CHAPTER XVII.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS.

The justification for this book on the well-worn subject of the campaign of Waterloo is to be found, if at all, in its treatment of certain topics to which we now propose very briefly to advert.

1. First among them is Napoleon’s plan of campaign.[782] In regard to this we have followed his own account, and have pointed out the difference between it and the plan which it has been claimed he either really did entertain or ought to have entertained.

2. In regard to the much-vexed question of the alleged verbal order to Marshal Ney to seize Quatre Bras on the afternoon of the 15th of June, new light, it is submitted, has been thrown.[783] The contemporaneous evidence of the bulletin, and the statement made by Marshal Grouchy in 1818, make it very difficult to disbelieve Napoleon’s account of this matter.

3. The true cause of the delay on the morning of the 16th of June has been, we submit, pointed out.[784] The fact that d’Erlon’s Corps was so far in the rear seems to have been the chief reason for delaying the forward movement both of the left wing and of the main army.

4. It has been shown by Marshal Ney’s orders to his command, and from other evidence furnished by his defenders, that his arrangements for carrying out his instructions on the 16th were extremely defective, and, in fact, that he perversely departed from the letter and spirit of his orders.[785] It has also been shown that a vigorous and unhesitating compliance with the orders which he received would in all probability have changed the issue of the campaign.[786]

5. In regard to the movements of d’Erlon’s Corps on the 16th, it has been shown that its leading division was two hours and a half behind the rear divisions of the 2d Corps on the road to Quatre Bras; and that if d’Erlon’s Corps had closely followed the rear division of the 2d Corps, it could not have been turned aside by the staff-officer’s blunder.[787]

6. Attention has been called to Napoleon’s plan of battle at Ligny, and to the criticisms which it has met with.[788]

7. The view of those writers who regard it as great negligence on the part of Napoleon that on the morning of the 17th he did not take adequate measures to ascertain the direction of the Prussian retreat, is fully adopted.[789]

8. It is also maintained that Napoleon should on that morning at daybreak have marched with the 6th Corps and the Guard to attack the English at Quatre Bras in conjunction with Ney’s forces,—a point on which most writers strongly insist.[790]

9. The connection between the injunction contained in the Bertrand order and the new idea as to the projects of Marshal Blücher, which Berton’s discovery of a Prussian corps at Gembloux had started in Napoleon’s mind, is brought out;[791] and Napoleon is censured for having on the afternoon of the 17th detached so large a force from his army when he had reason to apprehend that a movement by Blücher with the intention of coöperating with Wellington had been in operation since the previous evening.[792]

10. The warning contained in the Bertrand order is given its due prominence; and the fact that Marshal Grouchy was acting under that order, and therefore had entire liberty to take any steps which his own judgment might approve to frustrate the attempt of the Prussians to act in conjunction with the English, is strongly insisted on.[793]

11. It is shown that Grouchy was at Walhain, and not at Sart-à-Walhain when he heard the sound of the cannon of Waterloo and rejected the counsel of Gérard.[794]

12. That Napoleon expected Grouchy to arrive on the left bank of the Dyle by crossing it at the bridge of Moustier is shown by Marbot’s testimony; and attention is called to the inference which this fact warrants, that Napoleon was not cognizant of the language used in the 10 A.M. order to Marshal Grouchy, which seemed to imply that Grouchy was expected to reach Wavre first.[795]

13. It is pointed out that from about four o’clock in the afternoon of the 18th of June to about half-past six, Napoleon’s attention was absorbed by the attack of Bülow’s Corps upon the right and rear of the French army; and that, for the mistakes committed during this period in the assaults on the English army, Ney is mainly responsible.[796] It is furthermore shown that by reason of this distraction of the Emperor’s attention from the operations in his front, valuable opportunities for success against Wellington’s army were lost.[797]

14. Marshal Ney is censured for having done so little in the way of preparation for the successful charge of the Imperial Guard.[798]

15. The questions relating to the formation of the Imperial Guard in its charge against the English, and of its repulse and defeat by the English guards and the light brigade, have received particular attention. It is believed that the view here presented will be found to harmonize nearly all the conflicting statements.[799]

16. It is maintained that Marshal Grouchy, if he had started for the bridge of Moustier at daybreak,[800] or had followed the advice of Gérard at noon,[801] would probably have stopped Bülow and Pirch I. by engaging them, and that Zieten, in all probability, would not have proceeded further than Ohain;[802] in which case Napoleon would have been able to employ his whole army against that of Wellington, and would have defeated it.

Coming now to the Allies:—

17. It is contended that the definite understanding as to the steps to be taken in the event of a French invasion, which has generally been attributed to the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Blücher, did not exist.[803]

18. That the Duke, in the early morning hours of the 16th, ordered a general concentration of his army at Quatre Bras, as he says in his Report he did, is shown by an examination of his letter to Marshal Blücher, and a comparison of that letter with the statement as to the situation and destination at 7 A.M. of the 16th of the different divisions of his army, known as “The Disposition,” drawn up by Sir William De Lancey, the Deputy Quartermaster General, before the Duke left Brussels.[804]

19. That the Duke, in issuing the order for concentrating at Quatre Bras after he had become satisfied that Napoleon was concentrating in front of Blücher, was acting in strict accordance with the demands of the situation, is maintained:[805] but it is shown that it was several hours after Wellington received this information as to Blücher and Napoleon before he issued the order, and that this delay was not only uncalled for, but that it gravely imperilled the success of the allies.[806]

20. It is shown that it is not true that Blüchers decision to fight at Ligny was based on a promise of support from Wellington.[807]

21. Attention is called to the now generally admitted fact that it was not until the early morning hours of the 18th that Blücher was able to give Wellington definite assurance of his support in the battle of Waterloo.[808]

22. The evidence in regard to the story that the Duke rode over to Wavre on the evening of the 17th is given,[809] and, on that evidence, the story is rejected.

A few words in conclusion.

1. It does not seem to us that Napoleon can be charged with any lack of activity or decision of character, except on the morning after the battle of Ligny, when he was, as we imagine, pretty well tired out. But his energy speedily returned, and we find him conducting the pursuit of the English during the afternoon, and making an examination of their position in the mud and rain in the middle of the night.

2. Nor was there any defect in his plan of campaign. Had Ney executed his orders with promptness and without hesitation, the campaign would have been finished on the 16th of June, either by Ney’s furnishing the needed force to take the Prussians in rear at Brye and Wagnelée, or by his defeating Wellington badly by the help of the 1st Corps. If either of these things had happened, there could not possibly have been any battle of Waterloo; the Prussian and English armies would have been definitely separated; one, and perhaps both, would have been beaten; and never, in all probability, would they have acted together again. For this failure to achieve success on the second day of the campaign, Ney and not Napoleon was responsible.

3. But for not overwhelming at Quatre Bras on the early morning of the 17th the two-thirds of his army which Wellington had collected there, no one but Napoleon was responsible; and his failure to do this must be attributed to his excessive fatigue.

4. Then, for his neglect to ascertain the direction of the Prussian retreat on the same morning, Napoleon is responsible; and although Soult ought to have attended to this, in his capacity of chief-of-staff, yet, as the Emperor does not appear to have blamed him for not having reconnoitred in the direction of Wavre, we must consider Napoleon as open to this censure. It is true, it was not likely that Blücher had retired in the direction of Wavre; but it was of vital importance to know whether he had or not. Hence it was a great neglect not to find out.

5. Napoleon is also solely responsible for having persisted in his original design of detaching Grouchy in pursuit of the Prussians after he had reason to believe that they were intending to unite with the English, and to suspect, in fact, that they had been approaching the English during the previous night and morning; and for contenting himself with merely giving Grouchy a warning that this might be their intention. He laid upon Grouchy, in fact, a burden which to that officer, as Napoleon was well aware, was entirely new; hence, the Emperor was not warranted in risking so much on the chance of Grouchy’s being able to sustain it. It is this that Napoleon is to blame for in this connection; for having, when he saw that the Prussians might (as the Bertrand order expresses it) be “intending to unite with the English to cover Brussels in trying the fate of another battle,” persisted in adhering to his original plan,—devised when he and Grouchy and everybody else supposed that the Prussians had gone to Namur,—of sending Grouchy in pursuit of them with two _corps d’armée_. Many writers will have it that “Napoleon did not in the least foresee the flank march of the Prussians.”[810] This,—if to foresee be equivalent to expect,—may be true. But Napoleon certainly did, at 1 P.M. of the 17th, recognize the possibility of the Prussians uniting with the English; and the true criticism on him is, as it seems to us, that, having this in mind, as a possibility, he should have detached Marshal Grouchy with 33,000 men from the main army, and have been content to rely on Grouchy’s being able to prevent this project of the Prussians from being carried out. It must be added to this, that his neglect to send Grouchy any information of his own situation, and any orders as to what he expected him to do if he found the Prussians were marching to join Wellington or to attack the main French army, showed an unjustifiable reliance on the favors of fortune.

6. To Marshal Grouchy belongs the blame of having entirely failed to apprehend his mission, as indicated to him by the express warning contained in the Bertrand order. Had he acted intelligently in accordance with the information which he acquired in the night of the 17th and 18th, he could have prevented the Emperor from being overwhelmed by both the allied armies. At daybreak, as appears from his letter to Pajol, he knew that the Prussians had retired towards Wavre and Brussels. But the meaning of this fact he utterly failed to grasp. He made no change in his previously ordered dispositions, which this news should have shown him were wholly unsuited to the situation as now ascertained. Nor did the sound of the cannon of Waterloo produce on him a greater effect. He would not accept the suggestion of Gérard. He persisted in a course which completely isolated his command, and prevented it from playing any part in the events of that memorable day. Napoleon, as we have pointed out, made a great mistake in trusting so much to Grouchy’s good judgment; he took a wholly unnecessary risk; he might, as well as not, have taken Grouchy, with far the larger part of his command, with the main army; had he done so, the catastrophe of Waterloo could not, so far as we can judge, have happened. But had Grouchy acted up to the demands of the situation in which he found himself, he also would have averted the ruin which the unhindered union of the allies brought upon Napoleon and his army.

FOOTNOTES:

[782] Chapter I, and Notes: Notes to Chapter IV.

[783] _Ante_, pp. 64 _et seq._

[784] _Ante_, pp. 131, 132, 139.

[785] Chapter VIII., and Notes.

[786] _Ante_, pp. 184-186.

[787] _Ante_, p. 181.

[788] _Ante_, pp. 164 _et seq._

[789] _Ante_, p. 205.

[790] _Ante_, pp. 197 _et seq._

[791] _Ante_, p. 209.

[792] Chapter XV., note 1.

[793] _Ante_, p. 211; pp. 249 _et seq._

[794] _Ante_, p. 255; pp. 286 _et seq._

[795] _Ante_, pp. 268 _et seq._

[796] _Ante_, pp. 311 _et seq._; p. 330.

[797] _Ante_, pp. 314, 330.

[798] _Ante_, pp. 337, 338.

[799] _Ante_, pp. 316 _et seq._; pp. 331 _et seq._

[800] _Ante_, pp. 281 _et seq._

[801] _Ante_, pp. 259 _et seq._

[802] _Ante_, p. 328.

[803] _Ante_, pp. 70 _et seq._; p. 91.

[804] _Ante_, pp. 87 _et seq._

[805] _Ante_, p. 94.

[806] _Ante_, p. 89.

[807] Chap. X.

[808] _Ante_, p. 234.

[809] _Ante_, pp. 238 _et seq._

[810] Chesney, p. 207; Kennedy, pp. 163, 164.

APPENDIX A.

ON SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF NAPOLEON’S MEMOIRS.

Probably no military narratives that ever were written have been subjected to more harsh and unjust criticism than the two accounts of the campaign of Waterloo, which, under the names of the Gourgaud Narrative and the Memoirs, were dictated or written by Napoleon at St. Helena. To read the remarks of Charras, Chesney, Hooper, and others, about these books, one would suppose that a military narrative is the easiest, plainest sort of narrative to write, and that if a general wished to compose it properly he would isolate himself from his fellow-officers and subordinates, and get into some secluded corner of the world thousands of miles from the records of the war-department. For if this is not the view of these writers and of others like them, they are either ignorant of the extreme difficulty which attends the composition of a military narrative, or else are bent upon treating the fallen Emperor with gross injustice.

For instance, Napoleon says in his “Memoirs”[811] that “on the 14th _in the evening_,”[812] General Bourmont deserted to the enemy. The whole army broke camp in the early hours of the 15th. When the 4th Corps moved at five o’clock, it was discovered that Bourmont had left. Charras states that the staff-records of the 4th Corps, to which Bourmont belonged, mention that he deserted on the 15th, and that he wrote a letter to Gérard announcing his desertion dated at Philippeville on the 15th. But Napoleon at St. Helena had neither the staff-records of the 4th Corps to go by, nor the letter of Bourmont to Gérard. Yet Charras[813] calls the Emperor’s statement a designed misstatement (_une inexactitude calculée_).

But we have no disposition to dwell on harsh criticisms of this kind. Our purpose at present is to call attention to a peculiarity of Napoleon’s which may serve to explain the existence in his Memoirs of very definite statements which are apparently very wide of the truth. This peculiarity is, that while his orders to his lieutenants were often very general in their character,—pointing out clearly enough, it is true, the thing to be aimed at, or the danger to be feared,—but leaving entirely to the officer the course to be adopted if the emergency should arise,—yet these orders never seem to have been retained in Napoleon’s memory in the shape in which they were given, but what he did recall about them was his expectation that, on receiving his order, his lieutenant would act in such or such a manner. This expectation, that such or such action would be taken by his lieutenant on receiving such or such an order, was all that was left of the order in his mind; and, when he came to write his narrative, he would often (at any rate) state that he had given definite instructions to such or such an effect, when all he had really done was to give a general order, from the giving of which he expected such or such a course of action to be taken by his subordinate.

Thus, take the orders to Ney, issued on the afternoon of the 16th, at 2 and 3.15 P.M.[814] They were, as we have seen, very general in character; Ney was directed, after he should have beaten, or, at least, checked, the English, to turn round, and manœuvre so as to take the Prussians in flank and rear. But the “Memoirs”[815] say:—

“He [Napoleon] reiterated the order for him to push on in front of Quatre Bras; and, as soon as he should have taken position there, to detach a column of 8,000 infantry, with the cavalry-division of Lefebvre-Desnouettes, and 28 pieces of cannon, by the turnpike which ran from Quatre Bras to Namur, which he was to leave at the village of Marbais, in order to attack the heights of Brye, in the enemy’s rear.”

It is to be observed that the Memoirs make no mention of the orders which were actually sent to Ney that afternoon. And Napoleon sent to Ney no such order as this. What he here calls an order was really what he expected Ney to do when he should get the 2 and 3.15 P.M. orders. That this was so, appears from what follows:—

“After having made this detachment, there would still remain to him [Ney] in his position of Quatre Bras 32,000 men and 80 pieces of cannon, which would be sufficient to hold in check all the English troops which could be expected to arrive from their cantonments during the day of the 16th.”

That is,—the Emperor had figured it all out in his own head, as if he were in Ney’s place. Ney could spare so many men and so many guns; he would have so many men and so many guns left. But, in fact, the orders to Ney left it to him to make these calculations for himself.

Let us apply now this mode of working of Napoleon’s mind to his statements in regard to the orders which he says in his “Memoirs” he sent to Grouchy.[816]

“At ten o’clock in the evening the Emperor sent an officer to Marshal Grouchy, whom he supposed to be at Wavre, to inform him that there would be a great battle the next day; that the Anglo-Dutch army was in position in front of the Forest of Soignes, its left resting on the village of La Haye; that he ordered him to detach before daybreak from his camp at Wavre a division of 16,000 men of all arms and 16 pieces of cannon on St. Lambert, in order to connect with the main army and operate with it; that as soon as he should be assured that Blücher had evacuated Wavre, whether to continue his retreat on Brussels or to move in any other direction, he (Grouchy) was to march with the larger part of his troops to support the detachment which he had sent to St. Lambert.”

Thiers[817] finds in the minuteness of detail in which this supposed order is stated in the Memoirs a proof that it could not have been invented. We do not so regard the matter. To our mind, the terms in which Napoleon has, in the extract given above, framed what he says was the order which he sent to Grouchy, simply express the expectations formed in his own mind of what Grouchy would do, when, after having received the Bertrand order, he found that Blücher had fallen back towards the English. We think the orders sent to Ney on the afternoon of the battle of Ligny should serve as a guide to us here. We do not believe that Napoleon sent to Grouchy any such order as that which he gives in his Memoirs; but then we do believe that he sent him the Bertrand order, which he does not even mention in his Memoirs, and which in fact he no doubt forgot all about. And we believe that, having a distinct recollection of having sent Grouchy an order, and also a very distinct recollection of what he expected Grouchy would do when he got the order, he has fused the two things in his mind, and has given us his order in the terms of his expectations.

There is nothing very uncommon about this. It is certainly to be distinguished from deliberate misrepresentation. It is partly, at any rate, the result of an active imagination working on facts imperfectly recollected, but which have been dwelt upon until the mind has become disturbed and warped.

FOOTNOTES:

[811] Corresp., vol. 31, p. 251.

[812] The italics are ours.

[813] Charras, vol. 1, p. 104, n. 1.

[814] Doc. Inéd., XIII., p. 40; XIV., p. 24; App. C, xxv., xxvi; _post_, pp 383, 384.

[815] Corresp., vol. 31, p. 204.

[816] Corresp., vol. 31, p. 216; see, also, p. 212.

[817] Thiers, vol. xx, p. 95, n.

APPENDIX B.

ON MARSHAL GROUCHY AND THE BERTRAND ORDER.

We have stated (_ante_, p. 208) that Marshal Grouchy “denied, over and over again, in his pamphlets written about the battle, ever having received any written order, whether from Napoleon or Soult, until the next day (the 18th)”; and we have pointed out the grave misconceptions of the conduct of Napoleon which have been the result of these denials on the part of Marshal Grouchy, which, for many years, were very generally credited. We now propose to prove the truth of our statement.

In 1818 Marshal Grouchy published in Philadelphia his “_Observations sur la Relation de la Campagne de 1815 publiée par le Général Gourgaud_.” After giving an account of the verbal orders which Napoleon gave him, of his observations in regard to them, and of the Emperor’s reply (_ante_, p. 207), he says:—[818]

“Such are the only dispositions which were communicated to me; the only orders which I received.”

In the same pamphlet he says:—[819]

“But why, unceasingly repeats this ‘Combatant of Waterloo,’—why does not Marshal Grouchy publish the text of the orders which he received?

“The reason is simple. It is that they were only transmitted to me verbally. Those who have served under Napoleon know how rarely he gives them in writing. * * * If it is of any consequence to show that they were only verbal, I can find if not a proof, certainly a strong indication of it in the letter of the Major-General, Marshal Soult, in speaking of my march on Sartavalin. He expresses himself in these terms:—

“‘This movement is conformed to the dispositions which have been communicated to you.’

