CHAPTER IX

MR. S. M. EDWARDES, C.S.I., C.V.O.

1909-1916

Mr. S. M. Edwardes, who succeeded Mr. Gell as head of the Bombay City Police Force, was the first member of the Indian Civil Service to hold that appointment. He had previously held various appointments in Bombay ranging from Assistant to the Collector and Chief Inspector of Factories to acting Municipal Commissioner, and had acquired considerable knowledge of the population and past history of Bombay by his work as Census Officer in 1901 and later as Compiler of the Gazetteer. Shortly after the Tilak riots in 1908, he was nominated a member of the Morison Committee which, as previously stated, was appointed by the Bombay Government to consider the working of the urban police administration and make proposals for its future organization.

This Committee, which met in the Secretariat, directed particular attention to the provision of properly equipped police stations, to the reconstitution and enlargement of the detective branch, hereafter to be known as the C. I. D., to the creation of a trained Indian staff for the investigation of crime in the Divisions, and to the numbers and personnel of the European and Indian branches of the force. The Committee came to the conclusion from the facts and evidence before them that in dealing with political crime and seditious movements, planned, promoted and carried out by an Indian _intelligentsia_, the police were handicapped by the absence of educated Indians in the subordinate ranks of the force, and that the investigation of ordinary crime by the divisional police suffered from being in the hands of an old-fashioned agency, which conducted its inquiries in a multiplicity of small and sometimes obscure _chaukis_ and kept no proper record of its cases. Concentration of the staff in a definite number of properly-equipped stations in each division, and the inclusion in the force of a new cadre of Indian officers for the divisional investigation of crime were two obvious desiderata, upon which the Committee laid particular stress. They decided also that the time had arrived to place the C. I. D. under the immediate control of a gazetted officer of the Imperial Police, who would occupy the position of a Deputy Commissioner, leaving the existing Deputy Commissioner to deal with the divisional police and with the large amount of miscellaneous work requiring the attention of the headquarters staff. Proposals, of a more or less tentative character, were also made regarding the numbers, grading and duties of the European police, the recruitment of Indian constables, and the numbers and work of the Harbour, Docks and Mounted Police.

After drafting the report of the Committee and arranging for its submission to Government in October, 1908, Mr. Edwardes took leave to England. While there, he received an intimation from the Bombay Government of their intention to appoint him Commissioner of Police _vice_ Mr. Gell, who proposed to take leave in 1909. He was at the same time instructed to visit Scotland Yard and study at first hand the organization of the Metropolitan Police. Armed with a letter from the Home Office to the Chief Commissioner, Sir Edward Henry, Mr. Edwardes accordingly spent some time in the early part of 1909 in acquainting himself with the distribution of work and the machinery for the prevention and detection of crime in a typical London police division, with the details of the Metropolitan beat-system, with the work of the constables’ training-school in Westminster, with the organization of the Finger Print Bureau, and with the staffing, equipment, structural features and general management of one of the latest and most up-to-date London police-stations. The knowledge thus acquired was of the greatest value, when his own proposals for the reorganization of the Bombay City Police were under preparation.

Mr. Edwardes assumed charge of the Commissioner’s office on May 7th, 1909, with Mr. R. M. Phillips as his Deputy Commissioner and Superintendent Sloane as head of the Criminal Investigation Department. The former was succeeded in July by Mr. Hayter, who made way in September for Mr. Gadney. The latter served as Deputy Commissioner until November, 1913, when his place was taken by Mr. O. Allen Harker, who held the appointment until after the expiry of Mr. Edwardes’ term of office. In pursuance of the recommendations of the Morison Committee, an additional appointment of Deputy Commissioner in charge of the C. I. D. was sanctioned by G. R. J. D. 3253 of June 8th, 1909; and, Superintendent Sloane having been promoted to the cadre of the Imperial Police and transferred to a district, the new post was given to Mr. F. A. M. H. Vincent, son of the former Commissioner of Police, who held it until the beginning of 1913, when he was appointed Deputy Director of Criminal Intelligence at Simla. He was succeeded in Bombay by Mr. F. C. Griffith, who remained in charge of the C. I. D. during the remainder of Mr. Edwardes’ term of office. Both Mr. Vincent and Mr. Griffith subsequently succeeded in turn to the Commissioner’s appointment. In 1914 a third appointment of Deputy Commissioner was sanctioned by G. R. J. D. 9249 of December 19th, 1914, under the style and title of Deputy Commissioner of Police for the Port of Bombay. Mr. G. S. Wilson was chosen for this post and became responsible, under the general authority of the Commissioner, for all work connected with the Harbour and Dock Police and the Pilgrim Traffic. This period thus witnessed the permanent appointment of three Deputy Commissioners in place of a single officer of that rank, and the consequent delegation to them by the Commissioner of much of the work which he had hitherto been expected to perform without adequate assistance.

Mr. Edwardes’ appointment was not received favourably at first by the members of the Imperial Police Service, who naturally felt some resentment at such a post being given to one who was not a professional police-officer. This feeling led to the submission of memorials on the subject to the Bombay Government, who were able without difficulty to justify their departure from the usual practice. The discontent also communicated itself to the rank and file of the City police, who during the first few months of Mr. Edwardes’ _régime_ displayed a spirit of captious criticism, which was fanned at last by a few malcontents into overt disobedience. The movement culminated on January 7th, 1910, in the refusal of a certain number of Indian constables to receive their pay. The Commissioner, who had kept himself informed of the course of the movement, had arranged with the European officers of the Divisions what action should be taken in the event of open insubordination. The men who declined to accept their pay were therefore marched immediately to the Head Police Office and, after inquiry into their conduct, were dismissed from the force. This action completely quashed the movement, which was based upon no real grievance and was designed merely to cause trouble to a Commissioner, whose policy and plans they had been taught to regard with suspicion.

The strength and cost of the City Police Force underwent much alteration during this period of seven years, in consequence of the reorganization scheme prepared by the Commissioner. His proposals for the future constitution and character of the force, which were submitted in July, 1910, were sanctioned by the Government of India in September, 1911; but owing to very heavy work connected with the visit of Their Majesties the King and Queen in November of that year, the scheme was not actually introduced until the beginning of 1912. As early as 1909, however, certain changes were made in consonance with the proposals of the Morison Committee, and to meet emergent requirements, which resulted in an increase of the total number to 2,408. This total included additions to the Dockyard police, temporary sanitary police for service under the Port Health Officer, temporary constables for traffic-duty at various railway level crossings, and finally the revised strength of the C. I. D., which was fixed by G. R. J. D. 2708 of May 10th, 1909, at 1 Superintendent, 6 Inspectors, 7 Sub-Inspectors, 23 Head Constables and 41 Constables. In 1910 an additional Inspector was sanctioned for the Motor Vehicles department; and 9 Indian sub-inspectors, 3 head constables and 9 constables were added to the force, to enable the Commissioner to introduce tentatively in three areas the new divisional organization which formed the salient feature of his administrative proposals. Thus by 1911 the force numbered 2,505, which was equivalent to a proportion of one policeman to every 394 of population, and cost annually, inclusive of temporary police and contingent charges, Rs. 10,93,351. In 1913, when the reorganization was well in hand, the total strength of the force stood at 2,844 and cost Rs. 12,73,834; while at the end of 1915, a few months before Mr. Edwardes relinquished office, the total number, inclusive of a small temporary staff for watching transfrontier Pathans in the City, was 3,011, and the annual cost amounted to Rs. 13,37,208. The proportion of police to population at this date was 1 to 327, which compared unfavourably with the proportions in Calcutta and London. Had the Commissioner’s first proposals been sanctioned without alteration, the proportion of police to population in Bombay would have been far more favourable; for he had worked out a complete beat-system on the London model for the whole of the City. The number of men, however, required for this purpose was naturally large, and as the Bombay Government were compelled by the Government of India to restrict the additional annual cost of the force to 2½ lakhs of rupees, the Commissioner was obliged to jettison the beat-system and utilize the available funds in other directions, such as perfecting the divisional machinery for the investigation of crime, increasing the number of fixed traffic posts, and augmenting the inadequate pay of the European police.

This force of just over 3,000 men was distributed among the following divisions at the close of 1916:—

---------+---------------------------------------------------------- Division | Sub-divisions or Sections ---------+---------------------------------------------------------- A | Colaba, Fort South, Fort North, Esplanade B | Mandvi, Chakla, Umarkhadi, Dongri C | Market and Dhobi Talao, Bhuleshwar and Khara Talao D | Khetwadi, Girgaum, Chaupati, Walkeshwar E | Mazagon, Tarwadi, Kamathipura, New Nagpada, Mahalakshmi, | Jacob’s Circle F | Parel, Dadar, Matunga, Sion G | Mahim, Worli H and I | Harbour and Docks L | Head Quarters Armed and Unarmed Police M | Mounted Police N | The Government Dockyard and The Criminal Investigation Department (formerly the K division).

With the appointment of Mr. F. A. M. H. Vincent as Deputy Commissioner, C. I. D., and the increase in its personnel, the Criminal Investigation Department entered upon a period of remarkable activity. The staff was divided into four branches—Political, Foreign, Crime, and Miscellaneous—each in control of one or more Inspectors; work-books were introduced, which fixed responsibility upon individual officers for cases entrusted to them for inquiry and served as a check upon delay in the submission of final reports of investigations; a confidential strong-room was provided, and the card index system and upright filing of records were substituted for the old methods in vogue at this date in most official departments. In addition to the investigation of cases, some of the more remarkable of which will be mentioned hereafter, the department made confidential inquiries, often of a delicate character, into political, religious and social movements; it scrutinized plays for performance licenses, amending or rejecting those that were objectionable; it took vigorous action under the Press Act, confiscating on occasions as many as twenty-one thousand copies of proscribed books; it maintained a constant watch upon the arrivals and departures of steamers, assisted the Excise authorities, collaborated with the police of other districts and provinces, supervised and, if necessary, prohibited the songs sung by the _melas_ at the annual Ganpati celebration, and performed an immense amount of confidential work in connexion with the Muharram. It also assisted or secured the repatriation of all manner of destitute persons stranded in Bombay, including English theatrical artistes, Arabs belonging to French territories, ladies from Mauritius, Bengali seamen, Pathan labourers expelled from Ceylon, and deportees from the Transvaal.

The establishment at the beginning of 1911 of a “Police Gazette”, appearing thrice in the twenty-four hours and containing full details of all reported crimes, persons wanted, property stolen or lost, etc., was a further step in the direction of increased efficiency. Prior to this date, when a case of theft occurred, the first duty of the Inspector, in whose jurisdiction it took place, was to prepare with his own hand thirty or forty notices for dispatch to other police-stations in the City. Much valuable time was thus wasted; and when the notices were ready, several constables had to be released from their proper duties to act as messengers. Under the system introduced in 1911 the duty of the sectional officer consisted simply in telephoning full details to the Deputy Commissioner C. I. D., who arranged for their insertion in the next issue of the “Gazette”, copies of which were delivered at every police station within a few hours of the occurrence. The arrangements were adapted from the system followed in London and effected a great saving of time and trouble in the divisions. In 1915 the Police Notice Office, composed of a European Inspector and an Indian head constable, circulated in this way nearly 10,000 paragraphs and 67 supplements dealing with murders, thefts, deserters and persons wanted, and also published and circulated to the divisions forty pages of special orders concerned with daily routine.

Another salient feature of the reorganization, as mentioned above, was the creation of a special agency for the divisional investigation of crime. This was dependent upon the provision of properly-equipped police stations of a definite type, recommended by Mr. Edwardes, comprising the necessary offices, charge-room, cells, quarters for the European and Indian staff, and barracks for the constabulary. The scheme, as sanctioned, contemplated the provision of 17 stations of this character. At the date when Mr. Edwardes was appointed Commissioner, none of the existing police-stations fulfilled these requirements, and in some divisions paucity of accommodation directly hampered the daily work of the police. In 1911, for example, the station of the Khetwadi section of the D division was described as practically non-existent. The lease of a building having expired, and no alternative accommodation being available, the Inspector was holding his office in the dressing-room of an Indian theatre in Grant road, the station-stores and constables’ kit-boxes were temporarily placed in a tea-shop in Falkland road, and the two European officers of the section were forced to reside in very poor quarters in an adjoining section. Most of the older stations were very inconvenient and insanitary. The only office consisted of one of the sectional Inspector’s dwelling-rooms or of a portion of a verandah screened off; prisoners and witnesses were herded together on the stairs or in the street; the residence was surrounded by old-fashioned and odoriferous latrines; and every odd corner was choked with kit-boxes and with the recumbent forms of constables taking a rest before going on duty.

By the end of 1910, however, a complete programme for new stations had been prepared, and sanctioned by Government, and a commencement had been made in Colaba, Nagpada and Agripada, where the newer police-stations erected by the Improvement Trust were subjected to structural alterations and additions, in order to make them conform with the plan adapted from the London model. Each of these stations was equipped with a staff composed of one Inspector, one Deputy Inspector, three Indian Sub-Inspectors for criminal investigation, plain-clothes constables and a clerical staff; the first information sheet, case-diary and other records used by the District Police were so adapted to urban requirements as to secure a complete record of every case taken up by the police; and the time-table of duties was arranged so that at any moment during the twenty-four hours an English-knowing officer, with power to record complaints and commence inquiries, would be found in the general charge-room of the station. At the outset most of the Indian Sub-Inspectors were chosen from among the few English-knowing Jemadars and Havildars, already in the force; but from 1910 onwards a regular supply of such officers was secured by choosing young Indians of good middle-class standing and deputing them to the Provincial Police Training School at Nasik for an eighteen months’ course of tuition in law and police-work.

At the beginning of 1913 the Commissioner opened two more stations on the new model at Princess Street—a building erected by the Improvement Trust in 1910, and at Maharbaudi: and two more in 1914 in the new buildings of the Harbour and Dock police at Mody Bay and Frere road respectively, which were completed and occupied in January. At the beginning of January, 1916, three more stations were established under the reorganization scheme at Khetwadi, Hughes road, and the Esplanade, while at the close of the same year similar stations were organized in the new buildings erected at Gamdevi, Lamington road and Palton road. Thus, by the end of 1916 thirteen out of the seventeen model police-stations, originally proposed by the Commissioner, had been opened with a full complement of officers and men, while plans had been approved for similar accommodation in Mahim, Parel and other places in the northern portion of the Island of Bombay. Where it was found impossible to build full residential accommodation for both officers and men on the site allotted for these new stations, ancillary accommodation schemes were prepared, which, when completed, would ensure the proper housing of the majority of the force as it existed at the date of Mr. Edwardes’ departure.

A sustained effort was made during these years to teach English to the Indian constabulary, with the object of giving the men themselves a better chance of promotion and enabling them to hold their own more confidently with the large English-speaking population. In 1910 the number of officers, exclusive of Europeans, able to read and write was 127, of whom only 36 were literate in English, while literate constables, of whom only one or two knew English, numbered 584. In July 1911 the Commissioner commenced sending a chosen number of Muhammadan and Hindu constables to two free night-schools for instruction in English and one vernacular language. The success attending this experiment led the Bombay Government to sanction a proposal to open an English school for constables at the Head Police Office, under a qualified teacher from one of the official training-schools maintained by the Educational Department. This school was attended by 150 constables from the various branches of the force, who were given a three years’ course of tuition in English, and on Saturdays attended lectures on their duty to the public, their powers under the Police Act, and matters of simple hygiene. In 1913 the number of men attending the school had risen to 200, and the master had been forced to obtain gratuitous assistance in teaching the various classes. The question of accommodation also became urgent, and during 1915 and 1916 the classes had to be assembled in the Elphinstone Middle School, which the educational authorities allowed the police to use during the early morning and evening hours. The men, who were encouraged to study by the grant of small rewards and occasionally of promotion, if they were successful in the periodical examinations, derived distinct advantage from the school-course, and the number of constables literate in the English language showed a steady increase between 1911 and 1916. In the latter year 846 constables were reported to be able to read and write, and 72 of them were literate in English. Connected with the subject of education was the foundation of a fund in the name of the Commissioner—the S. M. E. Memorial Fund—subscribed by Hindu and Muhammadan residents, with the object of assisting Indian constables of the force to educate their sons. The proposal was made in the first instance by Mr. Kazi Kabiruddin, a barrister and Justice of the Peace, and at his instance sufficient funds were subsequently provided to admit of the grant of monthly scholarships and stipends to the sons of constables attending primary schools maintained by the Municipal Corporation.

A large amount of routine work devolved upon the police under the Arms, Explosives, Petroleum and Poisons Acts. Under the Arms Act licenses of various kinds were granted or cancelled, the shops and store-rooms of licensed dealers were regularly inspected and their stocks checked, and constant inquiries, numbering several thousand annually, were made to verify purchases from local dealers and trace the whereabouts of fire-arms. In 1911, just before the arrival of Their Majesties the King and Queen, five revolvers were stolen from a licensed dealer’s shop. The C. I. D. were successful in recovering the arms and in obtaining the conviction of the thieves: but in consideration of the approach of the Royal Visit, the Commissioner decided to take charge of the entire stock of arms and ammunition held by five Indian dealers, and kept it in deposit in the Head Police Office until after the departure of Their Majesties. Under the Explosives Act licenses were issued for manufacture, possession and sale; and magazines for the storage of explosives were regularly inspected by the special branch maintained for this purpose at headquarters. Similar duties were carried out under the Petroleum Act; while from April 1st, 1909, the Police became responsible for licensing the sale of poisons and checking stocks,—duties which up to that date had been performed by the Municipality. The task of licensing theatres and granting performance licenses, which was transferred to the Arms department at the close of 1909, imposed a heavy additional burden on the special staff. Most of the theatres at this date were devoid of proper exits and of means of protection against fire, and these seven years witnessed a continuous struggle to secure the erection of fire-proof staircases etc. and the provision of fire-proof drop-curtains. Fortunately the Police were able to obtain the help of the Chief of the Fire-brigade and of the Government engineering and electrical experts, in deciding what improvements were essential in each case, and it was chiefly due to this collaboration that a better fire-service had been installed by 1913 in each of the thirteen theatres of the City, and that many important structural alterations in both theatres and cinematographs had been introduced by the close of 1916. Perhaps the most notable achievement of the headquarters staff under Chief Inspector M. J. Giles was the preparation of a set of theatre rules, applicable to all structures used for public performances, which were brought into force in August 1914, and gave the police power to insist upon the provision of fire-appliances, water supply, exits, and fire-proof materials. As mentioned in a previous paragraph, the C. I. D. was made responsible for the scrutiny of plays, for which a performance license was required, and licenses were granted only to such plays as were declared by that department to be unobjectionable on political, moral or general grounds.

