Part 1

Transcriber’s Notes

A small number of obvious typos have been corrected by the addition of a missing accent. For example, “Prefecture” and “Eglise” have been changed to “Préfecture” and “Église”, respectively. Except for this, the spelling and punctuation of the book have not been changed.

Underscores are used for italic markup; the three words that end this sentence _are in italics_.

Equals signs are used for bold-face markup; the three words that end this sentence =are in bold face=.

The symbols ^{} are used to represent a superscript; for example "3 squared" would be printed as "3^{2}".

The table of contents is at the end of the main text.

Near the beginning of the chapter entitled “THE WAR OF 1914–18” there is a reference to

“=The Battle of the Marne=,” part III., “_The Revigny Pass_”.

This is another Michelin guide but it is NOT the one that has been posted to the Gutenberg site. This is another Michelin guide but it is not the one that has been posted to the Gutenberg site. If you are interested, see this book on archive.org—Battlefields of the World War, Vol I. Part III is on pages 215–289. See: https://archive.org/details/michelinguidetob00mill

ILLUSTRATED MICHELIN GUIDES TO THE BATTLE-FIELDS (1914–1918)

VERDUN

AND THE BATTLES FOR ITS POSSESSION.

MICHELIN &. C^{IE}—CLERMONT-FERRAND. MICHELIN TYRE C^O L^{TD}—81, Fulham Road, LONDON, S.W. MICHELIN TIRE C^O—MILLTOWN, N.J., U.S.A.

VERDUN HOTELS AND MOTOR AGENTS.

_On June 1, 1919._

Information extracted from the _Michelin Tourist Guide_ (1919).

Hostellerie du Coq Hardi, 8 Rue du St. Esprit (between the Rue Mazel and the Meuse).

Hôtel du Lion d’Or, Place Saint Paul (Opposite the Sub-Préfecture).

The “Comité du Ravitaillement des Réfugies,” whose headquarters are at the “Collège,” Rue St. Paul (see _Guide_, p. 31 and 33), has installed a refectory and dormitory in the “Collège.” The “Comité” supplies tourists with the addresses of private persons who let rooms.

The resources of the region around Verdun, described in the itineraries (p. 57 and 88), are absolutely nil. Tourists are therefore advised to provide themselves with Luncheon Baskets.

MOTOR AGENTS.

Grand Garage Central Rochette, 22 rue de la Rivière, Agent for Peugeot. Inspection pit. Petrol (Gasolene). Telephone No 50.

The above information may no longer be exact when it meets the reader’s eye. Tourists are therefore recommended to consult the Michelin Touring Office.

Before setting out on a motoring tour, whether in the British Isles or abroad, call or write to:

THE MICHELIN TOURING OFFICE 81, Fulham Rd., London, ——S.W. 3.——

who will be pleased to furnish all desired information and a carefully worked-out itinerary of the route to be followed, free of charge.

The MICHELIN MAPS

Invaluable to Motorists and Tourists.

FRANCE.

(_Scale—1:200,000_)

Published in 47 Sections. Beautifully printed in Five Colours.

The BRITISH ISLES.

(_Scale 3·15 miles to the inch._)

Published in 31 Sections. Beautifully engraved and printed in six colours.

=Price of Maps (English or French) per Section=:

On Paper — 1/- or post free 1/1-1/ 2 On Canvas — 2/- ” ” 2/2

MICHELIN TYRE CO., 81, Fulham Rd., S.W.3

THE BEST & CHEAPEST DETACHABLE WHEEL

_The Michelin Wheel is practical and strong_

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IN MEMORY OF THE MICHELIN EMPLOYEES AND WORKMEN WHO DIED GLORIOUSLY FOR THEIR COUNTRY

THE BATTLE OF VERDUN (1914–1918)

Published by MICHELIN & Cie Clermont-Ferrand, France

Copyright 1919 by Michelin & Cie

_All rights of translation, adaptation, or reproduction (in part or whole) reserved in all countries_

VERDUN

ORIGIN AND POLITICAL HISTORY

=Verdun=, one of France’s most ancient cities, was first a Gallic, then under the name of “Virodunum Castrum,” a Roman fortress. In 843 the celebrated treaty which divided the Carolingian Empire and annexed Verdun to the Kingdom of Lorraine was signed there. From 870 to 879 Verdun became part of France, but in 923 it was incorporated in the German Empire. As a county, it was governed under the feudal system by the hereditary counts, the last of whom was Godefroy de Bouillon, and later by the episcopal counts and bishops.