“He would not have failed to say to the instructions or the orders which I have transmitted to you, and which you are acting under, if I had received any except verbal orders.”

The point of this argument is fully seen only when we remember that the Bertrand order was dictated by the Emperor in the absence of Soult, the chief-of-staff, and therefore no copy of it was likely to be found on the regular official files. But fortune enabled Grouchy to make sure of this, for he had, soon after Waterloo, an opportunity of examining the records of the chief-of-staff.

Accordingly, we find him, soon afterwards,[820] in support of his denial of having received the orders alleged in the Memoirs to have been sent to him, saying, not, as he ought to have done, that he did receive an order through Bertrand, which, however, was entirely different in its tenor from those given in the Memoirs, but that he received on the 17th no written order at all.

“The proof of this is in the order-book and correspondence of the major-general, the organ of communication of the General-in-chief with his lieutenants. This irrefutable document, which, when I received the command of the army after the loss of the battle of Waterloo, came into my possession, shows that no orders or instructions except those contained in the two letters given herewith, and dated at 10 A.M. and 1 P.M. of the 18th, were ever sent to me.”

In a work published in Paris in 1829, speaking of the 10 A.M. order to him of the 18th of June, he says:—[821]

“This letter, and that dated from the field of battle of Waterloo, at one o’clock, are the only ones which I received and which were written to me on the 17th and 18th. The book of the orders and correspondence of the major-general, which I possess, proves this. It gives the hours at which orders are given, and the names of the officers who carry them; and its details do not permit a suspicion of an omission any more than of a misstatement.”

It is rather remarkable, to say the least, that General Bertrand should not have stated what he recollected about the matter. But he does not appear to have done so; unless the mention in Jomini’s “Political and Military History of the Campaign of Waterloo,”[822] that General Bertrand sent Grouchy a positive order to march on Gembloux, may be attributed to information received from Bertrand.

The Bertrand order first saw the light in 1842,—twenty-seven years after the battle of Waterloo. It was printed in a work entitled “_Notice Biographique sur le Maréchal de Grouchy, &c._,”[823] by E. Pascallet, editor of a Review treating of Biography, Politics and Letters. The biography is eulogistic. The order is accompanied by no explanation of the repeated denials, to which we have called attention above, of any such order ever having been received by the Marshal.[824]

After this publication, however, the Bertrand order was acknowledged in the memoirs of Marshal Grouchy. It is found in the work of the Marquis de Grouchy, published in 1864, entitled “_Le Maréchal de Grouchy du 16 au 19 juin, 1815_,”[825] written to refute the accusations of Thiers, and in the 4th volume[826] of the “_Mémoires du Maréchal de Grouchy_,” by his son, the Marquis. In neither of these books is there any attempt at explaining away the point blank denials of the Marshal’s having received any written order on the 17th of June. It would certainly not be easy to conjecture what explanation could be given. The order reads as follows (Pascallet, p. 79):—

“_Rendez-vous à Gembloux avec le corps de cavalerie de général Pajol, la cavalerie légère du quatrième corps, le corps de cavalerie du général Excelmans, la division du général Teste, dont vous aurez un soin particulier, étant détachée de son corps d’armée, et les troisième et quatrième corps d’infanterie. Vous vous ferez éclairer sur la direction de Namur et de Maestricht, et vous poursuivrez l’ennemi. Eclairez sa marche, et instruisez-moi de ses manoeuvres, de manière que je puisse pénétrer ce qu’il veut faire. Je porte mon quartier-général aux Quatre-Chemins, où ce matin étaient encore les Anglais. Notre communication sera donc directe par la route pavée de Namur. Si l’ennemi a évacué Namur, écrivez au général commandant la deuxième division militaire à Charlemont, de faire occuper Namur par quelques bataillons de garde nationale et quelques batteries de canon qu’il formera à Charlemont. Il donnera ce commandement à un maréchal-de-camp.”_

_Il est important de pénétrer ce que l’ennemi veut faire: ou il se sépare des Anglais, ou ils veulent se réunir encore, pour couvrir Bruxelles et Liège, en tentant le sort d’une nouvelle bataille. Dans tous les cas, tenez constamment vos deux corps d’infanterie réunis dans une lieue de terrain, et occupez tous les soirs une bonne position militaire, ayant plusieurs débouchés de retraite. Placez détachemens de cavalerie intermédiaires pour communiquer avec le quartier-général._

_Ligny, le 17 juin, 1815._

(_Dicté par l’empereur, en l’absence du major-général, au grand-maréchal Bertrand._)

Passing now to Marshal Grouchy’s report to the Emperor, dated Gembloux, June 17,1815, 10 P.M. This was printed for the first time in the Count Gérard’s “_Dernières Observations sur les Operations de l’Aile Droite de l’Armée Française à la Bataille de Waterloo_,” published in Paris in 1830. It reads as follows:—[827]

“_Sire_:

“_J’ai l’honneur de vous rendre compte que j’occupe Gembloux, et que ma cavalerie est à Sauvenières. L’ennemi, fort d’environ trente mille hommes, continue son mouvement de retraite; on lui a saisi ici un parc de 400 bêtes à cornes, des magasins et des bagages._

“_Il paraît d’après tous les rapports, qu’arrivés a Sauvenières, les Prussiens se sont divisés en deux colonnes: l’une a dû prendre la route de Wavres, en passant par Sart-à-Wallain; l’autre colonne paraît s’être dirigée sur Perwès._

“_On peut peut-être en inférer qu’une portion va joindre Wellington, et que le centre, qui est l’armée de Blücher, se rétire sur Liége: une autre colonne avec de l’artillerie ayant fait son mouvement de retraite par Namur, le général Excelmans a ordre de pousser ce soir six escadrons sur Sart-à-Wallain, et trois escadrons sur Perwès. D’après leur rapport, si la masse des Prussiens se retire sur Wavres, je la suivrai dans cette direction, afin qu’ils ne puissent pas gagner Bruxelles, et de les séparer de Wellington._

“_Si, au contraire, mes renseignements prouvent que la principale force prussienne a marché sur Perwès, je me dirigerai par cette ville à la poursuite de l’ennemi._

“_Les généraux Thielman et Borstell faisaient partie de l’armée que Votre Majesté a battue hier; ils étaient encore ce matin à 10 heures ici, et out annoncé que vingt mille hommes des leurs avaient été mis hors de combat. Ils ont demandé en partant les distances de Wavres, Perwès et Hannut. Blücher a été blessé légèrement au bras, ce qui ne l’a pas empêché de continuer à commander après s’être fait panser. Il n’a point passé par Gembloux._

_Je suis avec respect de Votre Majesté_, _Sire_, _Le fidèle sujet_, (_Signé_) _Le Maréchal Comte de Grouchy_.”

This version of Grouchy’s report from Gembloux has been adopted textually by all writers on the campaign,—Charras,[828] Siborne,[829] La Tour d’Auvergne,[830] Chesney,[831] Quinet,[832] the author of “Napoléon à Waterloo,”[833] and others.

The salient thing in this report is its response to the Bertrand order. That directed Grouchy to find out what the Prussians were intending to do, whether to separate from the English, or to unite with them to cover Brussels or Liége in trying the fate of another battle. Grouchy says in this despatch, that, if the mass of the Prussians retires on Wavre he will follow them in that direction _in order that they may not be able to gain Brussels and to separate them from Wellington_; but it on the contrary his information proves that their principal force is marching on Perwès he will march on that city in pursuit of the enemy. But in the Grouchy Memoirs this expression of intention is supplanted by another.[834]

The whole clause reads as follows:—

“_Si j’apprends par des rapports qui, j’espère, me parviendront pendant la nuit, que de fortes masses prussiennes se portent sur Wavre, je les suivrai dans cette direction, ET LES ATTAQUERAI DES QUE JE LES AURAI JOINTES._”[835]

This substitution of an expressed intention to attack the Prussians as soon as he should have caught up with them, if he finds them going to Wavre, is a radical departure from the received text. It is not difficult to see the motive for making this mutilation. Grouchy and his defenders were unwilling to allow that he had, in this despatch, expressed his intention of manœuvring with the object of separating the Prussians from Wellington, for that was exactly what he distinctly refused to do on the next day. And the reason which he alleged for refusing to follow Gérard’s advice was, that he had been told by the Emperor to follow the Prussians up closely, and attack them as soon as he should catch up with them. Hence, to admit that the received text of his 10 P.M. report on the 17th is correct, is to admit that Grouchy, at the time he wrote it, took a different view of his task from that which he put forward the next day, and ever afterwards maintained; it is, in fact, to admit that he had received, understood, and was intending to act under the Bertrand order, which warned him that the Prussians might be intending to unite with the English; that on that evening of the 17th, at any rate, he fully recognized the real danger to be feared, and regarded, as his great task, not the following on the heels of the Prussians, and attacking their rear guard, but manœuvring so as to prevent them from carrying out their purpose of joining the English.[836]

That the changes in the two Grouchy books are wilful mutilations of the correct text, made for the purpose stated above, appears sufficiently from the fact that the statement of what Grouchy was going to do, if he found the Prussians retiring on Perwès is entirely omitted, apart from the fact that not a single writer adopts the Grouchy version.

Charras puts it mildly in our opinion when he says of Grouchy,[837]—“He has not always been very exact, or very sincere.”

FOOTNOTES:

[818] Observations, Phila. ed. 1818, p. 13. In the Philadelphia edition of 1819, p. 12, and in the Paris edition, 1819, p. 13, the statement is made somewhat stronger by the insertion of the words “word for word.”

[819] Obs., Phila. ed., 1818, pp. 26, 27; ed. 1819, pp. 24, 25; Paris ed., pp. 30, 31.

[820] Doutes sur l’authenticité des Mémoires Historiques attribués à Napoléon. Par le Cte de Grouchy. Philadelphie; Avril, 1820.

[821] Fragments Historiques: Lettre à MM. Méry et Barthélemy, p. 5, note.

[822] Jomini, p. 149. Jomini’s Preface is dated in 1838.

[823] Pascallet, p. 79.

[824] _Cf._ Napoléon à Waterloo, p. 199, n.

[825] Le Mal de Grouchy en 1815, pp. 26-28.

[826] Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, pp. 50, 51.

[827] Gérard: Dem. Obs., p. 15.

[828] Charras, vol. 1, p. 244.

[829] Siborne, vol. 1, p. 297.

[830] La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 230.

[831] Chesney, p. 153.

[832] Quinet, p. 430.

[833] Napoléon à Waterloo, p. 219.

[834] Grouchy Mém., p. 58; see, also, p. 263, where the writer says that he has the original under his eyes. See, also, the same thing in the “Mal de Grouchy en 1815,” p. 37; and also p. 194, where Thiers is sharply taken to task for following the generally received version.

[835] The capitals are ours.

[836] _Cf._ Clausewitz, ch. 48, p. 131; ch. 50, p. 146.

[837] Charras, vol. 2, p. 53.

APPENDIX C.

I.

ADDRESS TO THE ARMY: June 14, 1815.

Corresp. Vol. 28, p. 324.

22052.—À L’ARMÉE.

AVESNES, 14 juin 1815.

Soldats, c’est aujourd’hui l’anniversaire de Marengo et de Friedland, qui décidèrent deux fois du destin de l’Europe. Alors, comme après Austerlitz, comme après Wagram, nous fûmes trop généreux; nous crûmes aux protestations et aux serments des princes que nous laissâmes sur le trône! Aujourd’hui, cependant, coalisés contre nous, ils en veulent à l’indépendance et aux droits les plus sacrés de la France. Ils ont commencé la plus injuste des agressions. Marchons donc à leur rencontre: eux et nous ne sommes-nous plus les mêmes hommes?

Soldats, à Iena, contre ces mêmes Prussiens aujourd’hui si arrogants, vous étiez un contre trois; à Montmirail, un contre six.

Que ceux d’entre vous qui ont été prisonniers des Anglais vous fassent le récit de leurs pontons et des maux affreux qu’ils ont soufferts!

Les Saxons, les Belges, les Hanovriens, les soldats de la Confédération du Rhin, gémissent d’être obligés de prêter leurs bras à la cause des princes ennemis de la justice et des droits de tous les peuples. Ils savent que cette coalition est insatiable. Après avoir dévoré douze millions de Polonais, douze millions d’Italiens, un million de Saxons, six millions de Belges, elle devra dévorer les états de deuxième ordre de l’Allemagne.

Les insensés! Un moment de prospérité les aveugle. L’oppression et l’humiliation du peuple français sont hors de leur pouvoir. S’ils entrent en France, ils y trouveront leur tombeau.

Soldats, nous avons des marches forcées à faire, des batailles à livrer, des périls à courir; mais, avec de la constance, la victoire sera à nous: les droits, l’honneur et le bonheur de la patrie seront reconquis.

Pour tout Français qui a du cœur, le moment est arrivé de vaincre ou de périr!

NAPOLÉON.

D’après la copie. Dépôt de la guerre.

II.

ORDER OF MOVEMENT: June 14, 1815.

Corresp. vol. 28, p. 325.

22053—ORDRE DE MOUVEMENT.

BEAUMONT, 14 juin 1815.

Demain 15, à deux heures et demie du matin, la division de cavalerie légère du général Vandamme montera à cheval et se portera sur la route de Charleroi. Elle enverra des partis dans toutes les directions pour éclairer le pays et enlever les postes ennemis; mais chacun de ces partis sera au moins de 50 hommes. Avant de mettre en marche la division, le général Vandamme s’assurera qu’elle est pourvue de cartouches.

A la même heure, le lieutenant général Pajol réunira le 1er corps de cavalerie et suivra le mouvement de la division du général Domon, qui sera sous les ordres du général Pajol. Les divisions du 1er corps de cavalerie ne fourniront point de détachements; ils seront pris dans la 3e division. Le général Domon laissera sa batterie d’artillerie pour marcher après le 1er bataillon du 3e corps d’infanterie; le lieutenant général Vandamme lui donnera des ordres en conséquence.

Le lieutenant général Vandamme fera battre la diane à deux heures et demie du matin; à trois heures, il mettra en marche son corps d’armée et le dirigera sur Charleroi. La totalité de ses bagages et embarras seront parqués en arrière, et ne se mettront en marche qu’après que le 6e corps et la Garde impériale auront passé. Ils seront sous les ordres du vaguemestre général, qui les réunira à ceux du 6e corps, de la Garde impériale et du grand quartier général, et leur donnera des ordres de mouvement.

Chaque division du 3e corps d’armée aura avec elle sa batterie et ces ambulances; toute autre voiture qui serait dans les rangs sera brûlée.

M. le comte de Lobau fera battre la diane à trois heures et demie, et il mettra en marche le 6e corps d’armée à quatre heures pour suivre le mouvement du général Vandamme et l’appuyer. Il fera observer, pour les troupes, l’artillerie, les ambulances et les bagages, le même ordre de marche qui est prescrit au 3e corps.

Les bagages du 6e corps seront réunis à ceux du 3e, sous les ordres du vaguemestre général, ainsi qu’il est dit.

La jeune Garde battra la diane à quatre heures et demie, et se mettra en marche à cinq heures; elle suivra le mouvement du 6e corps sur la route de Charleroi.

Les chasseurs à pied de la Garde battront la diane à quatre heures, et se mettront en marche à cinq heures et demie pour suivre le mouvement de la jeune Garde.

Les grenadiers à pied de la Garde battront la diane à cinq heures et demie, et partiront à six heures pour suivre le mouvement des chasseurs à pied.

Le même ordre de marche pour l’artillerie, les ambulances et les bagages, prescrit pour le 3e corps d’infanterie, sera observé dans la Garde impériale.

Les bagages de la Garde seront réunis à ceux des 3e et 6e corps d’armée, sous les ordres du vaguemestre général, qui les fera mettre en mouvement.

M. le maréchal Grouchy fera monter à cheval, à cinq heures et demie du matin, celui des trois autres corps de cavalerie qui sera le plus près de la route, et il lui fera suivre le mouvement sur Charleroi; les deux autres corps partiront successivement à une heure d’intervalle l’un de l’autre. Mais M. le maréchal Grouchy aura soin de faire marcher la cavalerie sur les chemins latéraux de la route principale que la colonne d’infanterie suivra, afin d’éviter l’encombrement et aussi pour que sa cavalerie observe un meilleur ordre.

Il prescrira que la totalité des bagages restent en arrière, parqués et réunis, jusqu’ au moment où le vaguemestre général leur donnera l’ordre d’avancer.

M. le comte Reille fera battre la diane à deux heures et demie du matin, et il mettra en marche le 2e corps à trois heures; il le dirigera sur Marchienne-au-Pont, où il fera en sorte d’être rendu avant neuf heures du matin. Il fera garder tous les ponts de la Sambre, afin que personne ne passe; les postes qu’il laissera seront successivement relevés par le 1er corps; mais il doit tâcher de prévenir l’ennemi à ces ponts pour qu’ils ne soient pas détruits, surtout celui de Marchienne, par lequel il sera probablement dans le cas de déboucher, et qu’il faudrait faire aussitôt réparer s’il avait été endommagé.

A Thuin et à Marchienne, ainsi que dans tous les villages sur sa route, M. le comte Reille interrogera les habitants, afin d’avoir des nouvelles des positions et forces des armées ennemies. Il fera aussi prendre les lettres dans les bureaux de poste et les dépouillera pour faire aussitôt parvenir à l’Empereur les renseignements qu’il aura obtenus.

M. le comte d’Erlon mettra en marche le 1er corps à trois heures du matin, et le dirigera aussi sur Charleroi, en suivant le mouvement du 2e corps, duquel il gagnera la gauche le plus tôt possible, pour le soutenir et l’appuyer au besoin. Il tiendra une brigade de cavalerie en arrière, pour se couvrir et pour maintenir par de petits détachements ses communications avec Maubeuge. Il enverra des partis en avant de cette place, dans les directions de Mons et de Binche, jusqu’ à la frontière, pour avoir des nouvelles des ennemis et en rendre compte aussitôt; ces partis auront soin de ne pas se compromettre et de ne pas dépasser la frontière.

M. le comte d’Erlon fera occuper Thuin par une division; et, si le pont de cette ville était détruit, il le ferait aussitôt réparer, en même temps qu’il fera tracer et exécuter immédiatement une tête de pont sur la rive gauche. La division qui sera à Thuin gardera aussi le pont de l’abbaye d’Aulne, où M. le comte d’Erlon fera également construire une tête de pont sur la rive gauche.

Le même ordre de marche prescrit au 3e corps pour l’artillerie, les ambulances et les bagages, sera observé aux 2 e et 1er corps, qui feront réunir et marcher leurs bagages à la gauche du 1er corps sous les ordres du vaguemestre le plus ancien.

