Part 6

Thus within six years from the death of Qutayba, much of his work was undone. He had laid the foundations on which the later rule of Islām was built, and laid them well, though his own superstructure was too flimsy to withstand the tempests of the years ahead. But the fault was not entirely, perhaps not even chiefly, the fault of the builder. He was snatched away before his work was done, even if in his latter years he tended to neglect everything else for military glory. As we shall see, there was no peace in Transoxania until other men arose, great and strong enough to adopt and carry out the best of his plans. The ruthlessness and ferocity of his conquests, however, have been much exaggerated. He was always ready to use diplomacy rather than force if it offered any hope of success, so much so that his lenience was misconstrued on occasion by both friends and foes. Only in cases of treachery and revolt his punishment came swift and terrible. That he did not hesitate to take vengeance on his private enemies is to say no more than that he was an Arab. It was not without reason that in later days the Muslims of Central Asia added Qutayba’s name to the roll of martyrs and that his tomb in Farghāna became a favourite place of pilgrimage[72].

To sum up the position in Central Asia in the years immediately following Qutayba’s conquests:—

(1) Lower _T_ukhāristān and Chaghāniān formed an integral part of the Arab Empire.

(2) _T_ukhāristān, now in the decay of its power, was held as a vassal state, together with the Transoxine provinces of Khuttal, Kumādh, etc., where, however, the Arab authority was much weaker.

(3) In Sogdiana, Bukhārā was regarded as a permanent conquest and gradually colonized; _S_ughd was still hostile territory held by strong outpost garrisons in Samarqand and Kish, connected to Bukhārā by minor posts.

(4) Khwārizm as a military power was negligible and was permanently colonized.

(5) The kingdoms beyond the Jaxartes remained independent, hostile, and relatively strong, supported by the Turkish power to the North East and also by the intervention of China.

(6) Ushrūsana, though unsubdued, does not seem to have offered any obstacle to the passage of Arab armies.

(7) The existing dynastic houses were everywhere maintained, as the representatives of the conquered peoples and vehicle of the civil administration. The actual administrative and financial authority in their territories, however, passed to the Wāli, or agent of the Arab governor of Khurāsān[73].

NOTES

[41] Chav. Doc. 42, 282 f.: Marquart Chronologie 15: _T_abarī II. 1078, 1080.

[42] As was suggested by Prof. Houtsma, Gotting. Gelehrt. Anz., 1899, 386-7.

[43] Suggested readings in Barthold, Turkestan, p. 71 n. 5, and p. 76.

[44] _T_ab. 1184 f., 1195: Chav. Doc. 172: Hamadhānī, Kitāb al-Buldān (Bibl. Geog. Arab. V) 209. 7: _cf._ _T_ab. 1874.

[45] Narshakhī 8, 15, 30, 37, 44: _T_ab. 1199. 1: Yaʿqūbī Hist. II. 342. 9. _Cf._ Marquart, Chronologie 63 and Barthold, Arab. Quellen 7.

[46] _H_amāsa, ed. Freytag, I. 349.

[47] Narshakhī 8. 15.

[48] _T_ab. 1207. 16: _cf._ Yaʿqūbī loc. cit. On the Arab method of crucifixion, Nöldeke Z.D.M.G. LVI (1902) 433; _cf._ _T_ab. 1691 and Dīnawarī 336. 18.

[49] Detailed accounts of this are readily accessible in “The Heart of Asia”, and “The Caliph’s Last Heritage” by Sir Mark Sykes, the latter in a richly imaginative vein. Very full geographical data are given by Marquart, Ērānshahr 219 f.

[50] Narsh. 46. 12, 50. 15.

[51] _E.g._ Narsh. 58. 5. On the new city, Barthold Turkestan 110 f.

[52] _E.g._ _T_ab. 1544. 9, 1600 ff.

[53] On this dynasty see Ērānshahr 37 f., 248 ff. and de Goeje in W.Z.K.M. XVI (1902) 192-195.

[54] Yaʿqūbī Geog. 283: Chav. Doc. 161.

[55] The pronunciation of this name, usually pointed Ghūzak, is fixed by the Chinese transcription U-le-kia (Chav. Doc. 136).

[56] On the city of Khwārizm (Fīl, Kath) see Sachau “Zur Geschichte usw. von Khwārizm” pp. 23-25.

