Part 2

Lord Lucan describes the arrival of the order thus:—“The Cavalry was formed to support an intended movement of the Infantry when Captain Nolan came up at speed and placed in my hands this written information—‘Lord Raglan wishes the Cavalry to advance rapidly to the front and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns. Troop of Horse Artillery may accompany. French Cavalry on your left.’” He said to Captain Nolan after reading the order “Attack sir, attack what, what guns sir?” Captain Nolan pointed with his sword, “There, my Lord, is your enemy, there are your guns.” This conversation must have occurred in the South Valley where the Heavy Cavalry were formed to support the Infantry and where neither guns nor enemy were in sight. Captain Nolan probably pointed with his sword to the Causeway Heights, where the nearest guns of the enemy lay, and which was the point of attack intended by Lord Raglan. Had they been on top of these heights the redoubts would have been in sight, had the speakers been in the North Valley the words would have been an absurdity, for the direction of the Russian Army did not require to be pointed out with a sword. Several batteries were plainly in sight across the valley and at each side, with thousands and thousands of troops. It is recorded that Lord Lucan made some insulting remarks to Nolan, telling him to quiet himself. Both of them moved over to the Light Brigade, and Lord Lucan informed Lord Cardigan that it was Lord Raglan’s order for the Light Brigade to charge the Russians in the Valley. There is probably no doubt that Cardigan called Lucan’s attention to the fact that there were batteries in front and on each flank, and that the ground was covered with riflemen. This of course I did not hear. I first saw Lord Lucan riding about the attacking line and was aware that we were about to charge. I also noticed the Chasseurs over at our left preparing to move at the same time. I saw very distinctly what does not appear in any history, Lord Cardigan gallop on perhaps three hundred yards in front and to the right to a piece of slightly rising ground, evidently to reconnoitre the position of the Russian Army and the best way-ground for his brigade. We were now in line thus:—

* Lord Cardigan. 11th Hussars. 17th Lancers. 13th Light Dragoons * Lord George Paget. 4th Light Dragoons. 8th Hussars.

Almost at the moment that Lord Cardigan had left us Colonel Douglas, commanding the 11th Hussars was ordered by Lord Lucan to fall back to support the 17th which they did, altering the attacking line so that we went on in this formation.

17th Lancers. 13th Light Dragoons. 11th Hussars. 4th Light Dragoons. 8th Hussars.

This movement was executed simply by the 11th Hussars waiting for us to advance until they were at proper supporting distance when they began to move, for we were getting under way at the time. I never heard the word of command to go forward from any officer. If given at all it must have been by Lord Lucan, for Cardigan was, as I said, in advance of us planning the line of movement and evidently did not see what went on in his attacking line at the moment of advance. The whole movement was executed in the greatest haste and we were quickly off at a trot.

Then in the very beginning of the Charge, when the direction we were taking just became evident, occurred Captain Nolan’s movement that has been the cause of so much controversy. I was only about seventy yards from Captain Nolan and distinctly saw every movement. Captain Nolan was in front of the 13th Light Dragoons, who took their dressing and interval and speed by the 17th Lancers, the regiment of direction. As soon as the brigade was fairly in motion, so that its direction down the valley was evident, Nolan rode away from the 13th at speed to the front of the 17th Lancers, reached a position in front of the centre of the 17th, gave his order “three’s right” with his horse’s head facing the regiment, at the same time waving his sword to the right, which signified “take ground to the right,” then turned his horse and galloped towards the Causeway Heights, still pointing with his sword in that direction. At that moment a shell exploded and a piece of it struck him in the left breast near the heart. Probably the unearthly scream which rang in our ears above the roar of the opening cannonade was a dying effort to make us follow his direction.

He remained in the saddle until the horse had cleared the right flank of the first squadron of the 17th, in column of threes, when the horse, finding the rider had no control over it, turned sharp to the right—the way home—throwing the lifeless body head-first to the ground.

The 17th had instantly followed his direction and gone “three’s right.” The 13th had gone straight on instead of checking, as they should have done to respond to our movements. They were perhaps 25 or 30 yards in front of us when Nolan fell. At that juncture I heard Sergeant-Major J. Nunnerley, of the 1st Squadron—now living at Ormskirk, Lancashire—shout in a loud voice, “17th Lancers, (Three’s Left) or Front forward!” (I belonged to the second Squadron). We went three’s left, the right flank of the second squadron lapping the left flank of the first one-fourth its front or more, so that the two flanks became merged together. At that instant, the Russian Artillery in position across the valley, fired a volley into the 17th, which seemed to paralyse it, killing and wounding a number of officers and men. It seemed to me a troop of horses fell, myself and horse being knocked down with them. I remounted and followed the shattered line. All this time I never saw Lord Cardigan at all. Kinglake’s account of him as such a conspicuous figure on his white-legged horse, riding in front of his command and constantly checking the speed by orders to “keep steady,” does not agree with my observation, although he is said to have been just in front of our regiment.

