Part 6

It was General Oglethorpe’s original purpose, as foreshadowed in his dispatch of the 27th of March, 1740,[86] with four hundred regular troops of his regiment, one hundred Georgians, and such additional forces as South Carolina could contribute, to advance directly upon St. Augustine, and attack, by sea and land, the town and the island in its front. Both of these, he believed, could be taken “sword in hand.” He would then summon the castle to surrender, or surprise it. Conceiving that the castle would be too small to afford convenient shelter for the two thousand one hundred men, women, and children of the town, he regarded the capitulation of the fortress as not improbable. Should it refuse to surrender, however, he proposed to shower upon it “Granado-shells from the Cohorns and Mortars, and send for the Artillery and Pioneers and the rest of the Aid promised by the Assembly;[87] also for Mortars and Bombs from _Providence;_” and, if the castle should not have yielded prior to the arrival of “these Aids,” he was resolved to open trenches and conduct a siege which he reckoned would be all the easier, the garrison having been weakened by the summer’s blockade.

About the time of the concentration of the Georgia and Carolina forces for combined operations against St. Augustine, that town was materially reinforced by the arrival of six Spanish half-galleys,—manned by two hundred regular troops and armed with long brass nine-pounder guns,—and two sloops loaded with provisions.

Warned by the preliminary demonstration which eventuated, as we have seen, in the capture of forts Francis de Papa and Diego, the enemy massed all detachments within the lines of St. Augustine, collected cattle from the adjacent region, and prepared for a vigorous defense.

Apprehending that he might not be able to carry the town by assault from the land side,—where its entrenchments were strong and well armed,—unless supported by a demonstration in force from the men of war approaching the town where it looks toward the sea and where it was not covered by earth-works, and being without the requisite pioneer corps and artillery train for the conduct of a regular siege, before putting his army in motion General Oglethorpe instructed the naval commanders to rendezvous off the bar of the north channel, and blockade that and the Matanzas pass to St. Augustine. Captain Warren, with two hundred sailors, was to land on Anastasia island and erect batteries for bombarding the town in front. When his land forces should come into position and be prepared for the assault, he was to notify Sir Yelverton Peyton, commanding the naval forces, and St. Augustine would thus be attacked on all sides. Shortly after the middle of May, 1740, General Oglethorpe, with a land army numbering over two thousand regulars, militia, and Indians, moved upon St. Augustine. Fort Moosa,[88] situated within two miles of that place, lay in his route. Upon his approach the garrison evacuated it and retired within the lines of the town. Having burnt the gates of this fort and caused three breaches in its walls, General Oglethorpe, on the 5th of June, made his reconnoissances of the land defenses of St. Augustine and prepared for the contemplated assault. Everything being in readiness, the signal previously agreed upon to insure the coöperation of the naval forces was given; but, to the General’s surprise and mortification, no response was returned. His forces being disposed and eager for the attack, the signal was repeated, but failed to evoke the anticipated answer. Satisfied that the town could not be carried without the assistance of the naval forces, and being ignorant of the cause of their non-action, the General reluctantly withdrew his army and placed it in camp at a convenient distance, there to remain until he could ascertain the reason of the failure on the part of the navy to coöperate in the plan which had been preconcerted. This failure was explained in this wise. Inside the bar, and at such a remove that they could not be affected by the fire of the British vessels of war,—the Flamborough, the Phœnix, the Squirrel, the Tartar, the Spence, and the Wolf,—Spanish gallies and half gallies were moored so as to effectually prevent the ascent of the barges intended for the attack, and preclude a landing of troops upon Anastasia island. The shallowness of the water was such that the men of war could not advance near enough to dislodge them. Under the circumstances therefore, Sir Yelverton Peyton found himself unable to respond to the important part assigned him in the attack.

