CHAPTER II

THE THIRD PRUSSIAN CORPS AND GROUCHY’S FORCES

The Third Prussian Corps, commanded by Lieut.-General Thielemann, entered on the campaign of 1815 with a total strength of 23,980 men and 48 guns. There were four divisions[3] of infantry, containing from six to nine battalions each. These were composed as follows:--

NINTH DIVISION--Major-General BORCKE-- Battns. Men. 8th and 30th Regiments of the Line 3} 6,752 1st KURMARK Landwehr Regiment 6}

TENTH DIVISION--Colonel KAMPFEN-- 27th Regiment of the Line 3} 4,045 2nd KURMARK Landwehr Regiment 3}

ELEVENTH DIVISION--Colonel LUCK-- 3rd and 4th KURMARK Landwehr Regiments 6 3,634

TWELFTH DIVISION--Colonel STULPNAGEL-- 31st Regiment of the Line 3} 6,180 5th and 6th KURMARK Landwehr Regiment 6} -- ------ TOTAL Infantry 30 20,611

The cavalry numbered 2,405 men, in two brigades, as follows:--

RESERVE CAVALRY--General HOBE.

Colonel MARWITZ’S Brigade-- Squadrons. Men. 7th Uhlans 3} 8th Uhlans 4} 925 9th Hussars 3}

Colonel Count LOTTUM’S Brigade-- 5th Uhlans 3} 7th Dragoons 5} 1,480 3rd KURMARK Landwehr 4} 6th KURMARK Landwehr 4} -- ------ TOTAL Cavalry 26 2,405

The Reserve Artillery of the Corps, under Colonel Mohnhaupt, numbered 964 men, with 48 guns. The guns were divided up into one 12 pr. foot battery (No. 7), two 6 pr. foot batteries (Nos. 18 and 35), and three batteries of horse artillery (Nos. 18, 19 and 20). Each battery, horse and foot, had 8 guns.

SUMMARY. Men. Guns. Infantry 20,611 Cavalry 2,405 Artillery 964 48 ------ -- TOTAL 23,980 ======

As regards organisation, the Corps was an early form of the modern Army Corps, although there were no “divisional” troops attached to the infantry divisions, and the “corps” troops consisted of the cavalry and artillery brought together as “reserves” under separate commanders, and the necessary engineers and train. It is curious to note that, in the actual fighting, the artillery and cavalry, more especially the former, were divided up, as soon as the battle began. The idea which prevailed in those days, of cavalry “reserves” and cavalry corps, composed of two or more “divisions,” is a marked feature of the later Napoleonic era; and the fact that both disappeared after 1815 goes some way to proving the futility, or, rather, the disadvantages of such organisations, as Napoleon meant them. No larger bodies of cavalry than divisions have been used since; nor has any army since gone forth with a cavalry “reserve.”

The Prussian infantry regiment had three battalions, one of which was the Fusilier battalion. The battalions averaged from 750 to 600 men each; the divisions, from six to nine battalions. The cavalry regiment was composed of from three to five squadrons; the brigade, of from three to four regiments. The batteries of artillery, horse and foot, consisted of 8 guns each, and the personnel of the battery numbered 160 on the average. Thielemann’s Corps was weak in cavalry and artillery, as measured by modern notions; the proportions were 1 cavalryman to nearly every 10 infantry, and 2·4 guns per 1,000 infantry.

The spirit of the troops was excellent, and they were led by brave and capable officers. The old hatred of the French still burned in the hearts of the Prussian soldiers, and they desired nothing so much as to be given an opportunity of revenging Jena and Auerstadt. Their officers were well trained and full of enthusiasm; they had confidence in their men, and the latter had confidence in them.