In the 10th century, Bishop Haimont, of Verdun, persuaded the Count of Verdun to transfer his rights to him. The arrangement was confirmed by Emperor Othon III., but the count’s heirs disputed the bishops’ title to the town. Later, the burgesses revolted against the authority of the bishops, and after a sanguinary struggle succeeded in throwing off their yoke about the middle of the 13th century. After a long occupation by the Germans, Henri II., King of France, retook Verdun in 1552 and granted it privileges which were confirmed by François II. in 1559. During the Religious Wars, the town was for the Leaguers, and only agreed to receive Henry IV.’s envoy, after that prince’s conversion to the Roman Faith. The burgesses did not take the oath of allegiance to the King of France until 1601.

CHIEF MILITARY EVENTS

Both in respect of its geographical position and history, Verdun is a typical fortified town. From time immemorial it has played an important part in resisting invasion, as witness its fortified camp and citadel. Since 1870 it has been the centre of an essential position formed by a rough hemi-cycle of hills and slopes bristling with defensive works and batteries.

Since the year 450, when Attila left it “like a field ravaged by wild beasts,” it has been besieged at least ten times.

Charles Quint besieged and took it in 1544, but after a seven years’ occupation it was retaken by Henry II. of France in 1552. The Huguenots tried to take it by surprise in 1589, but were unable to overcome the resistance of the burgesses.

=Siege of 1792.=—In 1792, the Prussians attacked and bombarded the town, defended by Beaurepaire with only thirty-two guns and forty-four artillerymen. The Council of Defence, urged thereto by the Anti-Republican section of the population, decided to capitulate, in spite of opposition on the part of Beaurepaire, who died suddenly soon afterwards at the Town Hall by his own hand, according to some, others holding that he was assassinated. The Prussians occupied the town for six weeks, after the garrison had left. Although it is true that a few women went to the Camp of Bras with an offering of sweetmeats for the King of Prussia, it has not been established that the latter gave a ball at Regret, at which the women of Verdun danced. The victory of Valmy forced the Prussians to leave Verdun. On October 13th Kellermann took possession of the Citadel, and on the 14th the troops of the Republic entered the town. Several of the visitors to the Camp of Bras expiated their regrettable act on the scaffold.

=Siege of 1870.=—In 1870, Verdun offered a more stubborn resistance. When the Saxon troops, about 10,000 in number, appeared to the east of the town, the garrison of the latter comprised only 1,500 regular troops, including fifty artillerymen, 2,000 “mobiles” (newly levied men) and 1,400 men of the National Sedentary Guard, while its armament consisted of twenty mortars, two howitzers and ninety-six guns, of which only forty-six were rifled. Under the command of General Guérin de Waldersbach, seconded by General Marmier, this small garrison repulsed an attack on August 24th, and refused to surrender. After being reinforced by 2,600 men who had escaped from Sedan, several sallies were made. By September 23rd the enemy had completely encircled the town, and were forcing the inhabitants of the surrounding villages to help with the siege-works. On the night of October 19th thirty sappers, twenty-five artillerymen and 100 foot soldiers surprised the two German batteries on Heyvaux Hill, between Thierville and Regret, on the left bank, and after hand-to-hand fighting, spiked all the guns.

After the fall of Metz, Verdun, besieged by 15,000 men with 140 heavy guns, in addition to field artillery, surrendered on November 8th with the honours of war.

The town had been bombarded three times. On August 24th it received about 2,000 shells; on September 26th the Citadel received 1,000 to 1,200 shells in five hours; on October 13th, 14th and 15th 20,000 to 25,000 shells fell in the town, severely damaging the upper part and the Citadel.

The name of the German Prefect who governed Verdun and the Meuse province was Von Bethmann Hollweg.

THE WAR OF 1914–1918

Abbreviations: Q.G., _General Headquarters_; P.C., _Post of Commandment_.

=German= army corps are indicated by Roman figures followed by the letters “C” for the _active_ and “R.C.” for the _reserve_.

=French= army corps are indicated by arabic figures followed by the letters “C.A.”

=German= infantry divisions are indicated by their number followed by the letters “D” for the _active_, “R.D.” for the _reserve_, “D.L.” for the “_Landwehr_,” and “E.D.” for the “_Ersatz_.”

=French= infantry divisions are indicated by their number followed by the letters “D.I.”

Verdun played an essential part in the great war.

In 1914, during the battle of the Marne, the army under General Sarrail, resting on Verdun, formed the pivot for Marshal Joffre’s manœuvre (_see the Michelin Guide_: “=The Battle of the Marne=,” part III., “_The Revigny Pass_”).

After the battle of the Marne, the Crown Prince established his positions of resistance north of the fortress, on the line Malancourt—Brabant—Haumont—Maucourt. On September 15th, General Sarrail slipped in from this side the 6th C.A. and 72nd R.D., which were sent beyond the advance forts. The enemy sought to isolate and approach Verdun at the same time. The combats which occurred successively on the initiative of each side were indecisive on the north, but not on the S.E.

