Part 27

As to the proposal of a separate peace arising from a desire of _reconciliation_, it certainly was so on the part of the people of England, but on the part of the late Ministry, it probably arose from the hopes of suggesting to France ideas of some infidelity on the part of America towards them. If you should ask me, why I have _seemed_ to conspire with this, my answer is very plain. In the first place, if I could have prevailed with the late Ministry to have actually made an irrevocable offer, _on their own part_, of a separate peace to America, that very offer would in the same instant have become on their part also a consent to a general peace; because _they_ never had any wish to a separate contest with France, and America being out of the question, _they_ would have thought of nothing after that but a general peace. I never could bring them even to this. _They_ wished that _America_ should make the offer of a separate treaty, for obvious views. _My_ proposal was, that _they_ should offer irrevocable terms of peace to America. If they had meant what they pretended, and what the people of England did really desire, they would have adopted that proposition. Then the question would have come forward upon the fair and honorable construction of a treaty between France and America, _the essential and direct end_ of which was fully accomplished. When I speak of Great Britain offering irrevocable terms of peace to America, I mean such terms as would have effectually satisfied the provision of the treaty, viz. tacit independence.

I send you a paper entitled a _Breviate_, which I laid before the late Ministry, and their not having acted upon it, was a proof to me that the disposition of their heart to America was not altered, but that all their relenting arose from the impracticability of that war, and their want of success in it. But desponding as they were at last, it was not inconsistent with my expectations of their conduct, that they should make great offers to France to abandon America. It was the only weapon left in their hands. In course of negotiating with the late Ministry, I perceived their courage drooping from time to time, for the last three or four years, and it was upon that ground I gave them credit for an increasing disposition towards peace. Some dropped off, others sunk under the load of folly, and at last they all failed. My argument _ad homines_ to the late Ministry might be stated thus. _If you don't kill them, they will kill you._ But the war is impracticable _on your part_; ergo, the best thing you can do _for your own sake_ is to make _peace_. This was reasoning to men, and through men to things. But there is no measure of rage in pride and disappointment,

Spicula coeca relinquunt Infixa venis, animasque in vulnere ponunt.

So much for the argument of the _breviate_, as far as it respected the late Ministry. It was a test which proved that they were not sincere in their professions. If they had been in earnest, to have given the war a turn towards the House of Bourbon, and to have dropped the American war, a plain road lay before them. The sentiments of the people of England were conformable to the argument of that breviate; or rather I should say, what is the real truth, that the arguments of the breviate were dictated by the notoriety of that sentiment in the people of England. My object and wish always has been to strike at the root of the evil, the American war.

If the British nation have jealousies and resentments against the House of Bourbon, yet still the first step in every case would be to rescind the American war, and not to keep it lurking in the rear, to become hereafter, in case of certain events, a reversionary war with America for unconditional terms. This reversionary war was never the object of the people of England; therefore the argument of the breviate was calculated bona fide to accomplish their views, and to discriminate the fallacious pretences of the late administration from the real wishes of the country, as expressed in the circular resolution of many counties in the year 1780, first moved at York, on March 28th, 1780. Every other principle and every mode of conduct only imply, as you very justly express it, a secret hope that war may still produce successes, and then--. The designs which have been lurking under this pretext could not mean anything else than this. Who knows but that we may still talk to America at last. The only test of clear intentions would have been this, to have cut up the American war, and all possible return to it for any cause, or under any pretext. I am confident that the sentiment of the people of England is, and always has been, to procure peace and reconciliation with America, and to vindicate the national honor in the contest with the House of Bourbon. If this intention had been pursued in a simple and direct manner, I am confident that the honor and safety of the British nation would long ago have been established in a general peace with all the belligerent powers. These are the sentiments upon which I have always acted in those negotiations, which I have had upon the subject of peace with the late Ministry; reconciliation with America, and peace with all the world, upon terms consistent with the honor and safety of my own country.

