Part 43

Precisely at this hour the French artillery opened fire upon the orchards of Hougoumont, and Jerome, with his division, moved forward to the attack. As we have seen, Napoleon himself assigns to his second corps, to whom this duty was assigned, a strength of 17,900 men; and, reasoning upon his uniform practice of diminishing his real numbers, we may safely estimate its real force at 20,000. This corps was to storm and take Hougoumont, and then, from this position, to annoy and perhaps to attack with success, the Duke’s right. But it never succeeded even in its first object. The whole power of these 18,000 or 20,000 men failed to carry a post which was never garrisoned by so many us 2,800. Thus, Gourgaud tells us that at noon “Prince Jerome with his division took possession of the wood: he was driven out, but a new attack once more rendered him master of it. The enemy, however, kept possession of the largo house in the centre.” Again, at half-past four, he says, “General Reille supported the attack of Jerome’s division by Foy’s division. (Each being 5,000 or 6,000 strong.) Howitzers had set fire to the house and nearly destroyed it; three-fourths of the wood was in our possession; the fields were strewed with the English guards, the flower of the enemy’s army.” But beyond this partial success the French never attained. They never carried the chateau itself, but in the attempt they lost from 6,000 to 8,000 men, while the killed and wounded of the defenders amounted to a few hundreds only. This portion of the battle lasted from noon until night, and all that the French could boast of, was, that with five or seven times the number of the British, they obtained possession of “three-fourths of the wood.”[27] Napoleon says, in “Book ix,” “The wood remained in the possession of the French; but the chateau, in which some hundreds of intrepid English troops defended themselves, opposed an invincible resistance.”[28]

ONE O’CLOCK.

But now, having commenced the battle by this vehement assault on Hougoumont by his left wing, Napoleon prepared what he admits to be his main attack, on the Duke’s centre and left, by Count d’Erlon’s whole corps, led by Marshal Ney. This was the corps which had not been engaged at either Ligny or Quatre Bras. Napoleon states its strength at 17,900; but Ney more frankly describes it us between “twenty-five and thirty thousand.” This force was directed against the centre of the English position. Throughout the day Napoleon seemed to rely on _mere strength_. He knew that he was superior on every point, in each branch of the service, and in every particular, and he had never experienced the obstinate endurance of the English infantry. Thus, as the Duke afterwards said, “He did not manœuvre at all. He just moved forward, in the old style, in columns, and was driven off in the old style.”

Great were the expectations based on this attack. Napoleon himself said to Ney: “This is a day and an action worthy of you: I give you the command of the centre; and it is you who are to gain the battle.”[29] But while all the French accounts admit the vast importance which was attached to this, the main attack, they entirely forget to say _what was the result of it_. Thus Gourgaud writes: “The Emperor directed Marshal Ney to commence the attack, and to take possession of La Haye Sainte;” “Our infantry advanced;” “The enemy’s line, however, made no manœuvre; it maintained its immobility. His cavalry made several successful charges on the flank of one of the columns of the first corps, and about 15 of our pieces of artillery, which were advancing, were driven back into a hollow road. One of Milhaud’s brigades of Cuirassiers advanced against this cavalry, and the field of battle was soon covered with their slain. When the Emperor perceived that some disorder prevailed on our right, he proceeded at full gallop.”[30]

Napoleon says, in “Book ix,” “Many charges of infantry and cavalry followed it; the detail of them belong more to the history of each regiment, than to the general history of the battle; it is enough to say, that after three hours’ fighting, the farm of La Haye Sainte was occupied by the French infantry; while the end which the Emperor had in view was obtained.”[31]

Thus, from the French accounts, we gain no intelligible information as to the actual result of this attack of 25,000 men on the English centre; except, indeed, that Gourgaud’s single phrase, “the enemy’s line maintained its immobility,” tacitly implies that the attack failed. We turn, then, to the English narrators, and learn from them what actually occurred.

