CHAPTER XV: THE EIGHTEENTH OF JUNE:

GROUCHY AND BLÜCHER 245

Grouchy’s letter from Gembloux of 10 P.M. not really satisfactory 245

But Napoleon and Soult do not give him further instructions or any information 246

Napoleon thinks Grouchy may arrive by the bridge of Moustier and sends Marbot to look out for him 247

Grouchy was acting under the Bertrand order 248

Which laid upon him the task of ascertaining the intentions of the Prussians 249

And then left him entire liberty of action 249

Errors of Gardner and Maurice as to this latter point 249, 250

Grouchy at 10 P.M. of the 17th issues his orders for the next day to move on Sart-à-Walhain at 6 and 8 A.M. 250

But at daybreak he has learned that the Prussians had retired on Brussels 251

Yet he does not change his orders 252

He should have marched for the bridge of Moustier at daybreak 253

Opinion of Jomini 253

Opinion of Clausewitz 253

Opinion of Charras 253

Grouchy neglects to reconnoitre to his left 254

He arrives at Walhain and stops at the house of M. Hollert, a notary 255

He writes a despatch to the Emperor 255

Analysis of this despatch 255, 256

The sound of the cannon of Waterloo is heard 256

Grouchy’s plain duty 256

Gérard’s advice 256

Grouchy refuses to follow it 257

And resumes his march on Wavre 257

Condition of the roads and bridges 258

Grouchy might have crossed the Dyle after having arrived at La Baraque 259

Three general misconceptions 259

1. As to the place where the sound of the cannon was heard 259

2. As to the necessity of marching by way of Mont St. Guibert 259

3. As to the resistance to be expected at the bridges 260

Grouchy might have been across by 4 P.M. 260

Positions of the IVth and IId Prussian Corps at that moment 261

And of the Ist Corps 261

Probability that Grouchy would have arrested the march of Bülow and Pirch I. 261

Zieten’s march, however, would not have been interfered with 261

Bülow reaches St. Lambert at noon 262

Pirch I. and Zieten do not leave Wavre till nearly noon 262

Tardiness of these movements 263

Accounted for by Gneisenau’s distrust of Wellington 263

His postscript to the letter to Müffling 263

His doubts as to Wellington’s accepting battle dispelled by the sound of the cannon of Waterloo 264

The combat at Wavre 264, 265

The bridge of Limale carried by the French between 6 and 7 P.M. 265

Soult’s 10 A.M. order to Grouchy 265

Analysis of this order 266

Its main object 266

It furnishes no justification for Grouchy’s course 267

Inconsistency between this despatch and the instructions given to Marbot 268-270

The despatch probably not revised by Napoleon 270

The 1 P.M. order to Grouchy 270, 271

Both despatches show that Napoleon was relying on Grouchy 272

The postscript to the second shows that the Emperor had become alarmed 272

NOTES TO CHAPTER XV 273

1. The wisdom of detaching Grouchy with 33,000 men considered 273

This course was decided on when it was believed that the Prussians had retreated on Namur 273

For Grouchy was not needed for the battle with the Anglo-Dutch army 274

But the Bertrand order shows that Napoleon feared that Blücher might have undertaken to join Wellington 274

In which case he would have had a long start by the time when Grouchy could move 275

Yet Napoleon adhered to the original decision to send Grouchy off, although he gave him a distinct warning 276

Risks incurred by this course 276

It would have been far safer to have taken Grouchy and his two corps with the main army 277

2. Kennedy’s reason against the detachment of Grouchy 277

But it was not to beat Wellington that Grouchy was needed, but to keep off Blücher 278

3. Importance of treating independently of the conduct of Napoleon and Grouchy 279

4. Hamley’s opinion as to Grouchy’s proper course given and commented on 280

5. The probable results, if Grouchy had marched for Moustier at daybreak 281

It would seem that he might easily have concealed the object of his march 281

Charras, however, is of a different opinion 282

Examination of his views 282

Probability that Grouchy could have effected a crossing at Moustier and Ottignies by 11 A.M. 283

And that Bülow would have stopped to concentrate his corps and fight 283

And that Pirch I. and Thielemann would have reinforced Bülow 284

Zieten, however, if he chose to do so, might have continued his march 284

6. Charras’ view as to the difficulty of Grouchy’s effecting a crossing after he had arrived at La Baraque 284

His statements as to the Prussian force in the vicinity of the lower bridges unsupported 285

7. It is generally stated that Grouchy was at Sart-à-Walhain when he heard the sound of the cannon of Waterloo 286

Statements of the different narratives 286, 287

He was, however, at Walhain, at the Chateau Marette, then the residence of M. Hollert, the Notary of Nil St. Vincent 287, 288