Part 5

The booty from the first expedition into Khwārizm was enough to satisfy Qutayba’s troops, who demanded to be allowed to return to their homes, but a sudden thrust at Samarqand promised such success that Qutayba and his leaders decided to make the attempt. The _S_ughdian army had apparently been disbanded, and under cover of a false movement of the advance guard, the Arabs marched directly on Samarqand. The advance guard under ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān numbered 20,000 men, while the main body included the new Persian contingents from Khwārizm and Bukhārā. The march occupied only a few days and the slight resistance encountered did not prevent the Arabs from proceeding at once to invest the city. Ghūrak conducted the defence with vigour, however, and appealed to Shāsh and Farghāna for assistance, reminding them that Samarqand was the bulwark of the Jaxartes valley. A strong force was despatched from Shāsh with the intention of making a surprise attack on the Arab camp, but was ambushed at night by a picked troop of Arabs and almost annihilated. This reverse, together with the continuous bombardment to which they were subjected, disheartened the _S_ughdians, but the wall had been breached and an entrance almost effected by the Arabs, stoutly assisted by their new Iranian divisions, before Ghūrak sued for peace. Qutayba’s demands were unexpectedly light—an annual tribute, stated in widely varying amounts, and a strong corps of _S_ughdians, together with a stipulation that the city should be cleared of its fighting men while the Arabs built a mosque and celebrated the ritual prayers. Once within the gates, however, Qutayba refused to restore the city to Ghūrak: a strong garrison was established in the citadel, under the command of ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān (so Yaʿqūbī; in _T_abarī ʿAbdullah) and drastic orders were issued excluding all unbelievers except under strict surveillance, doubtless with the intention of avoiding a repetition of the friction that had occurred at Bukhārā. Ghūrak either could not or would not place himself in the humiliating position of _T_ughshāda, and with his retinue, accompanied possibly by the merchants, withdrew from Samarqand altogether and built a new city, Farankath, some four farsakhs distant in the direction of Ishtīkhan[58]. Qutayba’s double-dealing on this occasion, however, tarnished his reputation among both Persians and Arabs, far more than his severity to Paykand and Khwārizm, and left a rankling memory in _S_ughd. In order to avoid the stigma of treachery attaching to their hero the Bāhilite tradition relates this expedition in an entirely different version[59]. Qutayba, we are told, after marching down the right bank of the Oxus and collecting his army at Bukhārā, advanced to Rabinjān where he was met by the _S_ughdians under Ghūrak, supported by the troops of Shāsh and Farghāna and the Turks. The enemy retired on Samarqand but engaged in constant rearguard actions, the city being finally entered by force after a decisive battle in the suburbs. Though this account is at first sight borne out to some extent by Ghūrak’s own narrative in his letter to the Emperor of China, in which he claims an initial success against the Arabs, but was unable to prevent their advance, both statements must be regarded as exaggerations in opposite interests. At all events it is quite certain that none but _S_ughdian troops were involved at first.

A further development of the Bāhilite tradition has given rise to some controversy. According to this, Ghūrak appealed for help not only to Shāsh but also to the Khāqān, and the squadron sent from Shāsh appears as a force of Turks, commanded by a son of the Khāqān. This is, of course, an obvious exaggeration on the former narrative. In the Turkish Orkhon inscriptions, however, an expedition under the prince Kül-tegin into Sogdiana “to organize the Sogdian people” is mentioned, following on a successful campaign against the Türgesh in 710/711. Marquart endeavours to prove that this expedition occurred in 712 and is, in fact, corroborated by the Bāhilite tradition. Professor Houtsma has raised several objections to this view, the most important being that the chronology of the inscriptions has to be manipulated to allow of this date, as the natural date to assume from the context is at latest 711. These, together with the considerations mentioned above, render Marquart’s hypothesis absolutely untenable.

