PART IX
EPILOGUE
On 23 May 1968, several members of the 26th Marines who had fought at Khe Sanh had a reunion of sorts in Washington, D. C. and the surroundings were a far cry from the dirt and grime of the combat base. The "CP" belonged to the President of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson. In the Cabinet Room of the White House, the Commander in Chief paused to honor the men of the 26th Marines and awarded the Presidential Unit Citation to the regiment. Colonel Lownds, whose large handle-bar mustache had been shaved off at the direction of "the highest possible authority"--his wife, and Sergeant Major Agrippa W. Smith, senior enlisted man at the KSCB, were on hand to receive the award. While it was fitting that the 26th Marines be cited as a unit, the President also praised the South Vietnamese, U. S. Army, U. S. Navy, U. S. Air Force, and Marine aviation and support units which contributed so gallantly to the defense of the installation.(223)
In some quarters, however, there were still grumblings over the Khe Sanh issue. During the siege, there had been a virtual storm of protest from critics who opposed the Administration's decision to hold the base. These doomsday prophets suffered from what some military experts referred to as the "Dien Bien Phu Syndrome." Many noted intellectuals were in the van of this group and throughout the battle they could not be convinced that air and artillery support would provide the margin of difference; they warned that the tiny base would suffer the same fate which had been meted out to the French garrison 14 years earlier.(224)
There are several reasons why Khe Sanh did not become another Dien Bien Phu. The first and most obvious being that the Americans possessed the overwhelming supporting arms which were not available to the French. Contrary to the predictions of many critics, air and artillery were decisive and more than made up for the numerical superiority of the enemy. Over 100,000 tons of bombs and 150,000 artillery rounds were delivered--and delivered intelligently--by the Americans during the siege. Much of the credit goes to the regimental commander and his staff who knew how to coordinate their different sources of firepower to achieve maximum results. The NVA learned this during the five major attacks against the base and hill outposts.
The ability to keep Khe Sanh resupplied was another major factor. The NVA encirclement did not coincide with the monsoon season by accident. With Route 9 interdicted, the fate of the garrison hinged on the success or failure of the airlift and apparently the North Vietnamese anticipated that it would fail. The fact that the airlift was successful in the face of heavy enemy fire and the foulest weather imaginable is indeed a tribute to the aircrews and recovery personnel but the resupply effort went much deeper than just delivering the goods. The Force Logistics Command at Da Nang augmented by U. S. Army sources at Cam Ranh Bay was responsible for the mountain of supplies and material which sustained the 26th Marines. An excerpt from the works of Winston Churchill which was selected as the motto of the Force Logistics Command best describes the vital role these logistics agencies played: "Victory is the beautiful colored flower. Supply is the stem without which it could never have blossomed."(225)
Another important facet of the defense was the close supervision and leadership provided by the senior commanders, namely CG, 3d MarDiv, CG, III MAF, and ComUSMACV. Since much of the supporting arms and all of the logistical support was handled by agencies external to the 26th Marines, constant coordination among these three headquarters was imperative. General Tompkins was the pivotal figure of the triumvirate. During his daily trips to the base, the general learned first hand what the regimental commander needed; he not only saw that Colonel Lownds received adequate support but he insured that the defenders made the most of their resources. In so doing he exposed himself to heavy enemy antiaircraft, artillery, and mortar fire as did General Cushman during his periodic visits to Khe Sanh. Commenting on the strong role played by the 3d Marine Division commander, General Cushman later said, "General Tompkins made or approved every major decision during the battle."(226)
The real hero of Khe Sanh, however, was on the opposite end of the rank scale--the individual fighting man. For 77 days the defenders waited in the trenchlines while the bulk of the credit and publicity went to the artillery, fighter/bombers, and B-52s. On several occasions the supporting arms could not prevent major enemy assaults from reaching the wire; at this point, it was the Marines or ARVN Rangers, armed with rifles, grenades, and bayonets, who stopped the North Vietnamese--often in bitter hand-to-hand combat. Without exception, the battalion commanders were lavish in their praise of the young Americans and South Vietnamese who held the perimeter and denied the enemy a much-needed victory. In spite of the inherent hardships which accompanied the siege and the incessant shelling, the defenders were always itching for a fight. The most overused expression during the battle was, "I wish they (North Vietnamese) would hurry up and come so we can get this thing over with." When asked by a reporter if the NVA troops could take Khe Sanh, one officer answered, "Hell no, those 19-year-old Marines won't let them."[75](227)
Finally, much of the credit for the American success at Khe Sanh belongs to the NVA. The North Vietnamese obliged the 26th Marines by standing toe to toe in a slugging contest during which they were outgunned and outfought; in effect, the enemy destroyed himself. If there was one salient feature which resulted in the enemy's defeat it might well be his rigid adherence to a siege strategy in the face of certain failure. Even when it became obvious that the Americans were aware of their master plan, the North Vietnamese doggedly pursued their siege tactics without alteration. The extremely lucrative target presented by the massed NVA forces which ringed the base was one of the main reasons the garrison was maintained. Thus, the question may be legitimately asked, "Who besieged whom?"(228)
To a lesser degree, there was a controversy over who or what had won the battle. Proponents of air power and strategic bombing were the most vocal; they felt that the B-52 had been the most decisive instrument of defense. While the Stratofortress was a valuable asset and, without doubt played a major role, any attempt to single out one supporting arm as the ultimate weapon in the battle would be futile. The B-52 was but one part of an intricate defensive fire plan. The bombers struck targets beyond 1,100 meters of the base; tactical air and artillery took up the slack to within about 250 meters and the organic weaponry of the defenders provided close-in fires. The system was balanced and effective but, if any part were eliminated, the defenders would have paid a much higher price in casualties. Both General Tompkins and Colonel Lownds were unstinting in their praise of all supporting arms, as well as the logistical effort; they stressed, and stressed heavily, that the defense of Khe Sanh was a joint endeavor. The highly successful results were achieved through the contributions of all U. S. Services and the South Vietnamese. While the Marines had been unable to find an infantryman who could carry a 27-ton payload, neither had the U. S. Air Force come up with a B-52 which could man a foxhole. Both, in their own way, were essential.(229)
The Khe Sanh story again became news in late June 1968 and the old controversy over strategy was rekindled. Prior to leaving his post as ComUSMACV on 11 June, General Westmoreland visited PCV Headquarters in I Corps and approved the recommendations of Generals Cushman and Rosson to raze the KSCB and withdraw all Allied forces to the Ca Lu area. While General Westmoreland made the decision prior to his departure, he did not close the base at that time, because mopping-up operations were being conducted around Khe Sanh. In addition, large amounts of supplies had been stockpiled there and the general deemed it more economical to maintain the base while these stocks were consumed in support of the operations rather than backhaul them to Ca Lu. For these reasons, he left the choice concerning the optimum time to dismantle the installation up to his successor, General Abrams. When bulldozers finally began to level the bunkers and structures which had housed the 26th Marines throughout the siege, the American people wondered why the base had been so tenaciously defended if it was to be eventually abandoned. Had American blood been shed in vain? Critics of the hold-out policy argued that, in the final analysis, they had been right and those who decided to defend the base had been wrong. Such rationale pinpointed the inability of many Americans to break away from the techniques employed in past wars and recognize the peculiarities of the conflict in Vietnam.
There were several reasons for the deactivation of the KSCB since, for all practical purposes, the base had outlived its usefulness. The rationale endorsed by General Cushman and General Rosson was threefold. First, the enemy had reduced his forces and changed his =modus operandi= in the Khe Sanh area. Secondly, the NVA artillery in Laos had accurately targeted the base and access road which compounded the casualty and resupply problems. Finally and most important, General Cushman had sufficient assets in June to pursue the mobile offensive strategy which he had advocated strongly for such a long time. Two U. S. Army divisions (i.e. 1st ACD and the 101st Airborne) with their inherent helicopter resources had been shifted to III MAF and, during March and April, the tremendous logistics burden associated with the introduction of these 50,000 men into northern I Corps had been alleviated. Since he had sufficient maneuver elements to go on the offense in western Quang Tri Province, General Cushman no longer needed five battalions buttoned up in Khe Sanh.(230)
An additional consideration for the abandonment of the base was President Johnson's announcement on 31 March that the U. S. would end air strikes in North Vietnam.[76] While the decision was a major step toward peace, it also enabled thousands of NVA support personnel who were responsible for road repair in North Vietnam to move further south. These workers constructed a network of infiltration arteries which bypassed the combat base and the continued policy of positioning static Allied defense installations in the path of these routes would have been inefficient and undesirable. In this regard, the best defense was a highly mobile offense and while a forward operating base for such operations was essential, the LZ Stud/Ca Lu area was much better suited than Khe Sanh.(231)
By the time PEGASUS was over, LZ Stud was in full operation. The airstrip was extended to accommodate C-123s, a Force Logistics Area was established, and local defenses were strengthened. The base was outside the range of the North Vietnamese 130mm and 152mm guns in Laos and the stretch of Route 9 from Ca Lu to the Rockpile and eventually Dong Ha was easier to keep open. Thus, two factors--enemy shelling and resupply problems--which had negated the effectiveness of Khe Sanh as a base of operations were absent at LZ Stud.
While not physically located on the Khe Sanh Plateau, the forces at LZ Stud controlled it. Two forward fire bases were established in the vicinity of the old combat base from which extensive patrolling was conducted. Ground patrols were supplemented by air surveillance. Whenever contact with the enemy was made, lighting-fast helicopter assaults were launched from LZ Stud and were supported by the artillery of the forward fire bases, tactical aircraft, and Huey gunships. The enemy was attacked by these mobile forces whenever and wherever he appeared. When a major NVA unit was encountered, sufficient reinforcements were also injected by helicopter. So, the only thing that changed on the Khe Sanh Plateau, besides the face of the combat base, was the style and tempo of operations.(232)
The new strategy by no means diminished the accomplishments of the men who had held Khe Sanh; it was simply a continuation of the battle in another form. When the leaders in Hanoi finally accepted President Johnson's peace overtures and consented to meet with U. S. representatives in Paris, there was one thing that the North Vietnamese negotiators did not possess--the battle standard of the 26th Marines. An editorial in the =Washington Star= provided an appropriate tribute to the men of Khe Sanh:
To be sure, Khe Sanh will be a subject of controversy for a long time, but this much about it is indisputable: It has won a large place in the history of the Vietnam war as an inspiring example of American and Allied valor. One day, in fact, the victory over the siege may be judged a decisive turning point that finally convinced the enemy he could not win.(233)
FOOTNOTES:
[75] Many of these young men exhibited a maturity beyond their years. One message, scrawled on the back of a C-ration carton by an anonymous Marine, was found after the siege. It read: "Life has a special flavor to those who fight for it that the sheltered never know."