“Seventy-four guns” (“Book ix,” says eighty) were ordered forward to a little elevation, so as to bring their fire to bear upon the English line at a range of about 700 yards. Soon after, as two o’clock approached, the columns of attack, under Ney’s command, were seen descending from their elevated ground, crossing the valley, and ascending the northern slope. The British artillery gave them a warm reception; but still the columns pressed on, until they approached the Duke’s line, near the centre and left centre. Here were placed the brigade of Sir Thomas Picton, about 3000 strong; and a Belgic-Dutch brigade under Bylandt. As the French columns drew near, with shouts of “Vive l’Empereur!” the courage of the Belgians gave way, and the whole brigade, amidst the groans and hooting of the British soldiers, begun a hasty movement to the rear, from which they could not be induced to advance during the whole remainder of the day.

Left thus to himself, to sustain the whole attack of twice or three times his numbers, the gallant Picton never hesitated. Forming his little band two deep, he waited till the French column came within charging distance. It then halted, and endeavoured to deploy into line. Saluting it, at this moment, with a volley from his whole brigade, Picton gave the word “Charge!” and his men sprang forward with the bayonet. In an instant the whole French column was in confusion; and before they had time to recover themselves, Ponsonby’s brigade of heavy cavalry, the Royals, the Scots Greys, and the Enniskilleners, broke in upon them, and in a few moments the whole side of the hill was covered with fugitives. The heroic leader of “the fighting division,” however, the gallant Picton, fell, shot through the brain in the moment of triumph. Another fierce encounter was at hand. Milhaud’s Cuirassiers were close behind the French columns, and they essayed to retrieve the fight. But the Household Brigade met them, and after a desperate encounter--of the best horsemen in England and the best in France--the whole mass of the French, horse and foot, were driven back in confusion, leaving behind them the eagles of the 45th and 105th regiments, and nearly 3000 prisoners. The grand attack of Ney on the British centre had failed; and the first corps of the French army was so seriously cut up and disorganized, as to be in no condition to renew the attack. We now understand Gourgaud’s confessions, “The enemy’s cavalry made several successful charges on the flank of one of the columns of the first corps;” and, “when the Emperor perceived that some disorder prevailed on our right, he proceeded thither at full gallop.”

It was now considerably past two o’clock. The principal attack had been repelled: the English position had not been forced, or even endangered. “The enemy’s line,” says Gourgaud, “maintained its immobility.” But Napoleon’s second corps had been beaten and much damaged at Hougoumont; and now his first was crippled and nearly disabled in front of La Haye Sainte. In this strait, either Ney or Napoleon, or both of them, still confident in their superior strength, had recourse to a desperate measure, which had, indeed, a probability of success; but which, if it failed, would involve a serious danger.

They had, still untouched, or nearly so, a reserve of what Napoleon himself styles, “twelve thousand select horse,” the two corps of Cuirassiers, the light cavalry of the Guard, and the horse grenadiers and dragoons of the Guard. There need be no dispute as to the strength of this force, since Napoleon himself twice states it to have been 12,000.

THREE O’CLOCK.

At this period of the battle, then, desperate at the two failures on the left and on the right, either Ney or his master launched this enormous mass of “select cavalry” against the centre of the British line. The error, if it is one, is sought by Napoleon to be charged on somebody else. In his bulletin, written at the time, he says:--

“Our two divisions of cuirassiers being engaged, all our cavalry ran at the same moment to support their comrades.”

Gourgaud endeavours to cast the blame upon Ney, saying:--

“Marshal Ney, borne away by excess of ardour, lost sight of the orders he had received; he debouched on the level height, which was immediately crowned by two divisions of Milhaud’s cuirassiers, and the light cavalry of the Guard. The emperor observed to Marshal Soult, “This is a premature movement, which may be attended with fatal consequences.”

These accounts would represent Napoleon himself famous for his rapidity and decision, to have had no command over his own troops. They are, therefore, not credible.

