Part 4

It may be contended that under the plan here proposed the government might lose by a continued decline in silver, and that the silver it already has would remain depreciated far below the price the government paid for it. I frankly admit this. But is it reasonable to suppose that silver will continue to decline? The probabilities are that in the succeeding twenty years the production of gold will increase more rapidly in proportion than silver; and it also seems that whereas processes for extracting and refining silver have well-nigh reached their limit of economy, the new processes for treating gold are rapidly improving. Nor must it be forgotten that should such a decline occur the mint deposits are from day to day keeping pace with the withdrawals, the losses on the latter thus being counterbalanced by concurrent gains, and interest-bearing debts being constantly transmuted into non-interest bearing currency. It is equally clear that the utilization of a dead asset, as the government stock of silver now is, is a distinct gain, and will permanently dispense with the future issue of bonds for the repletion of the gold reserve. As for the silver purchased by the government under the Acts of 1878 and 1890 having become depreciated, the fact is there whether we choose to recognize or ignore it. There is no better way for palliating that loss than to make that silver immediately available for the payment of the nation's debts.

Allied to the question of the costliness of the system is that of its tendency toward, or freedom from, speculative disturbances. So long as payment solely in gold was compulsory, speculators had a fertile field for their operations. By giving the Treasurer the option of payment in silver or gold, however, raids upon either metal can be met by paying exclusively in the other until the proper equilibrium is restored. If a real difficulty should still be found to exist in practice, a slight mint charge would effectually put an end to it. In any event, natural bimetallism is much less open to criticism on this score than the existing system, or than that of the fixed ratio.

The pieces of silver with which redemptions are to be made are in no sense to be regarded as money. They are distinctly merchandise, possessing a commercial value precisely equivalent to the number of money units received or surrendered therefor, and when the notes have been redeemed, and the commercial equivalent has been given therefor, the government's responsibility ends. The government assumes no obligation to maintain silver bullion at a given ratio to gold, but it does assume to make each unit of money the equal of 25.8 grains of gold. In other words, the fluctuations in the value of silver are confined to it in its bullion shape, and cannot enter into its form as money. The idea that paper currency must be redeemed in gold, _as money_, or silver, as money, is erroneous. It is redeemed in those metals because they have value as _merchandise_. In domestic transactions this fact is often lost sight of, but it becomes manifest in international exchanges when the metallic money passes strictly on its merits as bullion, and without regard to the stamp it bears. For these reasons the Treasury should not be understood as guaranteeing the weight or fineness of the metal, except in its immediate transactions, although to facilitate its ready acceptance between reputable merchants, the affixing of the government's seal upon the pieces would be a very proper practice.

Nor is there any mechanical difficulty in the way of the operation of the plan. The silver could be fashioned into pieces of different sizes graduated upon a decimal scale of grains, with the smallest piece containing fifty grains, being somewhat larger than the current dime. By limiting redemptions, then, to fifty dollars and multiples thereof, our pieces will in every conceivable instance enable us to make the exchange, or redemption, to the accuracy of a single grain on each dollar, which is certainly sufficiently close for all practical purposes.

In contrast to the national banking system, the bonds could be retired without derangement to our finances, the metals forming a basis upon which our outstanding currency could directly rest--thus obviating the extravagant features of that system and stripping us of the impediment of an immense debt. And not only this: the encouragement natural bimetallism would hold out to owners of bullion of both kinds would cause our national vaults to be filled to overflowing with the sinews of war, and make us the best equipped nation on the earth for a prolonged struggle, should such a struggle come.

By providing a means for the remonetization of silver at the market rate we are doing its friends a greater kindness than they ask. Free coinage on seemingly more favorable terms would result in immediate overproduction and a glutted market, from which condition it would be most difficult to escape. If there be any merit in the contention that a "demand" for the metal is what is needed, and that that demand will enhance its price, so much the better, for in that case not only will the condition of the silver industry improve, but the government itself will be benefited by the enhancement in the value of the metal it already holds and may hereafter acquire. The example set by the United States would be gladly imitated by other nations, and the use of silver as a basis for money would speedily rival that of gold.

Viewed as an experiment the trial of it would be inexpensive and without peril, while congressional debates pending its consideration would give no cause for apprehension or disturbance to business, since the gold standard would not be jeopardized. But why should it be regarded as experimental when the most elementary and most familiar business principles are followed?