[76] The attacks were halted except in the area north of the demilitarized zone where the continuing enemy buildup directly threatened Allied forward positions and where the movements of their troops and supplies clearly related to that threat.
APPENDIX A
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTES AND FOOTNOTES
=Explanatory Note=: Unless otherwise noted the material in this monograph is derived from Admiral Ulysses S. G. Sharp, USN, and General William C. Westmoreland, USA, =Report On The War In Vietnam=, hereafter Sharp and Westmoreland, =Report On The War=; Maj John J. Cahill, USMC, and Jack Shulimson, "History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, Jan-Jun65"; FMFPac, Operations of U. S. Marine Forces Vietnam, Mar67-Apr68, hereafter =FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam=; FMFPac, U. S. Marine Corps Forces in Vietnam Mar65-Sep67 Historical Summary, Volume I: Narrative, hereafter =FMFPac HistSum=; III MAF Command Chronologies Apr67-Apr68, hereafter =III MAF CmdChron=; 3d Marine Division Command Chronologies, Apr67-Apr68, hereafter =3d MarDiv CmdChron=; 1st Marine Aircraft Wing Command Chronologies, Apr67-Apr68, hereafter =1st MAW CmdChron=; 26th Marines Command Chronologies, Apr67-Apr68, hereafter =26th Marines CmdChron=; 1/26 Command Chronologies, Apr67-Apr68, hereafter =1/26 CmdChron=; 2/26 Command Chronologies, Jan68-Apr68, hereafter =2/26 CmdChron=; 3/26 Command Chronologies, Jun67-Apr68, hereafter =3/26 CmdChron=; 3d Marines Khe Sanh Operations After Action Report, 9Jun67, hereafter =3d Marines Khe Sanh AAR=; VMGR-152 Command Chronologies Jan68-Apr68, hereafter =VMGR-152 CmdChron=; Marine Corps Command Center, Status of Forces, Apr68, hereafter =MCCC Status of Forces=; Defense Intelligence Bulletins Dec67-Apr68, hereafter =DIA IntBul=; Six Month Evaluation Report, prepared by HQ, MACV 31May68; Presentation of LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., USMC, in 1968 General Officers Symposium Book, HQMC, dtd 15Jul68; CG, FMFPac msg to CMC dtd 200327Z Mar68; Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation PEGASUS (C), hereafter =PEGASUS AAR=; Gen William C. Westmoreland ltr to CMC dtd 14Dec68, Subj: Review of the draft manuscript "The Battle of Khe Sanh Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =Westmoreland Comments=; LtGen Lewis W. Walt Interviews with HistBr dtd 17Dec67 and 14Jan69; LtGen Robert E. Cushman, Jr., USMC, ltr to Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, HQMC, dtd 26Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =Cushman Comments=; LtGen Herman Nickerson, USMC, memo to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, HQMC, dtd Dec68, Subj: Review of draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =Nickerson Comments=; LtGen William B. Rosson, USA, ltr to CMC dtd 18Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =Rosson Comments=; LtGen John J. Tolson, III, USA, ltr to CMC dtd 21Jan69, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter =Tolson Comments=; MajGen Norman J. Anderson, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 2Jan69, Subj: Khe Sanh Historical Monograph, hereafter =Anderson Comments=; MajGen Louis Metzger, USMC, memo to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, HQMC, dtd 23Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =Metzger Comments=; MajGen John R. Chaisson comments on draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =Chaisson Comments=; Interview with MajGen Rathvon McC. Tompkins, USMC, dtd 26Aug68 No. 3088 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC), hereafter =Tompkins Interview=; Deputy Chief of Staff (Air) comments on draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh," dtd 9Dec68, hereafter =DCS/Air Comments=; BGen Robert P. Keller, USMC, ltr to Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 17Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter =Keller Comments=; BGen Harry C. Olson, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 13Jan69, Subj. "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter =Olson Comments=; BGen Carl W. Hoffman, USMC, ltr to CMC (Code AO3D) dtd 22Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter =Hoffman Comments=; Chief, USAF Historical Division Liaison Office ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 18Dec68, Subj: Review of Historical Study, "The Battle of Khe Sanh"; Chief, Historical Studies Branch, USAF Historical Division ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 22Jan69, Subj: Review of Historical Study, "The Battle of Khe Sanh"; Chief, Project CORONA HARVEST ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 15Jan69, Subj: Review of Draft Manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter =Air Force Historical Comments=; Interview with Col David E. Lownds, USMC, dtd Jul68, No. 801 674/4 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC), hereafter =Lownds Jul Interview=; Col David E. Lownds, USMC, Interview with HistBr dtd 13Sep68, hereafter =Lownds Sep Interview=; Col Frank E. Wilson, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 6Jan69, Subj: Review of "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter =Wilson Comments=; Col Bruce F. Meyers, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 16Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh" hereafter =Meyers Comments=; Interview with Col Franklin N. Pippin, USMC, dtd 24Jun68, No. 2907 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Interview with Col Johnnie C. Vance, Jr., USMC, dtd 20Jun68, No. 2909 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Col Robert D. Brown, USAF, ltr to HQMC (AO3D) dtd 8Jan69, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh" hereafter =Brown Comments=; Col Robert E. Brofft, USAF, ltr to HQMC (AO3D) dtd 8Jan69, Subj: Monograph, "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter =Brofft Comments=; LtCol John F. Mitchell, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 31Jan69, Subj: Comments on "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter =Mitchell Comments=; LtCol Harry L. Alderman, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh" hereafter =Alderman Comments=; LtCol James B. Wilkinson, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd Dec68, Subj: Response to HQMC ltr AO3D-rem S807 373 of 6Dec68, "The Battle of Khe Sanh," hereafter =Wilkinson Comments=; LtCol John A. Hennelly, USMC, comments on draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh" of 15Feb69, hereafter =Hennelly Comments=; Interview with LtCol Edward J. A. Castagna, USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); LtCol Francis J. Heath, Jr., USMC, comments on draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =Heath Comments=; LtCol Frederick J. McEwan, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 30Dec68, Subj: Comments on "The Battle of Khe Sanh Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =McEwan Comments=; LtCol Johnny O. Gregerson, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC dtd 3Jan69, Subj: Review of a draft copy of the historical monograph: "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =Gregerson Comments=; LtCol John C. Studt, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC dtd 24Dec68, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh" manuscript, hereafter =Studt Comments=; Interview with LtCol Harry T. Hagaman, USMC, dtd 2Mar68, No. 2548 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); LtCol William J. White, USMC, comments on draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" n.d., hereafter =White Comments=; Interview with Maj William J. Sullivan, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Maj John A. Shepherd, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, dtd 2Jan69, Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" hereafter Shepherd Comments; Taped comments of Maj Matthew P. Caulfield, USMC, on the draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" dtd 2Jan69, hereafter =Caulfield Comments=; Interview with Maj Matthew P. Caulfield, USMC, dtd 10Feb68, No. 2535 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Maj Wayne M. Wills, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC, dtd 2Jan69, Subj: Historical Monograph, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =Wills Comments=; Maj Harper L. Bohr, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC, dtd 18Dec68, Subj: Comments concerning "The Battle of Khe Sanh" hereafter =Bohr Comments=; Maj Jerry E. Hudson, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3, HQMC, dtd 2Jan69, Subj: Review of Historical Monograph of Khe Sanh, hereafter =Hudson Comments=; Maj Mirza M. Baig, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC dtd 23Dec68, Subj: Comments on draft manuscript, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" hereafter =Baig Comments=; Maj William H. Dabney, USMC, comments on draft manuscript n.d., "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" hereafter =Dabney Comments=; Maj William H. Dabney, USMC, Interview with HistBr dtd 10Jan69; Maj Earl G. Breeding, USMC, comments on draft manuscript dtd 22Dec68, "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68," hereafter =Breeding Comments=; Interview with Capt Earl G. Breeding, dtd Jul68, No. 2121 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Maj Kenneth W. Pipes, USMC ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, n.d., Subj: Khe Sanh Manuscript, hereafter =Pipes Comments=; Interview with Capt Kenneth W. Pipes, USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); 1stLt James M. Alexander, USMC, ltr to HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC, n.d., Subj: "The Battle of Khe Sanh, Apr67-Apr68" hereafter =Alexander Comments=; Interview with 1stLt James M. Alexander, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Interview with 1stLt William L. Everhart, USMC, dtd 10Feb68, No. 2535 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Interview with Sgt Timothy B. Keady, USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); Interview with HM3 Frank V. Calzia, USN, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC); LCpl Michael A. Barry, USMC, Interview with HistBr dtd 17Feb69; Cornelius D. Sullivan, =et al.=, =The Vietnam War: Its Conduct and Higher Direction= (Washington, D. C.: The Center For Strategic Studies, Georgetown University, 1968) (U), hereafter Sullivan, =et al.=, =The Vietnam War=; Bernard B. Fall, =The Two Viet-Nams= (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965 ed.) (U); Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., USMC, =Soldiers of the Sea= (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute 1962 ed.) (U); Capt Ken Kashiwahara, USAF, "Lifeline to Khe Sanh," =The Airman=, v. XII, no. 7 (Jul68) (U), hereafter Kashiwahara, "Lifeline to Khe Sanh"; =Washington Star=, 25May68, p. 13 (Early Bird) (U); =Washington Star=, 9Jun68, p. 1-E (Early Bird); =Baltimore Sun=, 25May68, p. 2 (Early Bird) (U). All documentary material cited is located in the HistBr, G-3 Division, HQMC and, unless otherwise noted, carries an overall classification of Secret.
