Part 7

We, the Congress of the United States of North America, having thought it proper to appoint you their Minister Plenipotentiary to the Court of His Most Christian Majesty, you shall in all things, according to the best of your knowledge and abilities, promote the interest and honor of the said States, at that Court, with a particular attention to the following instructions.

1. You are immediately to assure His Most Christian Majesty, that these States entertain the highest sense of his exertions in their favor, particularly by sending the respectable squadron under the Count d'Estaing, which would probably have terminated the war in a speedy and honorable manner, if unforeseen and unfortunate circumstances had not intervened.

You are further to assure him, that they consider this speedy aid not only as a testimony of his Majesty's fidelity to the engagements he has entered into, but as an earnest of that protection, which they hope from his power and magnanimity, and as a bond of gratitude to the union, founded on mutual interest.

2. You shall, by the earliest opportunity, and on every necessary occasion, assure the King and his Ministers, that neither the Congress, nor any of the States they represent, have at all swerved from their determination to be independent in July, 1776. But as the declaration was made in the face of the most powerful fleet and army, which could have been expected to operate against them, and without any the slightest assurance of foreign aid, so, although in a defenceless situation, and harassed by the secret machinations and designs of intestine foes, they have, under the exertions of that force, during those bloody campaigns, persevered in their determination to be free. And that they have been inflexible in this determination, notwithstanding the interruption of their commerce, the great sufferings they have experienced from the want of those things, which it procured, and the unexampled barbarity of their enemies.

3. You are to give the most pointed and positive assurances, that although the Congress are earnestly desirous of peace, as well to arrange their finances and recruit the exhausted state of their country, as to spare the further effusion of blood, yet they will faithfully perform their engagements, and afford every assistance in their power to prosecute the war for the great purposes of the alliance.

4. You shall endeavor to obtain the King's consent to expunge from the treaty of commerce the eleventh and twelfth articles, as inconsistent with that equality and reciprocity, which form the best security to perpetuate the whole.

5. You are to exert yourself to procure the consent of the Court of France, that all American seamen, who may be taken on board of British vessels, may, if they choose, be permitted to enter on board of American vessels. In return for which, you are authorised to stipulate, that all Frenchmen who may be taken on board of British vessels, by vessels belonging to the United States, shall be delivered up to persons appointed for that purpose by His Most Christian Majesty.

6. You are to suggest to the Ministers of His Most Christian Majesty the advantage, that would result from entering on board the ships of these States British seamen, who may be made prisoners, thereby impairing the force of the enemy, and strengthening the hands of his ally.

7. You are also to suggest the fatal consequences, which would follow to the commerce of the common enemy, if, by confining the war to the European and Asiatic seas, the coasts of America could be so far freed from the British fleets, as to furnish a safe asylum to the frigates and privateers of the allied nations and their prizes.

8. You shall constantly inculcate the certainty of ruining the British fisheries on the Banks of Newfoundland, and consequently the British Marine, by reducing Halifax and Quebec; since, by that means they would be exposed to alarm and plunder, and deprived of the necessary supplies formerly drawn from America. The plan proposed to Congress for compassing these objects is herewith transmitted for your more particular instruction.[10]

[10] For a copy of this Plan, see the _Secret Journals_, Vol. II. p. 111.

9. You are to lay before the Court the deranged state of our finances, together with the causes thereof; and show the necessity of placing them on a more respectable footing, in order to prosecute the war with vigor on the part of America. Observations on that subject are herewith transmitted,[11] and more particular instructions shall be sent, whenever the necessary steps previous thereto shall have been taken.

[11] See the _Secret Journals_, Vol. II. p 118.

10. You are, by every means in your power, to promote a perfect harmony, concord, and good understanding, not only between the allied powers, but also between and among their subjects, that the connexion so favorably begun may be perpetuated.

11. You shall in all things take care not to make any engagements, or stipulations, on the part of America, without the consent of America previously obtained.

We pray God to further you with his goodness in the several objects hereby recommended; and that he will have you in his holy keeping.

Done at Philadelphia, the 26th day of October, 1778.

By the Congress.

H. LAURENS, _President_.

* * * * *

COMMITTEE OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO B. FRANKLIN.

Philadelphia, October 28th, 1778.

Sir,

As the Marquis de Lafayette will deliver this, we refer you to his conversation, in addition to the gazettes, for an account of the movements of the enemy. He will doubtless gain some further knowledge of them, than we are yet possessed of before he leaves Boston. We shall speedily have opportunities of forwarding duplicates and triplicates of what he now carries; and upon any material event we shall despatch a vessel occasionally. Enclosed with other papers is a resolve of Congress of the 22d, which we have officially sent to all the Commissioners.