The question may be raised whether the preservation of the gold standard is desirable, since, it is claimed, it is gradually appreciating in value. To this it may be said that the peril of the gold standard does not consist in the fact that it is rising, but that it has been hitherto accompanied by the non-use of silver in final redemptions. That an appreciating dollar is necessarily an evil is, moreover, fairly debatable. During the period from 1864-1872 (which our Democratic friends delight to laud as the most prosperous in our history), although we were nominally on a bimetallic basis, contracts were made on that of the greenback, which rose during that time an average of ten per cent per annum, to wit: from 49.2 cents in 1864, to 89 cents in 1872. In other words the debtor who borrowed $492.00 in 1864 was obliged, eight years later, to pay his creditor $890.00 of like purchasing power as he had received, in addition to a considerably higher interest than now current. I do not wish to be considered as standing sponsor for the rising dollar, but it is a pertinent question to ask those who decry the gold standard for this reason, why the same cause did not have the same effect in each instance.

The objection may be made that I would make of a silver mere commodity, but the point is not well taken, inasmuch as the mint offerings are transmuted into paper currency, which is virtually making silver, money; moreover, the silver itself is retained in its present form of subsidiary coinage. Silver is not a moral being possessed of rights and sensitive to insults; it is a mere thing whose function it is to serve us in any way we may deem most conducive to our interests. If under the system of natural bimetallism it does this best, the question as to its money or commodity character is vain. Moreover, under Gresham's law, one metal under the fixed ratio is not only "reduced to a commodity," but is absolutely expelled from circulation and as a basis for circulation; and we have also seen that in the last analysis both silver and gold are commodities under any system of specie payments.

Under a republican form of government, where frequent and extreme changes from one policy to another must be guarded against, that policy should be adopted which most nearly conforms to justice, and which the sense of the largest majority commends. What proposition, then, could be fairer and more apt to commend itself to the general intelligence than that the metals should be monetized at their commercial values from day to day, or what policy more likely to remain unaffected by the mutations of parties and politics?

In conclusion let me sum up the salient points: We have seen (1) that the chief weakness of the present system is the non-availability of silver for final redemptions; (2) that "currency reform" is inadequate because of its unpopularity and in failing to increase the primary basis of money by the addition of silver; and (3) that the principle of the fixed ratio is fallacious and impracticable. On the other hand, we have discovered Natural Bimetallism to be the application of the principles of everyday business to that business which underlies all others,--national finance,--and that the advantages resulting therefrom are: It dispenses with the necessity of an international agreement with its attendant uncertainties, perils, and delays, and at the same time points out the way to a sound and permanent home policy upon which all our factions could unite. It practically restores to silver its unlimited coinage at its just market rate, injects a healthy stimulus into the languishing silver industry, preserves our admirable system of subsidiary coinage, and utilizes both metals as companion pillars of our national credit. It coaxes gold to the mint, keeps it there, and does away permanently with bond issues. It provides for the retirement of the greenbacks, supplies their place with currency equally sound but less hazardous, and insures the absolute parity of every dollar in circulation with every other, and with gold. In fine, as every true principle must, and as only a true principle can, it answers every condition of the problem to which it applies, and commends itself as the best, if not the only, way out of our financial embarrassments.

II. BIMETALLISM EXTINGUISHED.

BY JOHN CLARK RIDPATH.

The article on "Bimetallism Simplified" by Mr. George H. Lepper is open to one serious criticism: the title should be changed to "Bimetallism _Extinguished_;" for, when the argument is translated out of its sophistical form, that is its precise meaning. We are obliged, in such a matter as this--even at the expense of courtesy--to break through the thin film of plausibility, and at one stroke to lay bare what is in the bottom.

It is a marvellous thing that they who engage in excogitating this kind of double-meaning literature about bimetallism, should suppose that the people can any longer be deluded with it. The agents of the money-power and the fuglemen of the dominant political party seem to think that a certain species of casuistry and complicated makeshift of argument can still be forced into currency, as it has been in the past, and that the great American democracy can be persuaded thereby to accept fallacy for truth and thus to perpetuate the reigning Dynasty of Robbers. Messieurs, you can perform this feat no longer.

Mr. Lepper admits in the outset that the McKinley administration is doomed _unless_ it can provide the country with a sound and popular system of bimetallism. As a matter of fact, a sound system of bimetallism is simply bimetallism. A popular system of bimetallism is simply bimetallism--neither more nor less. In this vital matter, the popularity will take care of itself, and so will the soundness.