FOOTNOTES:
(1) Major John J. Cahill, USMC and Jack Shulimson, "History of U. S. Marine Corps Operations in Vietnam, Jan-Jun65," pp. 67, 68, 126 (S).
(2) =FMFPac=, =Marine Opns in Vietnam=, Jun67, pp. 5-12 (S).
(3) =Ibid.=
(4) =3d MarDiv CmdChron=, Oct68, p. 11 (S).
(5) =FMFPac=, =Marine Opns in Vietnam=, Mar67, p. 15 (S).
(6) =3d Marines Khe Sanh AAR=, p. 7 (S); Bernard B. Fall, =The Two Viet-Nams= (New York: Frederick A. Praeger 1965 ed.), p. 3.
(7) =Westmoreland Comments.=
(8) =3d Marines=, =Khe Sanh AAR=, p. 12 (S).
(9) Lieutenant General Lewis W. Walt Interview with Historical Branch dtd 17Dec68 and 14Jan69 (S).
(10) =3d Marines, Khe Sanh AAR=, pp, 7-30 (S).
(11) =Ibid.=
(12) =Ibid.=, pp. 32-33 (S).
(13) =FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam=, May67, p. 11 (S).
(14) =Ibid.=, pp. 7-10, 19 (S).
(15) =FMFPac HistSum=, pp. 7-17 (S).
(16) =FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam=, Jul67, pp. 9-13 (S).
(17) =Ibid.=
(18) =FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam=, Sep67, pp. 52-73 (S); =3d MarDiv ComdChron=, Sep67, p. 25 (S); Chaisson Comments; Personal observations of the author.
(19) =Westmoreland Comments=; =Metzger Comments=.
(20) =FMFPac=, =Marine Opns in Vietnam=, Oct67, pp. 24-36 (S).
(21) =Metzger Comments.=
(22) =26th Marines CmdChron=, May67, p. 4 (S).
(23) =Ibid.=
(24) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jun67, p. 4 (S).
(25) =Ibid.=, Jul67, p. 4 (S).
(26) Col Lownds tape No. 801 674/4 (S); =26th Marines CmdChron=, Aug67, p. 4 (S); =Metzger Comments=.
(27) =Wilkinson Comments.=
(28) Col Lownds Tape No. 801 674/4 (S); =26th Marines CmdChron=, Aug67, p. 4 (S), =Brown Comments=.
(29) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Nov67, p. 4 (S).
(30) =Cushman Comments=; =Hoffman Comments=.
(31) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Dec67, p. 4 (S).
(32) =Alderman Comments.=
(33) =Bohr Comments.=
(34) =Hudson Comments.=
(35) =FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam=, Jan 68, pp. 8, 9; =III MAF CmdChron=, Jan and Feb68 (S); =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, p. 60 (S); =Lownds Sep Interview= (S).
(36) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); =3/26 CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 10 (S); =Caulfield Comments=.
(37) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 4 (S).
(38) =3/26 CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 3 (S).
(39) =2/26 CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 2 (S).
(40) =Ibid.=; =Breeding Comments=; =Caulfield Comments=.
(41) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, pp. 3, 4 (S); =Lownds Sep Interview= (S).
(42) =FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam=, Jan68, p. 10 (S).
(43) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, pp. 3, 4 (S); =3/26 CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 3 (S); =Alderman Comments=; =Dabney Comments=; =Caulfield Comments=.
(44) =Ibid.=
(45) =Dabney Comments.=
(46) =Ibid.=; =26th CmdChron=, Jan68, pp. 3, 4 (S); =3/26 CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 3 (S); =Alderman Comments=; =Dabney Comments=.
(47) =Ibid.=
(48) =Cushman Comments=; =Tompkins Interview= (S); =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); =Wilkinson Comments=; =Pipes Comments=; =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 5 (S).
(49) =Caulfield Comments.=
(50) =Alderman Comments.=
(51) =Caulfield Comments.=
(52) =Ibid.=
(53) =3/26 CmdChron=, Jan 68, p. 3 (S); =Caulfield Comments=.
(54) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); Interview with Major Matthew P. Caulfield, USMC dtd 10Feb68, No. 2535 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); =Caulfield Comments=.
(55) =Dabney Comments=; =Caulfield Comments=.
(56) =Ibid.=; =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 4 (S); =Lownds Sep Interview=; =White Comments=.
(57) =Pipes Comments.=
(58) =Wilkinson Comments.=
(59) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 4 (S); =Hudson Comments=.
(60) Interview with First Lieutenant William L. Everhart, dtd 10Feb68 No. 2535 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); =Hennelly Comments=.
(61) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 9 (S); =FMFPac Marine Opns in Vietnam=, Jan68, p. 11 (S); =Tompkins Interview= (S); =Hudson Comments=.
(62) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S).
(63) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 9 (S).
(64) =Cushman Comments.=
(65) =Ibid.=; =Westmoreland Comments=.
(66) =Westmoreland Comments.=
(67) =Ibid.=; Sharp and Westmoreland, =Report on The War=, p. 163.
(68) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, pp. 4, 11 (S); =Lownds Sep Interview= (S).
(69) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); =Baig Comments=.
(70) =Wilkinson Comments.=
(71) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, p. 4 (S); =Lownds Sep Interview=; =Wilkinson Comments=.
(72) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan68, pp. 3, 4 (S); =III MAF CmdChron=, Jan68, pp. 3-10 (S).
(73) Sharp and Westmoreland, =Report on The War=, p. 158.
(74) Presentation of Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman, Jr., USMC, in 1968 General Officers Symposium Book, dtd 15Jul68 (S).
(75) Sullivan, =et al.=, =The Vietnam War=, pp. 101-104.
(76) =Ibid.=, Sharp and Westmoreland, =Report on The War=, p. 235.
(77) =Ibid.=
(78) Sullivan, =et al.=, =The Vietnam War=, p. 99.
(79) =Ibid.=
(80) =Lownds Jul Interview= (S).
(81) =Ibid.=
(82) =Ibid.=; CG FMFPac msg to CMC, dtd 200327Z Mar68 (S).
(83) =Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews= (S).
(84) =Dabney Comments.=
(85) =Ibid.=
(86) =Ibid.=
(87) =Ibid.=; =Caulfield Comments=.
(88) =Dabney Comments.=
(89) =Lownds Jul Interview= (S).
(90) =Mitchell Comments.=
(91) =Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews= (S); =Tompkins Interview= (S).
(92) =Ibid.=; =Mitchell Comments=.
(93) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, p. 8 (S); Interview with Captain Earl G. Breeding, USMC, dtd Jul68, No. 2121 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S): =Breeding Comments=.
(94) =Ibid.=
(95) =Ibid.=
(96) =Ibid.=; =Dabney Comments=.
(97) =Ibid.=
(98) =White Comments.=
(99) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, pp. 8-10 (S); =Tompkins Interview= (S).
(100) =Ibid.=; =Lownds Jul Interview= (S); =Hennelly Comments=.
(101) =Hennelly Comments.=
(102) =Hudson Comments.=
(103) =Wilkinson Comments.=
(104) =Lownds Sep Interview=; =Caulfield Comments=.
(105) =Anderson Comments.=
(106) =Westmoreland Comments=; =White Comments=; =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, pp. 4-8 (S).
(107) =DIA IntBul.=
(108) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, pp. 8, 48 (S); =Mitchell Comments=.
(109) =Ibid.=
(110) Lance Corporal Michael A. Barry Interview with HistBr, dtd 17Feb69.
(111) =Ibid.=
(112) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, pp. 8, 48, 49 (S); Mitchell Comments.
(113) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, p. 49 (S).
(114) =Ibid.=, p. 51 (S).
(115) =Air Force Historical Comments=; =1st MAW CmdChron=, Feb68, p. 8 (S).
(116) =Wilkinson Comments=; =White Comments=.
(117) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, p. 51 (S); Kashiwahara, "Lifeline to Khe Sanh".
(118) =Ibid.=; =Lownds Sep Interview= (S).
(119) =VMGR-152 CmdChron=, Feb68, p. 4 (S); =Gregerson Comments=.
(120) Kashiwahara, "Lifeline to Khe Sanh"; =Meyers Comments=; =Brown Comments=; =Air Force Historical Comments=.
(121) =Ibid.=; =Lownds Jul Interview= (S).
(122) =Ibid.=
(123) Information provided by the Marine Corps Command Center on 19Feb68.
(124) =Ibid.=
(125) =1st MAW CmdChron=, Jan, Feb, Mar68 (S); =Wilson Comments=.
(126) =Ibid.=
(127) =Dabney Comments.=
(128) =Ibid.=
(129) =Wilson Comments.=
(130) =DCS/Air Comments.=
(131) =Breeding Comments.=
(132) See =1st MAW CmdChron=, Jan, Feb, Mar68 (S); CG FMFPac msg to CMC dtd 200327Z Mar68 (S).
(133) =Wilkinson Comments.=
(134) CG FMFPac Msg to CMC dtd 200327Z Mar68 (S); =Lownds Jul Interview= (S).
(135) See =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan, Feb, and Mar68 (S).
(136) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S).
(137) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan, Feb, and Mar68 (S); =Lownds Sep Interview=; Interview with Major William J. Sullivan, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); =Hennelly Comments=; =Gregerson Comments=; =Air Force Historical Comments=.
(138) =1st MAW CmdChron=, Jan and Feb68 (S).
(139) =Ibid.=, Debrief Sheets (S).
(140) =Dabney Comments.=
(141) =1st MAW CmdChron=, Feb 68, p. 2-2 (S); =Pipes Comments.=
(142) Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Harry T. Hagaman, USMC, dtd 2Mar68, No. 2548 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (C).
