CHAPTER I.

THE PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.

Napoleon entered Paris on his return from Elba on the twentieth of March, 1815. His first endeavor, after quieting the not very formidable movements of the royalists in the south and west of France, was to open communications with the great powers. He proclaimed his policy to be strictly one of peace, and we have every reason to believe that his intentions were sincerely pacific. But his agents were turned back on the frontier. The nations of Europe refused to treat with him on any terms, and entered into an offensive and defensive alliance against him with the avowed purpose of driving him from the throne of France. The armies of the neighboring powers began immediately to concentrate on the border, and even Russia set her troops in motion for the general attack upon France and her Emperor.

To meet this formidable coalition Napoleon bent all his energies. The army had, since his first abdication, been reorganized, and many high commands had naturally been given to the chiefs of the royalist party. Much had to be done before the new arrangements, necessitated by the re-establishment of the Imperial government, could be effected.

These changes in the military organization of the country required time. Besides, Napoleon was not desirous to precipitate matters. He was naturally solicitous not to appear to commence an avoidable war. He was, moreover, much occupied with domestic politics, but of his dealings with the chambers and of his new constitution we do not propose to speak.

Besides increasing and reconstituting the army, work was begun on the fortifications of the principal cities.

By the first of June, no change having taken place in the relations of France with her neighbors, it became incumbent on the Emperor to decide what he would do.

The situation was, in brief, as follows: Two large armies, one composed of English, Dutch, Belgian and Hanoverian troops, with contingents from Brunswick and Nassau, the whole under command of the Duke of Wellington, the other composed of Prussians, Saxons, and other Germans under Marshal Blücher, lay scattered in their cantonments in Belgium to the north and east of the rivers Sambre and Meuse. On the eastern frontier, the Austrians were collecting a formidable force, and were expecting to be reinforced in July by a powerful Russian army. If Napoleon should maintain a strictly defensive attitude, France would again be the theatre of hostilities, as in the previous year. True, time would be gained by the delay, and time was most important for filling the ranks of the army, completing the fortifications, manufacturing ammunition, and generally putting the country into a state of defence. But when the invasion came, it would be made in overwhelming force. It was possible, certainly, to hope for the repetition of the exploits of 1814, for victories like Champ Aubert, Montmirail and Rheims; on the other hand, bloody and indecisive battles like those of Brienne, Laon, and Arcis-sur-Aube were to be expected with equal probability. The thing for Napoleon to do, if possible, was to reduce this tremendous disparity of numbers, and this could only be effected by beating his enemies in detail. If he could dispose of the armies of Wellington and Blücher now, he would have so much the better chance against the Austrians and the Russians. And Napoleon undoubtedly hoped that if fortune should favor him in 1815 as in 1805 and 1806, for instance,—if he should be able to repeat in Belgium the astonishing successes of Austerlitz and Jena,—he would not find it impossible to make peace with his father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria, and that Russia, whose interests in the war were remote and really theoretical, would willingly retire from the contest. When we add to this that Napoleon’s _forte_ was the offensive, that his genius was specially adapted for enterprising and daring strategy, we are not surprised that he should have decided to move at once, with all his available force, upon the armies of Wellington and Blücher.[5]

These armies were, as has been stated, lying in their cantonments on and behind the Belgian frontier. (See Map 1.) Their front covered, roughly speaking, an extent of a hundred miles, from Namur and Huy on the east to Mons and Tournay on the west. They were distributed in numerous towns and villages, some of these being as far back as forty miles from the frontier. With the location of the various detachments Napoleon was undoubtedly, to a great extent, acquainted. He calculated that Wellington’s forces, which were scattered over a wide extent of country, could not be concentrated in less than two days; and that it would require more than one day for Blücher to assemble the four corps of which his army was composed.

The high-road, which runs from Charleroi north through Quatre Bras, Genappe and Waterloo to Brussels, ran between these armies,—that of the Duke of Wellington lying to the westward of the road and that of Marshal Blücher lying to the eastward of it. The Prussians lay considerably closer to the frontier than the English and Dutch. Wellington’s headquarters were at Brussels; Blücher’s at Namur. The turnpike, which runs from Namur through Quatre Bras to Nivelles, was the main avenue of communication between these two armies.

