CHAPTER XI

SOME REMARKS ON THE ENTERPRISE

This book would be incomplete if I omitted to append some general remarks on the operation and on the factors which led to success.

First and foremost, it is necessary to indulge in comparisons. The enterprise described in this book attracted attention owing to its somewhat unusual type as far as the Navy was concerned. Nevertheless, there are many points of similarity between the attack on Zeebrugge and the military trench raids which took place night after night on the Allied fronts. The preliminary bombardment, the advance under cover of darkness and smoke, the wild firing of star shell, the rush across No Man's Land, the encounter with barbed wire and other defence material, the leap down into the enemy's trench, the hand-to-hand fighting, the holding of the position whilst demolition work was in progress, and the final withdrawal when the object had been attained; such was a trench raid as carried out again and again by our brothers in the Army. In their case the following day brought a two-line communiqué, e.g., "Last night in the Ypres salient our troops carried out a trench raid; they captured seven prisoners." In our case the communiqué and unofficial reports filled many pages. I would warn the reader not to be misled into thinking that the military raids were any less hazardous than our own.

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The story provides just one more illustration of the fact that, however large may loom the difficulties with which one is confronted, the means to overcome them can usually be found if one possesses the "will to win through."

The fundamental principles of war demand the Offensive and Concentration. The all-important element of strategy to be utilised against a strongly entrenched enemy is that of Surprise. From the latter spring Diversion and Mystification.

An attempt has been made to describe the manner in which the seemingly impossible was accomplished without very great difficulty.

The plan was built up on the foundation of surprise--not surprise in the sense that something would suddenly occur where all had been quiet up to that moment, but surprise in that the real object of the enterprise would be concealed up to the latest possible moment, the concealment to be brought about by mystifying the enemy and diverting his attention.

Whilst concentrating all available powers of offence against the enemy, and allowing nothing to divert us from our main object, we took every step to bewilder the defence and to shift the weight of the difficulties upon the shoulders of our opponents. But that was only the foundation. The material brought into use was the best available at the moment; it is not suggested that, given further time, it would have been incapable of improvement.

Earlier in this book a few remarks were offered on the importance of the personnel. Many further remarks could now be added after the story has been told. I only propose, however, to deal with certain {263} aspects which, by their nature, are less likely to be realised by the man-in-the-street.

It has already been mentioned that a considerable percentage of the vessels and craft engaged in the attack were commanded and manned by officers and men of the Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve. The majority of the smoke-screening craft and rescue craft came under that heading. Without the smoke the operation must have failed. Without the rescue work the price paid for success would have been excessive. These representatives of the auxiliary naval services earned a full measure of admiration. Their daring in the face of danger, their coolness in situations which lacked nothing in excitement, their initiative when confronted with the unexpected, and their perfect co-operation with the remaining forces engaged in the enterprise, were worthy of the best traditions of the Navy. The more that one considers the dependence upon seamanship, the practical use of technical knowledge, the mental and physical strain, the value of perfect discipline, and the initiative called for on such an occasion, the greater is one's admiration for these fine fellows of whom the majority had seen comparatively little of sea life and had lacked that severity of training which is inseparable from the naval profession.

The reports of all Commanding Officers contained one particular similarity--I refer to the behaviour of the men. The cynic who might be inclined to discount such unqualified praise, on the plea that the men were specially chosen, could easily be silenced. The specially selected personnel were certainly picked {264} with difficulty, not because the desired qualities were rare, but for exactly the opposite reason. The Grand Fleet and naval bases contained many thousands of such men; the embarrassment lay in deciding who of these thousands should be taken to make up the seventeen hundred and eighty personnel required. But the latter were only required for some ten vessels out of one hundred and sixty-two; required because those ten vessels were out of commission and therefore had no crews. The remaining one hundred and fifty-two vessels and craft took part in the operation with their ordinary crews, and I repeat that the behaviour of the crews of _all_ units was exemplary.

But co-operation between units, and efficiency of individuals, are not alone sufficient to ensure success. Absolute confidence and perfect co-operation between officers and men, founded on true discipline, is of vital importance. Without these, little or nothing can be achieved in war. The seeds of these vital requirements were sown by our forefathers. Those of our predecessors who, although too old to serve in the Great War, were still in the land of the living had reason to feel proud at the success attained by their pupils.

