Chapter 27

THE CRISIS OF 1914

"We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is wider than that which we have in the literal operation of the guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether this country would quietly stand by and witness the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of history and thus become participators in the sin."--GLADSTONE:

Speech of August 1870.

The Prussian and German Army Bills of 1860 and onwards have tended to make military preparedness a weighty factor in the recent development of nations; and the issue of events has too often been determined, not by the justice of a cause, but rather by the armed strength at the back of it. We must therefore glance at the military and naval preparations which enabled the Central Powers to win their perilous triumph over Russia and the Slavs of the Balkans. In April 1912 the German Chancellor introduced to the Reichstag Army and Navy Bills (passed on May 21) providing for great increases in the navy, also forces amounting to two new army corps, and that, too, though Germany's financial position was admitted to be "very serious," and the proposed measures merely precautionary. Nevertheless, only Socialists, Poles, and Alsatians voted against them. But the events of the first Balkan War were cited as menacing Germany with a conflict in which she "might have to protect, against several enemies, frontiers which are extended and by nature to a large extent open." A new Army Bill was therefore introduced in March 1913 (passed in June), which increased the total of the forces by 145,000, and raised their peace strength in 1914 to more than 870,000 men. The Chancellor referred gratefully to "the extraordinary ability and spirit of conciliation" of Sir Edward Grey during the Conference at London, and admitted that a collision between Germans and Slavs was not inevitable; but Germany must take precautions, this, too, at a time when Russia and Austria agreed to place their forces again on a peace footing. Germany, far from relaxing her efforts after the sharp rebuff to the Slavonic cause in the summer of 1913, continued her military policy. It caused grave apprehension, especially as the new drastic taxes (estimated to produce £50,000,000) were loudly declared a burden that could not long be borne. As to the naval proposals, the Chancellor commended Mr. Churchill's suggestion (on March 26) of a "naval holiday," but said there were many difficulties in the way.

The British Naval Budget of 1912 had provided for a six years' programme of 25 _Dreadnoughts_ against Germany's 14; and for every extra German ship two British would be added. In March 1913 this was continued, with the offer of a "holiday" for 1914 if Germany would soon accept. No acceptance came. The peace strength of the British Regular Army was reckoned early in 1914 at 156,000 men, with about 250,000 effective Territorials.

The increases in the German army induced the French Chambers, in July 1913, to recur to three years' military service, that of two years being considered inadequate in face of the new menace from beyond the Rhine[544]. Jaurès and the Socialists, who advocated a national militia on the Swiss system, were beaten by 496 votes to 77, whereupon some of them resorted to obstructive tactics, and the measure was carried with some difficulty on July 8. The General Confederation of Labour and the Anarchist Congress both announced their resolve to keep up the agitation in the army against the three years' service. Mutinous symptoms had already appeared. The military equipment of the French army was officially admitted to be in an unsatisfactory state during the debate of July 13, 1914, when it appeared that France was far from ready for a campaign. The peace strength of the army was then reckoned at 645,000 men.

[Footnote 544: The _Temps_ of March 30, 1913, estimated that Germany would soon have 500,000 men in her first line, as against 175,000 French, unless France recurred to three years' service. See M. Sembat, _Faites un Roi, si non faites la Paix._]

In Russia in 1912 the chief efforts were concentrated on the navy. As regards the army, it was proposed in the Budget of July 1913 to retain 300,000 men on active service for six months longer than before, thus strengthening the forces, especially during the winter months. Apart from this measure (a reply to that of Germany) no important development took place in 1912-14. The peace strength of the Russian army for Europe in 1914 exceeded 1,200,000[545]. That of Austria-Hungary exceeded 460,000 men, that of Italy 300,000 men. Consequently the Triple Entente had on foot just over 2,000,000 men as against 1,590,000 for the Triple Alliance; but the latter group formed a solid well-prepared block, while the Triple Entente were separate units; and the Russian and British forces could not be speedily marshalled at the necessary points on the Continent. Moreover, all great wars, especially from the time of Frederick the Great, have shown the advantage of the central position, if vigorously and skilfully used.

[Footnote 545: G. Alexinsky, _La Russie et la guerre_, pp. 83-88.]

In these considerations lies the key to the European situation in the summer of 1914. The simmering of fiscal discontent and unsated military pride in Germany caused general alarm, especially when the memories of the Wars of Liberation of 1813-14 were systematically used to excite bellicose ardour against France. Against England it needed no official stimulus, for professors and teachers had long taught that "England was the foe." In particular preparations had been made in South-West Africa for stirring up a revolt of the Boers as a preliminary to the expulsion of the British from South Africa. Relations had been established with De Wet and Maritz. In 1913 the latter sent an agent to the German colony asking what aid the Kaiser would give and how far he would guarantee the independence of South Africa. The reply came: "I will not only acknowledge the independence of South Africa, but I will even guarantee it, provided the rebellion is started immediately[546]." The reason for the delay is not known. Probably on further inquiry it was found that the situation was not ready either in Europe or in South Africa. But as to German preparations for a war with England both in South-West Africa and Egypt there can be no doubt. India and probably Ireland also were not neglected.

[Footnote 546: General Botha's speech at Cape Town, July 25, 1915.]

In fact a considerable part of the German people looked forward to a war with Great Britain as equally inevitable and desirable. She was rich and pleasure-loving; her Government was apt to wait till public opinion had been decisively pronounced; her sons, too selfish to defend her, paid "mercenaries" to do it. Her scattered possessions would therefore fall an easy prey to a well-organised, warlike, and thoroughly patriotic nation. Let the world belong to the ablest race, the Germanic. Such had been the teachings of Treitschke and his disciples long before the Boer War or the Anglo-French Entente. Those events and the Morocco Question in 1905 and 1911 sharpened the rivalry; but it is a superficial reading of events to suppose that Morocco caused the rivalry, which clearly originated in the resolve of the Germans to possess a World-Empire. So soon as their influential classes distinctly framed that resolve a conflict was inevitable with Great Britain, which blocked their way to the Ocean and possessed in every sea valuable colonies which she seemed little able to defend. The Morocco affair annoyed them because, firstly, they wanted that strategic position, and secondly, they desired to sunder the Anglo-French Entente. But Morocco was settled in 1911, and still the friction continued unabated. There remained the Eastern Question, a far more serious affair; for on it hung the hopes of Germany in the Orient and of Austria in the Balkans.

The difficulty for Germany was, how to equate her world-wide ambitions with the restricted and diverse aims of Austria and Italy. The interests of the two Central Empires harmonised only respecting the Eastern Question. _Weltpolitik_ in general and Morocco in particular did not in the least concern Austria. Further, the designs of Vienna and Rome on Albania clashed hopelessly. An effort was made in the Triple Alliance, as renewed in 1912, to safeguard Italian interests by insisting that, if Austria gained ground in the Balkans, Italy should have "compensation." The effort to lure the Government of Rome into Balkan adventures prompted the Austrian offer of August 9, 1913, for joint action against Servia. Italy refused, alleging that, as Servia was not guilty of aggression, the Austro-Italian Alliance did not hold good for such a venture. Germany also refused the Austrian offer--why is not clear. Austria was annoyed with the gains of Servia in the Peace of Bukharest, for which Kaiser William was largely responsible. Probably, then, they differed as to some of the details of the Balkan settlement. But it is far more probable that Germany checked the Austrians because she was not yet fully ready for vigorous action. The doctrine of complete preparedness was edifyingly set forth by a well-informed writer, Rohrbach, who, in 1912, urged his countrymen to be patient. In 1911 they had been wrong to worry France and England about Morocco, where German interests were not vital. Until the Bagdad and Hedjaz Railways had neared their goals, Turkish co-operation in an attack on Egypt would be weak. Besides, adds Rohrbach, the Kiel-North Sea Canal was not ready, and Heligoland and other coast defences were not sufficiently advanced for Germany confidently to face a war with England. Thanks to the Kaiser, the fleet would soon be in a splendid condition, and then Germany could launch out boldly in the world. The same course was urged by Count Reventlow early in 1914. Germany must continue to arm, though fully conscious that she was "constructing for her foreign politics and diplomacy, a Calvary which _nolens volens_ she would have to climb[547]."

[Footnote 547: Rohrbach, _Der deutsche Gedanke in der Welt_ (1912), p. 216 (more than 10,000 copies of this work were sold in a year); Reventlow, _Deutschlands auswärtige Politik,_ p. 251.]

Other evidence, especially from Bernhardi, Frobenius, and the works of the Pan-German and Navy Leagues, might be quoted in proof of Germany's design to begin war when she was fully prepared. Now, the immense sums voted in the War Budget of 1913 had not as yet provided the stores of artillery and ammunition that were to astonish the world. Nor had Turkey recovered from the wounds of 1912. Nor was the enlarged Kiel-North Sea Canal ready. Its opening at Midsummer 1914 created a naval situation far more favourable to Germany. A year earlier a French naval officer had prophesied that she would await the opening of the canal before declaring war[548].

