Part 3

The Commander-in-Chief, worn out with Lord Lucan’s delay of nearly 40 minutes, despatched the fourth and last order, viz., “Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the front and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. Troop of Horse Artillery may accompany. French Cavalry on your left. Immediate.” Captain Nolan was selected specially to see this order carried out, being one of the best cavalry officers in the British Army. When the order was given he started and galloped down the steep heights to the South valley to Lord Lucan, saluted him and gave him the order. I suppose he read it, but knowing what took place after, I rather doubt it. Lord Lucan says after he read the order he said to Captain Nolan, “Attack! Sir! Attack what? What guns, sir?” and he states also that Captain Nolan, pointing, said, “There, my Lord, is your enemy, and there are your guns.” Captain Nolan did not tell him to attack and he had no proof to show he did.

Lord Lucan left the largest part of his command in the South valley prepared to support infantry he had never seen. The first thing he did was to inform Lord Cardigan that Lord Raglan had ordered the Light Brigade to charge the guns, telling a lie in the Commander-in-Chief’s name. Lord Lucan then ordered Colonel Douglass to fall back and support the 17th Lancers, and none of the Regimental Commanders or Lord Cardigan were informed of the alteration, although just going into the most deadly charge ever made. Captain Nolan placed himself in front of the 13th Light Dragoons. Seeing one-third of the cavalry going down the valley to be sacrificed, they having to charge one mile and a half, leaving army and supports, and the commander of the Brigade away, Captain Nolan rode in front of the 17th Lancers, the regiment that gave the speed and direction, taking Lord Cardigan’s place. He knew the enemy were on the Causeway Heights retreating and abandoning the captured guns, not more than half a mile from the Light Brigade, and no danger to the Brigade to get where Lord Raglan intended. Captain Nolan knew the guns we were going to charge were sent to that position to cover the Russians’ retreat from the Causeway heights. After Captain Nolan had galloped about forty or fifty yards in the front and centre of the 17th Lancers (he did not know that the 11th Hussars were ordered to fall back) he gave the word of command “Threes right,” waving his sword and turning to his left. At the same moment the Russians opened fire and a piece of shell struck him in the breast near his heart. Had he not have turned he would have been struck in the back or possibly have been missed altogether. When he gave that word of command he intended the whole attacking line to move by it. Though killed his body still remained in the saddle, the horse, seeing the opening on the right, turned sharply in that direction and flung the corpse to the ground.

[Picture: The dress worn in the charge by the 17th Lancers, October 25th, 1854]

The dress worn in the charge by the 17th Lancers, October 25th, 1854.

The Russians having opened fire, the 13th Light Dragoons did not hear the word of command but advanced. If Sergeant-Major Nunnerley had not given the word of command “Three’s Left” (or front forward), it is a question how far we should have taken ground towards the Causeway heights. The 13th Light Dragoons had their commanding officer, Captain Oldham killed, and all the regiment so scattered that a group of men never held together. The 11th Hussars, through the 17th Lancers taking ground to the right, lost them entirely. The 8th Hussars that were in the 2-line under Lord Paget, with the 4th Light Dragoons, got separated and joined part of the 17th Lancers, after fighting through the guns. Lord Paget, with the 4th Light Dragoons, found the 11th Hussars through the guns, and Colonel Douglas commanding would not obey Lord Paget because Lord Lucan had given him the command of the regiment to support the 17th Lancers, although Lord Paget was the senior officer. Yet they had to join together to fight their way out.

In the meantime, Sir George Cathcart marched his division down the heights of Sebastopol and across the North valley near the 5th redoubt, (without guns) on the top of the Causeway heights. He could see the Light Brigade charging 12 to 20 guns in front and receiving flank fire from 20 other cannon, being the Russian field artillery and the seven ship guns the Turks had lost, together with ammunition in the three redoubts. Sir George could also see the French Cavalry charging a battery of field artillery of six guns on our left. The Russian cannon were all brass polished, 12 and 24 pounds. Their infantry were in square, and the commanding hill covered with the Needle riflemen. Sir George saw all this destruction of life and he could see the Heavy Brigade and Horse Artillery had not even been ordered from the South valley to support or assist the Light Brigade or French Cavalry. Sir George said it would be dangerous to advance further. Lord Lucan brought up two regiment and yet Cathcart would not budge an inch. I believe I saw the whole of the regiments—five in all. (See Lord Raglan’s letter where he states only two regiments).

The Duke of Cambridge is the only General living that commanded a division in the battles of Alma, Balaclava and Inkerman, and he knows what I have written is the living truth in every particular. He saw over 400 horses killed in less than 15 minutes after receiving the order to charge. The combined forces who took part in the Charge numbered 670 all told, of whom only 198 returned mounted.