There is one other human aspect which cannot be omitted without leaving a serious blank in these pages. That aspect is the one of Leadership.

Leadership has been defined as that power in a man which causes others to follow him irrespective of the direction in which he leads.

It would be a presumption, almost amounting to an impertinence, for me to endeavour to measure out the praise which is due to the Vice-Admiral in command of the enterprise, now Vice-Admiral Sir Roger Keyes. {265} The reader will understand my difficulty. In past history, again and again, it was manifest that some of the outstanding factors which led to success were the personality of the leader, the supreme confidence in him held by all ranks, his realisation of the powers and limits of his subordinates, his personal courage, and his intensity of purpose. The outstanding factors which brought success on the particular occasion described in this book have served to repeat and illustrate these old historical lessons.

A few more words and I shall have finished.

I venture to suggest that this particular exploit provides just one more example, such as are recorded again and again in the histories of most civilised countries, of what can be accomplished in the face of difficulty. Unfortunately, when hostilities cease, we are prone to forget, not only the sacrifices by which successes were achieved, but also the principles which guided us in the achievement. We are all ready enough to admit that confidence and co-operation are of prime necessity for the preservation of our lives and our interests when danger threatens us in war, but, somehow, when the welfare of communities is threatened in days of so-called peace, by international suspicions, by revolutionary doctrines, by economic difficulties, by unemployment, and by political schisms, we weaken ourselves as a result of deconcentrating into numberless camps, one against the other, in direct opposition to those fundamental principles which are the root cause of our existence.

It is all very strange, and, I suppose, very human, for nothing is stranger than humanity. How many of us realise that our superiority over the rest of the {266} animal world is directly attributable to the fact that human beings, alone, have sufficient understanding to combine when danger threatens? Having successfully combined for the greatest of all causes, are we now to revert to the instincts of the inferior animals? Are we to persuade ourselves that co-operation merely results from paper treaties rather than from a common spirit, forgetting that officers and men, armies and navies, needed no signed agreements between them for the overthrow of the greatest menace to civilisation that the world has ever seen?

The Great War is over; is a Great Peace to follow?

What is our object? Surely it is the welfare of civilised communities and the progress of those who are less enlightened.

There will always be secondary objects calculated to divert us from our purpose. There will always be individuals who, for their own ends, will endeavour to sow discord and confuse the issue. It is of paramount importance that we keep our object in view, and that we cultivate intensity of purpose and wholeheartedness, without which our object is unattainable.

We know that the right spirit exists, but it is of little value if we keep it locked away within us until disaster is imminent; the mere fact of its existence cannot keep us free from danger any more than the existence of medicine stored at the apothecary's can protect us from infection and illness.

Let each one of us, each class, each sect, each nation, each group of nations, do all that is humanly possible to foster that spirit, to further mutual {267} understanding, to breed confidence in one another, and to co-operate for the weal of all.

Without such confidence and co-operation success is impossible; with them, our well-being is assured.

THE END

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APPENDIX

The following vessels and craft took part in the simultaneous blocking operations at Zeebrugge and Ostende.

THE ZEEBRUGGE ENTERPRISE

(_a_) _Special services during the oversea voyage_

Aerial Escort-- 61st Wing of Royal Air Force. Other services-- Special service vessel Lingfield. Motor Launches Nos. 555, 557.

(_b_) _Off shore forces_

Outer Patrol-- Scout--_Attentive_. Destroyers--_Scott, Ulleswater, Teazer, Stork_. Long-range Bombardment-- Monitors--_Erebus, Terror_. Destroyers--_Termagant, Truculent, Manly_.

(_c_) _Inshore forces_

Flagship-- Destroyer--_Warwick_ (Flag of Vice-Admiral R. J. B. Keyes). Blockships-- Light Cruisers--_Thetis, Intrepid, Iphigenia_. Storming Vessels-- Light Cruiser--_Vindictive_. Special vessels--_Iris, Daffodil_. Attack on Viaduct-- Submarines--C1, C3, and one picket boat. Aerial Attack-- Aircraft--65th Wing, Royal Air Force. Other Operations-- Destroyers--_Phoebe, North Star, Trident, Mansfield, Whirlwind, Myngs, Felox, Morris, Moorsom, Melpomene_.