[Footnote 548: _Revue des questions diplomatiques_ (1913), pp. 417-18.]

At Midsummer 1914 the general position was as follows. Germany had reached the pitch of perfection in armaments, and the Kiel Canal was open. France was unready, though the three years' service promised to improve her army. The Russian forces were slowly improving in number and cohesion. Belgium also, alarmed by the German menace both in Europe and on the Congo, had in 1912-13 greatly extended the principle of compulsory service, so that in 1914 she would have more than 200,000 men available, and by 1926 as many as 340,000. In naval strength it was unlikely that Germany would catch up Great Britain. But the submarine promised to make even the most powerful ironclads of doubtful value.

Consequently, Germany and her friends (except perhaps Turkey) could never hope to have a longer lead over the Entente Powers than in 1914, at least as regards efficiency and preparedness. Therefore in the eyes of the military party at Berlin the problem resembled that of 1756, which Frederick the Great thus stated: "The war was equally certain and inevitable. It only remained to calculate whether there was more advantage in deferring it a few months or beginning at once." We know what followed in 1756--the invasion of neutral Saxony, because she had not completed her armaments[549]. For William II. in 1914 the case of Belgium was very similar. She afforded him the shortest way of striking at his enemy and the richest land for feeding the German forces. That Prussia had guaranteed Belgian neutrality counted as naught; that in 1912 Lord Haldane had warned him of the hostility of England if he invaded Belgium was scarcely more important. William, like his ancestor, acted solely on military considerations. He despised England: for was she not distracted by fierce party feuds, by Labour troubles, by wild women, and by what seemed to be the beginnings of civil war in Ireland? All the able rulers of the House of Hohenzollern have discerned when to strike and to strike hard. In July 1914 William II.'s action was typically Hohenzollern; and by this time his engaging personality and fiery speeches, aided by professorial and Press propaganda, had thoroughly Prussianised Germany. In regard to _moral_ as well as _matériel_, "the day" had come by Midsummer 1914.

[Footnote 549: Frédéric, _Hist. de la guerre de sept Ans_, i. p. 37.]

Moreover, her generally passive partner, Austria, was then excited to frenzy by the murder of the heir to the throne, Archduke Francis Ferdinand. The criminals were Austrian Serbs; but no proof was then or has since been forthcoming as to the complicity of the Servian Government. Nevertheless, in the state of acute tension long existing between Servia and Austria-Hungary, the affair seemed the climax of a series of efforts at wrecking the Dual Monarchy and setting up a Serbo-Croatian Kingdom. Therefore German and Magyar sentiment caught flame, and war with Servia was loudly demanded. Dr. Dillon, while minimising the question of the murder, prophesied that the quarrel would develop into a gigantic struggle between Teuton and Slav[550]. In this connection we must remember that the Central Empires had twice dictated to the rest of Europe: first, in the Bosnian crisis of 1908-9; secondly, in the negotiations which led to the Treaty of Bukharest (August 1913). On other occasions Kaiser William had bent the will of Tsar Nicholas II., notably in the Potsdam interview of November 1910. It is therefore possible that Berlin reckoned once more on the complaisance of Russia; and in that event Austria would have dragooned Servia and refashioned the Balkan lands at her will, Germany meanwhile "keeping the ring." This explanation of the crisis is, however, open to the objection that the questions at issue more vitally affected Russia than did those of 1908-10, and she had nearly recovered normal strength. Unless the politicians of Berlin and Vienna were blind, they must have foreseen that Russia would aid Servia in resisting the outrageous demands sent from Vienna to Belgrade on July 23. Those demands were incompatible with Servia's independence; and though she, within the stipulated forty-eight hours, acquiesced in all save two of them, the Austrian Government declared war (July 28). In so doing it relied on the assurances of the German Ambassador, von Tchirsky, that Russia would not fight. But by way of retort to the Austrian order for complete mobilisation (July 31, 1 A.M.), Russia quite early on that same day ordered a similar measure[551].

[Footnote 550: _Daily Telegraph_, July 25, 1914.]

[Footnote 551: _J'accuse_, pp. 134-5 (German edition). The partial mobilisations of Austria and Russia earlier were intended to threaten and protect Servia. The time of Austria's order for complete mobilisation is shown in French Yellow Book, No. 115. That of Russia in Austrian "Rotbuch," No. 52, and Russian Orange Book, No. 77.]

The procedure of Austria and Germany now claims our attention. The policy of Count Berchtold, Austria's Foreign Minister, had generally been pacific. On July 28 he yielded to popular clamour for war against Servia, but only, it appears, because of his belief that "Russia would have no right to intervene after receiving his assurance that Austria sought no territorial aggrandisement." On July 30 and 31 he consented to continue friendly discussions with Russia. Even on August 1 the Austrian Ambassador at Petrograd expressed to the Foreign Minister, Sazonoff, the hope that things had not gone too far[552]. There was then still a hope that Sir Edward Grey's offer of friendly mediation might be accepted by Germany, Austria, and Russia. But on August 1 Germany declared war on Russia.

[Footnote 552: Austrian "Rotbuch," Nos. 50-56; British White Papers, Miscellaneous (1914), No. 6 (No. 137), and No. 10, p. 3; French Yellow Book, No. 120.]

It is well to remember that by her action in August 1913 she held back Austria from a warlike policy. In July 1914 some of Germany's officials knew of the tenor of the Austrian demands on the Court of Belgrade; and her Ambassador at Vienna stated on July 26 that Germany knew what she was doing in backing up Austria. Kaiser William, who had been on a yachting cruise, hurriedly returned to Berlin on the night of July 26-27. He must have approved of Austria's declaration of war against Servia on July 28, for on that day his Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, finally rejected Sir Edward Grey's proposal of a Peace Conference to settle that dispute. The Chancellor then also expressed to our Ambassador, Sir Edward Goschen, the belief that Russia had no right to intervene in the Austro-Serb affair. The Austrian Ambassador at Berlin also opined that "Russia neither wanted nor was in a position to make war." This belief was widely expressed in diplomatic circles at Berlin. Military men probably viewed matters from that standpoint; and in all probability there was a struggle between the civilians and the soldiers, which seems to have ended in a victory for the latter in an important Council meeting held at Potsdam on the evening of July 29. Immediately afterwards the Chancellor summoned Sir Edward Goschen and made to him the "infamous proposals" for the neutrality of Great Britain in case of a European War, provided that Germany (1) would engage to take no territory from the mainland of France (he would make no promise respecting the French colonies); (2) would respect the neutrality of Holland; (3) would restore the independence of Belgium in case the French menace compelled her to invade that country.

These proposals prove that by the evening of July 29 Germany regarded war as imminent[553]. But why? Even in the East matters did not as yet threaten such a conflict. Russia had declared that Servia was not to be made a vassal of the Hapsburgs; and, to give effect to that declaration, she had mobilised the southern and eastern portions of her forces as a retort to a similar partial mobilisation by Austria. But neither Russia nor, perhaps, Austria wished for, or expected, a European war[554]. Austria seems to have expected a _limited_ war, _i.e._ only with the Serbs. She denied that the Russians had any right to intervene so long as she did not annex Serb land. Her aim was to reduce the Serbs to vassalage, and she expected Germany successfully to prevent Russia's intervention, as in 1909[555]. The German proposals of July 29 are the first clear sign of a general conflict; for they presumed the probability of a war with France in which Belgium, and perhaps England, might be involved while Holland would be left alone. In the course of his remarks the Chancellor said that "he had in mind a general neutrality agreement between England and Germany"--a reference to the German offers of 1912 described in this chapter. As at that time the Chancellor sought to tie our hands in view of any action by Germany, so, too, at present his object clearly was to preclude the possibility of our stirring on behalf of Belgium. Both Goschen and Grey must have seen the snare. The former referred the proposals to Grey, who of course decisively refused them.

[Footnote 553: M. Jules Cambon telegraphed from Berlin to his Government on July 30 that late on July 29 Germany had ordered mobilisation, but countermanded it in view of the reserve of Sir Edward Goschen as to England's attitude, and owing to the Tsar's telegram of July 29 to the Kaiser. Berlin papers which had announced the mobilisation were seized. All measures preliminary to mobilisation had been taken (French Yellow Book, No. 107; German White Book, No. 21).]

[Footnote 554: Russian Orange Book, Nos. 25, 40, 43, 58.]

