Part 7

"This leads us to inquire into the origin of this government and the source of its power. Whose agent is it? Is it the creature of the State legislatures, or the creature of the people? If the government of the United States be the agent of the State governments, then they may control it, provided they can agree in the manner of controlling it; if it is the agent of the people, then the people alone can control it, restrain it, modify or reform it. It is observable enough, that the doctrine for which the honorable gentleman contends leads him to the necessity of maintaining, not only that this general government is the creature of the States, but that it is the creature of each of the States severally; so that each may assert the power, for itself, of determining whether it acts within the limits of its authority. It is the servant of four and twenty masters, of different wills and purposes; and yet bound to obey all. This absurdity (for it seems no less) arises from a misconception as to the origin of this government, and its true character. It is, sir, the people's constitution, the people's government; made for the people; made by the people; and answerable to the people. The people of the United States have declared that this constitution shall be the supreme law. We must either admit the proposition, or dispute their authority. The States are unquestionably sovereign, so far as their sovereignty is not affected by this supreme law. The State legislatures, as political bodies, however sovereign, are yet not sovereign over the people. So far as the people have given power to the general government, so far the grant is unquestionably good, and the government holds of the people, and not of the State governments. We are all agents of the same supreme power, the people. The general government and the State governments derive their authority from the same source. Neither can, in relation to the other, be called primary; though one is definite and restricted, and the other general and residuary.

"The national government possesses those powers which it can be shown the people have conferred on it, and no more. All the rest belongs to the State governments, or to the people themselves. So far as the people have restrained State sovereignty by the expression of their will, in the constitution of the United States, so far, it must be admitted, State sovereignty is effectually controlled. I do not contend that it is, or ought to be, controlled further. The sentiment to which I have referred propounds that State sovereignty is only to be controlled by its own 'feelings of justice;' that is to say, it is not to be controlled at all; for one who is to follow his feelings, is under no legal control. Now, however men may think this ought to be, the fact is, that the people of the United States have chosen to impose control on State sovereignties. The constitution has ordered the matter differently from what this opinion announces. To make war, for instance, is an exercise of sovereignty; but the constitution declares that no State shall make war. To coin money is another exercise of sovereign power; but no State is at liberty to coin money. Again, the constitution says, that no sovereign State shall be so sovereign as to make a treaty. These prohibitions, it must be confessed, are a control on the State sovereignty of South Carolina, as well as of the other States, which does not arise 'from feelings of honorable justice.' Such an opinion, therefore, is in defiance of the plainest provisions of the constitution."

Mr. Webster proceeded to investigate the South Carolina doctrine as it was then termed; he referred to the resolutions of Pennsylvania and Kentucky declaring the tariff laws constitutional, while in South Carolina the same laws were declared to be a palpable, deliberate usurpation of power by Congress; and in speaking of the absurdity of allowing each State to decide in such cases, he said:

"If there be no power to settle such questions, independent of either of the States, is not the whole Union a rope of sand? Are we not thrown back again precisely upon the old confederation?

"It is too plain to be argued. Four and twenty interpreters of constitutional law, each with a power to decide for itself, and none with authority to bind anybody else, and this constitutional law the only bond of their union! What is such a state of things but a mere connection during pleasure, or, to use the praseology of the times, _during feeling_? And that feeling, too, not the feeling of the people who established the constitution, but the feeling of the State governments."

In referring to remarks made by Mr. Hayne, concerning what Mr. Hillhouse should have said about not being bound to obey an unconstitutional law, Mr. Webster says:

"He quotes that distinguished senator as saying, that in his judgment the embargo law was unconstitutional, and that, therefore, in his opinion, the people were not bound to obey it.

"That, sir, is perfectly constitutional language. As unconstitutional law is not binding; _but then it does not rest with a resolution or a law of a State legislature to decide whether an act of congress be or be not constitutional_. An unconstitutional act of congress would not bind the people of this District although they have no legislature to interfere in their behalf; and, on the other hand, a constitutional law of congress does bind the citizens of every State, although all their legislatures should undertake to annul it, by act or resolution. The venerable Connecticut senator is a constitutional lawyer, of sound principles and enlarged knowledge; a statesman practiced and experienced, bred in the company of Washington, and holding just views upon the nature of our governments. He believed the embargo unconstitutional, and so did others; but what then? Who did he suppose was to decide that question? The State legislature? Certainly not. No such sentiment ever escaped his lips."

