Part 2

On Saturday morning the right of the Confederate line extended to the Reed’s Bridge road. Forrest’s Cavalry Corps was posted on the right of this line. Thomas’ troops arrived on the LaFayette road at the Kelley field near daylight on Saturday morning, the 19th. Brannan’s division moved up the main road to the McDonald field, thence east toward Reed’s bridge. When in the vicinity of Jay’s Mill they encountered Forrest’s cavalry. Croxton’s brigade fired into them and thus opened the battle of Chickamauga. Forrest’s men dismounted and returned the fire, fighting as infantry. It was now 7:30 A. M. The battle was slow to start. Then it became severe. Both sides sent for re-enforcements which were sent at once. Connell’s and VanDerveer’s brigades came to Croxton’s support while Walker and Liddell brought their divisions to Forrest’s assistance. Due to the Confederates not being in the positions which Bragg had ordered them, a great deal of confusion resulted. However, troops kept filling in on both sides until the lines were about three miles in length. Each side gained and lost ground many times by severe charging and counter-charging. Baird made an effort to reform his lines but while doing so, was attacked by Walker in greater numbers. King and Scribner were driven back some distance at the same time. The Union forces then drove Walker to his former position. At this time Cheatham came to Walker’s rescue and they drove Johnson, Palmer and VanCleve back in order. Reynolds was then overpowered by the Confederates, the rebels yelling wildly all the while. Davis and Wood then checked the advance of the Confederates. After adjusting their lines, they drove Cheatham, Walker and Stewart back to their former positions. Most of the fighting was in the woods at this time although some was in open fields. Much of it was at very close range. In just such manner the fighting lasted all the forenoon, neither side gaining very much. Casualties were high on both sides. It is believed that the 10th and 74th Indiana Infantry were the most severely engaged at this time. It may be interesting to learn that Col. William B. Carroll, commanding the 10th Indiana Infantry, was the first field officer to be killed at Chickamauga. By noon the fighting was general throughout the lines.

During the afternoon the most severe fighting took place near the opposite ends of the lines in the Vineyard field. Fighting at this point was all at close range and some was hand-to-hand. About 4:00 P. M., Col. Hans C. Heg, 15th Wisconsin Infantry, was mortally wounded. Col. Heg commanded the 3rd brigade of Davis’ division. With death staring him in the face, he again rallied his men and rode nearly one-quarter of a mile before the loss of blood weakened him to such an extent that he was forced to give up his command. His brigade was taken over by Col. John A. Martin of the 8th Kansas Infantry. Col. Heg was the first brigade commander to fall on the Chickamauga battlefield. After a restless night in a hospital, he passed away near noon of the 20th. After sundown the fighting ceased at all portions of the field. Neither side had gained any worthwhile advantage during this first day of battle, although the Union forces had been driven much closer to the main road. The left of the Union line under Thomas was well anchored across the main highway; the center under McCook was just west of the highway, and the right end of the line under Crittenden was still east of the highway. The Confederate line was very close to the Union line at all points. Shortly after dark the battle was renewed near the north end of the lines. Cleburne and Cheatham encountered Johnson and Baird. The fighting lasted only about an hour but the losses were heavy. Two brigade commanders lost their lives about 7:00 P. M. On the Union side, Col. Philemon P. Baldwin of Indiana, was killed. Col. Baldwin commanded the 3rd brigade of Johnson’s division. Col. William W. Berry of the 5th Kentucky Infantry, assumed command of Baldwin’s brigade. On the Confederate side, Brig.-Gen. Preston Smith of Tennessee was killed. Gen. Smith commanded a brigade of Cheatham’s division. Col. Alfred J. Vaughn, Jr., 13th Tennessee Infantry, assumed command of Smith’s brigade. During the night both armies rearranged their lines in preparation for the next day’s battle. The right end of the Union line was shifted from the vicinity of the Vineyard field westward to the Crawfish Springs road near Widow Glenn’s. The Confederate line remained east of the highway at all points, slightly over-lapping the Union line on either end. The troops on the left of the Union line fortified their positions during the night by falling trees, stacking rails, stumps, etc., in preparation for Sunday’s battle. On the Confederate side Longstreet, the South Carolinian, arrived with his corps about 11:00 P. M. At this time Bragg divided his army into two wings, the left and right. Longstreet was given command of the left wing; Gen. Leonidas Polk, the North Carolinian, who was the first Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Louisiana, was placed in command of the right wing. Bragg gave order for the battle to be resumed at daylight on Sunday morning. His plan was to launch the Confederate right against the Union left, with each division and brigade to their left to take up the firing in order until the battle became general throughout the field. Hill’s corps was on the right of the Confederate line. Breckinridge commanded the extreme right division. The latter had three brigades, commanded by Helm, Adams and Stovall.