Peace must be sought in such ways, as promise the greatest degree of practicability. The sentiments of individuals as philanthropists may be overborne by the power of ancient prejudices, which too frequently prevail in the aggregates of nations. In such case, the philanthropist, who wishes the good of his own country and of mankind, must be the bulrush bending to the storm, and not the sturdy oak, unavailingly resisting. National prejudices are, I hope, generally upon the decline. Reason and humanity gain ground every day against their _natural_ enemies, folly and injustice. The ideas of nations being _natural_ enemies to each other are generally reprobated. But still _jealousies_ and ancient rivalships remain, which obstruct the road to peace among men. If one belligerent nation will entertain a standing force of three or four hundred thousand fighting men, other nations must have defended frontiers and barrier towns, and the barrier of a neighboring island, whose constitution does not allow a standing military force, must consist in a superiority at sea. It is necessary for her own defence. If all nations by mutual consent will reduce their _offensive_ powers, which they only claim under the pretext of necessary _defence_, and bring forward the reign of the millennium; then away with your frontiers and barriers, and your Gibraltars, and the key of the Baltic, and all the hostile array of nations,

Aspera compositis nitescant sæcula bellis.

These must be the sentiments of every philanthropist in his interior thoughts. But if we are not to seek peace by some practicable method, accommodated to the remaining prejudices of the multitude, we shall not in our own time, I fear, see that happy day. If Great Britain and France are ancient rivals, then, until the reign of the millennium shall approach, arrange that rivalship upon equitable terms, as the two leading nations of Europe, set them in balance to each other; the one by land, the other by sea. Give to France her elevated rank among the nations of Europe. Give to Great Britain the honor of her flag, and the security of her island by her wooden walls, and there would be no obstruction to general and perpetual peace. The prejudices of disrespect between nations prevail only among the inferior ranks. Believe me, for one at least, I have the highest sentiments of respect for the nation of France. I have no other sentiments of hostility but what are honorable towards them, and which, as a member of a rival State at war with them, consists in the duty of vigilance which I owe towards the honor and interests of my own country. I am not conscious of a word or a thought, which on _the point of honor_ I would wish to have concealed from a French Minister.

In the mode which I have proposed of unraveling the present subjects of jealousy and contest, I would make my proposals openly to France herself. Let America be free, and enjoy happiness and peace forever. If France and Great Britain have jealousies or rivalships between themselves, as European nations, I then say to France, let us settle these points between ourselves, if unfortunately we shall not be able by honorable negotiation to compromise the indispensable points of national honor and safety. This would be my language to France, open and undisguised. In the meanwhile I desire you to observe, that it would not be with reluctance that I should offer eternal freedom, happiness, and peace to America. You know my thoughts too well to suspect that. I speak only as in a state of war, desirous to arrange the complicated interests, and to secure the respective honor of nations. My wishes are, and always have been for the peace, liberty, and safety of mankind. In the pursuit of those blessed objects, not only this country and America, but France herself and the House of Bourbon, may justly claim the conspiring exertions of every free and liberal mind, even among their temporary enemies and rivals.

I am, &c.

D. HARTLEY.

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_Breviate mentioned in the preceding Letter._

_February 7th, 1782._--It is stated, that America is disposed to enter into a negotiation of peace with Great Britain, without requiring any formal recognition of independence; always understood, that they are to act in conjunction with their allies, conformable to treaties.

It is therefore recommended to give for reply, that the Ministers of Great Britain are likewise disposed to enter into a negotiation for peace, and that they are ready to open a general treaty for that purpose.

If the British Ministers should see any objection to a general treaty, but should still be disposed to enter into a separate treaty with America, it is then recommended to them to offer such terms to America as shall induce her to apply to her allies for their consent, that she should be permitted to enter into a separate treaty with Great Britain. The condition of which being the consent of allies, no proposition of any breach of faith can be understood to be required by them, by the requisition of a separate treaty.

The British Ministers are free to make any propositions to America, which they may think proper, provided they be not dishonorable in themselves, which in the present case is barred by the supposition of consent being obtained. In this case, therefore, if they should be inclined to offer a separate treaty, it is recommended to them to offer such terms to America, as should induce her to be desirous of closing with the proposal of a separate treaty, on the grounds of national security and interests, and likewise such as may constitute to them a case of reason and justice, upon which they may make requisition to their allies for their consent. It is suggested, that the offer to America of a truce of sufficient length, together with the removal of the British troops, would be equivalent to that case, which is provided for in the treaty of February 6th, 1778, between America and France, viz. _tacit_ independence; and the declared ends of that alliance being accomplished, it would not be reasonable that America should be dragged on by their allies in a war, the continuance of which, between France and Great Britain, could only be caused by separate European jealousies and resentments (if unfortunately for the public peace any such should arise) between themselves, independent and unconnected with the American cause. It is to be presumed, that France would not in point of honor to her allies refuse her consent so requested, as any rivalship or punctilios between her and Great Britain, as European nations, (principles which too frequently disturb the peace of mankind) could not be considered as _casus foederis_ of the American alliance; and their pride as a belligerent power would not permit them to claim the assistance of America as necessary to their support, thereby proclaiming their nation unequal to the contest in case of the continuance of a war with Great Britain, after the settlement and pacification with America. Their consent, therefore, is to be presumed. But if they should demur on this point, if Great Britain should be disposed to concede _tacit_ independence to America by a long truce, and the removal of the troops, and if the obstruction should evidently occur on the part of France, under any equivocal or captious construction of a _defensive_ treaty of alliance between America and France, Great Britain would from thenceforward stand upon advantage ground, either in any negotiation with America, or in the continuance of a war including America, but not arising from any further resentments of Great Britain towards America, but imposed reluctantly upon both parties by the conduct of the Court of France.