Advised of this fact, and chagrined at the non-realization of his original plan of operations, Oglethorpe determined at once to convert his purposed assault into a siege. The ships of war lying off the bar of St. Augustine were directed to narrowly observe every avenue of approach by water, and maintain a most rigid blockade. Colonel Palmer, with ninety-five Highlanders and forty-two Indians, was left at Fort Moosa with instructions to scout the woods incessantly on the land side and intercept any cattle or supplies coming from the interior. To prevent surprise and capture, he was cautioned to change his camp each night, and keep always on the alert. He was to avoid anything like a general engagement with the enemy. Colonel Vanderdussen, with his South Carolina regiment, was ordered to take possession of a neck of land known as Point Quartel, about a mile distant from the castle, and there erect a battery. General Oglethorpe, with the men of his regiment and most of the Indians, embarked in boats and effected a landing on Anastasia island, where, having driven off a party of Spaniards there stationed as an advanced guard, he, with the assistance of the sailors from the fleet, began mounting cannon with which to bombard the town and castle.[89] Having by these dispositions completed his investment, Oglethorpe summoned the Spanish Governor to a surrender. Secure in his strong-hold, the haughty Don “sent him for answer that he would be glad to shake hands with him in his castle.” Indignant at such a response, the General opened his batteries upon the castle and also shelled the town. The fire was returned both by the fort and the half gallies in the harbor. So great was the distance, however, that although the cannonade was maintained with spirit on both sides for nearly three weeks, little damage was caused or impression produced.[90] It being evident that the reduction of the castle could not be expected from the Anastasia island batteries, Captain Warren offered to lead a night attack upon the half gallies in the harbor which were effectually preventing all ingress by boats. A council of war decided that in as much as those galleys were covered by the guns of the castle, and could not be approached by the larger vessels of the fleet, any attempt to capture them in open boats would be accompanied by too much risk. The suggestion was therefore abandoned.

Observing the besiegers uncertain in their movements, and their operations growing lax, and being sore pressed for provisions, the Spanish Governor sent out a detachment of three hundred men against Colonel Palmer. Unfortunately that officer, negligent of his instructions and apprehending no danger from the enemy, remained two or three consecutive nights at Fort Moosa. This detachment, under the command of Don Antonio Salgrado, passed quietly out of the gates of St. Augustine during the night of June 14th, and after encountering a most desperate resistance, succeeded in capturing Fort Moosa at day light, the next morning. Colonel Palmer fell early in the action. The Highlanders “fought like lions,” and “made such havoc with their broadswords as the Spaniards cannot easily forget.” This hand-to-hand conflict was won at the cost to the enemy of more than one hundred lives. Colonel Palmer, a Captain, and twenty Highlanders were killed. Twenty-seven were captured. Those who escaped made their way to Colonel Vanderdussen at Point Quartel. Thus was St. Augustine relieved from the prohibition which had hitherto estopped all intercourse with the surrounding country.

Shortly after the occurrence of this unfortunate event, the vessel which had been blockading the Matanzas river was withdrawn. Taking advantage of the opportunity thus afforded, some small vessels from Havana, with provisions and reinforcements, reached St. Augustine by that narrow channel, bringing great encouragement and relief to the garrison. This reinforcement was estimated at seven hundred men, and the supply of provisions is said to have been large. “Then,” writes Hewitt,[91] whose narrative we have followed in the main, “all prospects of starving the enemy being lost, the army began to despair of forcing the place to surrender. The Carolinean troops, enfeebled by the heat, dispirited by sickness, and fatigued by fruitless efforts, marched away in large bodies. The navy being short of provisions, and the usual season of hurricanes approaching, the commander judged it imprudent to hazard his Majesty’s ships by remaining longer on that coast. Last of all, the General himself, sick of a fever, and his regiment worn out with fatigue and rendered unfit for action by a flux, with sorrow and regret followed, and reached Frederica about the 10th of July, 1740.”

