Part 32

ST. CHARLES.--On the 6th of November, 1837, a riot occurred at Montreal, but no lives were lost. On the 10th, Sir John Colborne, the Commander of the Forces, removed his head quarters from Sorel to Montreal. On the same day, a detachment proceeded to St. John’s under the command of Captain Glasgow. He found a large body of people posted on the opposite bank of the Richelieu, and the cavalry proceeded to take possession of the bridge, in order to prevent them from crossing. On the 16th, warrants were issued for the apprehension of twenty-six of the chief leaders. As a party of volunteer cavalry, newly organised, who had charge of two prisoners, were returning to Montreal, a large body of peasantry fired upon them from behind the fences near Longueuil, and compelled them to abandon their prisoners. Colonel Wetherall, with a considerable force, proceeded immediately from Chambly in the direction of St. Charles, for the purpose of dispersing a large body of people who had assembled there, and fortified their position. At some places the insurgents fled on the approach of the army, but at St. Charles the defenders were so obstinate that the Colonel was obliged to storm and carry the works, burning every house but one. The slaughter was great on the side of the unfortunate and misguided people, but slight on that of the troops. Another party of troops, who were marching from Sorel up the course of the Richelieu to effect a junction with Colonel Wetherall, were not so successful. At St. Denis they met with such a strong opposition, that they were compelled to abandon their intention and march back to Sorel. This success on the part of the insurgents was only of short duration, for, on the winter roads being formed, the same party marched through the country without opposition. Having captured St. Charles, and dispersed a considerable body collected for the purpose of cutting off his return, Colonel Wetherall came back to Montreal, bringing with him the pole and cap of liberty, which had been reared at St. Charles, and twenty-five prisoners. Four or five battalions of troops were raised in Montreal, and upwards of 50 corps of various kinds in other parts of the country. One of the most tragical events which took place at this time was the murder of Lieutenant Weir. This young officer had been sent overland to Sorel with a despatch directing the officer in command to prepare a force to accompany Colonel Gore, who was to leave Montreal in the afternoon in the steamboat. The roads were so bad that travelling was almost impossible, and he could not reach Sorel by land until half an hour after Colonel Gore and his division had crossed the St. Lawrence and marched on their route to St. Denis. Taking a fresh calèche, he hastened to join his troops; but, mistaking the road, he passed them and arrived at St. Denis before them. Here he was made a prisoner, closely pinioned, sent forward to St. Charles, and on the road was barbarously murdered by his brutal guardians. The fact and the circumstances attending it were only ascertained on the second expedition to St. Denis. The body was found in the Richelieu, and was brought to Montreal for interment. The funeral took place with military honours, and so solemn and imposing a sight was never before witnessed in the city.

Martial law was proclaimed in the District of Montreal on the 5th of December, and Sir John Colborne invested with authority to administer it. Immediately after this the attention of Government was called to the preparations making at the Lake of the Two Mountains, at St. Eustache, St. Benoit and St. Scholastique, where the most active and able leaders of the revolt had fortified themselves in a formidable manner.

On the morning of the 13th of December, Sir John Colborne, with about 1300 men, advanced towards the district from Montreal along the left hank of the Ottawa. On the 14th the army crossed the river and invested the village of St. Eustache. The attack was completely successful, though attended with much destruction of life and property. The handsome church was set on fire as well as the _presbytère_ and about 60 of the principal houses. One of the leaders was killed near the church, and a large number burnt or suffocated from the flames; of the troops only one or two were killed and a few wounded.

The next day, as the troops marched forward to St. Benoit, His Excellency was met by delegates bearing a flag of truce, and stating that the insurgents were prepared to lay down their arms unconditionally. Almost every house exhibited something white; and, on arriving at St. Benoit, 250 of these misguided men were found drawn up in a line and suing for pardon, stating that their leaders had deserted them. They were immediately dismissed to their homes and occupations. With the return of the troops from the county of the Two Mountains the military operations, connected with the first insurrection in Lower Canada, may be said to have terminated.