These thoughts are not suggested with any view of giving any preference in favor of a separate treaty above a general treaty, or above any plans of separate but concomitant treaties, like the treaties of Munster and Osnaburgh, but only to draw out the line of negotiating a separate treaty, in case the British Ministry should think it necessary to adhere to that mode. But in all cases it should seem indispensable to express some disposition, on the part of Great Britain, to adopt either one mode or the other. An absolute refusal to treat at all must necessarily drive America into the closest connexion with France, and all other foreign hostile powers, who would take that advantage for making every possible stipulation to the future disadvantage of British interests, and above all things would probably stipulate, that America should never make peace with Great Britain, without the most formal and explicit recognition of their independence, absolute and unlimited.

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ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO B. FRANKLIN.

Philadelphia, May 22d, 1782.

Dear Sir,

I expected to have written you a long letter, more particularly as it is some time since you have received any information from this country, the enemy having effectually blocked up our ports for some months past. But I find myself so extremely hurried, that I have hardly leisure to write this, the vessel by which it is to be sent going sooner than I apprehended.

You will receive herewith a letter to His Most Christian Majesty, which you will present, and a copy, which you will be pleased to deliver to the Count de Vergennes. This I believe is the usual form. You will also receive in the enclosed papers an account of the marks of respect, with which the annunciation of the birth of the Dauphin was received. These are of some importance, at a time when Great Britain is endeavoring to represent us as weary of the alliance, and anxiously wishing to return to our connexion with them. It is probable, that the late changes in the British Administration, and the conciliatory measures they propose, may excite apprehensions of our firmness. I have the pleasure of assuring you, that it has not produced the least effect; all orders of people seem to agree, that it should redouble our vigilance, and while it argues the weakness of the enemy, it serves as a spring to our exertions.

Sir Guy Carleton, shortly after his arrival, wrote a complimentary letter to General Washington, sending him an account of his appointment, and the prints which contained the Parliamentary debates, and requesting leave to send his Secretary with despatches to Congress. The General refused the passport, till he had the sense of Congress thereon; and upon Sir Guy's letter being laid before them, they came to the resolution enclosed.

The papers I send you contain also resolutions of the State of Maryland, and of the Executive Council of Pennsylvania, which I believe speak the language of all the States, which will, I doubt not, make similar declarations when their legislatures shall be convened. So that you may safely assure His Majesty's Ministers, that no art which Great Britain can put in practice will have the least influence in lessening the attachment of the people of this country to the principles of the alliance. It is true their expectations of powerful assistance this campaign are very high. They saw with some pain last year, that the fleet was withdrawn when the enemy were absolutely at their feet, and when one month's stay would have reduced either New York or Charleston. They look eagerly for the return of the fleet. They generally believe this to be the last campaign in America. There is no knowing what effect a disappointment in this hope would have. I believe, from the present view of things, that they would bear it with fortitude, but I should be sorry to see it put to the trial.

Our trade has suffered astonishingly of late; the influence which this will have upon our internal resources is much to be apprehended. It is to be wished, that France would see the great advantages she would derive from keeping a superiority on this coast, where her fleets would be maintained cheaply while they protected our commerce, and compelled England either to risk her army, or to keep a regular fleet here at five times their expense. Enclosed is a statement of our trade drawn up by Mr Morris. You are requested to communicate this to the Court of Versailles, and to use every means in your power to bring the Court to concur in adopting it.