The Carolineans, under Colonel Vanderdussen, proved themselves inefficient, “turbulent, and disobedient.” They lost not a single man in action, and only fourteen deaths occurred from sickness and accident. Desertions were frequent.[92]

Upon Oglethorpe’s regiment, and the Georgia companies, devolved the brunt of the siege. On the 5th of July the artillery and stores on Anastasia island were brought off, and the men crossed over to the mainland.[93] Vanderdussen and his regiment at once commenced a disorderly retreat in the direction of the St. Johns, leaving Oglethorpe and his men within half-cannon shot of the castle. In his dispatch to the Secretary of State, dated Camp on St. Johns in Florida, July 19th, 1740, the General thus describes his last movements: “The Spaniards made a sally, with about 500 men, on me who lay on the land side. I ordered Ensign Cathcart with twenty men, supported by Major Heron and Captain Desbrisay with upwards of 100 men, to attack them; I followed with the body. We drove them into the works and pursued them to the very barriers of the covered way. After the train and provisions were embarked and safe out of the harbour, I marched with drums beating and colours flying, in the day, from my camp near the town to a camp three miles distant, where I lay that night. The next day I marched nine miles, where I encamped that night. We discovered a party of Spanish horse and Indians whom we charged, took one horseman and killed two Indians; the rest ran to the garrison. I am now encamped on St. Johns river, waiting to know what the people of Carolina would desire me farther to do for the safety of these provinces, which I think are very much exposed to the half-galleys, with a wide extended frontier hardly to be defended by a few men.”

In one of the Indian chiefs Oglethorpe found a man after his own heart. When asked by some of the retreating troops to march with them, his reply was, “No! I will not stir a foot till I see every man belonging to me marched off before me; for I have always been the first in advancing towards an enemy, and the last in retreating.”[94]

This failure to reduce St. Augustine may be fairly attributed

I; to the delay in inaugurating the movement, caused mainly, if not entirely, by the tardiness on the part of the South Carolina authorities in contributing the troops and provisions for which requisition had been made;

II; to the reinforcement of men and supplies from Havanna introduced into St. Augustine just before the English expedition set out; thereby materially repairing the inequality previously existing between the opposing forces;

III; to the injudicious movement against forts Francis de Papa and Diego, which put the Spaniards on the alert, encouraged concentration on their part, and foreshadowed an immediate demonstration in force against their stronghold; and

IV; to the inability on the part of the fleet to participate in the assault previously planned, and which was to have been vigorously undertaken so soon as General Oglethorpe with his land forces came into position before the walls of St. Augustine.

V. The subsequent destruction of Colonel Palmer’s command,—thereby enabling the enemy to communicate with and draw supplies from the interior,—the lack of heavy ordnance with which to reduce the castle from the batteries on Anastasia island,—the impossibility of bringing up the larger war vessels that they might participate in the bombardment,—the inefficiency of Colonel Vanderdussen’s command,—the impatience and disappointment of the Indian allies who anticipated early capture and liberal spoils,—hot suns, heavy dews, a debilitating climate, sickness among the troops, and the arrival of men, munitions of war, and provisions through the Matanzas river, in the end rendered quite futile every hope which at the outset had been entertained for a successful prosecution of the siege.

Great was the disappointment upon the failure of the expedition, and unjust and harsh the criticisms levelled by not a few against its brave and distinguished leader.[95] We agree with the Duke of Argyle who, in the British House of Peers, declared “One man there is, my Lords, whose natural generosity, contempt of danger, and regard for the public prompted him to obviate the designs of the Spaniards, and to attack them in their own territories; a man whom by long acquaintance I can confidently affirm to have been equal to his undertaking, and to have learned the art of war by a regular education, who yet miscarried in the design only for want of supplies necessary to a possibility of success.”

