Part 4

But such innovations could not overcome the constant and painful pressure of large Federal fleets all along the Southern coast. So vital were the navies to the Northern war effort, James G. Randall wrote, "that Union victory without the naval contribution seems inconceivable."

SUGGESTED READINGS

Ammen, Daniel, _The Navy in the Civil War: The Atlantic Coast_ (1883, 1960, 1962). Carse, Robert, _Blockade_ (1958). Dufour, Charles L., _The Night the War Was Lost_ (1960). Durkin, Joseph T., _Stephen R. Mallory: Confederate Navy Chief_ (1954). Gosnell, H. Allen, _Guns on the Western Waters_ (1949). Horn, Stanley F., _Gallant Rebel_ (1947). Jones, Virgil C., _The Civil War at Sea_ (3 vols., 1960-62). Lewis, Charles L., _David Glasgow Farragut, Our First Admiral_ (2 vols., 1941-43). Mahan, Alfred T., _The Navy in the Civil War: The Gulf and Inland Waters_ (1883, 1960, 1962). Merrill, James M., _The Rebel Shore_ (1957). Porter, David D., _The Naval History of the Civil War_ (1886). Robinson, William M., Jr., _The Confederate Privateers_ (1928). Scharf, J. Thomas, _History of the Confederate States Navy_ (1887). Semmes, Raphael, _Service Afloat_ (1903). ____, _The Confederate Raider Alabama_ (1962). Sinclair, Arthur, _Two Years on the Alabama_ (1895). Soley, James R., _The Navy in the Civil War: The Blockade and the Cruisers_ (1883, 1960, 1962). West, Richard S., Jr., _Gideon Welles: Lincoln's Navy Department_ (1943). ____, _Mr. Lincoln's Navy_ (1957). White, William and Ruth, _Tin Can on a Shingle_ (1957).

VI. DIPLOMACY

What the nations of Europe did--or did not do--were matters of constant and vital concern to both North and South during the Civil War. President Davis and other Confederate officials hoped earnestly that England, and possibly France as well, would recognize the independence of the Southern nation and grant it much-needed aid. President Lincoln and the Federal authorities were just as desirous that European powers should not intervene in the American struggle. Thus, starting in 1861, both sides began a determined tug-of-war to woo the statesmen of Europe to their respective cause.

The first major international incident occurred in the autumn of 1861 and is known as the "Trent Affair". Two Confederate commissioners, James M. Mason and John Slidell, were sent to plead the South's cause at London and Paris, respectively. The agents were en route on the British mail steamer, _Trent_, when, on November 8, a Federal warship, the _San Jacinto_, stopped the British vessel on the high seas. Mason and Slidell were removed from the _Trent_ and imprisoned at Fort Warren in Boston.

Northern officials were unprepared for the storm of indignation that came from England. The _San Jacinto_, it was pointed out, had violated English neutrality by intercepting the _Trent_. Equally outrageous to the British was the fact that the _San Jacinto_ had fired two warning shots across the _Trent's_ bow. This was equivalent to firing at the British flag; as such, it constituted an act of war against England.

Fortunately for the North, Lincoln and his Secretary of State, William H. Seward, were able to resolve the incident with a minimum of ill feelings. Apologies were dispatched to London. Mason and Slidell were released from prison and allowed to continue their overseas journey without further Federal interference.

In addition to Mason and Slidell, the Confederacy utilized a number of foreign agents. Most of these commissioners pursued a policy of "King Cotton diplomacy"--that is, promising England and France large quantities of the popular staple in return for official recognition of, and active aid to, the Southern Confederacy. When the demand for American cotton dropped sharply in Europe, this approach failed.

Southern agents Henry Hotze, Edwin DeLeon, and James D. Bulloch then tried new strategy. They wrote extensively about the close ties in business and society between the English aristocracy and the great Southern planters, a lower tariff on foreign-made goods if the Confederacy triumphed in the war, and a more active European participation in American commerce.

The nations in Europe had other reasons for wishing to assist the Southern cause. The Federal blockade prevented English goods from reaching eager Southern markets. Many persons abroad looked on the Civil War as a struggle of the South for the right of self-determination. On the other hand, the British middle and working classes detested slavery. After Lincoln's Emancipation, most Europeans believed that the North was waging a great struggle for freedom.