Mr. Webster went on to ask from whence this supposed right of the States came? Where did they get the power to interfere with the laws of the Union? He contended that the notion was founded in a misapprehension of the origin of this government and of the foundation on which it stands. I hold, said he, this to be a popular government, erected by the people, those who administer it responsible to the people, and itself capable of being amended and modified just as the people may choose it should be.

"It is as popular, just as truly emenating from the people, as the State governments. It is created for one purpose; the State governments for another. It has its own powers; they have theirs. There is no more authority with them to arrest the operation of a law of congress, than with congress to arrest the operation of their laws. We are here to administer a constitution emenating immediately from the people, and trusted by them to our administration. It is not the creature of the State governments. It is of no moment to the argument that certain acts of the State legislatures are necessary to fill our seats in this body. That is not one of their original State powers, a part of the sovereignty of the State. It is a duty which the people, by the constitution itself, have imposed on the State legislatures, and which they might have left to be performed elsewhere, if they had seen fit. So they have left the choice of president with electors; but all this does not affect the proposition that this whole government--president, senate and house of representatives--is a popular government. It leaves it still all its popular character. The governor of a State (in some of the States) is chosen not directly by the people for the purpose of performing, among other duties, that of electing a governor. Is the government of the State on that account not a popular government? This government, sir, is the independent offspring of the popular will. It is not the creature of State legislatures; nay, more, if the whole truth must be told, the people brought it into existence, established it, and have hitherto supported it, for the very purpose, amongst others, of imposing certain salutary restraints on State sovereignties. The States cannot now make war; they cannot contract alliances; they cannot make, each for itself, separate regulations of commerce; they cannot lay imposts; they cannot coin money. If this constitution, sir, be the creature of State legislatures, it must be admitted that it has obtained a strange control over the volition of its creators."

Mr. Webster then proceeded to show that when the people erected this government they gave it a Constitution, and in that Constitution they enumerated the powers which they bestowed on it. That they had made it a limited government, and defined its authority and restrained it to the exercise of such powers as were granted, and all others were reserved to the States or the people. But they did not stop there, being aware that no Constitution could be so plainly written but what there would be a difference of opinion on the construction of some points, consequently they (the people) in order to avoid a recurrence of the difficulties experienced under the old confederacy and render the laws of Congress effective and binding upon all parties without applying to State authority, thus rendering the government complete within itself, declared the Constitution and the laws of the United States, made in pursuance thereof, should be the supreme law of the land. In referring to the tribunal in which to decide questions arising under the Constitution, Mr. Webster said:

"But, sir, the people have wisely provided, in the constitution itself, a proper, suitable mode and tribunal for settling questions of constitutional law. There are, in the constitution, grants of powers to congress, and restrictions on those powers. There are also prohibitions on the States. Some authority must therefore necessarily exist, having the ultimate jurisdiction to fix and ascertain the interpretation of these grants, restrictions, and prohibitions. The constitution has itself pointed out, ordained, and established that authority. How has it accomplished this great and essential end? By declaring, sir, that '_the constitution and the laws of the United States, made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding_.'