The Prussian lines of supply extended by way of Liége and Maestricht to the Rhine; the English by way of Ostend and Antwerp to the sea. The bases of the two armies were thus situated in opposite directions. It was, of course, probable that if either of these armies should be obliged to retreat, it would retreat towards its own base. But to retreat towards its own base would be to march away from its ally. On this peculiarity in the situation Napoleon’s plan of campaign was, to a great degree, founded. The situation was far more favorable for him than if the 220,000 men in Belgium had all belonged to one army, for now, not only were there two armies, under two commanders, in whose operations he might safely count upon the existence of more or less misunderstanding and failure fully to meet each other’s expectations, but the two armies were bound, in case of disaster to either or both, to follow lines of retreat which were wholly divergent.

We are now prepared to consider Napoleon’s plan. He proposed to assemble his own forces with all possible secrecy in the neighborhood of Charleroi,—near the point of junction of the two opposing armies. He expected that, on the first news of his approach, the two armies would respectively concentrate, and then endeavor to unite. He expected that the Prussians, being less scattered than the English, and being likely to know of the approach of the French before the English could possibly hear of it, would be the first to concentrate, and he expected therefore to encounter them alone and unsupported by their allies.

The statement of Napoleon’s plan of campaign in Gourgaud’s narrative is as follows:—[6]

“The Prussian army, having intimation of the enemy’s intentions eight or ten hours before the English, would accordingly be first concentrated. Hopes were even entertained of attacking the Prussians before their four corps were united, or of obliging them to fall back in the direction of Liége and the Rhine, which was their line of operations; and by thus separating them from the English, to create an opportunity for new combinations.

“In these calculations, the characters of the enemy’s commanders were much to be considered. The hussar habits of Marshal Blücher, his activity and decided character, formed a strong contrast with the cautious disposition, the deliberate and methodical manner of the Duke of Wellington. Thus, it was easy to foresee, that the Prussian army would be the first to be concentrated, and also that it would evince more decision and promptitude in hastening to the aid of its ally [than the English army would if the Prussians should be the first to be attacked]. If Blücher had only two battalions ready to act, he would be sure to employ them in support of the English army; but there was reason to believe that Wellington, unless his whole army was united, would not attack the French to succor Blücher. All these considerations rendered it desirable that the attack should be commenced against the Prussian army; it necessarily would, so we thought, be the first to be concentrated, and this turned out to be the fact.”

To the same effect the Emperor says in his “Memoirs”:—[7]

“The [Prussian] army was to assemble in rear of Fleurus. * * * In the night between the 14th and 15th, confidential messengers returned to the French headquarters at Beaumont, and announced that everything was tranquil at Namur, Brussels and Charleroi; this was a happy presage. To have thus succeeded in concealing from the enemy the movements which the French army had made for the last two days, was to have already obtained a great advantage. The Prussian army found itself obliged either to establish a point of concentration further back than Fleurus, or to receive battle in that position without being able to be assisted by the Anglo-Dutch army. * * * All the measures of Napoleon had therefore for their object to attack the Prussians first.”

In a word, Napoleon believed that the allied generals had fixed the points of concentration of their armies too near the frontier for that concentration to be effected in season to oppose to his army an overwhelming force; he thought it very likely also, for the reasons above stated, that he would have only the Prussian army to deal with in the first encounter of the campaign.

There were, to be sure, other courses open to him. He might direct his army upon the communications of the Prussians by passing to the eastward of them and turning their left flank. But this operation involved a wide _détour_ over a difficult country, and in the battle which was certain to result, the Prussian and the English armies would, beyond a doubt, both be united against him. On the other hand he could turn Wellington’s right by moving _viâ_ Lille, Valenciennes or Mons upon Ghent or Brussels. An advance in this direction presented, to be sure, fewer difficulties than the one just spoken of, and promised greater advantages. The Duke himself always maintained that this would have been Napoleon’s best move. It probably would have cut the English communications with Ostend, and would very likely have forced Wellington to evacuate Brussels without a battle, that is, unless he cared to risk an engagement without the aid of his ally. But the Prussians in the meantime would have concentrated without molestation their whole army of 120,000 men, and if Wellington had been successful in avoiding a battle with the French superior force, the two allied generals ought to have been able either to manœuvre Napoleon out of Belgium or to force him to battle on disadvantageous terms. It is probable that in neither of these flanking movements would there be an opportunity afforded for a direct, immediate, crushing blow upon one of the allied armies, such as that which Napoleon thought it very possible that the temerity of Marshal Blücher was going to present to him, if he advanced by way of Charleroi.