At Ligny, the Corps won praise for its firm behaviour, and although, during the battle, it had not been hard pressed at any time, at the close of the day, when the Prussian right and centre were broken, it maintained its original position before Sombreffe and on Blucher’s left, enabling the First and Second Corps to withdraw from the field in safety. When it was almost too dark to distinguish friend from foe, Thielemann made a bold counter-stroke with two of his battalions. Major Dittfurth, with the First and Second Battalions of the 30th Prussian Regiment, moved out from Mont Potriaux, which village he had held throughout the afternoon, crossed the Ligny, and made a demonstration against Grouchy on the French right, in order to hinder the pursuit of the broken Prussian centre. A regiment of Dragoons from Excelmans’ Corps charged the Second Battalion, but was repulsed, and Dittfurth, gaining courage, pushed his men further and seized a hill occupied in force by the French. Two more cavalry charges were launched against them, but were also repulsed. And now a division of Lobau’s Corps, in a heavy column, advanced against the First Battalion; but Dittfurth, with great skill and presence of mind, so disposed the Second Battalion as to bring a heavy flanking fire on the French, who suffered severe losses from this fire, and who, being uncertain in the darkness of the strength of the enemy, withdrew. Dittfurth now checked his advance, having successfully prevented the French from pressing too hard on the Prussian centre, and withdrew his battalions to Mont Potriaux. A French cavalry brigade charged up to the barrier on the Fleurus high-road to gain Sombreffe, but the Prussians of the Ninth Division beat them off.

When the battle died out in the darkness, Thielemann held the line Sombreffe-Point du Jour. He remained in position until 3 A.M. on the 17th, when the whole field had been evacuated by the First and Second Corps; and then he commenced, in perfect order, his retreat to Gembloux, where he was to join the Fourth Corps, under Bulow, who had arrived there during the night.

Thielemann’s men were not discouraged by the loss of the battle of Ligny; on the contrary, they were full of spirit and determination; their behaviour under fire had been excellent, and they eagerly waited for a further opportunity of trying their strength with their formidable enemies.

The losses in the corps at Ligny amounted to about 1,000 men killed and wounded, and 7 guns lost.

The force detached by Napoleon for the pursuit of the Prussians, and given over to Marshal Grouchy, numbered 33,611 men and 96 guns. It was composed as follows:--

THIRD CORPS--VANDAMME. Battns.} Men. Eighth Division--(Lefol) 15th Light Infantry, 23rd, 37th, and } 64th Regiments of the Line 11 } } Tenth Division--(Habert) } 22nd, 34th, 70th and 88th Regiments } 14,508 of the Line 12 } } Eleventh Division--(Berthézène) } 12th, 33rd, 56th, and 86th Regiments } of the Line 8 } --- Battalions Infantry 31 ---

Artillery Men. Guns. 4 batteries Foot[4] Artillery (8 guns each) 782 32 Engineers 146

TOTALS, THIRD CORPS

Infantry 14,508 Artillery 782 32 Engineers 146 ------ 15,536 ======

FOURTH CORPS--GÉRARD.

Twelfth Division--(Pecheux) Battns. Men. 30th, 63rd, and 96th Regiments of the Line 10} } Thirteenth Division--(Vichery) } 48th, 59th, 69th, and 76th Regiments } of the Line 8} 12,589 } Fourteenth Division--(Hulot) } 9th Light Infantry, 44th, 50th, and } 111th Regiments of the Line 8} -- Battalions Infantry 26 ===

Seventh Cavalry Division--(Maurin) Squadrons. Men. 6th Hussars 3} 8th Chasseurs 3} 758

Reserve Cavalry Division--(Jacquinot) 6th, 11th, 15th, and 16th Dragoons 16 1,608

Artillery Guns. 4 Batteries Foot Artillery 32} 1 Battery Horse Artillery 6} 1,538

Engineers 201

TOTALS, FOURTH CORPS

men. guns. Infantry 12,589 Cavalry 2,366 Artillery 1,538 Engineers 201 ------ -- TOTAL 16,694 38 ====== ==

TWENTY-FIRST DIVISION--TESTE. Detached from Lobau’s Corps. Battns. Men. 8th Light Infantry, 40th, 65th, and 75th Regiments of the Line 5 2,316