(143) Information supplied by U. S. Air Force Public Information Office, 16Oct68 (U); =Chaisson Comments=; =Air Force Historical Comments=; =Brofft Comments=.
(144) =Tompkins Interview= (S).
(145) =Ibid.=; =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); Kashiwahara, "Lifeline to Khe Sanh."
(146) =Air Force Historical Comments=; =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan, Feb and Mar68 (S); =Tompkins Interview=; =Baig Comments=.
(147) =Gregerson Comments.=
(148) =Lownds Jul Interview= (S); Interview with Major William J. Sullivan, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); =Gregerson Comments=.
(149) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); Interview with First Lieutenant James M. Alexander, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); =Hennelly Comments=.
(150) Interview with Major William J. Sullivan, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); Interview with First Lieutenant James M. Alexander, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan, Feb and Mar 68 (S); =Gregerson Comments=.
(151) =Ibid.=
(152) =Ibid.=
(153) =Lownds Interview=; =Hennelly Comments=.
(154) =Hennelly Comments.=
(155) =Baig Comments.=
(156) =Hennelly Comments.=
(157) =Ibid.=; =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan, Feb and Mar68 (S); =Baig Comments=.
(158) =Ibid.=
(159) =Baig Comments.=
(160) =Ibid.=
(161) =Ibid.=
(162) =Ibid.=; Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Edward J. A. Castagna, USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., USMC, =Soldiers of the Sea= (Annapolis: United States Naval Institute 1962 ed.) p. 563.
(163) =Baig Comments.=
(164) Six Month Evaluation Report, HQ USMACV, 31May68 (S); Interview with Colonel Franklin N. Pippin, USMC, dtd 24Jun68, No. 2907 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S).
(165) =1/26 CmdChron=, Jan and Feb68 (S); CG FMFPac msg to CMC dtd 200327Z Mar68 (S); Information provided by Research, Development, and Study Division, HQMC, 8Nov68 (U); =Lownds Jul Interview= (S).
(166) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan and Feb68 (S); =Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews= (S).
(167) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Jan, Feb and Mar68 (S).
(168) =Dabney Comments.=
(169) =Ibid.=
(170) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); Interview with Sergeant Timothy B. Keady, USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S).
(171) =Baltimore Sun=, 25 May, p. 2 (Early Bird) (U).
(172) Interview with First Lieutenant James M. Alexander, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); Interview with Major William J. Sullivan, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); Interview with Colonel Johnnie C. Vance, Jr., USMC, dtd 20Jun68, No. 2909 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S); Interview with Major John A. Shepherd, USMC, dtd 26Apr68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S).
(173) =Shepherd Comments.=
(174) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S).
(175) =Lownds Jul Interview= (S).
(176) =Ibid.=; =Tompkins Interview= (S).
(177) =Keller Comments.=
(178) =Wilkinson Comments.=
(179) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, Encl 1 (S).
(180) =Ibid.=
(181) =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); Interview with HM3 Class Frank V. Calzia, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S).
(182) =Ibid.=; Interview with Captain Kenneth W. Pipes, USMC, dtd Mar68, No. 2621 (Oral History Collection, HistBr, HQMC) (S).
(183) =Ibid.=
(184) =Ibid.=; =26th Marines CmdChron=, Feb68, Encl 1 (S).
(185) =Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews= (S).
(186) =Ibid.=; =26th Marines CmdChron=, Mar68, p. 4 (S); =Baig Comments=.
(187) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Mar68, pp. 3, 4 (S); =Wilkinson Comments=.
(188) =Ibid.=; =Lownds Sep Interview=.
(189) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Mar68, p. 8 (S).
(190) =Ibid.=, pp. 11, 12.
(191) =Ibid.=, p. 7.
(192) =Ibid.=, pp. 7, 8.
(193) =Ibid.=, p. 6.
(194) =Ibid.=, p. 10 (S).
(195) =Ibid.=; =White Comments=.
(196) =Ibid.=; =McEwan Comments=; =Pipes Comments=.
(197) =26th Marines CmdChron=, Mar68, pp. 9, 10, and Encl 1.
(198) =Ibid.=; =Baig Comments=.
(199) MCCC, Status of Forces, Apr 68 (S); =Lownds Sep Interview= (S); =PEGASUS AAR=, pp. 1-4.
(200) =PEGASUS AAR=, Encl 1 (C); =Westmoreland Comments=; =Cushman Comments=.
(201) =Ibid.=
(202) =Tolson Comments.=
(203) =Ibid.=
(204) =PEGASUS AAR=, Encl 1 (C); =Rosson Comments=.
(205) =Ibid.=
(206) =Ibid.=
(207) =Ibid.=; =Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews= (S).
(208) =PEGASUS AAR=, Encl 1 (C).
(209) =Ibid.=
(210) =Ibid.=; =Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews= (S); =Tolson Comments=.
(211) =PEGASUS AAR=, pp. 13, 14 (C).
(212) =Ibid.=, Encl 1.
(213) =Ibid.=
(214) =3/26 CmdChron=, Apr68, p. 4 (S); =Studt Comments=; =Meyers Comments=.
(215) =Ibid.=; =Caulfield Comments=.
(216) =Ibid.=; =Dabney Comments=.
(217) =Caulfield Comments.=
(218) =Meyers Comments.=
(219) =3/26 CmdChron=, Apr68, p. 4 (S); =Meyers Comments=; =Studt Comments=.
(220) =Caulfield Comments.=
(221) =PEGASUS AAR.=
(222) =Ibid.=; =26th Marines CmdChron=, Apr68, p. 4 (S); =Caulfield Comments=.
(223) =Baltimore Sun=, 25May68, p. 2 (Early Bird) (U); =Washington Star=, 25May68, p. 13 (Early Bird) (U).
(224) =Ibid.=
(225) =Olson Comments.=
(226) =Cushman Comments.=
(227) =Alderman Comments=; =Caulfield Comments=.
(228) =Baig Comments.=
(229) =Tompkins Interview=; =Lownds Jul and Sep Interviews= (S).
(230) =Westmoreland Comments=; =Cushman Comments=; =Rosson Comments=.
(231) =Ibid.=
(232) =Ibid.=`
(233) =Washington Star=, 9Jun68, p. 1-E (Early Bird) (U).
APPENDIX B
GLOSSARY
AAR After Action Report
ABCCC Airborne Command and Control Center
A-4 Skyhawk A single-seat, lightweight, jet attack bomber in service with Navy and Marine Corps squadrons. Built by Douglas.
AN/PRC-25 U. S.-built, short-range, portable, frequency-modulated radio set used to provide two-way communication in the 30 megacycle to 75.95 megacycle band.
AN/TPQ-10 U. S.-built, ground-based radar system used to guide aircraft on bombing missions.
A-1 Skyraider U. S.-built, prop-driven, attack aircraft built by Douglas.
Arc Light Operational name for B-52 strikes in South Vietnam.
ARVN Army of The Republic of Vietnam.
A-6A Intruder U. S. Navy and Marine Corps twin-engine, low-altitude, jet attack bomber specifically designed to deliver ordnance on targets completely obscured by weather or darkness. Carries a heavier and more varied load than any other U. S. naval attack aircraft. Built by Grumman.
ASRT Air Support Radar Team
BDA Battle Damage Assessment
Bde Brigade
B-52 Stratofortress USAF eight-engine, swept-wing heavy jet bomber. Built by Boeing.
BLT Battalion Landing Team
CAC Combined Action Company
CACO Combined Action Company Oscar
CavSqd (e.g. 1/9) 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry
C-4 Plastic explosives
CG, 1st MarDiv Commanding General, 1st Marine Division
CG, FMFPac Commanding General, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
CG, 3d MarDiv Commanding General, 3d Marine Division
CG, III MAF Commanding General, III Marine Amphibious Force
ChiCom Chinese Communist
CH-53A Sea Stallion U. S.-built, single-rotor, heavy assault transport helicopter powered by two shaft-turbine engines with an average payload of 12,800 pounds. Full-sized rear opening with built-in ramp permits loading of 105mm howitzer and carriage. External sling will accommodate a 155mm howitzer (towed). Carries crew of 3 plus 38 combat troops or 24 litters. Built by Sikorsky.
CH-46D Sea Knight U. S.-built, medium transport, twin-turbine, tandem rotor helicopter with an average payload of 4,800 pounds. Has rear loading ramp and external sling mount. Carries crew of 3 plus 25 combat troops or 15 litters and 2 attendants. Built by Boeing.
CIDG Civilian Irregular Defense Group
Claymore U. S.-built, directional antipersonnel land mine employed above ground and normally in an upright position.
CMC Commandant of the Marine Corps
CmdChron Command Chronology
CO Commanding Officer
ComUSMACV Commander, U. S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
CP Command Post
CS Designation for tear gas
DASC Direct Air Support Center
D-Day Day scheduled for the commencement of an operation.
DIA IntBul Defense Intelligence Agency Intelligence Bulletin
DMZ Demilitarized Zone
EC-121 Super USAF and USN four-engine, prop-driven, Constellation long-range, heavy transport modified with special equipment for radar early warning patrols and electronic warfare duty. Built by Lockheed.
FADAC Field Artillery Digital Automatic Computer
FDC Fire Direction Center
F-8 Crusader U. S. Navy and Marine Corps supersonic, single-seat, single-engine, jet fighter with afterburner. Primarily used in South Vietnam in an attack role. Carries air-to-air and air-to-ground ordnance. Built by LTV Vought Aeronautics.
F-4B Phantom II U. S. Navy and Marine Corps twin-engine, two-seat, supersonic fighter/attack jet with afterburners; has dual role of interceptor and bomber. Of all U. S. naval attack aircraft, F-4B carries second largest payload. Built by McDonnell.
F-4C U. S. Air Force model of the Phantom II.
