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THE CIVIL WAR

_by_ JAMES I. ROBERTSON, JR.

Washington 25, D. C. U. S. Civil War Centennial Commission 1963

EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD

Alma E. Anderson, _Social Studies Department, Robert E. Lee Junior High School, Danville, Va._ E. Merton Coulter, _Professor-Emeritus of History, University of Georgia, Athens_ William M. Grant, _History Department, Upper Arlington High School, Columbus, O._ Richard Harwell, _Librarian, Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Me._ William B. Hesseltine, _Professor of History, University of Wisconsin, Madison_ Daniel W. Hollis, _Professor of History, University of South Carolina, Columbia_ Stanley F. Horn, _Chairman, Tennessee Civil War Centennial Commission, Nashville_ William M. Lamers, _Assistant Superintendent, Milwaukee Public Schools_ A. B. Moore, _Professor-Emeritus of History, University of Alabama, University_ Allan Nevins, _Chairman, U. S. Civil War Centennial Commission, San Marino, Cal._ Mary G. Oliver, _History Department, George Washington High School, Danville, Va._ Glenn A. Rich, _Director, Division of Elementary and Secondary Education, Ohio Department of Education, Columbus_ Bell I. Wiley, _Professor of History, Emory University, Atlanta, Ga._ T. Harry Williams, _Professor of History, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge_ Hazel C. Wolf, _History Department, Manual High School, Peoria, Ill._

FOREWORD

Thousands of student requests for information on the Civil War prompted the publication of this booklet. Its purpose is to present in simple language a survey of the eleven most popular aspects of the 1861-1865 conflict. This guide is intended as a supplement, not a substitute, for American history textbooks.

Space limitations prevented mention of each of the 6,000 engagements of the Civil War. Thus, while such actions as the battle of Picacho Pass, Ariz., and Quantrill's sacking of Lawrence, Kan., had import for their particular locales, they of necessity had to be omitted. In those battles herein discussed, statistics for armies and losses are those generally accepted. The map midway in the booklet may help familiarize the student with the various theaters of military operations. After each section is a list of works recommended for those who desire more detailed information on the subject.

Relatively little consideration of the political, economic, and social history of the period was possible within the limits of this small work. However, the Commission can supply upon request and without charge the following pamphlets treating in part of those subjects: _Emancipation Centennial, 1962: A Brief Anthology of the Preliminary Proclamation_; _Free Homesteads for All Americans: The Homestead Act of 1862_, by Paul W. Gates; _The Origins of the Land-Grant Colleges and State Universities_, by Allan Nevins; and _Our Women of the Sixties_, by Sylvia G. L. Dannett and Katharine M. Jones.

The Commission is deeply indebted to the Editorial Advisory Board members, each of whom rendered valuable assistance toward the final draft of the narrative.

James I. Robertson, Jr., _Executive Director_ _U. S. Civil War Centennial Commission_

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE I. Causes of the Civil War 5 II. Advantages of North and South 7 III. Summary of Military Campaigns 11 1861 11 1862 in the West 13 1862 in the East 17 1863 in the West 21 1863 in the East 23 1864 25 1865 30 IV. Losses 35 V. Navies 37 VI. Diplomacy 42 VII. Prisons and Prisoners of War 45 VIII. Arms 48 IX. Leaders 52 X. The Common Soldiers 57 XI. The War's Legacy 62 XII. Suggested Topics for Further Discussion 64

I. CAUSES OF THE CIVIL WAR

Historians past and present disagree sharply over the major cause of the Civil War.

Some writers have viewed the struggle of the 1860's as a "war of rebellion" brought on by a "slavepower conspiracy." To them it was a conflict between Northern "humanity" and Southern "barbarism." James Ford Rhodes, who dealt more generously with the South than did many other Northern writers of his time, stated in 1913: "Of the American Civil War it may safely be asserted that there was a single cause, slavery."

Other historians, such as Charles A. Beard and Harold U. Faulkner, have argued that slavery was only the surface issue. The real cause, these men state, was "the economic forces let loose by the Industrial Revolution" then taking place in the North. These economic forces were strong, powerful, and "beating irresistibly upon a one-sided and rather static" Southern way of life. Therefore, the 1860's produced a "second American Revolution," fought between the "capitalists, laborers, and farmers of the North and West" on the one hand, and the "planting aristocracy of the South" on the other.

A third theory advanced by historians is that the threat to states' rights led to war. The conflict of the 1860's was thus a "War between the States." Many in this group believe that the U. S. Constitution of 1787 was but a compact, or agreement, between the independent states. Therefore, when a state did not like the policies of the central government, it had the right to withdraw--or secede--from this compact.