The growth in the number of motor-vehicles continued unchecked and ultimately necessitated the promulgation of new rules under the Motor Vehicles Act in 1915. In 1909, the total number of motor-vehicles registered since 1905 was 1,295, while in 1915 this figure had increased to 4,947. But a good many of these gradually disappeared in the course of ten years, and the actual number estimated to be on the roads in 1915 was 2,482 as compared with only 814 in 1909. Heavy motor-vehicles of the lorry type also appeared during this period and numbered 70 in 1915. This increase of motor-traffic synchronized with, and was partly responsible for, a steady increase in the number of street accidents. While reckless driving was unquestionably the cause of many accidents, despite energetic action in several directions to prevent it, the large majority of the casualties reported from year to year were the outcome of that carelessness and lack of alertness on the part of the average Indian pedestrian, with which all who have driven cars or carriages in Bombay are only too well acquainted. Accustomed as they are to the peace of a sequestered country life, many of the foot-passengers in the streets of the city seem totally unable to exercise any caution or to acquire the habit of keeping to the side of the road, while in the case of the mill-workers, whom one meets in Parel and elsewhere, the sense of hearing seems to have been permanently dulled by the constant rattle and clatter of the machinery at which they labour during the greater part of the day.

The Haj traffic continued to expand between 1909 and 1911, the total number of pilgrims who left Bombay for Jeddah in those years being 19,748 and 21,965 respectively. From 1912 the numbers commenced to decline until the year after the outbreak of the War, when the traffic virtually ceased altogether. The period witnessed a struggle on the part of a British shipping-firm to secure the monopoly of the Red Sea trade, including the pilgrim traffic, by ousting the few Muhammadan-owned vessels which had hitherto catered for the pilgrims. The firm in question was unquestionably in a position to offer better vessels and a better organization for the return journey than the Indian ship-owners: but one or two of the latter resented the effort to drive them out of the traffic, with the result that the Commissioner of Police and the Pilgrim department, who endeavoured to act in a strictly neutral manner, ran the risk of blame from both parties for showing undue preference to their rivals. At the moment of the Declaration of War all the vessels engaged in the traffic were owned by the British firm, except one or at most two which belonged to a well-known Muhammadan resident. It might have been supposed that, considering the wholly Islamic character of the pilgrimage, a British firm would have acquiesced in the continued presence of a Muhammadan-owned vessel, and have trusted to time and the ordinary economic law for its ultimate disappearance from the Jeddah route. Such, however, was not the case; and at the instance of the local manager of the firm, a pushing Scot from Aberdeen, the Bombay Government was asked practically to insist upon the Commissioner and the Pilgrim department refusing all facilities to the Muhammadan ship-owner to sell his tickets and dispatch his vessel. The outbreak of War in 1914, and the consequent cessation of the traffic to and from Jeddah, solved a dispute which for some time imposed additional work upon the Police and Pilgrim authorities.

The Finger Print Bureau steadily maintained its efficiency and had compiled a record of more than 45,000 slips by the end of 1915. At the request of the municipal authorities, it commenced about 1912 to take the finger-impressions of hundreds of candidates for employment as sweepers in the Health department, and was able to prove annually from its records that a certain proportion of these people had previous convictions under the Penal Code. In another direction—revolver-practice by the European police—a considerable improvement was effected. Up to 1914 it was customary to arrange for the practice in a field at the back of the China Mill at Sewri, which was sufficiently remote and secluded to obviate danger to the public. But the distance of the site from the centre of the City rendered the regular attendance of all officers practically impossible, and in consequence, on the rare occasions when the European police were called upon to use their revolvers at disturbances, their shooting was inclined to be a trifle erratic. In the Muharram riots of 1908, for example, when Mr. Gell ordered the European officers to fire on the mob in Bhendy Bazar, a Parsi who was watching the rioting from the window of a third upper-storey was unfortunately killed by a revolver-shot, directed at the crowd in the street. To ensure more regular practice by all officers, therefore, the Commissioner obtained the approval of Government to the erection of a safety revolver range in the compound of the Head Police Office, which was opened in September, 1914.

Before dealing with the record of crime, a brief reference is desirable to the extraordinary volume of miscellaneous work performed under the orders of the Commissioner. Derelict children were constantly being picked up in the streets by the divisional police and forwarded to the Head Office, when the Commissioner had to make the best arrangements he could for their maintenance and welfare; penniless women and children were repatriated to various parts of India, to Persia, Mauritius, Egypt, South Africa and Singapore, with funds collected by the Police Office for each individual case from charitable townspeople; penurious women were assisted to get their daughters married, and on one occasion a Muhammadan and his wife, who desired a divorce and applied for police assistance, were granted facilities for the ceremony at police headquarters. On another occasion the Commissioner was asked to assist in the rebuilding of a mosque belonging to the Sidis or African Musalmans of Tandel Street, and was able to obtain the necessary funds from several well-to-do Muhammadans in the city. The Police dealt also with a large number of lunatics; they traced deserters from the Army and Navy; they made inquiries into the condition of second-class hotels and drinking bars in the European quarter and took action, when necessary, in consultation with the Excise authorities; they dealt with a very large number of prostitutes under the Police Act. The number of summonses which they were called upon to serve annually on behalf of magisterial courts in Bombay and other Provinces was enormous, and their work in connexion with the grant of certificates of identity to persons proceeding to Europe, with the grant of passes for processions and for playing music in the streets, and of permits to enter the Ballard Pier on the arrival and departure of the English mail-steamer, was heavy and continuous. Appeals for unofficial assistance from private individuals and from societies like the League of Mercy, engaged in rescue-work among women, were also never refused. Miscellaneous activities of this varied type formed no small portion of the annual task of the force and were rendered effective by the close collaboration of the staff at headquarters, the C. I. D., and the divisional police.

The difficulty of providing suitable shelter and guardianship for the many derelict girls of tender age found wandering in the streets by the police led directly to the foundation by the Commissioner of the Abdulla Haji Daud Bavla Muhammadan Girls’ Orphanage. With the possible exception of one or two Christian missionary institutions, to which it would have been impolitic on political and religious grounds to send children, no organization or society existed in 1909, which was prepared to take charge of homeless girls. Consequently, many little waifs gravitated into the brothels of the city or were gradually absorbed in the floating criminal population. Moreover, when a child was found in the streets, homeless and friendless, the police had no shelter to offer her except the cells at the sectional police-station; and these, being regularly filled with the dregs of the criminal population, were a most undesirable environment for girls of tender years. As caste-prejudices offered peculiar obstacles to any scheme for the benefit of Hindu girls belonging to the Shudra class, the Commissioner determined to concentrate his attention upon a home for Muhammadan girls, and accordingly drew up a scheme and issued an appeal, which was widely circulated among the Muhammadan community. The appeal was favourably received, and about 2 lakhs of rupees were collected within a few weeks. To this sum were added more than 3 lakhs from the estate of the late Abdulla Haji Daud Bavla, whose executors offered the amount on condition that the orphanage should bear his name, that his trustees should be represented on the managing committee of the orphanage, and that the objects, constitution and maintenance etc. of the orphanage should be embodied in a legal deed of trust. At the request of the Commissioner, the Bombay Government agreed to become a party to the deed and bound themselves to appoint the Commissioner of Police, or any other of their officers resident for the time being in Bombay, as chairman of the board of trustees of the orphanage. The legal preliminaries having been completed and the funds duly invested in gilt-edged securities, a suitable building was taken on a lease, and furnished at the expense of a philanthropic Muhammadan merchant, and in December, 1910, the orphanage was formally opened by Sir George Clarke (now Lord Sydenham) and Lady Clarke. The institution soon justified its existence; the number of girl-inmates steadily increased, their physical health and welfare being under the general supervision of a trustworthy Englishwoman, and their religious exercises and elementary lessons being given by a Mullani and her assistants. The problem of the girls’ future was solved in the only feasible way by arranging for their marriage with Muhammadans of their own class, as soon as they reached the age of maturity. These hymeneal arrangements were made by a chosen officer of the C. I. D., Khan Saheb M. F. Taki, in consultation with the _jamats_ and leaders of the various Musalman sections. Experience has proved that the establishment of institutions like this Muhammadan Girls’ Orphanage is an essential preliminary to any serious effort to combat the deplorable traffic in children, which still flourishes in India and constitutes the chief means of recruitment for the brothels of the larger towns and cities.

This period witnessed a steady increase in crime up to 1915, when the stringent measures taken during the pendency of the War to clear the City of undesirables imposed a notable check upon the normal increase in reported crime. Previous to that date the rapid increase in recorded crime was the natural result of the changes which took place in the force after 1909, and particularly of the improvement in registration which followed the introduction of the new divisional police-stations. Not only did these stations offer increased facilities for the reporting and detection of crime, but it was also impossible under the new system for cases to escape registration and final inclusion in the returns. The improvement in the registration of cases was manifested also in a marked diminution of the number of complaints classed as made under a misapprehension of law or fact. By 1916 the sanctioned strength of the police force had been augmented by one-third since 1906, and this fact by itself would have sufficed to account for a large increase in the amount of crime brought to light. When coupled with the reorganization of the various police-stations, each of which was furnished with a strong registering and investigating staff, the increase in recorded crime became inevitable. It was likewise due to more accurate estimates of the value of property stolen that the percentage of recovery declined from 56 in 1908 to about 40 in succeeding years.

Murder and attempts at murder were still deplorably frequent, including cases of infanticide which are extremely difficult to detect in an Oriental city. The number of murder cases varied from 16 in 1909 to 31 in 1910, 25 in 1911, 31 in 1912, and 24 in both 1913 and 1915. The largest number, 35, occurred in 1914. The most notable murder was that of a young and wealthy Bhattia widow, residing in her own house on Malabar Hill. Her husband, Lakhmidas Khimji, who had died some time previously in circumstances which gave rise to ill-founded rumour, had been a well-known figure in Indian commercial circles. His widow Jamnabai, was brutally strangled by a gang of six men from northern India, two of whom belonged to well-known criminal tribes in the United Provinces and a third was a night-watchman in the employ of a Jain resident on Malabar Hill. At first there appeared to be no clue whatever to the crime; but a few days after its occurrence the commissioner received an anonymous letter in Hindi, which was translated for him by the Subehdar of the Armed Police, who happened to be a north-Indian Brahman conversant with that language. The letter, which was written by one of the criminals in revenge for not receiving what he regarded as a fair share of the ornaments stolen from the widow’s house, gave sufficient details to enable the Police to arrest five of the gang the same evening. The sixth accused was subsequently arrested at Bassein. All of them were placed on trial for murder and convicted.

By the year 1909, the vice of cocaine-eating had attained an extraordinary hold upon the lower classes of the population. Women and even children had fallen victims to a habit which plainly exercised a deplorable effect upon their health and morals. The supplies of the drug came in the first instance from Germany in packets bearing the name of Merk, and were frequently smuggled into India in ways that defied detection. Moreover the traffic in the drug, which was international in character, was so cleverly organized that it was practically impossible to trace and prosecute the importers and distributors. Action was therefore confined to prosecuting the smaller fry for the offences of illicit sale and possession, and the majority of such cases occurred in the notorious Nal Bazar area of the C division, which for the last thirty or forty years has sheltered a large population of disreputables. The Police were not held primarily responsible for the control of the cocaine-traffic. This duty devolved upon the Collector of Bombay, who maintained a large and well-paid excise staff for the purpose.[115] But the obligation which rested on the police to assist the excise authorities as far as possible, and the direct stimulus to crime provided by the cocaine-habit, rendered the question of combating the traffic of more than ordinary importance. With this in view, the Commissioner in 1909 put a special police-cordon on the area devoted to the traffic for about six weeks. This produced satisfactory results for the time being, but had to be abandoned, to allow of the men reverting to their regular duties which suffered by their absence. In 1911 a second attempt was made to restrict the evil by placing a European Inspector and a staff of constables on special duty in the C division for a period of about two months, during which nearly 600 individuals were caught and convicted by the courts. These incursions into the area of the retail-traffic were not the only successes achieved by the police. In 1911 the Dock Police arrested an Austrian steward of the S. S. _Africa_ with 300 grains of cocaine concealed in the soles of his boots; in 1912 the Superintendent of the Harbour Police secured the arrest of a fireman from a German merchant-ship with 40 lbs. of the drug, valued at Rs. 45,500, in his possession; another large consignment, valued at Rs. 17,000 was traced by Khan Saheb M. H. Taki and Khan Saheb F. M. Taki of the C. I. D. to a house in Doctor Street in 1913; and on two occasions Indian constables on duty in the Docks arrested on suspicion persons belonging to vessels in the harbour, with large quantities of the drug concealed on their person. It cannot be asserted, however, that these arrests and prosecutions secured any real diminution of the traffic from abroad. They did upset the local market for the drug, and interfered temporarily with the supply of the tiny paper packets sold in the darker corners of the C division. The traffickers were not thereby daunted, for when the real article was difficult to procure, they palmed off powdered magnesia and Epsom salts on their unfortunate victims, who were naturally unable to complain of the deception. The first real check to the traffic was provided by the drastic restrictions on imports and exports imposed after the declaration of War in 1914, and by the sudden cessation of the continental steamship companies’ traffic between Europe and the East. At a comparatively recent date the question of the traffic in cocaine has been discussed at Geneva under the auspices of the League of Nations, and the view seems to be generally accepted that the evil can only be adequately countered by stringent supervision of the primary sources of supply and joint action on the part of all the States concerned.

Of the many important criminal cases successfully investigated by the Police during these seven years, a few deserve special mention. In 1910 and 1911 some very seditious books were brought to the notice of the Bombay Government by certain persons to whom they had been sent anonymously. In the course of their inquiries the Police discovered a large store of these books at Navsari in the Baroda State, and also secured proof that the books were printed at Mehsana in the same territory. A prominent Indian pleader of Kaira, who was concerned in their distribution, was prosecuted and duly convicted. H. H. the Gaekwar of Baroda was in England at the time of the inquiry; but on his return he deported the author of the books, who was one of his own subjects, for a period of five years. In 1912 the police successfully dealt with a swindler named Amratlal, who had victimised a firm of jewellers in Germany to the extent of nearly 2 lakhs of rupees, and they also detected the perpetrator of a series of thefts on board the P. and O. Company’s ships, including a case of tampering with the mails. In the following year the premises of the well-known firm of Messrs Ewart, Latham and Company were destroyed by fire. Immediately after the fire, a stolen cheque filled in for Rs. 10,826 and bearing a forged signature, was presented at a bank for payment and cashed. One of the firm’s employés was eventually arrested and charged with the offences of theft, cheating and forgery, the police investigation establishing also the moral certainty that the accused had set fire to the office in the hope of obliterating all trace of his crime. The accused was committed to the Sessions, where a peculiarly stupid jury, failing to appreciate the evidence, brought in a verdict of “not guilty.” The presiding Judge discharged the accused and passed severe comments on the perversity displayed by the jury. A case, which contained elements of both tragedy and comedy, concerned the marriage of a Koli girl, about 9 years old, to a sexagenarian Bania. Three Hindus, acting on the principle that love is blind, falsely represented that the girl was a Bania, and thereby induced the elderly Lothario to pay Rs. 1,500 for the privilege of wedding the girl. After the marriage the old gentleman discovered the deception practised upon him, and made a formal complaint to the police, who traced the three culprits and secured the conviction of two of them.

In 1914 the embezzlement of Rs. 1,000, representing the fees paid by students at the Government Law School, led to the arrest and conviction of a clerk on the school staff, who was proved in the course of the police-inquiry to have embezzled no less than Rs. 12,000 between the years 1902 and 1912. At the request of the police of the United Provinces, two charges of filing false civil suits, with the object of avoiding payment of sums due by them, were successfully proved against natives of upper India; and these were followed by an equally long and intricate inquiry into a case of cheating, in which three Hindus, one of whom had a local reputation as a palmist and astrologer, persuaded two Bhandaris of Bombay to pay them Rs. 4,000, on condition that they would use their supposed influence with the excise authorities to obtain two liquor-licenses for their dupes. In 1915 the Bohra thief and house-breaker, Tyebali, whose conviction during Mr. Gell’s _régime_ has already been mentioned, completed his term of imprisonment and recommenced his thieving exploits. After committing several thefts from houses in Nepean Sea road he was caught, convicted and sentenced to a fresh term of six years’ imprisonment. All the stolen property was recovered from a Bohra receiver, who worked with Tyebali. In September of the same year information was received from the Director of Criminal Intelligence, Delhi, that three valuable Persian manuscripts had been stolen from the library of Nawab Sir Salar Jung Bahadur at Hyderabad. After a lengthy inquiry the Bombay police traced one of the manuscripts, a _Shahnama_, with illuminated headings and illustrations in colours and gold, which was declared by experts to be an artistic treasure of immense value. A chance remark furnished a clue to the whereabouts of the manuscript, which was in due course returned to its owner in Hyderabad.