[57] _T_ab. 1252 f., 1525: Bal. 421: Al-Bīrūnī, “Chronology of Ancient Nations” (trans. Sachau, London 1879) pp. 41 f. Prof. Barthold is inclined to regard Al-Bīrūnī’s narrative as fictitious (perhaps intended to account for the absence of written records of Khwārizm dating from pre-Muslim times?) _cf._ “Turkestan” p. 1.

[58] Barthold, Arab. Quellen 21 f.

[59] _T_ab. 1247 f., 1249. For Ghūrak’s latter, Chav. Doc. 204 f.

[60] Marquart, Chronologie 5 ff.: Barthold, Arab. Quell. 11 f.: Houtsma as note 2 above.

[61] _Cf._ _T_ab. 1418: Bal. 425.

[62] _T_ab. 1365. 8, 1518, 1542. 1.

[63] Ibn Hawqal 383; I_st_akhrī 328. 4. The latter’s statement that Qutayba here beleaguered the Afshīn of Ushrūsana is almost certainly due to the omission of some words or perversion of the text. On the other hand, there could not be, as in Ibn Hawqal’s account, any question of Musawwida (“Black Robes”) in the ordinary sense of the term as early as 94 A.H. and above all in Ushrūsana.

The absence of any reference to levies from _S_ughd in this expedition would seem to favour Prof. Barthold’s theory of a _S_ughdian rising in co-operation with the Turks. The evidence in favour of an accidental omission is, however, very strong. At this point _T_abarī’s narratives, in contrast to the preceding period, become extremely brief. The levies from the four states mentioned met Qutayba at Bukhārā and marched with him into _S_ughd. Naturally the _S_ughdian levies would have awaited his arrival there. Had the omission been intentional it would be difficult to explain why _T_abarī did not include some account of the reasons why _S_ughdian troops were not summoned. In any case it is certain that Qutayba would not have left a hostile _S_ughdian army in his rear, and they must therefore have taken part in the march to the Jaxartes.

[64] Cordier, Hist. gen. de la Chine, I. 460: Wieger 1642: _T_ab. 1280. 3.

[65] Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, II. 619 ff. For another view of these embassies see Bretschneider, Mediaeval Researches (1910), II. 247 f.

[66] Hirth, Nachworte 81.

[67] Bal. 425 f.: Yaʿqūbī, Hist. II. 354: Wellhausen, Arab. Reich 275.

[68] Yaʿqūbī, Hist. II. 346. 7.

[69] See his character-sketch in Wellhausen 277.

[70] Bal. 401. 5: _T_ab. 1353.

[71] _T_ab. 1364 f., 1356. 13, 1364. 13, 1421. 7, 1418. 13: Bal. 422, 426.

[72] Narsh. 57. 4: Fa_z_āʾil Balkh, ap. Schefer, Chrest. Persane, I. 71. 2.

[73] Sachau, Khwārizm I, 29: Barthold, Turkestan 189.

IV. THE TURKISH COUNTERSTROKE.[74]

The princes of Transoxania had so long been accustomed to regard the Arabs as mere marauders that it was some time before they could realise the loss of their independence. Though necessity forced them at first to adopt a conciliatory spirit (as, for example, in their acceptance of Islām under ʿOmar II), they were dismayed to find all the machinery of permanent occupation set in motion, and their authority flouted by tactless and greedy Arab officials. Such a state of affairs was tolerable only in the absence of any countering force. The situation was not stationary for long, however; even before Qutayba’s death other and disturbing factors had begun to enter. Our best clue to the complications in Transoxania during this period is the attitude of Ghūrak, king of _S_ughd, of whose movements, fortunately, sufficient indications have been preserved. In maintaining a precarious balance between the Türgesh and the Arabs, his true statesman’s instinct seldom misled him in judging how and when to act to advantage throughout his troubled reign. In addition to this we have the evidence, unreliable in detail but confirmatory in the mass, of the embassies sent by the subject principalities to the Chinese court. Doubtless they were despatched in the guise of commercial missions and in many cases were truly so, but that they frequently possessed a political character can hardly be denied. The dates of these embassies as given in the authorities translated by Chavannes fall naturally into four periods. In the following list all embassies have been omitted in which the Arabs are known to have participated or whose object is known to have had no connection with the Arab conquests, as well as those which appear to be duplicated, and those from the minor states:

NUMBER OF EMBASSIES FROM:—

1. 717-731 _S_ughd 11, _T_ukhāristān 5, Bukhārā 2, Arabs 4. 2. 732-740 ” none ” 2 ” none ” 1 (733). 3. 741-747 ” 4 ” 3 ” 1 ” 4 4. 750-755 ” 4 ” 2 ” 3 ” 6

These four periods, as will be seen, closely correspond to the fluctuations of Arab authority in Transoxania.

