CHAPTER XV.

THE EIGHTEENTH OF JUNE: GROUCHY AND BLÜCHER.

Napoleon received Marshal Grouchy’s letter, dated Gembloux, 10 P.M. of June 17th, about 2 A.M. of the 18th, at the Caillou House, on the Brussels turnpike, where he passed the night of the 17th. A close examination of it might have raised a suspicion in his mind that Grouchy did not thoroughly comprehend his task, and that he might possibly fail to take the right course, if the emergency, which he had in his letter represented as not unlikely to occur, should actually confront him. He had said, that, if he found that the mass of the Prussians were retiring on Wavre, he “would follow them in that direction, in order that they might not be able to gain Brussels, and to separate them from Wellington,” but if they were retiring on Perwez, that he would direct himself on that city. We have pointed out above that it was clearly impossible for him to prevent the Prussians from getting to Brussels. He was thirty miles from Brussels,—the Prussians less than twenty,—and they were directly between him and Brussels. And as for separating the Prussians at Wavre from Wellington, while Grouchy must of course follow them in the direction of Wavre as distinguished from that of Perwez, yet the only thing really open to him was to cross the Dyle at once by the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies and then to act in close connection with the main French army,—to stand between it and the Prussians, and ward off the danger as best he might. This could be done; but this was all that could be done. It was not to be expected that an attack upon the Prussian rearguard at Wavre,—which was the only other thing that Grouchy could do,—however vigorously made, could have the result of detaining their whole army. But, in Grouchy’s letter, a movement on his part to rejoin or to approach the main army by crossing the Dyle, in case he found that the Prussians were massing at Wavre, was not even mentioned.

Napoleon and Soult, therefore, one would suppose, might have seen by the programme which Grouchy had marked out for himself in his despatch that in all probability he was not clearly apprehending the situation, and that it was therefore possible that he might make a serious, perhaps a very serious, mistake the next day. They ought, therefore, if they suspected this to be the state of the case, to have replied at once, giving him precise instructions as to his course in the event of the retreat of the Prussians on Wavre. They should have told him, that, if he should find this to be the fact, he must at once march to cross the Dyle above Wavre, at Moustier and Ottignies, approach the main army, and act in conjunction with it. Yet although Grouchy told the officer who carried the 10 P.M. despatch to wait for an answer, none was returned.[561] Grouchy was not even informed where the army was, and that it was confronted by the English army in position. Nor was he advised, as he surely should have been, that Domon’s reconnoissance had proved that a strong Prussian column,—consisting, as we have seen, of the two beaten corps, those of Zieten and Pirch I.,—had retired on Wavre by way of Gery and Gentinnes.[562] It is impossible to account for these omissions.[563]

Now this last-mentioned fact, that “a pretty strong (Prussian) column” had “passed by Gery and Gentinnes, directed on Wavre,” was the most important fact that could be ascertained, both for Napoleon and Grouchy. Napoleon had in fact, at 2 A.M. of the 18th, when Grouchy’s letter arrived, strong reason to apprehend that Grouchy might, during the night, ascertain that the whole of Blücher’s army had retired on Wavre. It certainly would seem that this was one of those cases where nothing should be omitted that could assist the mind of a subordinate in arriving at a correct conclusion.[564]

Napoleon, however, seems to have thought it unnecessary to send Grouchy any precise directions. We know that he expected Grouchy to arrive the next afternoon by the bridge of Moustier. Marbot, whose Memoirs have just been published, states,[565] that, towards 11 A.M. of the day of the battle, he was sent with his own regiment of hussars and a battalion of infantry to and beyond the extreme right of the army, with instructions, brought to him by one of the Emperor’s aides, to push reconnoissances to the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies. He says that these detachments were connected by cavalry-posts, “so that they could quickly inform him of their junction with the advance guard of the troops of Marshal Grouchy, which were to arrive on the Dyle.”

It may perhaps be, that Grouchy’s expressed intention that he would try to prevent Blücher from joining Wellington was held by both the Emperor and his chief-of-staff as indicating with sufficient certainty that, if he found that the Prussians were retiring on Wavre, he would proceed at once to cross the Dyle at Moustier or Limale, and operate on the left bank of that river, on the right of the main army.[566] This course was almost necessarily implied in an attempt to prevent the Prussians at Wavre from joining the English, as we have just pointed out; it may be, therefore, that the Emperor thought another order needless. But whatever the reason, no order was sent to Grouchy till 10 A.M. the next morning. This did not reach him till 4 P.M.[567] that afternoon, when he was fighting in front of Wavre.

Marshal Grouchy, then, acted up till 4 o’clock of the 18th of June under the order dictated the previous day by the Emperor to Count Bertrand. This fact we desire distinctly to bring out, so that there shall be no possibility of further mistake on this subject. The history of this day, from the very first narratives down to the very last, has been illustrated by the mistakes of historians and critics as to the orders under which Marshal Grouchy acted. Not only did Grouchy himself deliberately deny for nearly thirty years that he received any written order on the 17th, thereby misleading the most sagacious critics and rendering their criticisms on this part of the campaign in great part valueless, but even long after the fact was universally acknowledged that he did get a written order in the shape of the Bertrand letter, a certain unwillingness or inability to take in the meaning of this written order, to recognize that it imposed a different task on Marshal Grouchy from that laid upon him by the verbal orders which had previously been given him, has, nevertheless, strangely enough existed. We have pointed this out in the Notes to Chapter XIII; but we will add one or two more instances here.

The Bertrand order, as we have seen, instructed Grouchy to find out what the Prussians were intending to do,—_whether they were intending to separate themselves from the English, or to unite with them for the purpose of trying the fate of another battle for the defence of Brussels or Liége_,—and the order closed without giving him any directions whatever in case either of these emergencies should arise. The thing which Grouchy was to do, therefore, was to ascertain whether the Prussians were intending to unite with the English, _and then to act in accordance with his best judgment_. No directions whatever, we repeat, were given to him for his conduct if he should find that the Prussians were intending to unite with the English. We have just adverted to this omission of the Emperor to give Grouchy precise instructions in this emergency. There is no question that he did not give any. Grouchy was entirely untrammelled. If he found that the Prussians were intending to unite with the English to fight another battle for the defence of Brussels, he was absolutely free to adopt whatever course might seem to him best.

Yet we find the latest American historian of this campaign, in speaking of Grouchy’s rejection of the advice given by Gérard, when the cannon of Waterloo was heard, saying, that the question was, “whether to turn the army to its left on reaching Corbaix, and, crossing the Dyle by the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies, to take the road to Maransart and Planchenoit, _or to adhere to the Emperor’s orders to follow the Prussians_ whom they now knew to be at Wavre,”—[568] and, again, that Grouchy “_persisted in adhering to the orders the Emperor had given him_.”[569]

In the same way we find the latest English commentator on the campaign saying, “Whether Grouchy can be held responsible for not having” marched to the sound of the guns “_when Napoleon’s instructions directed him on Wavre_, will always be a subject for endless, and, I think, not very profitable, debate.”[570]

It is quite time that an end should be put to misunderstandings on this subject. Until 4 P.M., we repeat, Grouchy acted under the Bertrand order only.

To return to the narrative.

Marshal Grouchy had written to the Emperor at 10 P.M. of the 17th, as we have seen, telling him that, “arrived at Sauvenières, the Prussians had divided into two columns, one taking the road for Wavre in passing by Sart-à-Walhain, and the other appearing to be directed on Perwez.” He then went on to say that he would operate in the direction in which he found that the mass of their forces had gone.

Being thus in doubt as to the direction of the retreat of the enemy, he determined to move at first on Sart-à-Walhain, from which point he could march either on Wavre or on Perwez according to the information he might there receive. Inclining probably at this time to the opinion that the Prussians had retreated by way of Perwez, in which case there would be no necessity for unusual haste, he determined to give his troops a good night’s rest. Of the absolute necessity of gaining time in case he should find that the Prussians had retreated on Wavre with the intention of joining Wellington, he seems to have been utterly unmindful.

Hence, at or soon after 10 P.M., he issued his orders to his corps-commanders to march in the morning to Sart-à-Walhain. Vandamme,[571] whose corps had bivouacked somewhat in advance of Gembloux, was to start at 6 A.M. It was to be preceded in the march by Exelmans’ cavalry, the bulk of which was at Sauvenières. Gérard,[572] whose troops were in and about Gembloux, was to follow with his corps at 8 A.M. Pajol[573] was ordered from Mazy on the Namur road, where he then was, taking with him the division of Teste, to Grand Leez, where he would receive further orders.

Then, at 2 A.M., Grouchy writes to the Emperor to inform him that he was intending to march on Sart-à-Walhain,[574] but without indicating his ulterior course.