Lord Lucan only gave one order to the Light Brigade, and that led to its destruction, sooner than inform the Commander-in-Chief that he had no ammunition for his artillery. If Lord Raglan had known, there would not have required any order or A.D.C., and there would not have been any murderous charge by order of Lord Lucan. Had Lord Raglan had known there was no ammunition, he would not have ordered the Horse Artillery to accompany, (see his letter for proof). Lord Lucan allowed the Russian cavalry to advance at a trot through the camp ground of the Heavy Brigade, and none of the commanders knew about it till informed by the Commander-in-Chief. Lord Lucan could not be found, and in consequence it was left to five regiments, under General Scarlett, to engage and defeat the Russians, who numbered seven to one. Lord Cardigan asserts there were only three regiments engaged. And that seven regiments were mere spectators, and yet Lord Lucan asserts he was not taken by surprise. If so, it is an amazing thing that a commander should permit a Russian cavalry force (3500) to make its way, in broad daylight, directly through the camp ground of his own troops.

After the charge Lord Lucan ordered the remnant of the Light Brigade six miles off on the hills near Inkerman to recuperate. In a few days the rain came down and every thing became a mass of mud, impossible to procure either meat, drink, or clothing. All the water we could get to drink was ladled off the ground. The supply consisted of small holes the horses made with their feet and all kinds of filth being on the ground helped to make things worse. We were left to die without having any medicine or even a cup of hot water. Several weeks elapsed before Lord Lucan found it out, for everyone seemed afraid of him and Cardigan, and these two never talked together. Lord Lucan occupied all the houses in Balaclava Harbour, while Lord Cardigan lived on his yacht seven miles from his command, and never visited them, although they were dying of hunger and starvation, and even when we went into action at Balaclava and Inkerman he still lived aboard. It was twelve o’clock when he arrived at Inkerman and his command never went under fire again during his service.

At last a storm came on the 14th of November, 1854, which continued for three days, and not a tent could be made to stand up. Some were blown away and never found again. Think of men dying under such conditions. The horses also were dying of hunger some of them eating all the hair off their bodies. If it had not been for Lord George Paget I do not know what would have become of us. He marched us down to Balaclava but the journey proved too much for our horses, over 100 stuck fast and died in the mud. The Light Brigade received several hundred horses that broke loose on from the Russians on the night of October 25th, 1854, or I would not be counting horses by the hundred. (See Lord George Paget’s Book for proof.)

Lord Cardigan died serenely satisfied because he had destroyed his command in obedience to orders, after stating in the _Times_, “No one man surpassed another in gallantry.” He is the only officer who had a command that returned back mounted, and that did not give a helping hand. He lost the whole of his command, five regiments and staff, and returned back by himself. He states in _Kinglake_, “I rode slowly up the hill and met General Scarlett. I said to him, ‘What do you think, General, of the aide de camp after such an order being brought to us which has destroyed the Light Brigade, riding to the rear and screaming like a woman’? Sir J. Scarlett replied, ‘Do not say any more, for I have ridden over his body.’”

Lord Cardigan, in less than six months after, published a letter in the _Times_ newspaper, dated April 6th, 1855, viz.:—“The Light Brigade had not advanced more than 100 yards when they were fired upon, and Captain Nolan, who had placed himself in front of a squadron of the 13th Light Dragoons, was killed.” Lord Cardigan’s statement to Kinglake, published in the appendix 14 years after the charge, viz.:—“After advancing about eighty yards a shell fell within reach of my horse’s feet, and Captain Nolan, who was riding across the front retreating with his arms up through the interval of the brigade.”

I should like to know which statement is true about Captain Nolan. It was impossible for him to be killed in front of the 13th Light Dragoons. It was impossible for him to be retreating with his arms up through the interval in front of Lord Cardigan. The interval was in the rear of him, and he would have to look back. Did Nolan scream in front or rear of Cardigan? How did he get in front of Lord Cardigan without him seeing him go? Lord Cardigan was in front of his command a minute or less before the attacking line commenced the charge, and this is why so many saw him. Captain Nolan would not dare take command if Lord Cardigan had been there. What kind of leading was he doing not to see him; and the 17th Lancers go “threes’ right” and take ground to the right. Many things I should like to explain if I had space.

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LORD RAGLAN _re_ LORD LUCAN.

Before Sebastopol,

Dec. 16th, 1854.

Field-Marshall Lord Raglan

to Duke of Newcastle, Sec. for War.

My Lord Duke,

I regret to be under the necessity of forwarding to your Grace the copy of a letter which has been addressed to me by Lieutenant General the Earl of Lucan.

When I received it I placed it in the hands of Brigadier-General Airey, the Quartermaster-General, and requested him to suggest to his lordship to withdraw the communication, considering that it would not lead to his advantage in the slightest degree; but Lord Lucan having declined to take the step recommended, I have but one course to pursue—that of laying the letter before Your Grace and submitting to you such observations upon it as I am bound, in justice to myself, to put you in possession of.

Lieutenant General the Earl of Lucan complains that in my dispatch to Your Grace of the 28th of October, I stated that, “from some misconception of the instruction to advance, the Lieutenant General considered that he was bound to attack at all hazards.” His Lordship conceives this statement to be a grave charge and an imputation reflecting seriously on his professional character, and he deems it incumbent upon him to state those facts which he cannot doubt must clear him from what he respectfully submits as altogether unmerited.

I have referred to my dispatch and far from being willing to recall one word of it, I am prepared to declare, that not only did the Lieutenant General misconceive the written instruction that was sent him, but that there was nothing in that instruction which called upon him to attack at all hazards, or to undertake the operation which led to such a brilliant display of gallantry on the part of the Light Brigade, and unhappily, at the same time occasioned such lamentable casualties in every regiment composing it.

In his lordship’s letter he is wholly silent with respect to a previous order which had been sent him. He merely says that the cavalry was formed to support an intended movement of the infantry.

This previous order was in the following words:—“The cavalry to advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights. They will be supported by infantry which has been ordered to advance on two fronts.”

This order did not seem to me to have been attended to, and therefore it was that the instruction by Captain Nolan was forwarded to him. Lord Lucan must have read the first order with very little attention for he now states that the cavalry was formed to support the infantry, whereas he was told by Brigadier General Airey, “that the cavalry was to advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights, and that they would be supported by infantry.” Not that they were to support the infantry; and so little had he sought to do as he had been directed, that he had no men in advance of his main body, made no attempt to regain the heights, and was so little informed of the position of the enemy, that he ask Captain Nolan, “where and what he was to attack, as neither enemy nor guns were in sight?”

This, Your Grace will observe, is the Lieutenant General’s own admission. The result of his inattention to the first order was, that it never occurred to him that the second was connected with, and a repetition of the first. He viewed it only as a positive order to attack at all hazards (the word “attack” be it observed was not made use of in General Airy’s note). An unseen enemy, whose position, numbers and composition he was wholly unacquainted with, and whom, in consequence of a previous order, he had taken no steps whatever to watch.

I undoubtedly had no intention that he should make such an attack—there was nothing in the instructions to require it; and therefore I conceive I was fully justified in stating to Your Grace what was the exact truth, that the charge arose from the misconception of the order for the advance which Lord Lucan considered obliged him to attack at all hazards.

I wish I could say with his lordship that, having decided against his conviction to make the movement, he did all he could to render it as little perilous as possible. This, indeed, is far from being the case in my judgment. He was told that the Horse Artillery might accompany the cavalry. He did not bring it up. He was informed that the French cavalry was on the left. He did not invite their co-operation. He had the whole of the heavy cavalry at his disposal. He mentions having brought up only two regiments in support, and he omits all other precautions, either from want of due consideration, or from the supposition that the unseen enemy was not in such great force as he apprehended, notwithstanding that he was warned of it by Lord Cardigan, after the latter had received the order to attack. I am much concerned, My Lord Duke, to have to submit these observations to Your Grace. I entertain no wish to disparage the Earl of Lucan in your opinion, or to cast a slur upon professional reputation; but having been accused by his lordship of having stated of him what was unmentioned in my dispatch, I have felt obliged to enter into the subject, and trouble Your Grace at more length than I could have wished, in vindication of a report of Your Grace in which I had strictly confined myself to that which I knew to be true and had indulged in no observations whatever, or in any expression which could be viewed either as harsh or in any way grating to the feelings of his lordship.

I have etc.

(Signed) RAGLAN.

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[Picture: The Gun that Lieutenant Jarvis and myself captured]

SWORN STATEMENT FOR VICTORIA CROSS IN SUPREME COURT, UNITED STATES.

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To Lord Wolseley, Commander-in-Chief.

909, STEUBEN STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C., U.S.A., NOVEMBER 12th, 1896.

MY LORD,

I beg leave to renew my application for the Victoria Cross, basing my claim upon gallantry of conduct during the Charge of the Light Brigade, 25th October, 1854, and the Battle of Inkerman, and will give proofs that corroborate my own statements.

My previous applications for the Cross have been brief. With your Lordship’s permission I will now give a more detailed statement.