Anonymous communications are exceedingly common in India, and as a rule it is practically impossible to trace their authorship. A case of this type, which presented unusual features, was successfully investigated by the police in 1915. For more than two years a series of objectionable and defamatory postcards and letters had been received by high officials, prominent Indians, and clubs. Any event of public interest during that period resulted in a shower of these typed communications, which were always very scurrilous and occasionally flagrantly indecent. They were addressed not only to residents of Bombay, but to officials in other parts of India also, to the Governor, the Viceroy and even to members of the Royal Family in England. The C.I.D. had been able to establish the fact that all the cards and letters were typed on a single machine of a particular and well-known make; and having done that, they proceeded, with the approval of the postal authorities, to subject all the postcards received in the General Post Office to close scrutiny throughout a period of several weeks. At length their patience was rewarded. A card was found, which on careful scrutiny was seen to have been typed on the missing machine, and as it was an ordinary and _bona fide_ business communication it was not difficult to locate the machine. It proved to be the property of a well-known Indian merchant, and further inquiry rendered it certain that he was the author of the anonymous cards. He was therefore arrested and released on bail. While the Police were collecting further evidence to support the charge against him, the accused, who had many influential friends, confessed his guilt to one of them and asked his advice. The friend advised him to make a clean breast of the whole matter to the Commissioner of Police and throw himself on his mercy. This he agreed at the moment, but in the end failed, to do and a few days later, while ostensibly endeavouring to light a gas-stove with a bottle of methylated spirit, he was so severely burned about the body that he died in a few hours. The case caused some commotion in the community, to which the accused belonged, and the Commissioner was urged to refrain at the inquest on the deceased from any allusion to the criminal inquiry into the authorship of the postcards. But this the Commissioner refused to do, in view of the wild rumours about the case which were being spread about the City, some of which placed the police in a false and undesirable position. It was doubtless satisfactory to the friends of the deceased that the Coroner’s jury found themselves able to pronounce a verdict of accidental death. It only remains to add that after the arrest of the accused the plague of anonymous postcards entirely ceased.

The criminal record of these years would be incomplete without a reference to the collapse in 1913 of a number of Indian banks. The most notable of all, the Indian Specie Bank, was never made the subject of a criminal investigation, though the apathy of its Directors was unquestionable, and its manager, who had set out to “corner” silver against the Indian Government with the monies of the bank’s depositors, found it desirable, when the crash came, to die suddenly at Bandora. Orders were issued by the Bombay Government to the Police to investigate the transactions of several lesser banks and bring the guilty to trial; and accordingly a protracted and intricate inquiry was commenced by Inspector Morris of the C. I. D. into the accounts and balance-sheets of the Credit Bank, the Bombay Banking Company and the Cosmopolitan Bank. In the case of the first-named bank, charges of criminal breach of trust and falsification of accounts were proved against the manager, who was sentenced in 1914 to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment, while the manager of the Bombay Banking Company and his nephew were likewise convicted of criminal breach of trust and cheating and sentenced to varying terms of imprisonment with hard labour. In the third case the police proved clearly that the bank was not a bank at all, and had neither funds, business nor influence; but the manager and the “bank’s” broker, who were charged by the police with cheating, were eventually discharged by the trying magistrate. These bank-failures were not confined to Bombay, but took place in other Provinces also, notably in the Punjab. When the collapse commenced, an attempt was made to draw some of the European-managed banks into the vortex, with the object of showing that the failures were due rather to general economic conditions than to bad management. The attempt failed; for the Scotchmen, who form ninety per cent of the European banking community in India, were too cautious and too solidly entrenched to succumb to any artificial panic, and despite the assertion of some Indian politicians that the European-managed banks, by withholding assistance from these mushroom Indian concerns, had deliberately precipitated the crisis, the general conclusion was that the failures were primarily due to careless or fraudulent management. This view found confirmation in the verdicts delivered in the Courts.

The collapse of at least one bank was due to the uncontrolled habit of speculation which has always distinguished the City of Bombay. Few persons now remain who can remember the famous Share Mania of the early ’sixties: but the spirit of gambling which underlay that colossal financial fiasco is still alive and manifests itself from time to time in wild speculation in the cotton and share markets. The abnormal readiness of the average Indian to follow the lead of any man of outstanding personality, and the ease with which credit is obtained and renewed in Indian circles only serve to aggravate the evil. The suicide of Mr. Dwarkadas Dharamsey, a leading Bhattia mill-agent and merchant, in September, 1909, provided an example of the latitude allowed to one whose financial position had for several years been very unsound. Dwarkadas Dharamsey was a man of great mental capacity, but devoid of scruple. He occupied a leading position in the mercantile and social world, was well-known on the race-course as an owner of horses, was a member of the Municipal Corporation and of the Board of the Improvement Trust, and had been appointed Sheriff of Bombay two or three years before his death. Yet in the very heyday of his prosperity he was spending more than he possessed, staving off importunate demands by all manner of temporary expedients, and juggling with the funds of the mills of which he was director and agent. Faced at last with almost complete insolvency and unable to raise further funds, he shot himself with a revolver at his house in the Fort. He left a kind of confession behind him in which he explained the reason for his action and referred in ambiguous language to some greater crime that he had committed. Though various conjectures were made as to the nature of this act, no definite solution was ever forthcoming. His secret died with him. Immediately after his death, the police discovered that the operatives of his four mills had not been paid their wages for two months, and owing to the closing of the mills they were left stranded and unemployed. With the assistance of Mr. R. D. Sethna, the Official Receiver, the Commissioner was able to get the mill-hands’ wages treated as a first charge on the estate of the deceased, and within a short time the wages due to the men were liquidated under Mr. Sethna’s orders.

On several occasions Indian constables distinguished themselves by acts of bravery and examples of professional acumen. The detection of a burglary in the showroom of an English firm was due entirely to the action of a Hindu constable, who noticed on a piece of furniture the mark of a foot possessing certain peculiarities, which he remembered having seen before in the foot of an ex-convict. Another Hindu constable grappled with a European who had stabbed a townsman, and though severely wounded in the stomach and bleeding profusely, managed to pursue the offender and hold him down till help came. On three other occasions Indian constables sustained severe wounds, when grappling single-handed with armed Pathans and others, and on each occasion they clung to the prisoner until his arrest was secured. Several instances occurred of women and children being saved from drowning, and in two cases the men were rewarded with the bronze medal of the Royal Humane Society. The action of a young Hindu constable, who had been only three months in the force, deserves more detailed description. About 3 a.m. one morning in August, 1912, a Punjab Muhammadan murdered his comrade in a room in Bapty road. The murder was not discovered till some time afterwards. At 4 a.m. the constable on duty at the junction of Falkland and Foras roads saw a man hurrying in a suspicious manner through the shadows towards Gilder street. He stopped and questioned him; and, his suspicions being aroused, decided to search the man. The fugitive offered the constable a bribe of Rs. 5, Rs. 10 and finally Rs. 30 to let him go; but the constable arrested him and marched him to the Nagpada police station, where a report of the murder had by that time been received. It was then found that the arrested fugitive was the murderer, and that the money with which he had tried to bribe the constable was stained with blood and formed part of the sum which he had stolen from his victim. Further investigation proved beyond doubt that the murdered man had himself stolen the money from an Englishman in Mussoorie. A unique case, in which an accused asked permission of the Magistrate to pay a reward to the constable who arrested him, occurred in 1914. The prisoner, on being questioned, explained that, owing to his timely arrest, he had managed to retain possession of a sum of money, of which he would certainly have been robbed by the disorderly persons with whom he was consorting at the time the constable locked him up.

Among the special events of these years which imposed extra work for the time being on the Police were the Nasik murder and conspiracy trials in the High Court in 1910, the visit of Lord Minto in 1909, the arrival of Lord Hardinge and the visit of the ex-German Crown Prince in 1910, and the arrival of Lord Chelmsford in 1916. For the first time on record, the Mounted Police under their European officers were permitted to form part of the escort both of Lord Minto and the German Crown Prince, and, riding grey Arabs in their handsome full-dress uniform, they provided not the least showy part of the spectacle. These Viceregal progresses from the railway terminus or the Apollo Bandar to Malabar Hill had changed in character since the beginning of the twentieth century. Formerly the route chosen for the arrival of a new Viceroy or the departure of his predecessor lay as a matter of course through Kalbadevi road and Bhendy Bazaar, and thence by way of Grant road, or later Sandhurst road, to Chaupati and Walkeshwar. No particular precautions were taken, for none were deemed necessary; the people were well-disposed and always ready to welcome the King’s representative as he was driven through the heart of the Indian quarters. But as the anarchical and revolutionary movement spread and attempts were made upon the lives even of Viceroys, the old route through the city was, except for very special reasons, gradually abandoned, and the incoming and departing potentates were escorted along the safer route of Queen’s road. The distance of this thoroughfare from the heart of the City, and the growing nonchalance of the majority of the inhabitants in regard to Viceregal appearances in public, were naturally responsible for an absence of sight-seers on the processional route, and at times there were few persons to be seen except the foot-police lining the sides of the road. On the occasion of Lord Chelmsford’s arrival in April, 1916, one of the Superintendents, through whose division a portion of the route passed, determined to keep up appearances of loyal welcome, by collecting the necessary crowd at Sandhurst Bridge and instructing them beforehand in the art of hand-clapping and other manifestations of popular satisfaction. As it was obviously impossible to impress respectable householders and others for this duty, the sectional officers were instructed to shepherd their bad characters of both sexes to the fixed point, after arranging that they all donned clean clothes and were paid 2 annas apiece for their trouble. The plan worked well. As the new Viceroy’s carriage swept out of Queen’s road on to the bridge, the signal was given and a hearty burst of hand-clapping, punctured with cries of _shabash_, rose from the little crowd of disreputables at the corner. No one knew who they were, except the police who had hunted them out of their haunts a few hours previously: and the Viceroy was doubtless gratified at this signal expression of welcome. When the last of the escort had passed, the unfortunates were taken back to their quarter and there set free to resume their ordinary and less harmless avocations.

There was no need of artificial welcomes of this character when Their Majesties visited Bombay in 1911, or at their final departure in 1912. They drove through the heart of the City; and both in the wide thoroughfares of the European business-quarter and in the narrower streets of the Indian city they were affectionately greeted and welcomed by thousands of their subjects of all castes and creeds. Their progress was, indeed, a triumph. The choice of the route had not been settled without some doubt and misgiving. The authorities in England declared that the royal procession must not pass along any road of less than a certain width: the Commissioner of Police pointed out that this restriction would entirely debar Their Majesties from entering the City north of Carnac road. The restriction was therefore waived, on condition that the Police adopted all possible measures to render the route completely secure. This by no means easy task was achieved by the C. I. D. and the divisional police, of whom the former spent the three months preceding the Royal Visit in mapping out the houses on the route, making themselves acquainted with all the inmates, posting plain-clothes men and agents in the upper-storeys, and keeping a daily register of arrivals and departures. In one or two cases the divisional police, whose duties lay in holding the route and directing traffic, imposed even stricter conditions than the C. I. D., as the following incident proves. Three or four days before Their Majesties’ arrival, an elderly Muhammadan woman of the lower class visited the Head Police Office and asked for an interview with the Commissioner. Her request was granted; and on being shown in, she informed the Commissioner that she occupied a room in the upper-storey of a house near the junction of Sandhurst and Parel roads, and that she desired permission to look out of her window at the royal procession. “But,” said the Commissioner, “you need no permission for that.” “Yes, Huzur, I do”, she answered; “the section-wala (_i.e._ the officer in charge of a police-station) says that unless I obtain a permit I must keep my window shut on the day”. It was clearly useless to argue with the old lady, who was honestly bent upon obtaining _darshan_ of the _Padshah_. The Commissioner, therefore, wrote out the following pass in his own hand, signed it, and sent her away satisfied:—

“To all Police Officers and those whom it may concern.

This is to certify that Aminabai, living in House No. —— ———— street, second floor, is hereby granted permission to look out of her own window at His Majesty the King-Emperor, on the occasion of the Royal Progress through Bombay on December 2nd. 1911.

S. M. Edwardes, _Commissioner of Police_.”

As an additional precaution the Commissioner of Police asked the Bombay Government to invest him with special magisterial powers, which would enable him to deal summarily with persons of bad character, whose liberty it might be necessary to curtail during the period of the Royal Visit. The request having been granted, the Commissioner proceeded to remand to jail the majority of the well-known hooligans and bad characters, to the number of 400. Fully another three hundred persons with guilty consciences decided to leave Bombay for a holiday up-country, in the belief that they would be sent to jail if they stayed in the City. In this way the City was cleared of seven or eight hundred of its worst characters, and the daily crime returns subsequently proved that the action thus taken produced a very marked diminution of crime during the period of the Royal Visit. Moreover, respectable townspeople, learning of the incarceration of the criminal classes, were able to leave their houses freely at night to visit the illuminations, without fear of burglaries occurring in their absence or of having their pockets picked in the crowd. Political offenders, who usually belonged to a higher stratum of society, were treated differently. In one or two cases they were remanded to jail for treatment as first-class misdemeanants: but the majority were given the option of spending a fortnight in some place chosen by themselves, the police of that place being warned of their arrival and of the need of keeping them under surveillance. In one instance a _détenu_ asked to be allowed to visit Ceylon, which he had never seen, and he was accordingly sent there in company with a plain-clothes officer of the C. I. D., who duly escorted him back again at the end of fifteen days. The entire absence of any protest on the part of the public or the Indian press against the Commissioner’s action shows that the powers were wielded cautiously and that special measures of this kind were generally accepted as appropriate to the occasion. The wholesale disappearance for the time being of the criminal and hooligan element certainly contributed to the peaceful and orderly progress of the Visit, and produced an immediate and marked decline of crime, which enabled the police to concentrate all their attention on the special arrangements for the functions held during Their Majesties’ stay.

Both before and during the Royal Visit, the Police received much help from the public. There was scarcely a householder who did not willingly undertake to carry out the suggestions of the police, and a large number of people, drawn from various classes and communities, volunteered to serve as special constables during the Visit. As to the manner in which the police force itself performed its heavy work, it will suffice to quote the words of the Governor-in-Council, who was “commanded to express to the Police of the City of Bombay His Imperial Majesty’s ‘entire satisfaction with the admirable police arrangements made during His Imperial Majesty’s recent visit to Bombay and with the manner in which they were carried out’”. In recognition of the exemplary performance of heavy additional duties, all ranks of the force, from inspectors downwards, received a special bonus, equivalent to ten days’ pay. Four Superintendents and three Inspectors received the medal of the Royal Victorian Order from the King-Emperor himself.

The subject of cotton-fires at the Colaba Green was revived by the disastrous epidemic of fires in the cold weather of 1913-14. As previously mentioned, a special committee was appointed by Government, with the Commissioner of Police as chairman, to enquire into the origin of the fires and suggest precautions for the future. The report of this committee, which found that the weight of evidence pointed to wholesale incendiarism, was submitted only a few weeks before the outbreak of War in 1914, and consequently received early burial in the records of the Secretariat. The deductions of the Committee were strengthened to some extent by the inquiries carried out by the C. I. D. during 1914. A thorough examination of the books of various companies established beyond a shadow of doubt that large fortunes had been made over the fires by persons in the cotton trade, as a result of fraudulent dealing, mixing and classification of cotton. This system of dishonesty had been facilitated by slack methods of insurance, which in turn were rendered profitable by clever underwriting. It is doubtful whether these little ‘idiosyncrasies’ of the Bombay cotton market will ever be wholly eradicated.

It is possible that long after the details of the reorganization of the police force have passed into oblivion, Mr. Edwardes’ tenure of office will be remembered for the abolition of the dangerous and rowdy side of the annual Muharram celebration. At the time he was appointed Commissioner, the Muharram, which had been a cause of excitement and anxiety from the days of Forjett, had degenerated into an annual scandal and become a menace to the peace of the city. No respectable Musalman took part in the annual procession of _tabuts_, nor would permit his family to visit the _tazias_ and _tabuts_ during the ten days of the festival, for fear of insult and annoyance from the _badmashes_ and hooligans, who chose the sites of the _tabuts_ in the various _mohollas_ as their gathering-ground. The cost of building and decorating each _tazia_ and _tabut_ was defrayed by a public subscription, which had degenerated into pure and simple blackmail, levied by the less respectable denizens of each _moholla_ upon the general public. The Marwadi and other Hindu merchants suffered particularly from this practice; at times they were threatened with physical injury if they did not subscribe; on other occasions the collecting-party, composed of four or five Muhammadan roughs, would visit the shops of the Jain merchants, carrying a dead rat, and threaten to drop it into the heaps of grain and sugar if the shop-owner did not forthwith hand out a fair sum. By the exercise of pressure and threats, some _mohollas_ contrived to raise comparatively large sums, aggregating several hundred rupees, and as only a fractional portion of this money was required to defray the cost of the _tabut_ and the paraphernalia of the final procession, the balance was devoted to the support of the hooligans of the _mohollas_ during the following few months. Attached to each _tabut_, and accompanying it whenever it was carried out in procession, was a _toli_ or band of attendants, usually varying in numbers from 50 to 200 and composed of the riff-raff of the lower quarters. In some cases these _tolis_ had been gradually allowed to assume a gigantic size, as for example that of the Julhai weavers of Ripon road (Madanpura), which comprised from two to three thousand men, all armed with _lathis_ tipped with brass or lead. Similarly the notorious Rangari _moholla_ (Abdul Rehman street), Halai Memon _moholla_, Kolsa _moholla_ and Chuna Batti _moholla_, could count upon turning out several thousand followers, armed with sticks and staves, who could be trusted to render a good account of themselves if there was a breach of the public peace.