During the early morning hours, however, information was received[575] which removed his doubts as to the direction of the Prussian retreat, for we find him writing to Pajol[576] “at daybreak,” as follows:—

“The movement of retreat of Blücher’s army appears to me very clearly to be upon Brussels.”[577]

Marshal Grouchy, therefore, at daybreak,—which in Belgium at that season of the year is at least as early as 3.30 A.M.,—for the sun rises at 3.48 A.M.,—had come to the conclusion that Blücher was retiring on Brussels by way of Wavre. Yet he still adhered to his plan of marching on Sart-à-Walhain, although that place had been chosen the evening before as the first stage in the next day’s march because he had then been in doubt as to whether his ultimate movement would be in the direction of Wavre or in that of Perwez.[578] Moreover, although he had come to the conclusion that the Prussians were retiring on Wavre, towards the English, which made promptness and celerity on his part of the very first importance, he did not change the very late hours he had fixed for the march of the next morning. In fact, even these hours were not adhered to. Exelmans,[579] who preceded the column, did not start till 7.30 A.M.; Vandamme,[580] who came next, did not move until 8 A.M.; and it was not until 9 A.M. that Gérard’s[581] corps got through the town of Gembloux, and was in full march for Sart-à-Walhain. And yet no one knew better than Marshal Grouchy that the Prussians had many hours the start of him, and that if he was going to do anything that day to prevent them from joining Wellington, there was no time to be lost.

There is no difference of opinion among the Continental[582] authorities as to Marshal Grouchy’s true course on this morning. As soon as he had arrived at the conclusion that the Prussians were retiring on Wavre, which was, as we have seen, between 3 and 4 A.M., he should have changed his evening orders entirely; he should have begun his march at once, and should have directed it to the bridge of Moustier. (See Map 9.)

Says Jomini:—[583]

“The Marshal should not, then, have hesitated; he should at daybreak on the 18th have marched with all speed on Moustier with Exelmans, Vandamme and Gérard, directing Pajol’s cavalry and Teste’s division on Wavre, in pursuit of the enemy’s rearguard.

“Being able to reach Moustier by ten o’clock,[584] he could have then forwarded his infantry on Wavre by Limale, pushing Exelmans’ dragoons on St. Lambert, or else have marched to Lasne himself.”

Says Clausewitz:—[585]

“But the moment he learnt that Blücher had turned towards the Dyle, which must have happened in Gembloux in the night between the 17th and 18th, the idea must have shot at once into his mind that this could only be in order to join Wellington, for one does not leave one’s natural line of retreat without reason. From that moment he had to consider it his duty, not to lie at the heels of Blücher’s rear-guard, but to get between him and Bonaparte, in order to be able to throw himself in front of Blücher in case he wanted to march off to his right. According to this, he would have to turn from Gembloux to the Dyle by the shortest road, &c.”

Says Charras:—[586]

“Everything indicated that the most advantageous manœuvre for Blücher was that which would bring him the most quickly near Wellington,—would unite the Prussians to the Anglo-Dutch. Since the opening of hostilities the two allied generals had manœuvred to bring about this union; and it was evident that they were not going to renounce this idea after the defeat of one of their armies; the activity, energy, audacity,—so well known,—of Blücher—the tenacity,—equally well known,—of Wellington, sufficed to guarantee that they would not easily renounce this intention.

“If they should succeed in this, Napoleon would find himself exposed to being crushed under the weight of the two allied armies.

“This catastrophe, the greatest of all misfortunes, Grouchy ought, before everything, to put himself in position to avert, so far as he could do so. Hence it was imperative that he should come as speedily as possible within the sphere of Napoleon’s operations; and hence, also, he must march on Moustier.

“From this point, in fact, better than from any other, he would be equally in position to diminish the consequences of the union of the Prussians and the Anglo-Dutch, if it should already have been effected, or to hinder it, if it should not yet have taken place.”

With these authorities we entirely concur. Marshal Grouchy, as soon as he had made up his mind that Blücher was retiring on Brussels by way of Wavre, should have marched for the bridge of Moustier, and should have started at daybreak.[587] Instead of this, he adhered to the direction of Sart-à-Walhain, although, even if he were proposing to follow Blücher straight to Wavre, Sart-à-Walhain was out of the direct route. It had in fact been selected _because_ it lay to the eastward of the Wavre road. He might have saved from two to four hours by starting at daybreak, but of this he was utterly unmindful. He did not thoroughly reconnoitre with his cavalry towards the Dyle, to see if the enemy were not marching towards the English, although it was certainly his manifest duty to do so.[588] All he did in this direction was to send[589] a staff-officer with a small escort at daybreak or soon after to the bridge of Moustier, to see, apparently, if any Prussian troops had crossed there, but he rejoined Grouchy before Grouchy had arrived at Sart-à-Walhain, that is, before 11 A.M. With this exception the Marshal made absolutely no reconnoissances to his left until he had arrived in front of Wavre.

Somewhere between 10 and 11 A.M. he reached Sart-à-Walhain. Thence he proceeded to Walhain, or, as it is sometimes called, Walhain St. Paul.[590] He alighted at the house of a M. Hollert, the notary of the neighboring village of Nil St. Vincent, who lived in a large house in Walhain known as the Chateau Marette. Here he stopped to write a despatch to the Emperor and to get his breakfast. The cavalry of Exelmans and the 3d Corps under Vandamme had passed this point on the road to Wavre, and had reached or perhaps passed Nil St. Vincent.

The despatch, which is dated Sart-à-Walhain, by an error for Walhain,—11 A.M.,—begins by stating that the Ist, IId and IIId Corps of Blücher’s army are marching in the direction of Brussels. Grouchy subsequently says:—[591]

“This evening I expect to be concentrated at Wavre, and thus to find myself between Wellington, whom I presume to be in retreat before your majesty, and the Prussian army.”

He also states that some of the Prussians are proceeding towards the plain of the Chyse, near the Louvain road, with the design of concentrating there, or of fighting any troops which may pursue them there, or of uniting themselves to Wellington. This part of the despatch looks as if Grouchy thought that a part of the Prussians intended to concentrate to his right. Still, as he distinctly states that the Ist, IId and IIId Corps are marching in the direction of Brussels, we must suppose that he is not referring to these three corps when he speaks of those Prussians who are proceeding towards the plain of the Chyse. So that, when he says that at Wavre he expects to be between Wellington, who he supposes is retiring on Brussels by the Charleroi turnpike, and the Prussian army, three of whose corps are, he says, also retiring on Brussels, it is difficult, if not impossible, to know what he means. He seems to have been completely bewildered.

This despatch had hardly been handed to the staff-officer[592] who was to carry it to the Emperor, when the cannon of Waterloo was heard. Then, at any rate, Marshal Grouchy knew that the English were not retreating before Napoleon, but were standing “on this side of the Forest of Soignes,” as the Emperor had, the afternoon before, conjectured they might. Three Prussian corps had gone towards Brussels, as Grouchy had just written to the Emperor. It was very possible that they might at that moment be marching across the country to join the Anglo-Dutch army. Perhaps nothing could prevent this. But it was plainly Grouchy’s duty to march towards the Emperor as fast as he could. If he could not prevent the Prussians from joining the English, he might at any rate be able to prevent them from attacking the French. If he should cross the Dyle at Moustier and Ottignies, and move directly towards the line of march which they must take in order to attack the French, their march would, if he arrived in time, assuredly be suspended. This was at any rate the thing to try to do. It was to be feared that a terrible disaster was impending over Napoleon and his army; but there was a chance of averting it. There was only one thing to do,—and that was, promptly and gallantly to make the attempt to avert it. (See Map 10.)

Gérard, who had arrived at Walhain with his corps, strenuously urged Grouchy to march to the sound of the cannon. He pressed this on Grouchy with perhaps undue heat; but the occasion was one that admitted of no delay. The son of Marshal Grouchy, who may be supposed to have heard his father’s account of the interview, says:—[593]

“The commander of the 4th Corps uttered haughtily, and in a fashion little in harmony with the respect due to his chief and with military discipline, the advice that the right wing ought to march to the sound of the cannon in order to effectuate a junction with the Emperor.

“Grouchy did not find the advice bad in itself, but the form employed to present it. At the same time he consented to discuss Gérard’s opinion with him.”

That personal feelings had some influence on Marshal Grouchy’s decision would seem from the above statement very probable.[594]

We do not reproduce the arguments of Marshal Grouchy here, because they are based mainly upon his statement, which we have found to be erroneous, that “his instructions, from which he was not permitted to depart, enjoined formally upon him not to lose sight of the Prussians when he should have joined them.”

A discussion where one of the parties concealed the existence of a written order, which prescribed no such instructions as those stated above, cannot enlighten us much.

The difficulties of marching across the country by way of Mont St. Guibert to the Dyle were also dwelt upon,—the chief-of-artillery of the 4th Corps, Baltus, having great doubts as to the possibility of such a march, and the chief-of-engineers, Valazé, offering to remove the obstacles.