Although the South tried desperately to gain much-needed European support, it was largely unsuccessful. British and French shipbuilders did sell several vessels to the Confederate government. Yet this aid dropped to a thin trickle following Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation. Spectacular Federal victories at Vicksburg and Gettysburg forever doomed the South's hopes for foreign aid.

The one man who unquestionably did most to keep Europe neutral during the Civil War was the American minister to England, Charles Francis Adams. He skillfully thwarted the efforts of Confederate emissaries, expounded the North's cause with vigor and tact, and let it be known at opportune times that assistance to the Confederacy could occasion war with the United States. Adams fought a host of Southern agents around the diplomatic tables of Europe. "When all the facts are considered," one author has stated, "it must be admitted that the character and ability of Charles Francis Adams were as valuable as Union military victories in contributing to ultimate success in the war."

SUGGESTED READINGS

Adams, Charles Francis, _Studies Military and Diplomatic, 1775-1865_ (1911). Adams, Ephraim D., _Great Britain and the American Civil War_ (2 vols., 1925). Bulloch, James D., _The Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe_ (2 vols., 1883, 1960). Callahan, James M., _Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy_ (1901). Duberman, Martin B., _Charles Francis Adams, 1807-1886_ (1961). Jordan, Donaldson and Pratt, E. J., _Europe and the American Civil War_ (1931). Meade, Robert D., _Judah P. Benjamin: Confederate Statesman_ (1943). Monaghan, Jay, _Diplomat in Carpet Slippers_ (1945). Owsley, Frank L., _King Cotton Diplomacy_ (1925, 1961). Sears, Louise B., _John Slidell_ (1925). Seward, Frederick W., _Reminiscences of a War-Time Statesman and Diplomat, 1830-1915_ (1916). ____, Ed., _Autobiography of William H. Seward_ (1877). Sideman, Belle B., and Friedman, Lillian, eds., _Europe Looks at the Civil War_ (1960). Woldman, Albert A., _Lincoln and the Russians_ (1952).

VII. PRISONS AND PRISONERS OF WAR

The Civil War was the first time that the nation had to contend with large numbers of war prisoners. As might be expected, therefore, policies and treatment varied greatly--and oftentimes sadly.

During the war the Confederates captured about 211,000 Federal soldiers. Of this number, 16,000 agreed to battlefield paroles--signed promises that they would not bear arms again. Conversely, Federal forces took some 215,000 Confederates as prisoners. At various times throughout the war, both sides made efforts to establish a workable program of prisoner exchange. (A ratio of exchange once existed whereby forty privates equalled one major-general.) However, owing to misunderstandings, violations of terms, and Grant's determination late in the war to bring the South to its knees at all costs, prisoner exchange was slight and sporadic.

The most notorious Southern prisons were: Libby and Castle Thunder, which were converted warehouses in Richmond; Belle Isle in the James River; "Camp Sorghum" at Columbia, S. C.; and Camp Sumter at Andersonville, Ga. Among the worst of the Northern compounds were: Elmira Prison Camp in southwestern New York State; Point Lookout, on the Chesapeake Bay; Johnson's Island, in Lake Erie a few miles offshore from Ohio; Camp Douglas, near Chicago; and Rock Island Prison Camp, Illinois.

Writing of these compounds in general, one historian has observed: "The prisons of the Civil War were of a considerable variety in structure and general make-up and for the most part consisted of temporary structures or old unused buildings not originally intended to confine prisoners. Most of them, judged by present-day standards of sanitation and safety, would have been condemned as uninhabitable."

Small wonder that great suffering existed in most prison camps, both North and South. In the nine-month history of the huge prison at Andersonville, Ga., a total of 45,613 Federals were jammed into a Stockade containing one polluted stream of water, few shelters, less food, and no sanitation. Over 12,900 prisoners died of disease, exposure, and starvation at Andersonville. Confederate authorities maintained that Federal prisoners in Andersonville received the same slim food ration as did their guards, and that the whole South suffered badly for want of medicines.

The North's prison camp at Elmira, N. Y., had many similarities to Andersonville. This Federal compound existed for a year. During that time, 2,963 of 12,123 Confederate prisoners died from various causes. In the twenty-month life of Rock Island Prison Camp, 1,960 of 12,400 Southern inmates succumbed to exposure and disease. At six remote tobacco warehouses in Danville, Virginia, 1,400 of 7,000 Federal prisoners died of smallpox, malnutrition, and intestinal disorders in the space of a year.