Still other writers believe "Southern nationalism" to have been the basic cause of the war. Southerners, they assert, had so strong a desire to preserve their particular way of life that they were willing to fight. This then became a struggle between rival sections whose differences could not be settled peacefully. The result was a "War for Southern Independence."

A recent group of historians, known as "revisionists," rejects these earlier theories. Leader of the revisionist school was the late James G. Randall, who once stated: "If one word or phrase were selected to account for the war, that word would not be slavery, or economic grievances, or states rights, or diverse civilizations. It would have to be such a word as fanaticism." Another revisionist, Avery O. Craven, agrees. The Civil War, he wrote, resulted because the great mass of American people "permitted their short-sighted politicians, their overzealous editors, and their pious reformers" to control public opinion and action. Primarily through the slavery issue, these radicals created more and more hatred between North and South. In the end, and as a result of these radicals, the differences between the sections, swelled by "a blundering generation," burst into a war.

II. ADVANTAGES OF NORTH AND SOUTH

Few nations have been as unprepared for a full-scale war as was the United States in 1861. The U. S. Army consisted of barely 17,000 men. Most of the soldiers were stationed at remote outposts on the western frontier. To make matters worse for the Union, a large number of army officers who had been born in the South and educated at West Point resigned from the army and offered their services to the Confederacy.

The U. S. Navy was in an equally bad state. It had performed little duty since the War of 1812. The Navy had a total of 90 ships, but only 42 of them were in active service at the outbreak of civil war. Of this number, 11 fell into Confederate hands with the capture of the naval base at Norfolk, Va., in April, 1861. The remaining vessels were scattered around the world. Moreover, 230 of 1,400 naval officers joined the forces of the Confederacy.

At the beginning of the Civil War, the North seemed to possess every advantage:

(1) 23 Northern states aligned against only 11 Southern states. (Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri were slave states, but they remained in the Union. Also, the western counties of Virginia revolted and formed their own state when the Old Dominion cast her lot with the Confederacy.)

(2) The population of the Northern states was approximately 22,000,000 people. The Southern states had only 9,105,000 people, and one-third of them (3,654,000) were slaves. The great difference in population, plus a steady flow of European immigrants into the Northern states, gave the Union tremendous manpower. Over 2,000,000 men served in the Federal armies, while no more than half that number fought for the South.

(3) The North had 110,000 manufacturing plants, as compared with 18,000 in the Confederate States. The North produced 97% of all firearms in America, and it manufactured 96% of the nation's railroad equipment.

(4) Most of the country's financial resources were in the North.

In view of the North's statistical superiority in so many areas, people often do not understand how the Civil War lasted four long years. Many reasons account for this:

(1) Both North and South needed many months of preparation before they were ready for full-scale war.

(2) For at least the first eighteen months of the war, the Confederacy was able to obtain many supplies from sympathetic nations in Europe. Not until late in 1862 did the Federals have enough ships to blockade effectively the major Southern ports.

(3) Southern armies generally fought on the defensive. It does not require as many men to hold a position as it does to attack and seize that position.

(4) Moreover, every time the Federals captured a city, bridge, road junction, or other important point, men had to be left behind to guard these places. To the Northern armies also went the task of sheltering, feeding, and to some extent training thousands of freed or runaway slaves. Therefore, even though the Federal armies greatly outnumbered the Confederate forces, the North needed more men to fight the war.

(5) In that age armies rarely fought in wintertime, a season of cold weather and deep mud. Most of the military campaigns took place between April and October. Hence, little activity occurred for about half of each year.

Before surveying the military campaigns, the student should bear in mind two more important, but somewhat confusing, points: each side named its armies by different systems, and each side used different methods for identifying battles.

The North named its armies for large rivers, while the South designated its forces by large areas of land. For example, the Federal Army of the Potomac fought against the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. This difference of names could and did sometimes become perplexing. An illustration of this occurred in the Western theater, where the Federal Army of the Tennessee (river) campaigned against the Confederate Army of Tennessee (state).

Likewise, both sides used different methods in naming battles. The North referred to a battle by the closest stream, river, run, or creek in the area. The South designated a battle by the name of the nearest town. Thus, the bloodiest one-day engagement of the Civil War is known in the North as the battle of Antietam Creek, and in the South as the battle of Sharpsburg, Maryland. In some cases, such as the battles of Gettysburg and Wilson's Creek, both sides adopted the same name.