We have seen that Napoleon seems to have thought it very likely that Blücher would fight, but, of course, Napoleon could but conjecture what Blücher would do; he could not certainly know that he would not now, as he had done in Germany in 1813, avoid a direct conflict with him, and retire on his base of operations. If Blücher should do this, the two armies, it is true, would be separated and could be dealt with accordingly; but the difficulties of the campaign would be vastly greater than if the Prussian army should be practically disposed of by a decisive victory at the outset. For if the Prussians should fall back without hazarding a battle, they would have to be pursued, certainly far enough to ascertain their real intentions, and to become assured that they were, for the time being at least, definitely separated from the army of Wellington. If this should appear to be the case the question would then arise, which of the two armies should be followed up; and in considering this question, the importance of the occupation of Brussels, at that time the capital of the Netherlands, would naturally influence Napoleon in favor of throwing the bulk of his forces against the Anglo-Dutch. Napoleon, however, as we have already said, seems to have thought it on the whole probable, knowing, as he did, the daring and resolute character of the man, that Blücher would fight, with or without the assistance of the English army, and he also thought that the situation of the English army was such that Blücher would not be likely to get much assistance from it. Napoleon, therefore, hoped to open the campaign with a signal victory, crippling, perhaps destroying, the Prussian army, and he knew that the result of such a victory must be the retreat of the beaten Prussians in a direction certain to separate them entirely and definitely from their English and Dutch allies. The French Emperor would then be free to carry the great bulk of his forces against the English and Dutch. If Wellington stood, he expected to beat him; if he retreated, he would leave Belgium and perhaps Holland at the disposal of the French.

Such, in brief, were Napoleon’s calculations and expectations.

_NOTE TO CHAPTER I._

The view given above of Napoleon’s plan has been by no means universally accepted. It is often stated that he intended to separate the two armies and attack them in detail, but if this expression is to be understood as meaning that the former operation was to precede the latter in point of time, it is not in our judgment a correct statement. There never was, we believe, any expectation on Napoleon’s part that he could, by throwing his army between those of Wellington and Blücher, or by merely occupying strategic points, separate the allied armies definitely from one another. What he did expect, was, as we have seen,[8] to encounter one of these armies, that commanded by Marshal Blücher, alone and unsupported by its ally. If it should decline an engagement, or should fight and be beaten, he calculated on its retiring towards its own base of operations, and so separating itself by every march taken in that direction from its ally.

But several writers on the campaign present us with quite other ideas of Napoleon’s intended operations. And as it is obviously of the first importance that we should start with a correct idea of Napoleon’s plan, if we would follow the events of the campaign intelligently, we will examine these other theories somewhat in detail.

Take first the view that Napoleon’s intention was to throw his army between those of Wellington and Blücher. This is Alison’s view. We cite him, not because his name carries any weight as a military authority, but because his error has been so clearly pointed out by no less a person than the Duke of Wellington, in a criticism[9] of Alison’s History of Europe written by the Earl of Ellesmere, who wrote, as is well known, under the Duke’s inspiration. In the following passage a quotation is made from the work of the famous German military critic, Clausewitz:—

“Mr. Alison (Hist. of Europe,[10] etc., vol. x, p. 991) speaks of ‘Buonaparte’s favorite military manœuvre of interposing between his adversaries, and striking with a superior force first on the right hand and then on the left,’ as having been attempted by him and baffled in this campaign. We doubt whether the expression of interposing between two adversaries can be correctly applied to any of Buonaparte’s successful campaigns, and we almost suspect that, if he had in contemplation a manœuvre of so much hazard on this occasion, it was the first on which he can be said to have attempted it. Hear Clausewitz on this matter:—

