Part 1

The Attack in Trench Warfare

Impressions and Reflections of a Company Commander

_By_

CAPT. ANDRÉ LAFFARGUE _153d Infantry, French Army_

Translated for the INFANTRY JOURNAL by an Officer of Infantry

Washington: THE UNITED STATES INFANTRY ASSOCIATION 1916

Copyright, 1916

U. S. INFANTRY ASSOCIATION

NATIONAL CAPITAL PRESS, INC., WASHINGTON, D. C.

INTRODUCTION.

It is probable that no book on any military topic published since the outbreak of the present war has excited an interest and comment in European military circles equal to that produced by the publication of Captain Laffargue’s _Etude sur l’attaque dans la période actuelle de la guerre_. It is, in fact, the first publication from the pen of a military man dealing with the general and detailed aspects of the tactics of the attack in trench warfare that has come to our attention.

The methods of training of infantry units for this class of warfare and the degree of careful preparation necessary for the attainment of any measure of success are among the most important features of Captain Laffargue’s study. The comparison which he makes between the conduct in battle of two regiments of very different quality, brings out very clearly the difference between real infantry and the cannon-fodder variety which is too often considered adequate for war purposes.

The fact that this study was so highly thought of by General Joffre that he caused it to be published to the French Army before it was given out for general publication, speaks for its excellence more eloquently than any commendation which could otherwise be bestowed upon it.

G. A. LYNCH, _Captain, Infantry_. Editor of the INFANTRY JOURNAL.

THE ATTACK IN TRENCH WARFARE.

Impressions and Reflections of a Company Commander.[1]

By Captain André Laffargue, 153d Infantry (French).

I. CHARACTER OF THE PRESENT ATTACK.

The attack at the present period has become one of siege warfare. We must accept it as it is, study it, tax our wits to find special means to prepare effectively for it and to orient the instruction of troops entirely with this in view.

The attack on all points of our front consists in breaking through several lines of defense upon a depth of about three kilometres and in preventing the enemy from holding on further back on new lines already prepared or merely improvized.

The attack is therefore an immense, unlimited, simultaneous assault on all points of the front of attack, furiously pushed straight to the front until all the enemy’s defenses are broken through.

_The characteristic of this attack is that it is not progressive but is an assault of a single rush; it must be accomplished in one day as otherwise the enemy reforms, and the defense, with terrible engines of sudden destruction, will later recover its supremacy over the attack, which cannot quickly enough regain the mastery of this consuming fire._ The whole series of frightful defenses cannot be nibbled at successively; they must be swallowed whole at one stroke with one decision.

Therefore, the fight is an unlimited assault. In order to attempt the assault, what is necessary?

Assaulting troops—and all troops are far from being assaulting troops.

An overwhelming superiority of fire all the time and not only at the moment of assault.

The possibility of rushing forth from a line of shelter a short distance from the enemy, a condition equally to be sought for in any other phase of the combat.

In order that the assault may be unlimited, the sacrifice being resolved upon, it must be pushed through to a finish and the enemy drowned under successive waves, _calculating, however, that infantry units disappear in the furnace of fire like handfuls of straw_.

Is it possible to pierce the enemy’s lines? I firmly believe so since the 9th of May[2]. But before that, this hypothesis seemed to me a mad temerity. I had taken part in the Battle of Nancy and in the Battle of Ypres where it appears that the Germans, after a terrifying deluge of heavy projectiles during interminable days, tried to break through us, which I certainly did not think possible, seeing the paltry and easily shattered efforts of their infantry. In considering the forces put into action which did not succeed in making us yield a foot, I believed in the inviolability of the lines of defense. On the 9th of May, by a single dash, our first wave submerged in one hour all the enemy’s first-line defenses to a depth of several kilometres.

The assault is extremely murderous; it is an implacable struggle in which one or the other must fall and in which the engines of combat not destroyed beforehand often make terrible havoc in the ranks of unprotected assaulting troops.

He who risks his life and does not wish to die but to succeed, becomes at times ingenious. That is why I, who was part of the human canister for more than nine months, have set about to consider the means of saving the inestimable existence of so many humble comrades, or at least to figure out how the sacrifice of their lives may result in victory.

II. PREPARATION OF THE ATTACK.

FORMS OF THE GERMAN DEFENSIVE ORGANIZATIONS.

The German defensive organizations, as well as I have been able to establish, appear to be in general as follows:[3]

1. A continuous line of trenches over the whole front, comprising on a limited depth two or three trenches, joined by numerous communicating trenches (_boyaux_), and separated by 100 to 300 metres, each one often protected by a wire entanglement.

2. Centers of resistance, comprising large villages, woods, or immense field works, consisting of a network of trenches which are very strongly organized and in which machine guns under cupolas as well as pieces of artillery are mounted.

