CHAPTER XIV

BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (III)

C. ACTION WITH THE LIGHT CRUISERS

At about 1 P.M., when the _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_ turned to port to engage the _Invincible_ and _Inflexible_ the enemy’s light cruisers turned to starboard to escape; the _Dresden_ was leading and the _Nürnberg_ and _Leipzig_ followed on each quarter.

“In accordance with my instructions, the _Glasgow_, _Kent_, and _Cornwall_ at once went in chase of these ships; the _Carnarvon_, whose speed was insufficient to overtake them, closed the battle-cruisers.

“The _Glasgow_ drew well ahead of the _Cornwall_ and _Kent_, and at 3 P.M. shots were exchanged with the _Leipzig_ at 12,000 yards. The _Glasgow’s_ object was to endeavour to outrange the _Leipzig_ with her 6-inch guns and thus cause her to alter course and give the _Cornwall_ and _Kent_ a chance of coming into action.

“At 4:17 P.M. the _Cornwall_ opened fire, also on the _Leipzig_.

“At 7:17 P.M. the _Leipzig_ was on fire fore and aft, and the _Cornwall_ and _Glasgow_ ceased fire.

“The _Leipzig_ turned over on her port side and disappeared at 9 P.M. Seven officers and eleven men were saved.

“At 3:36 P.M. the _Cornwall_ ordered the _Kent_ to engage the _Nürnberg_, the nearest cruiser to her.

“Owing to the excellent and strenuous efforts of the engine-room department, the _Kent_ was able to get within range of the _Nürnberg_ at 5 P.M. At 6:35 P.M. the _Nürnberg_ was on fire forward and ceased firing. The _Kent_ also ceased firing and closed to 3,300 yards; as the colours were still observed to be flying in the _Nürnberg_, the _Kent_ opened fire again. Fire was finally stopped five minutes later on the colours being hauled down, and every preparation was made to save life. The _Nürnberg_ sank at 7:27 P.M. and as she sank a group of men were waving a German ensign attached to a staff. Twelve men were rescued, but only seven survived.

“The _Kent_ had four killed and twelve wounded mostly caused by one shell.

“During the time the three cruisers were engaged with the _Nürnberg_ and _Leipzig_, the _Dresden_, who was beyond her consorts, effected her escape owing to her superior speed. The _Glasgow_ was the only cruiser with sufficient speed to have had any chance of success. However, she was fully employed in engaging the _Leipzig_ for over an hour before either the _Cornwall_ or _Kent_ could come up and get within range. During this time the _Dresden_ was able to increase her distance and get out of sight.

“The weather changed after 4 P.M. and the visibility was much reduced; further, the sky was overcast and cloudy, thus assisting the _Dresden_ to get away unobserved.”

Sir Doveton Sturdee’s account of the two actions between the two light cruisers is almost too syncopated to be intelligible. Fortunately, however, many other records of these two encounters are available, so it is possible to describe what happened in somewhat greater detail. From 1:20 until about quarter to four, _Glasgow_, _Kent_, and _Cornwall_ were engaged in a plain stern chase with the three enemy cruisers. At that time the enemy began separating out, and the three British cruisers worked into a line abreast following suit. The _Glasgow_ was at the right of the line between three and four miles from _Cornwall_ and about a mile to a mile and a half ahead of her. _Kent_ was to the left of _Cornwall_, about two and a half miles off and about abreast of her. Straight ahead of _Cornwall_ was _Leipzig_, the centre ship of the enemy. She was about eight miles from _Cornwall_ and between six and seven from _Glasgow_. To _Leipzig’s_ right, and two or three miles ahead of her, was _Dresden_, and to her left and about the same distance off was _Nürnberg_. There had been a certain exchange of shots before this condition was reached, for _Glasgow_, very much the fastest of the British cruisers, had more than once drawn up towards _Leipzig_, and opened fire on her in hopes of turning her towards _Cornwall_ and _Kent_. And each time her attack was met by resolute and accurate fire by the Germans. As the German ships began to separate, _Glasgow_ headed off to the right towards _Dresden_, once more coming under the broadside fire of _Leipzig_. It must be remembered that _Glasgow_ only had two 6-inch guns, only one of which--the bow gun--could be employed in these conditions, and that the _Leipzig’s_ 4.2’s completely outranged her 4-inch. It appears to be a universal practice with the Germans to mount all their guns from the largest to the smallest, so that they can be used at extreme elevation. It will be remembered how the _Koenigsberg_ showed the most perfect accuracy of fire at nearly 11,000 yards with guns of a calibre that in pre-war days few in the British Service would have thought it possible to employ at greater range than 7,000 or 8,000 yards. These efforts of _Glasgow_ to manœuvre _Leipzig_ into contact with Cornwall, gave _Dresden_ a chance she was not slow to take. She was much the fastest of all the German craft, and managed, between four and five, to slip completely out of sight and escape.