Le 4e corps (armée de la Moselle) a reçu ordre de prendre aujourd’hui position en avant de Philippeville. Si son mouvement est opéré et si les divisions qui composent ce corps d’armée sont réunies, M. le lieutenant général Gérard les mettra en marche demain à trois heures du matin, et les dirigera sur Charleroi. Il aura soin de se tenir à hauteur du 3e corps, avec lequel il communiquera, afin d’arriver à peu près en même temps devant Charleroi; mais le général Gérard fera éclairer sa droite et tous les débouchés qui vont sur Namur. Il marchera serré en ordre de bataille, et fera laisser à Philippeville tous ses bagages et embarras, afin que son corps d’armée, se trouvant plus léger, se trouve à même de manœuvrer.

Le général Gérard donnera ordre à la 14e division de cavalerie, qui a dû aussi arriver aujourd’hui à Philippeville, de suivre le mouvement de son corps d’armée sur Charleroi, où cette division joindra le 4e corps de cavalerie.

Les lieutenants généraux Reille, Vandamme, Gérard et Pajol se mettront en communication par de fréquents partis, et ils régleront leur marche de manière à arriver en masse et ensemble devant Charleroi. Ils mettront, autant que possible, à l’avant-garde des officiers qui parlent flamand, pour interroger les habitants et en prendre des renseignements; mais ces officiers s’annonceront comme commandant des partis, sans dire que l’armée est en arrière.

Les lieutenants généraux Reille, Vandamme et Gérard feront marcher tous les sapeurs de leurs corps d’armée (ayant avec eux des moyens pour réparer les ponts) après le premier régiment d’infanterie légère, et ils donneront ordre aux officiers du génie de faire réparer les mauvais passages, ouvrir des communications latérales et placer des ponts sur les courants d’eau où l’infanterie devrait se mouiller pour les franchir.

Les marins, les sapeurs de la Garde et les sapeurs de la réserve marcheront après le premier régiment du 3e corps. Les lieutenants généraux Rogniat et Haxo seront à leur tête; ils n’emmèneront avec eux que deux ou trois voitures; le surplus du parc du génie marchera à la gauche du 3e corps. Si on rencontre l’ennemi, ces troupes ne seront point engagées, mais les généraux Rogniat et Haxo les emploieront aux travaux de passages de rivière, de têtes de pont, de réparation de chemins et d’ouverture de communications etc.

La cavalerie de la Garde suivra le mouvement sur Charleroi et partira à huit heures.

L’Empereur sera à l’avant-garde, sur la route de Charleroi. MM. les lieutenants généraux auront soin d’envoyer à Sa Majesté de fréquents rapports sur leurs mouvements et les renseignements qu’ils auront recueillis. Ils sont prévenus que l’intention de Sa Majesté est d’avoir passé la Sambre avant midi, et de porter l’armée à la rive gauche de cette rivière.

L’équipage de ponts sera divisé en deux sections; la première section se subdivisera en trois parties, chacune de 5 pontons et 5 bateaux d’avant-garde, pour jeter trois ponts sur la Sambre. Il y aura à chacune de ces subdivisions une compagnie de pontonniers.

La première section marchera à la suite du parc du génie après le 3e corps.

La deuxième section restera avec le parc de réserve d’artillerie à la colonne des bagages; elle aura avec elle la 4e compagnie de pontonniers.

Les équipages de l’Empereur et les bagages du grand quartier général seront réunis et se mettront en marche à dix heures. Aussitôt qu’il seront passés, le vaguemestre général fera partir les équipages de la Garde impériale, du 3e corps et du 6e corps; en même temps, il enverra ordre à la colonne d’équipages de la réserve de cavalerie de se mettre en marche et de suivre la direction que la cavalerie aura prise.

Les ambulances de l’armée suivront le quartier général et marcheront en tête des bagages; mais, dans aucun cas, ces bagages, ainsi que les parcs de réserve de l’artillerie et la seconde section de l’équipage de ponts, ne s’approcheront à plus de trois lieues de l’armée, à moins d’ordres du major général, et ils ne passeront la Sambre aussi que par ordre.

Le vaguemestre général formera des divisions de ces bagages, et il y mettra des officiers pour les commander, afin de pouvoir en détacher ce qui sera ensuite appelé au quartier général ou pour le service des officiers.

L’intendant général fera réunir à cette colonne d’équipages la totalité des bagages et transports de l’administration, auxquels il sera assigné un rang dans la colonne.

Les voitures qui seront en retard prendront la gauche, et ne pourront sortir du rang qui leur sera donné que par ordre du vaguemestre général.

L’Empereur ordonne que toutes les voitures d’équipages qui seront trouvées dans les colonnes d’infanterie, de cavalerie ou d’artillerie, soient brûlées, ainsi que les voitures de la colonne des équipages qui quitteront leur rang et intervertiront l’ordre de marche sans la permission expresse du vaguemestre général.

A cet effet, il sera mis un détachement de 50 gendarmes à la disposition du vaguemestre général, qui est responsable, ainsi que tous les officiers de la gendarmerie et les gendarmes, de l’exécution de ces dispositions, desquelles le succès de la campagne peut dépendre.

Par ordre le l’Empereur:

Le maréchal de l’Empire, major général,

Duc de Dalmatie.

D’après l’original. Dépôt de la guerre.

III.

Doc. Inéd., p. 22.

15 Juin.

A M. LE COMTE REILLE.

COMMANDANT LE 2e CORPS D’ARMÉE.

Monsieur le comte Reille, l’empereur m’ordonne de vous écrire de passer la Sambre, si vous n’avez pas de forces devant vous, et de vous former sur plusieurs lignes, à une ou deux lieues en avant, de manière à être à cheval sur la grande route de Bruxelles, en vous éclairant fortement dans la direction de Fleurus. M. le comte d’Erlon passera à Marchiennes et se formera en bataille sur la route de Mons à Charleroi, où il sera à portée de vous soutenir au besoin.

Si vous êtes encore à Marchiennes lorsque le présent ordre vous parviendra, et que le mouvement par Charleroi ne pût avoir lieu, vous l’opéreriez toujours par Marchiennes, mais toujours pour remplir les dispositions ci-dessus.

L’empereur se rend devant Charleroi. Rendez compte immédiatement à Sa Majesté de vos opérations et de ce qui se passe devant vous.

Le maréchal d’empire, major général,

Duc de Dalmatie.

Au bivouac de Jumignon, le 15 juin, 1815, à 8 heures et demie du matin.

IV.

Doc. Inéd., p. 24.

A M. LE COMTE D’ERLON.

Bivouac de Jumignon, 15 juin, 10 heures du matin.

Monsieur le Comte, l’empereur m’ordonne de vous écrire que M. le comte Reille reçoit ordre de passer la Sambre à Charleroi, et de se former sur plusieurs lignes à une ou deux lieues en avant, à cheval sur la grande route de Bruxelles.

L’intention de Sa Majesté est aussi que vous passiez la Sambre à Marchiennes, ou à Ham, pour vous porter sur la grande route de Mons à Charleroi, où vous vous formerez sur plusieurs lignes, et prendrez des positions qui vous rapprocheront de M. le comte Reille, liant vos communications et envoyant des partis des toutes les directions: Mons, Nivelles, etc. Ce mouvement aurait également lieu si M. le comte Reille était obligé d’effectuer son passage par Marchiennes. Rendez-moi compte de suite de vos opérations et de ce qui se passe devant vous; l’empereur sera devant Charleroi.

V.

ORDER TO THE COUNT D’ERLON: 3 P.M., June 15, 1815.

Doc. Inéd., p. 25.

A M. LE COMTE D’ERLON.

(EXTRAIT DU REGISTRE DU MAJOR GÉNÉRAL.)

En avant de Charleroi, à 3 heures du soir, 15 juin 1815.

Monsieur le comte d’Erlon, l’empereur ordonne à M. le comte Reille de marcher sur Gosselies, et d’y attaquer un corps ennemi qui paraissait s’y arrêter. L’intention de l’empereur est que vous marchiez aussi sur Gosselies, pour appuyer le comte Reille et le seconder dans ses opérations. Cependant, vous devrez toujours faire garder Marchiennes, et vous enverrez une brigade sur les routes de Mons, lui recommandant de se garder très militairement.

VI.

SUBSEQUENT ORDER TO THE COUNT D’ERLON: June 15, 1815.

Doc. Inéd., p. 25.

A M. LE COMTE D’ERLON,

COMMANDANT LE 1ER CORPS.

Charleroi, le 15 juin 1815.

Monsieur le Comte, l’intention de l’empereur est que vous ralliez votre corps sur la rive gauche de la Sambre, pour joindre le 2e corps à Gosselies, d’après les ordres que vous donnera à ce sujet M. le maréchal prince de la Moskowa.

Ainsi, vous rappellerez les troupes que vous avez laissées à Thuin, Sobre et environs; vous devrez cependant avoir toujours de nombreux partis sur votre gauche pour éclairer la route de Mons.

Le maréchal d’empire, major général, Duc de Dalmatie.

VII.

ORDER TO GENERAL NOGUÈS: 3 A.M., June 16, 1815.

“Napoléon à Waterloo,” p. 144.

Ordre de mouvement adressé par l’adjudant commandant, chef d’état-major de la 3e division du 1er corps, au général Noguès, commandant la 1er brigade de cette division.

Quartier général à Marchienne-au-Pont: 16 juin (trois heures du matin).

D’après l’intention du général en chef, le lieutenant général me charge de vous inviter à faire partir de suite votre brigade pour être rendue à six heures du matin, et plus tôt s’il était possible, à Gosselies.

L’adjudant commandant, chef d’état-major: Ch. d’Arsonval.

P.S.

La 2e brigade reste ici jusqu’à l’arrivée de la première division, pour se rendre ensemble à la même destination.

This indicates that at 3 A.M. of the 16th, while the 4th division (Durutte’s) was in bivouac beyond Jumet (Doc. Inéd., Durutte’s statement, p. 71, where he gives Gosselies, where the Second Corps was, by mistake for Jumet), the 2d Division (Donzelot’s) must also have crossed the river, the 3d division (Marcognet’s) was at Marchienne, and the 1st (Allix’) had not yet reached the Sambre.

VIII.

BULLETIN OF THE ARMY: June 15, 1815: Evening.

Corresp. vol. 28, p. 331.

22056.—BULLETIN DE L’ARMÉE.

CHARLEROI, 15 juin 1815, au soir.

Le 14, l’armée était placée de la manière suivante:

Le quartier impérial à Beaumont.

Le 1er corps, commandé par le général d’Erlon, était à Solre, sur la Sambre.

Le 2e corps, commandé par le général Reille, était à Ham-sur-Heure.

Le 3e corps, commandé par le général Vandamme, était sur la droite de Beaumont.

Le 4e corps, commandé par le général Gérard, arrivait à Philippeville.

Le 15, à trois heures du matin, le général Reille attaqua l’ennemi et se porta sur Marchienne-au-Pont. Il eut différents engagements dans lesquels sa cavalerie chargea un bataillon prussien et fit 300 prisonniers.

A une heure du matin, l’Empereur était à Jamioulx-sur-Heure.

La division de cavalerie légère du général Domon sabra deux bataillons prussiens et fit 400 prisonniers.

Le général Pajol entra à Charleroi à midi. Les sapeurs et les marins de la Garde étaient à l’avant-garde pour réparer les ponts; ils pénétrèrent les premiers en tirailleurs dans la ville. Le général Clary, avec le 1er de hussards, se porta sur Gosselies, sur la route de Bruxelles, et le général Pajol sur Gilly, sur la route de Namur.

A trois heures après midi, le général Vandamme déboucha avec son corps sur Gilly.

Le maréchal Grouchy arriva avec la cavalerie du général Exelmans.

L’ennemi occupait la gauche de la position de Fleurus. A cinq heures après midi, l’Empereur ordonna l’attaque. La position fut tournée et enlevée. Les quatre escadrons de service de la Garde, commandés par le général Letort, aide-de-camp de l’Empereur, enfoncèrent trois carrés; les 26e, 27e et 28e régiments prussiens furent mis en déroute. Nos escadrons sabrèrent 400 ou 500 hommes et firent 1,500 prisonniers.

Pendant ce temps, le général Reille passait la Sambre à Marchienne-au-Pont, pour se porter sur Gosselies avec les divisions du prince Jérôme et du général Bachelu, attaquait l’ennemi, lui faisait 250 prisonniers et le poursuivait sur la route de Bruxelles.

Nous devînmes ainsi maîtres de toute la position de Fleurus.

A huit heures du soir, l’Empereur rentra à son quartier général à Charleroi.

Cette journée coûte à l’ennemi cinq pièces de canon et 2,000 hommes, dont 1,000 prisonniers. Notre perte est de 10 hommes tués et de 80 blessés, la plupart des escadrons de service, qui ont fait les charges, et des trois escadrons de 20e de dragons, qui ont aussi chargé un carré avec la plus grande intrépidité. Notre perte, légère quant au nombre, a été sensible à l’Empereur, par la blessure grave qu’a reçue le général Letort, son aide-de-camp, en chargeant à la tête des escadrons de service. Cet officier est de la plus grande distinction. Il a été frappé d’une balle au bas-ventre, et le chirurgien fait craindre que sa blessure ne soit mortelle.

Nous avons trouvé à Charleroi quelques magasins. La joie des Belges ne saurait se décrire. Il y a des villages qui, à la vue de leurs libérateurs, ont formé des danses, et partout c’est un élan qui part du cœur.

Dans le rapport de l’état-major général, on insérera les noms des officiers et soldats qui se sont distingués.

L’Empereur a donné le commandement de la gauche au prince de la Moskova, qui a eu le soir son quartier général aux Quatre-Chemins, sur la route de Bruxelles.

Le due de Trévise, à qui l’Empereur avait donné le commandement de la jeune Garde, est resté à Beaumont, malade d’une sciatique qui l’a forcé de se mettre au lit.

Le 4e corps, commandé par le général Gérard, arrive ce soir à Châtelet. Le général Gérard a rendu compte que le lieutenant général Bourmont, le colonel Clouet et le chef d’escadron Villoutreys ont passé à l’ennemi. Un lieutenant du 11e de chasseurs a également passé à l’ennemi. Le major général a ordonné que ces déserteurs fussent sur-le-champ jugés conformément aux lois.

Rien ne peut peindre le bon esprit el l’ardeur de l’armée. Elle regarde comme un événement heureux la désertion de ce petit nombre de traîtres, qui se démasquent ainsi.

Extrait du Moniteur du 18 juin 1815.

IX.

WELLINGTON’S FIRST MEMORANDUM OF ORDERS: June 15, 1815.

Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 472.

MEMORANDUM

FOR THE DEPUTY QUARTER MASTER GENERAL.

MOVEMENTS OF THE ARMY.

BRUXELLES, 15 June, 1815.

General Dörnberg’s brigade of cavalry, and the Cumberland Hussars, to march this night upon Vilvorde, and to bivouac on the high road near to that town.

The Earl of Uxbridge will be pleased to collect the cavalry this night at Ninhove, leaving the 2d hussars looking out between the Scheldt and the Lys.

The 1st division of infantry to collect this night at Ath and adjacent, and to be in readiness to move at a moment’s notice.

The third division to collect this night at Braine le Comte, and to be in readiness to move at the shortest notice.

The 4th division to be collected this night at Grammont, with the exception of the troops beyond the Scheldt, which are to be moved to Audenarde.

The 5th division, the 81st regiment, and the Hanoverian brigade of the 6th division, to be in readiness to march from Bruxelles at a moment’s notice.

The Duke of Brunswick’s corps to collect this night on the high road between Bruxelles and Vilvorde.

The Nassau troops to collect at daylight to-morrow morning on the Louvain road, and to be in readiness to move at a moment’s notice.

The Hanoverian brigade of the 5th division to collect this night at Hal, and to be in readiness at daylight to-morrow morning to move towards Bruxelles, and to halt on the high road between Alost and Assche for further orders.

The Prince of Orange is requested to collect at Nivelles the 2d and 3d divisions of the army of the Low Countries; and, should that point have been attacked this day, to move the 3d division of British infantry upon Nivelles as soon as collected.

This movement is not to take place until it is quite certain that the enemy’s attack is upon the right of the Prussian army, and the left of the British army.

Lord Hill will be so good as to order Prince Frederick of Orange to occupy Audenarde with 500 men, and to collect the 1st division of the army of the Low Countries and the Indian brigade at Sotteghem, so as to be ready to march in the morning at daylight.

The reserve artillery to be in readiness to move at daylight.

WELLINGTON.

X.

WELLINGTON’S LETTER TO THE DUC DE FELTRE: 10 P.M., June 15, 1815.

Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 473.

TO THE DUC DE FELTRE.

à BRUXELLES, ce 15 juin, 1815.

à 10 heures du soir.

MONSIEUR LE DUC:

Je reçois les nouvelles que l’ennemi attaqua les postes Prussiens ce matin à Thuin sur la Sambre, et il paraissait menacer Charleroi. Je n’ai rien reçu depuis neuf heures du matin de Charleroi. * * * *

WELLINGTON.

XI.

WELLINGTON’S “AFTER ORDERS”: 10 P.M., June 15, 1815.

Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 474.

MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY.

AFTER ORDERS, 10 O’CLOCK P.M.

BRUXELLES, 15th June, 1815.

The 3d division of infantry to continue its movement from Braine le Comte upon Nivelles.

The 1st division to move from Enghien upon Braine le Comte.

The 2d and 4th divisions of infantry to move from Ath and Grammont, also from Audenarde, and to continue their movements upon Enghien.

The cavalry to continue its movement from Ninhove upon Enghien.

The above movements to take place with as little delay as possible.

WELLINGTON.

XII.

EXTRACT FROM WELLINGTON’S REPORT OF THE OPERATIONS: June 19, 1815.

Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 478.

TO EARL BATHURST.

WATERLOO, 19th June, 1815.

MY LORD,

Buonaparte, having collected the 1st, 2d, 3d, 4th, and 6th corps of the French army, and the Imperial Guards and nearly all the cavalry, on the Sambre, and between that river and the Meuse, between the 10th and 14th of the month, advanced on the 15th and attacked the Prussian posts at Thuin and Lobbes, on the Sambre, at daylight in the morning.

I did not hear of these events till in the evening of the 15th; and I immediately ordered the troops to prepare to march, and afterwards to march to their left, as soon as I had intelligence from other quarters to prove that the enemy’s movement upon Charleroi was the real attack.

The enemy drove the Prussian posts from the Sambre on that day; and General Ziethen, who commanded the corps which had been at Charleroi, retired upon Fleurus; and Marshal Prince Blücher concentrated the Prussian army upon Sombref, holding the villages in front of his position of St. Amand and Ligny.

The enemy continued his march along the road from Charleroi towards Bruxelles; and, on the same evening, the 15th, attacked a brigade of the army of the Netherlands, under the Prince de Weimar, posted at Frasne, and forced it back to the farmhouse, on the same road, called Les Quatre Bras.

