Part 11

Chapter 113,445 wordsPublic domain

In the 1914–15 Estimates three more battleships of the _Royal Sovereign_ class--to be named _Renown_, _Repulse_, and _Resistance_--were provided for, also a sixth ship of the _Queen Elizabeth class_, which was provisionally named _Agincourt_. The participation of any of these in the war is very improbable.

The other vessels of the programme were four lightly armoured cruisers, twelve destroyers and an unstated number of submarines.

When war broke out three battleships building in British Yards--two for Turkey and one for Chili--were taken over by the British Admiralty. Details of these are as follows:--

There were also taken over three Brazilian armoured gunboats--renamed _Humber_, _Severn_, and _Mersey_--of 1,200 tons each, carrying two 6-inch guns forward and two 4.7-inch howitzers aft. The speed is about 11½ knots, and early use was made of these vessels on the Belgian coast shortly after the outbreak of war.

In addition to the above, two large Chilian destroyers building at Cowes were taken over and renamed _Broke_ and _Faulknor_.

A variety of other vessels were likewise incorporated into the British Fleet, liners (to act as auxiliary cruisers), trawlers (to act as mine sweepers), plus various hospital ships, transports, and so on and so forth. Roughly, from 25 to 33 per cent. of the British Mercantile Marine came to be used in some way or other by the Admiralty--to say nothing of innumerable private yachts and motor boats.

The destroyers of the period have not materially differed from their predecessors of the Dreadnought era, save for the adoption of two, and subsequently three, 4-inch guns in the armament, instead of one.

Submarines and aerial craft are dealt with in a separate chapter.

* * * * *

At and about the year 1912, the “super-Dreadnought” may be said to have reached its apotheosis.

For what it is worth, however, it may here be put on record that junior opinion in the Navy was then becoming opposed not only to “super-Dreadnoughts” but to Dreadnoughts in any shape or form. Hardly any naval officer under the rank of Commander, and an ever-increasing percentage over that rank, was to be found who was not more or less convinced that the days of the Dreadnoughts and “super-Dreadnoughts” might be nearly numbered, and that we were possibly on the verge of some as yet indeterminate revolution in naval construction as great as any that the “fifties” saw.

As yet no very clear argument can be produced. Only vaguely it is put forward that with torpedo range what it is, the big ship’s chance against torpedo craft is practically relegated to not being found, and “not being found” depends mainly upon the “super-Dreadnought” being screened with very numerous smaller craft.

When Lord Charles Beresford put it on record that a hundred anti-torpedo attack guns would be useless in a battleship, he spoke for all progressive naval ideas. A destroyer may be hit and hit vitally, but it is hard to imagine a hit which will stop her drifting within easy range of her quarry before going down. If hostile destroyers get in, the only real chance of big ships is to sweep their decks with the modern variant of “case shot” and so kill the crews, a difficult proposition at the best owing to the small amount of time available. The proposition is rendered tenfold harder by the certainty that attack, if it comes, will not come from one quarter only, but from several. Consequently to preserve the Dreadnoughts, an ever increasing number of auxiliaries is demanded. Of these no Navy can be said to have a sufficiency. Hence it is argued that a destroyer attack is bound to succeed sooner or later, while even did a sufficiency of small craft exist, the big ship has to be so nursed and protected that her sphere of usefulness is enormously reduced. Submarines also are a deadly danger.

On the other hand it is argued that, given sufficient bulk to the big ship, torpedoes are likely to be relatively harmless to her; it is also asked how can the small craft protect their own big ships and also search out and attack the enemy’s mastodons?

There, till the war proves something definite one way or the other, the matter must be left. The big ship has been doomed so often, and so often adapted itself to changed conditions, that it may well do so again, despite the seemingly heavy odds against it.

_PROTECTED CRUISERS OF THE DREADNOUGHT ERA._

The original conception of the Dreadnought era was “nothing between the most powerful armoured ships and torpedo craft,” though so far as second class cruisers were concerned the last of these had been laid down in 1901.

The persistence with which Germany continued yearly to build small protected cruisers eventually, however, began to cause some perturbation; and in the 1908–09 Estimates five protected cruisers of the _Bristol_ class were provided for. These were the _Bristol_ (Clydebank), _Glasgow_ (Fairfield), _Gloucester_ (Beardmore), _Liverpool_ (Vickers), _Newcastle_ (Elswick). The designed displacement was 4,820 tons, length 453 feet over all, beam 47 feet, and mean draught 15¼ feet. Armament two 6-inch, ten 4-inch, and two submerged tubes. A speed of 25 knots was expected from 22,000 horse-power. On trials all exceeded 26 knots. All were fitted with Yarrow boilers, also turbines of the Parsons type, except in the _Bristol_, in which Curtiss type turbines were installed.