ST. DIZIER, BATTLES OF.--_In France._--Between the Allied armies and the French--one of the engagements being commanded by Napoleon himself. The French sustained in these battles, as in several proceeding, severe defeats, and led the way by which the Allied armies entered Paris. Fought, January 27th and March 26th, 1814.

ST. JEAN DE LUZ, BATTLE OF.--“Soult had a strong position on the Nivelle from St. Jean de Luz to Ainhoe, about twelve miles in length. General Hill, with the British right, advanced from the valley of Baztan, and attacking the French on the height of Ainhoe, drove them towards Cambo, on the Nive, while the centre of the Allies, consisting of the English and Spanish troops, under Beresford and Alton, carried the works behind Sarre, and drove the French beyond the Nivelle, which the Allies crossed at St. Pé, in the rear of the enemy. Upon this the French hastily abandoned their ground and works on the left of the Nivelle, and during the night withdrew to their entrenched camp in front of Bayonne. Wellington’s headquarters were established at St. Jean de Luz, November 10th, 1813.”

ST. QUENTIN, BATTLE OF.--Philip II, of Spain, assisted by the British, defeated the French here, August 10th, 1557.

ST. SEBASTIAN, BATTLE OF.--The fortified works, through which ran the high road to Hernani, were carried by the English Auxiliary Legion, under General Evans, after very hard fighting. The British naval squadron off the place, lent, under Lord John Hay, very great aid to the victors. Fought, May 5th, 1836. Again, on the 1st of October, same year, a vigorous assault was made on the lines of General De Lacy Evan by the Carlists. Both sides fought with great bravery, but the Carlists were repulsed after suffering severely. The Anglo-Spanish loss was 376 men, and thirty-seven officers killed and wounded. The General was also wounded.

ST. SEBASTIAN, SIEGE OF.--By the British and Allied armies, under Wellington. After a short siege, during which it sustained a heavy bombardment, and by which the whole town was nearly laid in ruins, it was stormed by General Graham, and taken, August 31st, 1803. The loss was almost all on the British side in the storming--the Spaniards losing few.

ST. VINCENT, BATTLE OF CAPE.--Between the Spanish and British fleets off this Cape. The latter was commanded by Admiral Sir John Jarvis, who took four line of battle ships, and damaged considerably the rest of the Spanish fleet, February 14th, 1797. His own fleet consisted of 15 sail of the line only--whilst the enemy’s fleet was 27 sail, 7 of which carried from 112 to 130 guns each.

ST. VINCENT, CAPE.--Admiral Rooke, with 20 men of war, and the Turkish fleet, under his convoy, was attacked by Admiral Tourville with a force vastly superior to his own, when 12 English and Dutch men of war, and 80 merchant men were taken or destroyed by the French, June 16th, 1693. Here, also, Admiral Rodney destroyed several Spanish ships, January 16th, 1780.

SALAMANCA, BATTLE OF.--Fought July 22nd, 1812.--“Lord Wellington had fought the battle of Talavera in less than three months after he had marched out of Lisbon, and in only three months and six days after his landing in Portugal. He had seen some kind of action and enterprise to be absolutely necessary. It was demanded by England; it was expected by Spain and Portugal. Hence he first drove the French out of Oporto and out of the Portuguese dominions, and then, in conjunction with a Spanish army, marched upon Madrid, and fought a battle with the French.

But these three months sufficed to show him, how utterly valueless was the aid proffered him by the Spaniards. They left him without provisions; they furnished him with no means of transport; and when they placed an army by his side, that army could do nothing but run away, and spread alarm and consternation on every side. Hence, so soon as he fully understood the real condition of affairs, he wrote home to the British government in these plain terms:

“Spain has proved untrue to her alliance because she is untrue to herself;” “and until some great change shall be effected in the conduct of the military resources of Spain, and in the state of her armies, no British army can attempt safely to co-operate with Spanish troops in the territories of Spain.”