A second suggestion has been put forward by Professor Barthold, to which, however, Professor Houtsma’s objections would apply with equal force[60]. In the narrative of the historian Yaʿqūbī (II. 344), there is a brief notice as follows: “Qutayba appointed his brother ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān ibn Muslim governor of Samarqand, but the men of Samarqand treacherously revolted against him, and Khāqān, king of the Turks, attacked him also. He wrote to Qutayba, but Qutayba waited until the winter cleared, then marched to join him and routed the army of the Turks.” Professor Barthold takes the view, therefore, that this is the expedition referred to in the inscriptions, and attributes the failure of the Turks to the disastrous effects of a winter campaign in a devastated land, which so severely disabled them that they could not face the formidable army that took the field under Qutayba in the spring. It is questionable, however, how far Yaʿqūbī’s narrative may be trusted. None of the other historians give the slightest hint of this invasion, nor were the results such as we should expect after a _S_ughdian revolt. There was no ruthless reconquest, no stamping out of rebellion in blood. Neither does the general tenor of Yaʿqūbī’s accounts of Qutayba inspire confidence. They are not only confused in detail and chronology—the capture of Samarqand, for instance, is dated 94 A.H.—but in some cases are taken from what we know to be the Bāhilite tradition, and in others, such as the narrative under discussion and the account of the conquest of Khwārizm, follow a tradition which seems irreconcilable with our other information. While it cannot be said definitely therefore, that Yaʿqūbī’s statements in this case contain no truth, it is certainly preferable to regard them as a later development of the narrative, on the lines of the Bāhilite tradition.

If the chronological objections raised by Professor Houtsma are sound, there remains still a third possible solution, which, however, as there is no corroborative evidence from either the Arabic or Chinese sources, must remain nothing but a hypothesis. It is surely quite tenable that Kül-tegin’s “organization of the Sogdian people” had something to do with the deposition of _T_arkhūn and appointment of Ghūrak. With Sogdian trade playing the most important part which we know in the Turkish lands, it would be well worth while to try to prevent the Arabs from obtaining control over it. The very unexpectedness of the description given to this expedition shows clearly that there was some motive for “organization” and it is difficult to see what other motive there could have been. These circumstances would render it quite probable that Ghūrak did, in fact, appeal to the Khāqān for assistance against the Arabs, but it seems that the growing power of the Türgesh barred the way into Sogdiana against the Northern Khanate for the remainder of its short existence.

By the conquest of Samarqand Qutayba finally established his position in Transoxania. It must not be assumed, however, as many of the Arab historians give the impression of assuming, that the holding of Samarqand meant the conquest of _S_ughd. All that had been done was to settle an Arab garrison in a country as yet unfriendly. It was the duty of the commanders at Samarqand gradually to extend their authority over the whole district of _S_ughd by expeditions and razzias[61]. There was thus a radical difference between the conquest of Bukhārā and that of Samarqand. The former was the result of a series of campaigns in which the resources of the country had been exhausted and the province annexed piecemeal. The whole population had become subjects of the Arabs and were under constant surveillance: _T_ughshāda himself held his rank on sufferance and was compelled to maintain at least an outward show of loyalty. But Samarqand had been captured in one swift thrust; _S_ughd as a whole was still unsubdued and only from policy acknowledged the suzerainty of the Arabs for the time being. “Ghūrak at Ishtīkhan was free to turn either to the Arabs or to the Turks”[58]. Nevertheless in the years that followed there is evidence that friendly relations were formed between the Arab garrison and many of the local leaders and inhabitants[62]. The whole country, however, had suffered terribly in the constant invasions and counter invasions. A contemporary poet gives a vivid picture of its dissipated wealth, its ruined and desolate lands:

“Daily Qutayba gathers spoil, increasing our wealth with new wealth: A Bāhilite who has worn the crown till the hair that was black has whitened. _S_ughd is subdued by his squadrons, its people left sitting in nakedness.... As oft as he lights in a land, his horse leave it furrowed and scarred.”