This escape was made easier, and all the shooting throughout the two cruiser actions was made much more difficult by the sudden change in the weather that has already been noted as having begun shortly before 4 o’clock. A drizzling rain had set in, and not only had it become practically impossible to use rangefinders owing to the poor light, but it became extremely hard to detect the fall of shot and so correct the fire. In considering these two fights then, the extremely difficult conditions that prevailed must be taken into account. Let us deal first with the pursuit and destruction of _Nürnberg_.

“KENT” V. “NÜRNBERG”

At 5 o’clock _Kent_, after a chase of nearly four hours, was getting within range of _Nürnberg_. _Nürnberg_ had crept away to the eastward of _Leipzig_, so that by the time fire was opened, a considerable distance separated this from the other engagements. In point of fact, when the action began, the rain and increasing mist hid every other ship from sight. It was _Nürnberg_ which was first to open fire and, so far as could be judged, the range must have been about 11,000 yards or slightly over. _Kent_ held her fire for another ten minutes, as if waiting to see what the _Nürnberg’s_ guns could do at this range. She could of course, only use her two guns on the quarter-deck, and the after gun on the port side. To the astonishment of the _Kent_ all her first salvoes were right over. The range would have been a long one for a 6-inch gun; it seemed almost fabulous for a 4.2. Ten minutes later _Kent_ opened with her bow turret, and for the next half hour an active duel was maintained. The _Kent_ had sheered off a little to the left so as to bring her forward casemate guns also to bear. There was no doubt about the _Nürnberg’s_ shots falling over close, and the _Kent’s_ guns seemed from the ship to be fairly on the target. But for a considerable time there was no evidence that they were hitting, and _Kent_ was certainly not suffering from _Nürnberg’s_ fire, astonishingly accurate as it was. But suddenly, soon after half-past five, _Kent_, who was keeping up a speed of nearly a knot more than she had ever done before, began to gain enormously on her opponent. The range had been over 11,000 yards at 5 o’clock; by twenty minutes to six it got almost down to 7,000. It was obvious that _Nürnberg’s_ motive power had somehow come to grief. Had one of _Kent’s_ shells landed in her engine, or had one of the boilers, under the strain of so many hours’ high pressure, given way?