But remembering that Napoleon was himself at this moment in a forward position, and that the heavy cavalry placed in the rear as a reserve force must have defiled past him, we must at least believe him to have permitted this movement. Gourgaud says that Ney ordered forward Milhaud’s Cuirassiers, and that “the emperor ordered Kellerman’s corps to support him.” Colonel Heymes, aide-de-camp to Ney, says, “That movement took place under the eyes of the emperor, who might have stopped it, but did not.” Still as he afterwards, in private conversation, charged the fault on Ney,[32] we must suppose that the marshal, in his desperation, called for the reserve of cavalry, and that Napoleon permitted him to employ them. However this might be, it is certain that about three or four o’clock--the attack of the first corps on the centre and left of the English having failed, the whole mass of the “cavalry of reserve,” was brought forward and thrown upon the centre of the Duke’s position. Such an assault has rarely been made upon any other army in modern times. Deducting the troops in Hougoumont, and the losses from four hours’ fighting, there could not have been at this moment so many as 12,000 British infantry in the whole line. Yet it is from Napoleon’s own narrative that we learn, that upon this weak array there was launched a mass of 12,000 heavy horse, 6,000 of whom wore armour, and who seemed, in their united strength, able positively to ride down the insignificant force of resolute soldiers who still kept the heights of Mont St. Jean.

The British accounts generally divide this tremendous onset of the cavalry into two attacks, the first, between three and four o’clock, when forty squadrons, twenty-one of them being composed of cuirassiers, ascended the heights behind La Haye Sainte; the second perhaps an hour later, when the first assailants, having found it difficult to maintain their ground were rallied behind thirty-seven fresh squadrons sent by Napoleon to their succour. And this agrees with Gourgaud’s account who tells us, first, that “Ney debouched upon the level height, with Milhaud’s Cuirassiers and the light cavalry of the Guard,” and then adds, a little after, that “the Emperor directed Kellerman’s Cuirassiers to support the cavalry on the height lest it should be repulsed.” It is clear, therefore, that the first onset of 5,000 or 6,000 men had failed, or was in danger of failing, when Napoleon sent forward a second until, as he himself says, the whole “twelve thousand select horse” were involved in the struggle.

How it was that this tremendous attack failed, it is not easy at this distance of time to understand. The whole of the infantry in the British line were quickly formed into squares; the front ranks kneeling and presenting fixed bayonets, and the second and third lines keeping up a constant fire of musketry. The artillery, also, saluted the intruders with grape-shot; but many of the British guns were soon taken possession of by the cuirassiers. The Duke, always prepared for every emergency, had instructed the artillerymen that they should, on the approach of danger, take off a wheel and retire with it into the nearest square of infantry. Thus the cuirassiers, when they had seized a gun, found themselves hampered with it, and while they were trying to carry it off, the musketry of the British squares thinned their numbers.

Wellington, in describing the battle in a letter to Marshal Beresford, said, “I had the infantry for some time in squares, and the French cavalry walking about us as if it had been our own.”

There probably never was such a trial of “pluck” as this part of the contest presented. It was a hand-to-hand struggle, _lasting two or three hours_. Had a regiment of cuirassiers ever found courage enough to throw themselves on the British bayonets, there can be little doubt that some of the weaker squares might have been broken. But this never once occurred. Gourgaud, indeed, says, “Our cavalry penetrated many of the enemy’s squares, and took three standards,” but he must here be speaking of the Belgian or Hanoverian troops, many of whom were unsteady, and some of whom were scattered and cut up. There was, in fact, no absolute reliance to be placed on any but the British troops, and some of the best of the German. A whole Dutch-Belgian brigade, on the approach of the cuirassiers, moved off without firing a shot. After several charges of the British horse upon portions of the French cavalry, Lord Uxbridge put himself at the head of Tripp’s brigade of Dutch-Belgian carabineers, and ordered them to charge; and so they did, but not until they had first turned their backs to the enemy! Somewhat later, he ordered forward the Hanoverian regiment called the Cumberland hussars; but the colonel “did not see what good was to be done” by moving him from his snug position, which was out of reach of the firing. He added, that he could not answer for his men, for that they rode their own horses, and could not afford to lose them! Receiving from Lord Uxbridge the vehement reproof which might have been expected, he and his men moved off to Brussels, where they spread the report that the allied army was destroyed, and that Napoleon was advancing at the head of his Guards!