_The Expeditions into the Jaxartes Provinces._

It might perhaps have been expected that Qutayba’s next object after the capture of Samarqand would be to establish Arab authority in _S_ughd as firmly as had been done in Bukhārā. It would probably have been better in the end had he done so, but for the moment the attractions of the “forward policy” which had already proved so successful were too strong. Instead of concentrating on the reduction of _S_ughd, it was decided to push the frontiers of the Empire further into Central Asia, and leave the former to be carried out at leisure. Qutayba therefore crossed to Bukhārā, where 20,000 levies from Khwārizm, Bukhārā, Kish, and Nasaf had been summoned to meet him, and marched into _S_ughd. If there was a Turkish army wintering in the country, it offered no considerable resistance to the advance of the Arabs. In _S_ughd Qutayba divided his forces into two corps. The Persian levies were sent in the direction of Shāsh, while he himself with the Arabs marched on Khujanda and Farghāna. Our information is brief and lacking in detail. Of the northern expedition we are told only that they captured Shāsh and burnt the greater part of it. Qutayba’s own force had to overcome some resistance at Khujanda, but eventually reached Kāsān, where it was rejoined by the other. The geographers refer also to a battle fought by Qutayba at Mīnak in Ushrūsana, but against whom is not clear[63]. _T_abarī (1440. 7) preserves a tradition that Qutayba appointed an Arab resident, ʿI_s_ām b. ʿAbdullah al-Bāhilī, in Farghāna. If this is true, as seems not unlikely, the appointment was probably made during this year. The details of the tradition are quite unacceptable, however. No Arab governor would ever have taken up his residence in a hill-pass in the remotest district of Farghāna, completely cut off from his fellow-countrymen. One of Balādhurī’s authorities carries this or a similar tradition further by crediting Qutayba with the establishment of Arab colonies as far as Shāsh and Farghāna. Here again at most only temporary military outposts can be in question. On the other hand, the extraordinary success achieved by the Arabs on this expedition is apt to be overlooked, and Qutayba might well have imagined, as he returned to Merv, that the latest conquests were as permanently annexed to Khurāsān as Samarqand and Khwārizm.

The helplessness of their Turkish suzerain in face of the victorious Arabs, however, caused a revival in Transoxania of the tradition of Chinese overlordship. Appeals to the Khāqān were of no avail, and in the minds of the Sogdian princes, seeking for some counterpoise to the rapid extension of the Arab conquests, the idea of appealing directly to the Emperor was slowly maturing. Though no definite steps in this direction had as yet been taken, some inkling of it may have reached Qutayba. The Arabs were now familiar with China through the sea-borne trade of the Persian Gulf and at least after, if not before, their conquest of the cities which were already becoming the headquarters of Central Asian commerce, must have become aware of the close commercial relations which these cities maintained with China. Under these circumstances, Qutayba (or possibly _H_ajjāj) decided to send a mission overland to the Chinese court, possibly to prevent their intervention in the West, but more probably with the intention of promoting trade relations. As the princes of Sogdiana and _T_ukhāristān were much more alive to the advantages of preserving their commerce and to the dangers which might befall it under the new government than the Arabs could have been, it was probably on their suggestion that the embassy was sent. They would, of course, have no difficulty in persuading governors of the character of _H_ajjāj and Qutayba that their own interests also lay in safeguarding and encouraging the trade which brought such wealth to Transoxania. If the intervention of the Turks had been caused by their concern for Sogdian trade, it became doubly important for the Arabs to show their practical interest in its welfare. Apart from the immediate gain to the treasury which would accrue, such an action might reasonably be expected to secure the acquiescence of the Sogdians in Arab rule. The date of the mission is fixed as 713 by the Chinese records, which add also that in spite of the refusal of the envoys to perform the customary kow-tow it was favourably received by the Emperor. Both statements are confirmed by _T_abarī’s remark that the leader was sent to Walīd on his return, which must therefore be dated between the death of _H_ajjāj and the end of 714[64]. Unfortunately the Arab records of the mission have been confused with the legendary exploits of Qutayba two years later, becoming so disfigured in the process as to be almost worthless. The wisdom of this step must have been justified by its results, though there are no effects apparent in our histories and the relentless march of Chinese policy was not affected. This embassy is mentioned by the Arabic historians as if it were an isolated incident, but it was, as I have shown elsewhere[65], only the first of many such sent by the governors of Khurāsān to maintain friendly relations with the Chinese court. It cannot be doubted that in the majority of cases at least the object of these missions was commercial, particularly where joint embassies were sent with one or other of the Sogdian principalities.