[Footnote 555: Austrian "Rotbuch," Nos. 28, 31, 44; Brit. White Paper, Nos. 91-97, 161. _J'accuse_ (III. A) goes too far in accusing Austria of consciously provoking a European War; for, as I have shown, she wished on August 1 to continue negotiations with Russia. The retort that she did so only when she knew that Germany was about to throw down the gauntlet, seems to me far-fetched. Besides, Austria was not ready; Germany was.]

This was the first of Grey's actions which betokened tension with Germany. Up to the 28th his efforts for peace had seemed not unlikely to be crowned with success. On July 20, that is three days before Austria precipitated the crisis, he begged the Berlin Government to seek to moderate her demands on Servia. The day after the Austrian Note he urged a Conference between France and England on one side and Germany and Italy on the other so as to counsel moderation to their respective Allies, Russia and Austria. It was Germany and Austria who negatived this by their acts of the 28th. Still Grey worked for peace, with the approval of Russia, and, on July 30 to August 1, of Austria. But on July 31 and August 1 occurred events which frustrated these efforts. On July 31 the Berlin Government, hearing of the complete mobilisation by Russia (a retort to the similar proceeding of Austria a few hours earlier), sent a stiff demand to Petrograd for demobilisation within twelve hours; also to Paris for a reply within eighteen hours whether it would remain neutral in case of a Russo-German War.

Here we must pause to notice that to ask Russia to demobilise, without requiring the same measure from Austria, was manifestly unjust. Russia could not have assented without occupying an inferior position to Austria. If Germany had desired peace, she would have suggested the same action for each of the disputants. Further, while blaming the Russians for mobilising, she herself had taken all the preliminary steps, including what is called _Kriegsgefahr_, which made her army far better prepared for war than mobilisation itself did for the Russian Empire in view of its comparatively undeveloped railway system. Again, if the Kaiser wished to avoid war, why did he not agree to await the arrival (on August 1) of the special envoy, Tatisheff, whom, on the night of July 30, the Tsar had despatched to Berlin[556]? There is not a single sign that the Berlin Government really feared "the Eastern Colossus," though statements as to "the eastern peril" were very serviceable in frightening German Socialists into line.

[Footnote 556: German White Book, No. 23_a_; _J'accuse_, Section III. B, pp. 153, 164 (German edit.), shows that the German White Book suppressed the Tsar's second telegram of July 29 to the Kaiser, inviting him to refer the Austro-Serb dispute to the Hague Tribunal. (See, too, J.W. Headlam, _History of Twelve Days,_ p. 183.)]

The German ultimatum failed to cow Russia; and as she returned no answer, the Kaiser declared war on August 1. He added by telegram that he had sought, _in accord with England,_ to mediate between Russia and Austria, but the Russian mobilisation led to his present action. In reply to the German demand at Paris the French Premier, M. Viviani, declared on August 1 at 1 P.M. that France would do that "which her interests dictated"--an evasive reply designed to gain time and to see what course Russia would take. The Kaiser having declared war on Russia, France had no alternative but to come to the assistance of her Ally. But the Kaiser's declaration of war against France did not reach Paris until August 3 at 6.45 P.M.[557] His aim was to leave France and Belgium in doubt as to his intentions, and meanwhile to mass overwhelming forces on their borders, especially that of Belgium.

[Footnote 557: German White Book, Nos. 26, 27; French Yellow Book, No. 147.]

Meanwhile, on August 1, German officials detained and confiscated the cargoes of a few British ships. On August 2 German troops violated the neutrality of Luxemburg. On the same day Sir Edward Grey assured the French ambassador, M. Paul Cambon, that if the German fleet attacked that of France or her coasts, the British fleet would afford protection. This assurance depended, however, on the sanction of Parliament. It is practically certain that Parliament would have sanctioned this proceeding; and, if so, war would have come about owing to the naval understanding with France[558], that is, if Germany chose to disregard it. But another incident brought matters to a clearer issue. On August 3, German troops entered Belgium, though on the previous day the German ambassador had assured the Government of King Albert that no such step would be taken. The pretext now was that the French were about to invade Belgium, as to which there was then, and has not been since, any proof whatever.

[Footnote 558: British White Paper, No. 105 and _Enclosures_, also No. 116.]

Here we must go back in order to understand the action of the British, French, and German Governments. They and all the Powers had signed the treaty of 1839 guaranteeing the independence of Belgium; and nothing had occurred since to end their engagement. The German proposals of July 29, 1914, having alarmed Sir Edward Grey, he required both from Paris and Berlin assurances that neither Power would invade Belgium. That of France on August 1 was clear and satisfactory. On July 31 the German Secretary of State, von Jagow, declined to give a reply, because "any reply they [the Emperor and Chancellor] might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing." As on August 2 the official assurances of the German ambassador at Brussels were satisfactory, the British Foreign Office seems to have felt no great alarm on this topic. But at 7 P.M. of that evening the same ambassador presented a note from his Government demanding the right to march its troops into Belgium in order to prevent a similar measure by the French. On the morrow Belgium protested against this act, and denied the rumour as to French action. King Albert also telegraphed to King George asking for the help of the United Kingdom. The tidings reached the British Cabinet after it had been carefully considering whether German aggression on Belgium would not constitute a _casus belli_[559].

[Footnote 559: British White Paper, Nos. 123, 151, 153; Belgian Grey Book, Nos. 20-25. For a full and convincing refutation of the German charges that our military attachés at Brussels in 1906 and 1912 had bound us by _conventions_(!) to land an army in Belgium, see second Belgian Grey Book, pp. 103-6; Headlam, _op. cit._, ch. xvi., also p. 377, on the charge that France was about to invade Belgium.]

The news of the German demand and the King's appeal reached Westminster just before the first debate on August 3. Sir Edward Grey stated that we were not parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance, of which we did not know the exact terms; and there was no binding compact with France; but the conversations on naval affairs pledged us to consult her with a view to preventing an unprovoked attack by the German navy. He explained his conditional promise to M. Cambon. Thereupon Mr. Redmond promised the enthusiastic support of all Irishmen. Mr. Ramsay Macdonald, though demurring to the policy of Sir Edward Grey, said, "If the Right Honourable gentleman could come to us and tell us that a small European nationality like Belgium is in danger, and could assure us that he is going to confine the conflict to that question, then we would support him." Now, the Cabinet had by this time resolved that the independence of Belgium should be a test question, as it was in 1870. Therefore, there seemed the hope that not only the Irish but all the Labour party would give united support to the Government. By the evening debate official information had arrived; and, apart from some cavilling criticisms, Parliament was overwhelmingly in favour of decided action on behalf of Belgium. Sir Edward Grey despatched to Berlin an ultimatum demanding the due recognition of Belgian neutrality by Germany. No answer being sent, Great Britain and Germany entered on a state of war shortly before midnight of August 4.

The more fully the facts are known, the clearer appears the aggressive character of German policy. Some of her Ministers doubted the advisability of war, and hoped to compass their ends by threats as in 1909 and 1913; but they were overborne by the bellicose party on or shortly before July 29. Whether the Kaiser, the Crown Prince, or the General Staff is most to blame, it is idle to speculate; but German diplomacy at the crisis shows every sign of having been forced on by military men. Bethmann-Hollweg was never remarkable for breadth of view and clearness of insight; yet he alone could scarcely have perpetrated the follies which alienated Italy and outraged the sentiments of the civilised world in order to gain a few days' start over France and stab her unguarded side. It is a clumsy imitation of the policy of Frederick in 1756.

As to the forbearance of Great Britain at the crisis, few words are needed. In earlier times the seizure of British ships and their cargoes (August 1) would have led to a rupture. Clearly, Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues clung to peace as long as possible. The wisdom of his procedure at one or two points has been sharply impugned. Critics have said that early in the crisis he should have empowered Sir George Buchanan, our ambassador at Petrograd, to join Russia and France in a declaration of our resolve to join them in case of war[560]. But (1) no British Minister is justified in committing his country to such a course of action. (2) The terms of the Ententes did not warrant it. (3) A menace to Germany and Austria would, by the terms of the Triple Alliance, have compelled Italy to join them, and it was clearly the aim of the British Government to avert such a disaster. (4) On July 30 and 31 Grey declared plainly to Germany that she must not count on our neutrality in all cases, and that a Franco-German War (quite apart from the question of Belgium) would probably draw us in[561].

[Footnote 560: British White Paper, Nos. 6, 24, 99; Russian Orange Book, No. 17.]

[Footnote 561: British White Paper, Nos. 101, 102, 111, 114, 119. I dissent from Mr. F.S. Oliver (_Ordeal by Battle,_ pp. 30-34) on the question discussed above. For other arguments, see my _Origins of the War,_ pp. 167-9. The ties binding Roumania to Germany and Austria were looser; but anything of the nature of a general threat to the Central Powers would probably have ranged her too on their side.]