The Prince of Orange immediately reinforced this brigade with another of the same division, under General Perponcher, and, in the morning early, regained part of the ground which had been lost, so as to have the command of the communication leading from Nivelles and Bruxelles with Marshal Blücher’s position.

In the meantime, I had directed the whole army to march upon Les Quatre Bras; and the 5th division, under Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Picton, arrived at about half-past two in the day, followed by the corps of troops under the Duke of Brunswick, and afterwards by the contingent of Nassau.

At this time the enemy commenced an attack upon Prince Blücher with his whole force, excepting the 1st and 2d corps, and a corps of cavalry under General Kellermann, with which he attacked our post at Les Quatre Bras.

* * *

I should not do justice to my own feelings, or to Marshal Blücher and the Prussian army, if I did not attribute the successful result of this arduous day to the cordial and timely assistance I received from them. The operation of General Bülow upon the enemy’s flank was a most decisive one; and, even if I had not found myself in a situation to make the attack which produced the final result, it would have forced the enemy to retire if his attacks should have failed, and would have prevented him from taking advantage of them if they should unfortunately have succeeded.

* * *

I have the honor to be, &c.

WELLINGTON.

EARL BATHURST.

XIII.

WELLINGTON’S CONVERSATION WITH THE DUKE OF RICHMOND: June 16, 1815.

Letters of the First Earl of Malmesbury, London; Bentley. 1870. vol. 2, p. 445.

CAPTAIN BOWLES[838] TO LORD FITZHARRIS.

ORIGINAL MEMORANDUM BY THE WRITER.

At the Duchess of Richmond’s ball at Brussels the Prince of Orange, who commanded the 1st division of the army, came back suddenly, just as the Duke of Wellington had taken his place at the supper table, and whispered some minutes to his Grace, who only said he had no fresh orders to give, and recommended the Prince to go back to his quarters and go to bed.

The Duke of Wellington remained nearly twenty minutes after this, and then said to the Duke of Richmond, “I think it is time for me to go to bed likewise;” and then, whilst wishing him good-night, whispered to ask him if he had a good map in his house. The Duke of Richmond said he had, and took him into his dressing-room, which opened into the supper-room. The Duke of Wellington shut the door and said, “Napoleon has _humbugged_ me (by G—), he has gained twenty-four hours’ march on me.” The Duke of Richmond said, “What do you intend doing?”

The Duke of Wellington replied, “I have ordered the army to concentrate at Quatre Bras; but we shall not stop him there, and if so I must fight him _here_” (at the same time passing his thumb-nail over the position of Waterloo). He then said adieu and left the house by another way out. He went to his quarters, slept six hours and breakfasted, and rode at speed to Quatre Bras, where he met Hardinge and went with him to Blücher, who took him over the position at Ligny. The Duke of Wellington suggested many alterations, but Blücher would not consent to move a man.

The conversation in the Duke of Richmond’s dressing-room was repeated to me, two minutes after it occurred, by the Duke of Richmond, who was to have had the command of the reserve, if formed, and to whom I was to have been aide-de-camp. He marked the Duke of Wellington’s thumb-nail with his pencil on the map, and we often looked at it together some months afterwards.

XIV.

WELLINGTON’S ORDERS TO LORD HILL: June 16, 1815.

Gurwood, vol. xii, p. 474.

INSTRUCTIONS

For the Movement of the Army on the 16th.[839]

Signed by Colonel Sir W. De Lancey, Deputy Quarter Master General.

To General Lord Hill, G. C. B.

16th June, 1815.

The Duke of Wellington requests that you will move the 2d division of infantry upon Braine le Comte immediately. The cavalry has been ordered likewise on Braine le Comte. His Grace is going to Waterloo.

To General Lord Hill, G. C. B.

16th June, 1815.

Your Lordship is requested to order Prince Frederick of Orange to move, immediately upon the receipt of this order, the 1st division of the army of the Low Countries, and the Indian brigade, from Sotteghem to Enghien, leaving 500 men, as before directed, in Audenarde.

XV.

EXTRACT FROM WELLINGTON’S “MEMORANDUM ON THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO.”

SUPPLEMENTARY DESPATCHES, &c., of the Duke of Wellington: vol. x, pp. 523 _et seq._

But what follows will show that, notwithstanding the extension of the Allied army under the command of the Duke of Wellington, such was the celerity of communication with all parts of it, that in point of fact[840] _his orders reached all parts of the army in six hours after he had issued them_; and that he was in line in person with a sufficient force to resist and keep in check the enemy’s corps which first attacked the Prussian corps under General Zieten at daylight on the 15th of June; having received the intelligence of that attack _only at three o’clock in the afternoon of the 15th, he was at Quatre Bras before the same hour on the morning of the 16th,[841] with a sufficient force to engage the left of the French army_.

It was certainly true that he had known for some days of the augmentation of the enemy’s force on the frontier, and even of the arrival of Buonaparte at the army; but he did not deem it expedient to make any movement, excepting for the assembly of the troops at their several alarm posts, till he should hear of the decided movement of the enemy.

The first account received by the Duke of Wellington was from the Prince of Orange, who had come in from the out-posts of the army of the Netherlands to dine with the Duke at three o’clock in the afternoon. He reported that the enemy had attacked the Prussians at Thuin; that they had taken possession of, but had afterwards abandoned, Binch; that they had not yet touched the positions of the army of the Netherlands. While the Prince was with the Duke, the staff officer employed by Prince Blücher at the Duke’s headquarters, General Müffling, came to the Duke to inform him that he had just received intelligence of the movement of the French army and their attack upon the Prussian troops at Thuin.

It appears by the statement of the historian[842] that the posts of the Prussian corps of General Zieten were attacked at Thuin at four o’clock on the morning of the 15th; and that General Zieten himself, with a part of his corps, retreated and was at Charleroi at about ten o’clock on that day; yet the report thereof was not received at Bruxelles till three o’clock in the afternoon. The Prussian cavalry of the corps of Zieten was at Gosselies and Fleurus on the evening and night of the 15th.

Orders were forthwith sent for the march of the whole army to its left.

The whole moved on that evening and in the night, each division and portion separately, but unmolested; the whole protected on the march by the defensive works constructed at the different points referred to, and by their garrisons.

The reserve, which had been encamped in the neighborhood and cantoned in the town and in the neighborhood of Bruxelles, were ordered to assemble in and in the neighborhood of the park at Bruxelles, which they did on that evening; and they marched in the morning of the 16th upon Quatre Bras, towards which post the march of all the troops consisting of the left and centre of the army, and of the cavalry in particular, was directed.

_The Duke went in person at daylight in the morning of the 16th to Quatre Bras_, where he found some Netherland troops, cavalry, infantry, and artillery, which had been engaged with the enemy, but lightly; and he went on from thence to the Prussian army,[843] which was in sight, formed on the heights behind Ligny and St. Amand. He there communicated personally with Marshal Prince Blücher and the headquarters of the Prussian army.

In the meantime the reserve of the Allied army under the command of the Duke of Wellington arrived at Quatre Bras. _The historian asserts that the Duke of Wellington had ordered these troops to halt at the point at which they quitted the Forêt de Soignies. He can have no proof of this fact,[844] of_ _which there is no evidence_;[845] and in point of fact the two armies _were united about mid-day_ of the 16th of June, on the left of the position of the Allied army under the command of the Duke of Wellington. These troops, forming the reserve, and having arrived from Bruxelles, were _now_ joined by those of the _1st division of infantry,[846] and the cavalry_; and notwithstanding the criticism of the Prussian historian on the positions occupied by the army under the command of the Duke of Wellington, and on the march of the troops to join with the Prussian army, _it is a fact_, appearing upon the face of the History, _that the Allied British and Netherland army was in line at Quatre Bras, not only twenty-four hours sooner than one whole corps of the Prussian army under General Bülow, the absence of which is attributed by the historian to an accidental mistake, but likewise before the whole of the corps under General Zieten, which had been the first attacked on the 15th, had taken its position in the line of the army assembled on the heights behind Ligny, and having their left at Sombref_.

It was perfectly true that the Duke of Wellington did not at first give credit to the reports of the intention of the enemy to attack by the valleys of the Sambre and the Meuse.

The enemy had destroyed the roads leading through those valleys, and he considered that Buonaparte might have made his attack upon the Allied armies in the Netherlands and in the provinces on the left of the Rhine by other lines with more advantage. But it is obvious that, when the attack was made, he was not unprepared to assist in resisting it: and, in point of fact, did, on the afternoon and in the evening of the 16th June, repulse the attack of Marshal Ney upon his position at Quatre Bras, which had been commenced by the aid of another corps d’armée under General Reille. These were the troops which had attacked on the 15th, at daylight, the Prussian corps under General Zieten, which corps the Allied troops, under the Duke of Wellington, relieved in resistance to the enemy.

XVI.

WELLINGTON’S LETTER TO BLÜCHER: 10.30 A.M., June 16, 1815.

Ollech, opposite p. 124.

Sur les hauteurs derrière Frasne le 16me Juin 1815 à 10 heures et demi.

Mon cher Prince:

Mon armée est situé comme il suit:

Le Corps d’Armée du Prince d’Orange a une division ici et à Quatre Bras; et le reste à Nivelles.

La Reserve est en marche de Waterloo sur Genappe; ou elle arrivera à Midi.

La Cavalerie Anglaise sera à la même heure à Nivelles.

Le Corps de Lord Hill est à Braine le Comte.

Je ne vois pas beaucoup de l’ennemi en avant de nous; et j’attends les nouvelles de votre Altesse, et l’arrivée des troupes pour décider mes opérations pour la journée.

Rien n’a paru du côté de Binch, ni sur notre droite.

Votre très obéissant serviteur

Wellington.

XVII.

SOULT’S FIRST ORDER TO NEY: June 16, 1815.

Doc. Inéd., p. 26.

A M. LE MARÉCHAL

PRINCE DE LA MOSKOWA.

Charleroi, le 16 juin 1815.

Monsieur le maréchal, l’empereur vient d’ordonner à M. le comte de Valmy, commandant le 3e corps de cavalerie, de le réunir et de le diriger sur Gosselies, où il sera à votre disposition.

L’intention de Sa Majesté est qui la cavalerie de la garde, qui a été portée sur la route de Bruxelles, reste en arrière et rejoigne le restant de la garde impériale; mais, pour qu’elle ne fasse pas de mouvement rétrograde, vous pourrez, après l’avoir fait remplacer sur la ligne, la laisser un peu en arrière, où il lui sera envoyé des ordres dans le mouvement de la journée—M. le lieutenant général Lefebvre Desnoëttes enverra, à cet effet, un officier pour prendre des ordres.

Veuillez m’instruire si le 1er corps a opéré son mouvement, et quelle est, ce matin, la position exacte des 1er et 2e corps d’armée, et des deux divisions de cavalerie qui y sont attachées, en me faisant connaître ce qu’il y a d’ennemis devant vous, et ce qu’on a appris.

Le major général,

Duc de Dalmatie.

XVIII.

THE EMPEROR’S LETTER TO NEY: June 16, 1815.

Doc. Inéd., p. 32.: Corresp. vol. 28, p. 334.

AU MARÉCHAL NEY.

Mon cousin, je vous envoie mon aide de camp, le général Flahaut, qui vous porte la présente lettre. Le major général a dû vous donner des ordres; mais vous recevrez les miens plus tôt, parce que mes officiers vont plus vite que les siens. Vous recevrez l’ordre de mouvement du jour, mais je veux vous en écrire en détail parce que c’est de la plus haute importance. Je porte le maréchal Grouchy avec les 3e et 4e corps d’infanterie sur Sombref. Je porte ma garde à Fleurus et j’y serai de ma personne avant midi. J’y attaquerai l’ennemi si je le recontre, et j’éclairerai la route jusqu’ à Gem bloux. Là, d’après ce qui se passera, je prendrai mon parti, peut-être à trois heures après midi, peut-être ce soir. Mon intention est que, immédiatement après que j’aurai pris mon parti, vous soyez prêt à marcher sur Bruxelles. Je vous appuierai avec la Garde, qui sera à Fleurus ou à Sombref, et je désirerais arriver à Bruxelles demain matin. Vous vous mettriez en marche ce soir même, si je prends mon parti d’assez bonne heure pour que vous puissiez en être informé de jour et faire ce soir 3 ou 4 lieues et être demain à 7 heures du matin à Bruxelles. Vous pouvez donc disposer vos troupes de la manière suivante. Première division à deux lieues en avant des Quatre-Chemins, s’il n’y a pas d’inconvénient. Six divisions d’infanterie autour des Quatre-Chemins et une division à Marbais, afin que je puisse l’attirer à moi à Sombref, si j’en avais besoin. Elle ne retarderait d’ailleurs pas votre marche. Le corps du comte de Valmy, qui a 3,000 cuirassiers d’élite, à l’intersection du chemin des Romains et de celui de Bruxelles, afin que je puisse l’attirer à moi, si j’en avais besoin; aussitôt que mon parti sera pris, vous lui enverrez l’ordre de venir vous rejoindre. Je désirerais avoir avec moi la division de la Garde que commande le général Lefebvre Desnoëttes, et je vous envoie les deux divisions du corps du comte de Valmy pour la remplacer. Mais, dans mon projet actuel, je préfère placer le comte de Valmy de manière à le rappeler si j’en avais besoin, et ne point faire faire de fausses marches au général Lefebvre Desnoëttes, puisqu’il est probable que je me déciderai ce soir à marcher sur Bruxelles avec la Garde. Cependant, couvrez la division Lefebvre par les deux divisions de cavalerie d’Erlon et de Reille, afin de ménager la Garde; s’il y avait quelque échauffourée avec les Anglais, il est préférable que ce soit sur le ligne que sur la garde. J’ai adopté comme principe général pendant cette campagne, de diviser mon armée en deux ailes et une réserve. Votre aile sera composée des quatre divisions du 1er corps, des quatre divisions du 2e corps, de deux divisions de cavalerie légère, et de deux divisions du corps du Comte de Valmy. Cela ne doit pas être loin de 45 à 50 mille hommes.

Le maréchal Grouchy aura à peu près la même force, et commandera d’aile droite. La Garde formera la réserve, et je me porterai sur l’une ou l’autre aile, selon les circonstances. Le major général donne les ordres les plus précis pour qu’il n’y ait aucune difficulté sur l’obéissance à vos ordres lorsque vous serez détaché; les commandants de corps devant prendre mes ordres directement quand je me trouve présent. Selon les circonstances, j’affaiblirai l’une ou l’autre aile en augmentant ma réserve. Vous sentez assez l’importance attachée a la prise de Bruxelles. Cela pourra d’ailleurs donner lieu a des incidents, car un mouvement aussi prompt et aussi brusque isolera l’armée anglaise de Mons, Ostende, etc. Je désire que vos dispositions soient bien faites pour qu’au premier ordre, vos huit divisions puissent marcher rapidement et sans obstacle sur Bruxelles.

Charleroi, le 16 juin 1815.

N.

XIX.

COUNT REILLE’S LETTER TO NEY: June 16, 1815.

Doc. Inéd., p. 37.

A M. LE MARÉCHAL Prince de la Moskowa.

Gosselies, le 16 juin 1815, 10 heures et quart du matin.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

J’ai l’honneur d’informer Votre Excellence du rapport que me fait faire verbalement le général Girard par un de ses officiers.

L’ennemi continue à occuper Fleurus par de la cavalerie légère qui a des vedettes en avant; l’on aperçoit deux masses ennemis venant par la route de Namur et dont la tête est à la hauteur de Saint-Amand; elles se sont formées peu à peu, et out gagné quelque terrain à mesure qu’il leur arrivait du monde: on n’a pu guère juger de leur force à cause de l’éloignement; cependant ce général pense que chacune pouvait d’être de six bataillons en colonne par bataillon. On apercevait des mouvements de troupes derrière.

M. le lieutenant général Flahaut m’a fait part des ordres qu’il portait à Votre Excellence; j’en ai prévenu M. le comte d’Erlon, afin qu’il puisse suivre mon mouvement. J’aurais commencé le mien sur Frasnes aussitôt que les divisions auraient été sous les armes; mais d’après le rapport du général Girard, je tiendrai les troupes prêtes à marcher en attendant les ordres de Votre Excellence, et comme ils pourront me parvenir très vite, il n’y aura que très peu de temps de perdu.

J’ai envoyé à l’empereur l’officier qui m’a fait le rapport du général Girard.

Je renouvelle à Votre Excellence les assurances de mon respectueux dévouement.

Le général en chef du 2e corps.

Comte Reille.

XX.

NEY’S ORDERS TO REILLE AND D’ERLON: June 16, 1815.

Doc. Inéd., p. 38.

A M. LE COMTE REILLE,

COMMANDANT LE 2E CORPS D’ARMÉE.

ORDRE DE MOUVEMENT.

Frasnes, le 16 juin 1815.

Conformément aux instructions de l’empereur, le 2e corps se mettra en marche de suite pour aller prendre position, la cinquième division[847] en arrière de Gennapes, sur les hauteurs qui dominent cette ville, la gauche appuyée à la grande route. Un bataillon ou deux couvriront tous les débouchés en avant sur la route de Bruxelles. Le parc de réserve et les équipages de cette division resteront avec la seconde ligne.

La neuvième division[848] suivra les mouvements de la cinquième, et viendra prendre position en seconde ligne sur les hauteurs à droite et à gauche du village de Banterlet[849].

Les sixième et septième divisions[850] à l’embranchement de Quatre-Bras, où sera votre quartier général. Les trois premières divisions du comte d’Erlon viendront prendre position à Frasnes; la division de droite s’établira à Marbais avec la deuxième division de cavalerie légère du général Piré; la première couvrira votre marche, et vous éclairera sur Bruxelles et sur vos deux flancs. Mon quartier à Frasnes.

Pour le Maréchal prince de la Moskowa,

Le Colonel, premier aide de camp,

Heymès.

Deux divisions du comte de Valmy, s’établiront à Frasnes et à Liberchies.

Les Divisions de la garde des généraux Lefebvre Desnoëttes et Colbert resteront dans leur position actuelle de Frasnes.

XXI.

SOULT’S FORMAL ORDER TO NEY TO CARRY QUATRE BRAS: June 16, 1815.

Doc. Inéd., p. 27.

A M. LE MARÉCHAL

PRINCE DE LA MOSKOWA.

Charleroi, le 16 juin 1815.

Monsieur le Maréchal, l’empereur ordonne que vous mettiez en marche les 2e et 1er corps d’armée, ainsi que le 3e corps de cavalerie, qui a été mis à votre disposition, pour les diriger sur l’intersection des chemins dits les Trois-Bras (route de Bruxelles), où vous leur ferez prendre position, et vous porterez en même temps des reconnaissances, aussi avant que possible, sur la route de Bruxelles et sur Nivelles, d’où probablement l’ennemi s’est retiré.