In the next place, we observe that if the McKinley administration depends upon the adoption by it of _any_ system of bimetallism, then the administration is doomed, deeply and darkly doomed, already. Let the world know that the McKinley administration will not provide, and has never intended to provide, the country with _any_ kind of bimetallism. The administration has no notion of such a thing. It was not created for such a useful and honorable destiny. It was created to prevent bimetallism by treacherously pretending to be in favor of it. They who created the administration, they who determine and will continue to determine its action, openly sneer at any system of money except the gold-based system of monometallism.

Mr. Lepper must be aware of this fact. Indeed it is to be hoped that there is not any longer _one man_ in the United States so far gone down the slopes of delusion and idiotic infatuation as to imagine that the hollow pretensions of this administration in the direction of bimetallism by international agreement, or by any other method, have ever been anything else than cunning subterfuge and treachery.

The politicians who worked out the St. Louis platform knew what they were about. They knew that they were creating a hypocritical document with which to deceive and ensnare the American people. They fixed their net and made their haul. They succeeded to this extent--that they elected their ticket and gained possession of the government. Lo, the day of judgment has already come! Now, in the endeavor to postpone the judgment, they prepare arguments under captions that have a friendly sound but are at bottom bitterer than cassia and more mockful than the laughter of Mephistopheles.

The next stage in the policy of these gentlemen is to invent something that shall _seem_ to be bimetallism, but is not. This something they seek to palm off on the world and to distract mankind with it until the money sharks who are chuckling behind the gold-vaults of two continents shall be enabled, in the confusion and _melee_, to shuffle off to covert with their incalculable loads of booty.

Mr. Lepper's paper is a document of the kind described. The general purport of it is this: "People of the United States, I am a physician. I belong to the silver school. I am a graduate of the Bimetallic Institute. This pill which I give you is out of the silver pharmacopoeia. It will heal all your diseases perfectly." But when you examine the pill which he exhibits, you will find it to be a solid bolus of gold, filmed over with tin foil.

Mr. Lepper enters upon the discussion of the subject with the following statement: "The vast stores of silver purchased by the United States under the laws of 1878 and 1890 are a dead asset of the Treasury, and cannot be utilized for purposes of redemption until sixteen ounces of silver shall again be equivalent to one of gold." Observe what becomes of these propositions under a truthful analysis. In the first place, our "vast stores of silver" are _not_ vast stores. They are not nearly as vast as they ought to be. There are no bursting vaults of silver in the Treasury of the United States and never were. In the next place the stores of silver are _not_ a dead asset of the Treasury. They are just as much a living asset of the Treasury as is the accumulation of gold therein--and in the same sense. These stores cannot be used for purposes of redemption because _they do not exist for that purpose_. A bimetallist who is not a bimetallist is always strong on redemption; and he knows only one redeemer--gold. The redeeming business in our financial plan of salvation has been altogether overdone. In the name of wonder, what is it we want to redeem? Is it the greenbacks? Is it _any_ of our legal tender? The greenback is already constitutional money. Does Mr. Lepper know that the greenback has been declared constitutional money by the Supreme Court of the United States--this with only a single dissenting vote? Does he know that every national bank bill in the United States is finally redeemable in greenbacks? Does he know that in our scheme of redemption, the people have only a _paper_ redeemer, while the banks, with the connivance of the government, have a redeemer of _gold_? Our "vast stores of silver" have only to be coined into silver dollars; to be used as primary money, just as gold is used; to be paid out just as gold is paid out in the transaction of national business, and in particular in the payment of the national indebtedness. If this is freely done, the exaggerated purchasing power of the latter metal would at once be reduced to the normal standard. This reduction would immediately express itself, or begin to express itself, in a general rise of prices, in a revival of business, and in a universal restoration of prosperity. Everything would again be well in the great Republic. All this would happen without financial sin and without a redeemer.

Mr. Lepper very properly says that international bimetallism and independent bimetallism "are founded upon the same errors and misconceptions." He should have said that they are founded upon the same _truths_ and _necessities_. For "errors," read truths, and for "misconceptions" read necessities. The writer of "Bimetallism Simplified" next goes on to say that whatever value may be created by monetization is not a commercial value. Well, then, what kind of value is it? Is it a social value, such as a man attributes to his child that is not for sale? Or is it a political value, such as a party manager attributes to a vote that _is_ for sale?