Sir Edward is also charged with not making our intentions clear as to what would happen in case of the violation of the neutrality of Belgium. But he demanded, both from France and Germany, assurances that they would respect that neutrality; and on August 1 he informed the German ambassador in London of our "very great regret" at the ambiguity of the German reply. Also, on August 2 the German ambassador at Brussels protested that Belgium was quite safe so far as concerned Germany[562]. When a great Power gives those assurances, it does not improve matters to threaten her with war if she breaks them. She broke them on August 3; whereupon Grey took the decided action which Haldane had declared in 1912 that we would take. The clamour raised in Germany as to our intervention being unexpected is probably the result of blind adherence to a preconceived theory and of rage at a "decadent" nation daring to oppose an "invincible" nation. The German Government of course knew the truth, but its education of public opinion through the Press had become a fine art. Therefore, at the beginning of the war all Germans believed that France was about to invade Belgium, whereupon they stepped in to save her; that the Eastern Colossus had precipitated the war by its causeless mobilisation (a falsehood which ranged nearly all German Socialists on the side of the Government); that Russia and Servia had planned the dismemberment of Austria; that, consequently, Teutons (and Turks) must fight desperately for national existence in a conflict forced upon them by Russia, Servia, and France, England perfidiously appearing as a renegade to her race and creed.

[Footnote 562: British White Paper, Nos. 114, 122, 123, 125; Belgian Grey Book, No. 19.]

By these falsehoods, dinned into a singularly well-drilled and docile people, the Germans were worked up to a state of frenzy for an enterprise for which their rulers had been preparing during more than a decade. The colossal stores of war material, amassed especially in 1913-14 (some of them certain soon to deteriorate), the exquisitely careful preparations at all points of the national life, including the colonies, refute the fiction that war was forced upon Germany. The course of the negotiations preceding the war, the assiduous efforts of Germany to foment Labour troubles in Russia before the crisis, the unpreparedness of the Allies for the fierce and sustained energy of the Teutonic assault,--all these symptoms prove the guilt of Germany[563]. The crowning proof is that up to the present (August 1915) she has not issued a complete set of diplomatic documents, and not one despatch which bears out the Chancellor's statement that he used his influence at Vienna for peace. The twenty-nine despatches published in her White Book are a mere fragment of her immense diplomatic correspondence which she has found it desirable to keep secret, and, as we have seen, her officials suppressed the Tsar's second telegram of July 29 urging that the Austro-Serb dispute be referred to the Hague Tribunal.

[Footnote 563: See the damning indictment by a German in _J'accuse_, Section III., also the thorough and judicial examination by J.W. Headlam, _The History of Twelve Days_.]

The sets of despatches published by the Allies show conclusively that each of them worked for peace and was surprised by the war. Their unpreparedness and the absolute preparedness of Germany have appeared so clearly during the course of hostilities as to give the lie to the German pamphleteers who have striven to prove that in the last resort the war was "a preventive war," that is, designed to avert a future conflict at a time unfavourable to Germany. There is not a sign that any one of the Powers of the Entente was making more than strictly defensive preparations; and, as has been shown, the Entente themselves were formed in order to give mutual protection in case of aggression from her. The desperate nature of that aggression appeared in her unscrupulous but successful efforts to force Turkey into war (Oct.-Nov. 1914). No crime against Christendom has equalled that whereby the champions of _Kultur_ sought to stir up the fanatical passions of the Moslem World against Europe. Fortunately, that design has failed; and incidentally it added to the motives which have led Italy to break loose from the Central Powers and assist the Allies in assuring the future of the oppressed nationalities of Europe.

INDEX.

Abdul, Aziz 168-9 Abdul Hamid II., 169-70, 174, 177-9, 185-6, 204, 223-4, 238, 245-9, 259, 266-9, 274-5, 277, 285, 328, 436, 447-8, 453, 457, 591-2, 618 Abdul Kerim, 194-6, 200, 204, 206 Abdur Rahman, 389, 400, 404-5, 407, 417, 418-19, 428-31, 433 Abeken, Herr, 44 Abu Klea, Battle of, 480 Abyssinia, 335, 487, 504 Adam, Mme, 333 Adrianople, 221, 223, 229, 251, 270 Aehrenthal, Count, 613-4 Afghanistan, 334, 345-6, 366, 378-9, 386-91, 472, 527 War in (1878-9), chap. xiv. 394 _passim_ Africa, Partition of, chap. xviii, _passim_, 586 Africa, South-West, 635-6 Agadir, Coup d', 621, 623, 625 Albania, 158, 229 Albania, autonomy of, 630-1 Albert, King of Belgium, 644-5 Albrecht, Archduke, 33-6 Alexander I., 31, 160-1, 297, 364 Alexander II., 145, 167, 173-5, 180-83, 192, 204-5, 209-10, 215, 222-8, 234, 254-6, 289, 293, 295-8, 306, 308, 313, 318, 322, 325, 355, 398-9 Alexander III., 255-65, 272-86, 298-9, 301-4, 309-11, 331, 337, 340, 343-6, 423-4, 428-9 Alexander, Prince of Bulgaria, 254, 260-82, 286, 339, 428 Alexandretta, 622 Alexandria, bombardment of, 450-52 Alfonso, King of Spain, 619 _Algeciras_, Conference of, 604, 606-8, 610 Act of, 607 Alikhanoff, M., 424 Alsace, 94, 105, 132, 133-4 Alvensleben, General von, 61, 65-7, 77 Amur, river, 571, 572, 580 Andrassy, Count, 164, 232, 599 André, General, 600 Anglo-French Entente (1904), 601-4, 606, 607, 609, 622, 626, 636 Anglo-German Agreement (1890), 520-523,525, 532 Anglo-Japanese Compact, 597-8, 602 Anglo-Russian Conventions, 608-10 Angra Pequeña, 523, 524 Antonelli, Cardinal, 89 Arabi Pasha, 266, 444, 447-9, 452, 453-7 Archinard, M., 539 Argyll, Duke of, 371-2, 376, 417 Armenia, 220, 229, 242, 244, 250, 307 Army Bill, French (1875), 119, 121-2 Arnim, Count von, 123, 318 Artomoroff, Colonel, 504 Asquith, H.H., 626-8 Atbara, Battle of the, 490-91 Augustenburg, Duke of, 16 Aumale, Duc d', 117 Austria, 4-23, 32-7, 55, 63, 137, 148, 164, 177, 180-81, 184-6, 194, 227-8, 231, 232, 238, 242, 246, 257-8, 259, 271, 282, 284, 318, 320, 323-7, 331-3, 350-51, 485, 585, 592-3, 601, 604, 607, 609, 612-17, 622, 629-32, 634, 637, 639, 644, 647, 649 Army of, 635 Austro-German Alliance, 324-7 Austro-Prussian War (1866), 17-21 Austro-Russian Agreements (1897 and 1903), 615 Austro-Russian Treaty (1877), 179-180 Ayub Khan, 407, 415, 418-9

