Part 13

The general instructions furnished to Marshal St. Arnaud (who, by reason of the French army being so numerically superior to the English, and his military rank as marshal being higher than that of Lord Raglan, assumed the rank of generalissimo of the expedition), and which were understood to have been drawn up by the Emperor Louis Napoleon himself, though leaving to the discretion of the Generals the point of debarkation on the shores of the Crimea, yet strongly recommended--so strongly, in fact, as almost to amount to a command--the choice of Kaffa as the most convenient spot. It was, we cannot help believing, exceedingly fortunate that the allied Generals resolved upon examining for themselves the locality, and ultimately rejected the plans of the Emperor. Kaffa, it is true, affords the largest bay and the most secure anchorage in the Crimea, and, had they been the only requisites, there could have been little doubt that the imperial scheme would have been adopted. But the fleet was only valuable in the expedition as an auxiliary to the army--as a basis of operations, a depôt of stores, a means of conveying reinforcements, an assistant in the actual bombardment, or a medium of retreat in event of a disaster. For all practical purposes Sebastopol was the Crimea; and Sebastopol is on the western coast, while Kaffa is on the eastern, at least 100 miles distant. Had the object been to provide for the security and comfort of the fleet, it might as well have been in snug quarters at Spithead or Cherbourg, as at Kaffa, and there it would have been about as useful. The plan of Napoleon was to seize the town of Kaffa, thence to march across the peninsula, taking possession of Karu-Bazar, Simferopol, and Baktchi-Serai, thus advancing to Sebastopol, and securing the harbour of Balaklava, as a naval basis near the scene of intended operations. But the Emperor, by some strange oversight, seems to have forgotten his own previous caution not to separate from the fleets, when he sketched out the march of an army, only 50,000 strong, encumbered with necessary ammunition and baggage, along a road forty miles from the sea in some parts, through a mountainous district, in an enemy’s country, for a 100 miles, exposed to continued encounters with immense armies, and necessitated to seize and retain possession of, at least, three large towns, strongly garrisoned. It is true, a force stationed at Kaffa might intercept reinforcements arriving from Asia, or along the narrow strip of land bridging the Putrid Sea; but what was to hinder the arrival of the legions which should be poured into the Crimea, through Perekop, the most direct and available route from the very heart of the military strength of Russia, on the first intelligence of the invasion? Supposing, too, that a sufficient force to hold Kaffa had been left in occupation there (and if it had not been, what would have prevented the arrival of troops from Asia and the north, which would have followed the invaders, and enclosed them between two fires?)--that the three great towns had been captured and consequently garrisoned--or where the utility of taking them?--deduct the necessary casualties of the march, and the inevitable results of the unavoidable battles, even supposing them to have been victories, and how many men could possibly have arrived before Sebastopol out of 50,000? The expedition to the Crimea at all was romantic, and is said to have been strongly opposed by some of our most able Generals; but this contemplated march through a mountainous region, interposing innumerable obstacles to transit, in the face of a powerful enemy, far from assistance, cut off from supplies of food or ammunition, with three fortified towns to capture, at least several pitched battles to fight, and, as a finish to the prospect, the most strongly fortified town in the world to reduce, was the very absurdity of Quixoteism.

Fortunately, we say, the generals were wiser than their teacher. When the ships collected at their appointed rendezvous, orders were received to proceed to a spot about forty miles west of Cape Tarkan, in the north of the Crimea; then, embarking in the _Caradoc_, a small English steamer, Marshal St. Arnaud and Lord Raglan, accompanied by their seconds in command, Generals Canrobert and Brown, and Sir Edmund Lyons, proceeded to survey the coast and select the spot most favourable to their purpose. They skirted the western shore, ran close into Eupatoria, examined the coast thence to Sebastopol (where a few weeks previous, General Canrobert and Sir George Brown had closely scanned the fortifications on a flying visit, penetrating, under cover of night even into the harbour, and not retiring until the grey light of morning had revealed to them a considerable amount of information), passing almost within range of the guns, and coasting round to the little harbour of Balaklava; which having scrutinized, they returned in safety to the fleets. Had any of the large Russian steamers crossed the path of the little _Caradoc_, and attacked it, a very different fate might have awaited the Allies from that which they anticipated. But the Russian Admirals little dreamed of the prize they might have secured, and our modern Agamemnons were borne back unscathed from their perilous cruise.