1st ACD 1st Air Cavalry Division
1st MarDiv 1st Marine Division
1st MAW 1st Marine Aircraft Wing
FOB-3 Forward Operating Base 3
F-100 Super Sabre Single-engine, jet (with afterburner) sweptwing, supersonic fighter-bomber; in production since 1953, the F-100 was the first supersonic operational fighter developed for the U. S. Air Force. Carries air-to-air and air-to-ground ordnance. Built by North American.
F-105 Thunderchief U. S. Air Force supersonic, single-seat, single-engine, jet fighter/bomber with afterburner. Built by Republic.
FMFPac Fleet Marine Force, Pacific
FO Forward Observer
FSCC Fire Support Coordination Center
GCA Ground Controlled Approach
GPES Ground Proximity Extraction System
Grenade Launcher, U. S.-built, single-shot, break-open, M-79 breech-loaded shoulder weapon which fires 40mm projectiles and weighs approximately 6.5 pounds when loaded; it has a sustained rate of aimed fire of 5-7 rounds per minute and an effective range of 375 meters.
Gun, 100mm M1944 Soviet-built, dual purpose field and antitank gun introduced toward the close of World War II; it weighs 7,628 pounds, is 30.9 feet in length and has a muzzle velocity of 900 meters per second. Maximum range is 21,000 meters and maximum rate of fire is 8-10 rounds per minute. Is recognizable by long tube, double-barrel muzzle brake, dual wheels, and sloping shield.
Gun, 130mm Soviet-built fieldpiece which utilizes either a limber for transport or is self-propelled. Towed weapon weighs 19,000 pounds, is 38 feet in length, and has a muzzle velocity of 930 meters per second. Maximum range is 27,000 meters and maximum rate of fire is 6-7 rounds per minute. Tube has a multi-perforated muzzle brake.
Gun, 175mm U. S.-built, self-propelled gun which weighs 62,100 pounds and fires a 147-pound projectile to a maximum range of 32,800 meters. Maximum rate of fire is 1/2 round per minute.
Hand Grenade, U. S.-manufactured, hand-thrown bomb, Fragmentation which weighs approximately one pound, M-26 and contains an explosive charge in a body that shatters into small fragments; it has an effective range of 40 meters.
H&I Harassment and Interdiction
H&S Co Headquarters and Service Company
HistBr Historical Branch
HMM Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron
Howitzer, 105mm U. S.-built, towed, general purpose light M2A1 artillery piece; the weapon is mounted on a carriage equipped with split box trails and pneumatic tires. On-carriage sighting and fire control equipment are used both for direct and indirect fire. The piece weighs 4,980 pounds, is 19.75 feet in length, has a muzzle velocity of 470 meters per second, and a maximum range of 11,155 meters. Maximum rate of fire is 4 rounds per minute.
Howitzer, 155mm U. S.-built, towed, medium artillery piece M1 mounted on a two-wheel, split-trail carriage with detachable spades. The howitzer is fired from a three-point suspension, with the trails spread and the carriage resting upon an integral firing jack, the wheels being clear of the ground. The piece weighs 12,700 pounds, is 24 feet long, has a muzzle velocity of 560 meters per second and a maximum range of 15,080 meters. Maximum rate of fire is 3 rounds per minute.
Howitzer, 8-inch U. S.-built, self-propelled heavy artillery M-110 piece; 37 feet long tracked carriage is identical to that of 175mm gun. M-110 has a maximum range of 16,930 meters and a rate of fire of 1/2 round per minute.
HQMC Headquarters, United States Marine Corps
IFR Instrument Flight Rules
KBA Killed By Air
KIA Killed In Action
KSCB Khe Sanh Combat Base
LAPES Low Altitude Proximity Extraction System
LSA Logistics Support Area
LZ Landing Zone
MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAG Marine Aircraft Group
Machine Gun, U. S.-built, belt-fed, recoil-operated, .50 Caliber air-cooled automatic weapon, which weighs approximately 80 pounds without mount or ammunition; it has a sustained rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,450 meters.
Machine Gun, M-60 U. S.-built, belt-fed, gas-operated, air-cooled, 7.62mm automatic weapon, which weighs approximately 23 pounds without mount or ammunition; it has a sustained rate of fire of 100 rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,100 meters.
____ Marines Designation of Marine regiment
MATCU Marine Air Traffic Control Unit
Medevac Medical evacuation
Mortar, 60mm U. S.-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, single-shot, high-angle of fire weapon, which weighs 45.2 pounds when assembled and fires an assortment of high explosive and pyrotechnic rounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 30 rounds per minute and sustained rate of fire of 18 rounds per minute; the effective range is 2,000 meters.
Mortar, 81mm U. S.-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, single-shot, high angle of fire weapon, which weighs approximately 115 pounds when assembled and fires an assortment of high explosive and pyrotechnic rounds; it has a sustained rate of fire of 2 rounds per minute and an effective range of 2,200-3,650 meters, depending upon the ammunition used.
Mortar, 82mm Soviet-built, smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, single-shot, high-angle of fire weapon which weighs approximately 123 pounds when assembled and fires high explosive and pyrotechnic rounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 25 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 3,040 meters.
Mortar, 120mm Soviet- or Chinese Communist-built, smooth-bore, drop or trigger fired, single-shot, high-angle of fire weapon, which weighs approximately 606 pounds when assembled and fires high explosive and pyrotechnic rounds; it has a maximum rate of fire of 15 rounds per minute and a maximum range of 5,700 meters.
Mortar, 4.2 inch U. S.-built, 107mm, rifled, muzzle-loaded, M2 drop-fired weapon consisting of tube, baseplate and standard; weapon weighs 330 pounds, is 4 feet in length, and has a maximum range of 4,020 meters. Rate of fire is 20 rounds per minute and utilizes both high explosive and pyrotechnic ammunition. (Five M2s were employed at KSCB)
Mortar, 4.2-inch U. S.-built, 107mm, rifled, muzzle-loaded, M98 Howtar mortar; a towed weapon, the Howtar is mounted on a carriage with two pneumatic tires. Tube and carriage weigh 1,289 pounds; maximum range is 5,500 meters. (Two Howtars were employed at KSCB)
M-16 U. S.-built, magazine-fed, 5.62mm gas-operated, air-cooled shoulder weapon designed for either semiautomatic or full automatic fire; fully loaded weighs 7.6 pounds, fires a maximum rate of 150-200 rounds per minute, and has a maximum effective range of 460 meters.
9th MAB 9th Marine Amphibious Brigade
9th MEB 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade
NVA North Vietnamese Army
O1-E U. S.-built, single engine, two-seat, prop-driven light observation aircraft built by Cessna.
Ontos U. S.-built, lightly-armored tracked vehicle armed with six coaxially mounted 106mm recoilless rifles. Originally designed as a tank killer, the Ontos is primarily used in Vietnam to support the infantry.
PCV Provisional Corps, Vietnam
PF Popular Forces
PMDL Provisional Military Demarcation Line
RC-292 U. S.-built, elevated, wide-band, modified ground-plane antenna designed to operate with and increase the distance range of various radio sets.
Recoilless Rifle, U. S.-built, single-shot, recoilless, 106mm, M40A1 breech-loaded weapon which weighs 438 pounds when assembled and mounted for firing; it has a sustained rate of fire of 6 rounds per minute and an effective range of 1,365 meters. The weapon can be singly or Ontos mounted.
RF Regional Forces
RLT Regimental Landing Team
Rocket, 122mm A Soviet-built, four-piece, fin-stabilized, 9-foot long rocket weighing 125 pounds; maximum range is approximately 17,000 meters. Launcher tube and mount weigh 121 pounds and are 8.1 feet in length.
RPG-2 A Soviet-and Chinese Communist-built antitank grenade launcher; a smooth-bore, muzzle-loaded, shoulder-fired, recoilless weapon which fires a 40mm spin-stabilized round. The weapon weighs 6.3 pounds, is 3.2 feet in length, has a muzzle velocity of 84 meters per second, and an effective range of 100 meters. Maximum rate of fire is 4-6 rounds per minute utilizing High Explosive Antitank ammunition.
SLF Special Landing Force
S-2 Intelligence section or officer
TA-4 Two-seat trainer model of the A-4 Skyhawk
TAC(A) Tactical Air Controller (Airborne)
TAFDS Tactical Airfield Fuel Dispensing System
Tank, PT-76 Soviet-built, 15.4-ton, amphibious tank with a crew of 3; primary armament is turret mounted 76mm gun and maximum thickness of armor is 0.6 inches.
Tank, M-48 U. S.-built 50.7-ton tank with a crew of 4; primary armament is turret-mounted 90mm gun with one .30 caliber and one .50 caliber machine gun. Can be configured with water fording equipment. Maximum road speed of 32 miles per hour and an average range of 195 miles.
TAOR Tactical Area Of Responsibility
TET Vietnamese Lunar New Year
3d MarDiv 3d Marine Division
III MAF III Marine Amphibious Force
TIO Target Intelligence/Information Officer
TOT Time On Target
UHF Ultra High Frequency
UH-1E A single-engine, Marine, light Huey Gunship attack/transport helicopter noted for its maneuverability and firepower; carries a crew of three with seven combat troops or three litters, two sitting casualties and a medical attendant, or 3,000 pounds of cargo. It is armed with air to ground rocket packs and fuselage mounted, electrically fired machine guns.
UH-34D A single-engine, Marine, medium transport Sea Horse helicopter with a crew of three; carries 16-18 combat troops or 8 litters or a normal 5,000 pound payload.
USAF United States Air Force
USA United States Army
USMC United States Marine Corps
USN United States Navy
VC Viet Cong
VFR Visual Flight Rules
VHF Very High Frequency
Viet Minh The Vietnamese contraction for Viet Nam, Doc Lap Nong Minh Hoi, a Communist-led coalition of nationalist groups which actively opposed the Japanese in World War II and the French in the early years of the Indo-China War.
VMA Marine Attack Squadron
VMFA Marine Fighter/Attack Squadron
VMGR Marine Aerial Refueler Transport Squadron
VMO Marine Observation Squadron
VNAF Vietnamese Air Force
VT Variable Timed fuze for artillery shell which causes airburst over target area.