S. M. désire que, s’il n’y a pas d’inconvénient, vous établissiez une division avec de la cavalerie à Genappe, et elle ordonne que vous portiez une autre division du côté de Marbais, pour couvrir l’espace entre Sombref et les Trois-Bras. Vous placerez, près de ces divisions, la division de cavalerie de la garde impériale, commandée par le général Lefebvre Desnoëttes, ainsi que le 1er régiment de hussards, qui a été détaché hier vers Gosselies.

Le corps qui sera à Marbais aura aussi pour objet d’appuyer les mouvements de M. le maréchal Grouchy sur Sombref, et de vous soutenir à la position des Trois-Bras, si cela devenait nécessaire. Vous recommanderez au général, qui sera à Marbais, de bien s’éclairer sur toutes les directions, particulièrement sur celles de Gembloux et de Wavre.

Si cependant la division du général Lefebvre Desnoëttes était trop engagée sur la route de Bruxelles, vous la laisseriez et vous la remplaceriez au corps qui sera à Marbais par le 3e corps de cavalerie aux ordres de M. le comte de Valmy, et par le 1er régiment de hussards.

J’ai l’honneur de vous prévenir que l’empereur va se porter sur Sombref, où, d’après les ordres de Sa Majesté, M. le maréchal Grouchy doit se diriger avec les 3e et 4e corps d’infanterie, et les 1er, 2e et 4e corps de cavalerie. M. le maréchal Grouchy fera occuper Gembloux.

Je vous prie de me mettre de suite à même de rendre compte à l’empereur de vos dispositions pour exécuter l’ordre que je vous envoie, ainsi que de tout ce que vous aurez appris sur l’ennemi.

Sa Majesté me charge de vous recommander de prescrire aux généraux commandant les corps d’armée de faire réunir leur monde et rentrer les hommes isolés, de maintenir l’ordre le plus parfait dans la troupe, et de rallier toutes les voitures d’artillerie et les ambulances qu’ils auraient pu laisser en arrière.

Le maréchal d’empire, major général,

Duc de Dalmatie.

XXII.

SOULT’S SECOND ORDER TO NEY TO CARRY QUATRE BRAS: June 16, 1815.

Doc. Inéd., p. 31.

A M. LE MARÉCHAL

PRINCE DE LA MOSKOWA.

Charleroi, le 16 juin 1815.

MONSIEUR LE MARÉCHAL,

Un officier de lanciers vient de dire à l’empereur que l’ennemi présentait des masses du côté des Quatre-Bras. Réunissez les corps des comtes Reille et d’Erlon, et celui du comte de Valmy, qui se met à l’instant en route pour vous rejoindre; avec ces forces, vous devrez battre et détruire tous les corps ennemis qui peuvent se présenter. Blücher était hier à Namur, et il n’est pas vraisemblable qu’il ait porté des troupes vers les Quatre-Bras; ainsi, vous n’avez affaire qu’à ce qui vient de Bruxelles.

Le maréchal Grouchy va faire le mouvement sur Sombref, que je vous ai annoncé, et l’empereur va se rendre à Fleurus; c’est là où vous adresserez vos nouveaux rapports à Sa Majesté.

Le maréchal d’empire, major général,

Duc de Dalmatie.

XXIII.

FLAHAUT’S LETTER TO THE DUKE OF ELCHINGEN.

Doc. Inéd., p. 63.

A M. LE DUC D’ELCHINGEN.

Paris, 24 novembre 1829.

Je voudrais, mon cher Duc, pouvoir répondre d’une manière plus précise à vos questions; mais, n’ayant pas pris de notes, il m’est impossible, après un intervalle de quinze années, de me rappeler les détails que vous tenez à savoir.

C’est moi qui ai porté, le 16, à monsieur votre père, l’ordre de marcher aux Quatre-Bras et de s’emparer de cette position. L’empereur me l’a dicté le matin de bonne heure, autant qu’il m’en souvienne, entre huit et neuf heures.

Quant à celle à laquelle je l’ai remis à M. le maréchal Ney, il me serait impossible de le dire, n’y ayant pas attaché d’importance dans le moment.

Après le lui avoir remis, j’ai pris les devants et ai été rejoindre le général Lefebvre Desnoëttes, qui commandait l’avant-garde. L’infanterie s’est fait longtemps attendre, mais dès que monsieur votre père nous a rejoints, et avant qu’elle fût arrivée, il a fait attaquer les troupes anglaises. Voilà tout ce dont je puis me souvenir; je regrette que ce ne soit pas plus circonstancié, puisque vous tenez à avoir des détails plus précis.

Croyez, mon cher Duc, à la sincérité de l’amitié que je vous ai vouée.

Comte Ch. FLAHAUT.

XXIV.

NAPOLEON’S LETTER TO GROUCHY: June 16, 1815.

Corresp. vol., 28, p. 336.

22059.—AU MARÉCHAL COMTE GROUCHY

COMMANDANT L’AILE DROITE DE L’ARMÉE DU NORD.

Charleroi, 16 juin 1815.

Mon Cousin, je vous envoie Labédoyère, mon aide de camp, pour vous porter la présente lettre. Le major général a dû vous faire connaître mes intentions; mais, comme il a des officiers mal montés, mon aide de camp arrivera peut-être avant.

Mon intention est que, comme commandant l’aile droite, vous preniez le commandement du 3e corps que commande le général Vandamme, du 4e corps que commande le général Gérard, des corps de cavalerie que commandent les généraux Pajol, Milhaud et Exelmans; ce qui ne doit pas faire loin de 50,000 hommes. Rendez-vous avec cette aile droite à Sombreffe. Faites partir en conséquence, de suite, les corps des généraux Pajol, Milhaud, Exelmans et Vandamme, et, sans vous arrêter, continuez votre mouvement sur Sombreffe. Le 4e corps, qui est à Châtelet, reçoit directement, l’ordre de se rendre à Sombreffe sans passer par Fleurus. Cette observation est importante, parce que je porte mon quartier général à Fleurus et qu’il faut éviter les encombrements. Envoyez de suite un officier au général Gérard pour lui faire connaître votre mouvement, et qu’il exécute le sien de suite.

Mon intention est que tous les généraux prennent directement vos ordres; ils ne prendront les miens que lorsque je serai présent. Je serai entre dix et onze heures à Fleurus; je me rendrai à Sombreffe, laissant ma Garde, infanterie et cavalerie, à Fleurus; je ne la conduirais à Sombreffe qu’en cas qu’elle fût nécessaire. Si l’ennemi est à Sombreffe, je veux l’attaquer; je veux même l’attaquer à Gembloux et m’emparer aussi de cette position, mon intention étant, après avoir connu ces deux positions, de partir cette nuit, et d’opérer avec mon aile gauche, que commande le maréchal Ney, sur les Anglais. Ne perdez donc point un moment, parce que plus vite je prendrai mon parti, mieux cela vaudra pour la suite de mes opérations. Je suppose que vous êtes à Fleurus. Communiquez constamment avec le général Gérard, afin qu’il puisse vous aider pour attaquer Sombreffe, s’il était nécessaire.

La division Girard est à portée de Fleurus; n’en disposez point à moins de nécessité absolue, parce qu’elle doit marcher toute la nuit. Laissez aussi ma jeune Garde et toute son artillerie à Fleurus.

Le comte de Valmy, avec ses deux divisions de cuirassiers marche sur la route de Bruxelles; il se lie avec le maréchal Ney, pour contribuer à l’opération de ce soir, à l’aile gauche.

Comme je vous l’ai dit, je serai de dix a onze heures à Fleurus. Envoyez-moi des rapports sur tout ce que vous apprendrez. Veillez à ce que la route de Fleurus soit libre. Toutes les données que j’ai sont que les Prussiennes ne peuvent point nous opposer plus de 40,000 hommes.

NAPOLÉON.

D’après la copie. Dépôt de la guerre.

XXV.

THE 2 P.M.—June 16th—ORDER TO NEY.

Doc. Inéd., p. 40.

A M. LE MARÉCHAL

PRINCE DE LA MOSKOWA.

En avant de Fleurus, le 16 juin à 2 heures.

Monsieur le Maréchal, l’empereur me charge de vous prévenir que l’ennemi a réuni un corps de troupes entre Sombref et Bry, et qu’à deux heures et demie M. le maréchal Grouchy, avec les troisième et quatrième corps, l’attaquera; l’intention de Sa Majesté est que vous attaquiez aussi ce qui est devant vous, et qu’après l’avoir vigoureusement poussé, vous rabattiez sur nous pour concourir à envelopper le corps dont je viens de vous parler.

Si ce corps était enfoncé auparavant, alors Sa Majesté ferait manœuvrer dans votre direction pour hâter également vos opérations.

Instruisez de suite l’empereur de vos dispositions et de ce qui se passe sur votre front.

Le maréchal d’empire, major général,

Duc de Dalmatie.

Au dos de cet ordre est écrit: A M. le Maréchal Prince de la Moskowa, A Gosselies, sur la route de Bruxelles.

Et au crayon: Wagnée Bois de Lombuc.

Un duplicata de cet ordre porte A M. le Maréchal Prince de la Moskowa, A Gosselies, sur la route de Bruxelles.

Wagnée. Ransart.

XXVI.

THE 3.15 P.M.—June 16th—ORDER TO NEY.

Doc. Inéd., p. 42.

Monsieur le Maréchal, je vous ai écrit, il y a une heure, que l’empereur ferait attaquer l’ennemi à deux heures et demie dans la position qu’il a prise entre le village de Saint-Amand et de Bry: en ce moment l’engagement est très prononcé; Sa Majesté me charge de vous dire que vous devez manœuvrer sur-le-champ de manière à envelopper la droite de l’ennemi et tomber à bras raccourcis sur ses derrières; cette armée est perdue si vous agissez vigoureusement; le sort de la France est entre vos mains. Ainsi n’hésitez pas un instant pour faire le mouvement que l’empereur vous ordonne, et dirigez vous sur les hauteurs de Bry et de Saint-Amand, pour concourir à une victoire peut-être décisive. L’ennemi est pris en flagrant délit au moment où il cherche à se réunir aux Anglais.

Le major général,

Duc de Dalmatie.

En avant de Fleurus, le 16 juin 1815, à 3 heures un quart.

XXVII.

SOULT’S LETTER TO NEY: June 17, 1815.

Doc. Inéd., p. 45.

A M. LE MARÉCHAL

PRINCE DE LA MOSKOWA.

Flerus, le 15 [17] juin 1815.

Monsieur le Maréchal, le général Flahaut, qui arrive à l’instant, fait connaître que vous êtes dans l’incertitude sur les résultats de la journée d’hier. Je crois cependant vous avoir prévenu de la victoire que l’empereur a remportée. L’armée prussienne a été mise en déroute, le général Pajol est à sa poursuite sur les routes de Namur et de Liége. Nous avons déjà plusieurs milliers de prisonniers et 30 piéces de canon. Nos troupes se sont bien conduites: une charge de six bataillons de la garde, des escadrons de service et la division de cavalerie du général Delort a percé la ligne ennemie, porté le plus grand désordre dans ses rangs et enlevé la position.

L’empereur se rend au moulin de Bry où passe la grande route qui conduit de Namur aux Quatre-Bras; il n’est donc pas possible que l’armée anglaise puisse agir devant vous; si cela était, l’empereur marcherait directement sur elle par la route des Quatre-Bras, tandis que vous l’attaqueriez de front avec vos divisions qui, à présent, doivent être réunies, et cette armée serait dans un instant détruit. Ainsi, instruisez Sa Majesté de la position exacte des divisions, et de tout ce qui se passe devant vous.

L’empereur a vu avec peine que vous n’ayez pas réuni hier les divisions; elles out agi isolément; ainsi, vous avez éprouvé des pertes.

Si les corps des comtes d’Erlon et Reille avaient été ensemble, il ne réchappait pas un Anglais du corps qui venait vous attaquer. Si le comte d’Erlon avait exécuté le mouvement sur St. Amand que l’empereur a ordonné, l’armée prussienne était totalement détruite, et nous aurions fait peut-être 30,000 prisonniers.

Les corps des généraux Gérard, Vandamme et la garde impériale ont toujours été réunis; l’on s’expose à des revers lorsque des détachements sont compromis.

L’empereur espère et désire que vos sept divisions d’infanterie et la cavalerie soient bien réunies et formées, et qu’ensemble elles n’occupent pas une lieue de terrain, pour les avoir bien dans votre main et les employer au besoin.

L’intention de Sa Majesté est que vous preniez position aux Quatre-Bras ainsi que l’ordre vous en a été donné; mais si, par impossible, cela ne peut avoir lieu, rendez-en compte sur-le-champ avec détail, et l’empereur s’y portera ainsi que je vous l’ai dit; si, au contraire, il n’y a qu’une arrière-garde, attaquez-la, et prenez position.

La journée d’aujourd’hui est nécessaire pour terminer cette opération, et pour compléter les munitions, rallier les militaires isolés et faire rentrer les détachements. Donnez des ordres en consequence, et assurez-vous que tous les blessés sont pansés et transportés sur les derrières: l’on s’est plaint que les ambulances n’avaient pas fait leur devoir.

La fameux partisan Lutzow, qui a été pris, disait que l’armée prussienne était perdue, et que Blücher avait exposé une seconde fois la monarchie prussienne.

Le maréchal d’empire, major général, Duc de DALMATIE.

XXVIII.

SOULT’S ORDER TO NEY: 12 M., June 17, 1815.

Doc. Inéd., p. 44.

A M. LE MARÉCHAL

PRINCE DE LA MOSKOWA.

[851]4e corps d’armée [_sic_], à Gosselies.

En avant de Ligny, le 17 à midi.

Monsieur le Maréchal, l’empereur vient de faire prendre position, en avant de Marbais, à un corps d’infanterie et à la garde impériale; S. M. me charge de vous dire que son intention est que vous attaquiez les ennemis aux Quatre-Bras, pour les chasser de leur position, et que le corps qui est à Marbais secondera vos opérations; S. M. va se rendre à Marbais, et elle attend vos rapports avec impatience.

Le maréchal d’empire, major général, Duc de Dalmatie.

XXIX.

CAPTAIN BOWLES’ STORY OF WELLINGTON AT QUATRE BRAS: June 17, 1815.

Captain Bowles in Lord Malmesbury’s Letters, vol. 2, p. 447.

“On the morning of the 17th, my company being nearly in front of the farmhouse at Quatre-Bras, soon after daybreak the Duke of Wellington came to me, and, being personally known to him, he remained in conversation for an hour or more, during which time he repeatedly said he was surprised to have heard nothing of Blücher. At length a staff-officer arrived, his horse covered with foam, and whispered to the Duke, who without the least change of countenance gave him some orders and dismissed him. He then turned round to me and said, ‘Old Blücher has had a d—--d good licking and gone back to Wavre, eighteen miles. As he has gone back, we must go too. I suppose in England they will say we have been licked. I can’t help it; as they are gone back, we must go too.’

He made all the arrangements for retiring without moving from the spot on which he was standing, and it certainly did not occupy him five minutes.”

XXX.

GROUCHY’S REPORT TO NAPOLEON FROM SART-À-WALHAIN: 11 A.M., June 18, 1815.

Grouchy Mém. vol. 4, p. 71.

Sart-à-Walhain le 18 juin, onze heures du matin.

Sire:

Je ne perds pas un moment à vous transmettre les renseignements que je recueille ici; je les regarde comme positifs, et afin que Votre Majesté les reçoive le plus promptement possible, je les lui expédie par le major La Fresnaye, son ancien page; il est bien monté et bon écuyer.

Les 1er, 2e et 3e corps de Blücher marchent dans la direction de Bruxelles. Deux de ces corps out passé à Sart-à-Walhain, ou à peu de distance, sur la droite; ils ont défilé en trois colonnes, marchant à peu près de même hauteur. Leur passage a duré six heures sans interruption. Ce qui a défilé en vue de Sart-à-Walhain peut-être évalué à trente mille hommes au moins, et avait un matériel de cinquante à soixante bouches à feu.

Un corps venant de Liége a effectué sa jonction avec ceux qui out combattu à Fleurus. (Ci-joint une réquisition qui le prouve.) Quelques-uns des Prussiens que j’ai devant moi se dirigent vers la plaine de la Chyse, située près de la route de Louvain, et à deux lieues et demie de cette ville.

Il semblerait que ce serait à dessein de s’y masser ou de combattre les troupes qui les y poursuivraient, ou enfin de se réunir à Wellington, projet annoncé par leurs officiers, qui, avec leur jactance ordinaire, prétendent n’avoir quitté le champ de bataille, le 16, qu’afin d’opérer leur réunion avec l’armée anglaise sur Bruxelles.

Ce soir, je vais être massé à Wavres, et me trouver ainsi entre Wellington, que je présume en retraite devant Votre Majesté, et l’armée prussienne.

J’ai besoin d’instructions ultérieures sur ce que Votre Majesté ordonne que je fasse. Le pays entre Wavres et la plaine de la Chyse est difficile, coupé, et marécageux.

Par la route de Wivorde, j’arriverai facilement à Bruxelles avant tout ce qui sera arreté à la Chyse, si tant il y a que les Prussiens y fassent une halte.

Daignez, Sire, me transmettre vos ordres; je puis les recevoir avant de commencer mon mouvement de demain.

La plupart des renseignements que renferme cette lettre me sont fournis par la propriétaire de la maison où je me suis arreté pour écrire à Votre Majesté; cet officier a servi dans l’armée française, est décoré, et parait entièrement dévoué à nos intérêts. Je les joins à ces lignes.

XXXI.

GENERAL ORDER OF PREPARATION FOR THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO: June 18, 1815.

Doc. Inéd. p. 52.

A M. LE MARÉCHAL PRINCE DE LA MOSKOWA.

L’empereur ordonne que l’armée soit disposée à attaquer l’ennemi à 9 heures du matin; MM. les commandants des corps d’armée rallieront leurs troupes, feront mettre les armes en état, et permettront que les soldats fassent la soupe; ils feront aussi manger les soldats; afin qu’à 9 heures précises chacun soit prêt et puisse être en bataille avec son artillerie et ambulances, à la position de bataille que l’empereur a indiquée par son ordre d’hier soir.

MM. les lieutenants-generaux, commandant les corps d’armée d’infanterie et de cavalerie, enverront sur-le-champ des officiers au major-général pour faire connaître leur position et porter des ordres.

Au quartier-général imperial,

le 18 juin 1815.

Le maréchal d’empire, major-général,

Duc de Dalmatie.

XXXII.

ORDER FOR THE ATTACK TO BEGIN AT 1 P.M., June 18, 1815.

Doc. Inéd. p. 53.

Une fois que toute l’armée sera rangée en bataille, à peu près à 1 heure après midi, au moment où l’empereur en donnera l’ordre au Maréchal Ney, l’attaque commencera pour s’emparer du village de Mont St. Jean où est l’intersection des routes. A cet effet, les batteries de 12 du 2me corps et celle du 6me se réuniront à celle du 1er corps. Ces 24 bouches à feu tireront sur les troupes du Mont St. Jean, et le comte d’Erlon commencera l’attaque, en portant en avant sa division de gauche et la soutenant, suivant les circonstances, par les divisions du 1er corps.