On the morning of Monday, the 11th of September, the chiefs returned from their trip and rejoined the fleet; and the anxious expectation as to the point of debarkation, which had agitated the minds of all on board, during the two days’ tedious riding at anchor, was in some degree alleviated by the order to make sail, and rendezvous thirty miles west of Sebastopol. Even then, uncertainty seemed to cloud the counsels of the Commanders. The fleet was dispersed, the heavy sailing vessels having failed to keep in company with their more alert fellows of the steam fleet. At length, the English and French fleets, in one compact flotilla, approached the shore, and the town of Eupatoria, and the hills of the south-east, were presented to the eager gaze of the soldiers. A small steamer was despatched to summon the town to surrender at discretion, and a refusal being received, a small body of English and French marines was landed, their appearance soon stifling any qualms of conscience the local authorities might have felt at yielding up their trust to the enemy. The fleet then shaping a course in a south-easterly direction, the plans of the allied Generals became apparent. About eight miles from Eupatoria the ships cast anchor at a mile from the shore, in the Bay of Kalamita, near a place known as Old Fort. A narrow strip of level land was the spot selected for debarkation, and the enemy exhibited no signs of opposition, or even preparation. It had been not unnaturally anticipated that a formidable resistance would have been made to the expected landing of the Allies, which could only then have been accomplished with much loss. On the contrary, the only signs of Russian life apparent, was the presence of a mounted Russian officer, who, attended by three or four Cossacks, securely stationed on a neighbouring eminence, was calmly sketching the scene.

It had been arranged that the ships of the Admirals should occupy the centre of the bay, thus dividing the two armies. Had this determination been carried out, the landing might have been effected with the least imaginable difficulty; but the French Admiral, with an exclusive attention to his own branch of the allied force, which subsequent events of the campaign paralleled, thought proper to anchor his vessel at the extreme right of the bay, thus throwing the vessels into considerable confusion. One transport was grounded, and several fouled in their endeavours to get into their proper positions. In an incredibly short space of time, however, order was restored; and, under the energetic superintendence of Sir Edmund Lyons, the steamers and transports commenced to discharge their living freights. The sea was literally covered with boats, laden with soldiers in their varied uniforms, and bearing rations for three days, every article that could possibly be dispensed with being left in the ships. Those who landed first marked out with flags the spots to be occupied by each division and regiment; and the sailors, standing knee-deep in the water, lent hearty assistance to those who were less amphibious than themselves. Nothing could exceed the delight of the sturdy seamen, as they lifted their red-coated compatriots from the boats, and placed them dry-footed on the shore; or lent a hand, with more zeal than knowledge, to disembark the horses. Frequently, a noble charger, startled by the novelty of his situation, would roll into the water, half a dozen ancient mariners clinging to his mane or tail, and sharing his immersion,--emerging at length, dripping with brine, but in a high state of jollity at having rescued their steed, and overwhelming him with caresses of a nautical fashion, as they soothed his fears or indulged him with a short trot on _terra firma_. The two or three Cossacks who had watched our landing now deemed it prudent to withdraw, though not until a few shots had warned them of the prowess of the English riflemen, and one of their number had received a compliment from Major Lysons, of the 23rd, which would probably render his sitting in the saddle, or elsewhere, exceedingly inconvenient for some time to come. It so chanced, however, that even these few Cossacks were very nearly inflicting a heavy blow on the English army, by the capture of one of its most distinguished officers. Sir George Brown, general of the Light Division, had no sooner landed, than with characteristic daring he mounted his horse, and advanced alone to gain a view of the surrounding country. He had ridden some distance, and had closely approached the retreating party, quite unconscious of their neighbourhood, when he was suddenly astonished by the unwelcome apparition of three ferocious horsemen, lance in hand, in full career towards him, and at but a few yards’ distance. Sir George, who was almost unarmed, was too old a soldier to mistake rashness for courage, and wisely considering the odds too great, discreetly put spurs to his horse and galloped off, followed by his Cossack pursuers. A few of our men had fortunately, however, followed in the steps of their leader, and when they saw his danger, hastened to the rescue. Half a dozen levelled rifles proved too strong an argument for the valour of the Russian horsemen, and they, in their turn, made a precipitate retreat. Sir George Brown rejoined the main body, and proved, when the time came, that he could attack as bravely as he could retire discreetly.