APPENDIX C
CHRONOLOGY
1962
Aug U. S. Army Special Forces establish CIDG camp at Khe Sanh.
1966
Apr 1/1 sweeps Khe Sanh plateau during Operation VIRGINIA.
Oct 1/3 occupies KSCB; CIDG displaces to Lang Vei.
1967
Feb 1/3 replaced by single company, E/2/9.
15 Mar Company B, 1/9, replaces E/2/9 as resident defense company.
20 Apr Combat assets at KSCB pass to operational control of Col Lanigan's 3d Marines which commences Operation PRAIRIE IV.
24 Apr B/1/9 patrol engages large enemy force north of Hill 861 and prematurely triggers attack on Khe Sanh; "Hill Fights" begin.
25 Apr 2/3 and 3/3 airlifted to KSCB to counter enemy drive.
28 Apr After heavy prep fires, LtCol DeLong's 2/3 assaults and seizes first objective--Hill 861.
2 May LtCol Wilder's 3/3 seizes Hill 881S after four days of heavy fighting.
3 May 2/3 repulses strong enemy counterattack south of 881N.
5 May 2/3 secures final objective--Hill 881N.
11-13 "Hill Fights" terminate with 940 NVA and 155 Marine May KIA. 3d Marines shuttled to Dong Ha as 26th Marines (FWD) and 1/26 move into Khe Sanh.
13 May Col Padley, CO 26th Marines (FWD), relieves Col Lanigan as Senior Officer Present at Khe Sanh. Elements of 1/26 occupy combat base, Hills 881S, 861, and 950. Operation CROCKETT commences.
13 Jun Due to increasing enemy contacts, LtCol Hoch's 3/26 airlifted to KSCB.
16 Jul Operation CROCKETT terminates with 204 NVA and 52 Marines KIA.
17 Jul Operation ARDMORE begins.
12 Aug Col Lownds relieves Col Padley as CO, 26th Marines.
13 Aug Due to lack of significant contact around Khe Sanh, Company K and L, 3/26, transferred to 9th Marines and Operation KINGFISHER.
17 Aug Khe Sanh airfield closed to normal traffic for repair of runway.
3 Sep Remainder of 3/26 withdrawn to eastern Quang Tri Province.
27 Oct Air strip reopened to C-123 aircraft.
31 Oct Operation ARDMORE terminated with 113 NVA and 10 Marines KIA.
1 Nov Operation SCOTLAND I begins.
28 Nov MajGen Tompkins assumes command of 3d MarDiv.
13 Dec LtCol Alderman's 3/26 returns to Khe Sanh because of increased enemy activity in Khe Sanh TAOR.
21 Dec 3/26 conducts five-day sweep west of base and uncovers evidence of enemy buildup around KSCB.
1968
2 Jan Five NVA officers killed near western edge of main perimeter.
Intelligence reports indicate influx of two NVA divisions, and possibly a third, into Khe Sanh TAOR.
16-17 LtCol Heath's 2/26 transferred to operational control Jan of 26th Marines and arrive KSCB; 2/26 occupies Hill 558 north of base.
ASRT-B of MASS-3 displaces from Chu Lai to Khe Sanh to handle ground controlled radar bombing missions.
17 Jan Team from Company B, 3d Reconnaissance Battalion ambushed near Hill 881N.
19 Jan While searching ambush site, patrol from I/3/26 comes under fire from estimated 25 NVA troops and withdraws under cover of supporting arms. Two platoons from M/3/26 helilifted to Hill 881S as reinforcements for I/3/26 which prepares for sweep toward 881N the next day.
20 Jan Capt Dabney's I/3/26 attacks and, with the aid of air and artillery, badly mauls NVA battalion entrenched on southern slopes of 881N; 7 Marines and 103 North Vietnamese KIA.
On strength of testimony of captured NVA lieutenant that enemy attack is imminent, I/3/26 is withdrawn to 881S and base placed on Red Alert.
DASC of MASS-3 displaces to Khe Sanh.
20-21 Estimated NVA battalion attacks K/3/26 on Hill 861. Jan After penetrating southwestern portion of Marines' perimeter, the enemy is repulsed leaving 47 dead; NVA reserves are hit by heavy air strikes and artillery fire.
21 Jan KSCB comes under heavy mortar, artillery, and rocket attack which destroys main ammunition dump. NVA battalion attacks and partially overruns Khe Sanh village before CAC and RF companies drive off enemy. After second attack, Col Lownds withdraws defenders to confines of combat base.
22 Jan ComUSMACV initiates Operation NIAGARA to provide massive air support for Khe Sanh.
LtCol Mitchell's 1/9 arrives KSCB and takes up positions which encompass rock quarry southwest of combat base.
E/2/26 is relocated from Hill 558 to prominent ridgeline northeast of 861 as covering force for flank of 2/26; E/2/26 passes to operational control of 3d Battalion. New position is called 861A.
23-28 Large number of tribesmen and families are evacuated Jan from Khe Sanh area to avoid hostile fire.
27 Jan 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion arrives KSCB and takes up positions in eastern sector of combat base.
30 Jan Communists launch nation-wide TET Offensive.
5 Feb NVA battalion attacks E/2/26 on Hill 861A in concert with heavy shelling of KSCB. Enemy gains foothold in northern sector of Company E perimeter but is driven out by savage counterattack; 109 NVA and 7 Marines KIA.
7 Feb Special Forces camp at Lang Vei overrun by enemy battalion supported by PT-76 Soviet-built tanks; first use of NVA tanks in South Vietnam.
8 Feb Some 3,000 indigenous personnel, both military and civilian, from Lang Vei move overland to Khe Sanh. After being searched and processed, several hundred refugees are air evacuated.
8 Feb A/1/9 combat outpost 500 meters west of 1/9 perimeter hit and partially overrun by reinforced NVA battalion. During three-hour battle, reinforcements drive NVA from Marine position and with aid of supporting arms kill 150 North Vietnamese; Col Lownds decides to abandon outpost and units withdraw to 1/9 perimeter.
10 Feb Marine C-130 of VMGR-152, hit by enemy fire during approach, crashes after landing at Khe Sanh and six are killed.
Feb-Apr Paradrops, low-altitude extraction systems, and helicopters are primary means of resupplying 26th Marines due to bad weather and heavy enemy fire.
21 Feb After heavy mortar and artillery barrage, NVA company probes 37th ARVN Ranger lines but withdraws after distant fire fight. It is estimated that 25-30 NVA were killed.
23 Feb KSCB receives record number of incoming rounds for a single day--1,307.
First appearance of enemy trench system around KSCB.
25 Feb B/1/26 patrol ambushed south of KSCB; 23 Marines KIA.
29 Feb-1 Estimated NVA regiment maneuvers to attack 37th ARVN Mar Ranger positions but fail to reach defensive wire.
6 Mar USAF C-123 shot down east of runway; 43 USMC, 4 USAF, and 1 USN personnel killed.
7 Mar Large groups of refugees begin to filter into the combat base and are evacuated.
8 Mar ARVN patrols attack enemy trenchline east of runway and kill 26 North Vietnamese.
15 Mar American intelligence notes withdrawal of major NVA units from Khe Sanh area.
23 Mar KSCB receives heaviest saturation of enemy rounds for the month of March--1,109.
24 Mar A/1/9 patrol kills 31 NVA west of 1/9 perimeter.
25 Mar 1/9 CavSqd, 1st ACD begins reconnaissance in force operations east of Khe Sanh in preparation for Operation PEGASUS.
30 Mar B/1/26 attacks enemy fortified position south of combat base and kills 115 North Vietnamese; 9 Marines are KIA.
Operation SCOTLAND I terminates with 1,602 confirmed NVA and 205 Marines KIA; estimates place probable enemy dead between 10,000 and 15,000.
Task Force KILO launches diversionary attack along Gio Linh coastal plain to divert attention away from Ca Lu where 1st ACD, and 1st Marines are staging for Operation PEGASUS.
1 Apr Operation PEGASUS begins; 2/1 and 2/3 (1st Marines) attack west from Ca Lu along Route 9. Elements of 3d Bde, 1st ACD conduct helo assaults into LZ Mike and Cates. Joint engineer task force begins repair of Route 9 from Ca Lu to Khe Sanh.
3 Apr 2d Bde, 1st ACD assaults LZs Tom and Wharton.
4 Apr 1/5 CavSqd moves northwest from LZ Wharton and attacks enemy units near old French fort; 1st Battalion, 9th Marines moves southeast from rock quarry and assaults Hill 471.
5 Apr 1/9 repulses enemy counterattack on Hill 471 and kills 122 North Vietnamese.
1st Bde, 1st ACD departs Ca Lu and assaults LZ Snapper.
6 Apr One company of 3d ARVN Airborne Task Force airlifted to KSCB for the initial link up with defenders.
Elements of 2d Bde, 1st ACD relieve 1st Battalion, 9th Marines on Hill 471; 1/9 commences sweep to northwest toward Hill 689.
6 Apr 1st Bde, 1st ACD helilifted north of KSCB. 2/26 and 3/26 push north of combat base; Company G, 2/26 engages enemy force and kills 48 NVA.
8 Apr 2/7 CavSqd links up with 26th Marines and conducts official relief of combat base. 1/26 attacks to the west.
3d ARVN Airborne Task Force air assaults into LZ Snake west of Khe Sanh and kills 78 North Vietnamese.
10 Apr LtGen Rosson arrives Khe Sanh and directs LtGen Tolson to disengage and prepare for Operation DELAWARE in A Shau Valley.
11 Apr Engineers complete renovation of Route 9 and road is officially opened.
Elements of 1st ACD begin withdrawal to Quang Tri City in preparation for Operation DELAWARE; 37th ARVN Ranger Battalion airlifted to Da Nang.
12 Apr Col Meyers relieves Col Lownds as CO, 26th Marines.
14 Apr 3/26 attacks Hill 881N and kills 106 NVA; 6 Marines are KIA.
15 Apr Operation PEGASUS terminated; Operation SCOTLAND II begins.
18 Apr 26th Marines withdrawn to Dong Ha and Camp Carroll.
23 May President Johnson presents the Presidential Unit Citation to 26th Marines and supporting units during White House ceremony.