We must earnestly request, that, as we shall have opportunities of frequently conveying to you gazettes and other species of intelligence, you would strive to communicate, in the speediest and best way, to the gentlemen at the other Courts, what they are alike interested to know, that they may prosecute in the best manner the service of these States abroad. An exact copy of your credentials is among the papers herewith sent.

We wish you success in your new commission, and are, with much regard, &c.

R. H. LEE, JAMES LOVELL.

* * * * *

JAMES LOVELL TO B. FRANKLIN.

Philadelphia, December 8th, 1778.

Sir,

By Mr Cummins, on the 28th of last month, I forwarded several papers of importance, triplicates of which Mr Bromfield, the bearer of this, will deliver. But an accident then took place obliging me to hold back a letter, which I had written to you. Time was wanting in which to write another, the vessel having fallen down to Reedy Island, and the express being mounted. My letter was chiefly on the circumstances of an intended plan of operations, which was enclosed, but detained for alterations to be made in Congress.

Our only important struggle now is with our currency. We shall be able at least to keep it from growing worse; but we want the aid of skilful financiers, and of monied men, to bring about any considerable appreciation, as you will more clearly perceive by one of the papers herewith to be delivered.

I am, Sir, &c.

JAMES LOVELL,

_For the Committee of Foreign Affairs_.

* * * * *

DR PRICE TO B. FRANKLIN.

London, January 18th, 1779.

Doctor Price returns his best thanks to the Honorable Benjamin Franklin, Arthur Lee, and John Adams, for conveying to him the resolution of Congress of the 6th of October last,[12] by which he is invited to become a member of the United States, and to give his assistance in regulating their finances. It is not possible for him to express the sense he has of the honor, which this resolution does him, and the satisfaction with which he reflects on the favorable opinion of him which has occasioned it. But he knows himself not to be sufficiently qualified for giving such assistance; and he is so connected in this country, and also advancing so fast in the evening of life, that he cannot think of a removal. He requests the favor of the Honorable Commissioners to transmit this reply to Congress; with assurances that Dr Price feels the warmest gratitude for the notice taken of him, and that he looks to the American States, as _now_ the hope, and likely _soon_ to become the refuge of mankind.

[12] _In Congress, October 6th, 1778_--"_Resolved_, That the Honorable Benjamin Franklin, Arthur Lee, and John Adams, or any of them, be directed forthwith to apply to Dr Price, and inform him that it is the desire of Congress to consider him a citizen of the United States; and to receive his assistance in regulating their finances. That if he shall think it expedient to remove with his family to America, and afford such assistance, a generous provision shall be made for requiting his services."

* * * * *

JAMES LOVELL TO B. FRANKLIN.

Philadelphia, January 29th, 1779.

Sir,

By the way of Martinique, I send you a large course of newspapers. In those of late date you will see, that the enemy are exerting their force but too successfully in Georgia. We hope the Count d'Estaing will be able to operate with us by a detachment from his fleet, so that we may wrest from our foes the fruits of their present success. You will know by letters from Martinique, whether these our hopes are well or ill founded.

We have not had a line from you since the short letter of information respecting Byron's sailing, which you signed jointly with Mr Adams. I hope this does not arise from any other circumstance, than want of a good conveyance for important despatches. We have had a few short letters from Mr Adams, with gazettes. Late as it is, I enclose a quadruplicate of your credentials; and I wish you success and every satisfaction in your important agency, being with much respect,

Sir, &c.

JAMES LOVELL,

_For the Committee of Foreign Affairs_.

* * * * *

JAMES LOVELL TO B. FRANKLIN.

Philadelphia, February 8th, 1779.

Sir,

The Marquis de Lafayette having sailed from Boston the day before the arrival there of letters sent from hence for you by the President of Congress, I now forward to you duplicates of those letters, with a course of newspapers via St Eustatia, having a very fine opportunity to that Island, and hoping they will reach you securely from thence in a Dutch bottom.

I am, &c.

JAMES LOVELL,

_For the Committee of Foreign Affairs_.

* * * * *

TO DAVID HARTLEY.

Passy, February 22d, 1779

Dear Sir,

I received your proposition for removing the stumbling-block. Your constant desire of peace ought to endear you to both sides; but this proposition seems to be naturally impracticable. We can never think of quitting a solid alliance, made and ratified, in order to be in a state for receiving unknown proposals of peace, which may vanish in the discussion. The truth is, we have no kind of faith in your government, which appears to us as insidious and deceitful as it is unjust and cruel; its character is that of the Spider in Thomson,

----cunning and fierce, Mixture abhorr'd

Besides, we cannot see the necessity of our relinquishing our alliance with France in order to a treaty, any more than of your relinquishing yours with Holland.