By the time when the approaching darkness rendered it necessary to suspend operations for the day, 20,000 English, with thirty-six guns, and numerous horses, had been landed, and the French in about equal force. Our men had left their tents in the ships, and officers and common soldiers were alike unprovided with means of shelter. Their rations consisted of provisions for three days; and in this respect, those high in command shared with their less distinguished followers. As night closed in, torrents of rain began to descend, and in a brief space of time, the narrow strip of land on which they stood, bounded on the one side by the sea, and on the other by a salt lake, was a dismal swamp. Wrapping themselves in their blankets, which were thoroughly soaked in a few minutes, the men lay down in the mud, and endeavoured to sleep. A moderate, and not very luxurious supper of cold pork, washed down with a single sip of rum, was their first meal in the Crimea; and then, officers and men strove to drown in slumber the wretched aspect of affairs which thus initiated their invasion. Sir De Lacy Evans was fortunate enough to possess a tent, which some considerate member of the veteran’s staff had contrived to bring on shore. An old cart, the property probably of some Tartar peasant, frightened from his accustomed labour, made, when overturned, a canopy such as royalty seldom couches beneath; but under its welcome shelter the Duke of Cambridge pressed, no doubt for the first time, the bare earth. The French were better provided. They had contrived to land a considerable number of tents; and, moreover, many of their regiments were supplied with the little _tentes-abris_, a portion of which was borne by each soldier; and several of these parts could be united into a small tent, sufficiently commodious to afford some protection from the severity of the weather.

How little can the home-keeping public realise the feelings which must have been predominant in the bosoms of the men during that melancholy bivouac! Soldiers are, perhaps, less sensitive to hardships and exposure than civilians; and probably comparatively callous to the finer sentiments. But it is scarcely possible to conceive that, out of 60,000 men, lying on the bare earth in an enemy’s country, there would be many who would not be keenly alive to the emotions their situations would naturally suggest. Physically depressed by a day of extreme toil, poorly fed, and drenched by the descending torrent, the past would be inevitably present to their imaginations, and with the past the probable future. Many men will march dauntlessly to the cannon’s mouth, and show no signs of fear, but with cheerful voice, and light step, dash through the enemy’s fire, and over the bodies of the dead. But in the stillness of the night, when no excitement warms his blood, the bravest will be despondent, and the strong man be moved with emotions as keen as those which agitate the breasts of the tender woman or the sympathetic child. Oceans rolled between them and all they had learned to love and value. No hand so rough but had been pressed by some other hand on the day of departure; no nature so fierce and ungentle but had softened into a better manhood as the cliffs of England receded from the view. And now they lay through the long hours of that miserable night, striving vainly enough to drown their remembrances in sleep, and gain renewed strength and courage for the morrow--the morrow that might bring death, and certainly imminent dangers. Before them lay an unknown land--a future of deadly uncertainty. Battles were to be fought, shot and steel to be encountered; and who could tell who were destined to lie in the obscurity of death on that foreign soil, and who to bear the tidings back to thousands of melancholy homes?