For 1909–10 four more similar ships were provided--the _Weymouth_ class. Displacement rose to 5,250 tons, and a uniform armament of eight 6-inch was substituted for the mixed armament of the _Bristol_ class. These four “Town” cruisers were the _Weymouth_ (Elswick), _Yarmouth_ (London and Glasgow Co.), _Dartmouth_ (Vickers), and _Falmouth_ (Beardmore). All were given Yarrow boilers and Parsons turbines except the _Weymouth_, which was supplied with Curtiss turbines.

The Estimates of 1910–11 contained three cruisers, the _Chatham_, _Dublin_, and _Southampton_, of the same type, but with a displacement increased by 200 tons. Three more, the _Birmingham_, _Nottingham_, and _Lowestoft_, figured in the Estimates of 1911–12.

In 1907 the practice was instituted of building a Scout or two a year, those constructed to date being the _Boadicea_, _Bellona_, _Blanche_, _Blonde_, _Active_, _Amphion_, and _Fearless_, all of which are unarmoured, and so more or less compelled to fight modern destroyers on equal terms. Of these the _Amphion_ was lost early in the war by a mine.

Of the original type were three Australian cruisers, _Sydney_, _Melbourne_ and _Brisbane_, of which two were built in this country and the third built, or put together, in Australia. In all these ships the slight increase in displacement was due to the introduction of a thin armour belt amidships--a “reply” to a similar innovation in the German Navy.

The 1912–13 Estimates saw no more of the “Town” class cruisers being provided for, but, as already stated, they heralded the appearance of eight vessels of a new type, officially described as “lightly armoured cruisers.”

They were at one and the same time an entirely new type, and also a reversion to the original _Bristol_ with modifications born of experience.

In essence, these ships of the _Arethusa_ class--_Arethusa_, _Aurora_, _Galatea_, _Inconstant_, _Royalist_, _Penelope_, _Phaeton_ and _Undaunted_, compared with the prototype as follows:--

====================+========================+====================== | _Arethusa._ | _Bristol._ --------------------+------------------------+---------------------- Displacement (tons) | 3520 | 4800 Armament | 2--6in. | 2--6in. | 6--4in. | 10--4in. | 4 above water t. tubes | 2 submerged t. tubes Side protection | 2½″ | _nil._ H.P. | 30,000 | 22,000 Speed (est.) kts. | 30 | 25 ====================+========================+======================

Fuel supply has never been given out officially, but it may be stated that, roughly, by making use of oil fuel in the _Arethusa_, a radius equal to that of the _Bristols_ was secured with a considerable saving in weight.

Incidentally, this is one of the most interesting examples of how the progress of invention makes possible to-day the impossibility of yesterday. When the _Bristols_ were designed they were the “best possible” of 1908. Four years later oil fuel had opened out an entirely novel vista.

In the 1913–14 Estimates another eight of similar cruisers were provided for, with, however, 250 tons odd added to the displacement and an extra 6-inch gun forward allowed for; though this, however, was altered afterwards, as this batch of cruisers, the _Calliope_, _Caroline_, _Carysfort_, _Champion_, _Cleopatra_, _Comus_, _Conquest_, _Cordelia_, do not carry any 6-inch guns forward like the _Arethusa_, but mount a couple, one abaft the other aft--a wise arrangement, as a heavy weight forward does not make for sea-worthiness.

The _Arethusas_ and the “C” class, therefore, compare as follows:--

which indicates a couple of 4-inch guns gained for the extra 250 tons.

In the 1914–15 Estimates four similar vessels were provided for, but no details whatever have been published concerning them.

_DESTROYERS IN THE DREADNOUGHT ERA._

The Dreadnought era, while simplifying types of big ships, was the early institution of two distinct types of destroyers, plus an experimental vessel which was not duplicated. The original staple idea of Dreadnought era destroyers was to build very fast ocean-going destroyers for fleet work, and smaller craft, “coastals,” for local duties. A considerable flourish of trumpets accompanied the announcement of this decision, which, however, was in no way really novel. It merely reproduced in destroyers the long exploded idea of sea-going and coast-defence ironclads.

Of these boats the first instalment amounted to a total of eighteen; the most important being the experimental boat _Swift_, which was given a displacement of 1,825 tons, and so might just as well have been designated a fast small cruiser. The horse-power provided was no less than 30,000, the speed 36 knots, though on trials she once reached nearly 39 knots. Armament four 4-inch, two 18-inch tubes. Cost about £280,500.

It is interesting to note that in 1885 a precisely similar idea found vent in a _Swift_ (afterwards renamed t.b. 81) of 125 tons against the 40 to 65 tons that was then normal for torpedo boats. It was nine years before anything else of the same size was built.

