LETTER IV.

NORFOLK, VA., April, 15, 1861.

SUMTER has fallen at last. So much may be accepted. Before many hours I hope to stand amid the ruins of a spot which will probably become historic, and has already made more noise in the world than its guns, gallant as the defence may have been. The news will produce an extraordinary impression at New York--it will disconcert stock-jobbers, and derange the most ingenious speculations. But, considerable as may be its results in any part of the Union, I venture to say that nowhere will the shock cause such painful convulsions as in the Cabinet at Washington, where there appeared to exist the most perfect conviction that the plan for the relief of Sumter could not fail to be successful, either through the force of the expedition provided for that object, or through the unwillingness of the leaders at Charleston to fire the first shot, and to compel the surrender of the place by actual hostilities. The confidence of Mr. Seward in the strength of the name and of the resources of the United States Federal Government must have received a rude blow; but his confidences are by no means of a weakly constitution, and it will be long ere he can bring himself to think that all his prophecies must be given up one after another before the inexorable logic of facts, with which his vaticinations have been in “irrepressible conflict.” It seems to me that Mr. Seward has all along undervalued the spirit and the resolution of the Southern Slave States, or that he has disguised from others the sense he entertains of their extent and vigor. The days assigned for the life of Secession have been numbered over and over again, and Secession has not yielded up the ghost. The “bravado” of the South has been sustained by deeds which render retreat from its advanced position impossible. Mr. Seward will probably find himself hard pushed to maintain his views in the Cabinet in the face of recent events, which will, no doubt, be used with effect and skill by Mr. Chase, who is understood to be in favor of letting the South go as it lists without any more trouble, convinced as he is that it is an element of weakness in the body politic, while he would be prepared to treat as treason any attempts in the remaining States of the Union to act on the doctrine of secession. But the Union party must now prevail. As yet I do not know whether the views I expressed relative to the destination of the greater part of the troops and stores sent from the North were correct, for it cannot be learned how many ships were off Sumter when it surrendered; but, notwithstanding what has occurred, I reiterate the assertion that the Washington Cabinet always said and say they had no intention to provoke a conflict there, and that had the authorities at Charleston continued their permission to the garrison to procure supplies in their markets, there would have been no immediate action on their part to precipitate the fight, though they were determined to hold it and Fort Pickens, as well as Tortugas and Key West, and to victual and strengthen the garrison of the former as soon as they were able. Fate was against them. The decision and power of their opponents were against them. But their defence will be that they could not do anything till they got troops, and ships, and munitions of war together, and that they did as much as they could in a month. Sumter, in fact, was a mouse in the jaws of the cat, and the moment an attempt was made to release the prey by external influence, the jaws were closed and the mouse disposed of. The act will produce, I believe, in spite of what I see, a very deep impression throughout all the States, and will tend to bring about an immediate collision between the high-minded parties on both sides. When Mr. Lincoln came into office it was discovered that a promise had been made by outgoing members of the preceding government to surrender the Southern forts. The promise was ignored by the incoming ministry. The Southern Commissioners insist on it that, apart from the compact of Mr. Buchanan’s Cabinet, a pledge had been given to the South that no attempt would be made to reënforce the forts without notice to the Government at Montgomery; and so far as can be ascertained the authorities at Washington did cause to be conveyed to the Southern Confederation the expression of their intention to victual Sumter: but whether they do so in respect to their pledge, if it existed, or in consequence of the decision at Charleston to prevent the issuing of further supplies to the garrison, is uncertain. The withdrawal of the permission to market was all but an act of war. If the United States Government would act on the hypothesis that the Southern Confederation was an independent power, it would surely have considered the proceeding as a prelude to immediate hostility. But the course thus adopted arose out of the preparations made by the United States Government in fitting out expeditions, the object of which was scarcely dubious. The Commissioners of the Southern States at Washington, never acknowledged, at last met with a decisive rebuff just as Virginia saw her representatives from the Convention on the way to ask Mr. Lincoln to explain his intentions. The Commissioners were given to understand that their presence was useless, and that the forts would be reënforced; and on the intelligence thus furnished to the Government at Montgomery it was resolved to act by summoning Major Anderson to surrender before succor could arrive, and in event of refusal by compelling him to yield in the sight of the would-be relieving squadron. As soon as the Commissioners found that Mr. Lincoln had made his decision, they departed in no very yielding temper, and washed their hands in a valedictory paper of the results. It was my intention to have left Washington early in the week, and to have reached Charleston before these gentlemen had departed, but the heavy storms and floods which washed away part of the railway between Washington and Richmond at the other side of the Potomac prevented my departure, and not only arrested the mails from the South and the journey of the Virginian delegates for several days, but obliged the Commissioners to take the round-about course by rail to Baltimore, thence by steamer to Norfolk, Virginia, and then on by rail to Charleston, which I am now pursuing one day later.