In all, the Chief of the U. S. Record and Pension Office reported in 1903, 25,976 Confederates and 30,218 Federals died in Civil War prisons.

It is difficult still to give an accurate and impartial summary of Civil War prisons. Conflicting facts, lost records, and bitter feelings hamper attempts to arrive at a just verdict. But perhaps Prof. James Ford Rhodes was not far from the truth when he stated: "All things considered the statistics show no reason why the North should reproach the South [about atrocious prison conditions]. If we add to one side of the account the refusal to exchange the prisoners and the greater resources, and to the other the distress of the Confederacy, the balance struck will not be far from even. Certain it is that no deliberate intention existed either in Richmond or Washington to inflict suffering on captives more than inevitably accompanied their confinement."

SUGGESTED READINGS

_Civil War History_ (University of Iowa quarterly journal), June, 1962, issue: "Civil War Prisons." Cooper, Alonzo, _In and Out of Rebel Prisons_ (1888). Douglas, Henry Kyd, _I Rode With Stonewall_ (1940). Durkin, J. T., ed., _John Dooley, Confederate Soldier, His War Journal_ (1943). Hemmerlein, Richard F., _Prisons and Prisoners of the Civil War_ (1934). Hesseltine, William B., _Civil War Prisons: A Study in War Psychology_ (1930). Holmes, Clay D., _Elmira Prison Camp_ (1912). Isham, Asa B., _Prisoners of War and Military Prisons_ (1890). McElroy, John, _Andersonville_ (1879). Page, James M., _The True Story of Andersonville Prison_ (1908).

VIII. ARMS

ARTILLERY

About forty-eight different types and sizes of cannons were used in the Civil War. Identifying a particular weapon thus requires knowing such facts as the name of the gun, howitzer, rifle or mortar; whether it was a smoothbore (without rifling in the barrel) or a rifled gun (with barrel groovings), etc.

The two most popular cannons in the Civil War were the 12-pounder Napoleon smoothbore howitzer and the 10-pounder Parrott rifled field gun.

The Napoleon weighed about 1,200 pounds, fired a 12-pound spherical shell with a time fuse, and was very effective up to a range of 1,500 yards. The Parrott rifle--identifiable by a reinforced barrel seat--weighed 900 pounds. At a maximum range elevation of 12°, this piece was accurate to 3,000-3,500 yards (1¾-2 miles).

The Federals also made extensive use of mortars. Because of the ability of these squat, heavy weapons to lob large shells a great distance by high-angle fire, mortars were ideal for siege operations.

Artillerists used various types of shells, depending upon the action in which they were engaged. Solid shot was good for battering a fortification or for striking an enemy column in flank. Explosive shells and "spherical case" blanketed an area with what is known today as shrapnel. Canister, a shell filled with lead balls about the size of plums, was deadly for close action up to 300 yards. Somewhat similar to canister was grape shot. This type of shell, filled with balls the size of oranges, was effective to 700 yards. Yet grape shot was rarely used in land warfare.

The basic artillery unit was known as a battery. It normally consisted of 4-6 guns commanded by a captain. In battle, batteries normally supported infantry divisions.

During the conflict of the 1860's the North experimented with and used many new types of field weapons, including the machine gun and such cannons as Rodmans, Columbiads, and Dahlgrens. Despite the large variety, however, the Napoleons and Parrotts remained the "old reliables" to gunners on both sides.

SMALL ARMS

The weapon most used by Civil War infantrymen was known officially as the United States Rifle Musket, Model 1861. Soldiers popularly called it the "Springfield", since the Springfield, Mass., arsenal manufactured a majority of these guns.

The Springfield was a percussion-cap, muzzle-loading weapon, caliber .58, and weighed 9¾ pounds. The Springfield's effective range was 500 yards, although it could deliver a ball twice that distance. It fired a soft lead Minie bullet--known then as now as the "minnie ball." In all, over 670,000 Springfields were manufactured during the Civil War. They cost the government about $19 each.

Very popular among soldiers on both sides was the English Enfield Rifle Musket, Model 1853. About 820,000 of these rifles were purchased by North and South. The Enfield weighed 9 pounds, 3 ounces, had a caliber of .577, and was deadly up to 800 yards. It fired a bullet similar to the Minie projectile.

