CHAPTER VI.

THE FIFTEENTH OF JUNE: THE DUTCH-BELGIANS.

Turning now from the consideration of the arrangements ordered by the allied commanders, our first attention is due to the occupation of Quatre Bras by the brigade of Prince Bernhard of Saxe Weimar, belonging to the Dutch-Belgian division of Perponcher in the corps commanded by the Prince of Orange. This brigade, which was cantonned along the turnpike from Genappe to Frasnes and in the neighboring villages,[217] was, on the first news of hostilities, concentrated by its commander at Quatre Bras, with its outposts at Frasnes, an act which, done without orders, as it was, did him great credit.[218] As a matter of fact, however, orders were on the way directing the same thing. In the absence of the Prince of Orange at Brussels, his chief-of-staff, General Constant Rebecque, having heard of the advance of the French, had already[219] sent to Perponcher an order to assemble one brigade of his division at Quatre Bras, and the other at Nivelles. Between 5 and 6 o’clock of the afternoon of the 15th Prince Bernhard’s brigade was attacked near Frasnes by the advance of Reille’s Corps.[220] At 9 he sent off to Nivelles a report of the action; this was immediately forwarded to Braine-le-Comte, where the headquarters of the Prince of Orange were;[221] but he being at Brussels at the Duchess of Richmond’s ball, Rebecque, his chief-of-staff, took it upon himself to order Perponcher to support Prince Bernhard’s brigade at Quatre Bras with the other brigade of his division, Bylandt’s.[222] Rebecque then, at 10 P.M., sent a despatch to the Prince of Orange at Brussels informing him what he had done.

About 11 o’clock,[223] an hour at least after this order had been expedited, arrived Wellington’s 5 o’clock order to the Prince of Orange “to collect at Nivelles the 2d and 3d divisions of the army of the Low Countries.” In obedience to this, a new order[224] was made out and sent to Perponcher, but he took it upon himself to carry out his earlier instructions to assemble his whole division at Quatre Bras, and in this he was supported by his corps-commander, the Prince of Orange. The greater part of Bylandt’s brigade arrived in the early morning of the 16th. Perponcher arrived in person at 3 A.M.,[225] the Prince of Orange at 6 o’clock.[226] (See Map 3.)

Thus was Quatre Bras occupied on the evening and night of the 15th, not only without orders from Wellington, but contrary to his orders. Had his orders been obeyed, Ney would have found on the next morning no one to oppose him.

FOOTNOTES:

[217] Van Loben Sels, p. 130.

[218] Ib., pp. 131, 132. Chesney, p. 100.

[219] Van Loben Sels, p. 128, note.

[220] Ib., pp. 133, 134, note.

[221] Van Loben Sels, p. 175.

[222] Ib., p. 176.

[223] Ib., p. 176, note.

[224] Ib., p. 178, n. It would seem that the sending to Perponcher the order to return to Nivelles was a mere form.

[225] Ib., p. 183.

[226] Ib., p. 185.

_NOTE TO CHAPTER VI._

“Almost all historians” says Colonel Maurice,[227] “write as if the occupation of Quatre Bras by Prince Bernhard was a step for which he not only deserves the greatest credit, but one which in itself was sure to be of vast advantage to the English army.” In this opinion Colonel Maurice does not share. We have fully treated of this subject before.[228] All we need say here is to repeat, that the question of the suitableness of Quatre Bras as the point of concentration for the Anglo-Dutch army could not have been considered by the Duke of Wellington at this moment apart from the fact that Marshal Blücher was concentrating his army at Sombreffe; and that, when this fact was ascertained, the Duke must concentrate at Quatre Bras or abandon all hope of assisting his ally. We have also pointed out that the fact that the main French army was opposed to the Prussians constituted this case an exception to the general rule; for, in this instance, _ex hypothesi_, the Duke would encounter only those troops which Napoleon would feel himself strong enough to detach from his main body.

If we are right in this contention, therefore, then the Dutch-Belgian generals,—Constant Rebecque, Perponcher, and the Prince of Saxe Weimar,—having learned the situation of the French and Prussian armies before the Duke heard of it, did what Wellington, had he known what they knew, would have ordered to be done.[229] And it may be added, that we fully concur in the commendation which has so generally been awarded to them for their prompt and vigorous action.

FOOTNOTES:

[227] Maurice, p. 345: July, 1890.

[228] _Ante_, pp. 94 _et seq._

[229] Chesney, p. 102; Hooper, p. 84.