I also enclose a resolution of Congress, to request you to apply for the prisoners due to us, in order that they may be sent here and exchanged for our seamen, who are confined without the hope of relief. Is it impossible to devise some means for the enlargement of those, who are confined in England? Can no cartel be settled? Or no means devised for sending them here to be exchanged? Their case is really pitiable.

I have the honor to be, &c. &c.

ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON.

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DAVID HARTLEY TO B. FRANKLIN.

London, May 25th, 1782.

My Dear Friend,

Yours of the 13th instant I received by Mr Oswald. I did not doubt but that the news of a general and absolute release of the American prisoners, which Lord Shelburne was so good as to communicate to me, in answer to that part of your letter of the 5th of April, in which you speak so pathetically of _sweet reconciliation_, would give you much sincere and heartfelt pleasure. God send that it may be the happy omen of final _reconciliation_ and _durable peace_. I should be very happy to hear that good news from you, and in any way to contribute to it. Having on that subject communicated the preliminaries, dated May, 1782, to Lord Shelburne, you may be assured that I have no reservations upon that head respecting America, in any circumstances or condition whatever. You know all my thoughts upon that subject, and the principles upon which they are founded, and therefore that they are not changeable.

It would give me the greatest pleasure, if I could hope for any opportunity of seeing you. I could say many things, which are otherwise incommunicable, and which perhaps would contribute to facilitate the road to peace. I think I see in many parts much matter to work with, out of which a peace, honorable to all parties and upon durable principles, might be established. _No degrading or mortifying conditions to shorten peace and rekindle war._ Perhaps I might not say too much if I were to add, that simply the adoption of _reason_ among nations, and the mere rectification of obsolete and gothic absurdities, which carry no gratification, would afford a fund of remuneration to all parties for renouncing those objects of mutual contention, which, _in the eye of reason_, are no better than creatures of passion, jealousy, and false pride. Until the principles of _reason_ and equity shall be adopted in national transactions, peace will not be durable amongst men.

These are reflections general to all nations. As to the mutual concerns between Great Britain and North America, _reconciliation_ is the touchstone to prove those hearts, which are without alloy. If I can be of any assistance to you, in any communications or explanations conducive to peace, you may command my utmost services. Even if a French Minister were to overhear such an offer, let him not take it in jealous part. Zealously and affectionately attached to my own country and to America, I am nevertheless most perfectly of accord with you, that justice and honor should be observed towards all nations. Mr Oswald will do me the favor to convey this to you. I heartily wish him success in his pacific embassy.

Yours ever most affectionately,

DAVID HARTLEY.

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ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON TO B. FRANKLIN.

Philadelphia, May 30th, 1782.

Dear Sir,

Since my last of the 22d instant, I have been honored with yours of the 30th of March, together with the letter from Mr Adams to you enclosed, and the papers, for which I am extremely obliged to you.

I am not at all disappointed at the manner in which the British administration have declared their wish for peace, or at the reluctance they show in parting with this country. To a proud nation the loss of 3,000,000 subjects is mortifying. Every journeyman weaver in every petty village in England conceived himself a sovereign, even while working for the slaves of his supposed subjects. It requires a degree of magnanimity, of which they are incapable, to surrender with dignity what they are no longer able to hold. But they must suppose the politics of the rest of the world to move upon weaker principles than their own, if they imagine the offers they propose to hold out to the belligerent powers will detach them from their alliance with each other, till all the objects of it are attained. Of what avail would the cessions they made in the West Indies be to France, if we were again connected with England. What security would she have for those cessions, or even for the rest of her islands? What she has offered to Spain I know not. To us she has offered nothing, as I have yet heard, but her friendship and the blessings of her government. A seven years' enmity has taught us to put very little value on the former; and the present happiness of the people of England and Ireland has enabled us to form a just estimate of the latter.

I have told you, that we have nothing to apprehend here from the offers of Britain. I have had no reason since to change that opinion. The way, however, to put it out of doubt is to enable us to expel the enemy from this continent. The task is not difficult, and the object is sufficiently important not to let it depend upon other operations.

I am instructed to prepare a memorial to the Court of Versailles, on the subject of the prize money due to Paul Jones, and the officers and men that sailed under his command. Continual complaints are made on that subject. Surely M. de Chaumont has had sufficient time to settle this business. I must beg the favor of you to press it, and to draw and present a memorial to the Court, if it cannot otherwise be accomplished. Mr Barclay will have orders to receive the money for them. I enclose an exstract of a letter from Captain Jones on the subject, together with the list of the ships and their force, agreeable to which the division should be made.