Although the Ministers at the capital affected to discredit the existence of any design to seize upon the city, their acts indicated an apprehension of danger, or at least a desire to take all possible precautions against treachery. The district militia were called out and sworn for service, and the result showed that there were more citizens in the ranks ready to stand by the Government than there were Secessionists who would not defend it. Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday last were very busy days. The companies forming the battalions of the district militia were mustered and marched off from their various quarters to the inclosure in front of the War Department, where they took or refused the oath of service, as the humor moved them. It is scarcely possible to imagine a more heterogeneous-looking body of men; the variety of uniform, of clothing, and of accoutrements was as great as if a specimen squad had been taken from the battalions of the Grand Army of 1812. The general effect of the men and of their habiliments is decidedly French, and there is even a small company of Zouaves, but I cannot understand how these little independent bodies are to be brought into line of battle, or depended on for united action. On the days above mentioned the monotony of the wide, lifeless streets was broken at intervals by the tap of the drum, beating a pas in the French fashion, and then came the crowd of idlers who are fond of cheap martial display. To a company of forty rank and file there are generally two drummers and six or seven officers or more, and the glory of epaulettes shines out bravely through the cloud of French gray, and light and dark blue capotes. The musters are not, I am told, as they should be. There are some pale faces, rounded shoulders, and weak frames in the ranks, but the majority are very fair specimens of a fine race of men, and some companies were composed of soldier-like, stout fellows, who only required active service to set them up for any military duty. Not a fourth of those bound to serve were ready, however, to come forward and fight for the Government at Washington; and it is probable that nothing short of a struggle for life or death would induce one-half to take the field. Not one-half of the militia is properly armed. It is a great army on paper; no army in the world is so magnificently officered, even in proportion to its numbers. The strength of the militia of the whole of the ex-United States is nearly 3,000,000 men of all ranks. Of those there are no less than 3,833 generals of all sorts, 9,800 colonels and field officers, 38,680 captains and subalterns. Kentucky boasts of 188 generals, New York has not less than 392, Michigan is rich in 383 generals, and so on. But, unless there were some popular passion to excite the country, the actual force available for the field would be a fractional part of these grand totals. The American Minerva which sprang from the womb of the great Revolutionary War with panoply of proof, believes that she is invincible, and there is unquestionably a strong military spirit among the people, generated by the instances which attended their national birth, and developed by the subsequent small wars in which they have been engaged with rather impotent enemies. Whether this spirit will be called forth in the North and West as largely as it unquestionably has been in the South, remains to be seen. The evidences of the near approach of a civil war are now beyond all dispute, but the nature of the conflict will depend on the steps taken by the belligerents. If the Southern States await invasion they fight over a loaded mine. To avoid the horrors of a conflict on their own soil, they will probably seek to make good their boast of marching upon Washington; but whether they will reach it is quite another matter. The present means of defending it are very contemptible; but vast populations are close at hand which can furnish thousands of men for its protection. The city contains no stragetical points, and in a military sense its possession is not so important that it would be worth while to risk all to gain it; but its political significance is enormous, and it is likely enough that the Capital will become the object of military demonstrations on both sides. With the Potomac and Chesapeake Bay strongly held by the Federal Government, Virginia, in case she casts in her lot with the South, will find herself menaced in the most formidable manner. Southern men have complained to me in terms of the strongest indignation, that Virginia Secessionists have applied to South Carolina for five thousand men to enable them to seize the forts which command the rivers and the sea-coast. It proves that little active aid can be expected from that State if the Confederate party cannot do that little piece of business on their own account.

From the date of this letter it will be seen that I am on my way to the South; and, although I shall not arrive in time to give any account of the recent operations against Fort Sumter, I hope to gain some insight into the actual condition of the army of the Confederate States.

On Friday evening I bade good-by to Washington, and none of the Ministers had any idea that Sumter had been attacked, nor had Lord Lyons received any intelligence from Charleston.