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Motor Launches--Nos. 79, 110, 121, 128, 223, 239, 241, 252, 258, 262, 272, 280, 282, 308, 314, 345, 397, 416, 420, 422, 424, 513, 525, 526, 533, 549, 552, 558, 560, 561, 562. Coastal Motor Boats--Nos. 5, 7, 15, 16A, 17A, 21B, 226, 236, 24A, 25BD, 266, 27A, 28A, 306, 32A, 35A.

THE OSTENDE ENTERPRISE

(_a_) _Bombarding forces_

Monitors-- _Marshall Soult, Lord Clive, Prince Eugene, General Craufurd, M. 24, M. 26, M. 21_. Destroyers-- _Mentor, Lightfoot, Zubian_. Motor Launches-- Nos. 249, 448, 538, and three others. French Destroyers and Torpedo Boats-- _Lestin, Roux, Bouclier_, and Torpedo Boats Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 34. French Motor Launches--Nos. 1, 2, 33, 34. British Siege Guns in Flanders.

(_b_) _Inshore forces_

Blockships-- Light Cruisers--_Sirius, Brilliant_. Destroyers-- _Swift, Faulknor, Matchless, Mastiff, Afridi, Tempest, Tetrarch_. Motor Launches-- Nos. 11, 16, 17, 22, 23, 30, 60, 105, 254, 274, 276, 279, 283, 429, 512, 532, 551, 556. Coastal Motor Boats-- Nos. 2, 4, 10, 12, 19, 20, 20A, 34A.

COVERING SQUADRON FOR BOTH ENTERPRISES

Forces from Harwich-- Light Cruisers, seven. Leaders, two. Destroyers, fourteen.

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INDEX

Acetylene gas, use of, for salvage, 47, 52

Adams, Lieut.-Comdr. B. F., R.N., 187, 188, 200, 201

Admiralty, Board of, responsibility of, 69

Aerial attack-- at first attempt, 146, 147 at final attempt, 171

_Afridi_, H.M.S., App.

Aircraft-- German in Flanders, 6, 41 utility in defence, 40, 41

Allied lines of communication, 3, 12, 13

Anchoring of _Vindictive_, 184

Approach, the story of the, 173 _ff._

Astronomical conditions, 134

Attack, expected duration of, 132, 134

Attempt-- the first, 141 _ff._, 155 the second, 153, 154 the final start, 165

_Attentive_, H.M.S., App.

Babb, Sub-Lieut, R.N., 230

Bamford, Captain E., R.M.L.I., 203

Barrage firing from coast batteries, 37

Bases, use of advanced, 19

Beatty, Admiral Sir David, 63, 104, 105, 107, 108

Billyard-Leake, Lieut. Edward W., R.N., 226, 231, 234, 235

Blake, Able-Seaman F. E., R.N., 209

Blake, Sub-Lieut. L. R., R.N.R., 218

Blankenberghe, buoy, 174, 175, 242 description, 8, 9 German craft at, 11, 12, 190

Blocking-- alternative methods of, 17, 42, 43 favourable position for, 44 influence of current, 57 previous attempts elsewhere, 54-56, 58 summary of difficulties, 41, 56

Blockships-- capabilities of, 49, 52, 69, 70 credit due to, 73, 234, 235 difficulty of sinking, 56, 57, 58 preparatory work in, 52, 100 types of, 45-47, 69, 70 See _Thetis, Intrepid, Iphigenia_

Blockship's crews, disembarkation of surplus, 124, 125, 170, 171

Boddie, Engineer Lieut.-Comdr., R.N., 228

Bombardment-- by our monitors, 16, 84, 174, 175 previous attempts at, 35, 43, 44

Bonham-Carter, Lieut. Stuart S., R.N., 226, 228, 230, 234, 235

_Botha_, H.M.S., 91; App.

_Bouclier_, French destroyer, App.

Bowen, Lieut. G., 225

Bradford, Lieut. George N., R.N., 206, 207

_Brilliant_, H.M.S., 70, 143, 246; App.