Sunday morning came. The battle was not resumed at daylight. Sunrise came, but still no battle. Bragg was waiting impatiently, listening and wondering. His orders were not being carried out, even in part. Finally, becoming nervous, he went in search of Polk, Hill and Breckinridge. He was determined to find the cause for delay. It seems that everyone but the right one had received their orders. Hill claimed he had no knowledge of Bragg’s plan, although his division commanders had received their orders. Some of the Confederates had not had their breakfast, although it was considerably past the breakfast hour. None of the troops were in position for battle as had been ordered. This necessitated a great deal of rearrangement in the lines. It is a known fact that Hill did not approve of Polk being in a higher command than himself. Hill insisted that he was senior to Polk in his rank. Possibly this caused the delay in resuming the battle. About 9:00 o’clock, the Confederate right was thrown forward against the Union left. The logworks were too strong for the Confederates. Time and again they charged, to be driven back with severe losses. This fighting was at very close range. Helm’s brigade was almost shattered, and while engaged in this desperate struggle, the commander, Brig.-Gen. Ben Hardin Helm of Kentucky was mortally wounded. Helm was a brother-in-law of President Lincoln’s wife. However, fragments of his brigade, in addition to Adams and Stovall, gained the left and rear of the Union left and entered the Kelley field. Later they were repulsed. Gradually the battle rolled from right to left along the Confederate line. Longstreet, near the Confederate center, was opposite the Brotherton house. About 11:15 A. M., a gap was created in the Union center when Wood’s division, through the misunderstanding of an order issued by Rosecrans, withdrew from the line and marched to the left and rear of Brannan.

Longstreet, with eight brigades, forced their way through, throwing the right and right center of the Union line back in confusion. Rosecrans, McCook and Crittenden left the field. A great many of the troops under the latter named two left the field. Some few of them later rallied and remained on the field during the afternoon. Gen. Thomas, then being the senior officer on the field, immediately assumed command. Holding a pivot with the extreme left of his line, the right end moved back until it reached Snodgrass hill. This gave him an almost impregnable position. With this newly formed east-west line he could check the advance of the Confederates and also cover Rosecrans’ retreat. The Confederates, upon crossing the road, changed front with their artillery. Their infantry swept around like a large gate on hinges. By almost continuous advancing, the Confederates reached the south side of Snodgrass hill where they established their line. Within less than an hour from the time of the break in the Union line, three other brigade commanders lost their lives. Near the Confederate right, Col. Peyton H. Colquitt, 46th Georgia Infantry, was mortally wounded about noon. Colquitt commanded Gist’s brigade of Walker’s division. Lt.-Col. Leroy Napier assumed command of Colquitt’s brigade. A short distance to the south, Brig.-Gen. James Deshler of Texas was killed about the same time. Deshler commanded a brigade in Cleburne’s division. His command was taken over by Col. Roger Q. Mills. Farther to the southwest in the Union line, Brig.-Gen. William H. Lytle, the Cincinnati soldier-poet, was killed while trying to rally his brigade against the Confederate sweep to the north. Lytle commanded the 1st brigade of Sheridan’s division. His command was taken over by Col. Silas Miller of the 36th Illinois Infantry.