Le 2e corps s’avancera à mesure pour garder la hauteur du comte d’Erlon.

Les compagnies de sapeurs du 1er corps seront prêtes pour se barricader sur-le-champ à Mont St. Jean.

Au crayon et de l’écriture du Maréchal Ney.

Ajouté par M. le Maréchal Ney.

Le comte d’Erlon comprendra que c’est par la gauche que l’attaque commencera, au lieu de la droite.

Communiquer cette nouvelle disposition au général en chef Reille.

AU DOS.

Ordres dictés par l’empereur, sur le champ de bataille du Mont St. Jean, le 18, vers onze heures du matin, et écrits par le maréchal Duc de Dalmatie, major général. Paris, le 21 juin 1815. Le Maréchal Prince de la Moskowa Pair de France,

Ney.

XXXIII.

THE 10 A.M.—JUNE 18th—ORDER TO GROUCHY.

Grouchy Mémoires, vol. 4, p. 79.

En avant de la ferme de Caillou, le 18 juin, 1815, à dix heures du matin.

Monsieur le maréchal, l’Empereur a reçu votre dernier rapport, daté de Gembloux.

Vous ne parlez à Sa Majesté que de deux colonnes prussiennes qui ont passé à Sauvenière et à Sart-à-Walhain. Cependant des rapports disent qu’une troisième colonne, qui était assez forte, a passé par Géry et Gentines, se dirigeant sur Wavres.

L’Empereur me charge de vous prévenir qu’en ce moment Sa Majesté va faire attaquer l’armée anglaise, qui a pris position à Waterloo, près de la forêt de Soignes. Ainsi, Sa Majesté désire que vous dirigiez vos mouvements sur Wavres, afin de vous rapprocher de nous, vous mettre en rapport d’opérations et lier les communications, poussant devant vous les corps de l’armée prussienne qui ont pris cette direction et qui auraient pu s’arrêter à Wavres, où vous devez arriver le plus tôt possible.

Vous ferez suivre les colonnes ennemies, qui out pris sur votre droite, par quelques corps légers, afin d’observer leurs mouvements et ramasser leurs traînards. Instruisez-moi immédiatement de vos dispositions et de votre marche, ainsi que des nouvelles que vous avez sur les ennemis, et ne négligez pas de lier vos communications avec nous. L’Empereur désire avoir très-souvent de vos nouvelles.

Le maréchal duc de DALMATIE.

For translation, see _ante_ p. 265.

XXXIV.

THE 1 P.M.—JUNE 18th—ORDER TO GROUCHY.

La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 270.

Du champ de bataille de Waterloo, le 18 juin, à une heure après midi.

Monsieur le Maréchal,

Vous avez écrit, ce matin à deux heures, à l’Empereur, que vous marcheriez sur Sart-lez-Walhain; donc votre projet était de vous porter à Corbais ou à Wavre. Ce mouvement est conforme aux dispositions de Sa Majesté, qui vous out été communiquées. Cependant, l’Empereur m’ordonne de vous dire que vous devez toujours manœuvrer dans notre direction. C’est à vous de voir le point où nous sommes pour vous régler en conséquence et pour lier nos communications, ainsi que pour être toujours en mesure de tomber sur les troupes ennemies qui chercheraient à inquiéter notre droite et de les écraser.

Dans ce moment, la bataille est engagée sur la ligne de Waterloo; le centre ennemi est à Mont-Saint-Jean; ainsi manœuvrez pour joindre notre droite.

P. S. Une lettre qui vient d’être interceptée porte que le général Bülow doit attaquer notre flanc. Nous croyons apercevoir ce corps sur les hauteurs de Saint-Lambert; ainsi, ne perdez pas un instant pour vous rapprocher de nous et nous joindre, et pour écraser Bülow, que vous prendrez en flagrant délit.

Le maréchal duc de DALMATIE.

For translation, see _ante_, p. 270.

FOOTNOTES:

[838] Captain George Bowles (Guards).

[839] The original instructions issued to Colonel De Lancey were lost with that officer’s papers. These memorandums of movements have been collected from the different officers to whom they were addressed.

[840] The italics are ours.

[841] The text cited is from the Supplementary Despatches; but it seems to us quite possible that the reading of this passage given in the Appendix to C. D. Yonge’s “Life of Wellington,”—London; Chapman & Hall, 1860,—is the correct one. It there reads as follows:—

“He was at Quatre Bras before twenty-four hours on the 16th,”—that is by 3 P.M., on the 16th,—which was the fact. There are other points where these versions differ, but this is the most important one. See _ante_, p. 90.

[842] Clausewitz.

[843] About 1 o’clock, at the Windmill of Bussy, between Ligny and Brie: so Hardinge told me.—J. G.

[844] _Cf._ Siborne, vol. 1, p. 102, n.; Gomm, p. 352; Waterloo Letters; Gomm, p. 23.

[845] The italics are ours.

[846] The 1st division did not arrive on the field until after 6 P.M. (_ante_, pp. 183, 184), and the cavalry, not at all.

[847] That of Bachelu.

[848] That of Foy.

[849] A village on the Brussels turnpike half a mile north of Quatre Bras.

[850] Those of Jerome and Girard. This shows that Ney expected that Girard’s division would be returned to him.

[851] This mention of the 4th Corps, Gérard’s, must be an error.

INDEX.

A.

Adam, General Sir Frederick, commander British brigade, 35; his troops of the best quality, 315; his light brigade at Waterloo, 323-324, 332, 333, 335, 336.

Albemarle, Earl of, his _Fifty Years of My Life_, reports story of Napoleon’s secluding himself on forenoon of battle of Waterloo, 30.

Alison, Sir Archibald, his _History of Europe_ criticised by Wellington and the Earl of Ellesmere, 10; not a military authority, 10; his view that Napoleon intended to throw himself between the allied armies, 10.

Allies. (See ARMIES.)

Allix, General, commander division 1st French corps, 25; his division at Waterloo, commanded by Quiot, 302, 305.

Alten, Lieutenant-General Count, commander 3d British division, 38; arrival of two of his brigades gives Wellington an equality of force at Quatre Bras, 179, 183; position at Waterloo, 300; wounded, his division rallied by Wellington, 314.

Anglesea, Marquis of. (See UXBRIDGE.)

Anthing, commander brigade Dutch-Belgians, 36; his brigade ordered to Enghien, 83, 89; reported near Audenarde, at 7 A.M., June 16th, 108.

Appendices:— A. On some Characteristics of Napoleon’s Memoirs, 351-354. B. On Marshal Grouchy and the Bertrand Order, 355-361. C. Orders and Despatches, 362-389.

Arentsschildt, Colonel Sir F., commander cavalry brigade King’s German Legion, 35, 36.

ARMIES:—

ALLIED, in concert of action against Napoleon; troops of England, Belgium, Holland, Hanover, Brunswick, Nassau, and Prussia, 2-4; their cantonments on and behind the Belgian frontier, 3, 96; strength, organization, and internal economy of, 32-43.

ANGLO-DUTCH, positions in Belgium before the campaign, 2-4; their extended cantonments, 2, 96; commanded by the Duke of Wellington, 34; heterogeneous character of, 34, 294; organization, 34-35; troops employed on garrison duty, 35; strength and composition in detail, 35-37, 39; location of the various divisions, 38-39; merits and defects of, 39-40, 43; principal officers, 40; Wellington as a commander, 40-41; internal economy of, 41-42; positions of troops as given in the “Disposition,” at 7 A.M., June 16, 85, n. [186]; actual positions, 111-113; badly served with information from the front, 114; at Quatre Bras, 178-179, 183; strength at Quatre Bras 184; losses, 184; at Quatre Bras morning of 17th, 214; position, composition, and strength at Waterloo, 297-299; in the battle of Waterloo, 294 _et seq._; 18,000 men detached at Hal and Tubize, 339.

British, strength and composition in detail, 35; mainly relied upon by Wellington, 39, 298; at Quatre Bras, 178-179, 184; steadiness of infantry, 179; in the skirmish at Genappe, 216; strength at Waterloo, 298; positions at Waterloo, 299-300; charge of the Union brigade, 306-307; suffered severely in d’Erlon’s assault, 310; the brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur brought to the centre at a critical moment, 314; repulse of the Imperial Guard by the Guards, 319-321; skilful use of troops by Sir Colin Halkett and Colonel Elphinstone in support of the Guards, 322; services of the light brigade, 323-324, 332-336.

Brunswick contingent (see also BRUNSWICK, DUKE OF); strength and composition in detail, 37-38; in the action at Quatre Bras, 178-179, 183; broke in disorder, the Duke being killed, 179; strength at Waterloo, 299; position at Waterloo, 299-300; brought into action, 314; driven back by the French divisions of Donzelot and Quiot, 318.

Dutch-Belgians, strength and composition of, in detail, 36; positions of, 38; raw troops, 39; occupation of Quatre Bras, 101; occupation criticised by Maurice, 103; fully justified, 104; the first troops to receive the attack at Quatre Bras, 101, 178; suffered severely, 183; strength and composition at Waterloo, 299, 314; Bylandt’s brigade badly placed, 299; breaks in confusion, 306; Chassé’s division supports the British guards, 314; opportune employment of Van der Smissen’s battery, 320.

Hanoverians, strength and composition in detail, 36; raw troops, 39; at Quatre Bras, 179; fought stubbornly, 179; strength at Waterloo, 298; in the battle, 312.

King’s German Legion, strength and composition in detail, 35-36; positions, 38-39; relied upon by Wellington, 39, 298; strength at Waterloo, 298; position, 300.

Nassau contingent, strength and composition in detail, 37; in the reserve, 38; strength at Waterloo, 299; position, 300; suffered severely, 310; driven back by divisions of Donzelot and Quiot, 318.

PRUSSIANS (allied), positions in Belgium before the campaign, 2-4; extended cantonments, 2, 96; strength and composition in detail, 32-33; locations of different corps, 33; composed mainly of veterans, 33; temper and spirit of, 34; Marshal Blücher, 34; internal economy of, 42; ordered to concentrate at Sombreffe on the 14th, 70, 143; strength and positions at Ligny, 143-144, 151-152, 172; in the battle of Ligny, 154-159; losses, 159; Blücher disabled, 158, 226, 229; retreat towards Wavre, 159, 226 _et seq._; Blücher decides to join Wellington, 230; admirable conduct of commanders after the battle of Ligny, 231; pledged to support Wellington, 234, 237; delay in the march to support Wellington, 262, 264; the combat at Wavre, 264-265; in the battle of Waterloo, 307-309, 311, 313-314, 324-328, 336, 339-342. (See also Battles of LIGNY, WAVRE, and WATERLOO.)

FRENCH, condition of, upon Napoleon’s return from Elba, 1, 16, 17; Soult made chief of staff, 17; confidence in Napoleon, 17; the corps commanders, 18; estimates of general officers, 19; what Napoleon expected of his lieutenants, 20; Ney sent for at last moment, 20; Grouchy suddenly appointed to command of right wing, 21; Napoleon’s mistake in leaving Davout at Paris, 22; estimate of the army, 24-25; strength and composition in detail, 25-28; internal economy of, 41; assembled near Charleroi, 44-45; addressed by Napoleon at Avesnes on the 14th, 45; general order of movement, 45-46; desertion of Bourmont, 47; operations on the 15th, 47-69; arrival of Ney, 49; delays in movement, 46, 50-53, 55, 118-119, 121-122, 125-127, 130-132, 138, 139-140, 157, 161, 163 _et seq._, 176-178, 180-187, 197 _et seq._, 211-212, 252-254, 256-257; the 2d corps attacks the Dutch-Belgians at Quatre Bras on the 15th, 101; operations on the morning of the 16th, 116-142; in the battle of Ligny, 152-175; strength at Ligny, 154, 171; losses, 159; in the battle of Quatre Bras, 176-196; strength at Quatre Bras, 184; losses, 184; operations on the 17th, 197-225; force detached with Grouchy, 212, 220; pursuit of the English on the 17th led by the Emperor in person, 214; skirmish at Genappe, 216; Grouchy’s march on Wavre, 211-213, 245-262, 264-267, 272, 279, 288; the combat at Wavre, 264-265; position at Waterloo, 301; strength and composition, 301; in the battle of Waterloo, 289-342; unwieldy formation of d’Erlon’s troops, 304-307; the great cavalry charges upon the English centre, 308-311; the charge of the Imperial Guard, 315-326, 331-338; tactics employed at Waterloo, 329-331; the rout of the French army due to vigorous attack of Zieten’s corps at close of the day, 340. (See also Battles of LIGNY, QUATRE BRAS, WAVRE, and WATERLOO.)

Audenarde, on the Scheldt, one limit of Lord Uxbridge’s cantonment, 79.

Austria, concentrates a formidable force on the eastern frontier for ultimate coöperation against Napoleon, 2.

Auvergne. (See LA TOUR D’AUVERGNE.)

Avesnes, Napoleon issued stirring order here “to conquer or die,” on the evening of June 14th, 45; Marshal Mortier detained here by illness, June 14th, 46.

B.

Bachelu, General, commander division 2d French corps, 25; advance to Frasnes, 49; at Quatre Bras, 178; position at Waterloo, 302; in the attack upon Hougomont, 304; Ney neglects to use this division to support his cavalry charge, 309; or in support of the charge of the Guard, 337.

Baring, Major, his battalion of the King’s German Legion occupies farmhouse of La Haye Sainte, 300.

Battle of Ligny, 143-175; Prussian strength and position, 143-144, 151; Napoleon’s plan of battle, 152, 153; position of the French, 153, 154; battle begins at 2.30, 154; orders to Ney, 154, 155; fought with determination on both sides, 156; nearly all the Prussian divisions under fire, 156; Napoleon decides to put in the Guard, 156, 157; delay caused by d’Erlon’s corps, 157; the Guard breaks Prussian centre, 158; Prussians fall back to Brye and Sombreffe, 159; Prussian desertions, 159; losses, 159; non-employment of the 6th French corps, 159, 160; extent of the French victory, 161, 162; discussion of the battle, 163-175.

Battle of Quatre Bras, 176-196; attack begun by Ney at 2 P.M., 178; at that hour only Perponcher’s Dutch-Belgian division opposed him, 178; at 2.30 Wellington arrived and took command, 178; arrival an hour later of Picton’s division followed by the Duke of Brunswick’s corps, 178; the Dutch-Belgians retire after two hours’ fighting, 179; the Brunswickers break, the Duke being killed, 179; at 5 P.M. two brigades of Alten’s division arrive, 179, 183; Ney even then has in action only half the force assigned him, 179; and is therefore unable to execute Napoleon’s orders, 183; Kellermann’s gallant charge, 183, 184; arrival of Cooke’s division of the English guards, 184; the French retire, 184; forces engaged, 184; losses, 184; defeat of the French due to diversion of d’Erlon’s corps, 184; and to Ney’s disregard of orders, 187; Wellington’s skilful handling of his troops, 187, 188; discussion of the battle, 189-196.

Battle of Waterloo, 289-342; the field surveyed before the campaign by English engineers, 296; strength and composition of the Anglo-Dutch army, 298, 299; positions, 297, 299-301; strength of the French army engaged, 301; position, 301, 302; relative strength and efficiency of the two armies, 302; Napoleon’s plan of battle, 302; the French attack upon Hougomont, 303-304; d’Erlon’s assault upon the allied centre, 304-307; unwieldy formation of his troops, 305, 306; gains the crest of the British position, 306; deadly fire and bayonet charge of Picton’s division, 306, 307; the charge of Ponsonby’s British cavalry, 306, 307; repulse of d’Erlon’s charge, 307; the French capture La Haye Sainte at great sacrifice, 307; Bülow’s corps (Prussian) advances and threatens Planchenoit, requiring Napoleon’s withdrawal from the field, 309; Ney left in command, 309; splendid onsets of French cavalry, 309-311; repulse of Bülow, 311; return of Napoleon to the front, 314; Alten’s British division rallied by Wellington, 314; the Brunswick troops brought forward, 314; Chassé’s Dutch-Belgian division placed in rear of British guards, 314; the light cavalry brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur brought to the centre, 314; the English troops exhausted, the allies discouraged, much artillery dismounted, 314; the reserves, with Maitland’s guards and Adam’s brigade combined at centre, 315; Ney ordered to collect infantry and cavalry to support an attack by the Imperial Guard, 315; the attack upon the Anglo-allied line by Donzelot and Quiot, 318; the broken lines rallied by Wellington, 318; steady advance of the Imperial Guard, 318, 319; destructive repulse of the Guard, 319 _et seq._; persistency of the rear battalions of the Guard, 323-324; timely charge of the 52d regiment, supported by the rest of Adam’s brigade, 324; the rout of the Guard complete, 324; Zieten’s attack, 324, 325; the French right wing shattered, 325; charge of the British cavalry brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur, 325; Wellington orders his whole line to advance, 325; the French routed, 326; Napoleon borne away in one of the squares of the Guard, 326; the victory of the allies complete, 326; discussion of the battle, 329-342.

Battle of Wavre, Thielemann’s corps left to defend the town, 264; Grouchy’s attack without skill, 264; the troops of Vandamme entangle themselves in the attempt to carry the lower bridges, 264-265; the 4th French corps in vain attack the Mill of Bierges, above the town, 265; Gérard wounded, 265; Pajol carried the bridge of Limale, 265; battle conducted gallantly by the French, but without method, 265; resistance of the Prussians worthy of all praise, 265.

Batty, Captain, _Historical Sketch of Campaign of 1815_, cited, 333.

Baudus, Lieutenant-Colonel de, his _Études sur Napoléon_, cited, 193, 194, 195, 196, 279, 292.

Beaumont, headquarters of Napoleon on the evening of June 14th, 45.

Belgium, acts in concert with other nations of Europe against France and Napoleon, 2-4 (see also ARMIES ALLIED); territory occupied by the cantonments of the allied armies, 3, 74; Brussels the headquarters of Wellington, 3; daylight in, from before sunrise at 4 A.M. until 9 P.M., 52, 251.

Bernhard, Prince. (See SAXE-WEIMAR.)

Berthier, Marshal, Napoleon’s old chief of staff, retired into Belgium with Louis XVIII., 17.

Berton, General, commander French brigade, reports to Napoleon the discovery of a Prussian corps at Gembloux, 209; his _Précis, historique, militaire et critique, des batailles de Fleurus et de Waterloo_, cited, 258, 286, 338.

Bertrand, Grand Marshal (French), to whom Napoleon dictated order to Grouchy, 209, 210. (See GROUCHY.)

Bierges, Mill of, Gérard wounded in attack upon, 265.