“All writers who have treated of this campaign set out by saying that Buonaparte threw himself between the two armies, in order to separate them. This expression, however, which has become a _terminus technicus_ in military phraseology, has no clear idea for its foundation. The space intervening between two armies cannot be an object of operation.[11] It would have been very unfortunate if a commander like Buonaparte, having to deal with an enemy of twice his force, instead of falling on the one half with his united strength, had lighted on the empty interval, and thus made a blow in the air, losing his time, whilst he can only double his own force by the strictest economy of that commodity. Even the fighting the one army in a direction by which it will be pressed away from the other, even if it can be effected without loss of time, incurs the great danger of being attacked in the rear by the other. If the latter, therefore, be not far enough removed to put this risk out of the question, a commander will scarcely venture on such a line of attack. Buonaparte, therefore, chose the direction between the two armies, _not in order to separate them by wedging himself between_,[12] but because he expected to find and fall on Blücher’s force in this direction, either united or in separate bodies [corps].” _Feldzug von 1815_, &c., p. 54:[13]

* * * * * * * *

His main object was evidently to find the Prussian army, and beat it.”

Nevertheless we find Hooper,[14] who wrote long after Clausewitz, making the very statement which Clausewitz thought so objectionable:—

“He (Napoleon) calculated that if he struck at the centre of the two armies he should be able _to wedge himself in between them_, crushing any divisions which attempted to obstruct his progress, and, having won a position of vantage, he imagined that it would be in his power to manœuvre with rapidity from side to side and defeat each army in succession.”

To the same effect writes Quinet:—

“He (Napoleon) will place himself between the two armies, at the centre of the line, that is to say, at the extreme right of the Prussian cantonments. By this move, the Duke of Wellington and Marshal Blücher will be separated from the first hour. The occasion, the moment, will decide on which of the two armies it will be best to strike the first blow.”[15]

It is unnecessary to repeat what has been so well said above in opposition to this view. It is plain that these writers have misconceived Napoleon’s plan. But we must consider this more fully.

This conception of the campaign is practically identical with the theory first put forth by Rogniat in his “Considérations de l’Art de la Guerre,” and repeated in his “Réponse aux Notes critiques de Napoléon,” in the form of a criticism of Napoleon’s operations. He maintains that Napoleon should have aimed first at seizing the two points of Quatre Bras and Sombreffe on the Nivelles-Namur road, over which the allied armies communicated with each other.

“If, instead of six leagues, he had made eight or nine (and he had time enough, inasmuch as the Sambre was crossed at two o’clock), in pushing his left to Frasnes and his advance-guard to Quatre Bras, the centre and right to Sombreffe, with the reserves at Fleurus, he would have obtained the precious advantage he ought to have aimed at, that of separating the two opposing armies, of retarding the union of their corps, of taking a central position and of attacking them one at a time. In fact, Quatre Bras and Sombreffe are on the high-road from Namur to Brussels; master of these points, he could then have opposed the junction of the English on one side, of the Prussians on the other.”[16]

This view has also received the endorsement of Jomini,[17] who evidently thinks that Napoleon must have entertained it.

“Napoleon perceived that their (the Prussian) army sought to assemble between Namur and the causeway leading from Charleroi to Brussels, as it was by this route that the English would come to their assistance: now, under this supposition, the Emperor had but one wise course to follow; the most simple glance at the map would sufficiently indicate that it was essential to seize upon Sombreffe on the one side, and the central point of Quatre Bras on the other. * * * Because, once master of these two points, he was in position to act at will on either of the opposing armies, and prevent their junction.”

To the same effect is the sketch of Napoleon’s plan put forth by his advocate, the Prince de la Tour d’Auvergne in his “Waterloo”:

“The Sambre crossed, he (Napoleon) would seize the line of communication of the Anglo-Dutch and Prussians. Two columns would be charged to establish themselves, one at Quatre Bras, the other at Sombreffe.