THE PEAK OF THE BATTLE

By 2:00 P. M. the battle was raging on Snodgrass hill. This fighting was at very close range and a great deal was hand-to-hand struggling. The Confederates kept charging up the slopes, making every effort to drive the Union troops from their position. They were never able to carry the hill. A few of the Confederates passed over the hill to the right of the Union line. They moved to the rear of Brannan and entered the valley beyond his position. About 3.00 P. M., when the fighting reached its peak, Longstreet sent to Bragg for re-enforcements from the right wing. However, he never received them. On the contrary, he was told by Bragg that the troops of the right wing had been beaten back so badly that they would be of no service to him. There were Confederates in reserve which had scarcely been engaged, if Longstreet could only have gotten them. Along the Union line, it was quite different. At 3:30 P. M., Steedman’s division of Granger’s reserve corps came to Thomas’s assistance. These re-enforcements consisted of Mitchell’s and Whitaker’s brigades. They drove the Confederates from the rear of Brannan, strengthened and prolonged the Union line westward. They also passed out ammunition along the line. While the fighting was so severe the woods caught on fire. This was caused by the artillery firing so low. Hundreds of the soldiers, both Union and Confederate, were burned and scorched beyond recognition. Steedman no doubt saved Thomas from having to retreat from the hill since the latter’s ammunition supply was completely exhausted. It was at this point that Thomas gained the name of “The Rock of Chickamauga.”

THE CLOSE OF THE BATTLE

At 4:45 P. M., Thomas received orders from Rosecrans directing him to withdraw. The withdrawal was not started at this time. There had been severe fighting in the Kelley field during the afternoon. At 5:00 P. M. Col. Edward A. King, 68th Indiana Infantry, was killed in the southeast corner of this field. King commanded the 2nd brigade of Reynolds division. He was the last of the eight brigade commanders who lost their lives on the Chickamauga battlefield. Col. Milton S. Robinson assumed command of his brigade. About 7:00 P. M., Thomas began to withdraw. The Confederates had gained possession of the LaFayette road to the left and rear of the Union line. Since Thomas wanted to re-establish his lines between Bragg and Chattanooga, the withdrawal was made via McFarland Gap to Rossville; then south on the Chattanooga-LaFayette highway to Rossville Gap and Missionary Ridge. Fortifications were thrown up along this portion of the ridge to keep the Confederates in check. The Union line also extended across Chattanooga Valley and up the slopes of Lookout Mountain. Thomas held this line along Missionary Ridge throughout Monday, the 21st. During the night they abandoned this position and moved into Chattanooga. Thus ended the battle of Chickamauga.

There were approximately 124,000 troops engaged at Chickamauga. Of this number, there were 58,000 Union soldiers and 66,000 Confederates. During the two-day battle, there were 34,000 casualties. Of these casualties, there were 16,000 Union; 18,000 Confederates.

The Union army had lost the battle of Chickamauga. Still they had reached their objective—Chattanooga. Bragg’s plan was to attack the Union troops in Chattanooga on the morning of the 22nd. However, this failed to materialize. After some light skirmishing it was decided to call off this attack due to the Union troops being too strongly entrenched. The Union army was still holding their line up Lookout Mountain. Soon this line was abandoned since they realized that Bragg would only have to place forces at any point below in order to have control of the river line of supplies.

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMIES

Both Rosecrans and Bragg immediately started a reorganization of their armies. The Confederate army was divided into three corps, the commands being given to Longstreet, Hardee and Breckinridge. These three corps had a total of 10 divisions. Wheeler was in command of the cavalry. On the Union side, McCook and Crittenden were removed from their commands of the 20th and 21st Army Corps. These two corps were consolidated into the 4th and Granger was given the command. The Reserve Corps which was formerly commanded by Granger was consolidated into the 14th Army Corps, Maj.-Gen. John M. Palmer, commanding. The Union army at this time had six divisions, commanded by Baird, Cruft, Davis, Johnson, Sheridan and Wood. The Artillery Reserve was commanded by Brannan. This latter force consisted of two divisions, each with two brigades. Col. Parkhurst commanded the Post of Chattanooga.