Artillery attached to the Division-- Guns. 1 Battery Foot Artillery 8 161

Men. Guns. TOTAL, Teste’s Division 2,477 8

_Cavalry_ Squadrons. Men. FOURTH CAVALRY DIVISION (belonging to 1st Cavalry Corps) under PAJOL (commanding First Cavalry Corps)-- 1st, 4th, and 5th Hussars 12 1,234

Artillery attached to this Cavalry Division-- Guns. Men. 1 Battery Horse Artillery 6 154

SECOND CAVALRY CORPS (EXCELMANS’)-- Ninth Cavalry Division--(Strolz) Squadrons 5th, 13th, 15th, and 20th Dragoons 16} } Tenth Cavalry Division (Chastel) } 2,817 4th, 12th, 14th, and 17th Dragoons 15}

Artillery attached to the Second Cavalry Corps-- Guns. 2 Batteries Horse Artillery 12 246

SUMMARY OF GROUCHY’S FORCES.

+-----------------------------+---------+--------+----------+------+-----+ | |Infantry.|Cavalry.|Artillery.|Engrs.|Guns.| +-----------------------------+---------+--------+----------+------+-----+ |Third Corps, Vandamme | 14,508 | -- | 782 | 146 | 32 | |Fourth Corps, Gérard | 12,589 | 2,366 | 1,538 | 201 | 38 | |Twenty-First Division, Teste | 2,316 | -- | 161 | -- | 8 | |Fourth Cav. Division, Pajol | -- | 1,234 | 154 | -- | 6 | |Second Cav. Corps, Excelmans’| -- | 2817 | 246 | -- | 12 | | +---------+--------+----------+------+-----+ | | 29,413 | 6,417 | 2,881 | 347 | 96 | | Deducting losses at Ligny | 3,940 | 907 | 600 | -- | -- | | +---------+--------+----------+------+-----+ | TOTALS | 25,473 | 5,510 | 2,281 | 347 | 96 | +-----------------------------+---------+--------+----------+------+-----+ 33,611 men, 96 guns.

It will be seen that Grouchy was given a large proportion of cavalry, although the numbers composing the different units were in most cases very short. Thus the Second Cavalry Corps numbered only 2,817 men, whereas a modern cavalry corps, or rather, two cavalry divisions (as no modern army organises larger bodies of cavalry than divisions), would amount to 9,000 or 10,000 men. The Fourth Cavalry Division (commanded by Soult, brother of the Chief of the Staff, although under the immediate orders of Pajol, commanding the First Cavalry Corps), numbered 1,234 instead of 4,896 men, as the modern British Cavalry Division at war strength would number. The horse batteries consisted of 6 guns, as opposed to 8 in the Prussian horse batteries. The foot batteries contained 8 guns each on both sides. The infantry battalions were weak, averaging from 400 to 500 men. Only Gérard’s Corps was well supplied with cavalry; the remainder of the cavalry was formed in divisions or corps. The idea of cavalry reserves served its purpose on the field of battle in the earlier Napoleonic days, but for such operations as Grouchy was about to carry out, the organisations were too cumbersome.

Grouchy’s men were good soldiers, but without discipline, without confidence in their leaders. This would seem paradoxical; but as far as courage, determination, and tenacity make good soldiers, they were excellent. Houssaye said of Napoleon’s last army: “He had never before handled an instrument of war, which was at once so formidable and so fragile.” Indeed, Ligny proved well enough the impetuosity and dash of the French soldiers, but it was only the influence of victory which impelled them; had they suffered defeat, they would, not improbably, have been panic-stricken. They worshipped the Emperor as their idol, but for their more immediate superiors they had little respect. De Bourmont’s desertion on the 15th June, as the army crossed the frontier, had an injurious effect on the men’s feelings; murmurs rose from the ranks, and mistrust of their generals was everywhere visible. The Republican spirit was in them, but now it needed even more than the personal force of the Emperor to set it blazing again.