On September 20th the IIIrd Bavarian Corps attacked the 75th R.D. at Vigneuilles-les-Hatton châtel, and after forcing it to retreat, reached the Meuse Heights. The 6th Corps was hastily transferred to this region, where it checked the German advance. Further to the right, at St. Mihiel, the enemy succeeded on the 25th in forcing the passage of the Meuse and occupied Chauvoncourt.

During October, November and December, the adversaries harassed one another without intermission. In the vicinity of St. Mihiel the enemy maintained their positions on the left bank of the river.

So far from besieging Verdun, as the _Wolff News Agency_ falsely announced, or entering it, as a postcard circulated throughout Germany, entitled “_Combats in the streets of Verdun,_” tried to make believe, the Crown Prince was held in check on the general line Vauquois—Malancourt—Brabant—Bois des Caures—Ornes—Fromezey—Hennemont—Combres—Lamorville—Spada—Chauvoncourt. These positions were but slightly modified up to the time of the big attack in February, 1916.

In February, 1915, the city was bombed by aeroplanes, while the forts of Douaumont and Vaux were shelled by heavy artillery, including 17-inch guns. The Eparges crest, stubbornly held by the enemy since September, 1914, was definitely taken on April 6th by the 12th D.I. after more than a month of the fiercest fighting. This brilliant action was followed by violent counter-attacks by the Vth German corps, the combats being particularly furious on April 24th and May 5th, after which the fighting was less desperate.

On November 25th–26th the enemy attacked to the N.W. of the city, but despite the liberal use of poison gas, they failed to reach the French lines.

Further attacks by the Germans against Forges on January 12th and at Caures Wood on February 12th, 1916, were unsuccessful.

THE BATTLE OF VERDUN

A battle which was destined to last much longer than the entire Franco-German war of 1870–1871, and which absorbed the efforts of Germany throughout the year, began on February 21st, 1916.

The choice of this battlefield was perhaps less paradoxical than has been said. For the German High Command to take Verdun was to crush the French right, capture an important strategical position and secure an immense moral effect. Moreover, the enemy feared an Allied offensive and was disturbed by the continued increase of their strength in men and material. To forestall this offensive was to make it fail and keep the initiative of the operations. Moreover, the Germans desired to impress the public opinion of the world, which had begun to doubt their ultimate victory. Greece and Roumania seemed inclined to abandon their neutrality, and the time appeared ripe to prove by a crushing blow that German force had not diminished. Lastly, they were influenced by home political considerations; the rationing of the population had depressed the public _morale_ and provoked dissension between the political parties and the states; the prestige of the Crown Prince, after his failure in the Argonne, had considerably declined; a great victory was necessary to strengthen German _morale_, appease dissension and, by rehabilitating the Crown Prince, enhance the prestige of the Imperial family.

The Germans, who had fourteen railways at their disposal, and who, during a long and careful preparation, had concentrated seven army corps and extraordinarily powerful artillery, comprising at least 3,000 guns of all calibres, attacked the French, who had a river in their rear and whose one solitary broad-gauge railway was under enemy gun-fire. By sacrificing men and material on a lavish scale the enemy counted on rapidly overcoming all obstacles, level the French trenches, crush the centres of resistance under a deluge of 17-inch, 15-inch and 12-inch shells, isolate them with barrage fire from 8-inch guns and poison-gas shells, and occupy the destroyed positions—such were to be the German tactics. They were so sure, by repeated smashing blows, of breaking through between Bras and Douaumont, and, by their attack on Verdun, of forcing the French to withdraw their wings, that they neglected first to attack the French positions on the left bank and in the Woevre plain, with the result that their colossal effort broke down before the tenacious resistance and heroism of the French.

THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE

_February–August, 1916_

1.—The Central Attack

At the beginning of the battle, the first French lines were _on the left bank_, from Avocourt Wood to Forges, _via_ the slopes in front of Malancourt and Béthincourt; _on the right bank_, from Brabant-sur-Meuse to Fromézey, _via_ Haumont, Haumont Wood, Caures Wood, La Ville Wood, Herbébois, Ornes and Maucourt. On the morning of February 21st and simultaneously with a bombardment of the entire French front, the enemy began the systematic shelling of Verdun, whose last residents were evacuated on the 25th at noon.

The infantry attacked at 4.45 p.m. from Haumont Wood to Ornes. The 51st and 72nd divisions sustained the first shock of the IIIrd and XVIIIth C.A. and the XIIIth division of the VIIth R.C. A heroic combat followed the most formidable artillery preparation ever known till then. In Caures Wood the Chasseurs, under _Colonel Driant_, resisted foot by foot. When night fell, the enemy’s progress was insignificant, compared with his sacrifices. However, they succeeded in taking Haumont Wood.

On the 22nd the bombardment was resumed with, if possible, greater intensity. In Caures Wood _Colonel Driant_ resisted until death overtook him, having first evacuated his Chasseurs to Beaumont. Meanwhile, the sectors of Woevre and the left bank of the Meuse were violently shelled.

