CHAPTER VI.

TERMS

In logic the words _concept_ and _term_ are practically identical, but in the popular usage of the terms there is a distinct difference. This difference is warranted, if we depart from the theoretical phase of logic, for the word _concept_ really denotes an _idea_ in the mind, while the word _term_ really denotes a _word_ or name of an idea or concept--the symbol of the latter. In a previous chapter we have seen that Denomination, or "the act of naming or designating by a name" is the final step or stage in forming a concept. And it is a fact that the majority of the words in the languages of civilized people denote general ideas or concepts. As Brooks says: "To give each individual or particular idea a name peculiar to itself would be impracticable and indeed impossible; the mind would soon become overwhelmed with its burden of names. Nearly all the ordinary words of our language are general rather than particular. The individuals distinguished by particular names, excepting persons and places, are comparatively few. Most objects are named only by common nouns; nearly all of our verbs express general actions; our adjectives denote common qualities, and our adverbs designate classes of actions and qualities. There are very few words in the language, besides the names of persons and places, that do not express general ideas."

In logic the word _term_ is employed to denote _any word or words which constitute a concept_. The word _concept_ is employed strictly in the sense of _a subject of thought_, without reference to the words symbolizing it. The _concept_, or subject of thought, is the important element or fact and the _term_ denoting it is merely a convenient symbol of expression. It must be remembered that a _term_ does not necessarily consists of but a single word, for often many words are employed to denote the concept, sometimes even an entire clause or phrase being found necessary for the current _term_. For the purpose of the consideration of the subjects to be treated upon in this book, we may agree that: _A term is the outward symbol of a concept_; and that: _The concept is the idea expressed by the term_.

There are three general parts or phases of Deductive Logic, namely: Terms, Propositions and Syllogisms. Therefore, in considering Terms we are entering into a consideration of the first phase of Deductive Logic. Unless we have a correct understanding of Terms, we cannot expect to understand the succeeding stages of Deductive Reasoning. As Jevons says: "When we join terms together we make a Proposition; when we join Propositions together, we make an argument or piece of reasoning.... We should generally get nothing but nonsense if we were to put together any terms and any propositions and to suppose that we were reasoning. To produce a good argument we must be careful to obey certain rules, which it is the purpose of Logic to make known. But, in order to understand the matter perfectly, _we ought first to learn exactly what a term is, and how many kinds of terms there may be_; we have next to learn the nature of a proposition and the different kinds of propositions. Afterwards we shall learn how one proposition may by reasoning be drawn from other propositions in the kind of argument called the syllogism."

Now, having seen that terms are the outward symbols or expression of concepts, and are the names of things which we join together in a proposition, let us proceed to consider the different kinds of terms, following the classifications adopted by the authorities.

A _term_ may contain any number of nouns, substantive or adjective or it may contain but a single noun. Thus in, "Tigers are ferocious," the first term is the single substantive "tigers;" the second term is the single adjective "ferocious." And in the proposition, "The King of England is the Emperor of India," there are two terms, each composed of two nouns, "King of England" being the first term and "Emperor of India" being the second term. The proposition, "The library of the British Museum is the greatest collection of books in the world," contains fifteen words but _only two terms_; the first term being "The library of the British Museum," in which are two substantives, one adjective, two definite articles and one preposition; the second term being, "the greatest collection of books in the world," which contains three substantives, one adjective, two articles, and two prepositions. The above illustration is supplied by Jevons, who adds: "A logical term, then, may consist of any number of nouns, substantive or adjective, with the articles, prepositions and conjunctions required to join them together; still _it is only one term if it points out, or makes us think of a single object, or collection, or class of objects_." (A substantive, is: "the part of speech which expresses something that exists, either material or immaterial.")

The first classification of terms divides them into two general classes, _viz._, (1) Singular Terms; and (2) General Terms.

A _Singular Term_ is a term denoting a single object, person or thing. Although denoting only a single object, person or thing, it may be composed of several words; or it may be composed of but one word as in the case of a proper name, etc. The following are Singular Terms, because they are terms denoting but a single object, person or thing: "Europe; Minnesota; Socrates; Shakespeare; the first man; the highest good; the first cause; the King of England; the British Museum; the Commissioner of Public Works; the main street of the City of New York." It will be noted that in all of the examples given, the Singular Term denotes a particular something, a specific thing, a something of which there is but one, and that one possesses particularity and individuality. As Hyslop says: "_Oneness of kind_ is not the only or distinctive feature of Singular Terms, but _individuality_, or singularity, as representing a concrete individual whole."

A _General Term_ is a term which applies, in the same sense, to each and every individual object, person or thing in a number of objects, persons or things of the same kind, or to the entire class composed of such objects persons or things of the same kind. For instance, "horse; man; biped; mammal; trees; figures; grain of sand; matter," etc. Hyslop says, regarding General Terms: "In these instances the terms denote more than one object, and apply to all of the same kind. Their meaning is important in the interpretation of what are called universal propositions."