Whatever the cause, the results were exactly what Captain Allen was looking for. If the light had been bad at five it was getting worse every minute, and if the business was to be finished it had to be finished quickly. With the shortening range, the effect of the British lyddite was soon visible, and _Nürnberg_ had no alternative but to repeat the manœuvre of Von Spee and turn broadside to for her assailant. _Kent_ turned too, and not this time to lengthen the range, but to bring her whole nine broadside guns to bear. In point of fact, she closed the range as rapidly as she could, consistently with keeping all her guns bearing, and by 6 o’clock had reduced it to 3,000 yards. _Nürnberg_ was now a beaten ship. She had one topmast gone; her funnels were riddled; her speed had fallen from twenty-four knots at 5 o’clock to about eighteen at a quarter to six, and now almost to ten. Of the five guns on her port side only two were in action. Shortly after this she turned bows on to the _Kent_, and was at once caught by several 6-inch shells in the forecastle, which smashed up both the bow guns, shattering the bridge and conning-tower. Ever since the turn at a quarter to six, _Kent_ had kept ahead of her, though shortening the range, doubtless with an eye to the possibilities of _Nürnberg_ using a torpedo. When, therefore, at 6:10 she was almost stopped and seemed beaten, _Kent_ passed her and pushed on to about 5,000 yards to await developments. Shortly after six, _Nürnberg_ ceased fire altogether, and seemed a wreck. But her colours were still flying, and it was necessary to fire at her again. Just before seven she hauled down her colours and surrendered. Both ships were now at a dead stop, and _Kent_ got out her boats as far as she could to take possession of the enemy. But, as Captain Allen told the Association of Kentish Men in his very interesting letter about the action, the ship had received no less than thirty-six hits during the short but decisive engagement, and though she had been singularly fortunate in losing very few men--four men killed and twelve wounded--all her boats but two were in splinters, and both of these needed repairs before they could be used. They were, however, manned and lowered as quickly as possible, but they were hardly on their way towards the _Nürnberg_, some two miles off, when the enemy was seen to turn slowly on her side and sink. As she went below the waves, some of her gallant crew were seen on the stern waving the German ensign defiantly. For an hour and a half, that is until some time after dark, the _Kent’s_ two boats searched for survivors. Only seven were saved alive. Some were lashed to hammocks and gratings, and others were swimming. But in the extreme cold the great majority perished. One account of this dismal episode that has been sent to me says that the albatrosses were actually attacking the living as well as the dead in this last melancholy scene.

“CORNWALL” AND “GLASGOW” V. “LEIPZIG”

We have seen in the account of the _Kent_ and _Nürnberg_ action that up to 4 o’clock cruisers of both sides kept fairly well together, and that then the Germans opened out. It was shortly after this that they got out of sight of each other. _Kent_ pursued _Nürnberg_ in a more easterly direction, the _Glasgow_ and _Cornwall_ pursuing _Leipzig_ more to the south. In order to bring the _Leipzig_ to action _Glasgow_ was sent forward on the _Cornwall’s_ left, which made Leipzig, while still of course retreating as fast as she could, turn slightly towards _Cornwall_ and transfer her fire to her. All three ships were now firing, but the shots were falling short, until at about 4:20 _Cornwall_ made the first hit on the enemy, carrying away his foremast. This made the enemy edge away to the right, a move which was followed by _Cornwall_ also. The range was now shortening. When it was 8,000 yards _Leipzig_ made her first hits. _Cornwall_ thereupon altered course still more to starboard thus bringing about two effective results. The whole broadside of guns came in play, and the change of course threw out _Leipzig’s_ fire control. Both ships kept on these courses, and the range increased again to nearly 10,000 yards. As we have previously seen, it was at this time that the weather began to get really thick, and as a consequence of this it became exceedingly difficult to see the fall of shot, but it is worth remembering that _Leipzig_ was still hitting with her 4.2’s. Shortly after 5 o’clock, however, the range reached over 10,000 yards, and it became necessary to close once more. Between five and a quarter to six _Cornwall_, that had now clearly got the speed of _Leipzig_, carried out precisely the same tactics that the Vice-Admiral had adopted in the case of the battle-cruisers. Alternately, that is to say, closing the enemy at full speed, shelling him with the fo’c’sle guns, and then turning sharply to starboard to bring the whole broadside to bear. At about a quarter to six _Leipzig_ landed a shell in _Cornwall’s_ paint room, which shook the ship but did no damage. Captain Ellerton now decided to shorten the range and use lyddite shell. In the half hour between a quarter to six and a quarter past the range was brought down to about 8,500, and by about 6:40 it was reduced to 7,000. A far better proportion of hits was now being obtained, and the effect of the lyddite became immediately apparent. First one and then another of _Leipzig’s_ guns ceased firing, and by ten minutes to seven a big fire started forward. A few minutes before _Cornwall_ had heard the news by wireless of the sinking of _Scharnhorst_ and _Gneisenau_, and officers and men redoubled their efforts. The range was closed still more, the hitting became more intense, but the enemy in spite of his losses and damages kept every gun that could still work firing, and was actually hitting _Cornwall_ frequently right up to five minutes past seven, but in another five minutes two of her funnels were gone and the ship was blazing fore and aft.