Great strides were made at this time in breechloaders. These weapons fired ready-made bullets, a series of which were inserted at one time in the rear of the barrel. Breechloaders could fire faster and more accurately than the single-shot, muzzle-loading Springfield or Enfield. The Spencer Repeating Carbine, first patented in 1860, was a seven-shot repeater that weighed 8¼ pounds and had an effective range of 2,000 yards. The Spencer was capable of 15 shots per minute--three times the firepower of the Springfield. Another popular carbine among Federal soldiers was the 15-shot Henry repeater, which was a .42-caliber, rimfire carbine of extraordinary accuracy. About 10,000 of these weapons saw service in the Civil War. This gun was the forerunner of the modern Winchester carbine. Unfortunately for the North, red tape and political conservatism by its leaders prohibited the wide and prompt adoption of the repeating rifle.

The principal hand gun for cavalry and infantry officers was the Colt Army Revolver, Model 1860. Over 100,000 of these six-shot, .44-caliber revolvers were manufactured during the war. This same gun, in .36 caliber, was also made for the U. S. Navy. In addition, some twenty other types of pistols were used by soldiers of blue and gray.

SUGGESTED READINGS

Bruce, Robert V., _Lincoln and the Tools of War_ (1956). Fuller, Claud, _The Rifled Musket_ (1958). ____, and Stewart, R. D., _Firearms of the Confederacy_ (1944). Gluckman, Arcadi, _United States Muskets, Rifles and Carbines_ (1948). Lewis, Berkeley R., _Small Arms and Ammunition in the United States Service_ (1956). Mauncy, Albert, _Artillery through the Ages_ (1949). Naisawald, L. Van Loan, _Grape and Canister_ (1960). Peterson, Harold L., _Notes on Ordnance of the American Civil War, 1861-1865_ (1959). Wainwright, Charles S., _A Diary of Battle_, ed. Allan Nevins (1962). Wise, Jennings C., _The Long Arm of Lee_ (1915, 1959).

IX. LEADERS

The destiny of Civil War America lay largely in the hands of four men: Abraham Lincoln, Jefferson Davis, Ulysses Simpson Grant, and Robert Edward Lee. Since an abundance of printed works exists on the lives and careers of these leaders, given here are but a few generalities concerning each.

In many respects, Lincoln long seemed mysteriously complex. But those who knew the man quickly dropped any impression that Lincoln was crude or provincial. "He is the best of us all," his Secretary of State, William H. Seward, once stated. The solemn-looking Lincoln was a deeply earnest chief executive who devoted his last four years to reuniting a shattered nation that he loved dearly and to raising the nation to a higher moral and spiritual level. He was kind, genial, compassionate, and religious (though he attended church without joining any denomination).

Lincoln possessed several ingredients of greatness. He had a deep love of humanity, a keen understanding of men, and a fantastic patience with the generals and politicians who tried him by their lack of strength and capacity. He was also a man of total integrity and deep humility. As a patriot he believed firmly that "this government of the people, by the people, and for the people, shall not perish from the earth." Not once in those years of passion did he express the slightest hatred for the Union's enemies. In his second inaugural address, delivered a month before his death in 1865, Lincoln closed by stating: "With malice toward none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us continue the work we are in ... [and] do all that may achieve a just, and a lasting peace, among ourselves, and with all nations."

Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederacy, deserves better treatment than history has accorded him. The years have not been kind to his memory for two reasons: 1) he led the losing side; 2) when compared to his Northern counterpart, Lincoln, Davis left much to be desired in both personality and statesmanship. Unlike Lincoln, Davis was handsome, well-educated, and experienced in political and military affairs. However, he lacked administrative skill. He tried to do all of the government's work--and he was a slow worker. Worst of all, Davis was never able to gain the affection of his people in a degree remotely approaching the love heaped on Lincoln by the North.

Yet Davis did his best in an impossible job. He was harassed and criticized by jealous governors, independent generals, an apathetic vice-president, and a Confederate Congress more noted for constant arguing than for constructive activity. Ever-present from without was an enemy that heavily outweighed the South in resources.

Davis was in a sense doomed to failure from the start, but his devotion to the South never wavered. In spite of many physical handicaps, he demonstrated throughout his life honesty, courage, fortitude, and a firmness in the right as _he_ saw the right. In sectional terms, he may be adjudged one of the true patriots in American history.

Military analysts often assert that U. S. Grant was "the first of the modern generals" and that Robert E. Lee was "the last of the old-fashioned generals." What this implies is that two able field commanders fought one another differently: Grant introducing all-out, total war, Lee relying on a 500-year-old concept of limited warfare.