CHAPTER XVI: THE BATTLE OF WATERLOO 289

Napoleon examines the allied position at 1 A.M. 289

Early in the morning he again goes to the front to see if the English are there 290

His expectation of victory 290

The _rôle_ which he expected Grouchy to play 290

He does not seem to have drawn the very natural inference that Wellington was expecting Blücher; or, if he did, he certainly did not act upon it 291

The rain ceased about 8 A.M. 291

The original intention was to begin the battle at 9 o’clock 292

But Drouot suggested delay and Napoleon acquiesced 292

Napoleon forms the army in three lines 292

His delay in beginning the action criticised 293

And his neglect to send word to Grouchy 294

Every hour’s delay a gain to Wellington 294

Whose army was unequal to the shock without the assistance of the Prussians 294

Kennedy’s explanation of Wellington’s course 295

Risks that Wellington took 295

Wellington had had the field surveyed 296

Description of the English position 297

Composition and strength of Wellington’s army 298

Positions of the various troops 299

Hougomont and La Haye Sainte 300

Strength and composition of the French army 301

Positions of the corps 301

Napoleon’s plan of battle 302

Establishment of a great battery east of the Charleroi turnpike 302

It has been universally commended 303

The attack on Hougomont, ordered as a preliminary to the main attack, which was to be on the centre, very rashly and carelessly conducted 303, 304

The assault by d’Erlon’s Corps 304-307

Formation of the troops 305

No assignable reason for such a peculiar and unwieldy formation 305

The attack is made and repulsed 307

Napoleon sees the Prussians on the heights of St. Lambert 307

Capture of La Haye Sainte 307

The great cavalry attacks on the English centre 308

They were made against troops in good condition to stand them 308

Napoleon is called away at 4 P.M. to take charge of the resistance to the Prussians 308

Necessity of maintaining the Charleroi road and Planchenoit against their assaults 309

Napoleon’s personal supervision needed 309

The great cavalry charges 309

They accomplish little and the cavalry is ruined 310

French batteries placed to the south of La Haye Sainte enfilade the English line west of the turnpike 310

But this was only done to a limited extent 310

The attack by the heavy cavalry of the Guard 311

Napoleon succeeds in repulsing Bülow 311

The battle against the English not actively carried on after the cessation of the cavalry attacks 312

But the English line at this period becomes from various causes very weak. Kennedy’s description of it 312

What Napoleon might have accomplished against the English had he not been fighting the Prussians at this time 313

The fight with the Prussians terminated, Napoleon returns to the front 314

Wellington has made every effort to restore his line; its condition to the west of the pike 314

Ney is ordered to make preparations for an attack to be made by the Imperial Guard 315

Disposition at this time of the various battalions of the Guard 315, 316

Strength and composition of the attacking force 316

The Emperor leads up and hands to Ney two regiments of grenadiers and two of chasseurs 317

They are formed in columns of battalions and march in _échelon_, the right in advance 317

Premature attack of a body of French horse on the left of the Guard 317

No support furnished by Reille 318

Admirable conduct of d’Erlon 318

The leading battalions of the Guard strike Maitland’s brigade of guards 319

Captain Powell’s account 319

The leading battalions of the Guard are beaten 320

General Maitland’s account 321

Skilful and gallant conduct of Sir C. Halkett 322

The left and rear battalions of the Guard continue to advance 323

But are attacked in flank by the 52d regiment 324

And are completely overthrown 324

The failure of the attack largely due to the absence of supports 324

Arrival of the van of Zieten’s Corps on the field 324

The French right wing retires in confusion 325

Charge of the cavalry-brigades of Vivian and Vandeleur 325

Exertions of Napoleon to restore order 325

He is finally forced to retire 326

The French retreat blocked at Genappe 326

The result of the battle due to the intervention of the Prussians 327

Probable course of Zieten if Grouchy had detained Bülow and Pirch I. 328

Grouchy, however, not solely responsible for the defeat 328

NOTES TO CHAPTER XVI 329

1. The French tactics generally censured 329

Napoleon and Ney both to blame 329

Injurious effect on the French chances of success of Napoleon’s absence at Planchenoit 330

The attack on Hougomont criticised 330

The defence of Planchenoit praised 331

2. The English tactics exceedingly good 331

3. The attack of the Imperial Guard 331

A. No foundation for the hypothesis of two columns 332

B. The claims of the 52d regiment considered 333

The notion that it was only the skirmishers of the Imperial Guard who were driven off by Maitland’s brigade refuted by the testimony of eye witnesses 334

The great credit due to Colborne 335

4. Napoleon’s reasons for ordering the attack considered 336

Zieten’s intervention not anticipated 336

The English reported as growing weaker 337

Ney ordered and expected to support the attack by Bachelu’s division and by cavalry on the left 337

Ney disappoints the Emperor’s expectations in both respects 337

The charge of the Guard might have been properly supported 338

Contrast between Ney and Wellington 338

Note on Ney’s state of mind 338, n. [777]

5. Wellington’s course in leaving 18,000 men at Hal and Tubize, not to be defended 339

6. As to the effect upon the Prussians of the appearance of Grouchy’s force marching from the Dyle 339

7. The rout of the French army due to the irruption of Zieten’s Corps 340

The comparative weakness of the Anglo-Dutch army at the close of the action 341

8. Relative responsibility of Napoleon and Grouchy for the intervention of the Prussians 341

Both are responsible for it 342