Baden, 12, 21 Baden, Grand Duke of, 130 Baert, Captain, 564 Bagdad Railway, 591-4, 609, 615, 622, 637 Bahr-el-Ghazal, the, 504, 506, 552, 558-9 Bakunin, 292-5 Balfour, Mr. A., 431-2 Balkan League, the, 629, 632 Balkan Peninsula, 25, 332 Balkan Question, the, 631-2 Balkan States, 586, 592, 616, 628-9, 633 Balkan War (1912), 624, 629-31, 633 Balkh, 399, 433 Baluchistan, 367, 381, 384-6, 432 Baring, Sir E., 463, 466-473 Batak, 170, 171 Batoum, 205, 229, 234, 241, 276 Bavaria, 18, 20, 21, 131, 133-5 Bazaine, Marshall, 63-5, 67-73, 75-8, 97 Bazeilles, 79-82 Beaconsfield, Earl of, 29, 165-6, 171, 175, 181, 182, 187-8, 220, 231, 232-3, 234, 236-7, 240-41, 243-5, 287, 328, 380, 282-3, 391-3, 400, 405, 440, 516 Beaumont, Battle of, 78 Bebel, Herr, 589 Bechuanaland, 530-33 Beernaert, M., 556 Belfort, 98, 104, 105 Belgium, 5, 16, 26, 148, 550-52, 555-7, 567, 625, 627-8, 638-9, 641-2, 644-8 Bendereff, 271, 278-9 Benedek, General, 18 Benedetti, M., 40-43, 48 Bentley, Rev. W.H., 546 Berber, 473, 475, 478, 488, 490 Berchtold, Count, 640 Beresford, Lord Charles, 480 Berlin Conference (1885), 548-50, 552, 559, 562, 567 Congress of (1878), 228, 235-42, 247, 259, 323, 328, 345, 388, 513 Memorandum, the, 167-9, 181 Berlin, Treaty of (1878), 237-42, 253, 267-8, 275, 291, 332, 353, 612, 629 Bernhardi, General von, 625-6, 638 Besika Bay, 168, 171, 172, 177, 224 Bessarabia, 160, 205, 230, 234, 260 Bethman-Hollweg, Chancellor, 620, 623, 625, 627, 633-4, 641-2, 645-6, 648 Beust, Count von, 32, 36, 37 Biarritz, 16 Biddulph, General, 398 Bismarck, Prince Otto von, 8, 12-22, 27, 30, 31, 39, 41-49, 85, 86, 89, 94, 97, 103-5, 109, 114, 118, 123, 129-32, 137, 140, 141, 153, 164, 168, 173, 184, 228, 257, 261, 282, 317-27, 332, 335, 336-8, 342, 426, 446, 457, 513-15, 520-21, 527, 528, 534, 547, 548, 590, 599, 609 and "Protection," 141-150 Bismarck, Count Herbert, 523-4, 528 Blagovestchensk, 584 Blowitz, M. de, 321-2 Blumenthal, Count von, 72, 77, 85, 94 Boer War, 585-8, 590, 597-8, 610, 636 Bokhara, 365, 371 Bonnier, M., 539 Bordeaux, 98, 99, 103, 105, 106, 116, 118 Bosnia, 163, 168, 238, 242, 258, 332 Bosnia-Herzegovina, annexation of, 612, _seq_. 640 Botha, General, 598 Boulanger, General, 126, 333, 337, 339, 341 Bourbaki, General, 98 Bourbon, House of, 3-6 Bourgas, 278 Bourgeois, M., 504 Boxer Movement, the, 583 Boxer Rising in China (1900), 588, 595 Brazza, M. de, 546 Bremen, 132, 142 Bright, Mr. J., 417, 452 British Central Africa Protectorate, 533 Broadwood, General, 487, 496, 498 Browne, General Sir Samuel, 394 Brussels, Conference at (1876), 545 Anti-Slavery Conference at, 534 Buchanan, Sir George, 647 Bukharest, Peace of (1913), 631-2, 637, 639 Bukharest, Treaty of (1886), 272 Bulgaria, 157-9, 163, 170-72, 176, 180, 225, 229-30, 234, 237-9, 251-288, 302, 333, 334 Campaigns in, 194-216 Bülow, Prince von, 588-9, 596, 603, 605, 607, 617 Bundesrath, the, 133-4, 138 Burmah, 527, 530 Annexation of, 432 Burnaby, Colonel, 480 Burrows, Brigadier-General, 407 Busa, 540 Busch, Dr., 22, 143

Cabul, 370, 381, 383, 387, 388, 390, 401-5, 412-413, 431 Cabul, Treaty of (1905), 435 Cairo, capture of, 455-6 Cairoli, Signor, 329 "Caisse de la Delte" (Egyptian), 442, 459 Cambon, Jules, 620 Paul, 644, 646 Cameroons, 528, 533-6 Candahar, 367, 381, 387, 398, 405, 407, 413-18, 432 Canning, Lord, 368 Canrobert, Marshal, 72 Caprivi, Count, 520 Carnarvon, Lord, 225, 525 Carnot, President Sadi, 127 Casement, Mr. Roger, 558, 560-62, 565, 566 Cassini, Count, 580 Catharine II., 361 Cattier, M., 552, 563, 564 Cavagnari, Sir Louis, 401 Cavour, Count, 8-11, 13, 90, 142, 161 Centralisation of Governments, 111-112, 315 Chad, Lake, 537 Châlons-sur-Marne, 68, 74, 75 Chamberlain, Mr., 417 Chambord, Comte de, 117, 122, 123 Charasia, Battle of (1878), 402-3 Charles, King of Roumania, 192, 206, 210, 215, 230, 262, 632 Charles Albert, King, 6-8 Chevket Pacha, 626 China, 568, 571-2, 576-82, 595-7 Chino-Japanese War, 576-7 Chitral, 386, 388, 433 Chotek, Countess, 613 Christian IX., 14 Churchill, Winston, 627, 634 Clement, Bishop, 280, 282 Cobden, Mr., 142 Colombey, Battle of, 63-5 Combes, M., 349, 600 Congo Free State, the, 502, 541, _passim_ chap. xix. Congo, French, 622, 625 Constantinople, Conference of (1876), 174, 176-9 Constitution, French (1875), 124-5 German, 132-7 Turkish (1876), 177-9 Constitution of Finland, 308, 309 Cossacks, the, 360-62, 434, 435, 453 Coulmiers, Battle of, 97 Cranbrook, Lord, 387 Crete, 240, 248 Crimean War, 8, 13, 30, 31, 161-2, 345, 365, 425, 434 Crispi, Signor, 336, 337, 355, 600 Cromer, Lord. _See_ Baring, Sir E. Cronstadt, 343, 346 Crown Prince of Saxony, 74, 130 Currie, Sir Donald, 524, 528 Curzon, Lord, 423, 431, 432, 576 Cyprus, 328 Convention, 234-5, 243-4, 250

Dahomey, 539 Dalmatia, 329 Dalny, 583 Dardanelles, the, 168, 222, 224, 225, 241 Decazes, Duc, 321-2, 440 Delagoa Bay, 525-6, 528, 534 Delcassé, M., 587, 601, 606, 607 Denghil Tepe, Battle of, 420-23, 500 Denmark, 4, 5, 13-16, 35 Depretis, Signor, 329, 335-6, 355 Derby, Lord, 166, 176, 178, 181, 222, 224, 225, 226, 231, 243, 440, 524, 530 De Wet, General, 598, 635 Dhanis, Commandant, 553 Dilke, Sir Charles, 465, 563 Dillon, Dr., 639 Disraeli. _See_ Beaconsfield Dobrudscha, 197, 199, 229-30, 240 Dodds, Colonel, 539 Dolgorukoff, General, 280-81 Dongola, 474, 476, 479, 488, 489 Dost Mohammed, 368, 379 Dragomiroff, General, 197 Dreyfus, M., 600 Drouyn de Lhuys, 20 Drury Lowe, General Sir, 454-6 Dual Alliance, 342-50, 587-8, 590, 599, 609, 616, 644 Dual Control, the (in Egypt), 442, 443, 445, 457 Ducrot, General, 80, 81, 83 Dufaure, M., 126, 245, 246 Dufferin, Lord, 326, 424, 426-8, 429, 458, 461-2 Dulcigno, 246-7 Durand, Sir Mortimer, 433 Durbar at Delhi (1878), 383

East Africa (British), 520-21, 523 (German), 520-23 East Africa Company (British), 519-22 Eastern Question, the, 155-189, 222-250, 383, 615, 636-7 Eastern Roumelia, 238, 253, 259, 260, 263-4, 268, 275-6, 333 Eckardstein, Herr, 527 Edward VII., 601, 608, 618-9 Egypt, 166, 244, 266, 275, 602, 636-7, _passim_ chaps. xv. xvi. xvii. Einwold, Herr, 527 Elgin, Lord, 368 Elliott, Sir Henry, 176, 177, 221 El Obeid, Battle of, 461, 462 El Teb, Battle of, 470 Ems, 42-5 Ena, Queen of Spain, 619 England. _See_ Great Britain Enver Bey, 630 Epirus, 241, 248 Erzeroum, 194, 241 Eugénie, Empress, 19, 29, 38, 47, 75, 87, 97, 139

Faidherbe, M. 538 Fashoda, 349, 501-6, 594 Faure, President, 127, 346 Favre, M. Jules, 87, 88, 94, 98, 103, 114 Ferdinand, Prince, 285-6 Ferdinand, Tsar, of Bulgaria, 612, 631 Fergusson, Sir James, 336 Ferry, M., 266, 329 Finland, 304, 307-14 Flegel, Herr, 535 Floquet, M., 126 Flourens, M., 343 Forbach, Battle of, 62, 63 Formosa, Island of, 577 Fox Bourne, Mr., 563 France, 3-6, 9, 19, 20, 25-9, 32, 33, 35, 46-9, 52-6, 87-9, 112, 161, 228, 318, 320-24, 326, 333-6, 337-8, 341-5, 347-9, 350, 437-8, 442, 446, 448, 452-3, 457, 458-9, 485, 513-514, 529, 535, 537-41, 546-9, 558, 559, 577-9, 585-6, 591, 593-4, 597, 599-608, 614-6, 618, 620-2, 624, 626, 638, 641-8 and Morocco, 602, 604-7, 609-10, 620 _seq_., 636-7 Army of, 634-5 France and the Sudan, 501-6 France and Tunis, 328-30 Francis Ferdinand, Archduke, 613-4, 639 Francis Joseph, 6, 32, 36, 173, 232, 318, 613 Franco-German War, causes of, 36-49 Franco-Italian Entente, 601 Franco-Russian Alliance. (_See_ Dual Alliance) Frankfurt, Treaty of, 105, 114 Frankfurt-on-Main, 11, 12, 21, 22 Frederick the Great, 594, 635, 638, 646 Frederick III., Crown Prince of Germany and Emperor, 18, 74, 76, 80, 130, 136, 151, 236 Frederick VII., 14 Frederick Charles, Prince, 66, 68 Frederick William IV., 11-13, 31, 593 Free Trade (in Germany), 141-3 (in France), 142 French Congoland, 506, 546, 622, 625 French Revolution of 1830, 5 Frere, Sir Bartle, 380-81, 524 Freycinet, M. de, 446, 447, 452, 456, 502, 503 Frobenius, Herr, 638 Frossard, General, 63-5