I am, very affectionately, yours,

N. A.[13]

[13] North America

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LETTER RESPECTING CAPTAIN COOK.

Passy, March 10th, 1779.

To all Captains and Commanders of armed Ships, acting by Commission from the Congress of the United States of America, now at War with Great Britain.

Gentlemen,

A ship having been fitted out from England, before the commencement of this war, to make discoveries of new countries in unknown seas, under the conduct of that most celebrated navigator, Captain Cook,--an undertaking truly laudable in itself, as the increase of geographical knowledge facilitates the communication between distant nations, in the exchange of useful products and manufactures, and the extension of arts, whereby the common enjoyments of human life are multiplied and augmented, and science of other kinds increased, to the benefit of mankind in general.

This is therefore most earnestly to recommend to every one of you, that in case the said ship, which is now expected to be soon in the European seas on her return, should happen to fall into your hands, you would not consider her as an enemy, nor suffer any plunder to be made of the effects contained in her, nor obstruct her immediate return to England, by detaining her or sending her into any other part of Europe or America, but that you would treat the said Captain Cook and his people with all civility and kindness, affording them, as common friends to mankind, all the assistance in your power, which they may happen to stand in need of. In so doing, you will not only gratify the generosity of your own dispositions, but there is no doubt of your obtaining the approbation of Congress, and of your own American owners.

I have the honor to be, &c.

B. FRANKLIN,

_Minister Plenipotentiary from the Congress of the_ _United States to the Court of France_.

* * * * *

TO DAVID HARTLEY.

Passy, March 21st, 1779.

Dear Sir,

I received duly yours of the 2d instant. I am sorry you have had so much trouble in the affair of the prisoners. You have been deceived as well as I. No cartel ship has yet appeared; and it is now evident, that the delays have been of design, to give more opportunity of seducing the men by promises and hardships to seek their liberty in engaging against their country; for we learn from those who have escaped, that there are persons continually employed in cajoling and menacing them; representing to them that we neglect them; that your government is willing to exchange them; and that it is our fault it is not done; that all the news from America is bad on their side; we shall be conquered and they will be hanged, if they do not accept the gracious offer of being pardoned, on condition of serving the King, &c. A great part of your prisoners have been kept these six months on board a ship in Brest road, ready to be delivered; where I am afraid they were not so comfortably accommodated, as they might have been in French prisons. They are now ordered on shore. Doctor Bancroft has received your letter here. He did not go to Calais.

Knowing how earnestly and constantly you wish for peace, I cannot end a letter to you without dropping a word on that subject, to mark that my wishes are still in unison with yours. After the barbarities your nation has exercised against us, I am almost ashamed to own that I feel sometimes for her misfortunes and her insanities. Your veins are open, and your best blood continually running. You have now got a little army into Georgia, and are triumphing in that success. Do you expect ever to see that army again? I know not what General Lincoln or General Thomson may be able to effect against them, but if they stay through the summer in that climate, there is a certain _General Fever_, that I apprehend will give a good account of most of them. Perhaps you comfort yourselves that our loss of blood is as great as yours. But as physicians say, there is a great difference in the facility of repairing that loss between an old body and a young one. America adds to her numbers annually one hundred and fifty thousand souls. She, therefore, grows faster than you can diminish her, and will out-grow all the mischief you can do her. Have you the same prospects? But it is unnecessary for me to represent to you, or you to me, the mischiefs that each nation is subjected to by the war; we all see clear enough the nonsense of continuing it; the difficulty is, where to find sense enough to put an end to it.

Adieu, my dear friend, and believe me, &c.

B. FRANKLIN.

* * * * *

DAVID HARTLEY TO B. FRANKLIN.

London, April 22d, 1779.

My Dear Friend,

The bearer of this, and some other papers, is a very sensible and worthy gentleman, with whom I had the pleasure of contracting an acquaintance since the commencement of the American troubles, originally upon the business of the American prisoners. It is a satisfaction to me at all times to have found him a friend to the restoration of peace between the two countries. It has likewise been an additional satisfaction and confirmation to me in my own thoughts upon that subject, to find that his sentiments, I think upon most, or all of the subjects upon which we have conversed, have coincided with mine. We both seem possessed of the opinion, that some plan of opening a negotiation upon preliminaries, which each side might find to be a sufficient security to itself, might be practicable; and then your sentiment, which you gave me in a letter some years ago, might have its free scope and effect, viz, _A little time given for cooling might have excellent effects_.