Now let us turn to the war itself and "follow the armies."

SUGGESTED READINGS

Beard, Charles A., _The Rise of American Civilization_, Volume II (1927). Channing, Edward, _History of the United States_, Volume VI (1925). Cole, Arthur C., _The Irrepressible Conflict, 1850-1865_ (1934). Craven, Avery O., _The Coming of the Civil War_ (1942, 1957). ____, _The Repressible Conflict_ (1939). Milton, George Fort, _Conflict: The American Civil War_ (1941). Nevins, Allan, _The Emergence of Lincoln_ (2 vols., 1950). Nichols, Roy F., _The Disruption of American Democracy_ (1948). Pressly, Thomas J., _Americans Interpret Their Civil War_ (1954). Randall, James G., and Donald, David, _The Civil War and Reconstruction_ (1961). Rhodes, James Ford, _Lectures on the American Civil War_ (1913). Rozwenc, Edwin C. (ed.) _The Causes of the American Civil War_ (1961). Schlesinger, Arthur M., _New Viewpoints in American History_ (1922). Stampp, Kenneth P., _And the War Came_ (1950). ____, _The Causes of the Civil War_ (1959).

CHART OF CIVIL WAR ARMY ORGANIZATION ARMY General (CSA) Major General (USA) CORPS Lieutenant General (CSA) Major General (USA) DIVISION Major General BRIGADE Brigadier General BATTALION (less than 10 companies) Lieutenant Colonel or Major COMPANY Captain REGIMENT (10 companies) Colonel or Lieutenant Colonel COMPANY 75-100 men

III. MILITARY CAMPAIGNS

1861

Late in April, 1861, the Confederate government moved its capital from Montgomery, Ala., to Richmond, Va. This transfer was intended to bind Virginia closer to the other Southern states and to put the Confederate government nearer Washington when the time came to discuss the peace treaty. In reality the move backfired. It made Richmond the primary Federal target and Virginia the major battleground of the Civil War.

Few engagements occurred in 1861, when neither North nor South had a highly organized, efficient army. What both sides in 1861 called armies were more like armed and unruly mobs. Yet President Lincoln and the Congress, hoping to end the war quickly, were anxious to capture Richmond.

As a result, Federal forces made three thrusts into Virginia. They first moved from Ohio into the pro-Northern counties of western Virginia, where Confederate regiments as "green" as the Federal units were stationed. In a series of small battles, including Philippi (June 3), Rich Mountain (July 11), and Corrick's Ford (July 13), the Federals were victorious. In 1863 this region entered the Union as the loyal state of West Virginia.

The other two Federal invasions were less successful. The main Virginia defenses stretched from Norfolk northward to the Potomac River, thence westward to Harpers Ferry. Early in June, Gen. Benjamin F. Butler left Fort Monroe with a Federal force and struck at Richmond by way of the peninsula between the James and York rivers. At Big Bethel Church, just west of Yorktown, Confederates attacked and sent Butler's men stampeding back to their base at Fort Monroe.

The third and main Federal push into Virginia resulted in the largest battle fought in 1861. In mid-July, Gen. Irvin McDowell moved from Washington with some 35,000 recruits. McDowell's ultimate target was Richmond, but first he had to capture the important railroad junction of Manassas. Through espionage agents the Confederates learned of McDowell's advance. Quickly Gens. P. G. T. Beauregard and Joseph E. Johnston concentrated 30,000 Southern troops near Manassas to block the Federal move. On a very hot Sunday, July 21, McDowell attacked Beauregard and Johnston near a stream known as Bull Run. As in the case of many Civil War battles, the main attack was against the flank (or end) of the line, while for deception a lesser assault force struck at the center of the defending force's position.

The Federals might have won a smashing victory that day but for a stubborn brigade of Virginians under Gen. Thomas J. Jackson. The refusal of Jackson and his men to give ground not only helped save the day for the South but also earned for that general and his brigade the name "Stonewall."

Losses in the battle of First Manassas, or First Bull Run, were much less than those in the larger battles to come. The Federals lost 2,896 men killed, wounded, and missing. The Confederates suffered 1,982 casualties.

This battle at Manassas had several important effects. Southerners were convinced that Yankees were poor fighters, and that the war would be brief. On the other hand, Northerners realized that defeating the Confederacy would take longer than anticipated. Thus, while Southerners celebrated a great victory, the North began raising and equipping large armies for full-scale war.