Galatz, 197 Galbraith, Colonel, 411 Gallieni, M., 539 Gallipoli, 222, 226 Gambetta, M., 87, 96-101, 110, 125, 318, 330, 446, 452, 538 Gandamak, Treaty of, 400, 418 Garde Mobile, the, 55, 94 Garde Nationale, the, 55, 94 Garibaldi, 6, 7, 9-11, 28, 90-91, 327 Gastein, Convention of, 16 Gatacre, General, 490, 492 Gavril, Pasha, 263 Geok Tepe. _See_ Denghil Tepe George V., King of England, 645 George, David Lloyd, 623, 625 German Army, 135, 633-4 German Army, Kriegsgefahr, 643 Confederation (1815-66), 4-22 Constitution (1871), 132-7 Empire, 129. _See_ Germany Navy, 587-9, 594, 609, 617, 628, 633, 638 Zollverein, the, 141-2 Germany, 3-6, 11-18, 20-23, 27, 34, 39, 45-9, 51-5, 129-154, 164-6, 223, 246, 275, 277, 282, 318-27, 329, 330, 337-9, 350, 447-8, 453, 457, 472, 485, 513-18, 520-22, 524-30, 533-7, 541, 547, 559, 577-9, 581, 585-9, 592, 595-7, 600-609, 615-18, 620-21, 623-8, 632, 634, 635-8, 640-49 Gervais, Admiral, 343 Ghaznee, Battle of, 405 Giers, M. de, 258, 263, 265, 276, 281, 285, 302, 332, 333-5, 337, 424, 427, 515 Gladstone, Mr., 29, 46, 172, 223, 244, 275, 356, 371, 372, 376, 380, 392, 405, 417, 427-9, 446, 448-9, 452, 458, 461, 465, 484-5, 502, 517, 524, 528, 530, 531 Glave, Mr., 562 Gold Coast, 539 Goldie, Sir George T., 535, 541 Gontaut-Biron, M. de, 421 Gordon, General, _passim_ chaps. xvi. xvii. Gortchakoff, Prince, 164, 168, 190, 222, 226, 320, 322-3, 366 Goschen, Lord, 244, 246, 442 Goschen, Sir Edward, 641-2 Gough, General, 404 Gramont, Duc de, 32, 40, 42, 43, 47 Grant Duff, Sir Mountstuart, 322 Granville, Earl, 45, 389, 425-6, 447, 463, 465, 470, 473-4, 517, 523, 533, 547 Gravelotte, Battle of, 68-73 Great Britain, 14, 29, 30, 52, 95, 145, 147-9, 160-61, 168-77, 181, 187-8, 190, 231, 259, 266, 282, 284, 322-4, 328, 336, 337, 342, 364-6, 372-4, 382-4, 392-4, 400, 404-6, 417, 435, 513-14, 521, 523-30, 533-7, 541, 547, 578-9, 581-2, 585-7, 600, 604-9, 616, 618, 620, 622-3, 626-8, 636-9, 641-8 Army of, 634 Great Britain and Egypt, _passim_ chaps. xv. xvi. xvii. Great Britain and Russia (1878), 222-8 Greco-Turkish War, 585 Greece, 5, 158, 160, 194, 227, 240-41, 245-8, 257, 267 Grenfell, Rev. G., 546 Grévy, M., 337, 355 Grey, Sir Edward, 503, 586, 623, 626, 631, 634, 641-7 Griffin, Sir Lepel, 405-6 Gurko, General, 201-3, 208, 219

Habibulla, Ameer of Afghanistan, 431, 435 Hague Conference, 608 Congress, the (1899), 583 Tribunal, 601, 649 Haldane, Lord, 627, 639, 647 Hamburg, 132, 142 Hanotaux, M., 504 Hanover, 11, 21, 23 Hartington, Lord, 417, 465, 476 Hayashi, Count, 596 Heligoland, 521, 637 Herat, 367, 368, 381, 387, 388, 405, 425 Héricourt, Battle of, 98 Herzegovina, 163-5, 170, 238, 332 Hesse-Cassel, 12, 21, 23 Hesse Darmstadt, 20 Heydebrand, Herr, 625 Hicks, Pasha, 461-2 Hinde, Captain S.L., 553 Hinterland, Question of the, 547, 550 Hohenlohe, Prince, 589 Hohenzollern, House of, 11, 39-41, 129; also _see_ Germany Holland, 5, 554-5, 641-2 Holstein, 5, 26 Holy Alliance, the, 5, 319 Holy Roman Empire, the, 136 Hornby, Admiral, 224 Hoskier, M., 340 Hudson, Sir James, 274 Hungary, 32, 36, 159, 263, 277 Hunter, General, 487

Iddesleigh, Lord, 519 Ignatieff, General, 174, 177, 181, 229, 230, 232, 332 India, 165, 212, 365, 368, 592 "International Association of the Congo," 545, 547-9 "Internationale," the, 292 Isabella, Queen, 40 Ismail, Khedive, 438-40, 442 Istria, 329 Isvolsky, M., 615 "_Italia irredenta_," 329 Italo-Turkish War, the, 624, 628 Italy, 4-11, 16-23, 28, 30, 34, 37, 38, 55, 56, 63, 89-92, 148, 228, 266, 284, 319, 335, 350, 453, 485, 487, 540, 541, 567, 601, 603-5, 607, 615-17, 624, 628, 631, 636, 643, 646-7, 649 Italy and the Triple Alliance, 327-331, 600, 601, 615, 624, 637, 647

Jacob, General, 385 Jacobabad, Treaty of, 385 Jagow, Herr von, 645 Jameson, Dr. 587 Janssen, M., 552 Japan, 348, 572-4, 576-8, 581-4, 585, 597-9 Jaurés, M., 634 Jermak, 361, 569, 570 Jesuits, the, 138 Jews, persecution of the, 304, 305 Johnstone, Sir Harry, 519, 541

Kamchatka, 570, 571 Karaveloff, M., 256, 259, 280 Kars, 194, 229, 234 Kassala, 487, 488, 491 Katkoff, M., 259, 283, 324, 332, 333, 334, 337 Kaufmann, General, 366, 383, 398 Kaulbars, General, 255, 257-8, 283, 284 Khalifa, _passim_ chap. xvii. Khama, 533 Khartum, 437, 439, 445, _passim_ chaps. xvi. xvii. Khelat, Khan of, 384-5 Khiva, 365, 374, 377 Khokand, 383 Khyber Pass, 386, 390, 394, 401, 412 Kiamil Pacha, 630 Kiao-chau, 580-81 Kiderlen-Wächter, Herr, 621-2 Kiel, North Sea Canal, 587, 604, 637-8 Kirk, Sir John, 518, 541 Kitchener, Lord, 441, 479, 598, _passim_ chap. xvii. Komaroff, General, 427, 428 Königgrätz, Battle of, 18-20 Kordofan, 461, 462, 470, 476 Korea, 568 Korsakoff, General, 254 Kossuth, 6 Krüdener, General, 200, 206-7 Krüger, President, 586-7 Kultur-Kampf, the, 139-41 Kuropatkin, General, 311-12, 314, 422-3 Kurram Valley, the, 394-7, 400