Having arrived at this conclusion, Lord Wellington soon withdrew his army from Spain, retired into Portugal, and began to concert measures for the effectual defence of that kingdom. At home, party spirit, as usual, led to injustice. The opposition in the British parliament questioned the whole of his conduct of the past campaign. Sir W. Napier tells us, that “his merits, they said, were nought; his actions silly, presumptuous, and rash; his campaign one deserving not reward but punishment. Yet he had delivered Portugal, cleared Galicia and Estramadura, and forced 100,000 French veterans to abandon the offensive and concentrate about Madrid!”

He now calmly submitted to the British government his views of the defence of Portugal. He assigned to Marshal Beresford the organization of the Portuguese army; he required only 13,000 British troops to be permanently maintained; and with this force he expected to be able to defend Portugal, at least until Spain should be thoroughly subdued by the French; so as to allow of the concentration of their whole force on the work of subjugating Portugal.

The wisdom and expediency of this employment of English troops and English revenues in foreign war, was abundantly evident. For, when the Continent should have been wholly conquered by Napoleon, he would then, as he plainly declared, attempt the invasion of England. Hence, to keep his armies employed in the Peninsula, was the way plainly pointed out by common sense, as likely to postpone or wholly avert a French invasion of the British islands. To defend Portugal, therefore, was Wellington’s first object; for Portugal had become a sort of outwork of England.

The Spanish government, meanwhile, with equal imbecility and self-sufficiency, chose to rush into inevitable defeat. They had starved the English army; which, in a whole month, got only ten days’ bread; and which lost 1000 horses from mere want of provender; and had thus forced Lord Wellington to retire into Portugal. They now choose, with an army of 50,000 men, to give battle to the French at Ocana; where, on the 12th of November, they sustained such a total defeat, that ten days after the battle not a single battalion kept the field. No fewer than 20,000 of the Spaniards laid down their arms, and the rest were utterly scattered and dispersed.

At the opening of 1810, Napoleon resolved to complete the conquest of the Peninsula. He augmented his armies in Spain to 360,000 men. One army, consisting of 65,000 men, under the command of Soult, was charged with the subjugation of Andalusia; and another, of 80,000 men, under Massena, was to move to the west, and reduce Portugal. Now, therefore, must Wellington’s plans for the defence of Portugal be brought to the test.

The actual force of Massena’s army in May, 1810, is shown by French returns given by Sir W. Napier, to have been 86,847 men.

On the 1st of June the French commander invested Ciudad Rodrigo, which capitulated on the 11th of July. Almeida surrendered on the 26th of August, and thus the road to Lisbon was opened to the French army. Wellington would gladly have fought a battle to save these fortresses; but if he engaged 80,000 French, with 32,000 English and Portuguese, and did not signally defeat them; what would then have become of Portugal? Still, when on Portuguese ground, and engaged in the defence of Portugal, he thought it right, on September 27th, to make one stand at Busaco; where he inflicted on the French a loss of 4500 men, at a cost, to his own army, of only 1300. Massena then began even to think of retreating into Spain; when a peasant informed him of a mountain-pass by which he might carry his army into a position from which he could threaten Wellington’s left. This compelled the English General again to make a retrograde movement; and on the 15th of October the whole British and Portuguese army was collected within the lines of Torres Vedras.

These now famous lines, which Wellington had long been silently constructing, were so little thought of either in England or in France, that military instructions were actually given in England commencing thus: “As it is probable the army will embark in September.” And the French commander on his part, found his way suddenly stopped by an insurmountable obstacle, of the existence of which he had never before heard.

Lord Wellington had observed that on the land side (and the French had no force upon the water) Lisbon could be completely defended by a series of entrenchments properly manned. Silently, therefore, during many months past, he had been at work on these lines. They were now complete, mounting 600 guns and when manned by 50,000 men they might have defied Napoleon himself at the head of one of his largest armies.