_Cornwall_ thereupon ceased fire, expecting the enemy to strike his colours, but he did not do so. So _Cornwall_ closed about 5,000 yards and gave her a few more salvoes of lyddite. At a quarter to eight there was a loud explosion on board _Leipzig_ and her mainmast went over the side. At 8:12, it was of course dark by now, she sent up signals of distress. Both _Cornwall_ and _Glasgow_ now lowered boats as fast as they could be repaired and manned, but they were not able to reach the enemy until after 9 o’clock, and before they did so the ship turned over and sank. Only six officers and nine men were rescued from the water. Heavy as the casualties must have been, there were in all probability more than these unwounded at the end of the action, and all of those not killed, wounded as well as unwounded, might have been saved, for the ship was not actually in a sinking condition from _Cornwall_ and _Glasgow’s_ fire, and had been sunk by the orders of her own officers.

_Cornwall_ was hit eighteen times, but did not suffer a single casualty. _Glasgow_ had one man killed and five wounded. One of the _Leipzig’s_ officers said that from a quarter past six till seven, that is when the range had been brought down to about 7,000 yards, some rounds out of every salvo fired hit the ship. The effect of the lyddite appears to have been appalling. Men were blown to pieces and the ship was littered with ghastly fragments and relics of humanity. When the ship could reply no more, for there was no ammunition left for such guns as might still have been worked, the captain called the survivors together and said any one who liked could go and haul the flag down, but he would not do it. Nor did any one volunteer. About fifty jumped overboard, and when the ship sent up signals of distress there were only eighteen left alive on board. All but one of them were saved.

D. ACTION WITH THE ENEMY TRANSPORTS

“A report was received at 11:27 A.M. from H.M.S. _Bristol_ that three ships of the enemy, probably transports or colliers, had appeared off Port Pleasant. The _Bristol_ was ordered to take the _Macedonia_ under his orders and destroy the transports.

“H.M.S. _Macedonia_ reports that only two ships, steamships _Baden_ and _Santa Isabel_, were present; both ships were sunk after the removal of the crew.”

It is not clear from this what became of the third ship. But there were persistent rumours in various South American ports that the Germans had, in the course of the autumn, collected a very considerable number of trained reservists from the different South American States and cities, and had got them on board a transport with arms, etc., so as to be ready for any military purpose the naval commander-in-chief might select. It is exceedingly probable that the reason Von Spee did not appear off the Falkland Islands till five weeks after his defeat of Admiral Cradock was that he had had to spend a considerable time in getting these reservists ready for action. It certainly is quite clear that on December 8th he arrived off the Falkland Islands intending to attack, and it is far more probable that he intended to attack, seize, and annex the colony than merely to subdue and rob it. To seize and annex he would have needed troops, and the third transport that _Macedonia_ did not find when she got _Santa Isabel_ and _Baden_ probably contained the men destined to hold the colony. That the British Admiralty expected some attack of this kind is shown from the fact that _Canopus_, after being ordered north, was told to return to the Falkland Islands and to do the best possible for the defence of the colony. The only military strength possessed by the colony was three hundred volunteers who had had very little training and practically no arms beyond rifles. _Good Hope_ had left a field-gun when passing at the beginning of October, but of other artillery there was none. The seizure of the island, then, by Von Spee’s force of five ships, supplemented by a regiment of reservists, was a perfectly feasible project. Had it succeeded and the island been left with an adequate supply of machine and field guns, to resist a landing, it would have been an extremely difficult job to have turned them out. For with guns properly emplaced, the ships’ artillery could have done very little to protect landing parties, and Admiral Sturdee’s ships carried no sufficient surplus of men for it to have been practicable to incur a heavy sacrifice of life to regain the island. So far as this adventure was concerned the whole thing miscarried through being a week too late.