British morale, effect on, 258, 259

Brock, Wing-Commander Frank, R.N.A.S., 98, 115, 116, 153, 187, 200

Bruges, 9, 10, 11, 270

_Brussels_, merchant steamer, 29

Buckley, Yeoman of Signals John, R.N., 189, 190

Buoys, lack of dependence on, 8, 91, 92

Bury, Engineer Lieut.-Comdr. W. A., R.N., 184, 243

Calais, 13

Cameroon River, German attempt to block, 58

Campbell, Lieut. H. G., R.N., 185, 188, 189, 240, 245

Campbell, Commander V. L. A., R.N., 220

Canal system in Flanders, 9-11

Casualties, British, 253, 254

Cement, use of, in blockships, 52

Chappell, Lieut.-Comdr., R.N.V.R., 224

Chevallier, Sub-Lieut. F. E., R.N., 205

Clerical work, 140

Coast defences, German, 35-38

Coastal Motor Boats, 144, 145, 149-151 No. 5, 219; App. No. 7, 218, 233; App. No. 16, 217; App. Nos. 21, 25, 26, 219; App. No. 22B, 217; App. No. 23B, 217, 232; App. No. 32, 219, 220; App. Nos. 2, 4, 10, 12, 15, 17A, 19, 20, 24A, 27A, 28A, 29A, 30B, 34A, 35A; App.

Collins, Captain Ralph, R.N., 224

Command of the sea, 3, 4

Compasses, damage to--in _Vindictive_, 239, 240

Concentration, 144, 145, 262

Cooke, Lieut. F. T. V., R.M.L.I., 203

Co-operation, value of, 264

Cordner, Major, R.M.L.I., 182

Cory-Wright, Lieut., R.N., 230

Crews, size of, in blockships, 86, 124.

_Daffodil_, H.M.S.-- choice of, 79, 80 duties of, 81, 86, 176 fitting out of, 100, 108, 109, 118, 119 previous history, 80 proceedings of, 168, 173, 185, 188, 189, 199, 205, 237, 240 retirement of, 245

Dallas-Brooks, Captain Reginald, R.M.A., 192, 193, 194

Darkness, use of, 37, 38, 132

Davidson, Captain A. P., R.N., 111

Deane, Lieut. Percy T., R.N.V.R., 232, 233

Defence measures, 61, 62

Defences, summary of German, 41

Demolition-- object of, 76, 77, 195, 196 training for, 111, 112 the work of, 189, 205

Depths-- at Blankenberghe, 9 in entrance channel at Zeebrugge, 48, 49, 131

Destroyers, 84, 220, 221

D'Eyncourt, Sir Tennyson, 100

Dickinson, Lieut.-Comdr. C. C., R.N., 111, 205

Diversions, 59, 60, 61, 196, 208, 279 practibility of using, 61

Douglas, Captain H. P., R.N., 90 _n._

Dover-- the return to, 243, 244 the reception at, 244

Dover Patrol-- memorials, 15 morale, 96, 97 work of, 13, 14, 15, 97, 98

Dover Straits, difficulty of closing, 13, 14

Dunkerque, 13

Eagles, Major C. E. E., R.M.L.I., 208

Eastlake, Lieut. A. L., attached R.E., 186, 187

Edwards, Commander, R.N.V.R., 182

Elliot, Lieut.-Col. Bertram N., R.M.L.I., 111, 112, 128, 182

Endurance of German submarines, 4, 5

_Erebus_, H.M.S., 174; App.

_Faulknor_, H.M.S.; App.

Finch, Sergeant, R.M.L.I., 192

Flame-throwers in _Vindictive_, 115, 186, 187

Flanders Coast-- description of, 6, 7, 8, 22, 24, 25 value to Germany, 5-7, 10-12

Fog, effect on attackers, 60, 175 effect on defence, 59, 175

Fogs, artificial, 59, 60

Franks, Lieut. Ivor B., R.N., 110

French motor launches Nos. 1, 2, 33, 34; App.

French Torpedo Boats Nos. 1, 2, 3, 34; App.

Fuel, 4

Function of the Navy, 3

Gas, poison, 60

Geddes, Sir Eric, 157

_General Craufurd_, H.M.S.; App.

Geographical situation, 6, 7

German bases in Flanders, 6, 10, 29

German craft based on Flanders, 6

German High Seas Fleet, 3, 4, 19, 21, 94, 95

German morale before the attack, 96, 97, 104

German morale after the attack, 255-257

German reports of the attack, 250, 251

German submarines, 4, 5, 11, 12, 13, 14, 16

Gibbs, Commander Valentine F., R.N., 185, 207, 208

Godsal, Commander A. E., R.N., 42, 246, 247

Goeben battery, 204

Gore-Langton, Lieut-Commander Hubert E., R.N., 220, 223

Grand Fleet-- duties of, 94, 95 work of, 102, 103

Groynes, 7, 24, 25

Guerre de Course tactics, 5

Halahan, Captain H. C., R.N., 111, 114, 116, 128, 182, 201

Hardy, Lieut.-Comdr. H. N. M., R.N., 246

Harrison, Lieut.-Comdr. A. L., R.N., 200, 201, 202

Harwich, forces from; App.