Such are, for example, the Labyrinth and _Ouvrages Blancs_ of Neuville. These centers of resistance are separated by intervals of 800 to 1,500 metres; they mutually flank each other, and their intervals are generally guarded by closed works.

3. A second line of defense, which is not always continuous.

PREPARATION BY THE ARTILLERY.

In order to attack with minimum loss, the infantry-requires that the artillery in its preparation carry through the following program:

(_a_) _Destroy the wire entanglements._

(_b_) _Neutralize or destroy the defenders of the trenches._

(_c_) _Prevent the artillery from coming into action._

(_d_) _Prevent the bringing up of reserves._

(_e_) _Destroy the machine guns as soon as they reveal their positions._

(_a_) _Destruction of the Wire Entanglement._

The 75 produces sufficient breaches in the wire entanglements for the infantry to get through; in order to accomplish this, each piece remains laid on the same point of the entanglement. But the infantry should not expect the complete and continuous destruction of the entanglement: that would require too many projectiles.

(_b_) _Neutralization or Destruction of the Defenders of the Trenches._

The Germans, whenever they can, dig very deep and well protected shelters, in the interior of which they crowd themselves. The 75 has no effect on these shelters, and the infantry of the attack, who are delighted to see the parapets, the sand bags, planks, posts, etc., fly into the air as if pulverized by the ripping detonations, are stupefied on finding themselves greeted by a heavy fire as soon as they start out of their trenches. In consequence of this, the infantry is convinced that whenever the enemy has been able to construct deep shelters, an assault is certain massacre, in spite of the prodigious expenditure of 75’s, unless other and more powerful means of destruction have been employed.

The aerial torpedo, on the contrary, seems to produce terrifying effects on the defenders of the trenches; it has also considerable destructive effect. This power is not always sufficient to break in the shelter caverns, but it completely knocks to pieces the firing trenches, produces cave-ins, blocks the openings of the shelters, and thus walls in the occupants. By its formidable explosion, the extraordinary effects of its blast, and the concussion that it induces in the ground, it annihilates all energy in the defenders, who at every instant think their last minute has come.

In the sector of attack of my company on the 9th of May, a portion of the trenches in front of the 3d and 4th Sections was severely pounded by the fire of the 75 and especially by the aerial torpedoes, while the remainder of the trenches in front of the 1st and 2d Sections suffered only from the preparation by the 75. The difference was remarkable. While the 1st and 2d Sections, hardly out of their parallel, saw the enemy rise up and melted away under his suddenly opened rifle fire, and especially under that of a machine gun, the 4th Section reached the German trench, crossed it without hindrance, and continued on its way. As for the 3d Section, it had been received by only a few shots and had crossed the first trench in one rush, when it received some shots in the back. Returning to the rear, the men found several dozen Germans crouching in the deep shelters, absolutely all in and crying for mercy. The cannonade had ceased, and in spite of the violent fusillade cracking outside announcing an attack, they had not budged. Only a few had the courage to shoot in the back from an opening the French soldiers who passed close by.

Conversations with numerous infantry officers have definitely convinced me that the heaviest bombardment by 75’s alone is ineffective against trenches organized during a long period. The heavy artillery has too much dispersion, while the aerial torpedo, besides its considerable destructive and demoralizing effects, is very accurate.

Thus the preparation on the zone of the first trenches may be made largely by means of aerial torpedoes. But it is necessary that the torpedo guns be placed close together in a continuous line (at least one to every 100 metres of trenches) and that each one have its zone clearly defined.

At Arras, these guns were not very numerous, and their preparation was consequently only partial; in trying to pound several lines of trenches at the same time, large spaces remained outside the effects of their action, while certain corners were entirely demolished.

In the artillery depots, very numerous gun crews should be organized beforehand for the torpedo guns, and not date only from the day before and be at their first try out, as at Arras.

The aerial torpedo, terrorizing the defenders in the interior of their shelters, already neutralizes them in part; but the best plan of eliminating the enemy is to destroy him. In order to destroy him, it is necessary to force him to expose himself, to oblige him to come out to become the prey of the iron hail. For this there are several means:

Have the infantry advance during the preparation by the artillery;

Simulate the attack;

Finally a third method that can be transferred from the domain of fox hunting to that of the war with Germany: smoke him out.

The first plan is not applicable from first trenches as they are too near the enemy; we shall speak of this again.

In order to simulate an attack, interrupt the artillery fire suddenly and _open rifle fire with a great deal of shouting_; the enemy hurries out immediately to his combat positions; after several minutes’ waiting, a violent rafale of 75. This is what we did from time to time when we wished to make the Germans come out into their trenches so that we could demolish some of them by artillery fire. At Arras, there was a brusque interruption of artillery fire for ten minutes, but it was an absolute and impressive silence. The Germans were not misled by it, and when the interruption for the real attack came with its fusillade and noise, they manned their trenches to meet it.