Another general classification of Terms divides them into two respective classes, as follows: (1) Collective Terms; and (2) Distributive Terms. Hyslop says of this classification: "This division is based upon the distinction between aggregate wholes of the same kind and class terms. It partly coincides with the division into Singular and General Terms, the latter always being distributive."

A _Collective Term_ is one which denotes an aggregate or collected whole of objects, persons or things of the same or similar kind, _which collective whole is considered as an individual_, although composed of a totality of separate individual objects, persons or things. Thus the following terms: "regiment; congregation; army; family; crowd; nation; company; battalion; class; congress; parliament; convention;" etc. are Collective Terms, because they denote collective, aggregate or composite wholes, considered as an individual.

A _Distributive Term_ is a term which denotes _each and every individual object, person or thing in a given class_. For example, are the terms: "man; quadruped; biped; mammal; book; diamond; tree." As Hyslop says: "General terms are always distributive." Also: "It is important also to keep clear the distinction between _class_ wholes and _collective_ wholes.... They are often confused so as to call a term denoting a _class_ a Collective Term."

Another general classification of Terms divides them into the following two respective classes; (1) Concrete Terms; and (2) Abstract Terms.

A _Concrete Term_ is a term denoting either a definite object, person or thing which is subject to perception and experience, and may be considered as actually existent concretely, as for instance: horse; man; mountain; dollar; knife; table; etc., or else an attribute thought of and used solely as an attribute, as for instance: "beautiful, wise, noble, virtuous, good," etc.

An _Abstract Term_ is a term denoting the attribute, quality or property _considered as apart from the object, person or thing_ and as having an abstract existence, as for instance: "beauty; wisdom; nobility; goodness; virtue," etc. As we have seen elsewhere, these qualities have no real existence _in themselves_, but are known and thought of only in connection with concrete objects, persons and things. Thus we cannot know "Beauty," but may know _beautiful things_; we cannot know "Virtue," but we may know virtuous people, etc.

An _attribute or quality_ is _concrete_ when expressed as an _adjective_; and _abstract_ when expressed as a _noun_; as for instance, "beautiful" and "beauty," respectively, or "virtuous" and "virtue," respectively. The distinction may be summed up as follows: A Concrete Term is _the name of a thing or of a quality of a thing expressed as an adjective and as merely a quality_; while an Abstract Term is the name of a quality of a thing, _expressed as a noun and as a "thing" in itself_.

Certain terms may be used as either Concrete Terms or as Abstract Terms, and certain authorities have seen fit to classify them as _Mixed Terms_, as for instance the terms: "government; religion; philosophy;" etc.

Another general classification of Terms divides them into two respective classes as follows: (1) _Positive Terms_; and (2) _Negative Terms_.

A _Positive Term_ is a term which denotes its own qualities, as for instance: "good, human, large, square, black, strong," etc. These terms indicate the presence of the quality denoted by the term itself.

A _Negative Term_ is a term denoting the absence of a quality, as for instance: "inhuman, inorganic, unwell, unpleasant, non-conducive," etc. These terms _deny_ the presence of certain qualities, rather than _asserting_ the presence of an opposite quality. They are essentially negative in nature and in form. Jevons says: "We may usually know a Negative Term by its beginning with one of the little syllables un-, in-, a-, an-, non-, or by its ending with -less." Hyslop says: "The usual symbols of Negative Terms are _in_, _un_, _less_, _dis_, _a_, or _an_, _anti_, _mis_, and sometimes _de_, and _non_ and _not_." Jevons adds: "If the English language were a perfect one, every term ought to have a Negative Term exactly corresponding to it, so that all adjectives and nouns would be in pairs. Just as _convenient_ has its negative _inconvenient_; metallic, non-metallic; logical, illogical; and so on; so blue should have its negative, non-blue; literary, non-literary; paper, non-paper. But many of these Negative Terms would be seldom or never used, and if we happen to want them, we can make them for the occasion by putting not-, or non-, before the Positive Term. Accordingly, we find in the dictionary only those Negative Terms which are much employed."

The last named authority also says: "Sometimes the same word may seem to have two or even more distinct negatives. There is much difference between _undressed_ and _not-dressed_, that is 'not in evening dress.' Both seem to be negatives of 'dressed,' but this is because the word has two distinct meanings."