In the same year, 713, that Qutayba first led his army across the Jaxartes, a new era of westward expansion opened in China with the accession of Hiuen-Tsong. In 714 the Chinese intervened in the affairs of the Ten Tribes and obtained their immediate submission, while in the following year they restored the deposed king of Farghāna. In 716, on the death of Me-chuʾo, Khan of the Northern Turks, the powerful tribes of the Türgesh asserted their independence, and under their chief Su-Lu established, with Chinese assistance, a new kingdom in the Ili basin. The princes of Transoxania eagerly sought to profit by these developments to free themselves from the Arab yoke. In 718 a joint embassy was sent to China by _T_ughshāda, Ghūrak, Narayāna king of Kumādh, and the king of Chaghāniān. The first three presented petitions for aid against the Arabs, which are given in full in Chavannes’ _Documents_. _T_ughshāda asked that the Türgesh might be ordered to attack the Arabs, Ghūrak related the capture of Samarqand and asked for Chinese troops, Narayāna complained of the seizure of all his treasures by the Arabs and asked that representations might be made to induce them to remit their crushing taxation. It is significant that the king of Chaghāniān, acting for his suzerain, the Jabghu of _T_ukhāristān, did not compromise himself by joining in these requests. But beyond “fair words” the son of Heaven took no action, and no Chinese forces appeared West of the Jaxartes, in spite of the repeated entreaties addressed by the princes to their self-elected suzerain.

The Türgesh, however, were not long in intervening on their own account. Whatever opportunity the Arab government had to pacify the _S_ughdians was lost by a succession of incompetent governors. Already in the reign of ʿOmar II, as has been seen, they had withdrawn their allegiance from the weak ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān b. Nuʿaym. For a moment the situation seemed to improve at the beginning of the governorship of Saʿīd “Khudhayna” (102/720) owing to the firm handling of Samarqand by his lieutenant Shuʿba b. _Z_uhayr. But disturbances broke out and Shuʿba was recalled, perhaps in a vain attempt to appease the insurgents. It would seem that the _S_ughdians appealed to the new Turkish power in the East and Su-Lu, unable to make headway against the growing influence of China, willingly seized the opportunity of diverting his armies into Transoxania. A small Türgesh force was sent under Köl-chur (called by _T_abarī Kūr_s_ūl)[75] to make common cause with the _S_ughdian rebels in the following spring (end of 102). Saʿīd awoke to find the whole country in arms, a Turkish force marching on Samarqand, and the local princes, with few exceptions, aiding the invaders. The Arab commanders could not rely on their levies and a small garrison at Qa_s_r al-Bāhilī was evacuated only with the utmost difficulty. The tale of their relief by a small force of volunteers is one of the most spirited narratives of adventure in _T_abarī. But such episodes did not affect the general success of the Turkish forces. Kūr_s_ūl continued his advance through _S_ughd without opposition, avoiding Samarqand, until at last Saʿīd was roused by public reproach to march against the Turks. After a small initial success, which he refused to follow up, he was severely defeated and confined to the neighbourhood of Samarqand. The Turks were not strong enough to undertake a siege of the city, as the whole operation seems to have been little more than a reconnaissance in force combined with a raiding expedition. As the Türgesh retired, the Arab cavalry followed them up as far as Waraghsar, the head of the canal system of _S_ughd. Ghūrak appears to have refrained from committing himself by openly aiding the rebels, and doubtless recognised that the Arabs were not so easily to be dislodged. From the fact that Saʿīd’s camp was pitched at Ishtīkhan, in close proximity to him, it may even be conjectured that he outwardly supported the Arabs.