Haselfoot, Lieut.-Comdr. F. E. B., R.N., 90 _n._

Hawkings, Lieut. Claude E. K., R.N., 206

Heligoland, 19

Helyar, Lieut.-Comdr. Kenneth C., R.N., 220, 222, 223

Henderson, Lieut. Oscar, R.N., 209, 245

_Hermione_, cutting out of--in 1799, 54, 55

Hewett, Lieutenant Graham S., R.N.V.R., 194

Hilton-Young, Lieut. E., R.N.V.R., 196

_Hindustan_, H.M.S., 111, 118, 119, 120, 125, 127; App.

History-- lack of encouragement from, 58 object of studying, 54

Historical analogies, 54-56, 58

Howitzers in _Vindictive_, 79, 98, 193, 194

Hydrographic Department, 91

Initiative, 89, 149, 150

Instructions, the art of writing, 66,67

_Intrepid_, H.M.S., 70, 143, 170, 228, 229-231, 232, 234; App.

_Iphigenia_, H.M.S., 70, 143, 171, 228, 229, 231, 232, 234, 241, 243-251; App.

_Iris_, H.M.S.-- choice of, 79, 80 duties of, 81, 86 fitting out of, 100, 108, 109, 118, 119 proceedings of, 168, 173, 185, 205-209 retirement of, 245, 246

Jakobynessen battery, 37

Jellicoe, Admiral Sir John, R.N., 17, 157

Kaiser's visit to Zeebrugge, 252

Kaiser Wilhelm battery, 204

Keyes, Vice-Admiral Roger J. B., R.N., 14, 63, 109, 113, 114, 167, 168, 220, 243, 246, 263, 264, 265, 282 appreciation of, 63, 68, 69 connection with planning, 67, 68, 82 postponement decision, 147, 148

Lamplough, Lieut. C. R. W., R.M.L.I., 203

Leadership, 264, 265

_Lestin_, French destroyer; App.

_Lightfoot_, H.M.S.; App.

Lines of communication, 3, 12, 13, 96

_Lingfield_, H.M.S.; App.

Littleton, Lieut. H. A., R.N.V.R., 232, 233

_Lord Clive_, H.M.S.; App.

Lock gate, 10, 22, 28, 43, 44, 49

Losses, British material, 253, 254

MacVean, Lieut. D. E. J., R.N.V.R., 217

Mails, precautions, 120

_Manly_, H.M.S.; App.

_Mansfield_, H.M.S., 224; App.

Marine Artillery, 104, 112, 113, 126, 192-194 Infantry, 104, 111, 112, 126

Marines, embarkation of, 118, 119

_Marshal Soult_, H.M.S.; App.

Martinique, attack on--in 1794, 54, 55

_Mastiff_, H.M.S.; App.

_Matchless_, H.M.S.; App.

Material results obtained, 249-253.

Matériel, relation to personnel, 181

McCutcheon, Staff Surgeon, R.N., 197, 198

McKenzie, Able Seaman, 202

Medical, 197, 198

Meikle, Engineer Sub-Lieut., R.N., 230

_Melpomene_, H.M.S., 224; App.

_Mentor_, H.M.S.; App.

Mercantile Marine, appreciation, 143, 144

_Merrimac_, U.S. steamer, 54, 58, 88

Meteorological conditions, 131

Military training, 112, 113

Minefields, German, 38, 39

Mines-- effect of, 93, 94, 173 precautions against, 94

Mine-sweepers, 6, 39, 94

Monitors, 36, 146, 174

Monitors: M. 21, M. 24, M. 26; App.

Moon, state of, 134

_Moorsom_, H.M.S., 224, 242, 243; App.

Moral results obtained, 255-260

Morale, 96, 97

_Morris_, H.M.S., 224; App.