Thus was passed the night of the 14th of September, the anniversary of the death of the great Duke of Wellington, who, two years before, ended his career amid the universally expressed sorrow of a great people. He was, we had fondly hoped, the last great representative of the military glory of this country. A new era had been, we believed, initiated, in which the arts of peace supersede the operations of war. And now, but two years after the conqueror of Waterloo had looked for the last time upon the world, an English army had landed upon the shores of a hostile territory, and was commencing a warfare of which no man could see the termination, and which bade fair to involve every nation of Europe. The chosen champion of England’s military glory was quiet in his tomb; but his companions, pupils, and successors were prepared to emulate his deeds, and strike as vigorously for the honor of their country, and the maintenance of the freedom of Europe.”

CROPREADY, BATTLE OF.--Fought between the forces of Charles I of England and the Parliament, June 6th, 1644. It was a drawn battle; for both sides, in their respective accounts, claim the victory.

CRUSADES.--The holy wars, waged by the Christians, to wrest the Sepulchre of Christ and Jerusalem, from the hands of the Saracens, continued for many years, and no important results were derived from them as regards territorial acquisition, but they had an immense effect in civilizing the west countries of Europe. There were three principal ones.

CUDDALORE.--_India._--Possessed by the English in 1681. Reduced by the French, 1758. Recaptured two years afterwards by Sir Eyre Coote. Taken again in 1781. Besieged by the British under General Stuart in 1783.

CUIRASS.--A covering for protecting the body of cavalry from the weapons of opponents. The French had a body of soldiers covered with them.

CULLODEN, BATTLE OF.--Fought April 16th, 1746, between the Pretender and the Duke of Cumberland. The Scots lost 2500 men, while the English lost only 200. A writer thus describes the battle:--

“Thus far the affairs of the rebel army seemed not unprosperous; but here was an end of all their triumphs. The Duke of Cumberland, at that time the favourite of the English army, had been recalled from Flanders, and put himself at the head of the troops at Edinburgh, which consisted of about 14,000 men. With these he advanced to Aberdeen, where he was joined by several of the Scotch nobility, attached to the house of Hanover; and having revived the drooping spirits of his army, he resolved to find out the enemy, who retreated at his approach. After having refreshed his troops at Aberdeen for some time, he renewed his march, and in twelve days he came up to the banks of the deep and rapid river Spey. This was the place where the rebels might have disputed his passage, but they lost every advantage in disputing with each other. They seemed now totally void of all counsel and subordination, without conduct, and without unanimity. After a variety of contests among each other, they resolved to wait their pursuers upon the plains of Culloden, a place about nine miles distant from Inverness, embosomed in hills, except on that side which was open to the sea. There they drew up in order of battle, to the number of 8000 men, in three divisions, supplied with some pieces of artillery, ill manned and served.

“The battle began about one o’clock in the afternoon; the cannon of the King’s army did dreadful execution among the rebels, while theirs was totally unserviceable. One of the great errors in all the Pretender’s war-like measures, was his subjecting wild and undisciplined troops to the forms of artful war, and thus repressing their native ardour, from which alone he could hope for success. After they had kept in their ranks and withstood the English fire for some time, they at length became impatient for closer engagement; and about 500 of them made an irruption upon the left wing of the enemy with their accustomed ferocity. The first line being disordered by this onset, two battalions advanced to support it, and galled the enemy with a terrible close discharge. At the same time the dragoons, under Hawley, and the Argyleshire militia, pulling down a park wall feebly defended, fell among them, sword in hand, with great slaughter. In less than thirty minutes they were totally routed, and the field covered with their wounded and slain, to the number of 3000 men. The French troops on the left did not fire a shot, but stood inactive during the engagement, and afterwards surrendered themselves prisoners of war. An entire body of the clans marched off the field in order, while the rest were routed with great slaughter, and their leaders obliged with reluctance to retire. Civil war is in itself terrible, but much more so when heightened by unnecessary cruelty. How guilty soever an enemy may be, it is the duty of a brave soldier to remember that he is only to fight an opposer, and not a suppliant. The victory was in every respect decisive, and humanity to the conquered would have rendered it glorious. But little mercy was shown here; the conquerors were seen to refuse quarter to the wounded, the unarmed, the defenceless; some were slain who were only excited by curiosity to become spectators of the combat, and soldiers were seen to anticipate the base employment of the executioner. The Duke, immediately after the action, ordered thirty-six deserters to be executed. The conquerors spread terror wherever they came; and, after a short space, the whole country round was one dreadful scene of plunder, slaughter, and desolation; justice was forgotten, and vengeance assumed the name.”