At Ligny, the Third (Vandamme’s) and the Fourth (Gérard’s) Corps had borne the brunt of the fighting, and had splendidly attacked the stout-hearted Prussians posted in the villages and on the banks of the stream. The final success of their onslaught against Blucher’s centre and right, where the terrible slaughter gave evidence of the stubbornness of the fight, speaks well for the quality of the men. The cavalry had done little except execute some occasional charges against Thielemann’s Divisions, and seize Tongrenelles and Balâtre: although Milhaud’s Cuirassiers (with whom we are not concerned in this narrative) broke through the centre at Ligny at the close of the day.

The losses were heavy in Vandamme’s and Gérard’s Corps, especially among the infantry--nearly 4000 killed and wounded; while the cavalry lost 900 and the artillery 600.

There was very little of the spirit of co-operation between Napoleon’s generals in this campaign. They all had petty jealousies, but none so strongly as Vandamme, Gérard and Grouchy. And these were the men to whom the pursuit of the Prussians had been entrusted!

Grouchy was, and had been, a brilliant leader of cavalry. He had not the impetuous dash of Murat, the greatest of Napoleon’s cavalry commanders, but he had mastered the art of handling large masses of horsemen. He was a soldier of twenty years’ war experience, and he had distinguished himself at Hohenlinden, Friedland, Eylau, Wagram, and in Russia. He was given the command of the four corps of reserve cavalry--Pajol’s, Milhaud’s, Excelmans’, and Kellermann’s--early in June 1815, but after Ligny he was appointed to a higher and more responsible post--commander of the Right Wing, charged with the duty of following up the Prussians and preventing them from joining Wellington.

Grouchy was not a fit man for independent command. In spite of his exploits in former days, he had never before been exercised in so great a responsibility. And no sooner had he received the appointment than he began expostulating and raising objections. Yet whom else could Napoleon choose? Murat was no longer with him. Davoût was Minister of War and Commandant of Paris--he could not be spared. These were the two men who should have been in Ney’s place and Grouchy’s. Lannes, Dessaix, or Masséna would have well filled the post instead of Grouchy, but Lannes and Dessaix were dead, and Masséna’s services were not available. Napoleon was not now served by his lieutenants as he had been of old, and his generals were not of the stuff which had composed his earlier subordinates. The truth is that he could no longer ignore the claims of rank and seniority. In former days, he could promote to the highest ranks those whom he chose, and those “who had yet a name to make.”

Of the generals in the Waterloo campaign, on the French side, who could have taken Grouchy’s place? We cannot say that Gérard could, simply because he advised Grouchy at Walhain to do the right thing! He was junior, too, to Vandamme. And Vandamme was a rough, uncouth soldier. He had commanded a division at the age of twenty-seven, and had exhibited great qualities as a fighter, but for so important a command as Grouchy’s, he was not the man. Had he been a really capable general, would he not have risen beyond one step in rank since 1799? He was a divisional commander in 1799, and a corps commander in 1815; for sixteen years he had not risen. Besides, he quarrelled both with Gérard and Grouchy (as well as with Soult), and his slow movements on the 15th June, as Napoleon crossed the Sambre, were not entirely due to ignorance of orders.

Soult was the only possible alternative, but he was already Chief of the Staff. As Chief of the Staff he was a failure, but he could not be replaced, and Napoleon desired to have a Marshal of France by his side. Soult was in disgrace on Napoleon’s return from Elba, but the Emperor pardoned him and appointed him to the post that should have been given to Davoût, once the latter had put the organization of the armies in fair order. Suchet was a better man than Soult for Chief of the Staff, and Soult was a better man than Grouchy for the command of the right wing. But Suchet already commanded the army of the Alps.

However, at the time, it was not possible for Napoleon to make an alternative selection, and Grouchy was the only man available. Up to this point there had been no reason to doubt his capabilities, and it is not fair to criticise the man until his faults have been clearly proved; it must be remembered that mistakes in war are inevitable; and the “general who makes no mistakes in war has not waged war for long.”[5]