Motor launches, 144, 225, 240

Motor launches:-- No. 110, 225; App. No. 128, 224; App. No. 282, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234; App. No. 308, 225; App. No. 424, 224; App. No. 526, 229, 232, 233; App. No. 558, 224, 226; App. Nos. 11, 16, 17, 22, 23, 30, 60, 79, 105, 121, 223, 239, 241, 249, 252, 254, 258, 262, 272, 274, 276, 279, 280, 283, 314, 345, 397, 416, 420, 422, 429, 448, 512, 513, 525, 532, 533, 538, 549, 551, 552, 555, 556, 557, 560, 561, 562; App.

_Myngs_, H.M.S., 224; App.

Napoleon's maxim, 95

Navigation, coastal, 56, 57 difficulties and dangers, 7, 8, 40, 41 importance of accuracy, 90 _ff._, 178 open sea, 56

Nelson, Lord, 55, 147, 148

Newbold, Lieut. Aubrey C., R.N., 210, 214

Nieuport, 6, 7, 8

_North Star_, H.M.S., 220, 221, 222, 223; App.

Objectives, difficulty of locating, 42, 56, 71

Objects, secondary, 77

Offensive measures, 16, 17, 43, 262

Officers, choice of, 106, 107

Orders-- art of writing, 66, 67 the drafting of the, 66, 67, 140, 156, 166

Osborne, Commander E. O. B. S., R.N., 178

Ostende-- attack on, in 1798, 54, 55, 56 description of, 9, 10, 11, 12 difficulty of locating entrance, 42, 71 reason for blocking, 42 reason for omitting story, 41, 42

Outhwaite, Sub-Lieut. C., R.N.V.R., 219

Patrol craft, German, 40, 96

Peace, 266

Period available for attack, 134 Personnel, remarks on behaviour, 263, 264 selection of, 102 ff. training of, 112, 125, 126

_Phoebe_, H.M.S., 220-224; App.

Photography, 129, 130, 246

Plan-- credit for, 17, 18, 19 how built up, 262 inception, 17, 18, 67 history of, 17, 18, 67, 68 modifications of, 65 previous suggestions, 17, 70 various stages of, 64 _ff._, 72, 76

Plans department, 17, 67

Poison gas, 60

Port Arthur, attempts to block, 54, 56, 58

Postponement, first, 148 second, 154

Power, Rear Admiral L. E., R.N., 100

Preparations-- preliminary, 125 _ff._ final, 145, 167, 168

Preservation of life, 87

_Prince Eugene_, H.M.S.; App.

Printing the orders, 140

Puerto Cabello, attack on, in 1799, 54

Pyrotechnic Brigade, 194

Rain, effect of, 171, 172, 173

Rescue of men from Mole, 218

Rescue work, 87, 88, 89, 132, 229 _ff._, 244-249 vessels, 84

Results-- material, 249-253 moral, 255-260

Retirement, 132, 252-260

Rigby, Lieut. Charles N. B., R.M.A., 191, 192

Robinson, Lieut. J. W., R.N.V.R., 224

Robinson, Lieut. O., R.N.V.R., 224

Rocket apparatus, 194

Rodman, Rear Admiral Hugh, U.S.N., 107, 108

Rosoman, Lieut.-Comdr. R. R., R.N., 176, 184, 188, 238, 239, 242, 259

_Roux_, French destroyer; App.

Royal Air Force-- 61st Wing, 85, 130 65th Wing, 85, 146

Royal Naval Reserve, 130, 263

Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, 130, 263

Rufigi River, attempt to block, 54

St. George for England, 169

Salvage-- effect of silt on, 23, 24, 25, 28, 51 German attempts, 251 importance of, 44, 45 previous experience, 25 remarks on, 25, 26, 44 _ff._, 251, 252

Sandford, Lieut-Comdr. F. H., R.N., 213, 214

Sandford, Lieut. R. D., R.N., 210, 211, 213

Santiago, attempt to block in 1898, 54, 56, 58

_Scott_, H.M.S.; App.

Seamanship, importance of, 41, 57, 58

Seaplane base, German, 12

Secrecy, 100, 111, 120, 121, 155

Secret, divulging the, 108, 119, 120

Shoals, 7, 41

Siege guns, 84

Signalling difficulties, 137, 138

Silt, description, 23, 24 effect of, 24, 28, 51

_Sirius_, H.M.S., 70, 143, 246; App.