The first standard destroyers of the era were the “Oceans” (often known as “Tribals”). These averaged 880 tons, 33 knot speed with oil fuel only. Between 1906 and 1910 altogether a dozen were built. The armament given to the five first was five 12-pounder, and two 18-inch tubes; in later boats two 4-inch, 25-pounder were substituted for the five 12-pounders.

The “coastal destroyers,” which have since lost that name, and are now known as first-class torpedo-boats, were built in groups of twelve for three years; the first batch averaging 225 tons, and later boats about 260 tons. In all the armament is two 12-pounder and three 18-inch torpedo tubes; speed 26 knots. Parsons turbines in all, and oil fuel instead of coal.

In 1908–09 there came a revulsion of official feeling against both types, and an attempt to evolve a species of intermediate was made. It was held that the Oceans were exceedingly costly; also somewhat fragile. The new boats, the _Beagle_ class, averaged 900 tons instead of the thousand tons that the latest Oceans were getting to. Armament was reduced to one 4-inch, 25-pounder, and three 12-pounders, with the usual two 18-inch torpedo tubes. Speed was cut down to 27 knots. Oil fuel was done away with, and coal reverted to.

The 1909–10 programme provided for 20 destroyers of the _Acorn_ class. These are slightly smaller than the _Beagles_, armed with two 4-inch and two 12-pounders, but with oil again instead of coal only.

On account of considerable agitation in Parliament as to the small number of modern British destroyers, the construction of all this class was accelerated by a few months, and with a single exception they were completed in June, 1911.

Up till this time considerable latitude had been given to contractors for destroyers. In the 1910–11 programme the _Acheron_ class, an Admiralty design, was given out for fourteen of the boats, which, except that they had two funnels instead of three, closely corresponded with the destroyers of the preceding year. In the other six boats the firms of Thornycroft, Yarrow, and Parsons were given some considerable freedom of design with two boats each, and an increased speed was obtained with all.

For 1911–12 boats a similar principle was followed, and there was also still further acceleration. These latest boats are somewhat faster than heretofore, and an interesting innovation in the case of one of them--the Thornycroft type--is the appearance of the Diesel engine for partial propulsion instead of steam. As a matter of fact, this idea did not eventually materialise, owing to various circumstances of the side issue nature. More or less contemporaneously with this the Yarrow firm in the _Archer_ and _Attack_, their special destroyers, evolved a system of super-heated steam, which led to a very considerable increase in speed, as compared with older methods. A conflict between steam and “gas engines” for destroyers was, therefore, in 1912, a probable feature of the early future, a conflict still in the “to-morrow” stage; but it may be unwise to place too much reliance on the fact that a similar conflict with motor cars ended in the practical extinction of steam, for all that the probabilities point in that direction. The superior convenience of the Diesel engine whether for destroyers or larger ships is obvious, but there are undoubtedly still certain practical difficulties which cannot be ignored.

In 1912 the destroyer may be said to have reached its apotheosis. Later boats are considerably larger, more powerfully armed, and occasionally a trifle faster, but, taken all in all, they do not indicate any definite advance on the “general idea” of a destroyer.

Novelty, such as it exists, is confined to the introduction of flotilla leaders. The idea is not new, since the Germans hit on it for torpedo boats long before destroyers as we understand them were evolved. There is also the still older idea of our original _Swift_.

The integral notion is in each case the same. The idea is to provide the commander of the flotilla with a boat swifter and more powerful than those of his normal command, and thus to enable him to reinforce as requisite any particular portion of his squadron. Thus viewed, the idea is, of course, as old as naval warfare itself, or, for that matter, any warfare whatever; and it is strange that the principle of the superior power of the chief should ever have been allowed to lapse.

It is, however, curious to note that at the outbreak of the present war the British was the only Navy in which the idea was in actual practice. Not till the war is over shall we learn whether the seeming advantage is or is not of real value. All the indications, however, are that it should be an immense asset if properly handled.

_GUNS OF THE WATTS ERA._

The principal guns of the Watts era are as follows:--

=======+========+========+==========+========================= Calibre| Length | Weight |Weight of | Maximum penetration in. | in | tons. |projectile| A.P. capped against K.C. | cals. | | lbs. +------------+------------ | | | |at 5000 yds.| 3000 yds. -------+--------+--------+----------+------------+------------ | | | | in. | in. 13.5 | 45 | 80 | 1250 | 22 | 26 12 | 50 | 58 | 850 | 19 | 24 12 | 45 | 50 | 850 | 17½ | 22 9.2 | 50 | 30 | 380 | 10 | 13 9.2 | 45 | 27 | 380 | 8¾ | 11¼ =======+========+========+==========+============+============

It may be noted that the 12-inch, 45 cal. (as mounted in the original _Dreadnought_) is quite capable of penetrating anything in existence at most ranges, and the 12-inch, 50 cal. anything likely to exist. The main advantage of the 13.5 is the superior weight of the projectile and the better capacity of its shell.

