Part 2

Of the extraordinary genius of the early Sultans there is abundant proof[19]. The character of Othman was precisely suited for one who was to be the founder of a dynasty. He was conspicuous among a warlike tribe for his boldness and independence, and he possessed that marvellous influence over the minds of those around him, which is one of the peculiar characteristics of the greatest men. In Orchan we see the enduring watchfulness, the indomitable resolution which never fails to attain its object, while in the person of Alaeddin his coadjutor we may admire the far-sighted legislator, the brightness of whose original genius shone forth undimmed by the prejudices of an unenlightened age. By the organization of a standing army he marked out future conquests for his race, while by the tolerant spirit of his legislation he ordained that a due protection should be given to the conquered. Amurath by a series of successful campaigns gained the city of Adrianople for his capital. Then with admirable prudence he paused for a while to consolidate his conquests and mature his resources, and thus paved the way for his final victory at Kossova. The name of Yilderim or the Thunderbolt testifies to the energy of the First Bajazet, but it was a just punishment for his overbearing pride in later years that the Tartar Conqueror Timour was provoked to crush his power on the field of Angora, and to doom him to an ignominious captivity. The work of the destroyer was for the time complete, and it seemed as if the Ottoman power was irrecoverably ruined. But the mould into which their national life had been cast was not so easily destroyed. The force of their institutions still remained, and the people were still attached to the tolerance of their ancient government, and so, after many years of civil war, the unity of the Ottoman power was easily restored by the vigorous hand of Mahomet the First. The bold measures of Amurath II. caused the signal overthrow of his Hungarian opponents at Varna, and the annexation of Servia and Bosnia in the succeeding reign are due in great measure to his toleration and prudence. The abdication of his father gave Mahomet the Second experience in the command of an Empire at the early age of eighteen, and a double failure as viceroy secured him wisdom for his sole reign. Setting aside any consideration of his character, it is impossible to deny his legislative ability and military genius, in building up the greatness of his nation. The domestic dissensions of the Empire, under the feebler hand of Bajazet II., showed how requisite a warlike and energetic Sultan was to its preservation under its peculiar constitution. Tabriz, and the subjection of the Mamelukes, were monuments of the ferocious spirit of the warrior Selim. By ceaseless carnage he made himself master of the whole of Egypt, took great part of Syria, and added the Caliphate to the titles of the Ottoman sovereign. At the moment when his cruelty had nearly driven his people to rebellion, the rise of Solyman furnished a pillar of strength to the house of Othman. At the time of his reign the thrones of Europe, as well as those of Persia and India, were occupied by some of the most powerful sovereigns of modern times. But in “a century rich with mighty spirits” there are few names which can compare with that of Solyman the Magnificent, the great lawgiver and commander of his nation. Under his sway, the dynasty of the Ottoman Turks reached its zenith. Though the institutions of his predecessors, and the military organization they had bequeathed, supplied a foundation, yet it was in great measure to his own genius, vigour, and capacity, that the mighty fabric of the Ottoman power owed its stupendous greatness, and that an Empire founded but three centuries before by a few families of wandering Turkomans, then numbered among its subjects twenty different races, and nearly fifty millions of inhabitants, and still survives with wonderful tenacity, after three centuries of decline, unbroken by a single vicissitude of success.

Thus for ten successive reigns, with perhaps a single exception, the throne of the Ottoman Turks was held by men of extraordinary talents. Nor was this vigour of the early Sultans merely accidental. The strict discipline to which they were subjected in early years, the attention that was paid to their education, and their subsequent training in the council and the field, must all have tended to this result.

The real weakness of the Ottoman government, its absolute dependence on a single man, was marvellously compensated and overcome by a continued succession of vigorous sovereigns. The superiority of a well regulated constitution over a despotism generally lies in a comparative equality of ability through all its different members. As long as absolute power is held by the strong hand of a great man all is prosperous. But a continued succession of great men rarely occurs, and when it falls to an irresolute hand to wield the sceptre of despotism the real weakness of the system appears. In France, the Revolution was the ultimate result of the exercise of unlimited power, by Louis the fourteenth; in England, the great Rebellion was the final issue of the attempt to subject the English people to a despotism. The reason that the same result did not occur in the case of the Ottomans is to be found in the historic facts: first, that the later Sultans were, in the eyes of Mahometans, the successors of the Prophet, as well as the descendants of Othman; and, secondly, that the Janissaries, like the Praetorian guards at Rome, jealously prevented their rulers from being made subject to any power but their own.

Besides the wonderful efficacy of their military organization and the talents of their Sultans, there is one point of their history which is worthy of remark as having tended indirectly towards their success. The whole tenor of their legislation was much in advance of that of the European powers in general. English history has often been said to be a century before that of France, but the history of the early Turkish Emperors was much more strikingly advanced beyond that of the other sovereigns of Europe. At the end of the fifteenth century, when, although the times were not yet ready for the development of popular right, the oppressions of European feudalism had become intolerable, the strong hand of despotic sovereigns supplied the only safe guard against lawless outrage. The aggrandizement of their power at that time saved the states which they governed. In this respect, however, the Ottomans were before their age--for whilst the states of Europe were for the most part impotent through the overbearing spirit of the feudal nobility, the Ottoman government was vigorously swayed by an Absolute Monarch[20]. Thus, when England was distracted by the wars of the Roses, Mahomet the Conqueror was leading his nation on to victory. In fact, the aggrandizement of the Ottoman Sultans was anterior to that of the European sovereigns.