Yet this tremendous attack failed, as the two preceding attacks had done. And its failure was one chief cause of Napoleon’s ruin. He had risked his cavalry reserve, and had lost it. For it is a remarkable and wonderful fact, that, continuing this struggle for two or three hours, this splendid body of “twelve thousand select cavalry” was wholly destroyed. Individuals, and parties of fugitives, doubtless escaped, and their number in the aggregate might be considerable; but this arm of the service was utterly disabled. In his Bulletin, Napoleon said, “For three hours numerous charges were made, several squares penetrated, and six standards taken;--an advantage bearing no proportion to the loss which our cavalry experienced by the grape-shot and musket-firing.” Fleury de Chaboulon, his secretary, says, “Our cavalry, exposed to the incessant firing of the enemy’s batteries and infantry, sustained and executed numerous brilliant charges, took six flags, and dismounted several batteries; but in this conflict we lost the flower of our intrepid cuirassiers, and of the cavalry of the Guard.” He adds, that on reaching Paris, and describing the battle, the emperor said, “Ney behaved like a madman!--he got my cavalry _massacred_ for me.” And it is the chief complaint of all the French accounts, that when at the close of the day the English horse swept over the field, the Emperor had not a single regiment of cavalry to oppose to them![33] The “twelve thousand select cavalry” had broken into the English position; but, except as scattered fugitives, they never returned!

FIVE O’CLOCK.

But the battle had now lasted six hours, and Napoleon had allowed his opportunity to pass away. Five o’clock brought the Prussians; and after they had entered the field a decisive victory for Napoleon became impossible.

Bent on his object of proving that he had been not so much beaten as overpowered by numbers, Napoleon in his “Book ix,” brings the Prussians into the field at _noon-day_! In doing this he does not scruple to employ the most direct and obvious falsehood. To give a single instance,--Gourgaud, his _aide-de-camp_, in his account of the battle, thus writes:

“It was _half-past four o’clock_, and the most vigorous fire was still kept up on every side. _At this moment_ General Domont informed his Majesty that he observed Bulow’s corps in movement, and that a division of 8,000 or 10,000 Prussians was debouching from the woods of Frischenois.”

Yet in “Book ix” Napoleon does not hesitate to say: At _two o’clock_ in the afternoon General Domont had given notice that Bulow formed in three columns; that the enemy appeared to him to be very numerous,--he estimated the corps at 40,000 men.”

But he does not even postpone their arrival until two o’clock:--two pages earlier he insists upon it that he saw them, in the distance, at _noon_.[34] Now as it is absolutely certain that, with the greatest exertion, the earliest of the Prussian brigades were unable to reach the field until half-past four, we may be sure that at twelve o’clock they must have been eight or ten miles off! Hence this passage in “Book ix” must either be a downright fiction; or else Napoleon must have discovered on a distant hill a party of the Prussian staff who had ridden forward to observe the position of affairs, and who must have been magnified by his alarms into an army-corps!

The real time of the arrival of the Prussians is one of the most clearly-defined facts of the whole history. All the witnesses agree upon it. We have just cited Gourgaud’s words, that “at half-past four General Domont observed a division of 8,000 to 10,000 Prussians debouching from the woods of Frischenois.”

In strict agreement with which the Prussian official account says.

“It was half-past four o’clock.... The difficulties of the road had retarded the march of the Prussian columns; so that only two brigades had arrived at the covered position which was assigned them. The generals resolved to begin the attack with the troops which they had at hand.”[35]

And General Drouet, who was at Napoleon’s side during the action, said, in his speech in the Chamber of Peers on the 24th of June, 1815,--“The Prussians began to attack us at about half-past five in the afternoon.”