The sentiments I have opened to you in my late letters for some months past, and which I have reduced in an enclosed paper into a more specific shape, seem to me, upon very repeated reflection, to promise the fairest ground of good expectation. These propositions originate from myself, as a mediator; I have communications with both sides, but certainly no authority to make proposals from either; and perhaps neither side, if I were to make the propositions separately to each, (being myself unauthorised) might give me positive consent. Each side separately might say, No, from what is called political prudence; and yet each side might secretly wish that the offer could be made, with a _done first_, from the other party. I think the proposition of a truce for five or seven years, leaving all things in the present dispute _in status quo_, must be advantageous to all parties, if it were only in consideration that a general satisfactory peace to all parties _may_ come among the _excellent effects of time given for cooling_. We can but fight it out at last. War never comes too late; wisdom may step in between. These matters have stolen upon us, and have arisen to great and formidable consequences, from small and unexpected beginnings; but henceforward, we should know by experience what to expect. If the rage of war could but be abated for a sufficient length of time for reason and reflection to operate, I think it would never revive. I cannot pretend to forecast the result of any negotiation, but I think war would not revive; which is all that I want for my argument. Peace is a _bonum in se_; whereas the most favorable events of war are but relatively lesser evils; certainly they are evils; _mala in se_, not _bona in se_.

I hope that a cessation of hostilities would produce a renewal of reflection; but even to take the argument at the worst advantage, the two parties are at a cooling distance of three thousand miles asunder. If the flames of war could be but once extinguished, does not the Atlantic ocean contain cold water enough to prevent them bursting out again? I am very strongly of opinion that the two nations of Great Britain and North America, would accord to the proposition of a truce _for cooling_. I cannot say whether a British ministry would accord to it, because they will not tell me; nor can I say whether an American Plenipotentiary would accord to it, because, probably, you will not tell me. I put myself into your hands, however, when I tell you frankly, I am of opinion that both would accord to it, if there could be a _done first_ on either side, to bind the bargain fast. You have the odds of me in this matter, because you know one half of the question; and I cannot give you any proof on the other side, but only my own presumptive judgment upon observation, and upon a course of reasoning in my own thoughts.

But for France. My judgment would be, that if the proposition of the proposed preliminaries should be agreeable to America, France would do very unhandsomely to defeat it by their refusal. I likewise think it the interest of France, because their interest leads them to go to a certain point, and no further. There is a disparity in the operation of the terms of the alliance on the part of France, and on the part of America. The more vigorously France interposes, the better for America; in proportion to their exertions, they create, less or more, a diversion of the British force; this reasoning goes straight forward for America; but it is not so with France. There is a certain point to France, beyond which their work would fail, and recoil upon themselves; if they were to drive the British Ministry totally to abandon the American war, it would become totally a French war. The events of a twelvemonth past seem to bear testimony to this course of reasoning. The disadvantage upon the bargain to America is, that the efficacy of the French alliance to them presupposes their continuance in the war. The demur to France is, that the liberation of their new ally recoils with double weight of the war upon themselves, without any ulterior points of advantage in view, as dependent upon that alliance. I think the interest of all parties coincides with the proposition of preliminaries.

The proposed preliminaries appear to me to be just and equitable to all parties; but the great object with me is to come to some preliminaries. I could almost add, whatever those preliminaries might be, provided a suspension of arms for an adequate term of years were one, I think it would be ten thousand to one against any future renewal of the war. It is not necessary to enter at large into the reasons which induce me to think, that the British Ministry, as well as the American Plenipotentiary, would consent to the terms of the proposed preliminaries; for indeed I do not know that I am founded in that opinion with respect to either, but still I believe it of both. But what can a private person do in such a case, wishing to be a mediator for peace, having access to both parties, but equally uncertain of the reception of his mediation on either side? I must hesitate to take any public step, as by a proposition in Parliament, or by any other means to drive the parties to an explanation upon any specific proposals; and yet I am very unwilling to let the session pass without some proposition, upon which the parties may meet, if they should be so inclined, as I suspect them to be. I have been endeavoring to feel pulses for some months, but all is dumb show. I cannot say that I meet with anything discouraging, to my apprehension, either as to equitableness or practicability of the proposition for preliminaries. If I could but simply receive sufficient encouragement, that I should not run any hazard of obstructing any other practicable propositions by obtruding mine, I should be very much satisfied to come forward in that case with mine, to furnish a beginning at least, which might lead to peace.