In other points we may notice the same advancement in their history. Their whole military system was beyond their age. They possessed disciplined infantry, when a standing army was unknown, and cavalry had not yet been supplanted by foot-soldiers in the rest of Europe. They had a regular commissariat department to supply their armies with the necessaries of war, and a special corps to do the work of Sappers and Miners, long before such a division of labour was adopted by Christendom. On the departments of artillery and engineering Mahomet II. bestowed his special attention. The Ottomans first made regular approaches in besieging a fortress, and became masters of the Italians in the art of fortification[21].

It is curious also that a nation popularly considered to have consisted of unenlightened barbarians should have been far in advance of us in some of the points which we consider as the distinguishing features of modern European civilization. Every advantage of Free Trade was allowed to the foreign merchant who traded to the Turkish sea-ports[22]. A system of municipal government was established throughout their dominions. A religious toleration beyond the spirit of the age was carried out towards the Christian population of their kingdom. In this particular the difference in the spirit of the Christian and Turkish governments is well illustrated by a traditionary account of the answers of Amurath and Hunyades, when questioned by the Servians on the subject of the maintenance of their religion. While Hunyades is said to have declared that, if victorious, he would compel them to join the Latin Communion, Amurath’s famous answer was: “I will build a church near every mosque, and the people shall worship in whichever they may prefer[23].”

But it was not to a purer moral principle that the system owed its origin. The clear sight of their rulers perceived that some toleration was necessary for the well-being of their composite empire. But the ruling genius of their creed was not tolerant then, any more than it is now. The institution of the Janissaries was in accordance with the tenets of their religion. But the protection of their Christian subjects was the conciliatory measure of a wise legislator, not of a devout Mahometan. Oh the one hand the compulsory conversion of a large portion of their hardier slave-population furnished them with a rich harvest of soldiers, while their toleration in other respects procured for them the contentment of their less warlike subjects.

The truth of the remark of Machiavelli that a man cannot found a state without opportunities, was not impugned by the rise of Othman and his dynasty. The divisions of the Seljukians seemed to invite the exaltation of some new power. A widely diffused Turkish population was left without a ruler. The imbecility of the Persian and Eastern Empires afforded ample scope for purposes of aggression. The distracted state of Christendom prevented any combination against the intrusion of Mussulmans in Europe.

Such were the external circumstances that favoured the rise of the Ottomans. But the great internal Causes of their successes we have traced to the genius of their early Sultans, and to their military organization, under which latter head must be included their peculiar feudal system and the institution of their Janissary corps. There were other incidental causes of their greatness, such as the warlike spirit common to the Tartar race and the Mahometan religion, the absolute position of the supreme head which gave unity to the empire, and its early progress in prudent legislation.

The failure of the two great elements of their power mainly caused their decline. The empire needed vigorous rulers; the Sultans after Solyman have been characterized by a native statesman as “either fools or tyrants.” It required a well-disciplined army; but after Solyman, the discipline of the Janissaries decayed; their very system was corrupted; they admitted native Turks into their body; they began to take wives and to ply trades, becoming turbulent citizens rather than soldiers; and with their decay fell the military organization of the state.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: Gibbon, vol. viii. p. 20.]

[Footnote 2: Ibid. vol. viii. p. 2. n.]

[Footnote 3: Creasy, History of Ottomans, vol. i, p. 43.]

[Footnote 4: Gibbon, vol. viii. p. 153.]

[Footnote 5: See an Article in the Christian Remembrancer for April, 1855, p. 232.]

[Footnote 6: Creasy, vol. i. p. 327.]

[Footnote 7: Ranke’s Spanish and Ottoman Empires, p. 1.]

[Footnote 8: Gibbon, vol. viii. 28.]

[Footnote 9: Ranke, p. 6.]

[Footnote 10: Ranke, passim.]

[Footnote 11: Ranke, p. 7.]

[Footnote 12: Creasy, vol. i. p. 324.]

[Footnote 13: Gibbon, vol. viii. p. 30.]

[Footnote 14: Creasy, vol. i. p. 112.]

[Footnote 15: Creasy, vol. i. p. 161.]

[Footnote 16: Hulme’s Chapters on Turkish History (in Blackwood, July, 1840,) p. 18.]

[Footnote 17: Von Hammer’s History of the Ottoman Turks, vol. i. p. 193.]

[Footnote 18: Gibbon, vol. viii, p. 93.]

[Footnote 19: Sec Freeman’s History and Conquests of the Saracens, p. 145.]

[Footnote 20: For proofs that the Ottoman government was really absolute, see Robertson’s Charles V. note 43.]

[Footnote 21: Robertson’s Charles V. note 45.]

[Footnote 22: Creasy, i. p. 334.]

[Footnote 23: Creasy, i. p. 114.]