Some authorities insist upon closer and further classification, as for instance, in the case of what they call a _Privative Term_, denoting the absence of qualities once possessed by the object, person or thing, as: "deaf, dead, blind, dark," etc. Hyslop says that these terms "are Positive in form and Negative in matter or meaning." Also in the case of what they call a _Nego-positive Term_, denoting "the presence of a positive quality expressed in a negative manner," as: disagreeable, inhuman, invaluable, etc. These last mentioned classes however are regarded by some as the result of "carrying too far" the tendency toward classification, and the two general classes, Positive and Negative, are thought sufficient for the purpose of the general student. The same objection applies to a classification occasionally made _i.e._, that which is called an _Infinitated Term_, denoting a term the intent of which is to place in a distinct category every object, person or thing other than that expressed in the corresponding Positive Term. The intent of the term is to place the positive idea in one class, and all else into a separate one. Examples of this class of terms are found in: "not-I, not-animal, not-tree, unmoral," etc. Hyslop says of these terms: "They are not always, if ever, recognized as rhetorically elegant, but are valuable often to make clear the really negative, or infinitatively negative nature of the idea in mind."

Another general classification of Terms divides them into two respective classes, as follows: (1) Absolute Terms; and (2) Relative Terms.

An _Absolute Term_ is a term denoting the presence of qualities intrinsic to the object, and not depending upon any relation to any other object, as for instance: "man; book; horse; gun;" etc. These terms _may be_ related to many other terms, but are _not necessarily_ related to any other.

A _Relative Term_ is a term denoting certain _necessary_ relations to other terms, as for instance: "father; son; mother; daughter; teacher; pupil; master; servant;" etc. Thus it is impossible to think of "child" except in relation to "parent," or _vice versa_. The one term implies the existence of its related term.

Hyslop says of the above classification: "Relative Terms suggest the thought of other individuals with the relation involved as a part of the term's meaning, while Absolute Terms suggest only the qualities in the subject without a relation to others being necessarily involved."

Some authorities also classify terms as _higher and lower_; also as _broad and narrow_. This classification is meant to indicate the content and extent of the term. For instance, when we classify, we begin with the individuals which we then group into a small class. These classes we then group into a larger class, according to their resemblances. These larger classes then go to form a part of still larger classes, and so on. As these classes advance they form _broader_ terms; and as we retreat from the general class into the less general and more particular, the term becomes _narrower_. By some, the _broader_ term which includes the narrower is called the _higher term_, and the narrower are called the _lower terms_. Thus _animal_ would be a higher and broader term than dog, cat or tiger because it includes the latter. Brooks says: "Since a concept is formed by the union of the common attributes of individuals, it thus embraces both attributes and individuals. The attributes of a concept constitute what is called its _content_; the individuals it embraces constitute its _extent_."

Accordingly, the feature of including objects in a concept or term is called its _extension_; while the feature of including attributes or qualities is called its intension. It follows as a natural consequence that the greater the _extension_ of a term, the less its _intension_; the greater its _intension_, the less its _extension_. We will understand this more clearly when we consider that the more individuals contained in a term, the fewer _common_ properties or qualities it can contain; and the more common properties, the fewer individuals. As Brooks says: "The concept _man_ has more _extension_ than _poet_, _orator_ or _statesman_, since it embraces more individuals; and less _intension_, since we must lay aside the distinctive attributes of poet, orator and statesman in order to unite them in a common class _man_." In the same way the general term _animal_ is quite extended for it includes a large number of individual varieties of very different and varied characteristics and qualities; as for instance, the lion, camel, dog, oyster, elephant, snail, worm, snake, etc. Accordingly its intension must be small for it can include only the qualities common to all animals, which are very few indeed. The definition of the term shows how small is its _intension_, as: "_Animal._ An organic being, rising above a vegetable in various respects, especially in possessing sensibility, will and the power of voluntary motion." Another narrows the intension still further when he defines _animal_ as: "a creature which possesses, or has possessed, life." Halleck says: "_Animal_ is very narrow in intension, very broad in extension. There are few qualities common to all animals, but there is a vast number of animals. To give the full meaning of the term in _extension_, we should have to name every animal, from the microscopic infusoria to the tiger, from the angleworm to the whale. When we decrease the extension to one species of animal, _horse_, the individuals are fewer, the qualities more numerous."

The importance of forming clear and distinct concepts and of grouping, classifying and generalizing these into larger and broader concepts and terms is recognized by all authorities and is generally regarded as forming the real basis of all constructive thought. As Brooks says: "Generalization lies at the basis of language: only as man can form general conceptions is it possible for him to form a language.... Nearly all the ordinary words in our language are general rather than particular.... This power of generalization lies also at the basis of science. Had we no power of forming general ideas, each particular object would be a study by itself, and we should thus never pass beyond the very alphabet of knowledge. Judgments, except in the simplest form, would be impossible; and it is difficult to see how even the simplest form of the syllogism could be constructed. No general conclusion could be drawn from particulars, nor particular conclusions from generals; and thus neither inductive nor deductive reasoning would be possible. The classifications of science could not be made; and knowledge would end at the very threshold of science."