The time-honoured sectarian enmity between Sunni and Shia usually showed itself by the second day of the festival, in the form of insults hurled at the Bohras (Shias) by the Sunni rag-tag and bobtail in the various streets occupied by the former. The most notorious of these centres of disturbance was Doctor Street, which debouched into Grant road opposite Sulliman _chauki_; but none of the Bohra quarters were safe from disturbance; and year after year Bohra merchants had to leave Bombay during the festival, or had to secure special protection, and even had to disguise their women in male attire, in the hope of thereby minimising the chance of insult by the lower-class Sunnis. Muharram rioting, which had become much too frequent during the first decade of this century, usually commenced with a fracas of some sort between Sunnis and Bohras, in which the former were generally the aggressors; and when the Police intervened to restore order, the mob on one pretext or another declared war against them with the inevitable result. The Sunni hooligans would never have reached the pitch of insolence which marked their behaviour in 1910, had they not felt assured that they had the support of the leading Sunnis residing in the _mohollas_, many of whom, though comparatively wealthy, were almost illiterate and totally uncultured; and the latter in turn were prompted to foster the more rowdy and disreputable aspects of the festival by the belief that the Moslem community thereby acquired more importance, even though of a sinister character, in the eyes of Government, and that the possibility of disturbance could be occasionally used as a lever to secure consideration or concessions in other directions.

This belief was partly confirmed by the attitude of the authorities, who persisted in attaching undue weight to the religious character of the festival,—a character which had practically ceased to have any influence on the celebrants, and in accordance with the time-honoured principle of strict religious neutrality showed great reluctance to impose any restrictions upon the celebration. The Police, who in times of disturbance often reaped a fair harvest of tips and presents from timorous townspeople who desired protection from mob-violence, and who also discovered in the aftermath of rioting an easy means of paying off old scores, had never troubled to explain to Government the precise character and danger of the annual Muharram. The old doctrine of “the safety-valve” was still in favour, with the result that during the concluding days of the festival Bombay used to witness the spectacle of police officers of the upper ranks urging the most uncompromising rascals to lift the _tabuts_ and form the processions, regardless of the fact that at any other season of the year they would not have hesitated to lock up most of these disreputables at sight. In short, under the cloak of religion, the worst elements in the bazaar were permitted to burst their bounds for ten days and flow over the central portion of the City in a current of excessive turbulence, to terrorize the peaceful householder and to play intolerable mischief in the streets. If the leaders and wire-pullers decided that there should be a disturbance, culminating in a conflict with the police, all they had to do was to pass the order to the various _mohollas_ not to “lift” their _tabuts_ on the tenth day and to the Bara Imam shrine in Khoja street not to send out the _sandal_-procession on the ninth night. This latter procession was, so to speak, the barometer of the Muharram, and its non-appearance in the streets invariably indicated storm. Once it had been decided not to “lift” the _tabuts_, the huge _tolis_, which should have accompanied them to their final immersion in the sea, were let loose in the streets with nothing to do, and a breach of the peace was rendered practically inevitable. When this point was reached on the last day, it was customary for the Afghans and Pathans, residing in the B division, to collect in groups in the lanes behind Parel road (Bhendy Bazar), and at the right moment to commence looting and setting fire to shops. In the Muharram riots of 1908 it was these people who set fire to a shop on Parel road and threw a Hindu constable into the middle of the flames. The only unobjectionable feature of the old Muharram was the _Waaz_ or religious discourse, which was delivered nightly in each of the leading _mohollas_ by a chosen _Maulvi_ or _Mulla_. Unfortunately these were very little patronized by the hooligans and damaged characters, who composed the _tolis_ and monopolized the celebration of the festival in the streets.

Mr. Edwardes’ first Muharram in 1910 ended without an actual breach of the peace: but the behaviour of the _mohollas_ was so insolent, and the license and obscenity displayed by the mob were so intolerable, particularly in the Bohra quarter of the C division, that he determined to impose restrictions at the Muharram of January, 1911. Accordingly in December, 1910, he issued a notification closing Doctor Street and the neighbouring lanes running parallel with it to all processionists throughout the period of the festival, and from the first night he placed a strong cordon of police round the prohibited area, to prevent any attempt by the mob to break the order. Practically the whole police force was on continuous duty for ten days and nights in the streets, and commissariat arrangements for both European and Indian police had to be made on the spot. Though no serious trouble occurred during the first few days of the festival, there were several indications of trouble brewing, and the Commissioner therefore arranged with Brigadier-General John Swann to hold garrison troops in readiness. On the tenth night or _Katal-ki-rat_ a serious disturbance broke out in Bhendy Bazar about 3 a.m., in connexion with the procession of the Rangari _moholla tabut_. Free fighting between the processionists and the mob from other _mohollas_ took place all the way from Grant road to Pydhoni, and it was due solely to the efforts of Mr. Vincent, the Deputy Commissioner, and a handful of police who were escorting the procession, that the _tabut_ was eventually brought back to its resting-place. The mob by this time had tasted blood and displayed so truculent an attitude that the Commissioner decided to telephone for the troops and picket them throughout the danger zone. By 4 a.m. on January 12th the troops had taken their places, and the mob, for the moment deeming discretion the better part of valour, melted away in the darkness. About 5 p.m., however, in the afternoon of the same day, the mob, which declined to carry out the _tabuts_ in procession, collected on Parel road and Memonwada road and commenced stoning the troops and police. They also stopped all traffic, stoned tram-cars and private carriages, and roughly handled several harmless pedestrians. The police made several charges upon them from Pydhoni, but were unable permanently to disperse the rioters. At length the Commissioner, seeing that the two mobs refused to disperse and were practically out of hand, and that the Pathans were on the point of breaking loose, called Rao Bahadur Chunilal H. Setalwad, one of the Presidency Magistrates, who was on duty at Sulliman Chauki, and asked him to give the order to the troops (the Warwickshire Regiment) picketed at Pydhoni to fire on the mob. The order was given at once and the rioting ceased.[116]

Like Napoleon’s famous “whiff of grapeshot”, the firing of the Warwicks may be said to have blown the old Muharram into the limbo of oblivion. From that date, January 1911, the processional part of the Muharram, with its _tolis_, its blackmail, its terrorism and its obscenities, ceased to exist and has not up to the present 1922 been revived. Before the succeeding Muharram drew near, the Commissioner had framed new rules for the celebration, of which the deposit by _tabut_-license holders of ample security for good behaviour and a complete revision of the processional route for each _tabut_ were two of the main features. He had also contrived to persuade the leaders of the various Muhammadan sections and _mohollas_ that the orgiastic method of celebrating the festival was an anachronism, not countenanced by Islamic teaching and gravely injurious to the City. In thus securing the obliteration of the customs and practices, which for more than fifty years had been responsible for periodical outbreaks of disorder, the Commissioner was greatly assisted by some of the leading men of the Sunni _jamats_, of whom the most conspicuous and most helpful was Sirdar Saheb Sulliman Cassum Haji Mitha, C. I. E., of Kolsa _Moholla_. He led the way at succeeding Muharrams in popularizing the _waaz_ or nightly religious discourses and in spending upon them, and upon illuminations and charitable distribution of food to the poorer classes, the money which was formerly wasted on irreverent and turbulent processions. For this fundamental change in the character of the festival none perhaps were more grateful than the _Maulvis_ and _Mullas_ who presided over the _waaz_; for with the disappearance of the _tolis_ and their paraphernalia their audiences were enormously increased. But respectable Moslems and the general public also breathed a sigh of relief, on realizing that the longstanding annual menace to law and order had been exorcised. In December, 1914, on the conclusion of the fourth Muharram celebrated in the new manner, the Bombay Government wrote to Mr. Edwardes, expressing their thanks for his unremitting efforts and skilful management of the festival. “The result”, they remarked, “is in large measure due to the excellent relations which you established between the Muhammadan leaders and yourself, thus rendering it possible to relegate to the past the disreputable ceremonies which used to disfigure the Muharram. It is now possible to regard the new regulations as having become permanently established”.

Such, very briefly, is the history of the purification of the Bombay Muharram. The old days, when the police were on continuous duty for ten days and nights, when the Bohras were subjected to volleys of the vilest and most obscene abuse and to open assault, when the lowest and most turbulent portion of the population was permitted to take charge of the central portion of the city, and when rioting with its complement of drastic repression was liable to recur in any year—those days have passed, and one hopes that a weak administration will never permit them to recur. The present puritanical and more reverent method of celebration was firmly established during Mr. Edwardes’ Commissionership with the help and approval of leading Muhammadans, who realized at length that the annual orgy in the streets was a disgrace to Islam.

It remains only to notice the effect upon the police of the outbreak of the Great War in August, 1914. The day after War was declared, local shopkeepers, particularly the dealers in foodstuffs, commenced to raise their prices to famine level, and large numbers of the poorer classes appealed to the police for assistance. Government having decided to appoint a food-price committee, the Commissioner ordered a _battaki_ to be beaten throughout the City for three days; several shopkeepers who were disposed to be recalcitrant were called up to the Head Police Office and warned; and in several cases constables were posted at shops to see that prices were not unduly raised. Excess amounts received by shopkeepers from mill-hands and others were in many cases recovered and paid back to the purchasers, and a series of judiciously-fabricated reports were spread by chosen agents, describing the imaginary fate which had overtaken certain shopkeepers, who had extorted fancy prices from the public. Somewhat similar action was taken with excellent effect in the case of retail-dealers, who refused to accept currency-notes of small denominations from the poorer classes. Within a few days these measures produced the required effect, and trade again became normal. The police were on constant duty day and night at the Government Dockyard, at the various military camps erected for the Indian Expeditionary Force, and during the economic disturbance in the early days of the War at the banks and Currency Office. They assisted the military authorities to find Dhobis, Bhistis and other camp-followers for enrolment, they traced absentee followers and native seamen, and during the heavy rain-storms of October, 1914, they found accommodation in permanent buildings for the troops under canvas. They took charge of coal-stacks for the Director, R. I. M., and did much extra duty at the Wadi Bandar railway goods-sheds. They displayed great tact in their management of the crowds which used to collect in the streets to hear the special editions of the vernacular newspapers read out during the early months of the War; and during the aeroplane scare, they were equally successful in dealing with the mobs which used to scan the skies for airships. While the _Emden_ was seizing vessels in the Bay of Bengal and bombarding Madras, there was again a scare in the City and some of the more timorous merchants, taking their cash and jewellery with them, fled to their homes in Native States, where in several cases the local police kindly relieved them of most of their valuables. Others, equally timorous but more reasonable, applied to the Police Commissioner for advice, and were satisfied with his assurance that if it should become necessary to vacate Bombay, he would give them ample warning beforehand. Trusting to this promise, many Hindu merchants remained in the City, who would otherwise have fled.

During the movement of the Expeditionary Forces, the scenes in certain quarters of the bazar, which were heavily patronized by soldiers and sailors, both European and Indian, beggared description. The Japanese quarter appeared to offer special attractions to fighting-men of Mongolian type, and the divisional police had a hard task to settle disputes and maintain order in these areas. In the mill-district there was unrest for some little time; but this was at length discounted by the labours of three Hindu gentlemen, Messrs. H. A. Talcherkar, S. K. Bole, and K. R. Koregaonkar, who volunteered their services as intermediaries between the Police Commissioner and the industrial population, and by means of lectures on the war, social gatherings and so forth, helped to keep the police in touch with popular feeling and to minimise panic. Very arduous work fell upon the Harbour police in connexion with the patrol of the various bandars and wharves, the boarding of all vessels entering the harbour, and the many miscellaneous and emergent requisitions entailed by war conditions. The old police launch which at its best was never very seaworthy, broke down under the strain and had to be docked for repairs to her machinery; but the Harbour police continued to carry on their duties by borrowing launches from other departments. The desertion of lascar crews at the beginning of the submarine scare caused much trouble to the Shipping Master and to the steamship-companies, and on several occasions _serangs_ and other Indian seamen were brought to the Head Police Office to have their apprehensions allayed. When Turkey entered the war, the Divisional police took a census and compiled a register of all Turkish subjects in the City, excluding certain wealthy Arabs of the upper class, who were visited by Muhammadan police officers specially deputed for this duty by the Commissioner.

The bulk of the confidential war work fell naturally upon the Criminal Investigation Department. Before the organization of the Postal Censor’s office, and in some cases also afterwards, the department scrutinized letters addressed to enemy subjects; it studied closely the daily and weekly newspapers in all languages, and prepared a daily report for the military authorities on the publication of war-news; it carried out requests for information and assistance from the Brigade Office, the Customs Department, and the Controller of Hostile Trading Concerns. It prepared lists for Government of hostile, allied and neutral foreigners resident in Bombay; it mustered all German and Austrian males, numbering respectively 189 and 37, at the Head Police Office, confiscated their fire-arms, and eventually dispatched them under arrest to the Ahmadnagar Detention Camp, whither were also sent many enemy foreigners subsequently removed from enemy ships in the harbour. It also kept under surveillance a certain number of persons who were permitted to remain on parole in Bombay; it kept under observation and deported a large number of transfrontier Pathans and tribesmen, under special powers granted for this purpose to the Commissioner; it arrested the officers and crew of a captured Turkish vessel and placed them in detention, and deported many Turkish subjects to Jeddah. The department also housed and fed for two months two hundred and sixty Chinese, who were removed from German prize vessels. One of the more amusing features of their arrival was the disgust shown by the Muhammadan police-officer, told off to arrange for their supply of food, when they begged him in a body to buy up all the pork he could find in the bazaar. Military prisoners from Mesopotamia were taken over and placed in charge of the proper authorities; constant inquiries were made about firms suspected of trading with the enemy; and from the end of 1915 the department had to organize a system of passes for all persons desiring to land at Basra or Mohammerah.

The process of clearing Bombay of hostile aliens of both sexes was finally completed in 1915. Among them were six ladies, a few children, one or two Jesuit priests, and eighteen prostitutes, who were sent to Calcutta for repatriation to Holland by the S. S. _Golconda_. This party left Bombay by special train, the respectable women and children being placed in the front carriages, the priests and the police-escort in the centre, and the unfortunate denizens of the brothels in the rear-compartments. The moment of departure was enlivened by a gentleman, belonging to the priestly class of a well-known community, who had been keeping one of the Austrian harlots. He came to see the lady off and burst into floods of tears and loud groans, as the train steamed out of the station. One of the most ticklish duties entrusted to the police occurred during the Muharram of 1915. A regiment composed of north-country Muhammadans was on the point of embarking for Mesopotamia, when one of the men murdered their English major. He was court-martialled without delay and sentenced to be hanged; and the military authorities, who handed him over to the police pending his execution, were very anxious that his punishment should be witnessed by the rest of the regiment. There was a general undercurrent of unrest at the time in the Muhammadan quarter, owing to sympathy with Turkey, and the Muharram festival was in progress. Any undue publicity given to the execution, and the overt movement of troops through the City, might have brought about an outbreak. Arrangements were therefore made by the Police to hang the culprit at the Byculla jail before daybreak and to march the regiment to the spot by a circuitous route, with a British regiment in attendance to prevent any attempt at mutiny. The execution was carried out without a hitch, and the regiment was back at its temporary quarters in the docks before the City was properly awake.

In conclusion it may be added that the whole police force, and the clerical staff of the Commissioner, subscribed one day’s pay apiece to the Bombay Presidency Branch of the Imperial War Relief Fund. This sum was augmented to a total of Rs. 15,000 by subscriptions received by the Commissioner from a motley assortment of local characters, among whom may be mentioned the leading Hindu dancing-girls, the Sadhus and Bairagis in Bai Jankibai’s _dharamshala_, the local Pathans working in the Docks, the Sidis or African Muhammadans, the Persian Zoroastrians or Iranis, who are mostly tea-shop keepers, and a Parsi amateur theatrical company. It says something for the good relations subsisting between the police and the general public that classes such as these voluntarily offered their contributions as soon as the general appeal for funds was issued under the auspices of Lord Willingdon, the Governor.

In two respects the Commissioner’s _régime_ was fortunate. He had an excellent and very hardworking clerical staff; and the relations between the Magistracy and the Police were uniformly cordial. Shortly after Mr. Edwardes joined the appointment in 1909, the old head-clerk, Mr. Ramchandra Dharadhar, retired, and his place was taken by Mr. Vinayakrao Dinanath, whose early service dated back to the days of Sir Frank Souter. Under him and the second clerk, Mr. Chhaganlal M. Tijoriwala, I.S.O., who has since succeeded to the head-clerk’s post with the title of “Superintendent of the Commissioner’s office,” an immense volume of correspondence was dealt with, which was often of so urgent a character that the staff was obliged to work on Sundays and to give up the public and sectional holidays allowed to all departments of Government.

Throughout this period the appointment of Chief Presidency Magistrate was held by Mr. A.H.S. Aston, whose transparent honesty of thought and purpose would have been an asset to any Bench; and he was ably seconded by Rao Bahadur Chunilal H. Setalwad, C.I.E., Mr. Oliveira, and Mr. Gulamhussein R. Khairaz. Mr. Setalwad combined with wide legal experience a valuable knowledge of the customs and idiosyncrasies of the many classes resident in Bombay, and in seasons of unrest and disturbance he was among the first to offer his services to the Police Commissioner towards the restoration of order. While he and his colleagues gave the police every support from the Bench, they never hesitated to inform the Commissioner personally of cases in which, in their opinion, the subordinate police had acted in error or exceeded their powers—a course of action which was most helpful to the head of the police force.

