congress to be at the expense of continuing me in Europe, with a view to my assisting at any conferences for peace, especially as Dr Franklin has given me intimations, that I cannot depend upon him for my subsistence in future.

My commission for borrowing money has hitherto been equally useless. It would fill a small volume to give a history of my negotiations with people of various stations and characters, in order to obtain a loan, and it would astonish Congress to see the unanimity with which all have refused to engage in the business, most of them declaring they were afraid to undertake it. I am told that no new loan was ever undertaken here, without meeting at first with all sorts of contradiction and opposition for a long time; but my loan is considered not only as a new one, but as entering deep into the essence of all the present political systems of the world, and no man dares engage in it, until it is clearly determined what characters are to bear rule, and what system is to prevail in this country.

There is no authority in Europe more absolute, not even that of the two empires, not that of the simple monarchies, than that of the States-General is in their dominions, and nobody but M. de Neufville dares advance faster in a political manoeuvre than the States. M. de Neufville has done his utmost, and has been able to do nothing; three thousand guilders, less than three hundred pounds, is all that he has obtained. Notwithstanding this, there is a universal wish that the world may be made to believe that my loan is full. It is upon 'Change, by a unanimous dissimulation, pretended to be full, and there are persons, (who they are I know not,) who write to London, and fill the English papers with paragraphs that my loan is full. M. de Neufville has advertised in the customary form, for all persons possessed of American _coupons_, to come and receive the money at the end of the first six months. These persons cannot be more than three in number.

My letters of credence to their High Mightinesses have been taken _ad referendum_ by the several Provinces, and are now under consideration of the several branches of the sovereignty of this country; but no one city or body of nobles has as yet determined upon them. None have declared themselves in favor of my admission to an audience, and none have decided against it; and it is much to be questioned whether any one will determine soon.

I have often written to Congress, that I never could pretend to foretell what the States-General would do. I never found anybody here who guessed right; and upon reading over all the negotiations of Jeannin, Torcy, d'Avaux, and d'Estrades, in this country, I found every one of those Ministers were, at the several periods of their residence here, in the same uncertainty. It appears to have been for this century and a half, at least, the national character, to manage all the world as long as they could, to keep things undetermined as long as they could, and finally to decide suddenly upon some fresh motive of fear. It is very clear to me, that I shall never borrow money until I have had an audience; and if the States pursue their old maxims of policy, it may be many years before this is agreed to. I am much inclined to believe that nothing decisive will be done for two or three years, perhaps longer; yet it may be in a month. Parties are now very high, and their passions against each other warm; and to all appearance, the good party is vastly the most numerous; but we must remember, that the supreme Executive is supposed to be determined on the other side, so that there is real danger of popular commotions and tragical scenes.

The question really is, whether the Republic shall make peace with England, by furnishing her ships and troops according to old treaties, and joining her against all her enemies, France, Spain, America, and as many more as may become enemies in the course of the war? The English party dare not speak out and say this openly; but if they have common sense they must know that England will make peace with them upon no other terms. They pretend that upon some little concessions, some trifling condescendencies, England would make peace with Holland separately. Some pretend that a separate peace might be had upon the single condition of agreeing not to trade with America; others upon the condition of considering naval stores as contraband goods; but the commercial cities are almost unanimously against both of these articles. The English party are sensible of this, yet they entertain hopes by keeping the Republic in a defenceless state, that commerce will be so far ruined, and the common people in the great trading cities reduced to such want and misery, as to become furious, demand peace at any rate, and fall upon the houses and persons of those who will not promote it.

The English party, I think, will never carry their point so far as to induce the nation to join the English. There are three considerations, which convince me of this beyond a doubt. First, corrupted and abandoned as a great part of this nation, as well as every other in Europe is, there is still a public national sense and conscience, and the general, the almost universal sense of this nation is, that the English are wrong and the Americans right in this war. The conduct of the Americans is so like that of their venerable and heroic ancestors, it is evidently founded in such principles as are uniformly applauded in their history, and as every man has been educated in a habitual veneration for, that it is impossible for them to take a part in the war against America. This was universally conspicuous upon the publication of my memorial to the States. Secondly; the commercial part of these Provinces, I think, will never give up the American trade. Thirdly; England is so exhausted and so weak, and France, Spain, and America so strong, that joining the former against the three latter, would be the total ruin of the Republic. Nevertheless, the court party will find means of delay, and will embarrass the operations of war in so many ways, that it will be long before any decisive measures will be taken in favor of America.

Whether, under all these circumstances, Congress will think proper to continue me in Europe, whether it will be in their power to furnish me with the means of subsistence, as Dr Franklin in his letter to me thinks I cannot depend upon him, and I have no hopes at all of obtaining any here, I know not, and must submit to their wisdom. But after all, the state of my health, which I have little reason to hope will be restored without a voyage home, and more relaxation from care and business than I can have in Europe, makes it very uncertain whether I shall be able to remain here. In short, my prospects both for the public and for myself are so dull, and the life I am likely to lead in Europe so gloomy and melancholy, and of so little use to the public, that I cannot but wish it may suit with the views of Congress to recall me.

I have the honor to be, &c.

JOHN ADAMS.

FOOTNOTE:

[4] The new commission for negotiating peace was given to John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, John Jay, Henry Laurens, and Thomas Jefferson. See the Commission and Instructions in the _Secret Journals of Congress_. Vol. II. pp. 445, 447.

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TO THE PRESIDENT OF CONGRESS.

Amsterdam, October 17th, 1781.

Sir,

There is at present a fermentation in this nation, which may arise to violent extremities. Hundreds of pamphlets have appeared, all of which must be adjudged to be seditious libels; some against the Court, and some against the city and sovereign magistrates of Amsterdam. At length, a large pamphlet has appeared in Dutch, and been distributed through the streets of the Hague, Leyden, Rotterdam, and other cities, which has occasioned a great alarm to the government, and a great agitation of spirits among the people. All parties speak of it as a composition, in the strongest terms of admiration. The substance of it will appear from the following placard against it.