THE SIEGE OF CHATTANOOGA

Bragg was determined to lay siege to the city and force the Union army into surrendering by starvation. While the Union army was strongly entrenching their positions in Chattanooga, the Confederates were establishing their lines on Missionary Ridge, east of the city, and Lookout Mountain, southwest of the city. A strong picket line was placed along the river from Chattanooga Creek to a point below Williams Island, including Brown’s Ferry. Another similar line was placed from just below the city to a point near the mouth of the Chickamauga Creek. A skirmish line was thrown out about one mile in front of Missionary Ridge. A short range of hills, of which Orchard Knob was the highest, was covered by this skirmish line. These Confederate positions controlled all supply lines south of the river, which meant railroads, highway and the river itself. The Union army was soon in dire straits. The only route which was left open was to cross the river north of the city, then cross Walden’s Ridge or Signal Mountain; thence down the Sequatchie Valley to Bridgeport and Stevenson. This route was about 65 miles long and most of it was mountainous roads. The fall rains had set in and this route was almost impassable. The Union supply wagons were easy prey for the Confederate cavalry which had been dispatched north of the river to conduct raids. Wheeler captured dozens of the supply wagons, killing the horses and burning the wagons. The Union base of supplies was Nashville—160 miles distant by very rough roads. Cattle were driven all this distance in many instances to feed the hungry soldiers. By the time the cattle reached Chattanooga (if they did not die enroute), they were so poor that the Union troops often remarked that they had nothing to eat but “hard tack” and “dried beef on the hoof.” To say the Union soldiers were in destitute circumstances would be a mild way of expressing their actual condition. Half rations, then quarter rations and less. At times the soldiers only had a little raw corn to eat. Finally it was necessary to place a sentry at the horse troughs in order to keep the soldiers from taking the grain which was fed to a few choice mounts. Even then, the Union army lost between 12,000 and 15,000 of their finest horses and mules from starvation. The troops were in a starved, sickened condition, and very low in spirits. No doubt they thought they were doomed, and that no one would come to their rescue before they starved. However, in this surmise, to their great joy, they were mistaken. It had been practically a month since their defeat at Chickamauga, but let us review a little to see what was being done to relieve this besieged army. Almost immediately after the battle of Chickamauga, Gen. Grant started Gen. Sherman from Vicksburg with four divisions (Army of the Tennessee) to the assistance of Rosecrans. These re-enforcements consisted of the 1st, 2nd and 4th divisions of the 15th Army Corps, commanded by Brig.-Generals Peter J. Osterhaus, Morgan L. Smith and Hugh Ewing, respectively. Also the 2nd division of the 17th Army Corps, commanded by Brig.-Gen. John E. Smith. Thirteen brigades were represented by Sherman’s re-enforcements.

A detachment from the Army of the Potomac consisting of the 11th and 12th Army Corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Joseph Hooker, were sent from Virginia to help lift the siege. The 11th corps was commanded by Maj.-Gen. O. W. Howard. Howard had the 2nd and 3rd divisions, commanded by Brig.-Gen. Adolph von Steinwehr and Maj.-Gen. Carl Schurz, respectively. The 12th corps, commanded by Maj.-Gen. Henry W. Slocum, had the 1st and 2nd divisions, commanded by Brig.-Generals Alpheus S. Williams and John W. Geary, respectively. Twelve brigades were represented by Hooker’s re-enforcements. Hooker’s troops left Virginia on September 25th. These troops came by the B. and O. Railroad via Indianapolis, Louisville, Nashville and Bridgeport. The advance of this column reached Bridgeport September 30th. They were supposed to have helped to reopen the Tennessee River the next day. This was impossible due to his supply trains not being here at that time. Rosecrans had devised a plan whereby the river supply line could be opened up. His plan was to seize Brown’s Ferry from Chattanooga, and bring Hooker forward into Lookout Valley at the same time. The execution of this plan only awaited completion of pontoon-boats for the necessary bridge. When they were ready, Wheeler made another raid north of the river, delaying the Union troops again. The date for the execution of this movement was then set for October 19th. On this date Rosecrans personally selected the site for throwing the bridge. It has been reported that Rosecrans rowed a boat himself. When he returned to his headquarters he found orders relieving him, and placing Thomas in command. On October 23rd, Gen. Grant arrived in Chattanooga. He approved of Rosecrans’ plan and ordered it executed at once. Thomas at once repeated Rosecrans’ order to Hooker, ordering him forward into Lookout Valley. Hooker’s supply trains reached him October 26th. He left Bridgeport on the 27th, reaching Brown’s Ferry the next day. In the meantime, during the night of the 26th, a part of two Union brigades marched across Moccasin Point, concealing themselves near Brown’s Ferry. About 3:00 A. M. of the 27th, there were 50 pontoon-boats placed in the Tennessee River, each carrying 30 men. These boats floated down the river under cover of darkness, rounding Moccasin Point unobserved by the Confederate pickets. By a quick crossing from the north bank to the south bank, they took the Confederates by surprise and soon captured this position. The pontoon-boats were then leashed together, forming a bridge across the river. At this time the troops which had marched to this point crossed and joined the others on the south bank.