Blücher, Field-Marshal Prince, commander of the Prussian army, 32; his character as an officer, 34; hatred of Napoleon, 34; chose the line of the brook of Ligny as a possible battle-field, 70; orders concentration of his army at Sombreffe, 70, 143; his understanding with Wellington, 70 _et seq._, 91, 100, 143-145; advises Müffling of the concentration of the Prussian army at Sombreffe, 78; his cantonments too greatly extended, 96 _et seq._; hears from Wellington, 144; determines to fight Napoleon at Ligny on independent grounds, 143-147; his reasons for accepting battle, 148-150; his position, 151; battle formation and force, 151, 152; his position criticised by Wellington, 155, n. 15; leads cavalry charge against the French and narrowly escapes capture, 158; key to his position taken by the French Guard, 158; falls back to Brye and Sombreffe, 159; result of accepting battle with but three-fourths of his force unsupported by Wellington, 162; held Brye and Sombreffe until after midnight, 204; his retreat toward Wavre, 159, 226, 231-233; not in communication with Thielemann and Bülow after defeat of the corps of Zieten and Pirch I., 226, n. [516]; his age at time of the battle, 229, n. [526]; decides to join Wellington, 230, 234; assures Wellington of support at Waterloo, 234, 237 _et seq._; he as well as Wellington desired to close the campaign with a great battle, 235; advises Müffling that though ill he will lead his army in person at Waterloo, 263.

Bonaparte, Jerome, commander French division, 2d corps, 25; had nominal command only, 25, n. [35]; at Quatre Bras, 178, 179; his division in the attack on Hougomont, 303, 304.

Bonaparte, Joseph, advised by Napoleon on morning of June 14th of his intended movement on Charleroi, 45.

Bourmont, General, deserted with his staff to the enemy, succeeded by Hulot, 26, n. [36], 47.

Braine-le-Comte, sixteen miles west of Quatre Bras, 82; headquarters of the Prince of Orange, 102.

Braine-la-Leud ordered to be intrenched by Colonel Smyth, 296, 297.

Brunswick, Duke of, commander Brunswick corps, 38; arrives opportunely at Quatre Bras, 178; killed at Quatre Bras, 179.

Brussels, Wellington’s headquarters, 3, 74; chief objective of Napoleon next to the dispersion of the allied armies, 142.

Brye, place of conference between Wellington and Blücher, 108, 144, 146.

Bullock, R. H., _Journal of_, cited, 113.

Bülow, General, commander 4th Prussian corps, 33; had in 1813 won the battle of Dennewitz against Ney, 34; ordered to Ligny, 70; not fully informed of situation, delayed execution of order, 73; his arrival expected by Blücher, 151, 172; his non-arrival, 231; on the march to Waterloo, 262, 263; attacks the right flank of the French army, 308, 309; attacks Planchenoit and is repulsed, 311; capture of Planchenoit, 325; assures the allied victory, 340.

Bylandt, Major-General Count de, commander Dutch-Belgian brigade, 36; at Quatre Bras, 102, 114; dangerous position of his brigade at Waterloo, 299, 300.

Byng, Major-General Sir John, commander brigade British guards, 35; position at Waterloo, 300.

C.

Caillou house, on the Brussels road near tavern of La Belle Alliance, Napoleon’s headquarters evening of June 17th, 30, 245, 289.

Charleroi, the general objective point June 15th, 46; occupied by the main French column at noon, June 15th, 47, 114; headquarters of Napoleon, 48.

Charras, Lieutenant-Colonel, his _Histoire de la Campagne de 1815_, cited, 13, 17, 19, 25, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 56, 57, 58, 59, 63, 67, 69, 70, 71, 73, 77, 80, 94, 96, 97, 98, 106, 122, 123, 124, 125, 136, 139, 144, 151, 152, 153, 154, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 163, 170, 171, 177, 178, 179, 183, 184, 189, 190, 193, 195, 201, 209, 212, 213, 214, 217, 222, 251, 252, 253, 258, 259, 262, 265, 270, 280, 282, 283, 284, 285, 289, 291, 292, 293, 298, 301, 304, 305, 306, 307, 312, 313, 316, 317, 319, 321, 324, 325, 326, 337, 352; admits no merit in Napoleon, iv.

Chassé, General, commander Dutch-Belgian division, 38; position at Waterloo, 300; opportunely brings into play Van der Smissen’s battery, 308; ordered to the rear of the British guards, 314.

Chesney, Colonel Charles C., his _Waterloo Lectures_, cited, 25, 29, 51, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 76, 77, 90, 95, 101, 104, 128, 141, 188, 219, 221, 268, 278, 280, 339, 349.

Clausewitz, General Carl von, his _Der Feldzug von 1815_, etc., cited, 3, 10, 11, 13, 14, 58, 59, 70, 71, 73, 96, 97, 98, 139, 154, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 205, 208, 217, 218, 219, 243, 253, 262, 280.

Clinton, Lieutenant-General Sir Henry, commander 2d British division, 38; position at Waterloo, 300.

Clinton, H. R., his _The War in the Peninsula_, etc., concurs with Hooper in opinion as to Napoleon’s intention to wedge himself between the opposing armies, 11, n. [14], 141.

Colborne, Lieutenant-Colonel Sir John (afterward Lord Seaton), commander British 52d regiment, 324; resists advance of the Imperial Guard, 324, 331-336.

Cole, Sir Lowry, commander British 6th division, 38; position at Waterloo, 299; not in the action, 299, n. [696].

Colville, General Sir Charles, commander British 4th division, 38; his division withheld from the field of Waterloo by Wellington, 339.

Communication between allied armies, lines of, not to be confounded with lines of supplies, 14.

Cooke, Major-General, commander 1st division, 38; at Quatre Bras, 184; position at Waterloo, 300.

_Correspondance de Napoléon_, cited, 5, 14, 19, 45, 47, 52, 53, 54, 57, 64, 65, 66, 68, 96, 98, 99, 100, 134, 135, 141, 142, 165, 180, 191, 215, 243, 289, 317, 332, 338, 351, 352, 353.

D.

Dalton, Charles, his _Waterloo Roll Call_ cited, 86.

Damitz, Major, his _Histoire de la Campagne de 1815_, cited, 144, 148, 149, 227, 285, 316, 317.

D’Auvergne. (See LA TOUR D’AUVERGNE.)

Davout, Marshal, desired field service, but was left at Paris, 22; would probably have prevented defeat at Waterloo, if in place of Ney or Grouchy, 22; Napoleon writes him, anticipating battle or retreat of Prussians, 45; his _Histoire de la Vie Militaire_, etc., cited, 22, 164, 166, 173.

Daylight in Belgium, through June from before sunrise at 4 A.M. until 9 P.M., 52, 251.

De Lancey, Colonel Sir William, Wellington’s chief of staff, 81; instructions to, lost, 81-82; his “Disposition” of the British army at 7 A.M., June 16th, 85-86, n. [186]; hurriedly drawn up, 114, n. [245]; is furnished copy of Wellington’s survey-sketches, 296.

Delbrück, Hans, his _Das Leben des Feldmarschalls Grafen Reithardt von Gneisenau_, cited, 34, 73, 78, 81, 109, 144, 145, 146, 149, 159, 204, 226, 228, 234.

D’Erlon, Count, commander 1st French corps, 18; position in the advance, 46; backwardness of his corps, 50-56, 94, 118, 119, 124, 127, 131, 132, 137-140, 156, 198; his wandering march, 157-161, 170-172, 174-175, 180-182, 193-196; ordered to halt at Frasnes, 177-178, 183; presence of his corps at Quatre Bras would have assured Ney’s victory, 184-186; ordered to pursue the English rear guard, 215; in the first line at Waterloo, 289, 301; his grand assault upon the allied line, 304-307; unwieldy formation of his troops, 305, 329; rallied to support the Guard, 318, 330; his corps hopelessly disorganized, 325.

Dirom, Captain, of 1st British foot-guards, describes advance of Imperial Guard, 335.

_Documents Inédits sur la Campagne de 1815_, cited, 48, 49, 50, 51, 55, 67, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 129, 131, 134, 141, 154, 155, 156, 169, 178, 180, 182, 189, 190, 191, 195, 196, 201, 203, 292, 302, 307, 308, 314, 326, 352.

Domon, General, commander cavalry division 3d French corps, 26; with Napoleon on march to Waterloo, 212; reported retreat of the Prussians, 246; at Waterloo, 301.

Donzelot, General, commander division 1st French corps, 25; in d’Erlon’s assault at Waterloo, 305; supports cavalry charge, 310; brilliant attacks upon the allied line in support of the Guard, 318, 322, 330, 337, 338.

Dörnberg, Major-General Sir William, commander British cavalry brigade, 35, 36; reports Napoleon as having turned towards Charleroi, 80, 83; as to Wellington’s pledge of support to Blücher on the 16th, 145.

Drouot, General, Adjutant-General of the Imperial Guard, an officer of great merit, 20; advised Napoleon to delay battle at Waterloo, 292.

Du Casse, A., _Le Général Vandamme et sa Correspondance_, cited, 139.

Durutte, General, commander division 1st French corps, 25; in the advance, 50, 129, 176, 179 _et seq._; position at Waterloo, 302; in d’Erlon’s assault, 305; his division routed, 325, 341.

E.

Elchingen, Duke of. (See NEY.)

Ellesmere, Earl of, _Essays on History_, etc., cited, 10, 43, 74, 139, 239.

Elphinstone, Colonel, skilfully supports the British guards at Waterloo, 322.

Erckmann-Chatrian, _Waterloo_, cited, 306.

Exelmans, General, commander 2d French cavalry corps, 27; at Ligny, 154; in the march to Wavre, 212, 251 _et seq._

F.

Flahaut, General, on Napoleon’s staff, the bearer to Ney of the Emperor’s plans for the operations of the 16th, 121, 131, 134, 135; returns, bringing news of the result at Quatre Bras, 200.

Fleurus, point of retreat of the Prussians on the 15th, 48, 70; occupied by the French army on the 16th, 153-154; headquarters of Napoleon after battle of Ligny, 159, 200.

Foy, General, his _History of the War in the Peninsula_, portrait of Napoleon, 23; commander division 2d French corps, 25; in the advance to Quatre Bras, 49, 122, 129, 130; at Quatre Bras, 178; at Waterloo, 301-302; joins in attack upon Hougomont, 304.

Fraser, _Letters of Colonel Sir A. S._, cited, 30.

Fraser, Sir William, _Words on Wellington_, cited, 105.

Friant, General, commander division Old Guard, 26; at Waterloo, 316.

G.

Gardner, Mr. Dorsey, his _Quatre Bras, Ligny, and Waterloo_, cited, 29, 105, 249, 268.

Gawler, an officer of the British 52d regiment, his _Crisis and Close of the Action at Waterloo_, cited, 333.

Genappe, a smart skirmish at, 216; after the battle of Quatre Bras Wellington spent the night at, 233; the French retreat blocked at, 326.

Gérard, General Count, commander 4th French corps, 18; in the advance, 44, 46; at Ligny, 153, 154, 157-159, 165; in the march to Wavre, 211; urged Grouchy to march to the sound of the cannon, 256, 257, 262; wounded in the attack on Wavre, 265; his _Quelques Documents_ and _Dernières Observations_, etc., cited, 212, 247, 251, 252, 258, 259, 267, 271.

Girard, General, commander division 2d French corps, 25; in pursuit of the Prussians, 49; at Ligny, 153, 154; mortally wounded, 203 his division left at Ligny to care for the wounded, 203.

Gleig, Rev. G. R., his _Life of the Duke of Wellington_, cited, 92, 93.

Gneisenau, General, chief of staff to Blücher, an able administrator, 34; remiss in not fully informing Bülow of the situation, 73; believed that Wellington had given assurance of support at Ligny, 145, 149; assumed command after Blücher’s injury, 226; gave order for the retreat on Wavre, 226, 227; his want of confidence in Wellington, 229, 264.

Gomm, Sir William Maynard, _Letters and Journals of_, cited, 83, 112, 178, 299.

Gore, Captain Arthur, _An Historical Account of the Battle of Waterloo_, cited, 316, 319, 332.

Gourgaud, General, _Campagne de 1815_, cited, 4, 19, 52, 56, 63, 64, 66, 195, 215, 216, 338.

Grouchy, Marshal, commander French cavalry reserve, 18, 21; a veteran, 18; unfit for independent command, 208, 273; given command of the right wing, 21, 22, 135; in the first day’s advance, 47, 48; in the battle of Ligny, 154; given verbal orders by Napoleon to pursue the Prussians, 206, 209; his objections to order, 207, 208; the order dictated to General Bertrand, 209-211, 218-221, 223, 249 _et seq._, 345, 350, 358; force given him for pursuit, 209, 212, 220; his letter to Napoleon from Gembloux, 212-213, 245, 250; his movement on Wavre, 211-213, 245-262, 264-267, 272, 279, 288; issues orders for the morning of the 18th, 250; his letter to Pajol morning of 18th, 251; makes no change in his orders, 252; should have marched for the bridge of Moustier at daybreak, 253; neglects proper reconnoissance, 254; his despatch from Walhain, 255, 256; heard the sound of the cannon of Waterloo at Walhain, not Sart-à-Walhain, 256, 259, 287, 288, 345; refused to accept Gérard’s advice, 256, 257; was expected to arrive on left bank of the Dyle by the bridge of Moustier, 268 _et seq._, 345; probable result had he marched for Moustier at daybreak, 281, 283, 284, 326-328, 339, 342; or had followed the counsel of Gérard at noon, 261, 339, 342; in the battle of Wavre, 264-265; receives further orders from Napoleon, 265, 270; is supposed to be bearing toward the main army, 271, 272; carried the bridge of Limale, 271; expected to keep off Blücher, not to fight Wellington, 278; not solely responsible for defeat at Waterloo, 328, 342.

Guard. (See IMPERIAL GUARD.)

Gudin, General, Napoleon’s page at Waterloo, credited with story as to Napoleon’s health on morning of battle of Waterloo, 30.

Guilleminot, General, according to Charras, the real commander of Jerome Bonaparte’s division, 25, n. [35], 304.

Gurwood, Lieutenant-Colonel, _The Despatches of Field-Marshal the Duke of Wellington_, cited, 39, 71, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 295, 328.

Guyot, General, commander cavalry division Imperial Guard, 27; at Ligny, 157; in Ney’s charge upon the allied centre, 310, 311.

H.

Halkett, General Sir Colin, commander British brigade, 35; assists in opposing charge of Imperial Guard at Waterloo, 320, 322, 331.

Hamilton, Lieutenant-General Sir F. W., his _Grenadier Guards_, cited, 111.

Hamley, General Edward Bruce, _The Operations of War_, etc., cited, 221, 222, 280, 281, 339.

Hardinge, General Sir Henry, English military _attaché_ at Blücher’s headquarters, gives Wellington’s criticism of Blücher’s position, 155; lost his left hand at Ligny, 229; story of discussion between Blücher and Gneisenau as to remaining in communication with the English, 230.

Harlet, General, commander 4th regiment grenadiers of the Guard at Waterloo, 316.

Henrion, General, commander 4th regiment chasseurs of the Guard at Waterloo, 316.

Heymès, Colonel, Ney’s aide-de-camp, 67; regarding interview between Ney and Napoleon, 49, n. [75], 67, 68; reports account of Ney’s interview with Napoleon at midnight of the 15th, 116; reports conference between Ney and Reille, 116; as to the inactivity of Ney on morning of 16th, 119; as to arrival of the 3.15 P.M. order to Ney from Napoleon, 195, n. [442]; overestimates Napoleon’s loss in taking La Haye Sainte, 307, n. [712]; denies that Ney ordered Guyot to charge upon the allied centre, 311.

Hill, Lieutenant-General Lord, commander 2d British corps, 38; a valuable man, 40; orders to, morning of the 16th, 82, 88, 89.

_Histoire de l’Ex-Garde_, cited, 326.

Hooper, George, his _Waterloo_, cited, 11, 77, 104, 155, 182, 183, 184, 190, 222, 282, 307.

Hougomont, Chateau of, description of, 297; occupied by the English, 300; French attack upon, 303, 304, 329, 330.

Hulot, General, succeeded General Bourmont to command of division 4th French corps, 26; at Ligny, 153, n. [345], 154.

I.

Imperial Guard, strength of, 26; leaves Paris, 44; ordered to advance 45-46; leaves its commander, Marshal Mortier, behind, ill, 46; a division of cavalry of, supports Ney at Frasnes, 49, 157; in reserve near Fleurus at beginning of battle at Ligny, 154; led by Napoleon in person at Ligny, 157, 158; loss, 161, 197; pursues the retreating English, 214-216; position at Waterloo, 301; in defence of Planchenoit, 309, 311; attack on the English line by the cavalry of, 309, 311; the _élite_ of the army, 312; position, condition, and strength of, 315-318; charge of, and repulse by British guards and Adam’s brigade, 318-324; the attack pressed, but again repulsed, 323, 324; resisted heroically to the last, 326; the Emperor finally forced to take refuge in one of its squares, 326; the charge of, reviewed, 331, 332, 335-338.

Inniskilling Dragoons, a part of the British Union brigade at Waterloo, 300.

J.

Jomini, General Baron de, _The Political and Military History of the Campaign of Waterloo_, cited, 12, 56, 59, 63, 66, 71, 139, 142, 153, 158, 170, 176, 177,186, 192, 193, 200, 205, 253, 280, 281, 357.

Jones, George, _The Battle of Waterloo_, cited, 125, 144, 146, 200, 235, 317, 332, 334, 338.

K.

Kellermann, Count of Valmy, commander 3d French cavalry corps, 27; at Quatre Bras, 183, 184, 197; in reserve at Waterloo, 301; in the charge upon the allied centre, 309-310.

Kempt, Major-General Sir James, commander British brigade, 35; at Waterloo, 306, 312.

Kennedy, General Sir James Shaw,—his _Notes on the Battle of Waterloo_, cited, 96, 97, 99, 100, 250, 268, 274, 278, 280, 284, 294, 299, 301, 308, 310, 312, 339, 349.

Kielmansegge, Count, commander Hanoverian brigade, 36; his brigade unable to hold its position at the close of the battle of Waterloo, 312.

Kruse, General von, commander Nassau contingent, 37; did not arrive at Quatre Bras in time to take part in the action, 113.

L.

La Haye Sainte, farm-house on Brussels road, 301; attack upon, by the French, 305, 307; captured shortly before 4 P.M., 307, n. [712], 308, 312.

La Tour d’Auvergne, Lieutenant-Colonel Prince Édouard de, his _Waterloo: Étude de la Campagne de 1815_, cited, 13, 46, 51, 56, 59, 63, 69, 71, 118, 130, 136, 146, 154, 157, 158, 177, 202, 248, 250, 251, 257, 270, 304, 306.

Leeke, Rev. William, an officer of the British 52d regiment, 333; his _History of Lord Seaton’s Regiment at the Battle of Waterloo_, cited, 111, 333, 334, 336.

Lefebvre-Desnouettes, General, commander division of cavalry Imperial Guard, 27; in support of troops at Frasnes, 49, 157; in the charge upon the allied centre at Waterloo, 309.