Let us see whether monetization does, or does not, create value. We will not quibble about the phrase "commercial value," but come directly to the issue of value in general. Take the case upon which the goldites so greatly rely, that of the safe burned in a fire with a bag of gold coin and a bag of silver coin fused within. The triumphant gold sophist says, "The ten gold dollars fused into a lump will still be worth just ten dollars, while the silver dollars fused into a lump will be worth only five dollars." Of course the lump of fused gold will be worth ten dollars when it is coined and measured by itself! Suppose that the lump of fused silver be coined into dollars again; how much will that be worth? Everybody who has a premonitory symptom of common sense knows that the lump of fused silver will--_if coinable again into dollars_--be worth just as much as the lump of fused gold. It is _because_ the lump of fused gold is coinable again into dollars that it retains its value. It is _because_ the lump of fused silver is _not_ coinable again, under the present order, that it is not worth ten dollars.

What makes the difference? It is the fact of monetization for one of the metals, and demonetization for the other. Does anybody suppose that ten dollars of silver fused into a lump would not still be worth ten dollars if the lump were re-coinable? Does anybody suppose that ten gold dollars fused into a lump would still be worth ten dollars if the lump were not re-coinable? The fact of monetization not only confirms the value of one metal, but it insures the value of the other also--that is, it _would_ insure it if monetization were not denied. Incidentally, this plain statement of the case utterly confutes the only seemingly valid argument, that is the two-bag argument, with which the goldites have been able to support their theory of "sound" money. Mr. Lepper's assertion that monetization does not confer commercial value will have to rise through many circles in the spiral of intelligence before it reaches the plane of nonsense.

Further on in his paper, Mr. Lepper says: "The inevitable result of free coinage at a fixed ratio, is to expel the undervalued metal from circulation." Who taught him that? Perhaps Gresham taught him. If so, he taught him what is not true. It is incredible that intelligent people should be humbugged with such a fallacious proposition as Gresham's so-called "law." Suppose that under free coinage, gold be undervalued, and suppose that, being so, it begins to vanish--where will it go to? To the Bank of England? If so, what will be the effect on the price of gold in the Bank of England? Will not the price begin to fall at that point at which the stream of gold pours out? And will it not continue to fall as long as the outflow goes on? What, on the other hand, will be the effect on the money market at that point from which the outflow is established? Will there not be produced a stringency behind the outflow, and will not all kinds of money begin to appreciate at that point from which the flow begins? And will not this stringency become greater and greater as long as the outflow continues? And will not the prices of all kinds of money, silver in particular, begin to rise until the outflow ceases? This is to say that the price of gold, like the price of anything else whatsoever, will fall wherever it accumulates, and the price of silver will rise in every place from which the gold is drained away, until a parity of values between the two money metals shall be inevitably established. This is the _real_ law of two money metals circulating together; and Gresham's so-called "law" is only the hocus-pocus and ghost of a law that is true to begin with, and is not true to end with.

I now come to the gist of Mr. Lepper's article, and I invite particular attention to the heart and core of the matter as he presents it. He says (all the while declaring himself to be a bimetallist): "Let us assume that gold only has hitherto been used as money, that 25.8 grains thereof have been taken to be one dollar, and that it is now desired to supplement it with the use of silver." I had not supposed that any person in the world could be under the influence of a delusion to the extent of propounding three such hypotheses as the foregoing. Mr. Lepper might with equally good reason, in discussing the constitution of nature, have said, "Let us assume that the world is a circular disk of tin," or rather, "Let us assume that the world has always been _regarded_ as a circular disk of tin. Let us assume that the world, being a circular disk of tin, weighs 3,820 lbs., and that it is now desired to improve its constitution by adding forty pounds to its weight and by converting it into a square block." These propositions would be just as philosophical, just as useful in argument, and just as well warranted as those which he presents! His assumption is that gold _only_ has been used as money. But it is not true that gold only has been used as money. It is not true that gold principally has been used as money. It is not true that gold has been as widely used as silver. It is not true that it is as universally used to-day as silver. It is not true that it was used at as early a day as was silver. It is not true that it has been used as a standard unit of money and account in the United States as long and as universally as silver has been used. It is therefore absurd to say, "Let us assume that gold only has been used as money." It is preposterous to offer such a hypothesis. If we should grant the affirmative of such an assertion, we should rush into a region of falsehood and fanaticism identical in all particulars with that station which the goldites now occupy, and from which they send forth their clamor.