BATTLE OF WAUHATCHIE

After Hooker’s arrival in Lookout Valley during the afternoon of the 28th, Geary’s division stopped at Wauhatchie, four miles below the northern point of Lookout Mountain. This was at a junction of the Nashville and Trenton railroads. Generals Bragg and Longstreet stood on Lookout and witnessed their arrival. About midnight Geary was attacked by Jenkins’ division of Longstreet’s corps. The battle lasted until about 3:30 A. M. Geary was reinforced by two brigades commanded by Tyndale and Orland Smith. Then the Confederates withdrew across Lookout Creek and onto the northern slopes of Lookout Mountain. This battle gave the Union army complete control of all short supply lines. The Confederates never made any further effort to regain control of this short route. The starving troops in Chattanooga were hurriedly refitted and Grant was only awaiting the arrival of Sherman before attacking the Confederates in their strong positions. Meanwhile, the Confederates were still clinging to their positions with the utmost confidence in holding them. On November 4th, Longstreet was sent to Knoxville to oppose Gen. Burnside. His command constituted about one-third of the Confederates. Naturally his departure shattered the Confederate hope.

On November 18th, Sherman arrived at Trenton. He moved to Brown’s Ferry at once, crossing three of his divisions commanded by M. L. Smith, Ewing and J. E. Smith.

Osterhaus was unable to cross his division due to the breaking of the bridge. He was then ordered to report to Hooker, which he did at once. From November 21st to the 23rd, Sherman was in a concealed camp behind Stringer’s Ridge, and near north Chickamauga Creek. His troops floated pontoon boats down this stream into the Tennessee River. From the north side of the river Sherman selected a high hill on the south bank which he thought was the north end of Missionary Ridge.

GEN. GRANT’S PLAN OF BATTLE

Grant had ordered an attack against the Confederates on the 21st. Due to bad roads, Sherman was unable to reach here by that time. When the battle did open on the 23rd, it was not according to plan. Under Grant’s original plan, Hooker was to hold Lookout Valley with Geary’s and Cruft’s divisions. The 11th corps was to be brought into Chattanooga to assist either Sherman or Thomas. Sherman was to cross the river at the mouth of the Chickamauga Creek during the night of the 23rd, and carry Missionary Ridge as far south as the tunnel, which at this time was not occupied by the Confederates. When Sherman reached this position, Thomas was to move to the left, connect with Sherman’s right, sweep up the valley and crowd the Confederates from their depot at Chickamauga Station, Tennessee, their communications and positions on the ridge. The battle did not progress as planned.

CAPTURE OF ORCHARD KNOB

On November 23rd, reports reached Grant’s headquarters to the effect that Confederates had been seen retreating from Missionary Ridge. This was Buckner’s Corps leaving for Knoxville to assist Longstreet. Grant at once ordered an attack against Orchard Knob, the outpost of the Confederates in front of Missionary Ridge. Thomas, with five divisions, charged out against this position, soon capturing it. The Confederate pickets moved back to the base of the ridge. Grant then established his field headquarters at this newly acquired point immediately, where the entire Confederate line could be seen.

BATTLE OF LOOKOUT MOUNTAIN