By the end of 1915 the strain of nearly seven years’ work and the additional burden imposed by war conditions had told so heavily upon Mr. Edwardes’ health that he asked the Bombay Government to transfer him to another appointment. He was offered and accepted the post of Municipal Commissioner, and bade a final adieu to the Police force on April 15th, 1916. But he was not destined to serve long in the Municipality. An old pulmonary complaint, which was seriously aggravated by the constant strain of police duty, developed so rapidly that he was obliged to take furlough to England in the following October and eventually to retire from the service on medical certificate in April, 1918. A few months after his final retirement, the Governor of Bombay, Lord Willingdon, unveiled at the Head Police Office a marble bust of the ex-Commissioner, which, in the words engraved on the pedestal, was “erected by subscriptions from all ranks of the Bombay City Police in appreciation of many and valued services rendered to the Force”.

APPENDIX

MR. EDWARDES’ REPORT ON THE FINAL MOHARRAM RIOT OF 1911 AND THE BOMBAY GOVERNMENT’S ORDER THEREON

No. 1431

_Bombay Castle, 8th March, 1911_

_Disturbances in Bombay during the Moharram of 1911_

No. 545—C, dated 20th January, 1911

From—S.M. Edwardes, Esquire, I.C.S., Commissioner of Police, Bombay;

To—The Secretary to Government, Judicial Department, Bombay.

I have the honour to state with regret that a serious outbreak took place in the City on the early morning of the 12th January in connection with the Moharram Tabut procession and that it was followed on the afternoon of the same day by a violent disturbance of such a character that I was forced to send for a magistrate to give an order to the troops on duty at the scene of disturbance, to fire on the mob. I submit hereunder a full account of the circumstances which rendered this order necessary.

2. The Moharram of 1911 commenced on the 2nd January. As Government are aware, I had with their approval issued a notification, dated 8th December 1910, closing Pakmodia Street, Dhabu Street, Doctor Street, Chimna Butcher Street and Mutton Street to all processionists throughout the Moharram. This order was rendered necessary by the behaviour of the Mahommedan Mohollas at the Moharram of 1910 and by the intolerable rowdiness and obscene license which for the last 6 or 7 years have characterized the progress of the procession through the Shia Borah locality of Doctor Street and neighbouring lanes.

3. The notification was not favourably received by the lower classes who take part in the Bombay Moharram, but was welcomed both by the Shias and respectable Sunnis as a step in the right direction. Till about a week before the first night of the festival it was generally understood that the various Mohollas would not apply for licenses and that they would sulk as they did last year. This in itself constitutes a serious menace to public peace and order, as the non-appearance of the tabuts and tazias in the streets lets loose the gangs or _tolis_ (numbering several thousands and composed of the riff-raff of the Musalman quarter) which usually accompany the mimic tombs to the water-side. However, after considerable vacillation, the leading Mohollas, Rangari, Kolsa, Chuna Batti and others, held a meeting at which it was decided openly to apply for licenses to me and to celebrate the festival in the usual manner. Shortly after this meeting it transpired that one of those who advocated most strongly the application for licenses and the observance of the police orders regarding Doctor Street was one Badlu, who lives in Madanpura and controls a tabut supported by the Julhai weavers of that locality. It appears that his action was part of a settled policy between himself and the notorious Rangari Moholla, the nature of which will be disclosed a little further on. It also transpired that the Konkani Mahomedan Mohollas were up in arms both against my order and against Rangari Moholla and its leader, Latiff, the tea shop-keeper, and that they found strong sympathisers among the Mohollas of the E division, and Bengalpura, Teli Gali, Bapu Hajam and Kasai Mohollas in the B division. The bone of contention was the closing of Doctor Street. The Konkani Mahomedans declared that the behaviour of the Mohollas at the Moharram of 1910 had obliged the Police Commissioner to take action in regard to Doctor Street, which was perfectly true, and secondly that that behaviour had been dictated and forced upon all the Mohollas in 1910 by Latiff and the Memons of Rangari Moholla, which was equally undeniable. They were incensed to find Latiff now advocating the observance of the festival and obedience to the Police Order, and declared that _they_ would not lift their tabuts and would not have anything further to do with Rangari Moholla. Nevertheless, while thus secretly determined not to go out in procession and nursing violent hostility to Rangari Moholla, they declared openly that there was nothing amiss and applied for tabut licenses as soon as Rangari, Kolsa and Chuna Batti Mohollas applied for theirs.

4. The policy of Badlu and Latiff of Rangari Moholla became apparent as soon as Latiff applied for his tabut-license. He asked me personally to grant the Julhais a pass for the procession. For, finding that there was considerable feeling against him among the Konkanis and the Mohollas who sympathised with them, he foresaw that, unless he commanded a strong following from some other quarter, the Rangari Moholla procession would be rather a poor one. He therefore without doubt arranged with Badlu that if he (Latiff) could squeeze a pass out of the Police, the Julhais were to amalgamate with his Moholla and make a brave display in front of the recalcitrant Mohollas.

I refused absolutely to give a pass, after consulting all persons who were in a position to give an opinion on the point. Government are aware that the Julhais are an extremely illiterate and fanatical population. When once an individual gets influence over them, they will do anything that he asks; and it has always been the policy of the police to forbid their bringing their tabut out in the ordinary procession and to prevent them coming anywhere south of the Parsi Statue on the _Katal-ki-rat_ and the last day. The Julhais can, if they obtain a pass, bring out a _toli_ of about 3,000 men, all armed with _lathis_, many of which are knobbed and tipped with brass or iron. I have had something to do with them, in the matter of getting them re-employed after a strike and obtaining their back wages from their employers: and in view of the gratitude which they professed for this help, I decided to send for Badlu myself and explain to him that it was impossible for me to grant them a pass, much as I regretted my inability to do so. Badlu after 20 minutes’ talk with me was quite reasonable and undertook not to worry any more about a pass and to keep his following cool. Apparently Latiff and Rangari Moholla were not very pleased at my having checkmated them, and from that moment Latiff began to talk somewhat ambiguously about the possible failure of the procession. Badlu, however, stuck to his promise to me, and the Julhais in a body took their tabut out and immersed it in the usual way in the area north of the Parsi Statue.

5. The next symptom of possible trouble concerned the _ugaráni_ or collection of funds for the tabut and procession, which each Moholla levies on the general public. Government are possibly not aware that it costs a Moholla anything from Rs. 100 to 400 to erect a Tabut and carry it out, and there are 105 Mohollas in the city which usually do so. The bulk of this money is extorted—there is no other word for it—from Marwadi and Bania merchants, who are threatened with physical injury unless they subscribe liberally. Just prior to the commencement of the Moharram, certain Marwadi merchants came and made a complaint at the Paidhuni Police Station that they were being harassed and assaulted by Bengalpura Moholla. The Divisional Police very properly made an enquiry into the complaint and finding it to be true, sent for the leaders of that Moholla and gave them a strict warning not to extort any more money from Hindu merchants. This was treated as a grievance, and Latiff himself had the impertinence to come to the Head Police Office and complain that “the police were not assisting the collection of funds”.

Added to these alleged grievances, rumour was also rife that the Bohras had been openly boasting that they had got Doctor Street closed and that they had won a victory over the Sunnis. I believe there is some foundation for this report, and that some of the lower-class Bohras, who number amongst them several very bad characters, did inflame the minds of individual Sunnis by talking and acting in a very indiscreet manner.

6. Such was the position at the opening of the Moharram on the 2nd January. In view of the notification alluded to above and in order to prevent any attempt to rush Doctor Street, I had to place a permanent cordon round the prohibited area from the first night, consisting of 324 native police and 30 European officers. In addition to this I had strong guards at Paidhuni, Sulliman Chowkey, the J.J. Hospital corner and Nall Bazaar, which were strengthened from the 6th night of the Moharram with pickets of armed police and mounted police. The men on the cordon and at the places mentioned were on practically continuous duty for ten nights and days, a few only being allowed off duty as opportunity offered to get their meals. I bring to the notice of Government that the strain on these men was very great, and that in consequence of the disturbance on the last day I had to retain them for three days and nights after their duty should in ordinary circumstances have ceased.

7. Nothing of any importance happened on the first night, except a little scuffle at the Shia Imambara on Jail Road, when a Sunni _toli_ was passing with music. The care-taker dashed out and abused the _toli_, which retorted by flinging a few stones at the Imambara and playing more loudly than before. This trouble was however allayed and no serious consequences ensued. On the 2nd night (following the first day) nothing of importance occurred, and the same was the case up to the 5th January. On that day I personally interviewed the leaders of the Pathans, Sidis and Panjabis and asked them to warn their respective class-fellows against going out and joining any _toli_. This they promised to do. No Sidis or Panjabis came out: but on the last day when the trouble commenced, the Pathans and Peshawaris were out in considerable force, throwing stones at the tram-cars and the Police, in spite of the fact that Samad Khan, one of the Pathan headmen, tried his best to hold his branch in check.

On the same day (5th January) I received a report from the D division that, according to rumour, the only Mohollas that intended to go out with their tabuts were Rangari, Kolsa and Chuna Batti Mohollas, and that if they actually did go out there would be trouble in Nagpada. Other rumours of an equally disquieting nature were abroad, which obliged the C.I.D. and Inspector Khan Bahadur Shaikh Ibrahim to redouble their efforts to smooth away spurious grievances and bring about a feeling of tranquillity. Nevertheless we hoped for the best and watched the _panjas_ and the _pethis_ come out on the 5th night (6th January) and pass down Grant Road, without making any serious attempt to break away down Doctor Street.

8. On the 7th night of Moharram (Sunday the 8th January) the Rangari Moholla _toli_ and the Halai Memon Moholla _toli_ turned out in force at a very late hour. In spite of the Police order that they should be back in their Mohollas by 2 a.m., it was 4 a.m. before they reached home and it was 4-30 a.m. before the Deputy Commissioners and I were able to leave the City. Before they started a reminder was sent to them about the carrying of “lathis” and bludgeons, and, so far as I can gather, out of the two to three thousand persons composing each _toli_, a considerable number were unarmed when they left their Mohollas. They wandered out of the B division into the C division, and thence gradually up Khoja Street to Grant Road. When they arrived at Sulliman Chowkey, Superintendent Priestley, who had been with them on their peregrinations for 2 hours and 20 minutes, reported that they had collected sticks on the route and had even torn down and armed themselves with the poles which support the awnings over the shops. As they passed me they appeared to be in a condition of considerable exaltation, and I was able to note the scum of which the _tolis_ were composed. There is no question of religion or religious fervour here. The _tolis_ are irreligious rascality, let loose for five days and nights to play intolerable mischief in the streets and terrorize the peaceful householder.

On their way out from their Moholla the Rangari _toli_ took a new route. Instead of coming direct up Abdul Rehman Street, as it always has done, it turned off into the Koka Bazaar, where many Bohras live and where there is a Bohra mosque, and there it drummed and played and hurled obscene abuse at the Bohras in the same way as it has done in Doctor Street. In fact, it passed the word round that though Doctor Street had been closed by the Police, it had found a new Doctor Street and had checkmated the Commissioner.

9. The action of these two _tolis_ produced the inevitable result. Some of the others, who were hesitating about coming out, got their blood up and turned out in great force on the following night (Monday the 9th). They were Kolsa Moholla, Kasai Moholla (the beef-butchers), the Bapty Road Chilli-chors or hack victoria drivers, and Teli Gali. These _tolis_ also were fully armed. We held a consultation as to whether it was advisable to rush in and disarm the crowds; but in view of the enormous size of the _tolis_, and the fact that most of our police were locked up in the cordoned area, and further that any show of force would have inevitably led to a disturbance of a serious character, I let the question of sticks slide and confined the police to urging the _tolis_ home as quickly as possible. From the 6th night we had to exercise the greatest caution in order not to precipitate a conflict, and in doing so we were obliged to wink at certain things which with a stronger police force we might have forcibly put down. We kept Doctor Street and the other streets hermetically closed from the beginning to the end, but this was only achieved by denuding our main posts and a considerable portion of the city of both European and Native police.

Two points deserve notice in connection with the _toli_ procession of the 9th January. First, Kasai Moholla on its way home turned into Koka Bazaar, assaulted one or two Bohras, and looted a few shops. On hearing this I drew off my armed police guard at Paidhuni and placed it in Koka Bazaar, and also placed 5 armed native police at each end. Secondly, Teli Moholla took the ominous step of coming out a short distance and then going back to its quarters. This is invariably a dangerous sign; and there is little doubt that Teli Moholla did this as a signal to the Konkani Mohollas, Bengalpura, and the Mohollas of the E division that the Moharram was to be wrecked, partly as a protest against the closing of Doctor Street and partly out of enmity to Rangari Moholla. Once more the C. I. D. and Khan Bahadur Shaikh Ibrahim did their best to smooth away difficulties, and once more we looked forward with slightly diminished hopes to the next day (10th January). When one left for home at 5 a.m. on the 10th January, one could not help feeling that the odds were slightly against our getting through the festival without trouble, but I still hoped that if Rangari, Kolsa and Chuna Batti Mohollas came out properly on the 10th night or _Katal-ki-rat_, the others would lift their tabuts on the last day, and all would be well.

10. On the 9th night (10th January) we exerted all our influence to keep the various Mohollas in a good temper. Mr. Vincent went with his most trusted C. I. D. officers to the E division Mohollas, spoke with the crowd, listened to their _Waaz_ or nightly discourse, subscribed to their funds and finally left them apparently happy and determined to carry out their tabuts properly. Meanwhile Mr. Gadney and I visited the B division tabuts, talked with the tabut wallas, and endeavoured to allay the tension, which was obviously spreading through the Musalman quarter. At the four chief Mohollas we visited we were received in friendly style; but I was made to understand secretly that none of them would lift their tabuts unless Rangari Moholla gave the lead, and that the Konkani Mohollas were absolutely obdurate and hostile.

The latter fact was sufficiently proved by the non-appearance of the Bara Imam Sandal procession, which usually starts from Khoja Street on the 9th night. It serves as the barometer of the Moharram and its non-appearance in the streets usually indicates storm. Every form of persuasion was used to make the licensee start out, as soon as the news of his recalcitrance reached me. But to no avail. Whether the licensee was a member of the cabal bent upon creating disturbance or whether he was, as he stated, afraid to move out, I cannot exactly say. But it is tolerably certain that the recalcitrant faction, including Bengalpura and Teli Gali, sent him a secret message that if he dared to leave Khoja Street, he and his processionists would be mobbed and hurt.

In spite of this we persuaded Chuna Batti Moholla to issue, and they were followed by old and new Bengalpura who were playing a double game, and by Kasar Gali and Wadi Bandar, whom Mr. Vincent had screwed up to the starting-point by his diplomatic visit. Nothing of note occurred during this procession of several thousand persons, except that they started late and kept us in the streets till 4-45 a.m.

11. Thus we reached the 10th night or _Katal-ki-rat_, which precedes the last or Immersion Day (January 12th). On the night of the 11th January I reached Paidhuni at 10 p.m. and there met Rao Bahadur Chunilal Setalvad, who had heard conflicting rumours and had offered his services to me in case I required them. We determined to wait there until the processions of the B division began to move out round the City, which should have happened about 11-45 p.m. By midnight the streets were crowded, but there was no sign of a procession. At 12-30 a.m. I received information that Latiff and Rangari Moholla had started out. In order to make quite certain I went down Abdul Rehman Street to find out where they were and give them a lead forward. I could not find them for some time, but finally caught sight of their torches moving down the south end of Koka Bazaar towards Carnac Road, in other words in the opposite direction to which they ought to have been moving. The next thing I heard was that they had turned back, placed their tabut down in its _mándwa_ and declined to go any further. Knowing that this in itself spelt trouble, and having been told that unless Rangari Moholla lifted its tabut none of the others would, I sent the divisional police to fetch Latiff, and told him that if he did not take out his tabut in procession along the proper route I would leave no stone unturned to punish him. Latiff was genuinely afraid and promised to start out again. So at length, about 1-45 a.m., the Rangari Moholla tabut moved up Abdul Rehman Street towards Paidhuni, with drums, band, torches, and a bullock cart containing oil and wood to replenish the torches. On arrival at Paidhuni, Latiff implored police protection for his procession, in view of the anger of Teli Gali, Bengalpura and the Konkani Mohollas. I therefore sent 4 sowars, several foot police and 4 European officers with the procession, while Mr. Vincent and some C. I. D. men undertook to walk ahead and see them safely into the C division limits.

Having thus started Rangari Moholla, I went down to Kolsa Moholla, Chuna Batti and Halai Moholla to get them to start out. Kolsa Moholla had already set forth once, but had retreated on hearing that Rangari Moholla had also done so. After immense delay, caused by these Mohollas making excuses that they had no coolies to carry the tabuts and that their bandsmen had run away, we managed to get all three into one long line containing several thousand persons and brought them out to the junction of Memonwada Road and Bhendy Bazaar. It was now about 3-30 a.m. At the moment that the front ranks turned the corner I looked up Bhendy Bazaar and saw in the far distance the lights and flares of Rangari Moholla returning. Knowing the hereditary animosity between Kolsa and Rangari Mohollas, and believing that if they met face to face in Bhendy Bazaar there would be a free fight, I managed with the help of Khan Bahadur Shaikh Ibrahim and the B division police to push the whole procession into Goghari Moholla, on its way up to the Nall Bazaar and Khoja Street, before Rangari Moholla had had time to get as far south. I sent two European police officers and some native police with the procession to see it safely through the C and E divisions.