CUNNERSDORF, BATTLE OF.--The King of Prussia with 50,000 men attacked the Austrian and Russian army with 90,000 men (in their camp). At first he gained considerable advantages, but pursuing too far, the enemy rallied and gained a complete victory. The Russians lost 200 pieces of cannon and 20,000 men in killed and wounded. Fought August 12th, 1759.

CUSTOZZA, BATTLE OF.--Fought Sunday, 24th June, 1866 between the Austrians and Italians. “The Italian army, divided into three corps and a reserve, making up a force of from 80,000 to 90,000 combatants, after crossing the Mincio at Gotto, and on the other points, on Saturday afternoon, June 23rd, 1866, and sending reconnoitering parties towards Peschiera and Verona, encamped for the night at some place beyond Roverbella, equidistant from the two fortresses. On the ensuing morning an attempt was made upon those high positions of Sona, Somma Campaigna, and Santa Ciustina, which commands the fifteen miles railway line joining the two strongholds, positions which played a conspicuous part in the campaign of 1848. The object of the Italians was evidently to take possession of the railway, so as to isolate Peschiera and secure a basis of operations against Verona. The Austrians, however, who were massed in great force at Verona, sallied forth from that place at daybreak, and, anticipating the Italian movements, took up their position upon those hills, which are now everywhere bristling with bastions and redoubts, and may be looked upon as mere outworks of the two citadels, extending from the gates of one to those of the other. After a severe and bloody, or, as the Italians describe it, “desperate struggle,” which lasted nearly the whole day--that longest of summer days--the Imperial army was victorious along the whole line. They stormed the summit of Montevente, where the Italians held out the longest, and at the close of the engagement, at five o’clock in the afternoon, they also carried the position of Custozza, a spot fatal to Italian arms in their encounter with Radetski, in July, 1848. The victors captured several guns, and about 2000 prisoners, and behaved, as the Archduke Albert’s bulletin assures us, and as we may readily believe, with even more than their ordinary bravery and endurance. On the same evening the Italian army was obliged to re-cross the Mincio.

The Italian accounts of the engagement present no points of material difference. According to them, the first army corps was sent forward to occupy some positions between Peschiera and Verona, but being surrounded by superior numbers, it “failed to effect its purpose,” and the description given of its losses in the contest leaves us little doubt that it was all but annihilated. The second and third corps, unable--it is not said for what reason--to advance to its rescue, were still in the evening “almost intact.” It was also stated from Brescia that the army had maintained its position; but there is little doubt that it had to withdraw across the Mincio later in the night. The Italians had several of their Generals wounded, among others the King’s second son, Prince Amadeus, who has arrived at Brescia.

There is every probability, also, that the Italians were, on this occasion, outnumbered by their enemies: for the Austrians have from 200,000 to 250,000 men in Venetia, and as they had in their hands the most formidable of all engines of modern warfare--the railway, they had probably massed three-fourths, at least, of their troops in Verona, ready for the long-expected Italian inroad. The Archduke’s bulletins, in fact, never speak of garrisons, but tell us that the “imperial army” was in the field.