From the time I saw him ride ahead and to one side of his command to reconnoitre, I never saw him again till we had passed the Russian guns. He probably joined some portion of the 13th Dragoons as they came up with him, but that regiment scattered completely, going down into skirmish line, having lost their base, the 17th Lancers.

No squad of it held together to pass the guns or to return. In the tremendous uproar and confusion of such cannonading it was impossible to have any very distinct impression. I observed everything clearly up to the moment the volley burst in our ranks and knocked me down. After that I simply scrambled on my horse and rode on pell-mell, and I believe Lord Cardigan did the same. The smoke prevented anyone from seeing any distance and the noise from hearing, so I never heard an officer’s voice from the time Nolan fell. It was the order of the brave Nunnerley that brought us to front forward as stated, and I heard no further orders after that.

The Russian gunners were well drilled. There was none of that crackling sound I have often heard in the American War and other places, where one gun goes a little ahead and the others follow, having the effect of a bunch of fire-crackers popping in quick succession.

In such case the smoke of the first gun obscures the aim of the rest. The Russian Artillery at Balaclava went off at the word of command, all together. One tremendous volley was heard with flashes of flame through the rolling smoke. While they reloaded the smoke lifted so that they could see to take aim again. There were probably twenty cannon at our right firing at us, and two batteries—twelve guns—in front. The batteries at the left on the Fedioukine Heights were in action, but their fire probably did not affect the first lines. Their fire was directed on the Chasseurs d’Afrique, who moved toward them simultaneously with our move forward. The direction was such, however, that the shells would fall among the supports, Colonel Douglas’ and Lord Paget’s lines. If we had been moving over uneven ground we should have had some slight protection in the necessary uncertainty of aim of the guns, but moving as we did in compact bodies on smooth ground directly in range, the gunners had an admirable target and every volley came with terrible effect.

There is a natural instinct to dodge cannon balls. In such fire as we were under it changed to an impulse to hurry. There was no time to look right or left, and the guns in front were what I looked out for. They were visible as streaks of fire about two feet long, and a foot thick in the centre of a gush of thick white smoke, marking about every three hundred yards of the way, as they would reload in 30 or 40 seconds. The last volley went off when we were close on them. The flame, the smoke, the roar were in our faces. It is not an exaggeration to compare the sensation to that of riding into the mouth of a volcano, but those who did not fall were through the guns in an instant and full of fight. The action of the scattered troops behind the battery and on the way back was sufficient proof that they were not frightened or demoralized, even by the proceeding—unheard of for Cavalry—of attacking batteries in front.

Before we reached the guns every officer of my squadron, the second, was either killed or wounded, leaving no one to command us.

Thirty of the men followed Troop Sergeant Major O’Hara, and fifteen followed Colonel Mayow, chief of Cardigan’s Staff. As I said before the 13th Light Dragoons were so scattered, that a group did not enter the enemy’s lines together. The 11th Hussars was ordered to support us, the 17th Lancers, and we never saw them in the fight. Colonel Douglas, 11th Hussars, Lord George Paget, 4th Light Dragoons, Colonel Shewell, 8th Hussars, all managed to keep groups of their commands together, to enter the line of guns. Lord Paget commanded the 4th Light Dragoons and 8th Hussars, yet he lost the 8th and found the 11th Hussars (our supports). The ride down the valley could not have occupied five minutes. I could have run it on foot in seven minutes, as I was champion runner in those days, but the formation of the brigade with which we started had been destroyed, probably within three minutes.

Our arrival at the battery silenced it instantly, and the gunners began to try to move the cannon away. The gospel of Russian fighting was always to save the guns.

My first thought after we were through the line was to look for an officer to see what we were to do, I saw Lord Cardigan at first but I had no impulse to join him. I think no British soldier ever had. He lead 670 and none relied on him. I saw troopers riding past him to the right and left. He was about 50 yards beyond the guns on their extreme left. I turned to look for some one of my own regiment and mistook Lieutenant Jarvis, of the 13th Dragoons, for one of my officers, as the uniforms of both regiments being very similar. Lieutenant (now Major) Jarvis is, I believe, still living. He was about 200 yards to my left front, riding to his right towards a cannon that was retreating to the rear. I galloped up to him and informed him that Lord Cardigan was above, pointing my sword to the place, my lance having been shot away at the last volley as we charged the guns. He replied “Never mind, let’s capture that gun!” We raced towards it. He said, “Cut down the gunners!” He shot one of the horse’s in the head bringing it to a sudden stop. The gunners disappeared between the horses and gun-carriage as we slashed at them. We both dismounted and took out the dead horse while more of the Brigade gathered about to assist us. Private John Smith, who died in a London Workhouse about the end of January, 1899, mounted one of the horses attached to the gun, and I believe there is another soldier living who mounted another horse of the gun.