In the following year 95/714 the raids on the Jaxartes provinces were renewed. It would seem on comparing Balādhurī’s account with _T_abarī that Qutayba made Shāsh his headquarters and worked northwards as far as Isbījāb. The prince of Shāsh appealed to China for assistance, but without effect[66]. Qutayba’s plan therefore was to follow up the important trade-route which led from Turfan down the Ili valley, along the northern edge of the Thian-Shan mountains, through Tokmak and Tarāz into Shāsh and Samarqand. Though the economic importance of controlling this trade-route may have had its part in this decision, especially in view of their new patronage of Sogdian trade, it is probable that this was less in the mind of the Arabs than its strategic value as the road by which the Central Asian Turks debouched on Transoxania. Towards the end of the summer, the expeditions were abruptly interrupted by the news of the death of _H_ajjāj, which had occurred in Shawwāl (June). Deeply affected by the loss of his patron and not a little uncertain of the effect on his own fortunes, Qutayba disbanded the army, sending garrisons to Bukhārā, Kish, and Nasaf, and returned to Merv. Walīd, however, allayed his fears by an encouraging letter, and made his province independent of ʿIrāq. But the death of _H_ajjāj had affected Khurāsān too deeply for such a simple remedy. The Arabs had gained wealth in their expeditions, they were weary of the constant campaigns and anxious to enjoy the comforts of peace. Factional feeling was merely slumbering, and a new element of unrest had been added by a Kūfan corps under Jahm b. Za_h_r, which had been transferred to Khurāsān from India by _H_ajjāj in his last year. All parties among the Arabs were alienated from Qutayba; even Qays had been estranged by his highhanded action in the first place with the house of Al-Ahtam and again by his feud with Wakīʿ b. Abī Sūd, the chief of Tamīm[67]; moreover, they were suspicious of his medizing tendencies. Amongst the Persians he was popular, but _H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī, though restored to his position in command of the Persian troops, had not forgiven Qutayba for his disgrace at Khwārizm. It seems extraordinary that the general himself should have been blind to any internal danger and was entirely confident in the loyalty of his army.

On re-opening the campaign in 96/715, therefore, his only precautions consisted in the removal of his family and personal property from Merv to Samarqand and the posting of a guard on the Oxus, in view of a possible restoration to favour of Yazīd b. Muhallab. It is unlikely that Qutayba could have had in mind the possibility of Walīd’s death; what he feared was more probably a _rapprochement_ between the Caliph and his heir Sulaymān, who was his bitter enemy.

The object of this last campaign was probably the complete subjugation of Farghāna. Having established his authority over the important section of the Middle Jaxartes and its trade route, it remained now to round off his conquests by extending it also over the central trade route between Farghāna and Kashgaria. The account which _T_abarī intends to convey, however, is that Qutayba marched first into Farghāna and from there led an expedition against Kashgar, with complete success. In an article of mine published in the _Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies_ (II. 467 ff.), all our evidence for this expedition has been critically discussed, and shown to be against the authenticity of the tradition. It is unnecessary, therefore, to do more than summarise very briefly the arguments there put forward. (1) None of the historians earlier than or contemporary with _T_abarī contain any reference to a raid on Kashgar, and even _T_abarī’s own statement is not borne out by the authorities on which it professedly rests. Only one of these relates an expedition to Kashgar, and that under the command of an unknown leader. (2) The interval between the opening of the campaign and the death of Qutayba in Farghāna in August or September does not allow time for such an expedition, especially in view of the mutinous attitude of the army after the death of the Caliph. (3) The Chinese account of Arab interference in Farghāna cannot refer, for chronological reasons, to Qutayba’s expedition, and in any case is silent on any attack on Kashgaria.