Although this attempt,—so formidable in its character when we consider the limited resources at command, and so full of daring when we contemplate the circumstances under which it was undertaken,—eventuated in disappointment, its effects were not without decided advantages to the Colonies. For two years the Spaniards remained on the defensive, and General Oglethorpe enjoyed an opportunity for strengthening his fortifications on St. Simons island, so that when the counter blow was delivered by his adversary he was in condition not only to parry it, but also to severely punish the uplifted arm.[96]

For two months after the termination of this expedition, Oglethorpe lay ill of a continued fever contracted during the exposures and fatigues incident upon his exertions and anxieties during the siege. When, on the second of September, Mr. Stephens called to see him at Frederica, he found him still troubled with a lurking fever and confined to his bed. His protracted sickness had so “worn away his strength” that he “seldom came down stairs, but retained still the same vivacity of spirit in appearance to all whom he talked with, though he chose to converse with very few.”[97]

Four companies of the regiment were now encamped at the south-east end of St. Simons island, and the other two at Frederica. So soon as the men recovered from the malady contracted at St. Augustine, they were busily occupied in erecting new fortifications and strengthening the old. From these two camps detachments garrisoned the advanced works, St. Andrew, Fort William, St. George, and the outposts on Amelia island;—the details being relieved at regular intervals.[98]

During the preceding seven years, which constituted the entire life of the Colony, General Oglethorpe had enjoyed no respite from his labors. Personally directing all movements,—supervising the location, and providing for the comfort, safety, and good order of the settlers,—accommodating their differences,—encouraging and directing their labors,—propitiating the Aborigines,—influencing necessary supplies, and inaugurating suitable defences, he had been constantly passing from point to point finding no rest for the soles of his feet. Now in tent at Savannah,—now in open boat reconnoitering the coast,—now upon the southern islands,—his only shelter the wide-spreading live-oak,—designating sites for forts and look-outs, and with his own hands planning military works and laying out villages,—again in journeys oft along the Savannah, the Great Ogeechee, the Alatamaha, the St. Johns, and far off into the heart of the Indian country,—frequently inspecting his advanced posts,—undertaking voyages to Charlestown and to England in behalf of the Trust, and engaged in severe contests with the Spaniards, his life had been one of incessant activity and solicitude. But for his energy, intelligence, watchfulness, and self-sacrifice, the enterprise must have languished. As we look back upon this period of trial, uncertainty, and poverty, our admiration for his achievements increases the more narrowly we scan his limited resources and opportunities, the more intelligently we appreciate the difficulties he was called upon to surmount. Always present wherever duty called or danger threatened, he never expected others to press on where he himself did not lead. The only home he ever owned or claimed in Georgia was on St. Simons island. The only hours of leisure he ever enjoyed were spent in sight and sound of his military works along the southern frontier, upon whose safe tenure depended the salvation of the Colony. Just where the military road connecting Fort St. Simon with Frederica, after having traversed the beautiful prairie,—constituting the common pasture land of the village,—entered the woods, General Oglethorpe established his cottage. Adjacent to it were a garden, and an orchard of oranges, figs and grapes. Magnificent oaks threw their protecting shadows above and around this quiet, pleasant abode, fanned by delicious sea-breezes, fragrant with the perfume of flowers, and vocal with the melody of song-birds. To the westward, and in full view, were the fortifications and the white houses of Frederica. Behind rose a dense forest of oaks. “This cottage and fifty acres of land attached to it,” says the honorable Thomas Spalding in his “Sketch of the life of General James Oglethorpe,”[99] “was all the landed domain General Oglethorpe reserved to himself, and after the General went to England it became the property of my father.... After the Revolutionary war, the buildings being destroyed, my father sold this little property. But the oaks were only cut down within four or five years past, and the elder people of St. Simons yet feel as if it were sacrilege, and mourn their fall.” Here the defences of St. Simons island were under his immediate supervision. His troops were around him, and he was prepared, upon the first note of warning, to concentrate the forces of the Colony for active operations. In the neighborhood several of his officers established their homes. Among them, “Harrington Hall,”—the country seat of the wealthy Huguenot, Captain Raymond Demeré, enclosed with hedges of cassina,—was conspicuous for its beauty and comfort.