It is quite clear, then, and beyond all dispute, that the Prussians first began to enter the field of battle, and to be visible to the French at half-past four in the afternoon; that the Prussian commanders immediately proceeded to make arrangements for an attack;--and that their first collision with the French troops took place about half-past five in the afternoon.

But Napoleon had been forewarned of their approach; for his flying parties had brought in, he tells us, two or three hours before, a Prussian hussar who was bearing a letter to the Duke of Wellington, announcing that General Bulow and his corps were on their march. Hence Napoleon had already set apart his sixth corps, under Count Lobau, to receive the Prussians whenever they should make their appearance.

He introduces at this period many complaints of Marshal Grouchy, who, he pretends, ought to have followed Bulow’s corps, and have taken part in the battle of Waterloo. This is the very height of injustice and absurdity; since he had employed Grouchy distinctly to follow and occupy the attention of the main body of the Prussian army; and in obedience to this command the marshal was at that moment engaged with the Prussian third corps at Wavre. But, on looking at Napoleon’s first bulletin of the battle, we see that this aspersion of Grouchy is an afterthought,--a mere device to lessen his own defeat. Writing at the time, and giving to France a full account of the battle, in that bulletin _not one word_ of any default of Grouchy’s appears.

This, of itself, is enough to show the hollowness of the excuse for the loss of the battle. Grouchy himself, when the “ixth Book” made its appearance, instantly wrote and published an indignant denial of its statements; and Brialmont remarks, that “Napoleon has so expressed himself to make it clear that he was anxious to diminish the amount of his own responsibility by sacrificing the reputation of his subordinates. Thus he pretends that he received on the night of the 17th a letter from Grouchy, which letter _never could have existed_.”

But Gourgaud himself, Napoleon’s own aide-de-camp, is the best witness in exculpation of Grouchy. He tells us, that in the afternoon, hearing the cannonade of Waterloo, General Excelmans urged upon Grouchy to leave following the Prussians and to march towards the cannonade. But Grouchy, “though he burnt with desire to take part in the great battle, _showed Excelmans his instructions_, which were to march upon Wavre, and said, that he could not take such a responsibility on himself.”[36] It is clear therefore, that up to the afternoon of the 18th Grouchy had no other orders than those which bade him follow the Prussians who were in position at Wavre.

Grouchy then, was not at Waterloo, simply because Napoleon had sent him to Wavre, a town some twelve miles distant; and because he was there engaged in a struggle with the third Prussian corps. But the fourth Prussian corps was at Waterloo at five o’clock, because Blucher had promised to send it there, and because Wellington expected it; and gave battle with inferior forces, relying on this assistance. Napoleon ought to have foreseen the probability of all this,--and, foreseeing it, he ought to have delivered his blows more rapidly so as to break the English line, if that were possible, before the Prussians could enter the field. But now that he had allowed his opportunity to pass, and now that Bulow was actually beginning to take part in the battle,--what was the respective strength ranged on either side? This question must be answered; for Napoleon says, “The enemy’s army had just been augmented by 30,000 men, already ranged on the held of battle; thus placing 120,000 men against 69,000, or two to one.” (p. 148.) And then he immediately afterwards, adds “It was _noon_.”

This statement, however, like most of Napoleon’s other statements, is untrue. The Duke’s army had never amounted to 70,000 men, of whom some 10 or 15,000 were merely nominal combatants, whom it was impossible to persuade to fight. And Napoleon wilfully overlooks the plain averment of the Prussian official account, that when their commanders began the attack,--not at _noon_, but some time after half-past four, _only two brigades_, had arrived on the field. Captain Siborne, who took the greatest pains to ascertain every fact of the case, states that at half-past four o’clock the Prussian force which had come up, amounted to 16,000 men; which, added to the Duke’s army of 68,000, made a joint force of about 84,000; but, if the non-fighting part of the Duke’s army were deducted,--of scarcely 70,000. Thus, even with the addition of the newly-arrived Prussians, the allied force was still numerically weaker than Napoleon’s army.