Modern progress in gunnery is remarkably demonstrated by a comparison between the 13.5 of the Barnaby era and the same calibre of the Watts era.

========+========+========+==========+======================+================ Calibre | Length | Weight |Projectile| Maximum penetration | Corresponding in. | in | tons. | lbs. | A.P. capped against | value in K.C. | cals. | | | K.C. at | of belt of ship | | | +-----------+----------+ carrying | | | | 5000 yds. | 3000 yds.| --------+--------+--------+----------+-----------+----------+---------------- 13.5 | 30 | 80 | 1250 | 9 | 12 | 9 13.5 | 45 | 67 | 1250 | 22 | 26 | 12 ========+========+========+==========+===========+==========+================

From which it will be seen that armour has in no way kept pace with the gun, except in so far as that in the conditions which obtained with the old 13.5 a range of 3,000 yards was considered an outside limit, 12,000 yards is now held in the same or even less estimation.

Along such lines progress has been practically nullified during the last twenty years. But the limit of vision has now been reached, and increased gun-power cannot, practically speaking, any longer be met by range. Whence the argument of many that, failing the production of some armour altogether superior to anything now existing, the armoured ship is closely approaching the status of the armoured soldier of the Middle Ages. A precisely similar remark, however, was first made in 1887,[37] and proved an incorrect prophecy. To-day, therefore, those best able to judge are extremely careful about prophecying.

Meanwhile, the outbreak of war synchronised with the fact that both the British and German Navies had under construction ships carrying 15-inch guns; thus indicating a trend of opinion towards ships capable of delivering heavier and heavier projectiles.

_TORPEDO PROGRESS._

The principal feature of the last few years has been the steadily increasing efficiency of torpedoes, mainly by the adoption of improved engines. For many years 2,000 yards had been the maximum torpedo range. About 1904 an 18-inch Whitehead with 4,000 yards range and a maximum speed of 33 knots came into service. This was presently improved upon by torpedoes of 7,000 yards range. The exact range of the latest type Hardcastle torpedo--so called after its inventor, Engineer Commander Hardcastle--is a matter of uncertainty, but it is supposed to be capable of about 7,000 yards at 45 knots, and up to 11,000 at 30 knots. As a torpedo would take about 5½ minutes to travel this distance, it is obviously unlikely to be able to anticipate the position of a single enemy sufficiently to ensure hitting her, except by pure chance. On the other hand, if a fleet be fired at, hits with a torpedo are almost as likely as hits from a gun, and it seems impossible that the old idea of ships fighting in line can possibly survive, and Admiral Bacon’s theory that for the squadron of the past there will have to be substituted the isolated monster ship of the future seems the only reasonable one, despite all the protests against “mastodons.”

With the improvement of torpedoes, especial attention has been devoted to under-water protection against them. One form of this, the solid bulkheads of the original _Dreadnought_, was, after a time, partially abandoned owing to its extreme inconvenience. Another form of protection adopted in all Dreadnoughts is a certain amount of internal armour, an idea first evolved in France for the battleship _Henri IV_, which was laid down in July, 1897. Experiments with a view to testing the efficiency of this device were not very promising. An improvement on the system was effected by M. Lagane, of La Seyne, in the Russian _Tsarevitch_ in 1899. This ship was actually torpedoed in the Russo-Japanese War, but unfortunately she was not hit on the specially-protected portion, so no experience was gained of the war utility of the system. While at the outbreak of war it was believed by some that the modern system is proof against half a dozen torpedoes, others were extremely sceptical as to whether any real immunity is afforded. The most that could ever be prophesied was that the next naval war would see the torpedo accomplish either a great deal more or a great deal less than is generally assumed. A paradoxical position; but so things are! No one can predict with any more certainty, even now that war is on us. We do not know what may happen. Some of us adhere to the idea that the torpedo is going to be omnipotent: that the gun is going to be relegated to the second place. The future is likely enough to discount the destroyer idea. But, from the submarine the torpedo is likely to do many unexpected things. If the Germans realise the torpedo, startling things are toward.[38]

The period just preceding the war saw a curious state of affairs in connection with net defence against torpedoes. Practically ever since nets were invented the use of them had been confined to the British, Russian and Japanese Navies--most other navies making no use of net defence. Curiously enough the adoption of nets by Germany and Austria coincided with their abandonment in the British Navy--the British theory being that net cutters had become so efficient that any kind of net would immediately be cut through. Incidentally it may be observed that with nets down a ship can only proceed at a very slow speed.

_NAVAL ESTIMATES OF THE WATTS ERA._