Including the soldiers and their families, Frederica in 1740 is said to have claimed a population of one thousand.[100] This estimate is perhaps somewhat exaggerated, although much nearer the mark than that of the discontents Tailfer, Anderson, and Douglas, who, in their splenetic and jacobinical tract entitled “A True and Historical Narrative of the Colony of Georgia in America,” assert that of the one hundred and forty-four lots into which the town was divided, only “about fifty were built upon,” and that “the number of the Inhabitants, notwithstanding of the Circulation of the Regiment’s money, are not over _one hundred and twenty_ Men, Women, and Children, and these are daily stealing away by all possible Ways.”[101]

As we have already seen, the town was regularly laid out in streets called after the principal officers of Oglethorpe’s regiment; and, including the military camp on the north, the parade on the east, and “a small wood on the south which served as a blind to the enemy in case of attack from ships coming up the river,” was about a mile and a half in circumference. The fort was strongly built of tabby and well armed. Several eighteen pounders, mounted on a ravelin in front, commanded the river, and the town was defended on the land side by substantial intrenchments. The ditch at the foot of these intrenchments was intended to admit the influx of the tide, thus rendering the isolation of Frederica complete, and materially enhancing the strength of its line of circumvallation. We reproduce from “An Impartial Enquiry into the State and Utility of the Province of Georgia”[102] the following contemporaneous notice: “There are many good Buildings in the Town, several of which are Brick. There is likewise a Fort and Store-house belonging to the Trust. The People have a Minister who has a Salary from the Society for propagating the Gospel. In the Neighbourhood of the Town, there is a fine Meadow of 320 Acres ditch’d in, on which a number of Cattle are fed, and good Hay is likewise made from it. At some Distance from the Town is the Camp for General _Oglethorpe’s_ Regiment. The Country about it is well cultivated, several Parcels of Land not far distant from the Camp having been granted in small Lots to the Soldiers, many of whom are married, and fifty-five Children were born there in the last year. These Soldiers are the most industrious, and willing to plant; the rest are generally desirous of Wives, but there are not Women enough in the Country to supply them. There are some handsome Houses built by the Officers of the Regiment, and besides the Town of _Frederica_ there are other little Villages upon this Island. A sufficient Quantity of Pot-herbs, Pulse, and Fruit is produced, there to supply both the Town and Garrison; and the People of _Frederica_ have begun to malt and to brew; and the Soldiers Wives Spin Cotton of the Country, which they Knit into Stockings. At the Town of _Frederica_ is a Town-Court for administering Justice in the Southern Part of the Province, with the same Number of Magistrates as at _Savannah_.”

At the village of St. Simon, on the south point of the island, was erected a watch-tower from which the movements of vessels at sea might be conveniently observed. Upon their appearance, their number was at once announced by signal guns, and a horseman dispatched to head quarters with the particulars. A look-out was kept by a party of Rangers at Bachelor’s Redoubt on the main, and a Corporal’s guard was stationed at Pike’s Bluff. To facilitate communication with Darien a canal was cut through General’s island. Defensive works were erected on Jekyll island, where Captain Horton had a well improved plantation, and there a brewery was established for supplying the troops with beer. On Cumberland island were three batteries,—Fort St. Andrew,—built in 1736, on high commanding ground, at the north-east point of the island,—a battery on the west to control the inland navigation,—and Fort William,—a work of considerable strength and regularity,—commanding the entrance to St. Mary’s river. Two companies of Oglethorpe’s regiment were stationed near Fort St. Andrew. As many of the soldiers were married, lots were assigned to them which they cultivated and improved. Near this work was the little village of Barrimacké of twenty-four families.

Upon Amelia island, where the orange trees were growing wild in the woods, were stationed the Highlanders with their scout boats. They had a good plantation,—upon which they raised corn enough for their subsistence,—a little fort, and “a stud of horses and mares.”[103]