A month later occurred an engagement in the West. On August 10, a Federal army sought out and attacked a Confederate force at Wilson's Creek, near Springfield, Mo. In this battle, often called "Bull Run of the West," the Federals met defeat. The Union commander, Gen. Nathaniel Lyon, was killed in the midst of the fighting.

On October 21, the North suffered another costly setback. Near Ball's Bluff, Va., Confederate defenders all but annihilated a Federal scouting force. The "Ball's Bluff disaster" spurred into action the "Committee on the Conduct of the War." Seven U. S. congressmen made up this investigating body. Although not one had had army training, they continually inquired into the military affairs of every Federal army and often embarrassed generals in the field.

While Confederates in 1861 won most of the battles, Lincoln and his government by no means felt defeated. Gen. George B. McClellan was building an army at Washington that would soon number 100,000 volunteer troops. This force would be the largest ever amassed in the Western Hemisphere up to that time. Moreover, the North had won a few victories. On November 7, a Federal amphibious force had captured Port Royal, S. C., thus gaining a beachhead on the South Atlantic coast. Yet on that same day, another Federal army suffered defeat at Belmont, Mo. The losing general was an unknown officer from Illinois, and this was his first Civil War battle. His name was Ulysses S. Grant.

1862 IN THE WEST

War's full fury struck in 1862. To understand the complicated movements of many armies, bear in mind two points:

(1) Not one, but _two_, separate areas of military operations existed. The Appalachian Mountains, extending in an almost unbroken line from Pennsylvania to Alabama, prevented armies from moving freely from eastern states (Virginia, the Carolinas, etc.) to western or trans-Appalachian states (Tennessee, Kentucky, etc.), and _vice versa_. As a result, different armies in the East (east of the mountains) and in the West fought practically two almost independent wars. Only in 1864 were the campaigns of the two areas effectively coordinated.

(2) In the 1800's, in contrast to modern military tactics, an invading army did not always move directly against an enemy force. Rather, its primary target was usually an important city. Once the invading army was in motion, the defending force then tried to place itself between the invader and his target. This set the stage for battle. Five such Confederate cities became principal Federal targets. In the East was Richmond; in the West were New Orleans and Vicksburg, both strongholds on the all-important Mississippi River, and Chattanooga and Atlanta, vital railroad centers.

Bearing these two points in mind, let us turn to the Western campaigns of 1862.

At the beginning of 1862 some 48,000 Confederate soldiers guarded a 600-mile line extending from the Appalachian Mountains westward to the Mississippi River. Obviously the Southern defenses were thinly manned. Early in February, Gen. Ulysses S. Grant left Cairo, Ill., with 15,000 men to attack the center of this line. His goal was to gain control of two important rivers, the Tennessee and the Cumberland.

To protect these streams, the Confederates had constructed twin forts in Tennessee just south of the Kentucky border. Fort Henry guarded the Tennessee; Fort Donelson stood menacingly on the banks of the Cumberland. On February 6 a Federal river fleet cooperating with Grant battered Fort Henry into submission. Ten days later Grant had surrounded Fort Donelson and its 12,000 defenders. Answering the Confederate commander's request for surrender terms, Grant replied: "No terms but unconditional surrender." Thereafter, U. S. Grant was "Unconditional Surrender" Grant.

Grant's victories brought great rejoicing in the North. Some writers consider the Henry-Donelson campaign as "the critical operation" of the Civil War. Capture of these forts assured Union control of Kentucky and Tennessee and opened Mississippi and Alabama to Federal invasion. The loss of the forts was a severe blow to Southern morale. With these successes the North had also demonstrated its ability and willingness to fight.

Meanwhile, an important battle occurred farther to the west for control of Arkansas and Missouri. On March 7-8, at Pea Ridge (or Elkhorn Tavern), Ark., a Confederate army of 16,000 men attacked 12,000 Federals under Gen. Samuel R. Curtis. Most of the Confederates lacked uniforms and were armed with shotguns and squirrel rifles. This force also included 3,500 Indians of the Creek, Choctaw, Cherokee, Chickasaw and Seminole tribes. After two days of fighting, a Federal counterattack broke the Confederate "army." With the defeat at Pea Ridge the Confederates permanently lost Missouri and northern Arkansas.

By the end of March Grant's army was near the Mississippi border. Just across the line Gens. Albert Sidney Johnston and Beauregard had collected a force of 40,000 Confederates. Even though most of his troops were ill-equipped, Johnston attacked Grant's encamped forces in an effort to destroy the Federal invaders. The battle of Shiloh (April 6-7), one of the war's most costly engagements, followed.