The fighting on the 23rd was even more furious. Brabant fell into the hands of the enemy after a fierce resistance by the 351st I.D., which clung desperately to the ruins of Samogneux until nightfall. Further east the battle raged fiercely. The French counter-attacked unsuccessfully at Caures Wood and were attacked at Herbebois. The 51st I.D. fell back, making the enemy pay dearly for his progress towards Fosses Wood.

In the evening the front extended along the Samogneux—Beaumont—Ornes line. Samogneux was captured by the enemy during the night. The situation was very critical.

Exasperated at the resistance of the French, and having received reinforcements, the Germans made a supreme effort on the 24th. Although harassed by French artillery on the left bank of the Meuse, they succeeded in taking Hill 344 to the east of Samogneux, Fosses Wood, Chaume Wood and the village of Ornes. French reinforcements arrived the same day, and the command of the army of Verdun passed from General de Castelnau to General Pétain.

On the 25th, the 37th I.D., with orders to defend Talou Hill and Louvemont village, resisted for a long time against incredibly furious attacks, but on their right the enemy succeeded in capturing Vauche Wood and, advancing towards Douaumont, carried the fort by surprise. However, their efforts to take the village failed before the heroic tenacity of the 31st Brigade, while the 94th D.I. covered itself with glory. The enemy advance from this side, had the effect of compelling the 31st I.D. to abandon Talou Hill. During this time the line in Woevre was, unknown to the Germans, voluntarily withdrawn to the foot of the Meuse hills, where the French only retained outposts at Fresnes and Manheulles.

Taking over the command on the night of the 25th, General Pétain at once divided the battle-line into four sectors, officered as follows: _General Bazelaire_, on the left bank, from Avocourt to the river; _General Guillaumat_, from the Meuse to Douaumont; _General Balfourier_, from this point to the Woevre; _General Duchesne_, on the Meuse Heights.

There were no trenches, but he ordered that the forts should at least be connected by a continuous line of entrenchments to be made while the battle was at its height and which the “poilus,” in their disdain for the shovel and pick, called the “Panic Line.” The entire 59th division was told off to organise the counter slopes on the second and third lines. Thirteen battalions kept in repair the road from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun, _via_ Souilly (the “=Sacred Way=”), which eventually became the main artery for revictualling the place in men and munitions, and along which 1,700 motor lorries passed each way daily. Lastly, General Pétain managed to imbue all under his command with his energy, activity and faith, and the enemy’s drive was stopped.

On the 26th, the 39th D.I., which had relieved the 37th, victoriously repulsed all attacks on Poivre Hill, while the 31st Brigade continued to hold Douaumont until relieved in the evening by the 2nd D.I.

On the following days the fighting continued about and in the streets of Douaumont, which the enemy finally captured on March 4th. The Germans now began to show signs of weakening. Their effort on the right bank had failed. Checked at Douaumont, they were taken in the rear by the French positions on the left bank, and were obliged to modify their plans. From that time they operated simultaneously or successively on both banks.

2.—The General Attack

(_See map, pp. 14 and 15_)

On March 6th two German divisions attacked from Béthincourt to Forges, where the French front was held by the 67th D.I., and succeeded in taking Forges and Regnéville, but were checked by the positions on Oie Hill. Continuing their advance on the 7th, they succeeded in capturing these positions, as well as Corbeaux Wood. The village of Cumières was the scene of terrible fighting, but remained in the hands of the French, while further to the west the enemy’s attacks broke down at Mort-Homme.

On March 8th, while on the left bank, French troops retook Corbeaux Wood, the Germans brought into line units of five army corps and began a general attack, which failed with very heavy losses, their only gain being the capture of part of Vaux village.

On the 9th they succeeded in getting a footing on the slopes of Mort-Homme, but at the other end of the battle-line their attack on Vaux Fort failed. Their radiograms announcing the capture of the fort were untrue.

On the 10th, Corbeaux Wood was taken by the Germans and the French withdrew to the line Béthincourt, Mort-Homme, south of Corbeaux and Cumières Wood and Cumières village. The battle continued in the village and in front of Vaux Fort, strongly held by the French. The enemy temporarily ceased his massed attacks. In reality their offensive had failed, while their losses in men and munitions had been exceptionally heavy. On March 10th Joffre was able to say to the soldiers of Verdun: “_For three weeks you have withstood the most formidable attack which the enemy has yet made. Germany counted on the success of this effort, which she believed would prove irresistible, and for which she used her best troops and most powerful artillery. She hoped by the capture of Verdun to strengthen the courage of her Allies and convince neutrals of German superiority. But she reckoned without you! The eyes of the country are on you. You belong to those of whom it will be said: ‘They barred the road to Verdun.’_”