CHAPTER IX: THE MORNING OF THE SIXTEENTH

OF JUNE: NAPOLEON 129

Ney and Napoleon at Charleroi during the night of the 15th and 16th 129

Napoleon, impressed by the backwardness of d’Erlon, decides to wait until the left wing is ready 130

The formal order to Ney to seize Quatre Bras not given until Ney’s report of the state of his command had arrived—between 8 and 9 A.M. 131

The advance of the centre and right also delayed to conform to the movements of the left 131, 132

Napoleon’s expectations as to the forwardness of Ney’s command 132, 133

Napoleon prepares and sends letters to Ney and Grouchy, in view of the possible withdrawal of Marshal Blücher 134, 135

He seems to have thought this probable 136

But he made every preparation for encountering the enemy in force both at Sombreffe and at Quatre Bras 137

The 6th Corps regarded as a reserve for the whole army 138

NOTES TO CHAPTER IX 139

1. The censure generally passed on Napoleon for his delays on the morning of the 16th not deserved 139

Opinions of Wellington and Clausewitz 139, n. [310]

2. Ney not responsible for the backwardness of the 1st Corps during the night 140

3. Ney’s inactivity on returning to Gosselies 140

4. No evidence thus far of indolence or irresolution on the part of Napoleon 140

5. Error of supposing that he ever thought of pressing on to Brussels between the two allied armies—Chesney and Clinton 141

His letters to Ney and Grouchy conclusive as to this 141, 142

His object was to destroy the allied armies in succession—Jomini 142