Massena, astonished, employed several days in examining these lines on every side, but at no point could he find an attack to be feasible. One or two attempts were made, in which his troops were roughly handled, and one of his Generals killed. At last, altogether perplexed, he sent off General Foy to Paris to ask of Napoleon what was to be done. But Napoleon himself had no remedy to prescribe, and hence, after remaining before the lines for one whole month, until utter starvation menaced his army, the French Marshal commenced a retreat. He first retired to Santaren, where he remained until the following March. He then finally retreated out of Portugal, having lost, in the short space of seven months, not fewer than 45,000 men, chiefly by exposure, disease, and starvation. Lord Wellington followed him, and at once invested Almeida. Massena ventured on an engagement at Fuentes d’Onore, but failed, and Almeida capitulated to the English on the 12th of May, 1811.

This campaign had greatly raised the hopes and the confidence of England, and had placed the character of her General on an unassailable elevation. Portugal had been defeated, and a French Marshal with a noble army had been driven back in defeat. Lord Wellington now, therefore, resolved to begin offensive operations in Spain, and he sat down before Badajoz. But Napoleon had at last awakened to the real character of this great struggle. He resolved that Badajoz should not be lost. He therefore earnestly and strenuously increased his forces in Spain, until, in September, 1811, they again amounted to 368,000 men. Soult and Marmont received their orders, and approached Badajoz with 60,000 men. Lord Wellington retired, but in July he threatened Ciudad Rodrigo, when again the two French Marshals marched to its relief with a greatly superior army. And now, as the winter approached, both armies went into cantonments, and the campaign of 1811 ended.

But with January, 1812, commenced that career of triumph which only ended at Waterloo. In 1810, Wellington had saved Portugal; in 1811, he had threatened and disquieted the French armies in their possession of Spain; but the opening year was not to close until that possession was very seriously endangered.

Silently, all November and December, Wellington’s preparations were going on. Soult imagined that he was about to renew the siege of Badajoz, but suddenly, in the earliest days of January, a bridge was thrown over the Agueda, and the English army crossed the river and invested Ciudad Rodrigo. The siege commenced on the 8th, and on the 19th the place was stormed and carried. It had cost the French a siege of six weeks to take it from the Spaniards two years before. On hearing of its capture in twelve days, Marmont wrote to Napoleon, saying, “On the 16th, the English batteries opened their fire: on the 19th the place was taken by storm, and fell into the power of the enemy. There is something so incomprehensible in all this, that until I know more I refrain from any observation.”

Badajoz, a far stronger place, was next invested, on the 17th of March, and on the 6th of April it was taken by storm. And here, too, General Lery, a French engineer, expressed his astonishment, writing thus: “I think the capture of Badajoz a very extraordinary event, and I should be at a loss to account for it in any manner consistent with probability.” These two great strongholds, the border-fortresses, had now been taken, and the way was thus opened into the heart of Spain. All Europe saw with astonishment that a little English army, seldom amounting--even with the aid of the Portuguese,--to more than 40,000 men, could counteract the efforts of the best armies of France, led by Napoleon’s most trusted Generals.

After these exploits, Wellington gave his army some rest until the harvest should grow up, and provisions be more easily obtained. But in May he sent General Hill to storm the forts at Almarez on the Tagus, when the French works, with all their artillery and stores, fell into the hands of the English, who lost only 180 men. By this able manœuvre the two armies of Marmont and Soult were separated.

On the 13th of June, the rains having ceased, and the field magazines being completed, Wellington passed the Agueda, and on the 17th be entered Salamanca, the people shouting, singing, and weeping for joy. The forts, however, were still held by French garrisons, and were not taken until the 27th.