"This, sir, was the first great step. By this, the supremacy of the constitution and laws of the United States is declared. The people so will it. No State law is to be valid which comes in conflict with the constitution or any law of the United States. But who shall decide this question of interference? To whom lies the last appeal? This, sir, the constitution itself decides also, by declaring '_that the judicial power shall extend to all cases arising under the constitution and laws of the United States_.' These two provisions, sir, cover the whole ground. They are, in truth, the keystone of the arch. With these it is a government; without them it is a confederacy. In pursuance of these clear and express provisions, congress established, at its very first session, in the judicial act, a mode for carrying them into full effect, and for bringing all questions of constitutional power to the final decision of the supreme court. It then, sir, became a government. It then had the means of self-protection; and but for this, it would, in all probability, have been now among things which are passed. Having constituted the government, and declared its powers, the people have further said, that since somebody must decide on the extent of these powers, the government shall itself decide--subject always like other popular governments, to its responsibility to the people. And now, sir, I repeat, how is it that a State legislature acquires any right to interfere? Who, or what, gives them the right to say to the people, 'We, who are your agents and servants for one purpose, will undertake to decide, that your other agents and servants, appointed by you for another purpose, have transcended the authority you gave them?' The reply would be, I think, not impertinent, 'Who made you a judge over another's servants. To their own masters they stand or fall.'"

He then went on to show that a State could not make treason against the United States legal, and, says he, when I maintain these sentiments, I am but asserting the rights of the people; I state what they have declared and insisted on as their right to declare it. They have chosen to repose this power in the general government, and I think it my duty to support it like other Constitutional powers.

In referring to the importance of having but one tribunal, whose decisions should be final--Sir, said he:

"If we look to the general nature of the case, could any thing have been more preposterous than to have made a government for the whole Union, and yet left its powers subject, not to one interpretation, but to thirteen or twenty-four interpretations? Instead of one tribunal, established by all, responsible to all, with power to decide for all, shall constitutional questions be left to four and twenty popular bodies, each at liberty to decide for itself, and none bound to respect the decisions of others; and each at liberty, too, to give a new construction, on every new election of its own members? Would any thing, with such a principle in it, or rather with such a destitution of all principle, be fit to be called a government? No, sir. It should not be denominated a constitution. It should be called, rather, a collection of topics for everlasting controversy; heads of debate for a disputatious people. It would not be a government. It would not be adequate to any practical good, nor fit for any people to live under."

Mr. Hayne, already overborne with the overwhelming and unanswerable arguments, was yet destined to receive the most cutting rebuke from his vanquisher. Mr. Webster said:

"And now, Mr. President, let me run the honorable gentleman's doctrine a little into its practical application. Let us look at his probable _modus operandi_. If a thing can be done, an ingenious man can tell _how_ it is to be done. Now, I wish to be informed _how_ this State interference is to be put in practice. We will take the existing case of the tariff law. South Carolina is said to have made up her opinion upon it. If we do not repeal it, (as probably we shall not,) she will then apply to the case the remedy of her doctrine. She will, we must suppose, pass a law of her legislature, declaring the several acts of congress, usually called the tariff laws, null and void, so far as they respect South Carolina, or the citizens thereof. So far, all is a paper transaction, and easy enough. But the collector at Charleston is collecting the duties imposed by these tariff laws--he, therefore, must be stopped. The collector will sieze the goods if the tariff duties are not paid. The State authorities will undertake their rescue: the marshal, with his posse, will come to the collector's aid; and here the contest begins. The militia of the State will be called out to sustain the nullifying act. They will march, sir, under a very gallant leader; for I believe the honorable member himself commands the militia of that part of the State. He will raise the _nullifying act_ on his standard, and spread it out as his banner. It will have a preamble, bearing that the tariff laws are palpable, deliberate, and dangerous violations of the constitution. He will proceed, with his banner flying, to the custom house in Charleston--

"all the while Sonorous metal blowing martial sounds."