23 Jun Although forward fire support bases are maintained in Khe Sanh area, the KSCB is dismantled and abandoned. LZ Stud at Ca Lu is selected as base for air mobile operations in western DMZ area.
APPENDIX D
=TASK ORGANIZATION AT KHE SANH, 24 APRIL-13 MAY 1967=
=A. 3D MARINES (-) (REIN)= 24APR-13MAY67
HEADQUARTERS COMPANY 24APR-13MAY67
2D BATTALION (REIN) 26APR-13MAY67 HEADQUARTERS AND SERVICE COMPANY(-)(REIN) DET, HQBN, 3D MARDIV DET, HQCO, 3D MAR DET, B BTRY (REIN), 1ST BN, 12TH MAR DET, 15TH DENTAL CO 2D CLEARING PLT (REIN), CO B, 3D MED BN 1ST PLT (-) (REIN), CO A, 3D ENGR BN 1ST PLT (REIN), CO C, 3D MT BN 1ST PLT (-) (REIN), CO C, 3D SP BN DET, LSU, FLC
COMPANY E (REIN) 1ST SEC, 81MM MORTAR PLT FAC TEAM DET, MED PLT DET, INTELLIGENCE SEC DET, B BTRY (REIN), 1/12 1ST SQD, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO A, 3D ENGR BN DET, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO C, 3D SP BN
COMPANY F (REIN) DET, H&S CO 2D SEC, 81MM MORTAR PLT FAC TEAM DET, MED PLT DET, INTELLIGENCE SEC DET, B BTRY (REIN), 1/12 2D SQD, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO A, 3D ENGR BN DET, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO C, 3D SP BN
COMPANY G (REIN) DET, H&S CO 3D SEC, 81MM MORTAR PLT DET, MED PLT DET, INTELLIGENCE SEC DET, B BTRY (REIN), 1/12
COMPANY H (REIN) DET, H&S CO 4TH SEC, 81MM MORTAR PLT FAC TEAM DET, MED PLT DET, INTELLIGENCE SEC DET, B BTRY (REIN), 1/12 3D SQD, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO A, 3D ENGR BN DET, 1ST PLT (REIN), CO C, 3D SP BN
COMPANY A, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 11-13MAY67
COMPANY B, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 11-13MAY67
COMPANY C, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 13 MAY 67
COMPANY D, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 11-13MAY67
COMPANY E, 2D BATTALION, 9TH MARINES 12-13MAY67
3D PLT (REIN), CO B, 1ST AMTRAC BN
2D PLT (REIN), CO A, AT BN
3D PLT, CO B, 3D RECON BN
2D PLT (REIN), CO A, 3D TANK BN
106MM RR PLT
3D BATTALION (-) (REIN) COMMAND GROUP "A"
COMPANY K 25-27APR67 FO TEAM, BTRY C, 1/12 DET, H&S CO FO TEAM, 81MM MORTAR PLT FAC TEAM (-) DET, MED PLT
COMPANY M 27APR-1MAY67 FO TEAM, BTRY C, 1/12 FO TEAM, 81MM MORTAR PLT SCOUT/DOG TEAM SCOUT TEAM, 3/3
COMPANY B, 1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES 25-27APR67
COMPANY K, 3D BATTALION, 9TH MARINES 25APR-13MAY67
COMPANY M, 3D BATTALION, 9TH MARINES 29APR-13MAY67
COMPANY F, 2D BATTALION, 3D MARINES 1MAY-3MAY67
COMPANY C, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 5-13MAY67
COMPANY A, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 12-13MAY67
BASE DEFENSE/RESERVE
COMPANY B, 1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES 24-27APR67
COMPANY F, 2D BATTALION, 3D MARINES 27APR-1MAY67
COMPANY E, 2D BATTALION, 9TH MARINES 1-12MAY67
COMPANY C, 1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 4-5MAY67
1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES 12-13MAY67
SUPPORTING UNITS
DIRECT SUPPORT
BATTERY F (REIN), 2/12 24APR-13MAY67 BATTERY B, 1/12 27APR-11MAY67 BATTERY A, 1/12 13MAY
TASK ORGANIZATION AT KHE SANH, 20 JANUARY-1 APRIL 1968
=A. 26TH MARINES=
HEADQUARTERS COMPANY 20JAN-31MAR68
1ST BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
2D BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
3D BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
=B. ATTACHED AND SUPPORTING UNITS=
=(1) U. S. MARINE CORPS=
1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES (LESS CO "C") 22JAN-31MAR68
CO "C", 1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES 23JAN-31MAR68
1ST BATTALION, 13TH MARINES 20JAN-31MAR68
1ST PROV, 155MM HOWITZER BTRY 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, 1ST SEARCHLIGHT BTRY 12TH MARINES 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, 3D ENGINEER BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
COMPANY "B", 3D RECON BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
3D PLATOON, COMPANY "D", 3D RECON BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
1ST PLATOON, COMPANY "A", 5TH RECON BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
COMPANY "A" (-) 3D ANTITANK BATTALION (REDESIGNATED ANTITANK COMPANY (-), 3D TANK BATTALION) 20JAN-31MAR68
COMPANY "A", 3D SHORE PARTY BATTALION 24JAN-31MAR68
DET, H&S COMPANY, 3D SHORE PARTY BATTALION 24JAN-31MAR68
2D CLEARING PLATOON, COMPANY "C" 3D MED BATTALION 24JAN-31MAR68
OTTER PLATOON, H&S COMPANY 3D MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, COMPANY "B", 9TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, COMPANY "A", 9TH MOTOR TRANSPORT BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, SU#1, 1ST RADIO BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, 3D DENTAL COMPANY 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, HEADQUARTERS BATTALION, 3D MARINE DIVISION (POSTAL, PHOTO, EXCHANGE, ISO, AO'S, STAFF AUGMENT) 20JAN-31MAR68
COMBINED ACTION COMPANY "O" 3D COMBINED ACTION GROUP, III MAF 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, COMM CO, HEADQUARTERS BATTALION, 3D MARINE DIVISION 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, 5TH COMM BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, 7TH COMM BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, FORCE LOGISTICS COMMAND 20JAN-31MAR68
SUB-TEAM #1, 17TH INTERROGATOR-TRANSLATOR TEAM 20JAN-31MAR68
COMPANY "B", 3D TANK BATTALION, 3D MARINE DIVISION 20JAN-31MAR68
DET "01", HEADQUARTERS & MAINTENANCE SQUADRON, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP-16 20JAN-31MAR68
DET "01", MARINE OBSERVATION SQUADRON, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP-16 15MAR-31MAR68
DET "2" MARINE AIR SUPPORT SQUADRON 3, MARINE AIR CONTROL GROUP-18 16JAN-31MAR68
DET, HEADQUARTERS & MAINTENANCE SQUADRON-36, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP-36 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, MARINE AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL UNIT-62, MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP-36 20JAN-31MAR68
=(2) U. S. NAVY=
DET "B", CONSTRUCTION BATTALION, MOBILE UNIT-301 20JAN-11FEB68
DET, MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION-10 20JAN-19FEB68
DET, MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION-53 20JAN-13FEB68
DET, MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION-5 20JAN-24JAN68
=(3) U. S, ARMY=
DET. A-101, 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, 44TH ARTILLERY 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, 65TH ARTILLERY 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, 238TH COUNTER-MORTAR RADAR UNIT, 108TH FIELD ARTILLERY GROUP 22JAN-31MAR68
DET, 1ST PLATOON (SMOKE), 25TH CHEMICAL COMPANY 9FEB-31MAR68
544TH SIGNAL DET, 37TH SIGNAL BATTALION 20JAN-31MAR68
=(4) U. S. AIR FORCE=
DET, (OPERATING LOCATION AJ), 15TH AERIAL PORT SQUADRON 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, 366TH TRANSPORT SQUADRON, 366TH COMBAT SUPPORT GROUP 20JAN-31MAR68
DET, 903D AERO MED EVAC SQDN 20JAN-31MAR68
DET "A", 834TH AIR DIVISION 20JAN-31MAR68
=ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM=
37TH ARVN RANGER BATTALION 27JAN-1APR68
APPENDIX E
=COMMAND AND STAFF LIST 3D MARINES, 24 APR-13 MAY 1967=
(Period covered during "The Hill Fights")
=3D MARINES=
Commanding Officer Col John P. Lanigan (24Apr67-13May67)
Executive Officer LtCol Jack Westerman (24Apr67-13May67)
S-1 WO Charles M. Christensen (24Apr67-13May67)
S-2 Capt Adolfo Sgambelluri (24Apr67-7May67) Capt James D. McGowan (8May67-13May67)
S-3 Maj Floyd A. Karker (24Apr67-13May67)
S-4 Maj Howard L. Long (24Apr67-13May67)
Communications Officer Capt Curtis G. Arnold (24Apr67-1May67) Capt George W. Brooks (2May67-13May67)
=2D BATTALION, 3D MARINES=
Commanding Officer LtCol Earl R. DeLong (24Apr67-13May67)
Executive Officer Maj Wendell O. Beard (24Apr67-13May67)
S-1 2dLt Billy L. Heaton (24Apr67-13May67)
S-2 Capt Robert N. Bogard (24Apr67-13May67)
S-3 Capt Douglas W. Lemon (24Apr67-13May67)
S-4 Capt Robert R. Green (24Apr67-13May67)
Commanding Officer Headquarters and Service Company Capt Stuart R. Vaughan (24Apr67-13May67)
Commanding Officer Company "E" Capt Alfred E. Lyon (24Apr67-3May67) 1stLt John F. Adinolfi (4May67-12May67) Capt Alfred E. Lyon (13May67)