But the new governor of ʿIrāq, ʿOmar b. Hubayra, was not the man to stand idly by in face of the danger that threatened Khurāsān. The weakness shown by Khudhayna and the complaints of oppression from his subjects, were sufficient reason for his recall, and Saʿīd b. ʿAmr al-_H_arashī, a man of very different stamp, was installed in his place. The transfer may be placed in the late autumn of 103/721. The new governor’s first act was to summon the rebels to submit, but a large number of nobles and merchants, with their retainers, either fearing that they could expect no mercy, or anxious to free themselves altogether from the Arab yoke, prepared to emigrate to Farghāna. Ghūrak did his utmost to persuade them to remain, but without effect; their absence would no doubt affect the revenues, and a certain emphasis is laid on the point in _T_abarī’s account. Leaving hostages behind, the malcontents marched towards Farghāna and opened negotiations with the king for the occupation of ʿI_s_ām. The majority settled in the interval at Khujanda, but other parties actually entered Farghāna, and one body at least occupied a fortified position on the Zarafshān. Al-_H_arashī followed up his demands by marching into _S_ughd and encamped near Dabūsia, where he was with difficulty persuaded to stay until sufficient contingents arrived. On advancing, he was met by a messenger from the king of Farghāna, who, outwardly professing to assist the _S_ughdians, had secretly decided to rid himself of them by calling in the Arabs against them. Al-_H_arashī eagerly seized the opportunity and pressed forward, receiving the allegiance of Ushrūsana as he passed. The emigrants, although urged by their leader Karzanj either to take active measures or to submit, decided to risk a siege in Khujanda, trusting to the protection of the king of Farghāna. But when Saʿīd set about the siege in earnest, and they realised that they had been betrayed, they surrendered on unexpectedly easy terms. Saʿīd divided them, placing the nobles and merchants in a camp apart from the soldiers. By the execution of Thābit, a noble from Ishtīkhan, he provoked a revolt, under pretext of which he massacred the nobles and the troops, sparing the merchants, who numbered four hundred, only in order to squeeze them of their wealth. _T_abarī’s account very thinly veils al-_H_arashī’s responsibility for this wanton act of atrocious cruelty, which could not fail to embitter the feelings of the whole population of Transoxania. It is curious that the Persian _T_abarī (Zotenberg IV. 268) has an entirely different story, which is found in none of the Arabic authorities. The refugees who escaped eventually took refuge with the Khāqān of the Türgesh, where they formed a regiment (no doubt continually recruited from new emigrants) which particularly distinguished itself in the war against the Arabs[76].

The expedition to Khujanda may be put in the spring and summer of 722 (end of 103, beginning of 104), though the chronology here, and indeed for all this period, is uncertain. The piecemeal reduction of the fortresses in _S_ughd occupied the remainder of the year, a series of operations whose difficulty is sufficient witness to the effect of the news from Khujanda in stiffening the resistance to the Arabs. The first fortress to be attacked was that of Abghar, in which a band of the emigrants had settled. The attack was entrusted to Sulaymān b. Abiʾs-Sarī, with an army composed largely of native levies from Bukhārā, Khwārizm, and Shūmān, accompanied by their princes. Sulaymān persuaded the dihqān to surrender, and sent him to al-_H_arashī, who at first treated him well in order to counteract the effect of the massacre of Khujanda, but put him to death after recapturing Kish and Rabinjān. The most inaccessible fortress and the crowning example of Al-_H_arashī’s perfidy were left to the last. The dihqān Subuqrī still held out in the fortress of Khuzar, to the south of Nasaf; unable to take it by force, Al-_H_arashī sent Musarbal b. Al-Khirrīt, a personal friend of Subuqrī, to offer him a pardon. On his surrender, he was sent to Merv and put to death, although the amnesty, it is said, had been confirmed by ʿOmar b. Hubayra.