Labouchere, Mr., 336 Lado, 502, 558-9 Lagos, 539 Lamsdorff, Count, 575 Lansdowne, Lord, 433, 567, 597, 602, 606 Lavigerie, Cardinal, 534 Lawrence, Lord J., 365, 368-9, 371, 385, 387 Layard, Sir Henry, 221, 226, 245, 246 Leboeuf, Marshall, 47, 53, 64, 65 Lebrun, General, 34-6, 65 Leflô, General, 322 Le Mans, Battle of, 98 Leo XIII., 327, 331, 335 Leopold II. (King of the Belgians), 342, 465, 509, 514, 543, 550-52, 555-7, 558, 565 Leopold, Prince of Hohenzollern, 40, 42 Lessar, M., 424 Lesseps, M. de, 438, 441 Lewis, General, 487 Liaotung Peninsula, 577, 578, 581-2 Liberation, Wars of (1813-14), 635 Li-Hung Chang, 577, 578, 582 Lissa, Battle of, 17 Livingstone, D., 508-9, 543-4, 567 Lobánoff, Prince, 575 Local Government (French), 119, 120 Lomakin, General, 420 Lombardy, 5-11, 32 London, Conference of (1867), 15, 28 Congress of (1871), 95 London, Peace Conference at (1913), 630-31, 634 Lorraine, 94, 103, 105, 132, 133-4 Lothaire, Commandant, 553 Loubet, M., 127, 601 Louis Philippe, King, 6 Lovtcha, 210, 212 Lübeck, 132, 142 Lüderitz, Herr, 523 Lugard, Sir Frederick, 522, 537, 541 Lumsden, Sir Peter, 426 Luxemburg, 27, 28, 32, 39 Lyttleton, Colonel, 492 Lytton, Lord, 481-7, 490-92, 405-6, 417, 419

Macdonald, General, 402, 487, 491, 496-8 Macdonald, Ramsay, 646 Macedonia, 158, 230, 248, 250, 287-8, 391 Mackenzie, Rev. John, 530-31, 541 Mackinnon, Sir William, 516, 541 Maclaine, Lieutenant, 408, 415 MacMahon, Marshall, 59-61, 74-80, 123, 125-7, 322, 525-6 Mahdi, the, 266; chaps. xvi. xvii. _passim_ Maiwand, Battle of, 407-11 Malet, Sir Edward, 548 Malmesbury, Lord, 47 Manchuria, 345-6, 349, 568, 578, 580, 584 Mancíní, Sígnor, 355 Manin, 7 Marchand, Colonel, 501-6, 540 Maritz, General, 635 Marschall, Baron von, 605 Mars-la-Tour, Battle of, 67-70 Maxwell, General, 487, 491, 497 "May Laws," the, 139-41, 319 Mayo, Lord, 372-3 Mazzini, 6, 7, 91, 92, 304, 327 Mecklenburg, 17, 142 Mehemet Ali, Pasha, 204, 209, 215-16 Melikoff, General Loris, 194, 296-8 Méline, M., 504 Mentana, Battle of, 28, 90 Mercantile System, the, 150 Merriman, Mr., 586 Merv, 345, 374, 387, 388, 423-5, 431, 518 Metternich, Prince, 7, 36 Metz, 55, 63-73, 97, 104 Mexico, 19, 26, 31 Midhat, Pasha, 178-9, 186 Milan, King, 167, 263, 269-72 Milner, Lord, 440, 448, 598 Milutin, General, 204, 215 Mir, the, 294, 307 Mohammed Ali, 437-8 Mohammed V., 618 Moltke, Count von, 18, 43, 65, 66, 78, 85, 104, 130, 193, 205, 320 Mombasa, 520, 523 Montenegro, 158, 163, 167, 173-4, 180, 194, 204, 225, 229, 232, 238, 242, 246-7, 263 Morier, Sir Robert, 187, 273, 286, 302, 428 Morley, Mr. John, 427 Morocco, 602, 604-7, 609-10, 620 _seq_., 636-7 Moslem Creed, the, and Christians, 156-8, 186-7 Mukden, 598, 606 Mukhtar, Pasha, 208 Münster, Count, 523 Murad V., 169 Muravieff, Count, 571-3, 575, 589

Nabokoff, Captain, 278 Nachtigall, Dr., 533-4 Napoleon I., 2-4, 12, 13, 15-17, 23, 25, 89, 100, 160, 325, 437, 537, 593, 608, 610 Napoleon III., 6, 7, 9-11, 16, 17, 19, 20, 25-33, 37-40, 46-9, 52, 63-5, 75-8, 84-6, 88-9, 98, 99, 105, 123, 138, 142, 162, 538, 599 Napoleon, Prince Jerome, 20, 37 Natal, 527, 528, 529, 534 National African Company, the, 535 National Assembly, the French, 98-108, 115-26 Nationality, 2-12, 23, 25, 26-8, 36, 89, 586 Nelidoff, Count, 265, 274, 277 Nelson, 437, 441 Nesselrode, Count, 364 Netherlands, the, 586 Nice, 9, 30, 39 Nicholas, I., 160, 289, 292, 304, 308, 364 Nicholas II., 289, 311-14, 346, 349, 506, 575, 580, 584, 590, 594, 598, 610, 614, 617, 621-2, 640, 643, 649 Nicholas, Grand Duke, 192-3, 200-2, 206, 210, 215, 223, 229, 291, 292 Nicholas, Prince of Montenegro, 263 Nicopolis, 196, 200-1, 206, 217 Niger, river, 533-40, 548 Nigeria, 534-7 Nihilism, 112, 233, 266-7, 291-8, 300-4, 327 Nikolsburg, 19 Northbrook, Lord, 373-4, 376, 379, 381, 465 Northcote, Sir Stafford, 168, 224, 225, 243 North German Confederation, 22, 35, 51, 52, 136 Norway, 4, 5 Novi-Bazar, 332 Novi-Bazar, Sanjak of, 612 Nuttall, General, 411

Obock, 504, 540 Obretchoff, General, 324, 326 O'Donovan, Mr., 424, 462 Ollivier, M., 28, 29, 34, 41, 46, 47, 55, 65 Olmütz, Convention of, 12, 18 Omdurman, Battle of, 441, 493-500 Orleans, 97 Osman Digna, 470, 486 Osman Pasha, 196, 200, 205, 214-19

Palikao, Count, 65, 75, 77, 79, 87 Palmerston, Lord, 30, 438, 441 Pan-German Movement, 593-4, 621 Pan-Islamic Movement, 592-3, 608 Panjdeh, 346, 426-9, 432 Papal States, the, 9, 10 Paris, 87, 88, 95, 97, 98, 105, 107-113, 120 Paris Commune, the (1871), 106-113, 116, 315 Paris, Comte de, 117, 122 Paris, Treaty of (1856), 161, 176 Peiwar, Kotal, Battle at, 396 Pekin, Capture of, 595 Persia, 367, 368, 374, 378, 380, 609, 624 Persian Gulf, the, 592 Peshawur, 394 Peter, King of Servia, 615 Peters, Dr. Karl, 517-19, 522 Phayre, General, 416 Philippopolis, 219, 260, 263-4, 270, 271, 281 Picard, M., 103 Piedmont, 7 Pishin, 400 Pius IX., 6, 7, 38, 89-91, 122, 138-9, 141, 327 Plevna, Battles at, 206-19 Pobyedonosteff, 299, 300 Poland, 4, 5, 25, 26, 31, 301 Pondoland, 529 Port Arthur, 346, 580 Porte, the. _See_ Turkey Portsmouth, Treaty of, 598 Portugal, 520, 525, 526, 540, 541, 546-9 Posen, 141 Primrose, General, 407, 411 Prudhon, 292-5 Prussia (1815-66), 4-22, 26, 51-5, 95, 130, 140, 141. _See_ Germany

Quadrilateral, the Turkish, 194-7, 199-200 Quetta, 381, 385, 398, 412, 416, 432

Rabinek, Herr, 565 Rachfahl, Herr, 605 Radetzky, General, 209, 220 Radowitz, Herr von, 321 Radziwill, Princess, 236-7, 291 Rauf Pasha, 460-61 Rawlinson, Sir Henry, 380 Redcliffe, Lord Stratford de, 188 Redmond, Mr., 646 Reichstag, the German, 133-4, 140, 141, 145-6 Reventlow, Count, 587, 595, 603, 637-8 Revolutions of 1848, 6-7, 11-12 Rezonville, Battle of, 67-70 Rhodes, Mr. Cecil, 530-32, 541 Rhodesia, 532 Riaz Pasha, 445 Ribot, M., 346 Ripon, Lord, 406, 412, 417 Roberts, Lord, 379, 389, 392-3, 395-8, 402-4, 535 Rohrbach, Herr, 637 Rome, 7, 10, 38, 89-92, 95, 138 Roon, Count von, 17, 43 Rosebery, Earl of, 275, 276, 503, 519, 528 Roumania, 26, 157, 158, 162, 192-3, 220, 222, 225, 229-30, 238-40, 257, 260-62, 269 Roumania, King of, 41 Rouvier, M., 607 Royal Niger Company, the, 526, 540 Rubber Tax, in Congo State, 565-7 Russell, Lord John, 14, 15 Russell, Lord Odo, 322 Russia, 5, 9, 12, 13, 26, 31, 32, 55, 95, 112, 145, 148, 161, 164-8, 172, 182, 190-92, 231, 234, 240, 289, 290, 318, 322-7, 331-5, 337, 341-5, 347-9, 371, 446, 447-8, 457, 458, 472, 485, 527, 586, 590-91, 593-5, 597, 603, 606-8, 612-13, 615-17, 621, 624, 626, 629-31, 633-4, 640-44, 647-8 and Bulgaria, 253-88 and Finland, 307-14 and Japan, 585, 592, 598-9 and the Jews, 304-5 and Turkey, 222-7, 229-42 army of, 635, 638 Russia in Central Asia, 359-66, 371-4, 376-80, 383, 387-91, 398-9, 403, 419-30 in the Far East, 595-6, 598, 614, chap. xx. _passim_ Russo-Japanese War, 598-9, 602 Russo-Turkish War, 585 Rustchuk, 194, 199, 208, 265, 280-82, 285, 334