We started back off the field at a gallop with the mounted cannon, and were near the place where I had seen Lord Cardigan, when a large body of Cossacks charged, who appeared from behind a hill and surrounded our group. I was riding on the right of the gun, the direction in which the Cossacks attacked us. In the melee I got through the wrong end and had to ride back again down the valley. I was pursued by seven of them until they fairly chased me into a body of Russian Cavalry with its back to me. There was no alternative but to ride through or surrender to the Cossacks. I put spurs to my horse and bolted into the line. I got through with a knock on the head from a Russian officer, that would have wounded me but for my dress cap, which I eventually lost, but the lines saved it. More members of the Light Brigade were riding about—some of them wounded—fighting as best they could.

Corporal Hall, of my own troop, had his lance trailing about and covered with blood. I told him to throw it away and wanted to pick it up myself, as I needed one, but there was no time. Hall was captured and died of amputation of a leg.

During the melee, about 40 stragglers of the Brigade were driving a line of Russian Hussars down the valley in close column. I rode in the rear of them and began to order the men back. I ordered Private Clifford of my own troop to halt, instead of which he charged into the solid column and was cut and pierced to death before my eyes. The column came to a trot, and walk, and then wheeled about. I turned my horse about and saw a line of Lancers marching down the valley and instantly thought they were the French Lancers, as they carried flags on their lances. I rode to them, and when within 30 yards they fired at me. I then saw their long grey cloaks and knew they were Russian. It was in fact the Jeropkine Lancers just formed in close line across the valley, cutting off our retreat. I turned back to my scattered comrades, who were riding about like myself in all directions, not seeing which way to go. I raised my sword and shouted to them to fall in. They galloped to me from all directions, and I hastily formed them in lines, putting those with lances in front. I believe there were eight of the 17th Lancers in the front rank, with members of other regiments forming a second line. The Russian Lancers were not more than 40 yards from us when I ordered them to cheer and charge. The Brigade of Russian Hussars were marching up the valley about 50 yards behind and there were Cossacks on each flank. The Russians must have thought we were assembling to surrender, and when we yelled and charged into the centre of their line, they seemed to be paralysed.

The point of a lance through my sword hilt tore the flesh off my middle finger, and this trifling wound was the only injury I received in that immortal fight. Three of the men in my group fell in the charge but I seemed to have more when I got through the lines, other stragglers having rushed through the opening we made or rode round the flanks. We galloped off on our way back, pursued by some of the Cossacks, firing at us, until we came to a square of infantry on rising ground with muskets and fixed bayonets pointing at us. They yelled something in Russian, I suppose calling us to surrender. When they saw that we was not going to surrender, they fired a volley point blank at us and at the shortest range. This was fearfully destructive, and only a few of my little squad were left. Weightman and Marshall together with others of the 17th were captured here, one with 13 wounds and the other with 9, and were prisoners for a year. We found the guns again re-manned and in position again across the valley, and after we had charged through them from the rear they opened fire on us again, as well as the infantry.

There were no more of the enemy in front and I told the men to separate. James Cope, 17th Lancers, and George McGregor, 4th Light Dragoons, opened out each side of myself, and we made the best of our way back up the valley. Cope and I reported together to the regiment which had assembled, numbered off, and been complimented by Lord Cardigan before we got there. We were the last squad to return, and the only squad that rallied through the guns.

The engagement may be summed up thus: There were five groups which charged into the guns. The first two were 17th Lancers, one group commanded by Colonel Mayow, chief of Lord Cardigan’s staff, the other by Troop Sergeant Major O’Hara. The third group was the 11th Hussars under Colonel Douglas. The fourth group were 4th Light Dragoons, commanded by Lord Paget. The fifth group, 8th Hussars, Colonel Shewell and the last regiment to enter the batteries. These five groups charged the masses of Russian Cavalry that were supporting the artillery, time and time again, driving them some hundred yards down the valley. This seems almost incredible, but it must be recalled that we had no idea of the colossal blunder of which we were victims. Our natural thought of course was that we would be immediately followed and supported by the Heavy Brigade and Infantry, both of which were stationed close in our rear. The French Cavalry we know had moved and I thought they were there with us until I had ridden nearly into a body of Russians, taking them for the French. Of course, the Russians shared our impression that this was the beginning of a general attack, which accounts for their temporary confusion and partial retreat.