Meanwhile I had received information from Mr. Gadney, who was at Sulliman Chowkey, that a very ugly-looking crowd was following behind the Rangari Moholla _toli_; and having got rid of the three other Mohollas, I determined to await the arrival of Rangari Moholla at Paidhuni and see what happened. About 3-45 a.m. it reached me in very sorry plight. It appears that having seen the tabut and _toli_ safely into the C division, Mr. Vincent walked by a side street to Nall Bazaar and escorted it thence to Sulliman Chowkey. By that time the _toli_ was being followed by an obviously hostile crowd, whistling and shouting “Huriya, Huriya”, the usual signal for disorder. Four more European officers from Sulliman Chowkey and the Doctor Street guard were therefore sent with the procession, while Mr. Vincent and a few C. I. D. officers walked behind the procession and between it and the crowd. Thus they left Sulliman Chowkey. After rounding the J.J. Hospital corner into Bhendy Bazaar the trouble began. The crowd, which was strengthened every minute by swarms of malcontents from the side _galis_, practically mobbed the police and the tabut procession all the way down Bhendy Bazaar. They shouted, whistled and used the filthiest language: they stoned the police and Rangari Moholla unceasingly; they beat the sowars and their horses with _lathis_, bringing one down; they carried on a hand-to-hand conflict as far as Paidhuni. The torch-bearers of Rangari Moholla put down their lights and fled, and the mob threw the lighted wood at the police. The tabut was within an ace of being abandoned when the Police seized the bearers and forced them to carry it on. Latiff was quivering with fear. Several times the European police begged Mr. Vincent to give orders to fire on the mob, which it was increasingly difficult to ward off, and each time Mr. Vincent refused, telling them to use their batons only and force the tabut and procession into the safer lanes of the B division. So they gradually arrived, fighting with the mob the whole way and being continuously stoned. A European officer and 2 native constables had to be sent to hospital to get their wounds dressed. At one point of the route a Pathan ranged himself on the side of the police and did remarkable execution on the mob with a _lathi_.

12. On hearing from Mr. Vincent at Paidhuni what had happened, and seeing that the crowd was increasing round the police station, I decided (_a_) to call for military assistance in picketing the streets and (_b_) to have a baton-charge on the mob. By this time it was quite obvious that the mob was composed of the worst elements in the recalcitrant Konkani Mohollas, Bengalpura and Teli Gali, aided, I believe, by the Kasai Moholla and Babu Hajam Moholla _badmashes_, who had definitely declined to lift their tabut. Since the 6th night I had, with the approval and assistance of General Swann, quartered 2 companies of the Warwickshire Regiment in the Head Police office as a precautionary measure. For eighty of these I at once telephoned and they arrived within 7 minutes. I ordered them to be stationed at Paidhuni, Koka Bazaar, Nawab’s Masjid, the junction of Erskine and Sandhurst roads, the J. J. Hospital corner, the Nall Bazaar and Doctor Street.

Having telephoned for the troops, I ordered the police to charge and disperse the mob. This they did with very good will and considerable success, though it was very difficult in the darkness to see what damage was done. Anyhow the mob dashed up the darker lanes and streets leading off Bhendy Bazaar and Paidhuni, and before they could collect again in force the troops had arrived. The sight of these put a check upon the mob’s intentions and they gradually melted away for the time being.

Meanwhile, fearing that Kolsa Moholla, Chuna Batti and Halai Moholla would be subjected to a similar attack, I sent police to call them back at once to their Mohollas from the C division. The police discovered Kolsa Moholla and Halai Moholla and turned them back, but Chuna Batti had gone far ahead and was lost for the time being in the north of the C division. By the time, however, that it reached the Bhendy Bazaar I had posted the troops and the procession had therefore a comparatively quiet passage back to its Moholla.

I append a copy of Mr. Vincent’s report to me on the disturbance in the early hours of Thursday morning.

13. In view of the rather serious situation created by the above circumstances I decided to leave the city for rest for 3 hours only. Mr. Vincent and I left at 6 a.m. and returned at 9 a.m., while Mr. Gadney stayed on till 9 a.m. and then went off on relief till 12 noon (on Thursday the 12th January). I also warned Rangari Moholla, Kolsa Moholla, Chuna Batti and Halai Moholla that if they wished to immerse their tabuts in the afternoon at Carnac Bandar, they must go straight down from their Mohollas to Carnac Road and not attempt to move up to and north of Paidhuni, They, however, refused to lift their tabuts or go out at all.

14. By 1 p.m. on Thursday it was fairly obvious that we were in for trouble. Huge crowds paraded the streets, and about 2 p.m. I received news that there was a certain amount of spasmodic stone-throwing at Paidhuni. I had definite information that not a single Moholla would lift its tabut. Believing that there was likely to be trouble in the neighbourhood of Doctor Street, I remained on duty at Sulliman Chowkey, where I was joined by General Swann and Major Capper. About 4-40 p.m., as no further news had come from Paidhuni, I decided to go and lie down for a short time, as I had had only 4 hours’ sleep on the morning of the 11th and none since. I went down Doctor Street to see that all was well and inspected the position there, and was making my way outside the Musalman quarter, when I was overtaken by the Commandant, Mounted Police, who told me that a message had just been received at Sulliman Chowkey to the effect that the situation at Paidhuni was very serious. I therefore rode straight back to Paidhuni.

On arrival there I found the road littered with new road-metal which was being flung at the police and the tram-cars and the military pickets by two large mobs situated, the one in Bhendy Bazaar and the other in Memonwada which debouches on Paidhuni. It was reported to me that about 4 p.m. the mob began to be very troublesome and the Paidhuni police went out with some mounted police to move them, but were forced to retire. At 4-15 the police again made a sally on the mob, but were stoned back again to Paidhuni. At about 4-30 p.m. the tram-traffic between the J. J. Hospital and Paidhuni came to a standstill. A European in a motor-car was stoned. The police then rushed out again and the mob retreated a little distance up Banian Row and Paidhuni Road and stoned them from there. Meanwhile a gang of Mahomedans at the junction of Chuna Batti was stoning carriages and trams. A tram-car in which a lady was seated was stopped by another gang and stones were thrown at the lady, who was hit on the left cheek. Then a number of Musalman youths got hold of the lady’s skirts, and as far as Sub-Inspector Butterfield (who was coming up to her rescue) could see, tried to pull the lady out of the car. Sub-Inspector Butterfield and 3 privates of the Warwicks with 6 constables then appeared on the spot. They were met by a shower of road-metal, but forced the mob some 20 or 25 paces up Chuna Batti, whence they were continuously stoned. Each time that they retired the crowd pressed forward again. At about 5 p.m. their retreat was cut off by another mob, which commenced throwing stones from the opposite side in Banian Cross Road and Pinjrapur Road. At 5-10 Sub-Inspector Butterfield saw the military officer at Paidhuni signal to him and the soldiers to get away from the danger zone, and as their retreat was cut off and they were unable to fight their way through, they ensconced themselves behind a municipal urinal at the junction of Chuna Batti and held the crowd off until firing commenced. While in this position they were continuously stoned both from the street and from the houses. Among those injured by the stoning of the trams was a Hindu solicitor, whose companion reports that there was a group of Pathans with stones at Nawab’s Masjid, and that the car in which he and his friend were sitting was stoned by bodies of rioters on both sides of Bhendy Bazaar from Nawab’s Masjid to Paidhuni. Mr. Paton of Messrs. W. and A. Graham and Company, who had come down with his wife to see the tabut procession and occupied an upper room in a house at the corner of Memonwada and Bhendy Bazaar, reports that he had to close the windows of the room in the side and rear against stones that were flung from the street. In referring to a group of Pathans who halted under the verandah of the house he writes:—

“In my twenty years’ experience of this country I never before witnessed behaviour which so impressed me with a sense of sinister intentions.”

Such was the position when I arrived about 5 p.m. The first thing I did was to ride forward a little way and have a look at both crowds. This produced a volley of road-metal. In the Memonwada crowd I observed 3 Pathans throwing stones and urging on the rest, and that established my conviction that the Pathans were on the war-path. My experience of previous disturbances shows that the Pathans at the very first sign of trouble begin to collect in small gangs at various points, and if the crowd once gets out of hand, they turn out in force and begin setting fire to shops and looting. This is unquestionably what they were preparing to do when I saw them.

I then looked at the Bhendy Bazaar mob, which completely covered the street as far as the eye could reach. In the front of it I noticed several boys throwing stones. I had already made up my mind that firing would have to be resorted to, as we had exhausted all attempts at pacific methods by Thursday morning at 3 a.m., and as also there was every possibility of the mob rising at Nall Bazaar, Two Tanks and Sulliman Chowkey, if the Bhendy Bazaar mob was not given a proper lesson. But I wanted to get rid of the boys first. Therefore about 5-10 p.m. I called the officer (Lieutenant Davies) in charge of the military picket and asked him to line up his men across both roads and place them in position to fire, but _not_ to fire until they received the order to do so. I hoped that the appearance of the soldiers would (_a_) frighten the boys in the Bhendy Bazaar mob away and (_b_) induce the mob to cease throwing stones and disperse. As regards (_a_) the movement had the desired effect and the small boys bolted; as regards (_b_) the mob retreated for a minute and then came forward again within 30 or 40 yards’ distance of the soldiers and recommenced stoning them. I was standing immediately behind the soldiers and saw them dodging the metal, while a stone hit Lieutenant Davies, near whom I was standing. At about 5-17 p.m. Rao Bahadur Setalvad, 4th Presidency Magistrate, for whom I had telephoned at 5-10 p.m., arrived on the scene and I pointed out the general position to him and told him that I thought we should have to fire. He saw both mobs, he saw the troops being stoned, and he saw the condition of the road. At roughly 5-20 p.m. he gave the order to fire.

The troops fired 72 rounds and put an end to the disturbance. As a result of the firing, 14 persons were killed, 6 persons were injured and subsequently died in the hospital, and 27 were injured, of whom 6 were treated and discharged immediately. Of the dead, 7 were Hindus who were mixed up in the mob and the rest were Mahomedans; and of the 27 injured, 19 were Mahomedans, 7 were Hindus and one was a Christian.

15. I greatly regret that we had to resort to extreme measures: but considering that the mob had been out at 3 a.m. and had had to be repulsed by the police, that the temper of the _badmash_ element had been getting steadily worse, and that the mob collected again in the afternoon in spite of the presence of the troops; considering also that stone-throwing had been going on for fully an hour before I arrived at Paidhuni, that all traffic was stopped, that the police at Paidhuni had three times tried to clear the mob, that the Pathans were bent on mischief, and that I was very apprehensive of trouble in other parts of the city if the disorder at Bhendy Bazaar was not put down very sharply, I am of opinion that by resorting to firing on the two mobs at Paidhuni we probably saved firing in other parts of the Musalman quarter and therefore greater loss of life. Government are aware how rapidly the spirit of tumult spreads, particularly among a populace like that of the Moharram celebrants, who belong to the lowest classes and actually regard the Mohorram, not as an opportunity for religious emotion but as the one chance vouchsafed them during the year of letting loose the forces of rascality and disorder and attacking the police and the public in more or less organised gangs. The information which I received from the _Katal-ki-rat_ onwards showed that there was a definite intention to create disorder, and the fact that new road-metal had been collected in the lanes leading off Bhendy Bazaar clearly shows that an outbreak was contemplated. I believe firmly that, had we not taken extreme measures at Paidhuni, we should have had to face rioting throughout the whole area bounded by Two Tanks, Falkland Road and Bhendy Bazaar.

16. I also regret greatly the presence of Hindus amongst the killed and wounded. It is impossible on such occasions to protect the innocent; but considering that the crowd had collected and been throwing stones for fully an hour before firing took place and that the divisional police had warned them to disperse, it is a matter of great regret that the Hindus, if they were innocent, did not disappear. I do not think the firing of the troops was in any way haphazard or open to censure, for had it been so, they must have killed an old beggar woman who was sitting on the pavement of Bhendy Bazaar with rioters on both sides of her. On either side of her a man was shot, but she was left untouched, and was subsequently led into Paidhuni by the police.

On the other hand it is an undeniable fact that Hindus, and particularly the sectional bad characters amongst them, take a prominent part in the Moharram _tolis_ and mob. Mr. Paton, who was an eye-witness of the whole outbreak, writes:—

“Under our eyes, and we were between the mob and troops all the while, the troops and police were murderously stoned, happily without any serious mishap, for close upon three-quarters of an hour. No law-abiding citizen had therefore any right to have been in either of the mobs and most certainly not at the late moment when the firing took place. If any were there at the outset of the stone-throwing he had most ample time and warning in which to get away, and if any stayed out of curiosity he had only himself to blame if he suffered along with the _badmashes_ with whom he chose to herd.”

17. Just after the firing ceased and both mobs had disappeared, General Swann arrived at Paidhuni; and at his suggestion I called up from the Head Police Office the balance of the Warwickshire Regiment, and from Marine Lines 4 companies of the 96th Berár Infantry. These were posted at once throughout the disturbed area. The measures taken at Paidhuni, however, had such an effect that by 10 p.m. I was able to draw off some of the military from each picket. By 12 midnight on Thursday I was able to send all British troops back to barracks, and by 12 midnight on Sunday the 15th January I was able to send back all the native infantry and reduce the police guard. This was partly due to the action of the police on Friday and Saturday in arresting a large number of persons who were identified as having played a prominent part in the disturbances of Thursday morning and Thursday afternoon. All those persons against whom definite evidence is forthcoming are being placed before the magistracy. By Friday morning all was outwardly quiet and the City had resumed its normal aspect. Since then there has been nothing to record beyond the fact that the bad characters of a particular type, who signalize their mode of life by wearing their hair long in front and curled, have had their locks cropped by the barber for fear of being arrested by the police as participants in the _toli_ disturbances.

18. There are certain points in this sorry business of the Moharram of 1911, which give some cause for satisfaction:—

_First._—The police carried out their orders regarding Doctor Street to the very letter and kept it hermetically closed from the first to the last day.

_Secondly._—The self-restraint shewn by Mr. Vincent, the European officers, the 4 sowars and the native foot police, who accompanied the Rangari Moholla tabut from the J. J. Hospital to Paidhuni in the early hours of the 12th under a continuous attack with stones, lighted wood and _làthis_, is worthy of commendation.

_Thirdly._—The material support which was received from General Swann and his staff went far towards recompensing the Police Commissioner for the anxiety of a ten days’ struggle to checkmate the forces of disorder. General Swann himself spent the 6th night with me at Sulliman Chowkey up to 4 a.m., with the sole object of shewing the public that he and I were working together. And many must have recognized him and drawn their own conclusions. General Swann was also present at Sulliman Chowkey on the last day and also at Paidhuni. I cannot sufficiently express my thanks for his help, and for the ready assistance afforded by Lieut-Colonel H. R. Vaughan and his regiment, and subsequently by Colonel Powys Lane and the 96th Berár Infantry.

_Fourthly._—I must express my thanks to Inspector Khan Bahadur Shaikh Ibrahim and the Mahomedan officers of the Criminal Investigation Department for their continuous efforts throughout a period of nearly three weeks to smooth away all difficulties and keep the Mohollas in a good temper. That their efforts ultimately proved fruitless was no fault of theirs, but was due to circumstances beyond their control. I have a lively sense of their unremitting efforts to ensure a peaceful Moharram.

_Fifthly._—Mr. Ardeshir Umrigar deserves special mention in that for a period of a week he supplied free of all cost at Paidhuni, Sulliman Chowkey and Nall Bazaar mineral waters, tea, coffee, sandwiches and light refreshments for the use of the European police officers who were on continuous duty at and near those points both by day and night. For the native constables who were in the streets for ten days and nights and who had no time to go to their homes, I provided 2 annas _per diem_ apiece to enable them to buy a meal and tea. A portion, if not the whole of the sum thus involved, has been offered to me by Rao Bahadur Keshavji N. Sailor, so that possibly I may not have to ask Government to sanction this extra but necessary expenditure.

_Sixthly._—Credit is due to Badlu and the Madanpura Julhais for accepting the position, keeping their promise to me, and performing their Moharram and tabut immersion in the regular way without giving the smallest trouble to the police.

_Seventhly._—Great credit is due to the divisional police of all ranks for the manner in which they performed a vigil of ten days and nights and for the self-restraint which they shewed in dealing with the mob.

19. In conclusion, I must raise the question as to what should be our policy for the future in regard to the Moharram. As matters are at present, there is no vestige of religion or religious fervour in the _toli_-processions and the tabut-processions. On the contrary the Moharram has become, and is utilized as merely an excuse for rascality to burst its usual barriers and flow over the city in a current of excessive turbulence. For ten days every year the Hindu merchants are blackmailed and harassed until they pay a contribution to the cost of the processions; the police, who are not half numerous enough to guard the whole area involved, are kept in the streets for ten days and nights and ordinary police work simply disappears, as there is no officer at the police-stations to record complaints and no native police to take up an enquiry; a large portion of the Shia population has to evacuate its houses and take refuge in Sálsette for fear of insult and assault; and in the end, if the police hold fast and insist upon rascality keeping within certain limits, the city has to face the distressing spectacle of open disorder and its complement of drastic repression.

The only unobjectionable features of the ten days’ celebration are the nightly _Waaz_ or religious discourses by chosen preachers. But, unfortunately, these are little patronized by those to whom they would do most good, namely, the bad characters in the _tolis_.

_Statement made by Mr. N. J. Paton, J. P., partner in the firm of Messrs. W. & A. Graham & Co._

On Thursday, 12th January, at 2 p.m., at the invitation of a Mahomedan friend I went with Mrs. Paton to the house at the junction of Parel Road and Kolsa Moholla (otherwise Memonwada) with a view to witnessing the Moharram procession.

The house, on the first floor where we were, has windows at the back and on the Kolsa Moholla side and a verandah on the Parel Road side, the latter affording a clear view down the Parel Road and of the open space in front of the Paidhuni Police Station.

The crowd came and went without much incident until about 3, when two Mahomedans were brought up under arrest amid a good deal of apparently sympathetic shouting on the part of the on-lookers.

After that the temper of the crowd seemed to change; but, although several carriages with European ladies drove past, they were suffered to do so without molestation.