Saarbrücken, Battle of, 61, 62 Said, Khedive, 438 St. Hilaire, Barthélémy de, 328 St. Lucia Bay, 519, 525, 527, 528, 534 St. Privat, Battle of _See_ Gravelotte St. Quentin, Battle of, 98 Saladin, 591 Salisbury, Marquis of, 176-7, 187, 232-4, 240, 243, 266-9, 272, 275, 283, 287, 328, 336, 380-81, 383, 387, 428, 505, 519, 522, 540, 554, 581 Salonica, 167, 229 Samarcand, 365-6, 371, 388-9, 604 Samoa, 588, 610 Samory, 539 San Stefano, Treaty of, 229-32, 233, 238, 253 Sandeman, Sir Robert, 384-5 Sardinia, Kingdom of, 8-11, 162 Saxony, 4, 5, 11, 18, 134-6 Sazonoff, M., 641 Schleswig-Holstein, 5, 12, 13-16, 21, 26, 142 Schnaebele, M., 334, 338 Sedan, Battle of, 77-88 Septennate, the (in France), 123 Serpa Pinto, 540 Servia, 158-9, 163, 167, 173-4, 180, 194, 225, 229, 232, 238, 242, 257, 258, 267, 612-13, 615-16, 631, 637, 639-43, 648-9 Seymour, Admiral, 449-50 Shan-tung, Province of, 580, 581 Shere Ali, 369-74, 376-7, 379-80, 384, 386-8, 390-92, 398-400 Sherpur, Engagements at (1878), 404 Shipka Pass, 197, 201-3, 208, 220 Shumla, 194, 208 Shutargardan Pass, the, 402 Shuvaloff, Count, 233, 235 Siberia, 361, 366, 570-72, 574 Sibi, 398, 400 Simon, Jules, 103 Sistova, 196, 197, 199, 208, 217 Skiernewice, 258, 266, 284, 302, 332-5, 426, 515-18 Skobeleff, General, 198-9, 203, 210, 211-15, 220, 259, 330, 388-9, 421-4, 431 Slave-trade, the, 558, 562 Slavophils, the, 310-12, 339 Slivnitza, Battle of, 270-71 Soboleff, General, 255, 257-8 Sofia, 210, 219, 271, 273, 278-9 Solferino, Battle of, 9 Somaliland, 540 South Africa Company, British, 533 South German Confederation, 21, 22, 35 South-West Africa (German), 523-7, 531-2 Spain, 40, 41, 42, 605 Spicheren, Battle of, 62, 63 Stambuloff, 256, 259, 264, 289, 283-6, 334 Stanley, Sir H.M., 465, 508-9, 543-4, 552, 553 State Socialism (in Germany), 150-53 Steinmetz, General, 71 Stephenson, General, 474 Stepniak, 294, 303 Stewart, Colonel, 466, 476 Stewart, Sir Donald, 398, 405 Stewart, Sit Herbert, 480 Stiege, Admiral, 623 Stoffel, Colonel, 53 Stokes, Mr., execution of, 565 Stolieteff, General, 388-90, 398 Stundists, the, 305-7 Suakim, 462, 473, 478, 486, 488, 518 Sudan, the, _passim_ chaps. xvi. xvii. Suez Canal, the, 166, 190, 225, 438, 439, 457, 513 Suleiman Pasha, 204, 208-9, 215, 216, 219, 221 Swat Valley, the, 433 Sweden, 4, 5 Switzerland, 98, 148

Tamai, Battle of, 470 Tangier, 614 Tashkend, 365, 388, 433 Tatisheff, M., 643 Tchernayeff, General, 174 Tchirsky, Herr von, 640 Tel-el-Kebir, Battle of, 454-5 Tewfik, Khedive, 442-7, 452-3, 458, 461, 466-7, 487, 503, 507 Thessaly, 240-41, 248-9 Thiers, M., 26, 27, 47, 87, 94, 100-6, 108, 114-19, _passim_ chaps. iv. v. Thomson, Joseph, 509-10, 535-6, 541 Thornton, Sir Edward, 427 Three Emperors' League, the, 179, 184, 319-23, 326, 332-4, 448, 515 Tilsit, Treaty of, 308 Timbuctu, 539 Tipu Tib, 553 Tirard, M., 341 Tirpitz, Admiral von, 589, 609 Tisza, M., 180, 283 Todleben, 216-17 Togo, Admiral, 598 Trans-Siberian Railway, the, 574-6, 580, 582-3, 599 Transvaal, the, 525, 527, 586 Treitschke, Herr, 626, 636 Trentino, 335 Triple Alliance, the, 21, 327-33, 335-9, 453, 515, 590-1, 599-601, 609, 615, 624, 635, 637, 647 Triple Entente, the, 593, 595, 609, 617, 635, 647, 649 Trochu, General, 101 Tsushima, Battle of, 598 Tunis, 328-30, 436, 448, 513-14, 600 Turgenieff, 294, 295 Turkestan, 361, 364, 366-7, 419-30 Turkey, 5, 155, 168-77, 181, 187-8, 190-221, 229-42, 332, 342, 348, 436-8, 446, 502, 567, 592, 613, 615-616, 618, 624, 628-30, 632, 638-9

Uganda, 502, 522-3 Umballa, Conference at, 372-3 Umberto I., King of Italy, 327, 329-31, 333, 335, 336 United Kingdom. _See_ Great Britain United Netherlands, Kingdom of, 5 United States, the, 30, 31, 547, 567, 578, 581, 596-8, 607

Vandervelde, M., 557 Venetia, 5-11, 17, 19, 21 Verdun, 65, 68 Versailles, 103, 106, 108, 109, 129 Victor Emmanuel II., King of Italy, 2-11, 37, 63, 90, 327 Victor Emmanuel III., 601, 615 Victoria, Queen, 14, 145, 165, 171, 223-4, 261, 322 proclaimed Empress of India, 382 Victoria, Crown Princess of Germany, 323 Vienna, Treaty of (1815), 4, 5 Vionville, Battle of, 67-70 Viviani, M., 644 Vladivostok, 572, 575, 580

Waddington, M., 240, 245, 246, 328 Wady Halfa, 439, 476, 478, 483, 484, 486, 489, 502 Waldeck-Rousseau, M., 600 Waldemar, Prince, 284 Walfisch Bay, 524 Wallachia, 160-62 Warren, Sir Charles, 531-2 Wei-hai-wei, 582 West Africa, 533-40 White, Major G., 402 White, Sir William, 177, 187, 265, 267-9, 273-4, 287, 302 Widdin, 194, 196, 200, 206, 270 William I. (King of Prussia, German Emperor), 11-22, 31, 32, 41-6, 73, 104, 129-30, 137, 152, 236, 321-2, 325, 335, 339, 517, 594 William II. (King of Prussia, German Emperor), 151-3, 339-40, 342, 522, 580, 582, 586-93, 598-9, 604, 606-611, 614, 616-7, 620-1, 623-4, 632, 636-7, 639-41, 643-6 William, Crown Prince of Germany, 625, 646 William of Weid, Prince, 632 Wilson, Sir Charles, 480 Wimpffen, General de, 79-86 Winton, Sir Francis de, 552 Wissmann, Lieutenant von, 546 Wolf, Dr., 546 Wolff, Sir H. Drummond, 485 Wolseley, Lord, 454-6, 466, 475, 476, 478, 481, 507 Wörth, Battle of, 59-62 Würtemberg, 21, 131, 133-5, 137

Yakub Khan, 379, 400-3 Young Turk Party, the, 612-3, 616, 618 Revolution (1908), 615

Zankoff, M., 280 Zanzibar, 516-21, 532, 553 Zazulich, Vera, 292 Zebehr, Pasha, 469-73 Zemstvo, the, 293, 296, 301 Zola, Emile, 600 Zulfikar Pass, the, 428