On the 8th of July, Marmont, the French General now opposed to Wellington, received a reinforcement of 6000 men, and both he and Wellington began to prepare for a battle. On the 15th and 16th, Marmont, who had previously made several deceptive movements, concentrated his beautiful and gallant army between Toro and the Hornija rivers. Then began a series of manœuvres, continued for several successive days, until, on the 20th, the two armies were in sight, marching on parallel heights within musket-shot of each other in the most perfect array. The strength of each army amounted to from 45,000 to 48,000 men; but of Wellington’s force a considerable portion consisted of Portuguese troops.

In two or three days more, Marmont would have been joined by two other French corps, augmenting his force by nearly 20,000 men. But then he apprehended the arrival of either King Joseph, or Jourdan, the senior Marshal then in Spain, either of whom would have superseded him in the command. His object, therefore, was either to force the English to retreat from Salamanca, or else to fight a battle, and if possible gain a victory, before either of his superiors in command could arrive.

On the 22nd of July, some change of position on the part of the English army gave Marmont the impression that Wellington was about to retire towards Ciudad Rodrigo. Eager not to let the English thus escape him, the French General ordered Maucune’s division, which formed his left, to march forward so as to fall upon the flank of the British in their expected retreat. They did so; but in so advancing a chasm intervened between them and the division of Bonnet, which formed part of the French centre. Word was brought to Wellington of this movement. “Starting up, he repaired to the high ground, and observed their movements for some time with stern contentment. Their left wing was entirely separated from the centre. The fault was flagrant, and he fixed it with the stroke of a thunderbolt.” Turning to the Spanish General Alava who stood by his side, he exclaimed, “Mon cher Alava, Marmont est perdu!”

A few orders issued suddenly from his lips like the incantations of a wizard, and suddenly the dark mass of troops seemed animated by some mighty spirit. Rushing down the slope of the mountain, they entered the great basin. And now, after long coiling and winding like angry serpents, the armies suddenly fastened together in deadly strife.

Marmont saw the country beneath him suddenly covered with enemies when he was in the act of making a complicated evolution; and when by the rash advance of his left, his troops were separated into three parts, each at too great a distance to assist the other. In this crisis, despatching officer after officer, some to hasten up his troops from the forest, some to stop the march of his left wing, he still looked for victory, till he saw Pakenham with his division penetrate between his left and his centre; then hope died within him, and he was hurrying in person to the fatal spot, when an exploding shell stretched him on the field, with two deep wounds in his side.”

This naturally augmented the confusion of the French; but they still fought manfully. It was just five o’clock when Pakenham fell on Maucune, who, little thinking of such an onset, expected to see, from the summit of a hill he had just gained, the Allies in full retreat. Still, his gunners stood to their guns, and his cavalry charged; but both were killed or repulsed; the infantry endeavoured to form a front, but in the midst of its evolution it was charged and broken. The British cavalry fell upon the rear, while Leith, with the fifth division, bore down on the right flank. For awhile, the French veterans maintained some kind of order, but at last the cavalry broke them; Thomiere, one of their Generals, was killed, 2000 of the French threw down their arms, and the whole division was utterly routed.

The next portion of the French line, Clausel’s division, while warmly engaged with the English under Cole and Leith, had to sustain a charge from 1200 British dragoons. The whole French division was broken in an instant. Five guns and 2000 prisoners were taken in a few minutes. The entire of the left wing of the French army was now only a helpless mob of fugitives. In the centre the struggle was a more arduous one. The French still held a strong position on a hill--the Arapiles. Two attacks by the Portuguese and English were repelled. Beresford, Cole and Leith, were all wounded, and the English centre for a moment was shaken and in danger. But Wellington, whose eye was always where the peril was greatest, immediately ordered up Clinton’s division from the rear, and restored the battle. The ridge of the Arapiles was regained, “And now the current once more set in for the British. Pakenham continued to outflank the French left; Foy retired from the ridge of Calveriza, and the Allied host, righting itself like a gallant ship after a sudden gust, again bore right onwards, holding its course through blood and gloom.”