As a third scheme _we have suffocating grenades and cartridges_, which irritate the eyes and produce tears and render the neighborhood of the spot where they fall untenable for several minutes. We could also have projectiles of larger dimensions, containing materials giving off heavy, suffocating gas. Thus this gas would creep over the ground, fall into the bottom of the trenches, and enter the shelters, driving out the occupants, who would then come under the fire of the high-explosive shells. This gas, being, moreover, only suffocating, would afterwards have the advantage of not incommoding our soldiers in their trench or during the attack.

While the heavy artillery may be replaced very advantageously by torpedoes for the preparation on the continuous line of trenches, it may be employed effectively against the centers of resistance, where its more concentrated effects will not produce the simply superficial disorganization of the 75, which leaves the cupolas of the machine guns intact.

The most important part to destroy in the centers of resistance _are the edges_, for the attack breaks through easily enough in the intermediate spaces but immediately comes under flanking fire. Moreover, a center of resistance whose borders are disorganized, becomes a harmless island, the attack of which by main strength would be terribly costly; for instance, the Labyrinth, Neuville-Saint-Vaast, Carency, which were passed by in less than an hour by groups arriving at the Cemetery of Neuville, at the La Folie Woods, and at the first houses of Souchez. _Therefore try especially to neutralize the borders_ by concentrating on them the fire of batteries suitably placed with a view to following the attack on the intervals. If one could put a _veil over the centers of resistance_ to isolate them and obstruct the view of the flanking works, the problem would be partly solved. It would then be necessary to have projectiles giving off large quantities of heavy smoke, which would spread out over the ground and dissipate very slowly.

The intermediate works in the intervals are easy to take because of their small dimensions. On the 9th of May, they were generally found knocked to pieces.

(_c_) _Preparation against Artillery._

_The infantry urgently demands that the hostile artillery be put out of action before the attack._ If the enemy artillery gets into action, the troops, crowded into the trenches, _boyaux_,[4] and parallels, have to suffer a painful bombardment, which causes losses and obliges everyone to hunt cover—an inauspicious attitude for troops which will have shortly to rush forward. Communications become difficult, the telephonic connections are broken, everyone gets nervous and perturbed. On the attack proper, artillery fire has an extraordinary disturbing effect; the bullets of the rifles and machine guns cause disorder by the sudden and serious losses they occasion, but the shells spread confusion almost solely by the sight and the crash of explosions. On the 9th of May, we hardly received any shells at all, not one during the attack itself, and this contributed in a large degree to the magnificent _élan_ of the first attacking waves.

At Langemarck on the contrary, in a night attack on the trenches on the 4th of December, the unsilenced hostile artillery bombarded our trenches of departure, and I had my second section dispersed through being saluted by a rafale of shrapnel that had put the chief of section and the file closers, _hors de combat_.

In order to silence the hostile artillery, it seems that, knowing the probable emplacement of the batteries, it would be necessary suddenly and without warning to let loose on them a deluge of fire. The personnel of these batteries not being continually at their firing positions, this sudden tempest would surprise them and keep them inside their shelters. In the midst of the confusion, the fire of the batteries which try to get into action is much disturbed, impeded, and frequently interrupted. On the 9th of May, the hostile artillery must have been completely surprised and literally stupefied during the whole morning, for they abandoned their infantry. Only a few pieces fired some hasty shots.

In order to render the emplacements of the batteries completely untenable, they might be overwhelmed with shells giving off clouds of smoke and also asphyxiating shells; by this means the cannoneers would be obliged to quit their pieces or serve them under extremely difficult conditions.

The aviators hovering over the hostile lines could complete the preparation by indicating by means of luminous balls to the batteries on watch the hostile batteries not yet silenced or which have come into action.

(_d_) _Preparation against Reinforcements and Reserves._

In the second and third trenches, the garrison does not generally occupy its firing positions; it is obliged to get to them in case of attack. As long as the artillery preparation lasts, it does not budge from the shelters; but as soon as the artillery ceases its fire, the garrison hastily mans the positions. It is necessary then for the artillery to extend its fire to the second and third lines and to continue this fire while the infantry rushes the first line. The approach trenches and their junctions should especially be swept. This has, moreover, the advantage of keeping crouched in their holes the defenders of the first line, who are not reassured by sensing the compact sheaves of the terrible explosive passing close over their heads. The preparation on the second line of defense is absolutely identical.