“The separation consummated, he would easily make an end of both the Prussians and the Anglo-Dutch. For this would only be to renew a manœuvre familiar to him, and which had so often given him the victory.”[18]

Charras, one of the Emperor’s hostile critics, takes the same view of his intentions:

“It requires only a glance at the map to indicate with certainty the point which it was his intention to reach in dictating his order of movement. * * *

“The French army, occupying these places [Quatre Bras and Sombreffe] in force, would find itself placed between the Anglo-Dutch and the Prussians, thenceforward really capable,—to borrow from Napoleon his own expression,—of attacking them in detail, leaving to them, if they would escape from this misfortune,—the greatest that could befall them,—only the alternative of yielding ground and of uniting their forces at Brussels or beyond it.”[19]

Against this array of authority we oppose with confidence that of Napoleon himself, of Wellington, and of Clausewitz. It was Napoleon’s expectation, as we have seen above, that the Prussian army would be the first to be concentrated, that it would offer battle at or near Fleurus, and that he would be able to attack and overcome it before it could be joined by the Anglo-Dutch forces.[20] If Blücher fought at all at that stage in the campaign, it stood to reason that he would fight _to the south_ of Sombreffe, _for the preservation of his line of communication with Wellington_,—the Namur-Nivelles road. Hence, the intention of occupying Sombreffe, _as a preliminary to a battle with the Prussians_, could not, as we venture to think, have entered Napoleon’s mind. On the contrary, he believed that the seizure of Sombreffe would inevitably necessitate the retreat of the Prussians to some point further north, as Wavre, or even to the neighborhood of Brussels, where their junction with the English could be effected without molestation.[21]

But the last thing which Napoleon wanted was that the allied armies should retire to Wavre, or to the neighborhood of Brussels, and there unite. He needed a battle, and a decisive success,[22] and he needed it at once. A war of manœuvres was not the game for him to play at this crisis. It was of vital importance for him to rout, if possible, in succession, the armies of Blücher and Wellington; a battle, therefore, was what he sought, and he expected that Blücher would fight him, and fight him alone. It was only by routing Blüchers army, or forcing it to retreat, that he expected to separate it from that of Wellington.

It must also be borne in mind, that the mere occupation of two points on the line of communication between two allied armies does not in any way prevent the unimpeded concentration of each army, and its being moved, when concentrated, in any direction that its commander may decide on. The “line of communication” seized is not to be confounded with the line of supplies or the line of retreat of either army. No doubt, the occupation of any point or points on the line by which two allied armies communicate with each other tends to embarrass them, to hinder any combined movements, and to delay their union; but to direct the march of an invading army merely to compass this end, when it is possible to defeat one of these opposing armies by engaging it where it cannot be supported by its ally, is to miss the opportunity of the campaign.

FOOTNOTES:

[5] See Clausewitz, chaps. 8, 14.

[6] Gourgaud, pp. 42, 43.

[7] Corresp., vol. 31, pp. 195, 197, 198.

[8] _Ante_, pp. 4 _et seq._

[9] Ellesmere, pp. 161, 162. See Maurice, pp. 333 _et seq._; Jan. 1891.

[10] In the edition of 1850, this passage (as we suppose it to be) is found in vol. xiii, p. 625, and reads somewhat differently, but the idea is precisely the same.

[11] Thiers; vol. xx, book lx, p. 23, says: “He had conceived the belief that the English and Prussians * * * would leave between their respective forces a space, not very strongly guarded, and he thought that, by bringing the whole strength of his army to bear upon this point, he might become master of the position.”

[12] The italics are our own.

[13] In the edition of 1862, this passage is found in Chap. 22 on pages 46 and 47.

[14] Hooper, p. 58. See also, by the same author, Wellington, p. 207. To the same effect, see Clinton, p. 378. _Cf._ Rogniat, Considérations, p. 339, who was the first to announce this theory.

[15] Quinet, p. 75.

[16] Réponse, &c., pp. 261, 262.

[17] Jomini, p. 122, 123; also, pp. 213, 225, 226.

[18] La Tour D’Auvergne, pp. 41, 42; also, pp. 73 _et seq._

[19] Charras, vol. I, pp. 115, 116. See also Quinet, p. 101,—“Pour empêcher la réunion (of the English and Prussian armies) il était indispensable de fermer à la fois les deux passages (Sombreffe and Quatre Bras).”

[20] Siborne (vol. I, p. 47) is perfectly clear on this point.

[21] Corresp.: vol. 31, p. 471.

[22] _Cf._ Clausewitz, ch. 14.