Smith, Petty Officer, R.N., 209

Smoke, artificial-- limitations of, 59, 60, 99 use of, 59, 60, 83, 99, 100, 175, 176, 208, 216, 217, 218, 246

Smoke-screen vessels, 83, 175

Sneyd, Commander R. S., R.N., 226, 228, 229, 235

Souvenir hunters, 248

Staff, operational duties, 66, 67, 139

Star shell, 38, 175

Stonewall Jackson's maxim, 60, 61

_Stork_, H.M.S.; App.

Storming the Mole, 186, 187, 188, 200-204, 213

Submarines-- attack on viaduct, 82, 100 defensive use, 40 German, 4, 40 shelters, 10, 11

Submarines-- C1, 210, 211, 214; App. C3, 210-211, 213, 215, 224; App.

Success, chances of, 54, 62

Supporting squadrons, 146

Surprise, 59, 60, 61, 262

Surveys, 7, 91

_Swift_, H.M.S.; App.

Swin Deep, 118, 153

Synchronisation of events, 137, 138, 170

_Teazer_, H.M.S.; App.

_Tempest_, H.M.S.; App.

Teneriffe, Nelson's attack on--in 1797, 54, 55

_Termagant_, H.M.S.; App.

_Terror_, H.M.S., 174; App.

_Tetrarch_, H.M.S.; App.

_Thetis_, H.M.S., 70, 143, 171, 226 _ff._, 233; App.

Tidal stream-- description, 7, 24, 30, 74 effect, 24, 92, 174, 183

Tide, rise and fall, 8, 48, 49

Tigris River, blocking of, 58

Time factor, 137-139

Time table, 138, 156

Tomkinson, Captain Wilfred, R.N., 220

Towing-- necessity for, 142 of _Iris_ and _Daffodil_, 142, 143, 173

Trench raid, analogy, 112, 113, 265

_Trident_, H.M.S., 224, 245; App.

_Truculent_, H.M.S.; App.

_Ulleswater_, H.M.S.; App.

United States-- battle squadron, 107 personnel, 107, 108

_Velox_, H.M.S., 224; App.

Viaduct-- attack on, 194, 195, 210-215 description, 23, 25, 82, 83

_Vindictive_, H.M.S.-- anchoring, 184 attack on Ostende, 247 choice of, 76, 126 command of, 114 damage, 181, 182, 198, 238, 239, 241, 255, 256 fitting out of, 77-79, 100, 110 position at Mole, 128, 129, 202, 203 proceedings of, 143, 148, 150, 170, 173, 176, 179 _ff._, 200 _ff._ retirement of, 230 ff.

Visibility, 136, 165

Volunteering-- for danger, 89, 122-125, 189, 202 how arranged, 104, 105, 122, 123

Von Capelle, Admiral, 158

Walcheren expedition, 156

Walker, Lieut. H. T. C., R.N., 190

_Warwick_, H.M.S., 144, 168, 173, 220, 221, 222, 233, 243; App.

Weather, vagaries of, 41, 93, 246

Weller, Major B. G., R.M.L.I., 202

Welman, Lieut. A. P., R.N., 217

Wemyss, Admiral Sir Rosslyn, R.N., 157

_Whirlwind_, H.M.S., 224, 230; App.

Wind, importance of direction, 60, 131, 176

Wounded, behaviour of, 196, 197

Youlton, Petty Officer, E. G., R.N., 238, 242

Young, Lieut.-Comdr., R.N.V.R., 225

Yser Canal, 7

Zeebrugge, 7, 8, 9, 11 batteries, 28, 29, 31, 33 craft based at, 11, 32 German belief in security at, 33, 34 German constructions at, 26, 28, 29 canal, 10, 22 canal lock, 22, 29, 43, 44, 49 navigable channel, 28, 49 obstruction and boom, 32, 33, 41, 227 tidal harbour, 22 village, 22

Zeebrugge Mole, description, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27 approach to, 27-30 attack on: _see_ Storming the Mole buildings on, 26, 28, 29, 32, 183 currents alongside, 30 garrison, 32, 81, 82 lighthouse extension, 27 outer wall, 26-28, 73, 74, 76 peace use, 22 seaplane base, 29, 32 souvenir, 244, 245 viaduct, 23, 25 _Vindictive's_ position, 128, 129, 202, 203 war use, 29, 30

Zero time, meaning and object, 170, 173

Zone of fire, German batteries, 30

_Zubian_, H.M.S.; App.