Arrived at the custom house, he will tell the collector that he must collect no more duties under any of the tariff laws. This he will be somewhat puzzled to say, by the way, with a grave countenance, considering what hand South Carolina herself had in that of 1816. But, sir, the collector would, probably, not desist at his bidding. Here would ensue a pause; for they say, that a certain stillness precedes the tempest. Before this military array should fall on custom house, collector, clerks, and all, it is very probable some of those composing it would request of their gallant commander-in-chief to be informed a little upon the point of law; for they have doubtless a just respect for his opinions as a lawyer, as well as for his bravery as a soldier. They know he has read Blackstone and the constitution, as well as Turenne and Vauban. They would ask him, therefore, something concerning their rights in this matter. They would inquire whether it was not somewhat dangerous to resist a law of the United States. What would be the nature of their offence, they would wish to learn, if they, by military force and array, resisted the execution in Carolina of a law of the United States, and it should turn out, after all, that the law _was constitutional_. He would answer, of course, treason. No lawyer could give any other reason. John Fries,[5] he would tell them, had learned that some years ago. How, then, they would ask, do you propose to defend us? We are not afraid of bullets, but treason has a way of taking people off that we do not much relish. How do you propose to defend us? 'Look at my floating banner,' he would reply; 'see there the _nullifying law_!' Is it your opinion, gallant commander, they would then say, that if we should be indicted for treason, that some floating banner of yours would make a good plea in bar? 'South Carolina is a sovereign State,' he would reply. That is true; but would the judge admit our plea? 'These tariff laws,' he would repeat, 'are unconstitutional, palpably, deliberately, dangerously.' That all may be so; but if the tribunals should not happen to be of that opinion, shall we swing for it? We are ready to die for our country, but it is rather an awkward business, this dying without touching the ground. After all, this is a sort of _hemp_-tax, worse than any part of the tariff.

"Mr. President, the honorable gentleman would be in a dilemma like that of another great general. He would have a knot before him which he could not untie. He must cut it with his sword. He must say to his followers, defend yourselves with your bayonets; and this is war--civil war."

Mr. Webster continued to show that to resist by force the execution of a law of the United States was treason, and that the Courts of the United States could take no notice of a State law to authorize persons to commit that grave crime. Said he, the common saying that a State cannot commit treason herself, is nothing to the purpose. Can it authorize others to do so? If John Fries[5] had produced an act of Pennsylvania annulling the law of Congress, would it have helped his case? Talk about it as we will, these doctrines go the whole length of revolution. They are incompatible with any peaceable administration of the government. They lead directly to disunion and civil commotion, and therefore it is, that at the commencement, when they are first found to be maintained by respectable men, and in a tangible form, that I enter my protest against them all. Mr Webster proceeded to show that the people of the United States have not chosen the State authorities as their guardians against encroachments from the general government. Said he:

"Sir, the people have not trusted their safety, in regard to the general constitution, to these hands. They have required other security, and taken other bonds. They have chosen to trust themselves, first to the plain words of the instrument, and to such construction as the government, itself, in doubtful cases, should put on its own powers, under their oaths of office, and subject to their responsibility to them; just as the people of a State trust their own State governments with a similar power. Secondly, they have reposed their trust in the efficacy of frequent elections, and in their own power to remove their own servants and agents, whenever they see cause. Thirdly, they have reposed trust in the judicial power, which, in order that it might be trustworthy, they have made as respectable, as disinterested, and as independent as practicable. Fourthly, they have seen fit to rely, in case of necessity, or high expediency, on their known and admitted power to alter or amend the constitution, peaceably and quietly, whenever experience shall point out defects or imperfections. And finally, the people of the United States have at no time, in no way, directly or indirectly, authorized any State legislature to construe or interpret _their_ instrument of government; much less to interfere, by their own power, to arrest its course and operation.

"If, sir, the people in these respects had done otherwise than they have done their constitution could neither have been preserved nor would it have been worth preserving. And if its plain provisions shall now be disregarded, and these new doctrines interpolated in it, it will become as feeble and helpless a being as enemies, whether early or more recent, could possibly desire. It will exist, in every State, but as a poor dependent on State permission. It must borrow leave to be, and will be no longer than State pleasure, or State discretion sees fit to grant the indulgence and to prolong its poor existence.

"But, sir, although there are fears, there are hopes also. The people have preserved this their own chosen Constitution for forty years, and seen their happiness, prosperity and renown grow with its growth, and strengthen with its strength. They are now generally strongly attached to it. Overthrown by direct assault, it cannot be; evaded, undermined, _nullified_ it will not be, if we and those who succeed us here, as agents and representatives of the people shall conscientiously and vigilantly discharge the two great branches of our public trust faithfully to preserve and wisely to administer it."