The whole of _S_ughd was thus once more in the hands of the Arabs. The nearer districts, Khwārizm and Bukhārā, had remained loyal and the Oxus basin seems to have been unaffected. But to make a solitude and call it peace did not suit the aims of the Arab government and Al-_H_arashī found that his “policy of thorough” only provided Ibn Hubayra with an excuse for superseding him. During the winter, therefore, he was replaced by Muslim b. Saʿīd al-Kilābī, who, as the grandson of Aslam b. Zurʿa, came of a house long familiar with Khurāsān. The danger of the movement of revolt spreading to the Iranians of Khurāsān seems to have preoccupied the Arab government during all this period. Saʿīd Khudhayna had poisoned the too-influential _H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī on suspicion of rousing the Persians against the government and that it was felt even in Ba_s_ra may be seen from Ibn Hubayra’s advice to his new governor, “Let your chamberlain be one who can make peace with your mawālī.” Muslim, in fact, favoured the Persians and did all in his power to appoint officials acceptable to them, the Mazdean Bahrām Sīs, for example, being appointed Marzubān of Merv[77]. But all such measures were merely palliatives and could not materially affect the growing discontent in _S_ughd and _T_ukhāristān. During his first year of office it is recorded (if the narrative is not, as Wellhausen thinks, a duplicate of the raid on Farghāna in the following year) that Muslim marched across the river but was met and pushed back into Khurāsān by a Turkish army, narrowly escaping disaster. It is not improbable that the local forces were again assisted by Türgesh on this occasion. In the following year, however, before the close of 105, a second expedition gained some success at Afshīna, near Samarqand. Meanwhile Hishām had succeeded Yazīd II as Caliph, and ʿOmar b. Hubayra, whose Qaysite leanings were too pronounced, was recalled in favour of Khālid b. ʿAbdullah al-Qasrī of Bajīla. The transfer took place most probably in March (724), though another account places it some months later. Muslim was now preparing an expedition into Farghāna, but the Yemenite troops at Balkh held back partly through dislike of the campaign and doubtless expecting the governor’s recall. Na_s_r b. Sayyār was sent with a Mu_d_arite force to use compulsion; the mutinous Yemenites were defeated at Barūqān and unwillingly joined the army. It is noteworthy that troops from Chaghāniān fought alongside Na_s_r in this engagement. Before leaving Bukhārā Muslim learned that he was to be superseded, at the same time receiving orders to continue his expedition. Four thousand Azdites, however, took the opportunity of withdrawing. The remainder, accompanied by _S_ughdian levies, marched into Farghāna, crossed the Jaxartes, and besieged the capital, cutting down the fruit trees and devastating the land. Here news was brought that Khāqān was advancing against them, and Muslim hurriedly ordered a retreat. The Arabic accounts graphically describe the headlong flight of the Arabs. On the first day they retired three stages, the next day they crossed the Wādī Sabū_h_, closely pursued by the Türgesh; a detachment, largely composed of mawālī, which encamped separately, was attacked and suffered heavy losses, the brother of Ghūrak being amongst the killed. After a further eight days’ march, continually harassed by the light Turkish horse, they were reduced to burning all the baggage, to the value of a million dirhems. On reaching the Jaxartes the following day, they found the way barred by the forces of Shāsh and Farghāna, together with the _S_ughdians who had escaped from Saʿīd al-_H_arashī, but the desperate and thirsty troops, hemmed in by the Türgesh from behind, cut their way through. The rearguard made a stand, but lost its commander. At length the remnants of the army reached Khujanda, where ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān b. Nuʿaym took command on behalf of Asad b. ʿAbdullah, and made good his retreat to Samarqand.

This disaster, which is known as the “Day of Thirst,” marks a period in the history of the Arab conquests. It was practically the last aggressive expedition of the Arabs into Transoxania for fifteen years, but of much greater importance was the blow which it struck at Arab prestige. The rôles were reversed; from now onwards the Arabs found themselves on the defensive and were gradually ousted from almost every district across the Oxus. No wonder, therefore, that the memory of the “Day of Thirst” rankled even long after it had been avenged[78]. According to the Arab tradition, the Türgesh armies were led on this occasion not by Su-Lu himself, but by one of his sons. Unfortunately the accounts of Su-Lu in such Chinese works as have been translated are silent on his Western expeditions, and the Arab historians are our only authorities. The immediate result of the Arab defeat, not only in _S_ughd but in _T_ukhāristān and the southern basin as well, was to stiffen the attitude of passive resistance to the Arabs to the point at which it only needed active support to break into a general conflagration. From this time, if not before, the subject princes regarded the Türgesh as the agents of their deliverance, commissioned by China in response to the urgent entreaties they had addressed to the Emperor for aid in their struggle. We find this actually expressed in a letter sent three years later by the Jabghu of _T_ukhāristān, which is, in Chavannes’ words “but one long cry of distress”[79]. “I am loaded with heavy taxation by the Arabs; in truth, their oppression and our misery are extreme. If I do not obtain the help of the (Chinese) Kagan ... my kingdom will certainly be destroyed and dismembered.... I have been told that the Celestial Kagan has given this order to the Kagan of the Türgesh: To you I delegate the affairs of the Far West; you must at once send soldiers to drive out the Arabs.” The point of view here expressed is of course that of the ruling princes, whose resentment at the curtailment of their authority is understandable. Besides making allowance for some natural exaggeration, it would be dangerous to assume that this was as yet fully shared by the people. In all probability, if we may judge from historical analogies, there was also a pro-Arab party in Sogdiana, who felt that the best interests of the country lay, not in an opposition whose final issue could scarcely be in doubt, but in co-operation with their new masters as far as was possible. The tragedy of the Arab administration was that by alternately giving and refusing co-operation on its side, it drove its supporters in the end to make common cause with its opponents.