I was not myself then anxious, but my Mahomedan friend at about 4 o’clock warned me that the crowd was now anything but peaceably disposed. Shortly thereafter I became apprehensive of coming trouble on noting the overt truculent bearing of the Pathans, of whom there were many, and notably of a group which halted for some time under our verandah. In my twenty years’ experience of the country I never before witnessed behaviour which so impressed me with a sense of sinister intentions.

At about 4-30 the police made a systematic attempt to clear the pavements and street in front of the Police Station down to opposite our verandah.

This the crowd resented and there was considerable hooting.

A few minutes later one stone was thrown from the crowd in Kolsa Moholla, and almost immediately stone-throwing of a very serious and dangerous kind commenced on both sides of us.

We were obliged to close our windows at the back and Kolsa Moholla side; but, although numerous stones fell on our house, none entered and no one was injured.

From the verandah it was possible to see not only what was going on in Parel Road but also to note the fusillade of stones that came from Kolsa Moholla.

The trams were still running in Parel Road; and, as each passed the end of Goghari Moholla, it was met by murderous volleys of stones, which by pure luck alone failed to result in most serious consequences to the passengers.

Occasionally the police endeavoured to keep the crowd at a distance by themselves throwing stones.

In this way half an hour passed, when about 5 o’clock or thereabouts Mr. Edwardes arrived and took charge.

Under his direction the detachment of the Warwicks, which had been standing under arms in the neighbourhood all the afternoon, was drawn in line across Parel Road and Kolsa Moholla and knelt down in readiness to fire.

The officer in charge waved his handkerchief in the hope that any law-abiding persons who might still be in the crowd would clear away.

About 5-15 Mr. Setalwad and Mr. Vincent arrived; and, as the stone-throwing was then proceeding as vigorously as ever, Mr. Setalwad gave the order to fire, an order that was immediately carried out. After two or three volleys, occupying about a minute, “cease firing” was ordered.

The mob had by this time cleared off, leaving between thirty and forty dead and wounded.

It is said some innocent Hindus have suffered. I hardly think this is possible.

If the troops had fired hurriedly it might have been so, but they did not fire without the most ample warning.

Under our eyes, and we were between the mob and the troops all the while, the troops and Police were murderously stoned, happily without any serious mishap, for close upon three-quarters of an hour.

No law-abiding citizen had, therefore, any right to have been in either of the mobs and most certainly not at the late moment when the firing took place. If any were there at the outset of the stone-throwing he had most ample time and warning in which to get away, and if any stayed out of curiosity he had only himself to blame if he suffered along with the _badmashes_ with whom he chose to herd.

It is impossible to under-estimate the seriousness of what might have occurred if the drastic lesson that was administered had been longer delayed, and it is puerile for those who were not present to presume to criticise it.

The two mobs numbered many thousands of the most lawless and fanatical men in the city, and the manner in which the fusillade of stones was started and kept up indicates clearly that stones must have been purposely brought to the ground in readiness for the fight and in very considerable quantity.

Viewing the situation as a whole, I consider that the mob without doubt was given more leniency than it had any right to expect, and that to have postponed the firing any longer, or to have restricted the firing to a single volley, must inevitably have seriously imperilled the safety of a large section of the city and would have involved much greater bloodshed than unhappily occurred, before order could have been restored.

Those who were eye-witnesses like myself can hold but one opinion as to the judgment, restraint and patience with which, in circumstances of intolerable and protracted provocation, Mr. Edwardes dealt with a situation of extreme gravity and difficulty.

RESOLUTION.—The Governor-in-Council has given careful consideration to the reports of the disturbance which took place in the city of Bombay on 12th January, 1911 on the occasion of the Moharram festival. He is of opinion that the police acted throughout with great discretion and restraint and that the final appeal to military force was necessary for the public security. The loss of life which occurred is much to be regretted, but the military do not appear to have done more than was consistent with dispersing the mob. The Governor-in-Council desires to express his thanks to the military authorities for the prompt assistance rendered by them and to Mr. Edwardes, Commissioner of Police, and the force under his charge, for their great exertions throughout the whole period of the Moharram.

2. It now remains to consider the measures to be taken for the future. Government have done all that lay within their power to enable the Moharram processions to be held with due regard to the safety of the law-abiding mass of the community, but without success. In 1909 and 1910 there were no processions; but this year, as in 1908, in spite of every precaution there were scenes of disorder and violence which had ultimately to be quelled by military force with considerable loss of life. Government cannot allow the recurrence of such disturbances, and it has become necessary to consider whether the procession of tabuts, with their attendant _tolis_, should not be prohibited next year. Before arriving at any final decision, however, Government trust that the Mahomedan community will, through their leaders or otherwise, endeavour to concert effective measures to secure that, while the religious character of the observance of the Moharram is retained, there may be a reasonable guarantee that it shall not again degenerate into lawlessness, discreditable to all concerned and gravely injurious to the interests of Bombay. The Governor-in-Council will be ready to give the most careful consideration to any such proposals, but it will be possible to adopt them only if they seem to provide a reasonable guarantee against any future disturbance of the peace.

3. In this connection the leaders of the Mahomedan community could do much to assist the cause of law and order by explaining to the people that the tabut processions and _tolis_ are in no way necessary to the religious celebration of the Moharram. Government have received information that for many years Kâzis in Sind have been issuing _fatwâs_ inveighing against the degradation of the mourning ceremony into processions of jesters and mountebanks, and that in the town of Sujāwal the people have themselves put a stop to all tabut processions.

_By order of His Excellency the Honourable the Governor-in-Council_,

C. A. KINCAID, Secretary to Government.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Charles II transferred Bombay to the E.I. Company in 1668.

[2] Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island, Vol. II. 238.

[3] Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island, Vol. II, pp. 65 ff.

[4] R. and O. Strachey, _Keigwin’s Rebellion_, p. 19 and App. E.

[5] The letter of December 15, 1673, from Aungier and Council mentions these as some of the chief classes of Hindus in Bombay.

[6] R. and O. Strachey, _Keigwin’s Rebellion_, p. 41.

[7] Ibid. p. 68.

[8] Bombay Gazetteer, Vol. XXVI. (Materials), Part III, p. 8.

[9] Bombay Gazetteer, Vol. XXVI, Part iii, p. 8.

[10] Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island, Vol. II, p. 238.

[11] Rev. F. Ovington, _Voyage to Suratt in 1689_. London, 1696.

[12] P. B. Malabari, _Bombay in the Making_, p. 437.

[13] Ibid. p. 465. _Vereador_ means procurator or attorney. The _Vereador_ wore a gown as Vereador da Camera or member of a town council (Da Cunha).

[14] Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island, Vol. II, p. 212.

[15] Bombay Gazetteer, Vol. XXVI, Part iii, pp. 8 ff.

[16] P. B. Malabari, _Bombay in the Making_, p. 287.

[17] Warden’s Report in W. H. Morley, _Analytical Digest of Cases decided in the Supreme Court of Judicature_ (London, 1849), Vol. II, p. 458.

[18] W. H. Morley, _Digest etc._, Vol. II (Warden’s Report); Bombay Gazetteer, Vol. XXVI, iii.

[19] General Wedderburn was killed at the storming of Broach in November, 1772.

[20] The fact that it was called the Bhandari militia implies that the Native Christian element had largely disappeared, and that Bhandaris and other Hindus of the lower classes formed the bulk of the force.

[21] Bombay Gazetteer, Vol. XXVI (Materials), Part iii.

[22] Morley _Digest_ etc. (Warden’s Report).

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid. Bombay Gazetteer, Vol. XXVI, Part iii.

[25] At that date the office of Superintendent of Police existed at Calcutta.

[26] Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island, Vol. II, p. 241 (note) Morley, _Digest etc._

[27] Morley, _Digest etc._ (Warden’s Report) Vol. II; Bombay Gazetteer, Vol. XXVI, Part III, 67.

[28] Sir J. Mackintosh’s letter in Morley, _Digest etc._, Vol. II, p. 513.

[29] It is not clear whether this post is identical with “Pilaji Ramji’s Naka” of the twentieth century, which is the name familiarly applied to the junction of Grant Road and Duncan Road near the Northbrook Gardens. Here some years ago one Pilaji Ramji occupied a corner house, in which he used to place an enormous figure of the god Ganesh during the annual Ganpati festival. Large crowds of Hindus used to visit the house to see the idol, and hence gave the name “Pilaji’s post” to the locality. It is quite possible that the name first came into use in the eighteenth century.

[30] Published in 1816, with illustrations by Rowlandson.

[31] Morley, _Digest etc._ (Warden’s Report), Vol. II, p. 492.

[32] _Bombay Courier_, February 4th, 1797.

[33] Sir J. Mackintosh’s letter of October, 1811, in Morley, _Digest etc._ Vol. II.

[34] Warden’s Report in Morley, _Digest etc._ Vol. II, pp. 482 ff.

[35] The Third Magistrate was not appointed until 1830. The other two were appointed in 1812, and the Second exercised jurisdiction over the whole Island, excluding the Fort and Harbour.

[36] Morley, _Digest etc._ (Warden’s Report), Vol. II.

[37] Hobson-Jobson, 1903, s. v. Cauzee.

[38] The Kazis of the Bene-Israel officiated at all festivals of the community until the latter half of the nineteenth century, when, as education advanced, the office gradually became extinct. One Samuel Nissim was Kazi in 1800 (Gazetteer of Bombay City & Island, Vol I, pp. 250 ff.)

[39] One of the most notorious gangs was that of a certain Ali Paru, described in the _Times of India_ of July 27, 1872.

[40] _Bombay Courier_, March 3rd, 1827.

[41] Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island, Vol. II, p. 143.

[42] One Thomas Holloway appears in the Annual Register as “High Constable” in 1827.

[43] The Supreme Court supplanted the Recorder’s Court in 1823, and was opened in 1824.

[44] F. D. Drewitt, _Bombay in the days of George IV_.

[45] P. B. Malabari, _Bombay in the Making_, p. 283.

[46] _Times of India_, September 22, 1894.

[47] Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island, Vol. II, p. 224 (note 2.)

[48] Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island, Vol. II, p. 146-7.

[49] S. T. Sheppard, _The Byculla Club_, p. 5.

[50] Mrs. Postans, _Western India_ in 1838, Vol. I, p. 27. The _Pagis_ received about Rs. 7 a month for prowling about the compounds of houses by night.

[51] Ibid., Vol. II, p. 222.

[52] Mrs. Postans, _Western India in 1838_, Vol. I, p. 92.

[53] Mrs. Postans, _Western India in 1838_, Vol. I, p. 27.

[54] _Bombay Times_, Feb. 22, 1845.

[55] Ibid., July 31, 1844.

[56] Report of Bombay Chamber of Commerce, 1854-55, pp. 11, 12.

[57] _Bombay Times_, December 14th, 1850.

[58] _Bombay Times_, October 18, 1851.

[59] _Report on the Administration of Public Affairs in the Bombay Presidency for 1855-56._ “During the year 1855 great reforms have been effected in the Police within the jurisdiction of His Majesty’s Supreme Court. Complaints were made by the Chamber of Commerce of the venality of the European constables and of the inefficiency of the general force. These complaints, and other circumstances which induced suspicion, determined Government to place in immediate command of the Police, Mr. Forjett, the most active and efficient of the Mofussil Superintendents, a gentleman who had once been a Foujdar, and who had risen to high and responsible appointments, solely through his own remarkable energy, acuteness and ability. An enquiry by this gentleman soon showed the existence of corruption among the European Constables, a corruption which impaired the efficiency of the whole force. A considerable number were summarily dismissed, and a thorough reform in Police arrangements throughout the Island was commenced by the new Superintendent. These are still in progress: but the Government has been assured that a feeling of entire security as to life and property is now entertained by all classes of the community.”

[60] Mr. B. Aitken in _Old and New Bombay_ states that Forjett was partly of French descent, and that the family name was originally Forget. Owing to constant mispronunciation, Forjett eventually anglicised the name in the form now familiar to students of Bombay history.

[61] See General Adm. Report, Bombay, 1855-56 and 1858-59.

[62] Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island, Vol. II, p. 244.

[63] The Annual Adm. Rep. Bombay Pres. for 1858-59 mentions that only one case of burglary had occurred in that year and that “robberies with violence have entirely disappeared”.

[64] Annual Police Returns, showing state of crime, for 1859-61. (India Office Records).

[65] Report of the Maharaja Libel Case, Bombay Gazette Press, 1862.

[66] Dunlop had been 3rd Assistant to the Master Attendant of the Government Dockyard, and was appointed head of the Water Police in 1844. Prior to that year no proper water police force was in existence.

[67] Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island, Vol. III, 252; _Times of India_, January 2nd, 1865; Annual Adm. Rep. Bombay Presidency, 1862-63.

[68] Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island, Vol. III, 49.

[69] Annual Crime Return, 1860; Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island, Vol. II, 244.

[70] Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island, Vol. II, p. 157.

[71] C. Forjett, _Our Real Danger in India_, 1877; _Bombay Gazette_, December 25th, 1907.

[72] C. Forjett, _Our Real Danger in India_, 1877; Holmes, _History of the Indian Mutiny_.

[73] Apparently it was customary during the Muharram festival in the ’fifties of last century to post a body of 200 Europeans in “the Bhendy Bazar stables”. Presumably additional European police were brought in from Poona and other districts. The Muharram danger was finally eradicated in 1912.

[74] The Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island, Vol. II, 158.

[75] C. Forjett, _Our Real Danger in India, 1877_.

[76] Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island, Vol. II, 158-9.

[77] C. Forjett, _Our Real Danger in India_.

[78] Douglas, _Bombay and W. India_, I, 211.

[79] C. Forjett, _Our Real Danger in India_.

[80] The use of the phrase “Deputy Commissioner of Police” is explained by the fact that, strictly speaking, the Senior Magistrate was at this date Commissioner of Police, and Forjett as head of the “executive police” was his Deputy. Forjett in his book speaks of himself as Commissioner of Police: but this title was not given to the head of the force till 1865. In the Senior Magistrate’s Annual Crime Return for 1860 Forjett is styled Superintendent of Police: but in his evidence before the Supreme Court in the Bhattia Conspiracy Case, Forjett stated, “In my official capacity as Deputy Commissioner of Police, I received a letter.”

[81] In earlier days one of the chief haunts of these gangs was a deep hollow near the site of the present Arthur Crawford Market (J. M. Maclean, _Guide to Bombay_, 1902, p. 206.)

[82] Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island, II, 244; Ann. Adm. Rep. Bombay Presidency, 1858-59.

[83] C. Forjett, _Our Real Danger in India_.

[84] F. H. Forjett joined the 59th Foot in 1865 and in 1870 was transferred to the Bombay Staff Corps. He served mostly in the 26th Bombay N. I., which in the “seventies” and “eighties” was known familiarly as the “Black Watch”, owing to its having no less than three Eurasian British officers, namely John Miles, the Commandant, a half-caste of dominating personality, John M. Heath and F. H. Forjett.

[85] C. E. Buckland, _Dictionary of Indian Biography_.

[86] J. Douglas, _Bombay and Western India_, I, 211.

[87] Letter to _Morning Post_, August 30th, 1921.

[88] Prior to 1865 there appear to have been 26 mounted police.

[89] First Annual Rep. of the Commissioner of Police, 1884; Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island, II, 245.

[90] G. R. J.D. No. 5628 of August 10th, 1883.

[91] Annual Crime Return, 1872.

[92] G. R. J. D. 2633 of April 21st, 1877.

[93] G. R. J. D. 2427 of April 29th, 1873.

[94] _Times of India_, 1872; Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island, II, 179.

[95] Senior Magistrate’s Report of Crime, 1873.

[96] _Times of India_, February 14th, 1874; the Annual Register, 1874; J. M. Maclean, _Guide to Bombay_ (1902) p. 285; Gazetteer Bombay City II, 180.

[97] Memoir of Sir Dinshaw Petit, Bart. by S. M. Edwardes, 1923.

[98] Annual Report of Senior Magistrate, 1874.

[99] Letter from Lord Salisbury to the Governor-General in Council, July 9th, 1874.

[100] Sir R. Temple, _Men & Events of My Time in India_.

[101] Annual Report of Senior Magistrate of Police for 1875.

[102] G. R. J. D., June 24th, 1892.

[103] G. R. J. D., 5389 of August 28th, 1893.

[104] Gazetteer of Bombay City and Island, II, 237. A Fourth Presidency Magistrate was appointed in 1892 and was accommodated in the Esplanade Police Court. After the occupation of the Nesbit Lane building by the Second Presidency Magistrate, the Court of the Fourth Magistrate was also located there.

[105] Report of Comm. of Police for 1893.

[106] Mr. Cooper, the Chief Presidency Magistrate, retired in 1893 and was succeeded by Mr. J. Sanders-Slater.

[107] Mr. Crummy acted more than once as Deputy Commissioner of Police.

[108] P. E. Roberts, _Hist. Geography of British Dependencies_, Vol. VII, p. 508.

[109] The account which follows is taken, in some passages _verbatim_, from Sir V. Chirol’s _Indian Unrest_, 1910.

[110] The Sirdar served for 38 years, having joined the force as a second-class Jemadar in 1865. Apart from his work as a detective, he is remembered as the founder of the Maratha Plague Hospital, which he organised and opened in 1898.

[111] G.R.J.D. 3051 of June 4th, 1903.

[112] He received the title of Khan Bahadur in 1904 and the King’s Police Medal in 1910.

[113] V. Chirol, _Indian Unrest_, pp. 55, 56.

[114] V. Chirol, _Indian Unrest_, p. 57.

[115] Prior to 1913 the Excise authorities were not empowered to prosecute offenders in the Courts. The Police had to conduct all prosecutions. From the year mentioned the Excise department was given the necessary powers.

[116] A full and detailed report of the disturbance is given in Mr. Edwardes’ letter to Government, No. 545 C. of January 20th, 1911, printed below as an Appendix.