That an expedition of this sort should have been attributed to Qutayba is not surprising, in view of the tradition of the embassy to China, and of the great renown which attached to his memory. Later tradition[68] recounted that _H_ajjāj pledged the governorship of China to the first to reach it of his two governors in the East, Mu_h_ammad b. Qāsim and Qutayba. “_S_īn” was, of course, not the sharply defined country of our days, but rather a loose term for the Far East, including even the Turkish lands in the North-East. Qutayba had probably done little more than make preparations for his campaign, perhaps to the extent of sending out minor raiding expeditions, when the news of the death of Walīd brought everything to a standstill.

The historians give the most contradictory accounts of the events that followed; according to Balādhurī the new Caliph Sulaymān confirmed Qutayba in his command but gave permission to the army to disband. _T_abarī’s narrative, with which Yaʿqūbī’s in general agrees, is fully discussed by Wellhausen (274 ff.), together with a valuable analysis of Qutayba’s position. The story of his highhanded negotiations with Sulaymān is too well known to need repetition. Finding the army disinclined to follow him, he completely lost his head and roused the mutiny in which he was killed. The Persian levies, who were inclined to side with him, were dissuaded by _H_ayyān an-Naba_t_ī, and at the last only his own family and bodyguard of Sogdian princes remained faithful.

The death of Qutayba marked not merely the end of the Arab conquests in Central Asia for a quarter of a century, but the beginning of a period of retrogression. Under Wakīʿ b. Abī Sūd, his successor[69], the armies melted away. Mukhallad, the son of Yazīd b. Muhallab and his lieutenant in Transoxania, carried out summer raids on the villages of _S_ughd, but an isolated attempt on the Jaxartes provinces by ʿOmar’s governor, Al-Jarrā_h_ b. ʿAbdullah, met with ignominious failure. It is possibly to this that the tradition, mentioned by Barthold (_Turkestan_ 160), of the disaster met with by a Muslim army refers. On the other hand an embassy was sent in the name of the Caliph to renew relations with the Chinese court, and a third in concert with the kingdoms of _T_ukhāristān and Samarqand, etc., during the reign of ʿOmar[65]. There is mention also of an expedition into Khuttal which regained some territory. But it was Qutayba, with _H_ajjāj at his back, who had held his conquests together, and when he disappeared there was neither leader nor organisation to take his place. The history of the next decade clearly shows how loose and unstable was the authority of the Arabs. It was force that had made the conquests, and only a settled policy of force or conciliation could hold them. The first was absent. “Qutayba in chains at the world’s end is more terrible to us than Yazīd as governor in our very midst” is the graphic summary put into the mouths of the conquered, while of Rutbīl, king of Zābulistān, we are told expressly that after the death of _H_ajjāj “he paid not a cent of tribute to any of the governors of Sijistān on behalf of the Umayyads nor on behalf of Abū Muslim.”[70].

Nor was ʿOmar’s policy a true policy of conciliation, based as it was not on the maintenance of the Arab conquests but on the complete evacuation of Transoxania. His orders to that effect were of course indignantly rejected by the Arab colonists in Bukhārā and Samarqand, but together with his appointment of the feeble and ineffective ʿAbdur-Ra_h_mān b. Nuʿaym al-Qushayrī as governor, such a policy was naturally construed by the Sogdians as mere weakness, and an invitation to regain their independence. In addition to the embassies to China, to be related in the next chapter, and possibly also some negotiations with the Türgesh, Ghūrak sought to win back his capital by playing on ʿOmar’s piety. The Caliph sent envoys to the princes of Sogdiana calling on them to accept Islām, and Ghūrak, outwardly professing his adherence, sent a deputation to ʿOmar urging that as “Qutayba dealt with us treacherously and tyrannically, but God has now caused justice and equity to reign” the city should be restored to the _S_ughdians. The commonsense of the judge appointed to try the case on ʿOmar’s instructions by the governor of Samarqand, Sulaymān b. Abiʾs-Sarī (himself a mawlā), solved the problem in an eminently practical manner, and we are told that his decision, so far from being “malicious,” was satisfactory to both the Arabs and the _S_ughdians, if not perhaps to Ghūrak. Beyond the remission of kharāj, it is doubtful whether ʿOmar’s administration benefited the subject peoples in the slightest, and the reaction which followed his brief reign only aggravated the situation. Already before its close the _S_ughdians had withdrawn their allegiance[71].