While these five groups were going on fighting as best they could, scattering the Russian Cavalry, the General ordered out the Jeropkine Lancers—fresh troops who had not been engaged in the attack on the Heavy Brigade two hours before. These Lancers took their position between the guns across the valley, apparently cutting off the retreat of all the Light Brigade by forming across their rear.

The officers commanding the different groups now realised that they were unsupported and in great danger. There was a hasty effort to join forces to make the best of their way back. Lord Paget, happening to be near the 11th Hussars, ordered Colonel Douglas to join his command. He refused at first, but seeing himself cut off did so, and a wordy controversy as to who was technically in command takes up many pages in Paget’s book. Probably, at the time, neither gave thought to anything but getting out of the trap. Colonel Mayow and Sergeant-Major O’Hara joined with the 8th Hussars, making two groups fighting and charging the Russian Lancers. Some squads of the Light Brigade had not time to wheel about, but just time to go three’s about, and charge with rear rank in front to prevent the Russian Cavalry from charging their flanks. Not all the Brigade had fallen into these larger groups which first cut their way out. After the remnants of these groups had escaped the Jeropkine Lancers, six squadrons strong were formed in line to prevent the stragglers from escaping.

The Brigade of Hussars seeing the Lancers marching down the valley and only a few scattered enemy, halted, wheeled about, and marched up the valley. It was just at this time and between these two bodies that I rallied my little squad.

It is a singular thing that every authority on the Charge of the Light Brigade gives a different number of killed and wounded, but they substantially agree as to the number 198 which reported mounted after the engagement.

Lord Cardigan gives 195. James Cope, 17th Lancers, McGregor, 4th Light Dragoons, and myself reported after the roll was called.

I am only certain of the figures for my own regiment. The 17th Lancers went into the engagement 145 and came out 45 mounted. Every officer of my squadron was killed or wounded. We lost 13 prisoners, only one of them unwounded, and he was dismounted, his horse having been killed. Of these only 3 lived to return to the English ranks, two of them from my squad—Weightman and Marshall. Weightman, who is still living as a retired officer, had thirteen wounds, and Marshall nine wounds.

THE CAUSE OF THE CHARGE.

[Picture: Lord Lucan (on horse)]

THE phrase “Someone had blundered” is familiar to every one, but the condition of affairs which precipitated the blunder are not known and have never been stated in history.

After the Heavy Brigade made their glorious charge, the Light Brigade was placed in the North valley by order of Lord Raglan, Lords Lucan and Cardigan being absent congratulating the Heavy Brigade officers. Both Commanders-in-chief and Staffs had assembled at the top of Sebastopol Heights and were watching the Russian Army. They decided to force a general engagement and recapture the guns and heights the Turks had lost. The Russian General could see the allied armies—the French massing on the heights of Sebastopol and the British Infantry and Artillery marching down both valleys. The Russians, recognising the uselessness of trying to take Balaclava, ordered their army on the Causeway Heights to retreat and abandon the captured guns. Lord Raglan sent General Airey, Quarter-master General, to give Lord Lucan instructions to which he paid no attention. The third order was, “The Cavalry to advance and take advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights; they will be supported by Infantry which has been ordered to advance on two fronts.” Now the trouble commenced. Lord Lucan could see that Lord Raglan intended the whole cavalry to advance in one body, but he could not give the word of command for his two brigades to move together, not knowing the drill in vogue. Again, how could he ask the cavalry to advance with the Artillery without ammunition? How far could he advance against the Russian Artillery? It would be simple slaughter to charge. Lord Lucan had invaded the Crimea without any supply for his cannon. He admits that he did not leave the forts till he had used all his ammunition, and that was before daylight. He was then only one mile from Balaclava Harbour, the only place for supply, and he could have sent his ammunition wagons for it. His artillery being only six-pounders—the smallest in the Crimea—it was impossible to draw or borrow it. So the humbug went on, and instead of him informing Lord Raglan he had no supply of ammunition in the Crimea—which was his first duty to his Queen and country—he prepared the Heavy Brigade to support infantry at the top of the South valley, quite reversing the third order.

The two commanders-in-chief had their infantry ready for the general engagement; the French infantry massed on the top of Sebastopol heights to support the English; and the French Cavalry was ordered to report to General Lord Lucan, the English Cavalry commander. The Duke of Cambridge had his division on top of Sebastopol heights the first and could see the Russian army retreating on the Causeway heights and abandoning the captured cannon. The Duke waited some time for Lord Lucan to get a move upon his command, then marched his troops down the heights of Sebastopol to the South valley, seeing no signs of the cavalry advancing, ordered his infantry and artillery in line of battle and marched them towards the Causeway heights. I am of the opinion—and always have been—that if Lord Lucan had continued his humbug for ten minutes longer, the Duke of Cambridge would have attacked the retreating Russians on the Causeway heights.