It is next necessary to cut the battlefield in two and isolate the zone of the first and second lines of defence, constantly manned by the troops near their combat positions, from the zone of cantonment. It is a matter of establishing an insuperable barrier. A barrier solely of ordinary shell fire is extremely expensive. The Germans have more simply solved the question by establishing a barrier of asphyxiating gas. They have employed this extremely effective scheme, it seems, at Bagatelle in the Argonne, on the 30th of June and the 1st and 2d of July.

The bombardment of the cantonment by long-range heavy guns throws disorder among the troops who are at rest. Suddenly surprised in the most profound quietude, the alarm causes all the more flurry and demoralization. Obliged to follow roads sprinkled here and there with fragments, they thus arrive diminished in number on the field of battle.

(_e_) _Destruction of Machine Guns._

The weapon which inflicts the heaviest losses on infantry is the machine gun, which uncovers itself suddenly and in a few seconds lays out the assailants by ranks. It is therefore absolutely necessary to destroy them before the attack or have the means of putting them out of action as soon as they disclose themselves.

During the days which precede the attack, a minute study of the hostile trenches should be made by the infantry officers who have to attack them, in concert with the artillery officers who pound the same trenches; their study should bear especially upon the emplacements of the hostile machine guns.

The machine-gun emplacements are recognized in the continuous trenches by the low horizontal loopholes much larger than ordinary loopholes. They are generally quite easily recognized. Occasionally the machine guns are in a little separate work which is quite characteristic.

Even when they cannot be directly observed, machine-gun emplacements should be pre-supposed in locations such as the following:

1. In a re-entrant in the line.

2. On the second line, particularly when it presents an elevated position permitting a tier of fire over the first line.

3. Squarely in front to obtain a flanking fire; in this case, they are found in a small _boyau_ (branch trench) which leaves the principal trench, and it is very difficult to see them from the front.

Thus, in front of La Targette, in studying the position in profile and having moved considerably toward the right for that purpose, I discovered a machine-gun emplacement which completely enfiladed the front of the German trenches for 600 metres.

One generally believes he recognizes a very large number of machine-gun emplacements; but it is infinitely better to mark the position of too many than to overlook one of them; moreover, the Germans have in their defensive organization an unsuspected number of them.

_Means of Destroying the Machine Guns._—_Machine Guns of the Trenches._—In the course of preparation by artillery, a very distinct part of the program is reserved for the destruction of the machine-gun nests. The destruction of the machine guns should not be commenced as soon as they have been located, that is to say, often several days before the final preparations, for the enemy would have ample time to shift them. The 75 is employed to destroy the machine guns. Unfortunately, on account of the dispersion, it does not perfectly fulfil its rôle; its shots often fall to one side and a great number of them are often necessary to find exactly the small space that holds the machine gun.

I recollect that before the attack of May 9, I fretted with impatience and went continually to find the artillery observer, as I saw an accursed rectangular loophole obstinately remain intact up to the end. When we started forward, fire burst out from this loophole, and two sections were wiped out.

To destroy these machine guns, there would be needed not only cannon placed at 1,500 metres, which have many other tasks, but cannon placed in the trench itself. The _mountain 80_ seems to realize the desired conditions of effectiveness and mobility. Hidden in the trench before the preparation, it unmasks itself during that operation; it takes under direct fire like a rifle all the machine-gun shelters successively, occupying itself with those alone and not leaving them until they are all completely out of action.

_Destruction of Machine Guns that may be set up outside the Trenches._—On the 9th of May, the survivors of my company and of the adjoining company, about eighty men, arrived at 11 o’clock[5] about 200 metres from the cemetery of Neuville-Saint-Vaast. The cemetery being unoccupied, the field of battle seemed void of Germans. In the distance, the batteries were fleeing. Two machine guns remained in the mill; this was the only resistance over an immense space, but it was sufficient. Impossible for my men to advance; we signal the fact with difficulty to the artillery, which from this time on is under open field conditions; it opens fire a long time afterwards and mistakes the objective. Then before the eyes of our furious men, abandoned by all because they were too far to the front, the cemetery fills up with Germans. Four hours afterwards, the 146th appears on the field and is mowed down by the machine guns; the next day the 229th succeeds it; new repetition with a slight and extremely costly advance.

With these machine guns revealing themselves thus without our being able to foresee their emplacement, and taking up positions to stop our progress in a region no longer familiar to us, we must have the means of suppressing them instantly. The field artillery is too far away; communication hardly exists after passing beyond the extremity of the telephone lines. The question is of the greatest importance and merits study. It would be absolutely necessary that the first waves of attack be followed, after the taking of the first lines of trenches, by light guns, the 37 for example, drawn by their cannoneers. These independent crews would be all eyes and ears to discover the machine guns and destroy them immediately. There are enough officers or noncommissioned officers of artillery to command them intelligently.

III. FORM OF ATTACK.[6]

To create a complete gap, it is necessary: