CHAPTER XIII: THE SEVENTEENTH OF

JUNE: NAPOLEON 197

_Résumé_ of the campaign up to date 197

Napoleon had no reason for delay 197

He had a disposable army composed almost entirely of fresh troops 197

Reasons for thinking that the Prussians might soon recover from the defeat of Ligny 198

Opportunity open to Napoleon of overwhelming that part of Wellington’s army which was at Quatre Bras 199

Napoleon’s inactivity on this morning 200

Probably the result of fatigue 200

Ney sends no report to the Emperor 200

Soult’s first order to him to move on Quatre Bras 201

Napoleon presumes that Wellington has long since fallen back 201

Napoleon’s lack of energy and activity this morning 202

Before noon, however, the 6th Corps and the Guard are ordered to Marbais 203

Second order to Ney at noon 203

Girard’s division of the 2d Corps left at Ligny 203

Napoleon’s reasons for supposing that Blücher had retired on Namur 203, 204

Of which the principal was that he had on the day before employed so large a part of his army in holding the Namur road 204

Pajol captures some prisoners and a battery on the road to Namur 205

Napoleon’s neglect to send out cavalry to explore the country to the north 205

Napoleon determines to send Grouchy with the 3d and 4th Corps to pursue the Prussians 206

His verbal orders to Grouchy, and Grouchy’s remonstrances 207

Grouchy’s points not well taken 207

Grouchy’s denial that he ever received on that day a written order 208

Berton reports a whole Prussian corps at Gembloux 209

The Emperor, then, in the absence of Soult, dictates to Bertrand an order to Grouchy 209

Full text of this order 209, 210

This order changes entirely the task assigned to Grouchy 210

He is to ascertain whether the Prussians intend to separate from the English or to unite with them to cover Brussels or Liége in trying the fate of another battle 211

And is left full discretion as to his course in either event 211

Strength and composition of his command 212

He reaches Gembloux that evening 212

And writes to the Emperor a report in which he says he shall try to separate the Prussians from Wellington 212, 213

Strength of Wellington’s force at Quatre Bras 214

At Quatre Bras the Emperor in person leads the pursuit of the English 214

His remark to d’Erlon 215

Interesting picture of the march by the author of “Napoléon à Waterloo” 215

Skirmish at Genappe 216

The English take up positions south of the hamlet of Mont St. Jean 216

NOTES TO CHAPTER XIII 217

1. Napoleon not to be blamed for not having pursued the Prussians in the early morning of the 17th. Clausewitz’s opinion 217

2. Napoleon probably would not have detached Grouchy had he known that the Prussians had retired on Wavre 218

3. Effect on the contemporary historians of Grouchy’s concealment of the Bertrand order—_e. g._, on Clausewitz 218

4. Curious survival of this effect on historians who wrote after the order had come to light 219

On Chesney 219

On Maurice 219

On Hamley 221

On Hooper 222

5. Whether the Bertrand order was sufficiently explicit. Charras’ opinion 222

6. The reasons for directing Grouchy on Gembloux considered 223

7. Valuable suggestions of Maurice as to the reasons which induced Napoleon to suppose that the Prussians had retreated to Namur 223

8. It was an error for Napoleon to trust to the probabilities, when so much was at stake 224, 225