L’Heritier, General, commander of division 3d French cavalry corps, 27; his division at Quatre Bras, 183.

_Life Guards, Historical Record of the_, cited, 113.

Ligny. (See BATTLE OF.)

Lines of supply, 4.

Lobau, Count of (Mouton), commander French 6th corps, 18, 26; in the advance on the 15th, 46; delayed in reaching Ligny, 160; as to non-employment of his corps at Ligny, 160; at Waterloo, 301; made gallant defence of Planchenoit, 311, 325, 331.

Lockhart, J. G., his _History of Napoleon Buonaparte_, cited, 238, 239.

M.

Mackworth, Sir Digby, on Lord Hill’s staff at Waterloo, describes advance of Imperial Guard, 332.

Maitland, Major-General, commander brigade British guards, 35; repulses attack of Imperial Guard at Waterloo, 319-323, 331-335.

_Malmesbury, Letters of the First Earl of_, cited, 81, 233.

Marbot, Colonel, his _Mémoires_, cited, 247, 254, 258, 268, 269, 270.

Marcognet, General, commander division 1st French corps, 25; position at Waterloo, 302; in d’Erlon’s assault 305; forced to abandon his position, 325, 341.

Marette, Chateau, at Walhain, 255, 288.

Marmont, Marshal, _Mémoires_, cited, 246, 247.

Maurice, Colonel J. F., his _Articles on Waterloo_, cited, 46, 47, 55, 71, 73, 74, 75, 76, 80, 83, 84, 85, 86, 94, 103, 106, 167, 204, 220, 221, 224, 227, 230, 237, 238, 241, 250, 262, 263.

_Memorandum on the Battle of Waterloo_, cited, 72, 74, 90, 95.

Mercer, General Cavalié, _Journal of the Waterloo Campaign_, cited, 216, 310.

Michel, General, commander brigade chasseurs of Imperial Guard at Waterloo, 316.

Milhaud, General Count, commander French 4th cavalry corps, 27; at Ligny, 154, 157-159; at Waterloo, 301; in the charge upon the allied centre, 309.

Morris, William O’Connor, his _Great Commanders of Modern Times, and the Campaign of 1815_, cited, 69, 307.

Morvan, General Poret de, commander 3d regiment grenadiers of the Imperial Guard at Waterloo, 316, 317.

Mortier, Marshal, commander Imperial Guard, taken ill just before the opening of the campaign, 20, 46.

Mouton. (See LOBAU.)

Mudford, William, his _Historical Account of the Campaign in the Netherlands in 1815_, cited, 105.

Müffling, General Baron von, his _Passages from my Life_, cited, 39, 42, 71, 77, 78, 80, 81, 105, 109, 144, 145, 146, 159, 229, 233, 340, 341.

Muquardt, his _Précis de la Campagne de 1815_, cited, 118, 159, 177, 338.

N.

Napier, General Sir William, _Life of_, cited, 24, 191, 338.

Napier’s battery at Waterloo, 317, 318.

Napoleon, his return to Paris from Elba, 1; general military situation, 2; his reasons for taking the offensive, 2, 3; his plan of campaign, 4-15, 45, 59 _et seq._, 343, 348; his army, 16-28; gives Ney command of the left wing, 21, 49; his bodily strength and vigor, 23, 24, 29-31, 140, 200, 202, 290, 347, 348; leaves Paris for the field, 44; assembles his army near Charleroi, 44, 45; issues general order of movement, 45, 46; the advance to Fleurus, 46-53, 55 _et seq._; fixes his headquarters at Charleroi, 48; as to verbal orders to Ney to seize Quatre Bras, 52, 62-69, 343; midnight conference, with Ney on the 15th, 54, 116, 129, 130, 132, 140; orders to Ney on the 16th, 120-125, 130, 131, 134, 141-142, 154-156; his reasons for delay on morning of 16th, 132-142, 163; his arrival at Fleurus about 11 A.M., 152; examines the position at Ligny, 152; his plan for the battle, 152-153, 164 _et seq._; battle of Ligny, 152-175; delays decisive blow upon the unexpected appearance of d’Erlon’s corps, 157-158, 160, 161, 170, 171, 174, 198; spends the night after the battle of Ligny at Fleurus, 159, 200; his skill conspicuous at Ligny, 171; not responsible for d’Erlon’s wandering, 182, 193 _et seq._; his delay on the morning of the 17th, 197 _et seq._; loses the opportunity of overwhelming Wellington at Quatre Bras, 199-202, 344, 348; orders to Ney on the 17th, 201, 203 (see NEY); his march to join Ney, 203, 213-214; misconceives movement of Blücher, 203-206; his neglect of proper reconnoissance on the morning of the 17th, 205, 217, 218, 223-225, 344, 348; gives verbal order to Grouchy to pursue the Prussians, 206, 209 (see GROUCHY); the Bertrand order to Grouchy, 209-211, 218-223, 248, 249, 274, 345; leads pursuit of the English from Quatre Bras, 214, 215; not to blame for not pursuing the Prussians on the early morning of the 17th, 217; expects Grouchy to arrive by the bridge of Moustier, 247, 268 _et seq._, 290, 293, 294, 345; orders to Grouchy on the 18th, 265-272, 291; his headquarters at the Caillou house, 289; reconnoitres the field of battle of Waterloo at 1 A.M., 289; his conduct on the morning of the 18th, 289-294; his plan of battle, 292, 302 (see BATTLE OF WATERLOO); decides to defer the main attack until about 1 P.M., 292, 302; the attack upon Hougomont, 303, 304, 329; called from the front to resist Prussian attack upon his right flank, 308-309, 311 _et seq._, 330, 345, 346; returns to the front, 314; organizes general advance upon the British position, 315-317, 336; the attack of the Guard repulsed, 318-324, 331-338; his efforts to rally the Guard, 325; his army routed, 326; borne from the field in a square of the Guard, 326.

_Napoléon à Waterloo_, cited, 48, 50, 51, 69, 157, 181, 214, 215, 222, 247, 269, 270, 314, 319, 357.

Ney, Marshal, placed in the field at the last moment, 20, 21, 49, 55; given command of the left wing, 21, 49; overtakes the army near Charleroi, 49; movement on Quatre Bras on the 15th, 49-54, 55, 56, 62, 69, 139; verbal orders from Napoleon on the 15th to seize Quatre Bras, 52, 62-69, 343; midnight interview with Napoleon on the 15th, 54, 116, 129, 130, 132, 140; lacks a competent staff, 55, 119, 129, 140; his defective preparations and disobedience of orders on the 16th, 116-128, 140, 176-183, 186-187, 191, 344, 348; orders from Napoleon on the 16th, 120-125, 130, 131, 134, 141-142, 154-156; in the battle of Quatre Bras, 178-196; prevented Wellington’s aiding Blücher, 187; makes no report of the result of the battle to Napoleon, 200, 202; orders from Napoleon on the 17th, 201, 203; his neglect to pursue Wellington on the morning of the 17th, 214; with Napoleon in pursuit of Wellington to Waterloo, 214 _et seq._; his great attack with d’Erlon’s infantry upon the allied line, 304-307; the capture of La Haye Sainte, 307; cavalry attacks upon the allied centre, 309-311; non-employment of infantry, 309, 311, 318, 324, 337; responsible for mistakes in assaults upon the allied line, 311 _et seq._, 329, 330, 345; his lack of preparations for an attack by the Imperial Guard, 315, 317, 337, 338, 346; leads the charge of the Imperial Guard, 318-324, 331-338; contrasted with Wellington, 338.

O.

O’Connor Morris, William (see MORRIS).

Oldfield, Major John, his _Letters on the Battle of Waterloo_, cited, 89, 105, 296, 301.

Ollech, General von, _Geschichte des Feldzuges von_ 1815, cited, 72, 73, 76, 77, 83, 84, 85, 106, 109, 134, 136, 143, 144, 145, 149, 154, 205, 208, 209, 226, 227, 228, 229, 231, 232, 233, 238, 258, 262, 263, 285.

Ompteda, Colonel von, commander brigade King’s German Legion, 35; his brigade nearly annihilated near La Haye Sainte, 312.

Orange, Prince of, commander British 1st corps, 38; character as an officer, 40; hears of the French advance, 76; notifies Wellington at Brussels, 77; at Quatre Bras, 102, 178.

P.

Pack, Major-General Sir Denis, commander British brigade, 35; at Waterloo, 306.

Pajol, General, commander 1st French cavalry corps, 27; in the advance on the 15th, 46, 47; at Ligny, 154; in pursuit of the Prussians after Ligny, 205; with Grouchy in the march on Wavre, 212; in the battle of Wavre, 265.

Papelotte, small village in front of Wellington’s position at Waterloo, 297; occupied by Zieten’s corps, 324.

Pascallet, M. E., _Notice Biographique sur M. le Maréchal Marquis de Grouchy_, cited, 209, 357.

Perponcher, General, commander division Dutch-Belgians, 38; at Quatre Bras, 102, 103, 112, 178; his position at Waterloo, 299.

Picton, Sir Thomas, commander 5th British division, 38; a man of energy and capacity, 40; at Quatre Bras, 178; in battle of Waterloo, 299; repulses d’Erlon’s charge, 306, 307.

Pirch I., General von, commander 2d Prussian corps, 32; headquarters at Namur, 33; at Ligny, 143, 151, 159; falls back towards Wavre, 159, 226, 232, 246, 339, 340, 346; delayed in leaving Wavre, 262, 263; supports Bülow’s assaults upon Planchenoit, 325, 340.

Piré, Lieutenant-General, commander cavalry division 2d French corps, 25; in the advance, 49; at Quatre Bras, 178; at Waterloo, 301, 337.

Planchenoit, 313, n. [722]; attacked successfully by Bülow, retaken by Napoleon, 311; gallantly defended by the Young Guard and Count de Lobau, 311.

Ponsonby, Major-General Sir William, commander Union brigade English cavalry, 35; his charge at Waterloo, 306, 307, 313.

Porter’s _History Royal Engineers_, cited, 296, 312.

Powell, Captain, 1st British footguards, 334; describes advance of Imperial Guard at Waterloo, 319, 324.

Q.

Quatre Bras, value of the position, 3 _et seq._, 12, 13, 61 _et seq._, 94 _et seq._ (See BATTLE OF.)

Quinet, Edgar, _Histoire de la Campagne de 1815_, cited, 11, 58, 282.

Quiot, General, commanded Allix’s division at Waterloo, 302; assigned to the task of capturing La Haye Sainte, 305; brilliant attacks upon the allied line in support of the Guard, 318, 330, 337.

R.

Raguse, Duc de, _Mémoires_, see MARMONT.

Rebecque, General Constant, chief of staff to the Prince of Orange, orders Perponcher to the support of Prince Bernhard’s brigade at Quatre Bras, 101-103.

Reille, General Count, commander 2d French corps, 18; in the advance, 44, 46, 48, 50, 101; conference with Ney on the 16th, 116; his _Notice Historique_, cited, 121; disobedience of orders, 121-122, 168, 176, 192-193; his corps at Quatre Bras, 178; position at Waterloo, 301; attacks Hougomont, 303-304, 314, n. 54, 329, 330, 337; failed to realize his opportunity for retreat, 326.

_Relation Belge sur la Bataille de Waterloo_, cited, 320.

Rogniat, his _Considérations de l’Art de la Guerre_, and _Réponse aux Notes Critiques de Napoléon_, cited, 12, 56, 57, 58, 164.

Roguet, General, commander brigade Imperial Guard at Waterloo, 316.

Royal Dragoons, a part of the British Union Brigade at Waterloo, 300.

Russia, sets her army in motion for the general attack upon France, 1; expected to reinforce the Austrian army, 2.

S.

Saint Hilaire, Émile Marco de, _Histoire de la Garde_, cited, 319.

Saltoun, Lord, at Waterloo, 320.

Sart-à-Walhain, Grouchy orders troops there, 250; erroneously supposed to be the place where he heard the cannon of Waterloo, 255, 286-288.

Saxe-Weimar, Prince Bernhard of, commander brigade Dutch-Belgians, 36, 36, n. [51]; driven from Frasnes, 49, 101; at Quatre Bras, 90, 101-103; his position at Waterloo, 299.

Scots Greys, a part of the British Union brigade at Waterloo, 300.

Scott, Sir Walter, _Life of Napoleon_, cited, 93.

Siborne, Captain W., _History of the War in France and Belgium in 1815_, cited, 13, 34, 35, 71, 73, 75, 77, 80, 82, 83, 84, 91, 111, 112, 114, 139, 154, 158, 159, 179, 183, 184, 191, 192, 199, 205, 212, 229, 232, 234, 237, 238, 254, 258, 261, 262, 270, 279, 283, 284, 285, 298, 301, 306, 310, 312, 319, 322, 333.

Sidney, Rev. Edwin, _The Life of Lord Hill_, cited, 332.

Sombreffe, its military value, 12-14, 57 _et seq._; point of concentration for the Prussian army, 70; the centre of the Prussian army at the battle of Ligny, 151.

Somerset, Major-General Lord Edward, commander cavalry brigade British guards, 35; position at Waterloo, 300; charge of his brigade, 307, 313.

Soult, Marshal, succeeds Berthier as Napoleon’s chief of staff, 17; unfit for the position, 18; told Sir W. Napier that Napoleon fought Waterloo without examination of the enemy’s position, 24, n. [32]; not at fault on the morning of the 16th, 128; orders Ney to envelop the enemy’s right, 155; told Sir W. Napier that Ney neglected his orders at Quatre Bras, 191; of no assistance to Napoleon on morning of 17th, 202; opposed to detaching Grouchy with so large a force, 279, n. [641]; negligent as a staff officer, 246, 348.

Stanhope, Philip Henry, 5th Earl, _Notes of Conversations with the Duke of Wellington_, cited, 42, 46, 155, 230.

Steinmetz, General von, commander division Prussian 1st corps, 32; at Waterloo, 324-325.

_Supplementary Despatches of the Duke of Wellington_, edited by his son, cited, 72, 74, 85, 90, 374 _et seq._

Supplies, lines of, not to be confounded with lines of communication between the allied armies, 14.

T.

Thielemann, General von, commander 3d Prussian corps, 33; at Ligny, 144, 151, 159; his corps placed where it could not aid Zieten and Pirch I., 204; in the retreat to Wavre, 231, 232, 234, 261; his corps left alone, defended Wavre against Grouchy, 264-265. (See BATTLE OF WAVRE.)

Thiers, M. A., his _History of the Consulate and the Empire of France under Napoleon_, cited, 10, 24, 29, 30, 66, 154, 193, 292, 354.

U.

Union Brigade, British, commanded by Major-General Ponsonby, composed of the Royal Dragoons, Scots Greys, and the Inniskilling Dragoons, at Waterloo, 300, 306, 307, 313.

Uxbridge, Lord (afterwards Marquis of Anglesea), commander of combined cavalry of British and King’s German Legion, 38; leads charge of Somerset’s cavalry at Waterloo, 307; calls Wellington’s attention to danger of pursuit of the French with weakened battalions, 341.

V.

Vandamme, Count, commander 3d French corps, known as a hard fighter, 18; delayed in the advance on the 15th, 47; at Ligny, 153, 154, 157-159; delayed in the march with Grouchy to Gembloux, 211, 252; his troops entangled in attempt to carry bridges at Wavre, 264, 265.

Vandeleur, Major-General Sir John, commander British light cavalry brigade, 35; his position at Waterloo, 299; brought to the centre with Vivian’s brigade at a critical time, 314; in the final charge, 325.

Van Löben Sels, E., _Précis de la Campagne de 1815 dans les Pays-Bas_, cited, 49, 76, 77, 92, 101, 102, 112, 279, 280, 284, 291, 310, 312, 317.

Vaudoncourt, General Guillaume de, _Histoire des Campagnes de 1814 et 1815 en France_, cited, 59, 289, 291.

Vivian, Major-General Sir Hussey, commander British light cavalry brigade, 35; his position at Waterloo, 299; brought into action at a critical moment, 314; in the final charge, 325.

W.

Walhain, where Grouchy heard the cannon of Waterloo, 255, 256, 259, 286-288.

Waterloo, the field of, 296; surveyed by English engineers before the opening of the campaign, 296. (See BATTLE OF.)

_Waterloo Letters_, cited, 83, 112, 233, 299, 300, 310, 312, 319, 321, 322, 323, 324, 332, 333, 334, 335.

Wavre, regarded by Napoleon as the proper point of concentration for the Prussian army, 98; the Prussian rendezvous after battle of Ligny, 233. (See BATTLE OF.)

Weather, 198, 211, 216, 289, 291, 292, 348.

Wellington, Duke of, headquarters at Brussels, 3, 74; his qualifications as a commander, 40, 41; his army, 34-40, 43, 294, 302; anticipates French advance by way of Mons, 74-77; his understanding with Blücher, 70 _et seq._, 91, 346; delays advance upon Quatre Bras, 77-115, 346-347; at Quatre Bras on the 16th, 106, 109; his conference with Blücher at Brye, 108, 144-146, 150; disapproves of Blücher’s position at Ligny, 155, n. [353]; in the battle of Quatre Bras, 178, 179, 183-185, 187, 188; retreats from Quatre Bras, 214, 233, 297; learns of Prussian defeat at Ligny, 233; did not receive assurance of support from Blücher until the morning of the 18th, 234, 238, 347; his ride to Wavre to consult with Blücher, 238 _et seq._, 347; his preparations for the battle of Waterloo, 294-297; occupies Hougomont, 297; his command at Waterloo, 297-300; fortifies La Haye Sainte, 301; his justification in accepting battle based upon assurance of support from Blücher, 294, 295, 302, 327; his efforts to restore his shattered line, 310, 312, 314, 318; his imminent peril, 314; repulses charge of the Imperial Guard, 318-325, 332-336; final advance of his whole line, 325, 340, 341; his retention of 18,000 men at Hal and Tubize, 339; contrasted with Ney, 338, 339.

Y.

Yonge, C. D., _Life of Wellington_, cited, 296.

Young, Rev. Julian Charles, _A Memoir of Charles Mayne Young, Tragedian_ cited, 239-241.

Z.

Zieten, General von, commander 1st Prussian corps, 32; headquarters at Charleroi, 33; resists French advance on the 15th, 47, 70, 77; at Ligny, 143, 151; falls back toward Wavre, 159, 226, 232; delay in movement on the 18th, 262; arrival of his corps at Waterloo, 324; his probable course indicated if Grouchy had detained Bülow and Pirch I., 328; his intervention not anticipated, 336; his appearance and decisive attack upon the right flank of French army assured the allied victory, 340, 341.

* * * * * *

Transcriber’s note:

The spelling, hyphenation, punctuation and accentuation are as the original, except for apparent typographical errors which have been corrected. Some unpaired double quotation marks could not be corrected with confidence and were left as in the original.