INDEX

A

Acworth, H. A., 102

Adultery, 66

Aga Khan, H. H. the, 63, 108-9

American Civil War, 50-54

Andhiyaru (“Andaroo”), 25, 28

_Ank Satta_, 84

Anonymous Postcards case, 171-2

Anthropometry, Bertillon system of, 95

Antonio, José, 34, 35

Armed Police, 9, 91

Arms Act, 61, 158-9

Arms traffic, illicit, 82

Asna Ashariya Khojas, 108, 109

Aston, A. H. S., 193

Aungier, Gerald, 1, 2, 5

_Aurora_ Conspiracy, 64

B

Back Bay Company, 51

Balloon ascents, 84

Bandareens, see Bhandaris

Bank, Credit, 72

Bank, Cosmopolitan, 172, 173

Bank, Specie, 172

Bank failures, 172, 173

Barrow, Major, 49

_Barsat ka Satta_, see Gambling, rain

Baynes, Capt. E., 35, 37

Bazar Gate, 41

Beggars, 15, 114, 115, 131

Bennett, Douglas, 102, 104

Bhagoji Naik, 54

Bhandari Militia, 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 9

Bhandaris, 2, 7 and _n_, 8, 9, 13, 30, 32

Bhat, 25, 27, 28

Bhattia Conspiracy Case, 43

Bhendy Bazar, 32, 37, 47_n_, 69, 75, 140, 176, 184, 185 and App.

Bickersteth, J. P., 56

Bombay Banking Company, 172, 173

Bombay Light Horse, 101, 139

Bombay Volunteer Artillery, 101

Brewin, Superintendent H., 73, 82, 91, 96, 98

Briscoe, Charles, 23, 28

Brown, F. L., 56

Bruce, Colonel, 55, 56

Budgen, General, 101

Burrows, Captain, 35

C

Calcutta _mori_, see Gambling, rain

Cauzee, see Kazi

Census (1864), 55; (1901), 119; (1906), 122

Chamber of Commerce, 144

Cheating cases, 169, 170

Chelmsford, arrival of Lord, 176, 177

Chhaganlal M. Tijoriwala, 192, 193

Child, John, 2, 3

Children, murder of, 65, 66, 107

Chief of Mahim, 19

Chief Presidency Magistrate, 57, 58, 96_n_, 193

_Chilli-chors_, 101 and App.

City Improvement Trust, 113, 147, 156, 174

Clarke, Sir George (Lord Sydenham), 144, 145, 165

Cocaine, 93, 166-68

Colaba, 28, 30, 36, 120

Commission of the Peace, 17

Commissioner of Police, appointment of, 50_n_, 56, 57

Committee, Morison, 123, 146, 148-9

Connon, John, 56, 58

Constabulary, European, 17, 18, 26, 36, 46, 47_n_, 48, 58, 74, 75, 90, 125, 134

” Indian, 17, 18, 26, 36, 46, 48, 58, 74, 90

” ” good work of, 137, 138, 174-76

Contagious Diseases Act, 61

Conveyances, number of, 94, 130

Cooper, C. P., 56, 74, 83, 102

Cordue, Colonel, 142

Corfield, A. K., 35, 37

Cotton-fires, 129, 130, 180-81

Court of Petty Sessions, 33, 34, 56, 57

Crawford, W., 37, 42, 45

Crowley Boevey, Mr., 70, 71

Crime, 4, 7, 9, 10, 14-16, 20, 21, 28-33, 36-7, 41, 51, 74, 89, 92, 97, 103, 106-110, 127-8, 165-6, 169

Criminal Investigation Department, 109, 137, 146, 148-50, 152-4, 160, 171, 178, 190

Criminal Procedure Code, 70, 92-3, 117

Crummy, Superintendent, 96 and _n_, 120

Cuffe, Lieut., 101

Cursetji Suklaji Street, 86, 87

Curtis, Capt. W., 35

D

Dacoity, 31, 107

Daji Gangaji Subehdar, 133

Danvers, E. F., 35

Dastur, Pheroze H., 103, 123

De Ga case, 62, 63, 72

Deputy-Superintendent (Mahim), 19, 20

Detective Police, 62, 71-73, 81, 89, 92, 146

de Vitré, J. D., 30, 35

Dinanath N. Dandekar, 144

Dockyard police, 55, 59, 126, 150, 152, 168

Doctor Street, 138, 168, 182, 184

“Dongri and the Woods”, 7, 17, 18, 19

Dosabhai F. Karaka, 56

Dunlop, Mr., 43, 44_n_

Dwarkadas Dharamsey, 173, 174

E

Edginton, Mr., 48, 62, 73

Edwardes, S. M., 123, 129, 137, 148-194 and App.

_Eki-beki_, 83

Elphinstone, Lord, 37, 40, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 53

Elphinstone Circle, 44

Embezzlement case, 170

Enthoven, R. E., 119

Erskine, W., 28

European offenders, 42, 64, 65, 66, 67

Ewart, Latham & Co., fraud on, 169

Explosives, 158, 159

F

False complaints, 108, 170

False evidence, 64, 72

Famine, effects of, 107, 108, 127

Farrant, G. L., 35

_Fazendars_, 7, 9

Finger-Print Bureau, 95, 96, 131, 132, 161, 162

Fire-brigade, 44, 56, 71, 73

Fisher, James, 19

Foreigners Act, 85, 86, 88, 115

Forgery, 64, 82, 128, 129

Forjett, Charles, 37, 38 and _n_, 39-53, 72, 73, 96, 118

Forjett, F. H. (Colonel), 52 and _n_, 101

Forjett Street, 53

Framji Bhikaji, Inspector, 73

Fraser, Lovat G., 119

Frere, Sir Bartle, 44, 55

G

Gambling Act, 83, 114

Gambling, rain, 82, 83

” ordinary, 83, 84, 113, 114

Ganga Prasad, 49

Ganpati celebrations, 90, 104-106, 154

Gayer, Sir John, 4

Gell, H. G., 73, 79, 120-147, 149, 162

Gentus (Hindus), 2

Giles, Chief Inspector M. J., 159

_Golconda_, S. S., 191

Goodwin, Richard, 28

Grant, G., 35

Grant, Sir J. P., 28, 29

Grant Road, 41, 86, 100, 102, 103, 140, 155, 176, 182, 185

Gray, H., 35

Grennan, Superintendent, 96, 134

Griffith, F. C., 150

_Gurakhi_, 110

H

Haj Committee, 136

Haj Traffic, 61, 62, 89, 98, 110, 134-6, 150, 161

Halliday, Simon, 17, 19, 22, 23

Harbour police, 26, 27, 36, 44, 55, 59, 91, 126, 150, 168, 189

Harker, O. A., 150

Henry, Sir E., 95, 149

Hewitt, B. H., 130

High Constable, 13, 17, 20, 26, 34

Hill-Trevor, A., 142

Holloway, Thomas, 28_n_, 34

Humfrey, Major, 79

I

Ingram, Superintendent, 96

Intemperance, 32, 64, 65, 89, 93

J

Jacob’s Circle, 142, 143, 144

Jagannath Shankarshet, 45, 46

Julhais, 101, 103, 182 and App.

Justices of the Peace, 5, 6, 10, 11, 14, 17, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 32, 34, 44

K

Kabraji, K. N., 41

Kazi, 25, 27

” of Bombay, 47, 48

Kazi Kabiruddin, 158

Keigwin, Richard, 3

Kennedy, H., 107-19, 127

Kennedy, M., 120

Khairaz, G. R., 193

Kidnapping, 115, 116, 117

Kirtikar, Mr., 132

Koregaonkar, K. R., 189

L

_Lakdi Satta_, see Gambling, rain

Lambert, R. P., 120

Lamington, Lord, 137

Law and Justice (1700), 5, 6

” ” (1800), 29, 30

Le Geyt, P. W., 35

Leslie, A., 142

“Lieutenant of Police”, 10, 12, 13

M

Macdonald, James, 142

Mackintosh, Sir J., 15, 22, 23, 25, 33

Magistrates of Police, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 33, 37, 44, 56, 57

Mansfield, Lieut., 84

Manslaughter, 43

Mayor’s Court, 5

McDermott, Superintendent, 96, 134

Memorial Fund, S. M. E., 158

Messent, P., 142

Mills, Superintendent, 63

Mir Abdul Ali, Sirdar, 63, 64, 72, 82, 92, 96, 119, 129 and _n_

Mir Akbar Ali, 62, 63, 72

Moors, 2

Morison, Sir W., 123

Morley, James, 19

Morris, Inspector, 172

Motor-vehicles, 130, 160

Mounted Police, 46, 90, 91, 112, 136, 176

Moharram, 36, 37, 46-8, 67-8, 72, 105, 181-84, 186-7, 191 and App. (See also “Riots, Moharram”)

_Mukadams_, 24

Municipal Commissioner, 44, 51, 56, 102, 193

Municipal Corporation, 56, 59, 77, 126, 174

Murder, Khoja Street, 62

” Roonan’s, 63

” Khoja (1), 63, (2), 108-9

” Pakmodie Street, 63, 64

” Dadar triple, 81

” Clerk Road, 81

” Khambekar Street, 81

” Rajabai Tower, 81, 82

” Walkeshwar (1), 91, (2), 166

” Duarte’s, 92

” Bapty Road, 175

” Regimental, 191-2

_Musafirkhana_, 62, 135

Mutiny days, 39, 45-50, 54

N

Nall Bazaar, 167

Nanabhai Dinshaw, 128

Narayan T. Vaidya, 144

Nasik murder trial, 176

Nolan, Superintendent, 96, 134

Northcote, Lord, 137

O

Oliveira, Mr., 193

Oliver, N. W., 37

Opium-dens, 93

Oriental spinning and weaving mill, 71

Orphanage, Abdulla H. D. Bavla, 163-5

P

_Pagi_, 31 and _n_

Parsi hooligans, 41

Pawnbrokers, 21

Petit, Sir Dinshaw, 43, 77

Petit, John, 2

Petroleum Act, 158, 159

Phillips, R. M., 120, 150

Pilaji Ramji’s naka, 18 and _n_

Pilgrim Brokers, 62, 135

Pilgrim Department, 62, 89, 98, 135, 137

Pillory, 29, 30

Pimps, foreign, 85, 86, 87, 88, 115, 131

Piracy, 28, 43

Plague, 97, 98, 107, 122, 127

” effect on police of, 90, 97, 98, 99, 106

Poisoning, 42, 91, 92, 108

Poisons Act, 158, 159

Police, corruption among, 15, 23, 33, 36, 37, 40, 41

” health of, 60, 74, 79, 80, 89, 98, 99

” literacy of, 60, 73, 133, 134, 157, 158

” pay of, 13, 14, 60, 124, 125, 126

Police buildings and housing, 74, 75, 76, 80, 112, 113, 132, 136, 155, 156, 157

Police Charges Act, 111, 126, 127

Police Commission, 91, 122, 123

Police Court, Esplanade, 75, 80, 132

Police ” Mazagon, 80, 132

Police Divisions, 7, 9, 17, 18, 111, 153

Police force, cost of, (1812), 26, 27, (1885), 59, (1888), 60, 79, (1892), 79, (1893), 90, (1894), 91, (1900), 110, (1902), 122, (1908), 126, (1911), 152, (1913), 152, (1915), 152

Police force, strength of (1793) 18, (1812), 26, 27, (1865), 55, 56, (1871), 58, (1879), 58, (1881), 58, (1885), 58-60, (1888), 60, 79, (1892), 79, (1893), 90, (1894), 90, 91, (1900), 110, (1902), 122, (1909), 152, (1911), 152, (1913), 152, (1915), 152

Police Gazette, 154-5

Police Hospital, 137

Police Office (Fort), 33; (Byculla), 75, 80; (Hornby Road), 75, 80, 112, 137, 162, 188, 190

Police precautions (Royal Visit), 177-80

Police Regulations and Acts, 6, 7, 11, 12, 22, 25, 37, 45, 71, 88, 96, 127

Police reorganization, 7, 8, 9, 10, 16, 17, 18, 19, 23, 25, 26, 31, 38, 54-6, 80, 90, 91, 123, 145-6, 148-9, 151-7

Police Stations, Agripada, 113, 156

” ” Bazar Gate, 75, 112

” ” Colaba, 113, 156

” ” Esplanade, 75, 80, 157

” ” Frere Road, 157

” ” Gamdevi, 157

” ” Hughes Road, 157

” ” Khetwadi, 157

” ” Lamington Rd., 157

” ” Maharbaudi, 75, 80, 81, 156

” ” Mahim, 157

” ” Mody Bay, 156

” ” Nagpada, 113, 136, 156, 175

” ” Paidhoni, 75, 112

” ” Palton Road, 157

” ” Parel, 157

” ” Princess Street, 113, 156

” ” Sussex Road, 136

” ” Wodehouse Road, 136

Police work, growth of, 60, 61, 65, 66, 96, 108, 110, 121, 165, 166

” ” miscellaneous, 154, 162, 163

” ” during War, 187-92

Port Trust, 59, 126

Powell, Dr. A., 136

Presidency Magistrates, 57, 70, 80_n_, 81_n_, 83, 101, 102, 132

” ” Honorary, 132

Presidency Magistrates Act, 34, 57, 70

Property stolen and recovered, value of, 42, 89, 92, 127, 166

Prostitution, 61, 85-9, 93, 94, 115, 116, 117, 118, 131

Punishments and penalties, 29, 30

R

Ramchandra Dharadhar, 192

Ramchandra, Subehdar, 133

Ramoshis, 99, 111, 125

Rangari _moholla_, 138, 182, 185 and App.

Receivers of stolen property, 21, 89

Recorder’s Court, 21, 23, 28, 33

Regulation I of 1812, 25, 28

” ” ” 1834, 33, 34

Reinold, Mr., 120

Revolutionary movement, Indian, 104, 106, 121, 145, 148

Revolver-practice, 162

Revolvers, theft of, 159

Riots, Hindu-Muhammadan, 52, 99-103, 104

” Khoja, 36

” Moharram, 36, 67, 68, 121, 138-40, 146, 162, 184-6 and App.

” Parsi, 68

” Parsi-Hindu, 30, 31

” Parsi-Muhammadan, 36, 37, 68, 69

” Plague, 103-4

” Tilak, 121, 123, 140-5, 146

Rivett, L. C. C., 35

Roshan Ali, Khan Saheb, 73, 97

Roughton, Major, 101

Royal Visits, 73, 74, 89, 121, 146, 177-180

Ryley, Colonel, 101

S

_Safed gali_, see Cursetji Suklaji Street

Sanders-Slater, J., 96_n_, 132

School, Constables’, 157-8

Seditious books case, 169

Setalwad, Rao Bahadur C. H., 186, 193 and App.

Sethna, R. D., 174

Share Mania, 173

Sheehy, Inspector, 91

Sheikh Ibrahim, Khan Bahadur, 97, 133 and App.

Sheriff, 6

Shortt, Brig.-General, 46, 49

Shortt, Capt., 35

Shortland, Colonel, 101

Sitaram K. Bole, 189

Sloane, Superintendent, 110, 129, 134, 150

Snow, J., 28

_Sonari toli_, 92

Souter, Sir Frank, 54-78, 79, 86, 192

Souter, W. L. B., 120, 124

Special Magistrates, 101, 142, 143

Spens, A., 35, 37

Street Accidents, 94, 160

Street Lighting, 32, 76

Strikes, industrial, 85, 99, 107, 121

Strike, Police, 121, 124, 125

Strike, Postal, 121

_Subehdars_ (of militia), 1, 4

Sub-Inspectors, Indian, 156

Sulliman Cassum Haji Mitha, Sirdar Saheb, 186

Sulliman _chauki_, 102, 182, 186

“Superintendent of Police”, 12, 17, 20, 23, 35

” ” ” powers of, 20, 21, 22, 24

Superintendents of Police, European, 73, 96, 131

Superintendent-General of Police, 24, 26, 33

Supreme Court, 28 and _n_, 33

Swann, General John, 185 and App.

Sweeney, Superintendent, 96

T

Taki, Khan Saheb F. M., 165, 168

” ” ” M. H., 168

Talcherkar, H. A., 189

Tatya Lakshman, Rao Saheb, 96-7

_Teji-mundi_, 84

Temple, Sir Richard, 74, 77

Textile Industry, 107

Theatres, licensing of, 159, 160

” rules for, 159, 160

Thornton, T., 35, 37

Tilak, Bal Gangadhar, 104, 105, 106, 121, 140-2, 143, 145

Tod, James, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 23

Traffic in Women and Children, 88, 165

Traffic-regulation, 94, 95, 130, 131

Tyebali Alibhai, 128, 170

U

Uniform (of constables), 34

” (of European police), 127

V

Vereadores, 5, 7

Viceregal Visits, 73, 146, 176

Vinayakrao Dinanath, 192

Vincent, F. A. M. H., 137, 150, 153, 185 and App.

Vincent, R. H., 62, 73, 80, 90-106, 107

W

Warden, F., 17, 20, 23, 24

Warden, J., 35

War Relief Fund, 192

Webb, Mr., 102

Wedderburn, General D., 7, 9

Weights and Measures, 61

Weir, Dr. T., 102

West, Sir E., 28

Williamson, Superintendent, 134

Willingdon, Lord, 192, 194

Willis, H., 35

Wilson, G. S., 150

Wilson, Lieut.-Col. W. H., 79-89, 112

Wise, Colonel, 79

Wodehouse, Sir P., 69, 70

Wyborne, Sir J., 3

Printed by V. P. Pendherkar, at the Tutorial Press, 211a, Girgaum Back Road, Bombay and Published by Humphrey Milford, at the Oxford University Press, 17-19, Elphinstone Circle, Fort, Bombay