Grouchy finally decided to resume the march towards Wavre. His army marched in a single column by the road which, passing through Nil St. Vincent and just to the north of Corbaix, reaches La Baraque, and thence leads to Wavre by a line, almost straight. Not a half a mile beyond La Baraque there is a road which leads to the bridge of Moustier, less than three miles off; three-quarters of a mile farther on is another road, which, with its branches, leads to the bridges of Limelette and Limale, at a distance of only two miles. Half a mile north of the bridge of Moustier is another bridge, that of Ottignies. These bridges had not been destroyed, and they were all unguarded.[595] Then there were convenient woods able to conceal any movement of the troops towards the river.

There was a slight affair in a wood a short distance beyond La Baraque, in which the cavalry of Ledebur,[596] assisted by two battalions of infantry, skirmished for an hour or so. While this was going on, two divisions of the IId Corps, which had been making their way through the town of Wavre, were brought back, and took up position, facing south, about a mile south of the town. But there was no resistance to speak of. When the French advanced, the Prussians retired on Wavre.

In its march, which was made to the sound of the cannon of Waterloo,[597] the army of Marshal Grouchy had then abundant opportunity to cross the Dyle at Moustier and Ottignies, at Limelette and Limale.[598] La Baraque, on the main road to Wavre, from near which the roads to these bridges diverge, was reached about two o’clock.[599]

From this point on to Wavre, the Prussians were clearly to be seen marching to the field of Waterloo.[600] If Grouchy had in season recalled Pajol and the division of Teste from the extreme right of the column, in order to mask the movement by threatening Wavre, it would certainly seem that Vandamme’s Corps might have crossed at Limale and Limelette, and Gérard’s at Ottignies and Moustier, and that, before 4 P.M., the whole force could have been _en route_ for St. Lambert.[601]

The fact is, the whole question of Grouchy’s flank march at noon has been unnecessarily confused by three very general misconceptions, namely:—

(1) That it was at Sart-à-Walhain where the sound of the cannon was heard. It was at Walhain, a good mile nearer to the bridges.

(2) That it was necessary, in order to go to the bridges, for Grouchy’s column to cut across the marshy and difficult country between Walhain and Moustier,[602] by way of Mont St. Guibert. Instead of this, the main road could be kept until the army had arrived at La Baraque; or, possibly, the 4th Corps could have taken a somewhat long cross-road which leads to Moustier from Neuf Sart, a village on the main road about a mile to the south-east of La Baraque, while the 3d Corps could have marched on the roads which branch off to the bridges just beyond La Baraque.

No doubt, if Grouchy had started at daybreak from Gembloux, as he ought to have done, he would have passed through Mont St. Guibert, and over very bad and miry roads; but to gain the bridge of Moustier from Walhain, the route he actually pursued, by way of La Baraque, was nearly as short as the other, and was, up to that point, so far as we know, a tolerable road.[603] At least there were no such complaints of it as were made of the roads from Ligny to Gembloux.

Now, from the point just beyond La Baraque, where the first road branches off, it is nearer to Moustier than it is to Wavre. From where the other road branches off to Limale and Limelette, the distance is about the same as to Wavre. Making allowance, then, for the badness of the river roads, on the one hand, and for the time saved by passing the army over several instead of over one single road on the other hand, and assuming that there had been no fighting, the whole force could have successfully crossed the river by 4 P.M., which was the hour at which Grouchy’s force arrived in front of Wavre.

(3) That there would have been any serious resistance experienced at the bridges.

Not one of these bridges, as has been above pointed out,[604] was occupied in force by the Prussians. Only one, that at Limale, was occupied at all, and that only by a small detachment. They had had also some cavalry and two battalions of infantry in observation at Mont St. Guibert, but these retreated to La Baraque on finding that the cavalry of Exelmans had got in their rear by way of Corbaix.

Had Marshal Grouchy, therefore, pursued his march to the neighborhood of La Baraque, which place his head of column reached about 2 P.M., and had he then promptly availed himself of the roads which lead to the bridges, directing Pajol, who was a very able and experienced officer, to cover and conceal the movement with his cavalry and the division of Teste, he could, as it seems to us, in all probability, have been across the Dyle at 4 o’clock, ready to march towards Lasne and St. Lambert.

Now at 4 o’clock only two brigades[605] of Bülow’s (IVth) Corps had passed through Lasne. They, with the artillery and cavalry which accompanied them, were at that moment resting and reforming in the Wood of Paris,[606] a little wood just west of the town of Lasne, after an exhausting march.[607] The other two brigades were between St. Lambert and Lasne. The IId Corps was stretched along the road between Wavre and St. Lambert. It had not yet reached the latter place.[608] The Ist Corps was a mile and a half from Ohain, on the northerly road. The IIId Corps was in and about Wavre. (See Map 11.)

If, then, Marshal Grouchy had succeeded in the operation of crossing the Dyle at the four bridges or any of them while Thielemann’s Corps was detained in Wavre by Pajol and Teste, and if he had boldly advanced towards Lasne and St. Lambert, he would certainly have arrested the march of Bülow and Pirch I. Although the Prussians would have been superior in numbers, they yet would have been compelled to halt and form line of battle on observing the advance of Grouchy’s 30,000 men. The chances are that Grouchy would ultimately have been forced to retire; he could hardly have been a match for the 50,000 men opposed to him; and his retreat could at any time have been precipitated by an attack on his right flank by Thielemann, if that officer had felt himself at liberty to leave Wavre. Yet these operations would without question have consumed the rest of the afternoon; it would almost certainly have been impossible for the corps of Bülow and Pirch I. to have attacked the French at Planchenoit that day. Zieten certainly might have pursued his march unmolested if he had thought it wise to do so. How these movements would have affected the result of the battle of Waterloo, we will consider when we come to the account of the battle. All we want to show at this stage of the narrative is, that, had Gérard’s counsel been taken, Marshal Grouchy’s command might have been across the Dyle at Moustier and the other bridges by 4 P.M., and that at that moment the van of the IVth Corps had only just passed through Lasne.

It is time that we returned to the Prussians.

Bülow, whose corps (the IVth) had not been engaged at Ligny, was ordered to march at daybreak from Dion-le-Mont, where he had passed the night, for St. Lambert, with the view of attacking the French right.[609] He had a long distance to go, and was, moreover, detained by a fire which broke out in the streets of Wavre, and his main body did not reach St. Lambert till noon.[610] Here there was a long halt.[611]

The IId Corps was to follow the IVth, but for some reason or other it did not begin to leave Wavre till nearly noon,[612] and it was not until 4 P.M. that the whole corps had got through the town and had taken the road for St. Lambert.[613]

The Ist Corps,—Zieten’s,—which was to march by the northerly road, by way of Ohain, to join the army of Wellington, also did not start until nearly noon.[614] The IIId Corps, which was to be the last to leave Wavre, was to march by way of Couture towards Planchenoit, in support of the IVth and IId Corps. But it was to remain in Wavre, if the enemy should show himself there in force.

These arrangements, it must be confessed, do not indicate that determination to march with all possible speed to the support of an ally in danger of being defeated before the promised support arrives, which has usually been attributed to Marshal Blücher. They are so deliberate, so tardy even, that we must seek an explanation of them. Bülow, it is true, moved out promptly enough; but the delay of the IId Corps in leaving Wavre is most extraordinary, under the circumstances, considering that its commander had been informed at midnight that the IVth Corps had been ordered to march at break of day, and that he himself had been ordered to join that corps immediately, and follow its line of march.[615]

It appears now, from the recent history of Von Ollech, that about 9.30 A.M. Marshal Blücher dictated a note to General Müffling, stating that he would place himself, ill as he was, at the head of his troops in order to attack at once the right of Napoleon’s army; and that Gneisenau, still disposed to be cautious in trusting to the assurances of the English general that he would accept battle at Waterloo, added a postscript in these words:—[616]

“General Gneisenau has been informed of the contents of this letter, but asks your Excellency to ascertain definitely whether the Duke really has a fixed determination to fight in his present position, or whether perhaps it is a mere demonstration, which at the best would be very unfortunate for our army. Your Excellency will have the kindness to obtain for me full information on this matter, as it is of the highest importance to be thoroughly assured of what the Duke is going to do, in order to determine our course of action.”

Ollech[617] goes on to tell us that Gneisenau was, even at this late hour, not without his misgivings. He says that Gneisenau believed that the Duke had left him in the lurch at Ligny. He also says that he fully took in the exposed situation of the Prussian army, if the Anglo-Dutch forces should fall back to Brussels,—a retreat by way of Louvain being probably then the only thing open to the Prussians. He says, indeed, that before an answer was received to this communication, Gneisenau had determined to go ahead, and carry out the plan, and that between 11 and 12 in the morning Zieten had been ordered to Ohain.

But may we not fairly infer, that, under the impression of these feelings,—of this doubt whether Wellington really intended to fight,—a doubt, it must be remembered, which no sound of cannon until half-past eleven in the morning came to dispel,—Bülow had been ordered to be very cautious, and to proceed with all deliberation,—and that the departure of Pirch I. and Zieten had been delayed? It would certainly seem as if this were the case.

The welcome sound of the cannon of Waterloo, however, shortly before noon, dispelled all doubts and all hesitations; and there can be no question that every one in the Prussian army from the old Field Marshal down to the privates in the ranks did their best for the success of the day. The roads were frightful; it was almost impossible to get the artillery and waggons over them; but every exertion was made.