Commanding Officer Company "F" Capt Martin Sorensen (24Apr67-9May67)
Commanding Officer Company "G" Capt James P. Sheehan (24Apr67-13May67)
Commanding Officer Company "H" Capt Raymond C. Madonna (24Apr67-13May67)
=3D BATTALION, 3D MARINES=
Commanding Officer LtCol Gary Wilder (24Apr67-13May67)
Executive Officer Maj Rudolph S. Sutter (24Apr67-13May67)
S-1 2dLt John C. Ralph (24Apr67-11May67)
S-2 2dLt Evander R. McIver III (24Apr67-11 May67) 2dLt Michael T. Montgomery (12May67-13May67)
S-3 Capt Thomas A. Stumpf (24Apr67-13May67)
S-4 SSgt William T. Pope (24Apr67-30Apr67) 1stLt John H. Admire (1May67-13May67)
Commanding Officer Headquarters and Service Company Capt Robert W. Poolaw (24Apr67-13May67)
Commanding Officer Company "I" Capt Christian L. Harkness (24Apr67-13May67)
Commanding Officer Company "K" Capt Bayliss L. Spivey, Jr. (24Apr67-13May67)
Commanding Officer Company "L" Capt John W. Ripley (24Apr67-13May67)
Commanding Officer Company "M" Capt William R. Griggs (24Apr67-13May67)
APPENDIX F
=COMMAND AND STAFF LIST 26TH MARINES, 20 JAN-1 APR 1968=
(Period covered in Presidential Unit Citation)
=26TH MARINES=
Commanding Officer Col David E. Lownds (12Aug67-1Apr68)
Executive Officer LtCol Louis A. Rann (28Sep67-1Apr68)
S-1 1stLt Robert J. Mariz (29Jan68-29Jan68)(KIA) Capt Arnold R. Nelson (30Jan68-8Feb68) Capt Anthony V. Latorre, Jr. (9Feb68-1Apr68)
S-2 Capt Harper L. Bohr, Jr. (1Aug67-7Feb68) Maj Jerry E. Hudson (8Feb68-17Mar68) Capt Thorvald P. E. Holm (18Mar68-1Apr68)
S-3 Maj Wayne M. Wills (1Aug67-22Jan68) LtCol Edward J. A. Castagna (23Jan68-1Apr68)
S-4 Maj Aubrey L. Lumpkin (17Mar68-1Apr68)
Communications Officer Maj John A. Shepherd (16Nov67-1Apr68)
=1ST BATTALION, 26TH MARINES=
Commanding Officer LtCol James B. Wilkinson (5Jul67-29Feb68) LtCol Frederick J. McEwan (1Mar68-1Apr68)
Executive Officer Maj Charles E. Davis III (23Dec67-31Jan68) Maj Howard J. McCarty (1Feb68-1Apr68)
S-1 1stLt Stephen A. Fitzgerald (13Dec67-31Jan68) 1stLt William J. Ferral (1Feb68-1Apr68)
S-2 1stLt Anthony E. Sibley (6Dec67-13Feb68) 1stLt Ernest E. Spencer (14Feb68-1Apr68)
S-3 Maj Bruce A. Greene (23Dec67-29Jan68) Maj Charles E. Davis III (30Jan68-1Apr68)
S-4 Capt Robert C. Onslow (6Nov67-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Headquarters and Service Company 1stLt Robert A. Brown (20Dec67-16Feb68) 1stLt Paul G. Lojkovic (17 Feb68-20Mar68) Capt Lajon R. Hutton (21Mar68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Company "A" Capt Ray G. Snyder (15Dec67-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Company "B" Capt Kenneth W. Pipes (20Dec67-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Company "C" Capt David L. Ernst (15Jan68-15Feb68 2dLt Paul W. Bush (16Feb68-2Mar68) Capt Walter J. Egger (3Mar68-22Mar68) Capt Lawrence E. Seaman, Jr. (23Mar68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Company "D" 1stLt Ernest E. Spencer (1Aug67-13Feb68) Capt Edward J. Hughes, Jr. (14Feb68-1Apr68)
=2D BATTALION, 26TH MARINES=
Commanding Officer LtCol Francis J. Heath, Jr. (Jan68-1Apr68)
Executive Officer Maj Royce L. Bond (Jan68-1Apr68)
S-1 1stLt Richard J. Gustafson (16Jan-1Apr68)
S-2 1stLt Edwin R. Matthews (Jan68-11Feb68) SSgt Horace E. Roland (12Feb68-9Mar68) 1stLt John C. Wainio (10Mar68-1Apr68)
S-3 Maj Gerald F. Kurth (Jan68-1Apr68)
S-4 Capt Erwin J. Martikke, Jr. (Jan68-18Mar68) Capt Earle G. Breeding, Jr. (19Mar68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Headquarters and Service Company Capt Stanley M. Hartman (Jan68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Company "E" Capt Earle G. Breeding Jr. (Jan68-8Mar68) 1stLt Joseph R. Meeks (9Mar68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Company "F" Capt Charles F. Divelbiss (Jan68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Company "G" Capt Lee R. Overstreet (Jan68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Company "H" Capt Charles O. Broughton (Jan68-1Apr68)
=3D BATTALION, 26TH MARINES=
Commanding Officer LtCol Harry L. Alderman (21Aug67-14Mar68) LtCol John C. Studt (15Mar68-1Apr68)
Executive Officer Maj Joseph M. Loughran, Jr. (9Sep67-1Apr68)
S-1 1stLt Edward J. Paurazas Jr. (21Dec67-1Apr68)
S-2 2dLt Jay G. Marks, Jr. (14Jan68-1Apr68)
S-3 Maj Matthew P. Caulfield (24Nov67-1Apr68)
S-4 1stLt Jack A. Brage (16Nov67-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Headquarters and Service Company Capt Alfred Lardizabal, Jr. (29Nov67-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Company "I" Capt William H. Dabney (24Nov67-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Company "K" Capt Norman J. Jasper, Jr. (23Nov67-22Jan68) 1stLt Jerry Saulsbury (23Jan68-27Jan68) Capt Paul L. Snead (28Jan68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Company "L" Capt Richard D. Camp, Jr. (30Jun67-29Jan68) Capt William F. Hurley (30Jan68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Company "M" Capt John J. Gilece, Jr. (29Nov67-31Jan68) 1stLt John T. Esslinger (1Feb68-23Mar68) Capt Walter R. Jenkins (24Mar68-1Apr68)
=1ST BATTALION, 9TH MARINES=
Commanding Officer LtCol John F. Mitchell (1Jan68-31Mar68) LtCol John J. H. Cahill (1Apr68)
Executive Officer Maj Joseph A. Donnelly (1Jan68-1Apr68)
S-1 1stLt Peter A. Woog (1Jan68-1Apr68)
S-2 1stLt Robert J. Arboleda (1Jan68-1Apr68)
S-3 Maj Edward M. Ringley (1Jan68-16Feb68) Capt Charles B. Hartzell (17Feb68-10Mar68) Maj Ted R. Henderson (11Mar68-1Apr68) S-4 1stLt John M. Georgi (1Jan68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Headquarters and Service Company 1stLt Michael J. Walker (9Jan68-13Feb68) Capt John W. Cargile (14Feb68-31Mar68) Capt Edward R. Miller, Jr. (1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Company "A" Capt Henry J. M. Radcliffe (1Jan68-31Mar68) Capt. Henry D. Banks (1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Company "B" Capt Robert T. Bruner (1Jan68-26Jan68) 1stLt Arthur N. Mangham, Jr. (27Jan68-2Feb68) Capt John R. Williams, Jr. (3Feb68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Company "C" Capt John W. Cargile (9Jan68-13Feb68) Capt Ralph H. Flagler (14Feb68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Company "D" Capt Don F. Schafer (1Jan68-31Mar68) Capt John W. Cargile (1Apr68)
=1ST BATTALION, 13TH MARINES=
Commanding Officer LtCol John A. Hennelly (10Dec67-1Apr68)
Executive Officer Maj Ronald W. Campbell (13Jul67-1Apr68)
S-1 2dLt Daniel W. Kelly (19Nov67-1Apr68)
S-2 1stLt Walter K. Jones (21Dec67-4Mar68) 1stLt Leslie M. Palm (5Mar68-1Apr68)
S-3 Capt Lawrence R. Salmon (13Jul67-8Mar68) Maj Gerald R. Houchin (9Mar68-1Apr68)
S-4 1stLt Harold P. Klunk (1Dec67-20Feb68) Capt Tommy J. Hicks (21Feb68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Headquarters Battery 1stLt Ralph W. Dunn, Jr. (2Aug67-20Feb68) 1stLt Walter K. Jones (21Feb68-15Mar68) Capt Jerome P. Rogers (16Mar68-21Mar68) 1stLt Jacob W. Hughes, Jr. (22Mar68-lApr68)
Commanding Officer Battery "A" Capt Dennis L. Pardee (Aug67-29Feb68) Capt Victor B. Snider (1Mar68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Battery "B" 1stLt George G. Wood (21Jan68-29Feb68) Capt James C. Uecker (1Mar68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Battery "C" Capt William J. O'Connor (28Nov67-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Mortar Battery Capt Michael T. Pierson (5Jan68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer 1st Provisional 155 Howitzer Battery, 3/12 Capt Joseph Taylor (5Jan68-29Feb68) Capt Stephen J. Hayes (1Mar68-1Apr68)
=ATTACHED UNITS=
Commanding Officer Company "A", 3d AT Battalion Capt James O. Lea (20Jan68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Company "B", 3d Tank Battalion Capt Daniel W. Kent ( -24Jan68) Capt Claude W. Reinke (25Jan68-1Apr68)
Commanding Officer Company "A", 3d Shore Party Battalion 1stLt Robert L. Singleton (28Jan68-4Mar68) Maj Howard W. Wahlfeld (5Mar68-1Apr68)
The device reproduced on the back cover is the oldest military insignia in continuous use in the United States. It first appeared, as shown here, on Marine Corps buttons adopted in 1804. With the stars changed to five points, this device has continued on Marine buttons to the present day.
End of Project Gutenberg's The Battle for Khe Sanh, by Moyers S. Shore