First as to the Charge of the 600:—

My squadron was nearly annihilated before we reached the Russian battery, every officer being either killed or wounded. Myself and horse had been knocked down once and my lance shot away. After our passing through and silencing the guns my first thought was to look for directions from an officer, and I rode to Lieut. E. L. Jarvis, still living I believe a retired Major, of the 13th Light Dragoons, as his uniform was so nearly like that of the 17th Lancers, that I first thought he belonged to my regiment. Lieut. Jarvis pointed to a cannon that was being taken off at a gallop towards our right rear, and said, “Let’s capture that gun.” We immediately charged upon it. Jarvis shot one of the horses in the head, bringing it to a stop. I cut down the gunners with my sword. We both dismounted and took out the dead horse, when more stragglers of the Brigade came to our assistance. Private John Smith, C Troop, 17th Lancers, now living in London, mounted one of the horses to the gun carriage and we started off the field with it when a large body of Cossacks charged upon us completely surrounding us. I fought my way through and was pursued down the valley by seven of them into a body of Russian Hussars re-forming. I had no alternative but to charge through their line, which I did, an officer striking my head with the sword, my lance hat saving my head except for a bad bruise. A brigade of Russian Hussars were retreating down the valley pursued by about forty of our men. I rode from the right flank to the left flank of the rear rank calling to the men to fall back. Private Clifford of my troop rode into the column and was cut to pieces before my eyes. The Hussars came about and we were then between two large bodies of cavalry, one marching up the valley, the other down, so that the few of our Brigade who were farthest beyond the Russian guns were now completely hemmed in by a great body of Russians. At this critical moment, when there was no officer to command us and we were apparently lost, I beg leave to introduce the words of a comrade still living describing my conduct.

[Picture: The Only Squad Rallied Through The Guns]

J. W. Wightman, late 17th Lancers, in _Nineteenth Century_, May, 1892.—“We heard the familiar voice of Corporal Morley, of our regiment, a great, rough, bellowing man from Nottingham. He had lost his lance hat, and his long hair was flying out in the wind as he roared, ‘Coom ’ere! coom ’ere! Fall in, lads, fall in!’ Well, with shouts and oaths he had collected some twenty troopers of various regiments. We fell in with the handful this man of the hour had rallied to him, and there joined us also under his leadership Sergeant-Major Ranson and Private John Penn, of the 17th. Penn, a tough old warrior who had served with the 3rd Light in the Sikh war, had killed a Russian officer, dismounted, and with great deliberation accoutred himself with the belt and sword of the defunct, in which he made a great show. A body of Russians blocked our way. Morley, roaring Nottingham oaths by way of encouragement, led us straight at them, and we went through and out at the other side as if they had been made of tinsel paper. As we rode up the valley, pursued by some Hussars and Cossacks, my horse was wounded by a bullet in the shoulder, and I had hard work to push the poor beast along. Presently we were abreast of the Infantry who had blazed into our right as we went down; and we had to take their fire again, this time on our left. Their firing was very impartial; their own Hussars and Cossacks following close on us suffering from it as well as we. Not many of Corporal Morley’s party got back.”

After Wightman fell I kept a group together through the battery, again in position and then ordered them to separate for safety. Private James Cope died in India, and James McGregor, 4th Light Dragoons, since dead, reported to our regiment with me. We were the last to get back to the regiment.

The names of Cope and McGregor are appended to my first application, 17th October, 1856.

Second as to the battle of Inkerman:—

At the battle of Inkerman, November 5th, Cornet Cleveland was mortally wounded. He fell from his horse in front of me just as the regiment was ordered to retire. After we had retired some distance I rode to the commanding officer of the regiment and asked to be allowed to fall out to go back for Cornet Cleveland. He told me to go to the Sergeant-major and tell him to send two men to assist me. He told his brother James O’Hara and went himself. In the act of carrying Cornet Cleveland off the field, both James O’Hara and myself had our dress hats shot off our heads by a cannon ball. I annex a letter from Lord Tredegar, commanding officer, in support of this statement:—

TERDEGAR PARK, NEWPORT, ENGLAND, APRIL 6th, 1889

MORLEY,

I remember quite well that on the field of Inkerman you asked permission to fall out to go and try and bring in Cornet Cleveland, who had been seriously wounded a short time previously. I gave you permission and you went with two other men, and brought Cornet Cleveland into camp. I also know that you displayed great gallantry in the Light Cavalry charge at Balaclava.

Yours sincerely, TREDEGAR, _Late Captain 17th Lancers_.

[Picture: Bringing out of the thickest of the fire, Cornet Cleveland, mortally wounded]

Bringing out of the thickest of the fire, Cornet Cleveland, mortally wounded.

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Third as to the Baida Valley:—