CHAPTER VII.

THE MEANING OF TERMS

Every term has its _meaning_, or _content_, as some authorities prefer to call it. The word or words of which the term is composed are merely vocal sounds, serving as a symbol for the real _meaning_ of the term, which _meaning_ exists only in the mind of the person understanding it. To one not understanding the meaning of the term, the latter is but as a meaningless sound, but to one understanding it the sound awakens mental associations and representation and thus serves its purpose as a symbol of thought.

Each concrete general term has two _meanings_, (1) the actual concrete thing, person or object to which the term is applied; and (2) the qualities, attributes or properties of those objects, persons or things in consequence of which the term is applied. For instance, in the case of the concrete term _book_, the first meaning consists of the general idea of the thing which we think of as _a book_, and the second meaning consists of the various qualities which go to make that thing a book, as the printed pages, the binding, the form, the cover, etc. Not only is that particular thing _a book_, but every other thing having the same or similar properties also must be _a book_. And so, whenever I call a thing _a book_ it must possess the said qualities. And, whenever I combine the ideas of these qualities in thought, I must think of _a book_. As Jevons says: "In reality, every ordinary general term has a double meaning: it means the things to which it is applied, ... it also means, in a totally different way, the qualities and peculiarities _implied_ as being in the things. Logicians say that the number of things to which a term applies is the _extension_ of the term; while the number of qualities or peculiarities implied is the _intension_."

The extension and intension of terms has been referred to in the previous chapter. The general classification of the degrees of _extension_ of a general term is expressed by the two terms, _Genus_ and _Species_, respectively. The classification of the character of the _intension_ of a term is expressed by the term, _Difference_, _Property_ and _Accident_, respectively.

_Genus_ is a term indicating: "a class of objects containing several species; a class more extensive than a species; a universal which is predicable of several things of different species."

_Species_ is a term denoting: "a smaller class of objects than a genus, and of two or more of which a genus is composed; a predicable that expresses the whole essence of its subject in so far as any common term can express it."

An authority says: "The names _species_ and _genus_ are merely relative and the same common term may, in one case, be the species which is predicated of an individual, and in another case the individual of which a species is predicated. Thus the individual, George, belongs to the logical species Man, while Man is an individual of the logical species Animal." Jevons says: "It is desirable to have names by which to show that one class is contained in another, and accordingly we call the class which is divided into two or more smaller ones, the _genus_, and the smaller ones into which it is divided, the _species_." _Animal_ is a _genus_ of which _man_ is a _species_; while _man_, in turn, is a _genus_ of which _Caucasian_ is a _species_; and _Caucasian_, in turn, becomes a _genus_ of which _Socrates_ becomes a species. The student must avoid confusing the _logical_ meaning of the terms _genus_ and _species_ with the use of the same terms in Natural History. _Each class is a "genus" to the class below it in extension; and each class is a "species" to the class above it in extension._ At the lowest extreme of the scale we reach what is called the _infima species_, which cannot be further subdivided, as for instance "Socrates"--this lowest species must always be an individual object, person or thing. At the highest extreme of the scale we reach what is _summum genus_, or highest genus, which is never a species of anything, for there is no class higher than it, as for instance, "being, existence, reality, truth, the absolute, the infinite, the ultimate," etc. Hyslop says: "In reality there is but one _summum genus_, while there may be an indefinite number of _infimae species_. All intermediate terms between these extremes are sometimes called _subalterns_, as being either genera or species, according to the relation in which they are viewed."

Passing on to the classification of the character of the _intension_ of terms, we find:

_Difference_, a term denoting: "The mark or marks by which the species is distinguished from the rest of the genus; the specific characteristic." Thus the color of the skin is a _difference_ between the Negro and the Caucasian; the number of feet the _difference_ between the biped and the quadruped; the form and shape of leaves the _difference_ between the oak and the elm trees, etc. Hyslop says: "Whatever distinguishes one object from another can be called the _differentia_. It is some characteristic in addition to the common qualities and determines the species or individual under the genus."

_Property_, a term denoting: "A peculiar quality of anything; that which is inherent in or naturally essential to anything." Thus a _property_ is a distinguishing mark of a class. Thus black skin is a _property_ of the Negro race; four feet a _property_ of quadrupeds; a certain form of leaf a _property_ of the oak tree. Thus a _difference_ between two species may be a _property_ of one of the species.

_Accident_, a term denoting: "Any quality or circumstance which may or may not belong to a class, accidentally as it were; or, whatever does not really constitute an essential part of an object, person or thing." As, for instance, the redness of a rose, for a rose might part with its redness and still be a rose--the color is the _accident_ of the rose. Or, a brick may be white and still be a brick, although the majority of bricks are red--the redness or whiteness of the brick are its _accidents_ and not its essential _properties_. Whately says: "_Accidents_ in Logic are of two kinds--separable and inseparable. If walking be the _accident_ of a particular man, it is a separable one, for he would not cease to be that man though he stood still; while, on the contrary, if Spaniard is the _accident_ connected with him, it is an inseparable one, since he never can cease to be, ethnologically considered, what he was born."

Arising from the classification of the meaning or content of terms, we find the process termed "Definition."

_Definition_ is a term denoting: "An explanation of a word or term." In Logic the term is used to denote the process of analysis in which the _properties_ and _differences_ of a term are clearly stated. There are of course several kinds of definitions. For instance, there is what is called a _Real Definition_, which Whately defines as: "A definition which explains the nature of the thing by a particular name." There is also what is called a _Physical Definition_, which is: "A definition made by enumerating such parts as are actually separable, such as the hull, masts, etc., of a ship." Also a _Logical Definition_, which is: "A definition consisting of the genus and the difference. Thus if a planet be defined as 'a wandering star,' _star_ is the genus, and _wandering_ points out the difference between a planet and an ordinary star." An _Accidental Definition_ is: "A definition of the _accidental_ qualities of a thing." An _Essential Definition_ is: "a definition of the essential _properties_ and _differences_ of an object, person or thing."

Crabbe discriminates between a Definition and an Explanation, as follows: "A _definition_ is correct or precise; an _explanation_ is general or ample. The _definition_ of a word defines or limits the extent of its signification; it is the rule for the scholar in the use of any word; the _explanation_ of a word may include both definition and illustration; the former admits of no more words than will include the leading features in the meaning of any term; the latter admits of an unlimited scope for diffuseness on the part of the explainer."

Hyslop gives the following excellent explanation of the _Logical Definition_, which as he states is the proper meaning of the term in Logic. He states:

"The rules which regulate Logical Definition are as follows:

1. A definition should state the essential attributes of the species defined.

2. A definition must not contain the name of word defined. Otherwise the definition is called _a circulus in definiendo_.

3. The definition must be exactly equivalent to the species defined.

4. A definition should not be expressed in obscure, figurative, or ambiguous language.

5. A definition must not be negative when it can be affirmative."

A correct definition necessarily requires the manifestation of the two respective processes of Analysis and Synthesis.

_Analysis_ is a term denoting: "The separation of anything into its constituent elements, qualities, properties and attributes." It is seen at once that in order to correctly define an object, person or thing, it is first necessary to analyze the latter in order to perceive its essential and accidental properties or differences. Unless the qualities, properties and attributes are clearly and fully perceived, we cannot properly define the object itself.

_Synthesis_ is a term denoting: "The act of joining or putting two or more things together; in Logic: the method by composition, in opposition to the method of resolution or analysis." In stating a definition we must necessarily join together the various essential qualities, properties and attributes, which we have discovered by the process of analysis; and the synthesized combination, considered as a whole, is the definition of the object expressed by the term.