Grouchy’s obstinate determination to operate on the right bank of the Dyle brought him in front of Wavre. He displayed more troops than the Prussian generals had supposed that he had with him. But their plan was not altered. To Thielemann’s Corps alone was it left to defend the town.

It is not necessary to go into the details of this action. It was not fought by Marshal Grouchy with any skill. The troops of Vandamme entangled themselves in the vain endeavor to carry the lower bridges in the town. The 4th Corps repeatedly but ineffectually endeavored to get possession of the Mill of Bierges, just above the town. Here Gérard was wounded. Between 6 and 7 P.M. Pajol carried the bridge of Limale, and this position was held, despite an attempt of the Prussians to repossess themselves of it. The attack on Wavre was conducted in the most gallant manner by the French, but without any well-arranged plan. Their efforts were in the main uselessly directed against an enemy behind walls and in houses, when nothing would have been easier than to have turned the whole position by crossing the river at Limale. The resistance of the Prussians was worthy of all praise.

During the action Marshal Grouchy received two despatches from Marshal Soult. These demand our careful consideration, not because they can in any way explain the motives which actuated Marshal Grouchy in directing his command upon Wavre instead of upon Lasne and St. Lambert, for they were received too late to have influenced him at all, but because they throw light on the expectations entertained by Napoleon in regard to Grouchy’s movements and especially in regard to his coöperation with the main army.

These orders were both signed by Marshal Soult, the chief-of-staff, and were no doubt drafted by him.

The first, dated at 10 A.M., reads as follows:—[618]

In front of the Farm of Caillou, June 18, 1815, 10 A.M.

Marshal:

The Emperor has received your last report, dated from Gembloux.[619]

You speak to his Majesty of only two Prussian columns, which have passed at Sauvenières and Sart-à-Walhain. Nevertheless, reports say that a third column, which was a pretty strong one, has passed by Gery and Gentinnes, directed on Wavre.[620]

The Emperor instructs me to tell you that at this moment his Majesty is going to attack the English army, which has taken position at Waterloo, near the Forest of Soignes. Thus his Majesty desires that you will direct your movements on Wavre, in order to approach us, to put yourself in the sphere of our operations, and to keep up your communications with us, pushing before you those portions[621] of the Prussian army which have taken this direction, and which may have stopped at Wavre, where you ought to arrive as soon as possible.

You will follow the enemy’s columns which are on your right by some light troops, in order to observe their movements and pick up their stragglers. Instruct me immediately as to your dispositions and your march, as also as to the news which you have of the enemy; and do not neglect to keep up your communications with us. The Emperor desires to have news from you very often.

The Marshal, Duke of Dalmatia.

To understand this despatch one must refer to that to which it professes to be an answer, namely, that dated Gembloux, at ten o’clock the night before. In that despatch Grouchy says, as will be remembered,[622] that, at Sauvenières, the Prussians apparently divided into two columns, one directed on Wavre and the other on Perwez; and that he will follow the principal force of the enemy in either direction as his information may indicate. Now Soult, having this before his eyes when he is writing the 10 A.M. despatch, simply says,—Do not take the Perwez direction,—take the Wavre direction,—for that will bring you nearer to us. We, also, have heard of a pretty strong Prussian column which has retreated on Wavre; that is an additional reason why you should take that direction. We want you to approach us,—to get within the sphere (_en rapport_) of our operations; to keep up your communications with us; therefore you ought to get to Wavre as soon as possible.

The object of directing Grouchy on Wavre was therefore that he might approach the main army; that he might keep in strict communication with it,—might be within the sphere of its operations. There is no strategical or other object even hinted at in directing Grouchy on Wavre, save that of approaching the main army.[623] Nor is there any difficulty whatever in discerning the meaning of the writer.

It is also perfectly plain that no opposition to Marshal Grouchy’s occupation of Wavre was apprehended. It is therefore fairly to be inferred that the writer intended, that, if the situation should be such from any cause that the occupation of Wavre or the attempt to occupy it, would not subserve the purpose of enabling Grouchy to draw nearer to the main army, he should carry out this purpose in some other way. It seems to us foolish to say that this despatch would have justified Grouchy in taking the course which he did take, supposing, that is, that he had received it in time for it to affect his action. If, for example, a gentleman on a walking tour should order his servant to bring his baggage to a certain town, so that he might easily get at it from the place where he was himself expecting to be the next day, and the servant should find that all communication between this town and the region where his master expected to be had been interrupted by some accident, like the destruction of a railway-bridge, for instance, and he should nevertheless bring his master’s baggage to that town, instead of bringing it within his master’s reach by carrying it to some other place, justifying himself by the terms of the letter, he would generally be regarded as having acted like a fool. Yet this is very nearly a parallel case to that of Marshal Grouchy, supposing that he had received the despatch in time to have acted on it, and had then acted as he did. The only thing needed to make it absolutely parallel is, that the servant in the case supposed should be in possession of information, of which his master was ignorant, making the carrying of the baggage to him at the earliest possible moment a matter of the utmost importance. Then the cases would be on all fours with each other.

But we have delayed perhaps too long to show that this order cannot justify Grouchy’s action. Our excuse is that it has been so used by more than one authority.[624] Nor does the order show that Napoleon would have made the same mistake that Grouchy did, as has sometimes been thoughtlessly said; for Napoleon, at the time the despatch was sent off, knew nothing, as has just been pointed out, of the circumstances then under Grouchy’s observation.

It cannot, of course, be contended that Napoleon was not responsible for this order of 10 A.M. A commander-in-chief must be supposed to know what orders are issued in his name. Yet it is certainly true that the directions given to Marbot do not tally at all with this order to Grouchy. According to the latter, Grouchy would be looked for in the direction of Wavre,—that is, of Lasne and St. Lambert; but Marbot was given to understand that the Emperor expected Grouchy to cross the Dyle at the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies. Colonel Marbot, in a letter written to Marshal Grouchy in 1830, says:—[625]

“At the commencement of the action, towards 11 A.M., I was detached from the division with my own regiment and a battalion of infantry, which had been placed under my command. These troops were posted on our extreme right, behind Frischermont, facing the Dyle.

“Particular instructions were given to me on the part of the Emperor by his aide-de-camp, Labedoyère, and by a staff officer whose name I do not recall. They prescribed to me to leave the bulk of my command always in view of the field of battle, to post 200 infantry in the Wood of Frischermont[626] one squadron at Lasne, having outposts as far as St. Lambert; another squadron, half at Couture, half at Beaumont, sending reconnoissances as far as the Dyle, to the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies.”

He then describes the arrangements for the speedy transmission of intelligence, and proceeds:—

“A note from Captain Eloy,[627] which the intermediate posts promptly transmitted to me, informed me that he had found no force at Moustier, nor at Ottignies, and that the inhabitants assured him that the French on the right bank of the Dyle would pass the river at Limale, Limelette and Wavre.”

He sent this word to the Emperor, who ordered him to push reconnoissances in those directions. Then, half a mile beyond St. Lambert, they captured some Prussians, who informed him that they were followed by a large part of the Prussian army. He then says:—

“I proceeded to St. Lambert with a squadron to reinforce the troops there. I saw in the distance a strong column, approaching St. Lambert. I sent an officer in all haste to forewarn the Emperor, who replied, telling me to advance boldly, that this body of troops could be nothing else than the corps of Marshal Grouchy, coming from Limale, and pushing before it some stray Prussians, of whom the prisoners I had just taken were a part.”

Soon after, the fact that the approaching column was composed of Prussian troops was manifest. The Emperor was now sure that Grouchy would come by the upper bridges:—

“My adjutant, whom I had ordered to go and inform the Emperor of the positive arrival of the Prussians at St. Lambert, returned, saying to me that the Emperor ordered me to inform the head of Marshal Grouchy’s column, which ought at this moment to be debouching by the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies, since it had not come by Limale and Limelette, of the fact that the Prussians were advancing by way of St. Lambert.”

It is plain from the above narrative that the Emperor, when he sent Marbot off, shortly before 11 A.M., expected Marshal Grouchy to arrive during the afternoon,[628] and that his first idea was that he would arrive by the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies. This seems to show that the Emperor did not revise the 10 A.M. despatch sent off by Soult, which indicated that they expected Grouchy to arrive from Wavre. Napoleon must have been at this hour,—10-11 A.M.,—making his final preparations for the battle.

Then there was another despatch to Grouchy, which we also give here in full:—[629]

Field of Battle of Waterloo, the 18th of June: 1 P.M.

Marshal:

You wrote to the Emperor at 2 o’clock[630] this morning, that you would march on Sart-lez-Walhain; your plan then is to proceed to Corbaix or[631] to Wavre. This movement is conformable to his Majesty’s arrangements which have been communicated to you. Nevertheless, the Emperor directs me to tell you that you ought always to manœuvre in our direction.[632] It is for you to see the place where we are, to govern yourself accordingly, and to connect our communications, so as to be always prepared to fall upon any of the enemy’s troops which may endeavor to annoy our right, and to destroy them.

“At this moment the battle is in progress[633] on the line of Waterloo. The enemy’s centre is at Mont St. Jean; manœuvre, therefore, to join our right.

The Marshal, Duke of Dalmatia.

“P. S. A letter, which has just been intercepted, says that General Bülow is about to attack our right flank; we believe that we see this corps on the height of St. Lambert. So lose not an instant in drawing near us and joining us, in order to crush Bülow, whom you will take in the very act.”

In this letter the Emperor’s desire that Grouchy would manœuvre in his direction is expressed again and again, and even in the body of the letter it is plain that some apprehension is entertained at headquarters of an attack upon the right of the army by the Prussians. The postscript, of course, speaks for itself.

Grouchy did not receive this letter till between 6 and 7 P.M.,[634] when it was too late for him to accomplish much. He, however, carried the bridge of Limale, and established himself on the left bank of the Dyle for the night.

Taking the two letters together,—and leaving out of view for the moment the postscript of the second,—we see that Napoleon was expecting that Grouchy would approach him. He had learned of the “pretty strong column” which had passed by Gery and Gentinnes, directed on Wavre. He, no doubt, supposed that Grouchy had also learned of it; and he knew from Grouchy’s despatches of 10 P.M. of the 17th and 2 A.M. of the 18th, that Grouchy had recognized the necessity of manœuvring in the direction of Wavre, if the mass of the Prussian army should have taken that course. Hence he expected to see him. He thought it likely that he would come by the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies, and strike in on his right and keep off any of the enemy’s troops who might seek to molest him.

Of any apprehension of a serious attack by the Prussians in force there is no trace till we come to the postscript to the second letter. Up to the time when this postscript was written, Napoleon would seem to have felt pretty sure (though perhaps with some misgivings), either that Grouchy would prevent the Prussians from attacking him, or would himself join, or connect with, the main army. But the appearance of the Prussians at St. Lambert and the absence of any information from Grouchy evidently alarmed him.

FOOTNOTES:

[561] Mém. du Duc de Raguse, vol. 7, pp. 124, 125.

[562] Soult’s despatch to Grouchy: June 18th, 10 A.M.

[563] Even if the Emperor had been asleep when Grouchy’s aide arrived, or had been at the front, where he was between one and two o’clock in the morning, to see if the English army was still in position, a competent chief-of-staff should, of his own motion, have sent back at once to Grouchy the information possessed at headquarters.

[564] Especially when, according to Marshal Marmont, the subordinate was a man like Grouchy: Mém., vol. 4, p. 125. See, also, Napoléon à Waterloo, p. 226, n.

[565] Marbot, vol. 3, pp. 404 _et seq._; Gérard: Dern. Obs. p. 44.

[566] _Cf._ La Tour d’Auvergne, pp. 232, 233, 245.

[567] Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, pp. 70, 87, 131, n.

[568] Gardner, pp. 160, 161. The italics are our own.

[569] Ib., pp. 161, 162.

[570] Maurice, p. 550: Sept. 1890., The italics are our own. It is possible that Colonel Maurice may have had in mind the language of Soult’s order dated 10 A.M., in which Grouchy’s movement on Wavre is approved. But this did not reach Grouchy till 4 P.M., as we have just stated. See, also, Kennedy, p. 159.

[571] La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 315, n. 1. The hour of starting is given in the Grouchy Memoirs (vol. 4, p. 56) as “before four o’clock.” But this is a gross and manifest error. _Cf._ Charras, vol. 2, p. 33, where the hour is given as 6 A.M.

[572] La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 316, n. 1; Grouchy Mém., vol. 4. p. 55.

[573] La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 316, n. 2; Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, p. 57.

[574] This despatch is not in existence, but its receipt was acknowledged and the above statement in it was referred to in Soult’s despatch to Grouchy, dated 1 P.M., June 18th. From Grouchy’s statement that he was going to Sart-à-Walhain, Soult drew the inference that he was going to Corbaix or to Wavre.

[575] Gérard: Dern. Obs., pp. 13, 14; Letter of General Exelmans.

[576] Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, pp. 62, 63.

[577] There is in the Grouchy Mémoires, vol. 4, pp. 65, 66, what purports to be a copy of a despatch to the Emperor dated Gembloux, 3 A.M. But its authenticity is more than doubtful. _Cf._ La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 318, n. It begins with the statement that all Grouchy’s reports and information confirm the idea that the Prussians are retiring on Brussels, to concentrate there, or to deliver battle after being united to the English.

[578] Charras, vol. 2, pp. 33, 55. Charras seems to us to be in error in supposing that Grouchy’s uncertainty still existed on the morning of the 18th. He has, perhaps, overlooked the statement in Grouchy’s order to Pajol, dated at daybreak, quoted in the text.

[579] Gérard: Dernières Obs., p. 24; Letter of General Exelmans.

[580] Ib., p. 25; Letter of General Berthezène.

[581] Gérard: Quelques Doc., p. 12.

[582] We shall examine the English authorities in the Notes to this chapter. See _post_, p. 280.

[583] Jomini, pp. 175 _et seq._

[584] 10.30 A.M., according to Charras, vol. 2, p. 62.

[585] Clausewitz, ch. 50, p. 146.

[586] Charras, vol. 2, pp. 57, 58.

[587] We reserve for the Notes to this chapter the consideration of the various opinions on the consequences of this movement, had it been made.

[588] See Siborne’s excellent remarks on this subject,—vol. 1, pp. 318 _et seq._

[589] Declaration of M. Leguest, in the Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, pp. 141, 142. The staff-officer, by name Pont-Bellanger, must have left Moustier several hours before Marbot’s officer, Captain Eloy, got there. See Marbot, vol. 3, p. 407.

[590] See the Notes to this chapter.

[591] Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, pp. 71, 72. This despatch is given in full in Appendix C, xxx; _post_, pp. 386, 387.

[592] Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, p. 75.

[593] Le Mal. de Grouchy, p. 15, n. 2: p. 59; Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, p. 75.

[594] La Tour d’Auvergne, p. 328. _Cf._ Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, p. 295.

[595] The one of these bridges which was nearest Wavre, that at Limale, was passed at six o’clock by Valin’s cavalry, without experiencing any serious resistance. Siborne, vol. 2, p. 286. Berton, pp. 66, 67. Marbot’s cavalry-picket occupied the bridge of Moustier all the afternoon. Marbot, vol. 3, p. 407. _Cf._ Charras, vol. 2, p. 69.

[596] Ollech, pp. 208, 209.

[597] Berthezène, in Gérard, Dem. Obs., p. 25.

[598] Berton, p. 66, n.

[599] Charras, vol. 2, p. 44.

[600] Berthezène, in Gérard, Dern. Obs., p. 25.

[601] Charras’ discussion of this movement will be considered in the Notes to this chapter: _post_, p. 284, n. 6.

[602] Charras, vol. 2, p. 69, n.

[603] The paved _chaussée_ which now runs straight from Gembloux to Wavre was not built in 1815. Nor was the _chaussée_ from Sombreffe to Gembloux.

[604] _Ante_, p. 258.

[605] The Prussian brigade corresponded then to the French or English division.

[606] Sometimes called the Wood of Frischermont.

[607] Siborne, vol. 2, pp. 127, 128.

[608] See Siborne’s Map of the Field of Wavre, 4 o’clock P.M., 18th June.

[609] Ollech, p. 187.

[610] Clausewitz, ch. 42, p. 107.

[611] Maurice, p. 549: Sept., 1890.

[612] Charras, vol. 2, p. 43.

[613] Ib., p. 45. _Cf._ Siborne’s Map of the Field of Wavre, 4 o’clock P.M., June 18th.

[614] Ib., p. 43.

[615] Ollech, p. 188.

[616] Ib., p. 189; Maurice, p. 537: Sept., 1890.

[617] Ollech, p. 190.

[618] Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, p. 79; Charras, vol. 1, pp. 283, 284; App. C, xxxiii; _post_, p. 388.

[619] _Ante_, p. 212; also App. B, _post_, p. 358.

[620] This must have been the Ist and IId Corps.

[621] The original has “corps”; but army-corps are not meant. The same word is used below,—“quelques corps légers.”

[622] _Ante_ p. 212; App. B, _post_, p. 358.

[623] Gérard (Dern. Obs. p. 19) remarks:—“If one analyzes separately the text of these two despatches, * * * one perceives that the Emperor has spoken of the direction of Wavre only because he finds it indicated in the reports of the commander of the right wing. The principal object of both of them was to insist upon movements which would bring the troops of the right wing near the main body.” Gérard is here referring to the order sent to Grouchy at 1 P.M. (_post_, p. 270), as well as to that dated 10 A.M.

[624] Chesney, p. 206; Kennedy, p. 162; Gardner, p. 161, n.; Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, pp. 78, 80, 87.

[625] Marbot, vol. 3, pp. 404 _et seq._ This letter is chiefly made up from his report, which is to be found in “Napoléon à Waterloo,” pp. 344 _et seq._ The editors of Marbot’s Memoirs say (vol. 3, p. 408) that the steps they have taken to find the report at the War Office have been unsuccessful.

[626] Sometimes called the Wood of Paris.

[627] He commanded the picket at Moustier.

[628] This was Marbot’s own conviction; vol. 3, p. 408.

[629] La Tour d’Auvergne, pp. 270, 271; Charras, vol. 1, pp. 286, 287; Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 400, 401; Napoléon à Waterloo, pp. 279, 280; App. C, xxxiv; _post_, p. 389.

[630] The Grouchy Memoirs (vol. 4, p. 82) give this as 3 o’clock.

[631] The text given in the Grouchy Memoirs, vol. 4, p. 82, replaces this “or” by an “and.” This is not followed in any other work.

[632] The text of the Grouchy Memoirs inserts here the following:—“and to seek to come near to our army, in order that you may join us before any body of troops can put itself between us. I do not indicate to you the direction you should take.”

[633] The original is “engagée.” “This letter,” says Marshal Grouchy (Fragm. Hist., Lettre à MM. Méry et Barthélemy; p. 14), “was in a hand writing so difficult to decipher that I read it, as did also my chief-of-staff, and my senior aide-de-camp, ‘gagnée.’” The chief-of-staff, General Le Sénécal, says that the Marshal closely questioned the officer who was the bearer of the despatch, but he was so intoxicated that they could not get anything from him. Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, pp. 132, 133. _Cf._ Gérard, Dern. Obs., p. 20, n.

[634] Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, p. 87.

_NOTES TO CHAPTER XV._

1. The first question that demands consideration in connection with the matters narrated in this chapter is this:—

Was it wise in Napoleon to detach from his main army such a large force as that which he gave to Grouchy? Or,—to state the question more carefully,—Napoleon, being, at 1 P.M. of the 17th (through his own neglect, but the cause is not important in this connection), in ignorance of the direction of the retreat of the Prussians, but having in mind that they might be intending to unite with the English and fight another battle for the defence of Brussels,[635]—was it wise in him to detach 33,000 men from his main army to find out about and take care of the Prussians?

This question, it must be observed, is quite a different one from that presented to Napoleon in the forenoon of the 17th, when he and Grouchy and every one else believed that the Prussians had fallen back on Namur. If the Prussians had retreated on Namur, they had assuredly given up all idea of further coöperation with the English, at any rate for the present. The two corps entrusted to Marshal Grouchy might perhaps accelerate their retreat, and ought to be able to prevent an offensive return on their part against the communications of the French. For this purpose they could perfectly well be spared; for the army which Napoleon was taking with him to Waterloo was able alone to defeat the army of Wellington. It was a somewhat larger army,[636]—it was composed throughout of excellent troops,—it was full of enthusiasm,—and it was commanded by the greatest general of the day. Nor was it a matter of any great importance that Grouchy could not well be detached till after twelve o’clock, owing to the necessity of giving his troops time to recover from the fatigues of the battle of the day before, the stress of which had fallen almost wholly on them, for, if the Prussians had retreated on Namur and Liége, there was no special and imminent danger to be apprehended.[637] To detach Marshal Grouchy with 33,000 men under these circumstances, which were then believed to exist, was one thing. But the question we are now considering is,—whether Napoleon’s adhering to the plan of sending Grouchy off with two corps is to be justified after he had seen reason to be apprehensive of the possibility of the Prussians uniting with the English to fight another battle for the defence of Brussels.

This danger of the union of the two allied armies was, as the Bertrand order shows, distinctly recognized as a possible danger by Napoleon when he dictated the order to Bertrand. It is true that Napoleon did not think it likely that this union would be made, but he knew perfectly well that if it should be made, it would place him in the greatest peril. He, therefore, expressly warned Grouchy that the Prussians might be intending to unite with the English to fight another battle for the defence of Brussels; and we have seen that, in the event of Grouchy’s finding this to be the case, Napoleon expected him to cross the Dyle and act in conjunction with the main army. If this was, in Napoleon’s opinion, to be his true course in the not impossible event of Blücher’s falling back on Wavre, why send him off at all? What was there to be gained by sending him off which made it worth while to run the risks inseparable from detaching such a large force from the main army when such a terrible danger as the union of the Prussian and English armies was even remotely apprehended? For there certainly was a chance of Grouchy’s not coming back in time to prevent the catastrophe; Napoleon ran the risk of Grouchy’s not receiving accurate or trustworthy information as to the doings of the enemy,—of his not acting on the information which he might obtain in accordance with sound military principles,—of his being delayed by the destruction of the bridges, and by the manœuvres of the enemy.

But this is not all. If the Prussians had fallen back on Wavre with the intention of uniting with the English and fighting another battle for the defence of Brussels, as Napoleon in the Bertrand order warns Grouchy they might be intending to do, they must have carried out their project in great part at the time when Napoleon was dictating his order to Bertrand. On this hypothesis, they had certainly already obtained a great advantage over any force sent to pursue them or to interrupt the execution of their scheme. Was it not therefore much wiser to keep the whole army together, well in hand, and under the Emperor’s immediate direction?

These risks and chances, and others, Napoleon took, when he sent Grouchy off with his 33,000 men; and for what?

The fact probably is this; that Grouchy was originally ordered to follow up and observe the Prussians when every one supposed them to be retreating towards the Rhine, and especially to prevent or check any offensive return upon the French communications; and that when Napoleon, between 12 and 1, received information which awakened in his mind doubts of the correctness of this supposition, and even some apprehension that Blücher might be intending to unite with Wellington and fight another battle for the defence of Brussels, he adhered to his original disposition of Grouchy’s force, contenting himself with giving him an express warning of the danger to be apprehended.

The question then comes down to this:—

If the Prussians were going to separate themselves from the English, there was no great risk in making such a large detachment from the main army, and there might very possibly be occasions in which a force of 33,000 men might accomplish more than a smaller one. It may, however, well be questioned whether half the number would not have answered every end, and allowed the Emperor the use of 15,000 more men in his contest with Wellington, who certainly could have brought to the encounter 18,000 more men than he actually had on the field.

On the other hand, if the Prussians were intending to unite with the English, as Napoleon had some reason at any rate to believe, and if Grouchy did not rejoin the main army, or at least act in connection with it, or defeat the Prussians while marching to the field of battle, Napoleon was ruined. There was then the risk of his not doing either of these things,—whether through the Prussians having so many hours the start of him,—or through ignorance of the facts,—bad roads,—broken bridges,—unsound judgment,—it matters not,—and that risk was assumed by Napoleon when he detached him, without, as it seems to us, any compensating advantage.

Our conclusion, then, is this: if Napoleon had sent off Grouchy with his 33,000 men in the full belief that the Prussians had fallen back on Namur, he would be chargeable only with neglect in not having found out where they had gone; but his sending off this large force after he had so much reason to apprehend that the Prussians were intending to unite with the English that he expressly warned Grouchy to that effect, was to take a wholly unnecessary and very dangerous risk. It was to persist in carrying out a plan which new information had rendered entirely inapplicable to the circumstances as now understood to exist.

Had Napoleon, when he had come to entertain the apprehension that the Prussians might be intending to unite with the English, followed on the 17th the same general plan which he had adopted on the 15th, and, leaving, say, Pajol with the division of Teste, to find out where the Prussians had gone and what they were proposing to do, had taken the rest of the army with him, sending Grouchy at daybreak of the 18th with one, or perhaps both, of his corps to St. Lambert, with instructions to delay the Prussians in every way possible should they come from Wavre either to attack the main army or to reinforce Wellington, he would have taken no serious risk, and he would have had his whole army under his own eye and subject to his immediate control on the day of the great battle. In this case Grouchy would have performed at St. Lambert the task which Ney performed at Quatre Bras,—of preventing the intervention of the other allied army in the battle then in progress. There is not the least reason to suppose that this course would have affected the decision either of Wellington to accept battle or of Blücher to support him. But the chances in favor of Napoleon’s success in the battle would have been vastly greater than they actually were.

2. We have expressed the doubt whether, even if the Prussians were known to be separating from the English, it would not have been wiser if Napoleon had given Grouchy only one corps wherewith to pursue them. But while this may be true, we cannot agree with Sir James Shaw-Kennedy in his reasons for criticising the detachment of Grouchy’s force from the main army. He says:—[638]

“His (Napoleon’s) great difficulty—as he ought well to have known from the experience of a whole succession of disastrous campaigns to his armies in Spain—was the overthrow of the Anglo-Allied army; and against it he should have led his last man and horse, even had the risk been great in the highest degree; which, as has been seen,[639] it clearly was not. Had Napoleon attacked the Anglo-Allied army with his whole force, and succeeded in defeating it, there could be little question of his being able to defeat afterwards the Prussian army when separated from Wellington.”

And again:—[640]

“If Grouchy’s proper place was on the field of battle at Waterloo, then Napoleon should have sent for him at daylight on the morning of the 18th, when he saw the Anglo-Allied army in position and determined to attack it.”

The difficulty with this reasoning, as it seems to us, lies in the fact that it was not that he might be strong enough to defeat Wellington that Napoleon needed to have all his army on the field of Waterloo, but in order to prevent his being overwhelmed by the union of the army of Blücher to that of Wellington. With the army of Wellington the force Napoleon had at Waterloo was abundantly able to cope; but against the two armies of Wellington and Blücher united, he was certain to succumb. Hence, inasmuch as he, at 1 P.M. of the 17th, had changed his mind as to the Prussian retreat, had come to regard as very questionable the view which until after 12 o’clock of that day he certainly had entertained, that the Prussians were separating themselves definitely from the English, and had recognized the possibility of their uniting with the English and even joining with them in a battle to be fought for the defence of Brussels, he should have changed his dispositions accordingly. He should have left a comparatively small force,—perhaps of cavalry only,—to follow up and find out about the Prussians, and should have taken all his army-corps with him, because if the Prussians should attempt to take part in the battle he would be sure to need every man he could muster.[641]

3. It seems for many writers to be well-nigh impossible to treat separately of the conduct of Marshal Grouchy. This may require some effort of mind; but it surely is worth while to make it.[642] Suppose we are of opinion that Napoleon made a mistake in the first place in detaching him with his 33,000 men; that he was furthermore inexcusable in not advising him on the night of the 17th and 18th of the most important fact that the two armies were confronting each other at Mont St. Jean,—in not sending him the information which Domon had picked up as to the retreat of a part of the Prussians towards Wavre,—and, finally, in not directing him in precise terms, that, if he should find that the Prussians were retiring on Wavre, he should cross the Dyle at Moustier and Ottignies, and operate in connection with the main army. Suppose, we say, we find all this to be true. We have yet to pass upon Grouchy’s conduct.

The Emperor’s faults cannot excuse Grouchy’s faults, nor can his faults excuse those of the Emperor.[643] The object of military criticism is not to see which officer made the most mistakes.

4. As to the proper course for Marshal Grouchy to take after he became satisfied (as he did about daybreak of the 18th) that the Prussians were retreating on Wavre, we have seen that the principal continental critics,—Jomini, Clausewitz and Charras,—are of opinion that he should at once have manœuvred to his left and crossed the Dyle, so as to get in communication with the main army under the Emperor.

But General Hamley[644] is of a different opinion. He approves of Grouchy’s direct movement on Wavre. After remarking that Grouchy did not know that Wellington would stop to fight at Waterloo, he says:—

“He thought the Prussians, if they were really moving on Wavre, intended to join Wellington at Brussels. * * * And were they so moving, he, by marching to Wavre, would threaten decisively their communications with their base by Louvain, and so either prevent the execution of their project, or render it disastrous.”

It is unnecessary to say anything in regard to this observation, except that, if Grouchy thought as Hamley thinks he did,—and as he very likely did,—he was wholly mistaken as to the intention of Marshal Blücher. Very possibly he might have injured the Prussians a good deal had they been intending to go to Brussels; but, as they were, on the contrary, intending to join Wellington, who had taken up a position for battle to the south of the Forest of Soignes, Grouchy’s calculations, as given us by Hamley, were beside the mark, and his movements were entirely useless.

It is certainly true, as Hamley says,[645] that Grouchy did not know that “Wellington would stop to fight at Waterloo.” But Grouchy expressly says that Napoleon told him[646] that he was going “to march upon the English, and fight them, if they stood this side [_i.e._, south of] the Forest of Soignes,” _i.e._, at Waterloo. This indicated that Napoleon thought it quite possible that the English might take their stand there and fight. And the Bertrand order warned Grouchy that the Prussians might be intending to unite with them to fight a battle for the defence of Brussels. But this order, as we have observed before, is utterly ignored by General Hamley.

5. We have pointed out in the text that the three principal Continental critics,—Jomini, Clausewitz and Charras,—unite in the opinion that Marshal Grouchy should have marched at daybreak for the bridge of Moustier,—covering the movement by his cavalry. What would have been the result of this manœuvre? (See Map 9.)

Let us suppose that the Prussian detachment of Ledebur, which was stationed at Mont St. Guibert to observe the movements of Marshal Grouchy’s column, had been driven out of their position, or flanked out of it (as they finally were), before six in the morning, by the French cavalry, and had been compelled to retire to the neighborhood of Wavre. The movements of the main body of Grouchy’s command might, therefore, without much difficulty, have been concealed from observation. At least this seems to be assumed by Jomini,[647] who says that Grouchy could have been at the bridge of Moustier at 10 A.M.,—and then have moved “on Wavre by Limale, pushing Exelmans’ dragoons on St. Lambert, or else have marched to Lasne himself.”

But Charras[648] thinks that the movement to Moustier would have been at once perceived by Ledebur’s cavalry, and that Grouchy would probably, on arriving at Moustier and Ottignies, have found himself in face of 40,000 men and 150 pieces of cannon, in position behind the Dyle, and that it could only have been by a very unlikely concurrence of circumstances that Grouchy could have seized these bridges before the Prussians would have been in sufficient force to oppose him.

These conclusions seem to us very strained. Grouchy had 6,000 excellent cavalry. Ledebur’s detachment consisted of two battalions of infantry, four squadrons of cavalry and two guns,—possibly 1,500 men in all.[649] A movement on Corbaix would have compelled him to fall back to La Baraque as surely at five in the morning as at one in the afternoon, when, as we have seen, it had this effect. Certainly, Ledebur could have been got out of the way, and could only have reported that the French were very active, and were manœuvring apparently on Wavre by way of Corbaix and La Baraque. We see no reason to doubt that Jomini is perfectly correct in supposing that the column of Marshal Grouchy, with the exception of one of his cavalry divisions, say, that of Pajol, supported, perhaps, by the infantry division of Teste, could have crossed the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies, without any molestation whatever, by or soon after 10 A.M., and that they might have been well on their way towards Lasne and St. Lambert before the Prussians were aware what they were about.

In speculations of this kind, it is very easy, of course, to omit by accident some of the _data_ of the problem. But when it is remembered that the principal subject which the Prussians were contemplating that morning was not the movements of the 12,000 or 15,000 men, who were (as they supposed)[650] all the troops which Napoleon had detached against them, but the very serious question whether the whole army, or three-fourths of it, should march across the country to attack Napoleon and succor Wellington, we can hardly believe that any reports which Ledebur could have brought in would have brought 40,000 men to the bridges of Moustier and Ottignies by 10 or 10.30 A.M.

It seems to us, then, altogether probable that Marshal Grouchy could have crossed the Dyle at Moustier and Ottignies with the bulk of his forces before 11 A.M.[651]

At this hour, only “the advanced guard of Bülow’s corps had * * * reached St. Lambert. The 16th, and then the 13th, brigade arrived much later, and the 14th brigade, which formed the rear-guard was a long way behind.”[652] At this hour the Ist, IId and IIId Corps were still in and about Wavre. It would have been at this moment, when the IVth Corps was thus strung out, toiling through the bad roads, that Grouchy would have made his appearance, and have commenced his march from Moustier and Ottignies to Lasne and St. Lambert. Can it be believed that he would not have stopped Bülow? What else could Bülow have done but halt, and concentrate his command, and await the reinforcements which were expected from Wavre? But this would have involved him in an engagement with Grouchy’s force, from which he could be released only by the arrival of those reinforcements. When would they have arrived? (See Map 10.)

If Grouchy’s movement on Moustier had not been observed and promptly reported to Blücher,—which is the assumption on which we are proceeding, as being on the whole the most probable,—there is no reason to suppose that the Ist and IId Prussian Corps would have moved out of Wavre earlier than they did,—that is, about noon.[653] The IId Corps followed the IVth, and would of course have become engaged with Grouchy. The IIId would in time very likely have followed the IId; but it probably would not have left Wavre till much later. These three corps would have been Grouchy’s opponents; they would have outnumbered him considerably, and would, no doubt, ultimately have worsted him. But he probably would have prevented any portion of their troops from attacking the main army under Napoleon.

As for the Ist Corps, there would have been nothing to prevent its marching along the northerly road by way of Ohain to join Wellington, if Zieten had thought it safe to run the chance of the Anglo-Dutch army holding out until his arrival.

What effect these operations would have had on the issue of the battle of Waterloo will be considered later.

6. We have stated above[654] that Grouchy, once arrived at La Baraque, might have crossed the Dyle by the four bridges of Moustier and Ottignies, Limale and Limelette, without, as it seems probable to us, encountering serious opposition.[655] This view is strongly maintained by Thiers, and as strongly contested by Charras. The latter’s principal reason for doubting the feasibility of this movement is the supposed presence in the woods of Sarats and Warlombrout, which line the road from La Baraque to Wavre on the east and west sides respectively, just after passing the former place, of the two divisions of Reckow and Brause of the IId Corps, some 11,000 or 12,000 men.[656] The wood of Warlombrout lies between the road leading to Moustier and that leading to Limelette.

We think Charras in error as to the advanced position of these two brigades, or divisions, as they may more properly be called.

Siborne makes no mention at all of the occupation of the wood of Warlombrout, and says that that of Sarats was occupied by some battalions of the 8th brigade, Reckow’s,[657] and that the rest of the brigade was in rear of the wood. He says that the 7th brigade, that of Brause, was in reserve. Ollech[658] says that Reckow’s brigade sent two battalions into this wood of Sarats,[659] and that the brigade took up position between Manil and St. Anne, which is nearly a mile in rear of the wood; and that the other brigade was in rear of this. He says nothing about the occupation of the wood of Warlombrout.

We do not know where Charras obtained his information; but it seems quite clear that the movement to the bridges would not have met with the amount of opposition which he claims. These brigades of Reckow and Brause were portions of the IId Corps, and were expecting to cross the Dyle at Wavre, and march to support Bülow. No one, of course, can say what these troops would have done had Grouchy attempted to cross the Dyle by the bridges or any of them; but it is certain that these troops were not then expecting any such movement, nor were they stationed where they could at once or easily have interfered with it.

7. Where was Grouchy when he heard the sound of the cannon of Waterloo, and rejected the advice of Gérard to march to the support of the Emperor?

That it was at Sart-à-Walhain where Marshal Grouchy heard the sound of the cannon of Waterloo, is the universally accepted belief. But it is an error. It may be interesting to see how it originated.

Berton, who wrote in 1818, says[660] that Grouchy’s column “was still at the village of Walhain when it heard the first cannon-shots of Mont St. Jean,” and that it was there that Gérard gave his advice.[661]

Grouchy, writing his “Observations” the same year in Philadelphia, which were reprinted in Paris in 1819, states[662] that the cannon was heard while they were skirmishing in the wood of Limelette, between 1 and 2 P.M.

Gérard, in a letter also written in 1819, states[663] that it was “at Wallin, or Sart-à-Wallin.” He says he found the Marshal eating some strawberries. It was about 11 A.M., a little more, or a little less. He gives an account of the interview, and then says “We quitted Wallin, &c.”

His acting chief-of-staff, Colonel Simon Lorière, says in his report:—[664]

“At 11 o’clock the Third [Fourth] Corps was entirely assembled at Walin.

“The Count Gérard, who preceded the march of his corps, learnt that Marshal Grouchy had stopped at a house in the village belonging to a M. Hollaert; he went there with the officers of his staff; he told me to follow; we found his Excellency at breakfast.”

Colonel Denniée of Gérard’s staff locates the incident at Sarra-Walin, and speaks of Gérard’s having found the Marshal at breakfast.[665]

Gérard wrote to a friend of his at Brussels to look up M. Hollaert; he did so, and wrote[666] to Gérard to say that he had been to see him at Sarra-Walin.

This seems to have decided Gérard that the place was Sart-à-Walhain; for he writes in 1820 to Colonel Grouchy, a son of the Marshal, as follows:—[667]

“It was not at 3 o’clock in the afternoon that I rejoined the commander-in-chief of the right wing, but towards 11 o’clock in the morning; he was at Sarra-Walin, at the house of a M. Hollaert, a notary, where he was breakfasting.”

Grouchy finally conceded to Gérard that it was long before they were skirmishing in the wood of Limelette, that the sound of the cannon of Waterloo was heard. He admitted in a letter[668] published in 1829, that it was at Sart-à-Walhain, and at 11.30 A.M. This is also the statement made in the Grouchy Memoirs.[669]

Nevertheless it was at Walhain and not at Sart-à-Walhain where Marshal Grouchy was when he heard the sound of the cannon, and Gérard proffered his advice to march toward the field of battle. It is certain that the incident took place at the house of a notary—a M. Hollaert (or Hollert, as it should be spelled),—for many of the officers who give their recollections mention his name; and it is in no wise remarkable that the name of the village in which his house stood should have made no distinct impression on their memories. Now there was at that time no notary at Sart-à-Walhain. There is none now. It is a very small village. There was not in fact a notary’s office at Walhain in 1815; there was none until 1818. But M. Joseph Hollert was in 1815 the notary of the neighboring town of Nil St. Vincent, and he lived in a large house in Walhain known as the Chateau Marette. It was here that he received Marshal Grouchy in the forenoon of the 18th of June, 1815, and it was into his garden that the officers went out from the house to catch the direction of the firing.[670]

The matter is of no very great importance. Still, Walhain was certainly a good mile nearer than Sart-à-Walhain to the bridges, whether Grouchy marched by way of Mont St. Guibert or La Baraque. (See Map 11.)

FOOTNOTES:

[635] See the Bertrand order, _ante_, p. 210.

[636] This statement is true only of the army which the Duke had in line of battle at Waterloo. There were besides some 18,000 men, stationed at Hal and Tubize, of whom he did not avail himself.

[637] “Napoleon would not have lost his line of communication with France had Blücher immediately reoccupied the position of Ligny upon Napoleon’s leaving it; for his advance upon Wellington necessarily opened to him both the Mons and Lille great lines to France.” Kennedy, pp. 154, 155.

[638] Kennedy, p. 157.

[639] _Ante_, p. 274, n. 3.

[640] Kennedy, p. 160; Chesney, pp. 206, 207.

[641] Marshal Soult, according to Baudus (vol. 1, pp. 222, 223), was opposed to detaching Grouchy with the large body of troops assigned to him. He said to one of his aides that it was a great fault to detach so considerable a force from the army which was going to march against the Anglo-Belgian troops; that in the condition in which the defeat of the evening before had put the Prussian army, a feeble force, with the cavalry of General Exelmans, would suffice to follow and observe it in its retreat. We concur in Marshal Soult’s conclusion, but not with his reasons. It was not because the Prussian army was so weak, but because it was still so formidable, that Napoleon should have kept all his army together.

[642] See the admirable observations of Siborne (vol. 1, pp. 318 _et seq._); and of Van Loben Sels, pp. 319 _et seq._ With many writers, to blame Napoleon is to exonerate Grouchy; with others, again, to blame Grouchy is to exonerate Napoleon.

[643] _Cf._ Kennedy, pp. 160, 161; Chesney, pp. 206, 207. On the other hand see Van Loben Sels, pp. 323, 324.

[644] Operations of War, p. 196 _et seq._

[645] Hamley, p. 196.

[646] Frag. Hist.; Lettre à MM. Méry et Barthélemy, p. 5; Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, p. 44.

[647] Jomini, p. 176.

[648] Charras, vol. 2, pp. 62, 63. Hooper’s view [pp. 342 _et seq._] is substantially that of Charras. He also seems to think that unless Grouchy could succeed in defeating the Prussian troops opposed to him, his intervention would be useless. It seems to us, on the other hand, that all that it was needful for Grouchy to do was to engage, and so to detain, the corps of Bülow and Pirch I.; and by marching from the Dyle upon their line of march from Wavre to St. Lambert, he was, it seems to us, certain to accomplish this. This view is well presented by Quinet, pp. 301-304.

[649] Charras, vol. 2, p. 42.

[650] _Ante_, p. 232.

[651] Siborne (vol. 1, p. 320) thinks that Grouchy could have successfully crossed the Dyle even if he had not started from Gembloux earlier than he did.

[652] Siborne, vol. 1, p. 311; Charras, vol. 2, pp. 72, 73.

[653] Charras, vol. 2, p. 43; Siborne, vol. 1, pp. 311, 312. Kennedy (p. 163) seems to suppose that Pirch I. and Zieten followed Bülow without any interval.

[654] _Ante_, p. 259.

[655] Van Loben Sels (pp. 322, 323, 340) is very positive as to this.

[656] Charras, vol. 2, p. 376; also, p. 44.

[657] Siborne, vol. 1, p. 313. He strictly follows Damitz, p. 247.

[658] Ollech, pp. 208, 209.

[659] Called by him Lautelle. It is sometimes called the wood of Lauzel, as it adjoins a farm of that name.

[660] Berton, p. 55.

[661] Berton, pp. 55, 59.

[662] Grouchy, Obs., p. 16.

[663] Quelques Doc., p. 7. He means Walhain and Sart-à-Walhain.

[664] Ib., 12. By “Walin,” he means Walhain.

[665] Quelques Doc., pp. 17, 18. By “Sarra-Walin,” he means Sart-à-Walhain.

[666] Ib., p. 19. His letter was dated September 30, 1819.

[667] Ib., p. 24. See also Gérard’s “Lettre à MM. Germain-Sarrut et B. Saint Edme,” pp. 10, 11; and his “Dernières Observations,” pp. 8, 29.

[668] Fragm. Hist.; Lettre à MM. Méry and Barthélemy, p. 9.

[669] Grouchy Mém., vol. 4, pp. 71, 75.

[670] The writer has abundant proof of the above statements. He has also visited the house. M. Wenseleers, who is referred to in the Preface, obtained for him this information in 1888 and 1889.